Results for {phrase} ({results_count} of {results_count_total}) Displaying {results_count} results of {results_count_total} Latin America has a history of dam failures where in 2015 the Fundão Dam collapsed in the city of Mariana the victims of Mariana are still waiting for reparations demonstrating a pattern of unaddressed human rights violations in Brazil These failures demand the attention of the Inter-American Human Rights System (SIDH) to address ongoing violations and protect communities from future environmental and human rights disasters The situation is further aggravated by the fact that, despite knowing about the dam’s problems, the consulting firm TÜV Süd issued Stability Condition Declarations which authorized its operation even outside international safety standards The aftermath of this negligence is still unfolding The Paraopeba was a vital source for fishing, food, navigation, recreation, and tourism that generated income for the population and also holds cultural and religious value for traditional peoples the distribution of funds allocated for the recovery of the Paraopeba River remains opaque Researchers and environmentalists in Minas Gerais criticise the lack of transparency from Vale as well as controversial investments of the R$37 billion in compensation agreed upon in court by the governor Given the ongoing severe contamination of the Paraopeba River it can be argued that the Brazilian state continues to systematically violate human rights related to the dignified life of the population The damages are severe. 297 hectares of Atlantic Forest were destroyed, with the released water damaging local flora and fauna, and the indigenous peoples of the Nao Xohã tribe were severely affected. In this regard, the IACHR aptly highlighted in Moiwana Community vs. Suriname (para. 131) that indigenous peoples have the right to live freely in their own territories; the close relationship they maintain with the land must be recognized and understood as the fundamental basis of their cultures Since indigenous peoples as well as riverside populations continue to suffer the consequences of the disaster to this day, full and adequate reparations cannot be reduced to the payment of compensation to victims or their families (cf. Herrera Espinoza and others vs. Ecuador, para. 214) According to international human rights standards the Brazilian state must hold companies accountable for not respecting human rights and ensure that they fully repair any and all damages caused This duty goes beyond mere economic reparations since the consequences are still affecting the dignified life and livelihood of many – not only of the families who lost their loved ones but also of those who depended on the Paraopeba River This article first appeared in Latin American Spanish on Agenda Estado de Derecho The article is part of a collaboration between AED and Verfassungsblog We welcome your comments but you do so as our guest Please note that we will exercise our property rights to make sure that Verfassungsblog remains a safe and attractive place for everyone Your comment will not appear immediately but will be moderated by us That means not all submitted comments will be published Comments under pseudonym are allowed but a valid email address is obligatory The use of more than one pseudonym is not allowed Δdocument.getElementById( "ak_js_1" ).setAttribute( "value" Verfassungsblog is a global forum of scholarly debate at the interface of academy and society We open up debates in public law – internationally The dates displayed for an article provide information on when various publication milestones were reached at the journal that has published the article activities on preceding journals at which the article was previously under consideration are not shown (for instance submission All content on this site: Copyright © 2025 Elsevier B.V. Metrics details Matters Arising to this article was published on 04 March 2025 The Original Article was published on 16 January 2024 arising from Puzrin et al. Communications Earth & Environment https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-023-01086-9 (2024) We have read with surprise the paper published by Zhu et al. based on some original numerical and analytical modelling they conclude “that the Brumadinho catastrophe can be explained by the creep-driven slip surface growth” we will present here just four reasons why we judge such conclusion as untenable and that such intergranular bonding endowed the tailings with added brittleness scanning electron micrographs of tailing showing some particles joined by bonds. An example of this kind of image was reproduced in Fig. 2a of Zhu et al an interpretation of CPTu and field shear wave velocity records from the dam that, according to the empirical criteria2 results on drained and undrained triaxial tests on tailing specimens showing an abrupt strength reduction post-peak. An example of this behaviour was presented Fig. 2b by Zhu et al Each one of these arguments is separately unconvincing as There is nothing in the SEM images that allows to associate the bonded grain occurrences with a post-depositional process instead of the previous metallurgical process The arguments for bonding are also unconvincing when considered jointly as the unspecified post-depositional process that should have generated bonding could not have acted similarly in the time-scale associated with laboratory testing of reconstituted specimens (hours or days) and in that associated with dam construction (years or decades) the K0 = 0.5 creep phase was performed drained whereas the K0 = 0.4 creep phase was undrained; thus the use of the K0 = 0.5 creep results is not consistent the authors assumption of undrained behaviour in the fine tailings The choice to calibrate with “Test 1” instead of “Test 2” seems important as the authors recognise (p.8) that if they calibrate the model on “Test 2” prognosis for dam failure moment would have been off by 2 years The calibration presented would thus call into question the robustness of the model and its capability to act as a failure prediction tool used end platens lubricated with latex membranes and grease and measured displacements externally instead of directly on the sample This experimental set-up was likely to result in an overestimation of displacement in the creep stages we performed triaxial tests on a stainless steel block 145 mm high and 72 mm diameter Using a “thick” layer of silicone grease of ~0.5 mm between the two latex membranes used for end lubrication Identical to (1) but with “thin” layers of grease of less than ~0.2 mm An additional test without latex membranes or grease When lubricated platens and latex membranes were not used, the test on the steel block showed no measurable displacements in time. Results for the other cases (Fig. 3) suggest that much of the creep measured on TXDW03 was a measurement artefact resulting from viscous deformation/compression of the end lubrication (grease and membranes) rather than soil behaviour. The stress condition was the same as in “Test 1” of the authors i.e particularly in relatively permeable soils such as tailings The uncoupled total stress model of the authors cannot thus provide a physically-based description of liquefaction Lacking a physical basis for their model leads the authors into unrealistic postulates The uncoupled model of the authors uses a total stress approximation to undrained soil behaviour It is postulated that undrained shear strength reduces permanently “even after the excess pore water pressures have dissipated and locally failed tailings consolidated under the new load” No evidence is provided to support this assumption The failure mode predicted by the model (Fig 6 of Zhu et al.) indicates a failure surface emerging at the front below the starter dam and emerging at the rear more than 100 m behind the crest Those features are not observed in the front or rear cameras that recorded the failure We contend that the authors have not explained the Brumadinho catastrophe have relied on selective and flawed experimental evidence to calibrate their model have adopted an unrealistic model of the involved mechanics we regard their conclusions as unsubstantiated Data created in the current study can be found in the OSF repository at https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/53E2J, direct link: https://osf.io/53e2j/?view_only=cc63951e605b4d13845c278e6b19897e Robertson, P. K., de Melo, L., Williams, D. J. & Wilson, G. W. Report of the expert panel on the technical causes of the failure of Feijai Dam I. http://www.b1technicalinvestigation.com/ (2019) Cone penetration test(CPT)-based soil behaviour type (SBT) classification system—an update Ore mineralogy and its relevance for selection of concentration methods in processing of Brazilian iron ores Arroyo, M. & Gens, A. Computational analyses of Dam I failure at the Corrego de Feijao mine in Brumadinho, CIMNE report to VALE (http://tinyurl.com/4zu8ymeh) (2021) Effect of tamping conditions on the shear strength of tailings The slip surface mechanism of delayed failure of the Brumadinho tailings dam in 2019 On some uncertainties related to static liquefaction triggering assessments Fundamentals of Soil Behavior (3rd ed.) (John Wiley & Sons Soil Liquefaction: a Critical State Approach (CRC Press Unified modelling framework of flowslide triggering and runout Residual shear strength measured by laboratory tests and mobilized in landslides The drained residual strength of cohesive soils Effect of strain history on the monotonic and cyclic response of natural and reconstituted silts Discussion of “Mechanism of failure of the Mount Polley Tailings Storage Facility” Theoretical framework for predicting the response of tolerably mobile subsea installations Viana da Fonseca, A. et al. The mechanics of iron tailings from laboratory tests on reconstituted samples collected in post-mortem Dam I in Brumadinho. Int. J. Geotechnical Geoenvironmental Eng. 45, https://soilsandrocks.com/sr-2022-001122 (2022) Download references Centre Internacional de Mètodes Numèrics en Enginyeria (CIMNE) carried out experiments and contributed to parts of the manuscript contributed to parts of the manuscript and analysis of data contributed to conceiving ideas of the manuscript and revised manuscript analysed data and review of the manuscript The authors declare no competing interests Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations Reprints and permissions Download citation DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-025-02067-w Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content: a shareable link is not currently available for this article Sign up for the Nature Briefing: Anthropocene newsletter — what matters in anthropocene research Brazil’s Superior Court of Justice makes ruling Already have an account? 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You can register here In January 2019 D1 tailing Dam Failed in Brumadinho Two hundred and seventy people were immediately killed when 11.7 million cubic meters of mining byproducts were released promoting major destruction and environmental damage travelling through the Paraopeba river basin This study aims to investigate the impact of this disaster in the dispensing of psychiatric drugs We evaluated monthly aggregated data from 12 months before to 12 months after the event from two data sources one accounting for psychiatric drugs dispensed by private pharmacies and the other by public health services We compared the median dispensing of benzodiazepines and antidepressants from the periods before and after the event using the Mann Whitney test and performed a visual analysis of line graphs from both datasets Data shows an increase of 294% in dispensing of benzodiazepines in the month following the event with a return almost to the baseline subsequently When comparing the periods before and after the event the increase was not statistically significant going from 16.03 to 20.60 daily defined daily doses (DDD) per 1000 inhabitants (p = 0.07) In the private sector dispensing increased from 8.54 to 11.70 (p = 0.01) whereas in the public it went from 6.67 to 8.91 (p = 0.15) Data on the dispensing of antidepressants showed a statistically significant increase in the period following the event going from 44.15 daily DDD per 1000 inhabitants to 53.32 (p = 0.02) In the public sector it rose from 27.89 to 32.43 (p = 0.20) and in the private from 14.90 to 22.03 (p< 0.01) We observed a peak in the dispensing of benzodiazepines in the month following the event drawn by the dispensing of diazepam in the public health sector Dispensing of both benzodiazepines and antidepressants tended to be higher in the period following the event Our findings should be taken carefully due to the nature of the data used for the study This study can serve as a call for more evidence and local guidelines on acute psychiatric pharmacological care following disasters and for better integration of pharmaceutical assistance in disaster plans Received: 07 Oct 2024; Accepted: 14 Apr 2025 Copyright: © 2025 Dell'Aringa, Correa-Oliveira, Della Corte, Ragazzoni, Hubloue, Murray, Piazza, Garcia Serpa Osorio-de-Castro, Miranda and Barone-Adesi. 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emergency situation involving a dam collapse Use the escape route to get to the meeting point then remain there and await further instructions.” residents of four villages Barão de Cocais municipality were awakened by this message blaring over loudspeakers This was just two weeks after the collapse of a dam holding back mining waste That prompted Daniel Neri, a physics professor at the Federal Institute of Minas Gerais, to conduct a study, which later culminated in a thesis on what’s now known as “dam terrorism.” “It’s a strategy of dispossession,” Neri says He points out that shortly after the collapse of the tailings dam at the Córrego do Feijão iron ore mine in Brumadinho companies that provided services to the iron ore industry in Minas Gerais suddenly declared that the safety certifications for some dams This was despite the fact that most of these dams weren’t even due for their routine assessments by Brazil’s national mining regulator DCEs guaranteed that the dams were safe,” Neri says and the dams began to be considered unsafe mining companies could use this supposed lack of safety to terrorize residents — with the aggravating factor that it was not even the time established by the ANM for this type of certification This was one of the main reasons for people to suspect that the whole thing had been forged.” when Neri learned about this alleged scare tactic by mining companies from a long-running environmental monitoring project by medical researchers at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UMFG) “After UFMG’s Manuelzão Project exposed it we quickly realized that many residents had doubts about the real risks of some dams that had been suddenly ascribed risk classifications and B3/B4 in Nova Lima municipality,” he says Then came a 2020 study by Klemens Laschefski a professor at UFMG’s postgraduate geography department that coined the term “dam terrorism” and showed how it was used to carry out “hidden land grabbing.” “Daniel Neri attended a course in which I presented my work on what I used to call ‘dam terrorism’ in debates with environmentalists,” Laschefski says originated from two workshops he held with people forced to move from their homes due to the alleged risk of dam collapse in Barão de Cocais (later studied in more depth by Neri) and in São Sebastião de Águas Claras municipality Neri’s research is very relevant as it presents many elements and empirical data to support his initial hypothesis consolidating the concept of dam terrorism “Neri’s work provided evidence of a strategy adopted by mining companies to influence not only the population but also government institutions and the courts through fear,” he says “His thesis makes an important contribution to understanding the actions of mining companies in the political arena.” Neri says the main purpose of his research was to demonstrate that some dams had their risk levels artificially inflated in order to force people from certain areas “Other questions emerged throughout the research such as how can companies subvert the licensing and inspection procedures for these structures at so many agencies,” he says citing the Minas Gerais state environmental department “What was this coordinated action that enabled these companies to achieve their corporate goals?” Neri adds the Brazilian mining giant behind the Brumadinho mine and several others across the state used dam terrorism to get people removed from the four villages of Socorro Tabuleiro and Vila do Congo in Barão de Cocais’s São João River Valley This would then allow it to carry out a large-scale mining project in the area: the Apolo project Vale is now trying to get the project licensed for the sixth time Vale began to transfer its mining rights to other companies instead of getting licenses for a large mining project And that is exactly what it is doing now.” Neri says the main evidence for the practice of dam terrorism is the way the removals took place the DCE safety certification for the Sul Superior dam was abruptly declared canceled at a meeting on Feb 2019 — 13 days after the Brumadinho disaster the prosecutors’ office and the Barão de Cocais municipal government decided that people would be removed amid the sounds of sirens and loudspeakers blaring “Attention this is a real dam collapse situation.” “Every day for two weeks people had been watching the removal of hundreds of bodies from Brumadinho on TV,” he says even though the evacuation had been decided in the afternoon It’s clear that they used the terror of the tragedy in Brumadinho to make people leave everything behind.” Leaving everything behind is what engineering geologist Ana Carla de Carvalho Cota had to do on Jan She lived in what she calls the death zone of Vale’s Doutor dam in Mariana municipality Minas Gerais — formally known as the self-rescue zone such because the risk is considered so high that rescuers won’t venture there in the event of a disaster and the company announced that it would remove everyone who lived within the [zone] as a precaution,” Cota says the sludge would reach my house in six seconds.” together with all of their neighbors — around 600 people for two years and nine months and counting — the family has been living in a room at the Providência Hotel in Mariana without proper conditions for a family and the healthy development of my children,” Cota says “It’s not a home; it doesn’t provide the basic conditions for the healthy development of two children.” living in the hotel is like being a prisoner on work release but I must be back at the hotel to sleep at night,” she says “My life is controlled by Vale; our daily meals are at the hotel; we’ve lost autonomy in our lives “Living there until the removal caused irreversible damage to my health,” Cota says I was diagnosed with panic syndrome at the time Every time it rained and I was at home in the zone I also developed atopic dermatitis due to prolonged stress In response to Mongabay’s request for comment Vale issued a statement from its press office in Portuguese Vale states that any attempt to suggest that the company uses schemes to obtain any type of benefit is unfounded and it is committed to ethics and strict compliance with the law Decommissioning upstream dam structures in Brazil is a commitment made by Vale and has also become a legal obligation 14 of the 30 structures included in the Decommissioning Program have been eliminated All of Vale’s upstream dams in Brazil are non-operational and are permanently monitored The actions implemented in these structures are subject to evaluation and monitoring by independent technical teams which are part of the Commitment Term signed The Barão de Cocais communities located in the Self-Rescue Zone (ZAS) for the Sul Superior dam were preemptively evacuated after the structure’s risk level was raised in order to guarantee the population’s safety The structure is in the process of decommissioning The families evacuated have signed compensation agreements with Vale or are living in homes of their own choice Vale clarifies that it is not in the municipality of Barão de Cocais The project is located between the municipalities of Caeté and Santa Bárbara It has been remodeled since its first version in 2009 and its development over the last decade was based on active listening to communities and environmental organizations and agencies This new project is also the result of advances in engineering solutions and reflects Vale’s new way of operating The New Apolo will not generate tailings and will not include dams or other tailing disposal structures with more efficient use of mineral resources and without including water in the production process The Apolo project is not located in the area of Serra do Gandarela National Park and therefore will not interfere with the boundaries or the Park’s waterfalls the project will not affect water provision in the area since it is located beyond the water collection point for the Belo Horizonte Metropolitan Area replacement will be carried out as required by law It should be noted that the flow will be replaced with the same water from the aquifer without changing the volume or quality of the water This story was first published here in Portuguese on Oct Neri, D. (2023). Terrorismo de barragens: Estratégias de despossessão produzidas pela mineração de ferro em Minas Gerais (Doctoral dissertation, State University of Campinas, Campinas, Brazil). Retrieved from https://www.repositorio.unicamp.br/acervo/detalhe/1373977 Laschefski, K. A. (2020). Rompimento de barragens em Mariana e Brumadinho (MG): Desastres como meio de acumulação por despossessão. AMBIENTES: Revista de Geografia e Ecologia Política, 2(1), 98. doi:10.48075/amb.v2i1.23299 The “fortress conservation” model is under pressure in East Africa as protected areas become battlegrounds over history and global efforts to halt biodiversity loss Mongabay’s Special Issue goes beyond the region’s world-renowned safaris to examine how rural communities and governments are reckoning with conservation’s colonial origins and trying to forge a path forward […] Companies and/or individuals involved: Vale S.A Charges: Homicide due to recklessness about the imminent threat posed by the Brumadinho dam But the fear of losing their client had forced the inspectors to issue their certificate to Vale The Brazilian prosecutor’s office suspects that Vale officials had persuaded the auditors to “correct” their initial assessment The accusations also related to a fundamental issue: the auditor’s dependence on the client who pays for the review from carrying out any certification procedures on Brazilian territory 1,400 plaintiffs – survivors and victims’ families – are still claiming half a billion euros in a German court. Proceedings against TÜV Süd are still pending in Brazil and Germany Metrics details The Original Article was published on 04 March 2025 replying to Reid et al. Communications Earth & Environment https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-025-02067-w (2025) We are grateful to the discussers for giving us an interesting opportunity to validate the physical processes behind the Brumadinho dam failure Detailed quantified analysis of their data confirms that the creep and permanent damage of microstructure are critical features of tailings behavior which facilitated the formation and growth of slip surfaces and caused the dam collapse Qtn vs IG chart to identify soils with microstructure (after Robertson2) Peak stress ratios are normalized for each tailings type by the corresponding stress ratio at the slowest strain rate their work suggests that the grease in Test 1 was so thin that it had a negligibly small non-decaying effect on the typical decaying creep of the tailings even if the grease were to exhibit a decaying creep making it possible to mimic exactly the time behavior of the whole sample by adjusting the thickness of grease at the ends of the steel block this would still not provide evidence that the tailings are rate independent this may simply mean that grease and tailings have the same relaxation times confirming again the suitability of Test 1 for calibration of the creep models This argument is not valid for the following four reasons: Multiple studies on sands reviewed by Augustesen et al.5 have revealed that even when shear strength is indeed rate independent And it is the creep and not the shear strength rate dependency that is driving the slip surface growth It follows that although the creep data of Robertson et al.3 are not very extensive they are consistent with the current state of knowledge and give no reason to worry about the excessive influence of grease In cases where detailed creep data are unavailable these rates can be used in a preliminary analysis of the long-term stability of tailings dams: if a dam fails at such relatively low rates can simulate well the generation of excess pore pressures during undrained shearing with undrained shear strength fully recovering after the pore pressure dissipation these models may not work for materials whose microstructure experiences permanent damage during undrained shearing We overcome this limitation by employing a simple model where this permanent damage is imposed directly in the form of undrained shear strength degradation Because the formation and fast growth of slip surfaces takes place under undrained conditions both total and effective stress analyses produce identical results provided one uses identical undrained shear strengths is simpler within the total stress analysis multiple inclined shear bands appear within the dam body and it is difficult at present to predict reliably which one will occur first because no matter where the first slip surface emerges behind the crest retrogressive failure will eventually lead to the collapse of the entire tailings body Our work shows that the creep and permanent damage of microstructure are critical features of the tailings behavior facilitating the formation and growth of slip surfaces We understand though that without suitable quantification it is easy to misinterpret even high-quality field and laboratory data and to overlook these important physical phenomena even the most sophisticated constitutive models can produce a false sense of safety concluding that some external actions are always required for an upstream dam to fail after its closure Our paper confirms that this may not be the case even for the relatively light bonding and low creep rates of the Brumadinho tailings We hope that it will encourage the development of new approaches beyond the mainstream thinking Assume that both grease and tailings exhibit decaying creep described by a Kelvin-Voigt model18: where q is the constant deviatoric stress; ${h}_{0}$ and ${H}_{0}$ are the initial thicknesses of the grease and tailings respectively; ${\varepsilon }_{s,g}$ and ${\varepsilon }_{s,t}$ are the shear strains ${G}_{g}$ and ${G}_{t}$ are the shear moduli ${\tau }_{g}$ and ${\tau }_{t}$ are relaxation times subscripts “g” and “t” refer to the grease and tailings the creep of the entire sample is given by Replacing the tailings by a rigid block with ${G}_{t}=\infty$ and changing the initial thickness of grease ${h}_{0}$ to ${h}_{g0}$ results in the creep rate of the entire sample (rigid block + grease): This can be adjusted to mimic exactly the response of the entire sample with grease and tailings in Eq (2) in two cases only: (i) when ${h}_{g0}={h}_{0}$ and ${\tau }_{t}=0$ when the tailings are indeed rate independent when the grease used by discussers is thicker than the one in the original Test 1 while the tailings and the grease are both rate-dependent with the same relaxation times which would be ideal for any experiment aiming to correctly calibrate creep rates Similar conclusions are valid for a generalized Kelvin-Voigt model with n elements where the creep responses of tailings and grease are given by Prony series: allowing for simulating practically any experimental decaying creep curve the perfect match between the tailings and the rigid block tests is achieved when which is a generalized form of Eq. (4) It follows that even when the grease can mimic the entire sample response perfectly this does not provide a unique proof of a rate independent behavior of tailings as erroneously concluded in the Matters Arising Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated during the current study All data needed to evaluate the conclusions in the paper are present in the manuscript Reid et al. Matters Arising. Commu. Earth Environ. https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-025-02067-w (2025) Cone penetration test (CPT)-based soil behaviour type (SBT) classification system—an update Report of the expert panel on the technical causes of the failure of Feijão Dam I Evaluation of time-dependent behaviour of soils Computational analyses of Dam I failure at the Corrego de Feijão mine in Brumadinho Rate-dependent undrained shear behavior of saturated clay and temperature effects in landslide shear zones Progressive failure of a constrained creeping landslide Case study of an active landslide at the flank of a water reservoir and its response during earthquakes Experimental study of drained creep behavior of sand On measuring creep behavior in granular materials through triaxial testing Geotechnics of mine tailings: a 2022 State of the Art In Proceedings of the 20th ICSMGE - State of the Art and Invited Lectures Australia - Australian Geomechanics Society Compressibility and Creep Behaviour of Hydraulically Placed PFA and Mine Tailings Fills In The 12th International Conference of International Association for Computer Methods and Advances in Geomechanics Evaluation of secondary compression of sands and silts from CPTU Evaluation of primary and secondary deformations and particle breakage of tailings In From Fundamentals to Applications in Geotech Time-dependent behaviour of sand with different fine contents under oedometric loading Constitutive Modelling in Geomechanics: Introduction Download references Download citation DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-025-02068-9 Bryan Harris selects her favourite stories in this weekly newsletter Workers at the Córrego do Feijão iron ore mine were on their lunch break on January 25 2019 when a dam at the site This unleashed a tidal wave of industrial waste that killed 270 people — the majority mine employees and contractors Mud swamped a 5km tract of land in front of the dam while rivers dozens of kilometres away were polluted “I lost my [pregnant] sister; I lost friends; my niece never had the chance to be born,” says Josiane Melo a former employee of the mine who escaped the incident because she was on a leave day the Brumadinho disaster was one of Brazil’s worst industrial and environmental tragedies the Rio de Janeiro-based mining group that ran the facility but also the wider industry and its use of often perilous tailings dams Such dams are embankments built in mining areas to facilitate storage of the waste — tailings — generated from processing ore including the Church of England Pensions Board banded together to demand that mining companies adhere to a new global standard for safety and transparency Brazilian prosecutors and legislators also successfully promoted and passed new laws phasing out the use of upstream tailings dams Brumadinho still seethes with anger and grief; almost everyone knows a victim are sharply critical of how Vale handled the disaster and the subsequent issue of reparations But those working in the industry say the tragedy has led to some progress “Brumadinho was the biggest environmental and human disaster in the history of Brazil but it brought a historic milestone in dam safety,” says Carlos Eduardo Ferreira Pinto This legislation prohibits the construction in Brazil of upstream tailings dams and requires that existing structures be decommissioned The last such dam in Minas Gerais should be closed by 2035 View of the Brumadinho dam site in 2024 © AFP via Getty ImagesAttendees at the fifth anniversary commemoration of the disaster © AFP via Getty ImagesUpstream tailings dams are considered more risky than downstream dams Building methods used for upstream dams differ from those downstream leaves a dam’s structure more vulnerable to instability if the stored waste becomes too wet Vale says it has decommissioned 13 upstream structures to date “in line with our plan to eliminate [our] 30 by 2035” The company has spent R$7bn ($1.4bn) on the programme since 2019 a vice-president with environmental services group Aecom which is auditing the safety of Brazilian mining dams says legislators were able to move quickly with the 2019 law because discussions had already taken place following a separate dam collapse in 2015 in the nearby Mariana township “Brazil is the only country that has not only prohibited upstream tailings dams He adds that the increased scrutiny from regulators and prosecutors following the Brumadinho disaster revealed many more potentially dangerous dams than had been previously identified only three mining dams nationwide were considered on any state of alert Mello’s cautious optimism is echoed by Adam Matthews chief responsible investment officer of the Church of England Pensions Board which — alongside several large European institutional investors — divested itself of Vale shares following the disaster Matthews has been at the front of the development of the Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management which sets out best practice in a broad array of areas — from public disclosure requirements to what to do in emergencies and how to engage with affected communities “My sense is we’re in a very different place to where we were five years ago,” says Matthews “A significant part of the industry is now quite clearly committed to a new path of implementing a global industry standard that didn’t exist before.” “It has required real change in their approach to tailings,” he adds pointing out that 65 per cent of the industry had committed to the standard — including Vale prosecutors alleged that Vale had been aware of structural problems with the dam and had failed to prevent its collapse was indicted for qualified homicide and environmental crimes But the case did not progress and was suspended this year despite 16 people being indicted — no one went to prison,” says Melo Vale says it has been “continuously improving the management of its mining dams” and that its plan is to have no structure in a critical safety condition by next year Vale also signed an agreement with the federal government to pay BR$37.7bn to repair “Brumadinho and municipalities affected by the collapse with a view to improving the population’s quality of life” About 70 per cent of the sum has been disbursed A further R$3.5bn has been paid as compensation to 15,400 people who signed indemnity agreements with the company Melo remains critical of Vale’s attitude towards the disaster “Real reparations are when you admit that you were wrong and go on to write a new chapter Vale still hasn’t admitted that it was a crime.” It looks like nothing was found at this location An international institute that seeks to improve the safety of reservoirs that store toxic waste from mining known as tailings kicked off Tuesday, six years after the collapse of a dam owned by Vale SA killed 272 people in the Brazilian town of Brumadinho The Global Tailings Management Institute will oversee independent audits and the certification of member companies’ facilities based on their safety and public disclosures The International Council on Mining and Metals the United Nations Environment Programme and the UN-backed Principles for Responsible Investment co-founded the organization that will operate from Johannesburg “We were very keen that the institute was based in a country that actually had both active mining operations and signatories” to the standard ICMM co-chief operating officer Aidan Davy said in an interview “That it was in a country that clearly had tailing facilities as well as its own regulatory structure around it And equally a country that had expertise.” The drive to set up the institute came after the disaster at Brumadinho which the institute’s founders described in the statement as “a stark wake-up call.” Only four years earlier a tailings-dam collapse at the Samarco mine in Brazil killed 19 and caused what analysts described as that country’s worst environmental disaster to date a dam at the Jagersfontein diamond mine in South Africa burst smothering almost 200 houses and killing three people destroyed property and caused massive environmental damage over the past seven decades “There’s a large group of investors that recognizes the importance of companies demonstrating good management of tailings facilities,” Adam Matthews chief responsible investment officer at the Church of England Pensions Board “It will be most listed companies that will be engaging with the institute Matthews, who spoke on behalf of the Principles for Responsible Investment, was instrumental in the Church of England selling its stake in Vale after the Brumadinho accident The three founding groups convened the Global Tailings Review shortly after the Brazilian disaster and in 2020 published the Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management “The establishment of the institute is the next transformative step,” Davy said the institute will elect a board of directors environmental experts and potentially affected groups It will then recruit a chief executive officer and a chief technical officer followed by appointing and training independent auditors to evaluate and certify tailings dams and website in this browser for the next time I comment Gruyere gold mine joint venture partners Gold Fields and Gold Road Resources reach agreement on a friendly deal to consolidate ownership. The latest 10 include the proposed copper-nickel mine in Minnesota under a joint venture between Glencore and Teck. Exploration and mining of the energy metal has for 12 years been banned or largely restricted for environmental reasons in British Columbia, Quebec and Nova Scotia. Jack Lundin, president and CEO, hailed Filo del Sol as "one of the most significant greenfield discoveries in the last 30 years." Reporting by Marta Nogueira in Rio de Janeiro; Writing by Andre Romani; Editing by Chris Reese Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles., opens new tab , opens new tab Browse an unrivalled portfolio of real-time and historical market data and insights from worldwide sources and experts. , opens new tabScreen for heightened risk individual and entities globally to help uncover hidden risks in business relationships and human networks. © 2025 Reuters. All rights reserved Brazil — Luiz de Castro was installing lamps at a mining complex in Brazil late last month when a loud blast split the air He figured it was just a truck tire popping a wall of mud unleashed by the collapse of a mining dam swallowed his co-workers The deluge of toxic mud stretched for five miles There are 87 mining dams in Brazil built like the one that failed — enormous reservoirs of mining waste held back by little more than walls of sand and silt And all but four of the dams have been rated by the government as equally vulnerable at least 27 sit directly uphill from cities or towns with more than 100,000 people living in especially risky areas if the dams failed all the elements for catastrophe were there: A bare-bones reservoir of mining waste built on the cheap sitting above a large town nestled underneath Overlooked warnings of structural problems that could lead to a collapse Monitoring equipment that had stopped working a country where a powerful mining industry has been free to act more or less unchecked The threat of poorly constructed mining dams in Brazil goes far beyond one company The latest deadly failure — the second in Brazil in three years — has made it clear that neither the mining industry nor regulators have the situation under control says it will close all 10 of its dams in Brazil with a design similar to the one it ran in the town “The dam had a safety factor in accordance with the world’s best practices,” Vale said in a statement and the reports “attest to the physical and hydraulic safety of the dam.” But questions about the safety of the dam had been brushed aside for years the company had managed to get its plan to expand the mining complex in Brumadinho fast-tracked for approval by local officials “When you have this sort of structure upstream of a population center that sends up all sorts of red flags,” said William F a former president of the American Society of Civil Engineers It is one of the oddest structures known to engineering — and constructed and monitored with great attention to detail Dams like the one that collapsed in Brumadinho are semi-hardened mud consisting of water and the solid byproducts of ore mining they can fail in a number of unsurprising ways Or they can fall victim to sloppy construction or maintenance the structure at Brumadinho strained the very definition of “dam.” It had no separate concrete or metal wall to hold back its contents relied on the lake of mud to remain solid enough to contain itself as a relatively modest mound of compacted material that acted like a dike waste from the mine was piped in behind the starter dike and subsequent dikes The tailings are mixed with water and piped into the dam area A setback was added to address problems with seepage in the lower parts of the dam New dikes are built on top of solidified mud tailings A setback was added to address seepage problems in the dam a member of the National Academy of Engineering and a professor at the University of Maryland The dams’ unique construction makes them vulnerable to a bizarre and potentially devastating process called liquefaction a solid material seemingly resting safely in place can abruptly become a murky liquid flowing downhill and destroying nearly everything in its path like an increase in water content because of especially heavy rains can create enough internal pressure to push apart the solid tailings and liquefy the mud The people of Brumadinho know all too well what can happen next “The forces are absolutely phenomenal,” said Dirk Van Zyl a professor of mining engineering at the University of British Columbia who investigated a 2014 collapse of a tailings dam in Canada “You really have to see it to understand.” A video of the Brumadinho collapse makes clear that the mud behind the dam did liquefy What is not clear is whether liquefaction caused the collapse The video appears to show where the dam failure began “and maybe in one second it looked like a whole patch down there.” Very rapidly “the dam fails and the tailings pour out and the dam goes to hell in a matter of seconds The mud tailings started to liquefy and flow down the valley Van Zyl said: “Ultimately everything liquefies and it’s gone Many engineers cautioned that it was too soon to draw firm conclusions about what precisely went wrong with the structure in Brumadinho called Dam I of the Córrego do Feijão Mine And they said it was possible to build upstream tailings dams safely “There’s nothing blatantly wrong with this method of construction,” said W “it’s usually a combination of several things that should have been done but don’t get done.” whose LinkedIn profile and a professional publication list him as a longtime Vale employee wrote a master’s thesis focused on the dam at Brumadinho Pirete concluded that the risks of liquefaction were low to moderate but several engineers say now that his analysis Pirete’s safety calculations “raise questions about the stability of the dam.” Mr Van Zyl said that if he had calculated the safety margins Mr “I wouldn’t sleep well.” He said his first reaction on seeing the thin margins was that the dam “should have failed earlier Pirete did not respond to several requests for comment The thesis describes a method of construction that is in many ways routine for upstream dams A so-called starter dike was built across the valley above Brumadinho and the mining company piped waste behind it the company built another slightly uphill — hence the name upstream construction The second dike sat directly on the hardened mud a towering structure rose over the mining complex its integrity dependent entirely on the solidity of the mud some of which were scarcely above the collapse threshold a German company hired by Vale took its own look at the dam and calculated higher stability factors than Mr Pirete did — but it did raise safety concerns The company Tüv Süd found blocked drainage pipes and cracks and made note of a small wooden structure that had been erected to stop part of the dam from slumping The company also found water visibly seeping from at least one area To reduce the risk of triggering a collapse through vibrations they advised Vale to avoid letting heavy equipment onto the dam or allowing detonations nearby They also advised work to keep the water level from rising sirens went off in the middle of the night 76 miles away This is a real dam break emergency,” loudspeakers blasted The alarms wreaked havoc as nearly 500 people were ordered to evacuate which owns the mining complex in Barão de Cocais called it a “preventive measure,” explaining it had initiated its emergency plan after the consulting firm Walm refused to attest to the dam’s stability but unlike many cities we had time to act,” said Décio dos Santos The true risk of dams in Brazil — and elsewhere — is largely unknown Just as in Brumadinho, the dams above the now evacuated areas of Barão de Cocais and another town, Itatiaiuçu, are upstream dams. There are a total of 87 upstream dams throughout Brazil and all but four have the same safety rating as the collapsed structure — or worse — according to government records Some of these poorly rated dams lie directly upstream from populated areas At least 27 sit directly uphill from cities or towns Upstream mining dams near populated places residents were also awoken in the pre-dawn hours on Friday Authorities and representatives of the ArcelorMittal mining company went door to door in one neighborhood the company said it had initiated its emergency plan after auditors adopted “a more conservative methodology” and refused to attest to the stability of a nearby dam — although the conditions themselves were unchanged When the dam collapsed at the Córrego de Feijão mine shortly after noon 11.7 million cubic meters of mining waste — enough to fill almost 5,000 Olympic swimming pools — descended toward the town below where there were a couple of hundred employees Vale is the main source of income for the 37,000 people living in Brumadinho Even run-of-the-mill activities became daunting with a mass of thick brown sludge now cutting through the town Mayor Avimar Barcelos described Vale as “incompetent and reckless.” Vale workers One said he no longer felt comfortable wearing his uniform on the street a monument bore a scribbled accusation: “Murderous Vale!!!” The company says it is still investigating what caused the rupture and insists there were no warning signs The dam had been inactive for almost three years and had been certified as stable in September despite warnings in a 2015 environmental impact study that some of the monitoring instruments were faulty a similar dam burst in the city of Mariana killing 19 people and unleashing one of the worst environmental disasters in Brazilian history That dam was jointly owned by Vale and the Anglo-Australian mining company BHP officials vowed to adopt rigorous safety protocols hiring independent auditors to verify dam safety through regular inspections and an analysis of written records — all provided by the company Experts say that creates a conflict of interest “You can’t have the person doing the inspection getting paid by the company he is inspecting,” said Evandro Moraes da Gama a professor of engineering at the Federal University of Minas Gerais who specializes in mining waste the police arrested the outside inspectors who had attested to its stability along with three Vale employees responsible for safety and environmental licensing Many residents of Brumadinho believe that the failure of the company’s warning system cost many lives Vale said the “speed at which the event occurred made it impossible to trigger the sirens.” the environmental tragedy would still happen whose sister worked at an inn downhill from the dam Passos ran four miles to the site — only to find an expanse of mud He and another man started carrying survivors out of the sludge When they found a woman clinging to a tree trunk with her legs broken they waited by her side until a helicopter airlifted her out The first Portuguese explorers came searching for gold and diamonds in the state of Minas Gerais whose name means “general mines.” It remains the hub of Brazil’s mining industry producing 53 percent of the country’s output with more mines and tailings dams than any other Brazilian state the laws are written by the mining companies an extraordinary meeting of the state council on mining regulations was called to vote on a proposal by Vale to expand operations at Córrego de Feijão and another mine The proposal had been declared a “priority” by the state an activist who represents the community vote on the council angrily pointed out that council members had been given just four business days to pore over thousands of documents “The environmental management of our state continues to be focused on the G.D.P according to minutes of the meeting that were sent to The Times the state representative from the federal environmental protection agency warned the council that the dams were not risk free “Any negligence on the part of those conducting risk management The proposal passed with one dissenting vote The board's decision came despite growing concern about accidents after the Mariana dam collapse activists in Brumadinho would try to convince residents that tourism But tourism is not what keeps the city spinning Mining started here in the 1950s and many communities in the city were created by its workers was born in a small community inside the Córrego do Feijão mining compound “My umbilical cord is buried there,” he said Coelho started working there alongside his father but was at home after a night shift on the day the dam broke He knew his father would be having lunch at the cafeteria and rushed to his car Coelho said he was desperately sad — but angry his father had been called in to fix a leak Coelho said he told the prosecutors in charge of the investigation what his father had told him Three other workers also told The Times they were aware of leaks Coelho said that despite his father’s warnings Vale said it would give the families of each victim 100,000 reais State and national governments quickly called for stricter regulations the outrage after the Mariana dam collapse did little to improve the regulatory framework facilitating the traffic of influence inside the licensing system,” said Klemens Laschefski a Federal University of Minas Gerais professor who participates in the council meetings “I’ve been to 40 meetings on priority projects — not one was rejected,” he said a community leader in a neighborhood where roughly 40 houses were destroyed said that Vale officials told residents last year that the dam posed little danger The officials even offered an odd sort of reassurance pointing out that the mine’s administrative offices were right below the dam Shasta Darlington and Manuela Andreoni reported from Brumadinho Anjali Singhvi and Troy Griggs from New York An earlier version of this article misstated the number of mining dams in Brazil built like the structure that collapsed in Brumadinho There are 87 — not 88 — mining dams in the country that are similar to the Brumadinho dam and 27 — not 28 — are estimated to sit above cities or towns O endereço abaixo não existe na globo.com Metrics details Matters Arising to this article was published on 04 March 2025 claimed 270 lives and caused enormous environmental damage A special feature of this failure was that it took place three years after the tailings disposal was terminated which should have allowed sufficient time for the material to consolidate and increase its strength Here we propose a basic physical mechanism of a delayed slip surface growth along weak layers of fine tailings within the dam body Using accurate numerical modelling of all stages of the evolution of the Feijão dam we show how this growth was preconditioned by dam construction and tailings discharge history and further driven by creep deformation during the post-closing stage until the slip surfaces reached their critical length resulting in their unstable propagation and the rapid collapse of the entire dam Main factors controlling the time of failure have been identified facilitating future risk assessment for decommissioned tailings dams It is of great importance to understand the dominant triggering factors of failed tailings dams such as the Brumadinho dam to effectively avoid failure recurrence in the same region d Map showing the dam location and impact area of the tailings mud flow Note: Historical images of the dam were retrieved using the Google Earth Pro with the specific coordinates of 20°07'12.05” S latitude and 44°07'14.55” W longitude This study presents a mechanism in which failure is initiated within layered fine tailings or slimes beneath upstream constructed dams and followed by a slow slip surface growth first driven by the increasing weight of the deposited tailings and then While other triggers such as rainfall and borehole drilling could have accelerated the slip surface growth we demonstrate that creep alone would be sufficient for the slip surface to reach the critical length making the catastrophic failure inevitable This is a worrying outcome for existing dams where tailings exhibit brittle and rate-dependent behaviour: the absence of unfavourable environmental and human factors does not guarantee long-term dam safety The entire evolution of the Feijão dam from the gradual upstream construction and operation to the post-closure phase followed by dynamic catastrophic failure was investigated numerically using a large deformation finite element scheme The main assumptions and results are provided below followed by discussion of the physical mechanism and controlling factors The numerical procedure and analytical criteria are briefly described in the Methods section a Scanning electron microscope of tailings b Stress-strain relationship under a drained triaxial test (confining pressure: 100 kPa) c Stress-strain relationship under an undrained triaxial test (confining pressure: 100 kPa) the creep rate increases with the applied stress The presence of fine particles in loose tailings also increases the creep rate The strains accumulated due to creep are particularly dangerous when combined with the brittle tailings behaviour because they can cause the growth of slip surfaces at constant loads resulting in a delayed failure even if a tailings dam is in the postclosing phase without further discharge of tailings The influence of creep in the failure of the Feijão dam will be evaluated through numerical analyses by incorporating an advanced creep constitutive model a Layout of raisings and layering of tailing in the Feijão dam; b Initiation and propagation of slip surfaces during the dam construction/operation and after the closure In the Feijão dam case, the fine tailings layers within the coarse sand beach (Fig. 3a) provided the locus for the slip surface. Our working hypothesis, schematically shown in Fig. 3b is that the initial slip surface has likely initiated within one or several of these fine layers and propagated progressively under the increasing weight of the dam during its construction The length of the slip surface within the weaker fine layers was not sufficient to cause the catastrophic failure of the dam during and immediately after its construction the weight of the dam stopped increasing and the slip surface should have stopped growing progressively its critical length necessary for the onset of the unstable catastrophic propagation could never be reached We propose a mechanism of a delayed catastrophic failure of the Feijão dam (Fig. 3b) the slip surfaces continued growing within the fine tailings layers under the constant external loads since no increase in external forces was required until the length of the slip surface has reached the critical value triggering the classical catastrophic slip surface propagation and subsequent dam failure The proposed mechanism will be validated and discussed in the following sections The dam consists of 10 raises with the starter dam completed in 1976 and tailings disposal ceased in 2016. Raises are schematically illustrated in Fig. 4a. The height of raises varies between 5 to 18 m, with the total height from the toe to the crest being 86 m and the final crest elevation being 942 m above the sea level. a Layouts of dams and tailings for ten raises b Distributions of accumulated total shear strain at raisings 7–10 which in principle indicates drained conditions often the local discharge rate is much higher than the average value considering interruption by operational maintenance and dam construction which may lead locally and temporarily to practically undrained conditions This can result in a local failure with strain softening irreversibly changing the strength of tailings even after the excess pore water pressures have dissipated and locally failed tailings consolidated under the new load the rapid undrained discharge with the subsequent slow increase in shear strength due to consolidation will be our main working hypothesis on the mechanism and time to failure are presented later in the Discussion section the dam remains globally stable after the completion of all ten raisings which is in alignment with the design and consistent with observations this plastic shearing significantly weakens the tailings at the slip surfaces pre-conditioning these localized shear zones towards further growth that will eventually cause the Brumadinho disaster no significant seismic shaking or evidence of piping reported prior to the Feijão dam collapse we believe that an internal failure mechanism was in motion turning the Feijão dam into a “ticking time bomb” b Creep performance of tailings dam after the closure of the Feijão dam: total shear strain with unfavored undrained discharge history Creep is a long-term process ensuring dissipation of any generated pore pressure and hence the drained conditions. However, at the tip of a slip surface the creep deformation is likely to cause a rapid brittle failure of tailings (as indicated in Fig. 2b, c) which in combination with the lower permeability of fine-grained tailings indicates that the growth of the slip surface is likely to take place under undrained conditions the main slip surface grows post-closure at a rate as high as 40 cm/day this growth is not a continuous process but a sequence of discrete propagation events taking place at even higher velocities where a rapid propagation of the slip surface tip is accompanied by equally fast shearing along the entire slip surface that assumption of undrained conditions represents an unfavourable scenario A number of new slip surfaces are initiating due to creep within the first month after the closure 5 being of particular interest for the future analysis Continuing creep displacements help to overcome the peak strength of tailings at the slip surface tips with the second set of slip surfaces located 10 m deeper (No Delay in these mergers was influenced by the need to cut through the layers of course material separating the surface tips The critical length of a slip surface at the depth of these three surfaces (averaged at 70 m) is 210 m which is larger than their combined length of 140 m prior to failure This is consistent with the observation that the catastrophic slip surface growth takes place after the merging of the top two surfaces rather than of the three bottom ones for the same elapsed times after the dynamic failure initiation the transfer from the progressive to the catastrophic slip surface growth was driven solely by creep under practically constant load and did not require any external trigger it has been shown that the delayed propagation of the slip surfaces prior to failure resulted in rather small displacements observed at the surface of the dam (about 30 mm over the last year before failure) This probably explains why there was no obvious deformation identified prior the collapse of the Feijão dam b Creep performance of tailings dam after the closure of the Feijão dam with favoured drained discharge history In real life the time to failure is influenced by multiple factors such as the construction and operation history and is therefore difficult to predict in practice the advanced numerical modelling presented above has been capable of correctly predicting the failure three years after the closure of the dam This demonstrates that a lifecycle numerical modelling using an advanced constitutive model of tailings has a potential to serve as an effective tool to identify delayed internal propagation of slip surfaces that can be hardly detected via the state-of-the-art site monitoring tools The prediction of sudden catastrophic failure can be made by conducting the numerical investigation of the type performed in this study indicating an extent to which the time to failure is affected by the creep characteristics of tailings The creep rate decays under a constant load so that delayed failure becomes less probable with the increase of the lapsed time The numerical modelling shows that the annual creep strain will become less than 0.1% after 100 years which implies a negligible annual growth of the slip surface if in the first few years the slip surface length has not reached the critical value for catastrophic propagation the subsequent failure of the dam is highly unlikely the slip surface growth can get reactivated when the applied load is increased or the shear strength is reduced due to Estimating the critical length using the criterion provided in the Methods and comparing it with the final slip surface length due to creep would allow for assessing how much safety remains in the dam and whether external factors such as extreme precipitations and seismicity should be of concern the loss of suction of shallow tailings facilitates rapid development of multiple shear bands when the slip surface length reaches its critical value and contributes to the static liquefaction of the entire dam body once it sets into motion While the proposed here mechanism predicts that the creep alone would be sufficient for the slip surface to reach its critical length it does not exclude that other disturbances could have served as the last straw our numerical and analytical modelling indicates that the Brumadinho catastrophe can be explained by the creep-driven slip surface growth although some negative contribution of other external triggers cannot be excluded This mechanism is relevant for all existing dams using the upstream construction where initial deep-seated slip surfaces may have developed during construction and operation and keep growing after closure without causing large displacements on the dam surface in the last months prior to failure that is the owner of the two recent collapsed dams in Brazil have committed to remove all upstream dams their full decommissioning is unlikely to be completed before the middle of the century it is possible for a dam to undergo significant deformation prior to reaching a state of failure monitoring surface displacement can be an effective precursor indicator when dealing with tailings that fail in a brittle manner the relationship between surface displacement and dam failure is not as straightforward Slip surface growth can occur with limited deformation It seems that numerical modelling of the whole-life evolution of the type performed here for the Feijão dam is currently the only available tool for the risk assessment of upstream dams potentially facing the same type of failure it can provide prediction of the time to failure and facilitate decision-making with respect to mitigation measures If the failure due to creep alone is impossible it can be combined with the proposed analytical criterion for the critical length of the slip surface to determine the long-term safety of the dam with respect to potential external triggers a Layout of raisings and layering feature of tailings b Mesh structure used in the numerical modelling c Strain-controlled tailings softening of frictional angle d Strain-controlled tailings softening of undrained strength e The generalised Maxwell model with softening plasticity (the viscoelasticity is governed by the spring-dashpot system with spring and dashpot controlling elasticity and creep where ${\gamma }^{{{{{{\rm{ie}}}}}}}$ is the accumulated inelastic shear strain as a sum of plastic strain ${\gamma }^{{{{{{\rm{p}}}}}}}$ and creep strain ${\gamma }^{{{{{{\rm{cr}}}}}}}$ and ${\gamma }_{{{{{{\rm{r}}}}}}}^{{{{{{\rm{ie}}}}}}}$ is the value of ${\gamma }^{{{{{{\rm{ie}}}}}}}$ at the onset of residual state In fast processes such as during rapid discharge and brittle failure where a favourable dissipation of pore pressures is impossible we used a total stress framework with the peak undrained shear strength of tailings ${s}_{{{{{{\rm{u}}}}}},{{{{{\rm{p}}}}}}}$ ${\sigma }_{{{{{{\rm{v}}}}}}}^{{\prime} }$ where k is the strength ratio affected by factors such as particle size and internal bond structure. With plastic shearing, the undrained shear strength is softening (see Fig. 8d) where ${{{{{{\rm{s}}}}}}}_{{{{{{\rm{u}}}}}},{{{{{\rm{r}}}}}}}$ is the residual shear strength Given N + 1 elements with shear modulus ${G}_{i}$ and viscosity ${\eta }_{i}$ where ${G}_{0}$ is the instantaneous modulus and ${g}_{i}$ is the standardised modulus of Maxwell element the following parameters were adopted for the coarse tailings: with the instantaneous shear modulus of ${G}_{0}=19.2$ MPa and the long-term shear modulus is ${G}_{\infty }=8.1$ MPa resulting in a fit with the root mean square error less than 1% The parameters for the foundation soils were adopted as: The total unit weight of foundation soils is 22 kN/m3 estimated based on reported dry unit weight and specific gravity The values are common for compacted soils and were found to have little influence on the numerical results as the foundation remains stable during the whole process where ${l}_{{{{{{\rm{c}}}}}}}$ is the critical length for the onset of catastrophic slip surface growth ${s}_{{{{{{\rm{u}}}}}},{{{{{\rm{p}}}}}}}^{{{{{{\rm{coarse}}}}}}}=1.3{\sigma }_{{{{{{\rm{v}}}}}}}^{{\prime} };{s}_{{{{{{\rm{u}}}}}},{{{{{\rm{p}}}}}}}=0.16{\sigma }_{{{{{{\rm{v}}}}}}}^{{\prime} };{S}_{{{{{{\rm{t}}}}}}}=\frac{{s}_{{{{{{\rm{u}}}}}},{{{{{\rm{p}}}}}}}}{{s}_{{{{{{\rm{u}}}}}},{{{{{\rm{r}}}}}}}}=5$ The average vertical stress of coarse tailings beaches above the slip surface is about a half of the value at the slip surface therefore the average peak undrained shear strength of the coarse tailings beach is about four times the value for fine tailings at the slip surface: ${s}_{{{{{{\rm{u}}}}}},{{{{{\rm{p}}}}}}}^{{{{{{\rm{coarse}}}}}}}\approx 4{s}_{{{{{{\rm{u}}}}}},{{{{{\rm{p}}}}}}}$ It follows that for the two slip surfaces of major concern the value of ${l}_{{{{{{\rm{u}}}}}}}$ can be estimated at 98 m the average shear stress ratio within the slip surface is ${r}_{0}\approx 0.5$ and the shear stress ratio at the slip surface tip is $r\approx 0$ This results in the critical length of slip surface of about 200 m which is the same order of magnitude as the value measured from the numerical modelling which is larger than the total length of the three merging surfaces (140 m) This is consistent with the observation that the catastrophic slip surface growth takes place after merging of the top two surfaces rather than of the three bottom ones The finite element code with implementation of constitutive models into the Abaqus software is available upon request The 2019 Brumadinho tailings dam collapse: Possible cause and impacts of the worst human and environmental disaster in Brazil Advanced analysis of satellite data reveals ground deformation precursors to the Brumadinho Tailings Dam collapse First year after the Brumadinho tailings’ dam collapse: Spatial and seasonal variation of trace elements in sediments fishes and macrophytes from the Paraopeba River Fundão tailings dam failures: the environment tragedy of the largest technological disaster of Brazilian mining in global context Immediate and long-term impacts of one of the worst mining tailing dam failure worldwide (Bento Rodrigues Mining and poverty reduction: Transforming rhetoric into reality Reported tailings dam failures: a review of the European incidents in the worldwide context The environmental impacts of one of the largest tailing dam failures worldwide Catastrophic tailings dam failures and disaster risk disclosure Causes and consequences of the Merriespruit and other tailings‐dam failures Numerical analysis and geophysical monitoring for stability assessment of the Northwest tailings dam at Westwood Mine Why coal ash and tailings dam disasters occur An overview of conventional tailings dam geotechnical failure mechanisms An anthropogenic flow type gravitational mass movement: the Córrego do Feijão tailings dam disaster Severe impacts of the Brumadinho dam failure (Minas Gerais Brazil) on the water quality of the Paraopeba River Advanced monitoring of tailings dam performance using seismic noise and stress models Robertson, P. 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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-023-01086-9 Please press and hold the button until it turns completely green If you believe this is an error, please contact our support team 147.45.197.102 : c2e043c4-79dd-40bb-bcfd-8562526d Serving the hydro power and dam construction industries since 1949 Five years after the catastrophic failure of the Brumadinho tailings dam in Brazil a team of researchers from science and technology university ETH Zurich have uncovered the physical mechanism that may have triggered the incident a tailings dam at the Córrego do Feijão iron ore mine in Brumadinho Two hundred and seventy people were killed as 9.7Mm3 of stored tailings were released with mudflow running through the Paraopeba River and seriously affecting the regional ecosystem This disaster occurred just three years after the failure of the Fundão dam in the same state and both dams were owned by mining company Vale As the team from ETH Zurich explains in their research published in Communications Earth and Environment with the rapid growth of mining activities and increased incidents of such tailings dam incidents it’s important to understand the dominant triggering factors behind failed structures so as to effectively avoid recurrence in the same region is the fact that the failure at Brumadinho occurred without any notification the dam hadn’t receiving any tailings since 2016 was equipped with state-of-the-art monitoring instrumentation while geotechnical reports prior to the failure indicated the dam was safe the tailings pond at Brumadinho was impounded by Feijão dam and was raised by a few metres at a time over the years to create additional space for the storage of processing residues An expert panel appointed by Vale after the disaster suggested the failure was associated with internal creep and the loss of suction induced by heavy rainfall at the end of 2018 the report of the Federal Police of Brazil concluded the disaster was triggered by vertical perforations in a weak point of the dam structure warns Professor Alexander Puzrin who led the study team from ETH Zurich as it could impede avoiding similar tragedies in the future Puzrin and his colleagues Fangyuan Zhu and Wangcheng Zhang used numerical and analytical modelling of all stages of the evolution of the dam in order to investigate the causes of the failure and identify a physical mechanism that may have triggered the mining accident their research shows that failure was initiated by a delayed slip surface growth along weak layers of fine tailings within the dam body They show how this growth was preconditioned by dam construction and tailings discharge history and further driven by creep deformation during the post-closing stage resulting in unstable propagation and the rapid collapse of the entire dam the authors demonstrate that creep alone would be sufficient for the slip surface to reach the critical length They add that this is a worrying outcome for existing dams where tailings exhibit brittle and rate dependent behaviour as the absence of unfavourable environmental and human factors does not guarantee long-term dam safety a closed dam is supposed to be on the safe side compared with one receiving tailings This is quite simply because tailings become compacted with long-term consolidation and the formation of an iron ore bonding structure gives strength and hence reduces risk of slope failure External factors like earthquakes or exceptionally strong precipitation combined with inefficient drainage conditions leading to piping can have an impact but there was no significant seismic shaking or evidence of piping reported prior to the Feijão dam collapse the researchers believe that this internal failure mechanism was already in motion danger may no longer be averted by ceasing loading of a pond with new tailings However their model can be used to carry out a risk analysis for existing dams and predict the likelihood of a dam failure and if identified it can be reduced by pumping water out from the boreholes in the tailings ponds endangered villages can be temporarily evacuated to protect inhabitants until the danger has been averted The authors say the study’s findings are relevant to all tailings dams that process residues from ore mining and can also provide an indication of how to further improve the safety of earthern dams impounding water in the event of an earthquake which can generate an initial slip surface our work helps to make dams safer in general,” Puzrin said The fifth anniversary of the Feijão dam collapse “serves as a powerful reminder to all of us in the mining industry about the tragic consequences when something goes wrong and the need to remain focused on improving how tailings facilities are managed across the entire industry” the International Council on Mining and Metals said in January 2024 ICMM co-convened a multi-stakeholder review with the UN Environment Programme and Principles for Responsible Investment that led to the development of the Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management This was described as “setting a high bar for the industry” and had 77 requirements integrating social local economic and technical considerations towards achieving the goal of zero harm to people and the environment The Global Tailings Management Institute is also being established to oversee conformance with the industry standard and promote its continued uptake ICMM members committed to conform with the standard for tailings facilities classified as ‘extreme’ or ‘very high’ consequences by August 2023 ICMM says this commitment galvanised immediate and sustained action by its members who represent one third of the global mining industry The mining council goes on to add that implementation of the standard has already resulted in ‘transformative improvements’ in tailings engineering It has elevated tailings management to the highest levels of company oversight and accountability and meaningful engagement with stakeholders And although there has been a sustained effort to bring the highest consequence facilities into conformance with the standard in just three years ICMM says that some companies have still not been able to achieve this “ICMM members have an unequivocal commitment to implementing the Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management I am encouraged by the considerable progress that companies have made so far and acknowledge that meeting our three-year milestone has proven to be ambitious and challenging because the standard sets a very high bar and members are working diligently to bring their tailings facilities into full conformance,” said Rohitesh Dhawan “We recognise that trust stems from transparency which will be foremost in how members disclose the progress they have made and how they intend to meet the full requirements of the standard.” ReferencesThe slip surface mechanism of delayed failure of the Brumadinho tailings dam in 2019 by Fangyuan Zhu, Wangcheng Zhang & Alexander M. Puzrin. Communications Earth & Environment (2024) 5:33. https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-023-01086-9 https://ethz.ch/en/news-and-events/eth-news/news/2024/01/brumadinho-dam-collapse-the-danger-emerged-after-the-decommissioning.html www.icmm.com/en-gb/news/2024/brumadinho www.icmm.com/progress-implementing-gistm Give your business an edge with our leading industry insights View all newsletters from across the Progressive Media network © Business Trade Media International Limited All content on this site: Copyright © 2025 Elsevier B.V., its licensors, and contributors. All rights are reserved, including those for text and data mining, AI training, and similar technologies. For all open access content, the relevant licensing terms apply. Reporting by Gabriel Araujo; Editing by Steven Grattan and Edmund Blair From International Rivers Latin America Team The worst dam disaster in the world in the last decade 2022 marks three years since the collapse of the Córrego do Feijão tailings dam Check the exclusive Photo Gallery that International Rivers and MAB (Movement Of People Affected by Dams – in portuguese Movimento dos Atingidos por Barragens) created to denounce Vale company’s impunity and show solidarity with the struggle of those affected Sign up for our newsletter to stay up-to-date on the latest from International Rivers International Rivers protects rivers and defends the rights of communities that depend on them Subscribe to emails and follow International Rivers on social media to get the latest news and actions Nonprofit Website by Wired Impact Metrics details Catastrophic failure of a tailings dam at an iron ore mine complex in Brumadinho on 25th January 2019 released 11.7 million m3 of tailings downstream Although reportedly monitored using an array of geotechnical techniques the collapse occurred without any apparent warning It claimed more than 200 lives and caused considerable environmental damage Here we present the Intermittent Small Baseline Subset (ISBAS) technique on satellite-based interferometric synthetic aperture radar (InSAR) data to assess the course of events We find that parts of the dam wall and tailings were experiencing deformation not consistent with consolidation settlement preceding the collapse we show that the timing of the dam collapse would have been foreseeable based on this observed precursory deformation We conclude that satellite-based monitoring techniques may help mitigate similar catastrophes in the future resulting from internal creep combined with the loss of suction induced by heavy rainfall during the annual wet season (from about October 2018 to the time of the failure) information on the deformation of the dam prior to the collapse is crucial to understanding the cause and nature of the collapse An enhanced understanding can subsequently aid the design of a more effective monitoring framework for the many dams of the same type worldwide and thus help to mitigate the risk posed by similar future catastrophes The data used are freely available Sentinel-1 C-band SAR imagery Two overlapping image stacks acquired from adjacent descending orbit tracks (tracks 53 and 155) during the period August 2017 to January 2019 were processed to provide independent observations With a 12-day revisit time over the site (increased to 6 days over Europe) the processing of these Sentinel-1 stacks provides a synoptic view of any precursory deformation within Dam I to be resolved at high temporal resolution a Map showing the location and failure extent (white dashed line) of the dam collapse b InSAR-derived average line-of-sight (LOS) rate of ground surface deformation for August 2017–January 2019 from track 53 e Comparison of the incidence angle-normalised LOS velocities of the dam between the two tracks Negative LOS velocities indicate motion away from the satellite a Cumulative LOS displacement between August 2017 and 17 January 2019 (from track 155) Negative LOS displacements indicate motion away from the satellite White dashed line represents the failure extent of the dam c Time-series of mean LOS displacement at locations 1–6 indicated on a Grey shading represents the cumulative uncertainty of the standard error of the ISBAS solutions plus the standard deviation of the LOS displacements observed at each location The star and vertical dashed line indicate the occurrence of the dam collapse on 25 January 2019 eventually culminating in the collapse of the tailings dam a Inverse velocity analysis for final movement phase exhibited at locations 3, 4, 5 and 6 (see Fig. 2) b Predicted time interval for the collapse for locations 3 5 and 6 in relation to the timing of the dam collapse (indicated by black arrow) c Sensitivity analysis of the predicted collapse time interval for locations 3 5 and 6 based on inverse velocity analysis of successive velocity measurements made during the period of movement approaching the dam collapse b and predicted collapse interval in c corresponds the number of days since the initial InSAR measurement (19 August 2017) Horizontal dashed black line in c represents the timing of the dam collapse If implemented as part of a comprehensive operational early-warning system, a systematic inverse velocity analysis producing three overlapping failure time intervals for the same or different locations on the dam would likely be cause to flag a potential issue with its stability. The data suggest that this would have occurred 44 days before the collapse occurred (Fig. 3c) offering 40 days of notice between when this third overlapping prediction was made and the beginning of its respective failure time interval Even when factoring in the 1 day of ISBAS processing time currently required to update the displacement time-series once a new SAR acquisition is performed this is still likely to have been adequate notice for appropriate action to have been taken—whether that be implementing more detailed monitoring using different types of sensor or other mitigation measures a InSAR-derived average line-of-sight (LOS) rate of ground surface deformation for June 2017–June 2019 b Time-series of mean LOS displacement at locations W–Z indicated on a Negative LOS displacement indicates motion away from the satellite The presence of water on the tailings beach or vegetation can also affect coherence and therefore limit the density and spatial distribution of displacement measurements that can be obtained; the effect of the latter has been shown here to be particularly limiting for conventional InSAR techniques through the application of the advanced ISBAS InSAR technique in conjunction with freely available Sentinel-1 imagery we have demonstrated the potential to perform detailed deformation monitoring over dry vegetated tailings dams in a cost-effective manner this was achieved without the need for ground infrastructure meaning that such an approach can be utilised independently by mine operators regulators or any third party to help support the monitoring of any site around the world Where stereo analysis is not possible due to an absence of orbit tracks with sufficiently different viewing geometries a SAR image stack acquired with a small angle of incidence is recommended due to the increased sensitivity to vertical deformations The application of an advanced InSAR technique has provided valuable insight into precursory deformation prior to the collapse of Dam I at Brumadinho on 25 January 2019 We observed widespread deformation across the dam wall and tailings from two independent satellite tracks revealing areas subject to consolidation settlement in contrast to attempts using other InSAR techniques we also detected evidence of anomalous deformation not consistent with consolidation on the dam wall and tailings beach instead exhibiting a clear accelerated rate of deformation from about late October 2018 following a period of increased rainfall An empirical approach based on the inverse velocity at these locations enabled correct predictions of the time interval for the collapse of the dam which demonstrates the importance of monitoring deformation over the entire tailings dam instead of solely the dam wall We analysed a similar dam thought to be at risk of collapse and found that it does not currently exhibit the same anomalous pre-failure deformation behaviour as Dam I instead showing characteristics of consolidation settlement A combination of this filtering and slight differences in the accuracy of the orthorectification is responsible for the apparent differences in coverage between the two tracks—e.g. the inconsistent shape of the lake on the neighbouring tailings dam is related to the number of best coherence interferograms used ni was 720 meaning for that site the maximum standard error is even better at 0.41 mm/year An ISBAS stereo analysis of the two Brumadinho time-series stacks was attempted37 with modifications to account for the same-side geometry and along-track directions associated with tracks 53 and 155 given the 5-day offset on acquisitions between the two tracks a linear temporal interpolation was applied to ensure that the dates coincided we performed the 2-D stereo analysis on the two time-series to derive displacements in the vertical up–down (dUD) and lateral towards–away across-track (dTA) directions as given by: Representative time-series for these locations were then obtained by averaging the individual time-series for a subset of 25–208 contiguous pixels within the locality depending on the spatial extent and uniformity of the respective deformation pattern The uncertainty associated with each average deformation time-series was then computed as the accumulation of the standard deviation of the subset time-series at each location plus the maximum standard error of the ISBAS solutions associated with the respective track Rainfall data for the Brumadinho and Sul Superior sites were obtained from the Brazilian National Institute of Meteorology (INMET) we sourced available data from the nearest automatic meteorological station for Brumadinho was located 15 km away in Ibirité (Rola Moça-A555) and for Sul Superior was located 38 km away in Belo Horizonte (Cercadinho-F501) The rainfall data from these weather stations was summed to generate daily rainfall totals (mm) for direct comparison with the InSAR deformation time-series We also undertook a sensitivity analysis to determine how early and reliably a correct collapse date could have been predicted using the systematic Sentinel-1 InSAR observations, by iteratively performing the regression analysis for an increasing number of successive inverse velocity measurements obtained during the final movement phase at each location (Fig. 3c) the onset of the final movement phase was identified as the point in the time-series at which there was a marked acceleration in the deformation the duration of this final phase of increased displacement was short only spanning the two Sentinel-1 observations acquired just before the actual dam collapse InSAR data were processed using the Punnet software (Terra Motion Limited) Deformation maps contained within the figures were created with the aid of ArcMap™ (Copyright © Esri GPR survey on an iron mining area after the collapse of the tailings Dam I at the Córrego do Feijão Mine in Brumadinho-MG Avoiding tailings dam collapses requires governance Monitoring of slope stability of tailings dams in South Africa using satellite interferometry XXIVth Geological Remote Sensing Group Annual General Meeting (Berlin Detection of uranium mill tailings settlement using satellite-based radar interferometry Brumadinho Dam InSAR study: analysis of TerraSAR-X COSMO-SkyMed and Sentinel-1 images preceding the collapse 2020 International Symposium on Slope Stability in Open Pit Mining and Civil Engineering (ed M.) 293–306 (Australian Centre for Geomechanics The 2019 Brumadinho tailings dam collapse: possible cause and impacts of the worst human and environmental disaster in Brazil Risk assessment for tailings dams in Brumadinho of Brazil using InSAR time series approach Persistent scatterer interferometry: potential limits and initial C- and X-band comparison Time series analysis of InSAR data: methods and trends DInSAR estimation of land motion using intermittent coherence with application to the South Derbyshire and Leicestershire coalfield Monitoring land motion due to natural gas extraction; validation of the Intermittent SBAS (ISBAS) DInSAR algorithm over gas fields of North Holland Atmospheric effects in interferometric synthetic aperture radar surface deformation and topographic maps Phase gradient approach to stacking interferograms Measurement of interseismic strain accumulation across the North Anatolian Fault by satellite radar interferometry Long-term ground deformation patterns of Bucharest using multi-temporal InSAR and multivariate dynamic analyses: a possible transpressional system Ground motion in areas of abandoned mining: application of the Intermittent SBAS (ISBAS) to the Northumberland and Durham coalfield Persistent scatterers interferometry: a review Consolidation settlement of Salt Lake County tailings impoundment revealed by time-series InSAR observations from multiple radar satellites The automatic extraction of DEM data from stereo RADARSAT pairs over the tropics State-of-the-art of elevation extraction from satellite SAR data A new method for predicting the failure time of a slope IVth International Conference and Field Workshop on Landslides (Tokyo Perspectives on the prediction of catastrophic slope failures from satellite InSAR Progressive failure leading to the 3 December 2013 rockfall at Puigcercós scarp (Catalonia Vale. Vale clarifies on the Gongo Soco mine. http://www.vale.com/EN/aboutvale/reports/atualizacoes_brumadinho/Pages/mina-gongo-soco.aspx (2019) Vale. Vale updates on Gongo Soco Mine slope movement. http://www.vale.com/EN/aboutvale/news/Pages/vale-updates-on-gongo-soco-mine-slope-movement.aspx (2019) Deformation monitoring of dam infrastructures via spaceborne MT-InSAR The application of the Intermittent SBAS (ISBAS) InSAR method to the South Wales Coalfield The relationship between intermittent coherence and precision of ISBAS InSAR ground motion velocities: ERS-1/2 case studies in the UK Comparison of small baseline interferometric SAR processors for estimating ground deformation Mexico City land subsidence in 2014–2015 with Sentinel-1 IW TOPS: results using the Intermittent SBAS (ISBAS) technique Two-dimensional phase unwrapping with use of statistical models for cost functions in nonlinear optimization A new algorithm for surface deformation monitoring based on small baseline differential SAR interferograms A review of interferometric synthetic aperture RADAR (InSAR) multi-track approaches for the retrieval of Earth’s surface displacements A modification to the Goldstein radar interferogram filter Guidelines on the use of the inverse velocity method as a tool for setting alarm thresholds and forecasting landslides and structure collapses On the monitoring and early-warning of brittle slope failures in hard rock masses: examples from an open-pit mine Displacement of a landslide retaining wall and application of an enhanced failure forecasting approach Download references This work was supported by the GeoEnergy Research Centre and by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council through the ACHILLES project (grant number EP/R034575/1) We are grateful to the Copernicus programme and INMET for making Sentinel-1 data and rainfall data freely available Durham Energy Institute & Department of Earth Sciences contributed to the data interpretation and led the writing of the manuscript All authors participated in manuscript editing and final approval The authors declare the following competing interests: A.S. The ISBAS method is owned by the University of Nottingham and is the subject of a UK Patent Application (No Andrew Sowter; it is currently Patent Pending Peer review information Primary handling editor: Joe Aslin Download citation DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-020-00079-2 Sign up for the Nature Briefing newsletter — what matters in science Chance of finding survivors ‘minimal’ after tailings dam at iron ore mine bursts Ten bodies have been found and more than 400 people are unaccounted for after a dam operated by the mining firm Vale collapsed in the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais releasing a wave of red iron ore waste and raising fears of widespread contamination The fire chief Col Edgar Estevão said 100 people had been rescued from the sea of mud released by the dam Firefighters said they had recovered 10 bodies by Saturday afternoon Rescue workers search for victims after the collapse of the Brumadinho dam Photograph: Douglas Magno/AFP/Getty ImagesVale released a list of 412 employees and contractors who were missing The document lists 412 names of people whom it had been unable to contact and who may be victims of the mudslide The fire brigade estimated that 300-350 people were missing visited Minas Gerais and flew over the disaster area on Saturday after dispatching three ministers there on Friday The state governor, Romeu Zema, said on Friday he did not expect many survivors. “We know now that the chances of having survivors are minimal and that we will probably rescue bodies,” he said Brazilian television showed images of survivors being winched to safety by a helicopter after the disaster at the Feijão mine near Brumadinho less than two hours from the state capital As videos and photos of the destruction wrought by the torrent of mud appeared on social media enraged Brazilians demanded punishment for anyone responsible The incident comes less than four years after another tailings dam collapsed in Minas Gerais, killing 19 people in what was Brazil’s worst environmental disaster which at the time of the disaster was jointly owned by Vale and the Anglo-Australian mining firm BHP Billiton said on Friday that one dam containing iron ore waste – known as tailings – had failed and another overflowed Brazil’s environment ministry had earlier said three dams were involved in the disaster “Most of those affected were Vale employees,” he said “I’m completely torn apart by what happened.” Read more“Our main worry now is to quickly find out where the missing people are,” Aihara said on the GloboNews cable television channel He later told TV Record that the Pousada Nova Estância hotel had been swept away along with 38 staff and guests the town of Brumadinho has dozens of guesthouses for tourists visiting the nearby Inhotim outdoor art complex but is also a home for mine workers which attracts visitors from all over the world The mud formed a barrier stopping the river and the town is on alert about what could happen,” said Bernadete Parreiras owner of the Pousada Lafevi guesthouse near Brumadinho’s centre many people from the town have disappeared … I don’t have words to express the feeling in the town and what people are suffering.” A collapsed bridge caused by flooding triggered by the dam collapse Photograph: Bruno Correia/APThe company said in a statement it had made 40 ambulances and a helicopter available for rescue work held 11.7m litres of mining waste and had condition-of-stability declarations from an international company called TÜV SÜD was regularly inspected and was being decommissioned But Vale was trying to increase capacity in the mine complex where the dam was located and at another nearby mine, according to the Intercept Brasil, which highlighted a report by the National Civil Society Forum for Hydrographic Basins that had urged the authorities not to grant the licence Brazil’s ministry of the environment said it had set up a crisis cabinet and that the environment minister head of the ministry’s environment agency Ibama A torrent of orange sludge released by the dam’s collapse Photograph: Xinhua/Barcroft Images“Our major concern at this moment is to attend any victims of this serious tragedy,” Bolsonaro tweeted “All reasonable measures are being taken.” Bolsonaro has attacked environment agencies including Ibama for holding up development with what he describes as excessive licensing requirements and has advocated freeing up mining in protected indigenous reserves Environmentalists said Brazil had failed to learn from the Mariana disaster The three companies that operated the Mariana dam – Samarco Vale and BHP Billiton – spent more than $1bn (£760m) on a cleanup and relief operation and paid millions of dollars in fines over the disaster said: “This new disaster with a mining waste tailings dam – this time in Brumadinho – is the sad consequence of a lesson not learnt by the Brazilian state and mining companies Cases like these are not accidents but environmental crimes that should be investigated This is the archive of The Observer up until 21/04/2025 The Observer is now owned and operated by Tortoise Media We take no responsibility for the accuracy of the translation 270 people died in the Brumadinho mine collapse Brazil’s worst environmental and industrial disaster A study shows that the dam collapse could have been predicted weeks in advance with the right monitoring technology in response to a civil suit brought against Vale by the workers’ union Sindicato Metabase Brumadinho a labour court ordered Vale to pay R$1million (US$200,000) compensation to the families of Vale employees but the action only benefits the families of 131 workers directly hired by Vale and does not include subcontracted workers In a shocking demonstration of insensitivity a company which according to the Brumadinho metalworkers’ union earns R$1 million in 255 seconds claiming that the amount of compensation owed to the victims is ‘absurd’ Evidence shows that the company had known that the dam was unstable for 16 years Brazilian state prosecutors charged Vale’s former chief executive and 15 other people with homicide Vale argued – and the Superior Court agreed - that there were indications that archaeological sites had been damaged The Public Ministry says it will appeal the decision In 2015, a tailings dam collapsed at the Samarco mine A thorough and proper investigation into the causes of the Samarco disaster might have prevented the Brumadinho dam disaster four years later The Brumadinho and Samarco disasters has prompted demands for greater transparency and tighter regulations on the management of tailings dams a global industry standard on tailings management was adopted on which IndustriALL Global Union participates has been established to implement the standard IndustriALL Global Union, despite its disappointment with the performance of the Brazilian NCP, will take up the recommendations resulting from the complaint filed after the Samarco disaster. IndustriALL Global Union general secretary “Vale claims to be sensitive to the plight of the Brumadinho victims but its resistance to any form of collective action prove otherwise reparation and accountability cannot be separated from ensuring the safety of tailing dams.” Thirty are currently operating under emergency protocols including three under ‘level 3’ indicating a risk of imminent rupture Residents living near dams at levels 2 and 3 have been evacuated and containment barriers have been built to prevent a catastrophic breach The company has committed to decommission its ten ‘upstream’ dams whose structure pose greater risks of instability Vale has eliminated seven upstream dams nationally Many of the dams are not expected to be decommissioned before 2035 In the days leading up to the third anniversary of the disaster torrential rains in the State of Minas Gerais caused flooding and landslides causing heightened concern about the tailings dams IndustriALL Global Union’s affiliates represent over 50 million workers in 140 countries in the mining We take up the fight for better working conditions and trade union rights around the world © Copyright 2018 - IndustriALL - We care about your personal information and data. Take a look at our Privacy Policy Metrics details This article has been updated The rupture of the Brumadinho mining tailings dam in Brazil is considered one of the largest mining disasters in the world resulting in 244 deaths and 26 missing people in addition to the environmental consequences The present study aims to evaluate the concentrations of multiple elements and the biological effects on water and sediments of the Paraopeba River after the Brumadinho Dam rupture The tailings are formed by fine particulate material with large amounts of Fe Cd and U were higher than those allowed by Brazilian legislation Cu and Cd levels were higher than the established sediment quality guidelines (TEL-NOAA) The differences in metal concentrations in the water and sediments between the upstream and downstream sides of the dam illustrate the effect of the tailings in the Paraopeba River Toxicological tests demonstrated that the water and sediments were toxic to different trophic levels The fish exposed to water and sediments containing mine ore also accumulated metals in muscle tissue This evaluation emphasizes the necessity of long-term monitoring in the affected area social and environmental impacts of this catastrophe are immeasurable the present study aims to evaluate the concentrations of multiple elements and the biological effects on water and sediments of the Paraopeba River after the mining tailings dam rupture in Brumadinho in southeast Brazil Some elements (Al, Cd, Fe, Hg, Mn, P and V) and rare earth metals (In and Gd) increased in concentration up to 10 times (mean = 17 times) below the dam rupture area (S2 – Brumadinho – 5.2 km) in relation to upstream levels (Supplementary Table S4) P and In levels increased by at least 70 times Association between the water variables of the Paraopeba River five days after the Brumadinho mine tailings dam rupture The values of the observations were transformed to a z-scale to make the variables comparable (a) The first group of variables clustered by the same behavior formed by SPM (d) The forth group formed by the total Sr and dissolved Al The light blue shading identifies the standard error of the regression model The dashed lines represent two water dams along the river Association between the superficial sediment variables of the Paraopeba River five days after the Brumadinho mine tailings dam rupture (a) The first group of variables clustered by the same behavior formed by Co and sand fraction (b) The second group formed by silt and clay fractions The brown shading identifies the standard error of the regression model Enrichment factors (EFs) from the tailings and sediments of sampling sites along the Paraopeba River The shades of brown indicate the following: 1 indicates no enrichment; <3 is minor enrichment; 3–5 is moderate enrichment; 5–10 is moderately severe enrichment; 10–25 is severe enrichment; 25–50 is very severe enrichment; and >50 is extremely severe enrichment Toxicological tests with representative species of different trophic levels exposed to the water (blue) or sediment (brown) of Paraopeba River five days after of the Brumadinho dam rupture: (a) chlorophycea algae - Raphidocelis subcaptata (primary producer) (b) microcrustacean - Daphnia similis (primary consumer) and (c) fish - Danio rerio (secondary consumer) only the dissolved Al and Fe presented levels above the legal limit established by Brazilian law (CONAMA 357/2005) in a sampling that occurred during the same period the present results indicated that the concentrations of total Cd and U and dissolved Al and Fe presented values higher than the levels allowed by Brazilian law for class I water (for human supply after simplified treatment) raising concern about the possible effects on biota and human health These differences may be due to methodological issues Fe and Cu concentrations were compared to the dissolved fraction in the Brazilian legislation while the total levels were used for the other elements according to the recommendations of Brazilian and international protocols The analysis of all elements performed by the Brazilian Geological Service in the water samples involved a filtration process and the results were representative of the dissolved fraction of metals in the water Association between the elements in the muscle of D rerio fishes exposed to the water (blue) or sediment (brown) of the Paraopeba River five after days of the Brumadinho mine tailings dam rupture (a) Al and Fe in muscle of the fishes exposed to the water (b) Mn in muscle of the fishes exposed to the water (c) Al in muscle of the fishes exposed to the sediment (d) Fe and Mn in muscle of the fishes exposed to the sediment livestock and urbanization along the basin that contribute to the metal concentrations in the sediments Na and S showed high enrichment levels since upstream the dam rupture area which might be used to show the influence of natural and/or anthropogenic activities in the upper part of the basin The incidences of immobilization in microcrustaceans and fish deaths also demonstrate the toxicity of the Paraopeba River water and sediments These data strongly support the susceptibility of the natural biota in the Paraopeba River and reinforce the need for long-term monitoring considering not only the metal levels in abiotic matrices but also the biological effects in the local trophic chain through toxicological evaluations and field studies The sediments showed a higher toxic potential than the water due to the 20% mortality occurrence in the fish exposed to S1 (Moeda: − 61.3 km) to S5 (São José da Varginha: 111 km) sediment samples The fish exposed to water and sediments containing mine ore from the Brumadinho Dam rupture accumulated metals in their muscle tissue The metal accumulation in the muscular tissue of fish exposed to water and sediments shows that these elements are available for accumulation in the biota suggesting a possible incorporation into the trophic chain and eventual risk of human contamination through the consumption of contaminated fish The metal accumulation in fish can be related to the oscillation of metal levels in the water and sediments between the sampling sites which demonstrates the importance of biomonitoring considering the whole path of the tailings along the Paraopeba River and some will reach the São Francisco River overspreading the effects of the tailings release These metals will consolidate in the bottom sediments of the Paraopeba River and may eventually be released into the water leading to biotic accumulation and the possibility of immediate and long-term effects such as mortality or decreases in reproduction Particularly in relation to rare earth metals many of their toxicological effects are unknown due to the different uses of the water from the Paraopeba River the present study provides the first insight into the water and sediment quality of the Paraopeba River and provides evidence for the influence of tailings as a source of metals at the sampling sites along the Paraopeba River This initial evaluation (only five days after the rupture) demonstrated that the tailings transported along the Paraopeba River still had not reached the farther sampling sites (beyond 48 km from the dam) the composition of the tailings with large amounts of Fe As and Hg and rare earth metals such as In and Ga was toxic to different trophic levels from primary producers such as algae to primary and secondary consumers such as microcrustaceans and fish species the long-term biomonitoring of the metal concentrations in abiotic matrices together with biological evaluations involving toxicological assays and field studies are necessary for the region dissolved oxygen and turbidity were measured fractionated and cooled for transport and analysis One portion was reserved for the biological tests; another portion was acidified to pH 2.0 with nitric acid Suprapur (MERCK) for total metal analysis Another subsample was filtered in 0.45 μm preweighed glass fiber filters and acidified to pH 2 for the dissolved fraction metal analysis The last aliquot was filtered through a 0.70 μm dried preweighed glass fiber filter to obtain the suspended particulate material (SPM) through gravimetry The surface sediments were collected in plastic bags and kept under refrigeration at −4 °C until analysis One sediment portion was used for granulometric characterization using a laser diffraction particle size analyzer (Shimadzu SALD-3101); another was freeze-dried and homogenized with grail and pistil for subsequent metal determinations; and the last portion was used in biological assays Aliquots of filtered water were acidified with 2 N HCl and purged with ultrapure synthetic air DOC and TDN were determined by high-temperature catalytic oxidation (680 °C) with an infrared dispersive detector in the Shimadzu TOC-VCPH apparatus and the coefficient of variation was less than 5% The enrichment factor is frequently used in geochemical studies to determine the degree of anthropogenic metal pollution: the EF values are interpreted as follows: EF < 1 indicates no enrichment; <3 is minor enrichment; 3–5 is moderate enrichment; 5–10 is moderately severe enrichment; 10–25 is severe enrichment; 25–50 is very severe enrichment; and >50 is extremely severe enrichment For the control (only with LC Oligo medium) and tested waters three replicates were prepared in sterile flasks A cell concentration of 1×104 cells/mL was added to each replicate The solutions were maintained under continuous agitation with white fluorescent light at 23 °C and 27 °C for 96 h three aliquots from the control and treated samples were counted under an optical microscope with a Neubauer chamber under a 100x objective The acute toxicity tests were performed according to the ABNT NBR 1271329 where four replicates with five neonates 6 to 24 h old were exposed to 10 mL of water samples for 48 h under static conditions at 20 ± 2 °C in the dark The control samples were maintained only with MS medium similis immobility in the negative controls did not exceed 10% the original dilution ratio of 1/4 was not followed to avoid immediate fish mortality and to evaluate a later moment after the initial impact The data were transformed to a z-scale (standard scale in statistics where the standard deviation is 1 unit and the mean is zero) to make the variables comparable Pearson’s correlation was conducted to identify metal associations in each matrix regardless of their concentrations at each sampling campaign This analysis was conducted excluding variables with missing data The groups were defined with pairwise variables that presented correlation coefficients greater than 0.90 The variables with missing data (with at least 3 observations) were correlated with others in the clusters when the correlation coefficients were greater than 0.90 The tendencies of metal concentrations were plotted according to the associations verified in the clusters using local polynomial regression fitting with the R software (loess and the shading in the plots identifies the standard error of the regression model The differences between toxicological tests and negative controls were determined with the R software (R Core Team The comparisons were conducted using the nonparametric Kruskal–Wallis test (free distribution) (kruskal.test followed by Dunn’s multiple comparison test (dunn.test The authors confirm that the data supporting the findings of this study are available within the article [and/or] its supplementary materials Carmo, F. F. et al. Fundão tailings dam failures: the environment tragedy of the largest technological disaster of Brazilian mining in global context. Perspect. Ecol. Conserv. 15, 145–151, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pecon.2017.06.002 (2017) Porsani, J., Jesus, F. & Stangari, M. GPR survey on an iron mining area after the collapse of the tailings dam I at the Córrego do Feijão mine in Brumadinho-MG, Brazil. Remote Sens. 11, 860, https://doi.org/10.3390/rs11070860 (2019) CPRM. Monitoramento especial da bacia do Rio Paraopeba - Relatório 01: Monitoramento Hidrológico e Sedimentométrico, http://www.cprm.gov.br/sace/conteudo/paraopeba/RT_01_2019_PARAOPEBA.pdf (2019) Hatje, V. et al. The environmental impacts of one of the largest tailing dam failures worldwide. Sci. Rep. 7, 10706, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-11143-x (2017) Quadra, G. et al. Far-reaching cytogenotoxic effects of mine waste from the Fundão dam disaster in Brazil. Chemosphere 215, 753–757, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chemosphere.2018.10.104 (2018) Segura, F. R. et al. Potential risks of the residue from Samarco’s mine dam burst (Bento Rodrigues, Brazil). Environ. Pollut. 218, 813–825, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envpol.2016.08.005 (2016) Pandey, L. et al. Towards a multi-bioassay-based index for toxicity assessment of fluvial waters. Environ. Monit. Assess. 191, 112, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10661-019-7234-5 (2019) Almeida, C. A. et al. Characterization and evaluation of sorption potential of the iron mine waste after Samarco dam disaster in Doce River basin – Brazil. Chemosphere 209, 411–420, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chemosphere.2018.06.071 (2018) Queiroz, H. M. et al. The Samarco mine tailing disaster: A possible time-bomb for heavy metals contamination? Sci. Total Environ. 637–638, 498–506, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2018.04.370 (2018) CPRM. Monitoramento especial da bacia do Rio Paraopeba - Relatório 03: Monitoramento Geoquímico, http://www.cprm.gov.br/sace/conteudo/paraopeba/RT_03_2019_PARAOPEBA.pdf (2019) Vicq, R. F. C., Matschullat, J., Leite, M., Nalini, H. Jr & Mendonça, F. P. C. Iron Quadrangle stream sediments, Brazil: Geochemical maps and reference values. Environ. Earth Sci. 74, 4407–4417, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12665-015-4508-2 (2015) CPRM. Monitoramento especial da bacia do Rio Doce: Relatório I - Dezembro/2015, http://www.cprm.gov.br/publique/media/hidrologia/eventos_criticos/riodoce_relatorio1.pdf (2015) CPRM. Monitoramento especial da bacia do rio Paraopeba - Relatório 02: Monitoramento Geoquímico, http://www.cprm.gov.br/sace/conteudo/paraopeba/RT_02_2019_PARAOPEBA.pdf (2019) Informativo semanal da avaliação dos sedimentos do rio Paraopeba nos locais monitorados ao longo do Rio Paraopeba após o desastre na barragem B1 no complexo da Mina Córrego Feijão da Mineradora Vale/SA no município de Brumadinho – Minas Gerais - Informativo N° 2 (2019) Thompson, F. et al. Severe impacts of the Brumadinho dam failure (Minas Gerais, Brazil) on the water quality of the Paraopeba River. Sci. Total Environ. 705, 135914, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2019.135914 (2020) Microwave Assisted Acid Digestion of Aqueous Samples and Extracts ABNT NBR 12648:2018 - Ecotoxicologia aquática - Toxicidade crônica - Método de ensaio com algas (Chlorophyceae) ABNT NBR 12713:2016 - Ecotoxicologia aquática - Toxicidade aguda - Método de ensaio com Daphnia spp (Crustacea ABNT NBR 15088:2016 - Ecotoxicologia aquática - Toxicidade aguda - Método de ensaio com peixes (Cyprinidae) 25 (2016) ABNT NBR 10006:2004 - Procedimento para obtenção de extrato solubilizado de resíduos sólidos IBGE. Bases Cartográficas, https://mapas.ibge.gov.br/bases-e-referenciais.html (2019) Download references The authors are grateful for the support from the Laboratório de Ciências Ambientais (LCA) and to the Programa de Pós Graduação em Ecologia e Recursos Naturais from the Universidade Estadual do Norte Fluminense Darcy Ribeiro and the Laboratório de Ecotoxicologia (LABTOX) from the Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo – Campus Alegre Vergilio thanks the financial support of FAPES Rezende thanks the financial support of CNPq (305217/2017-8) and FAPERJ (E-26/202.916/2017) and by the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior -Brazil (CAPES)-Finance Code 001 Centro de Ciências Exatas Naturais e da Saúde Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo - Campus Alegre Diego Borges de Aguiar & Tatiana da Silva Souza Universidade Estadual do Norte Fluminense Darcy Ribeiro Marcelo Gomes de Almeida & Carlos Eduardo de Rezende Cristiane dos Santos Vergilio wrote the main manuscript text designed the biological tests performed in the study and helped in the preparation of the figures and supplemental materials Diego Lacerda performed the statistical analysis and prepared all the figures and supplemental materials Braulio Cherene Vaz de Oliveira collected the field samples and performed all chemical analysis Echily Sartori performed the fish tests and helped in data organization Gabriela Munis Campos and Anna Luiza de Souza Pereira performed the algae tests Diego Borges de Aguiar helped in the execution of the fish tests Tatiana da Silva Souza helped in execution of the biological tests Marcelo Gomes de Almeida helped in the analytical control of the chemical analysis Fabiano Thompson contributed with comments on the final version of the manuscript Carlos Eduardo de Rezende was in charge to the field sampling provided the technical and financial support and also contributed with some comments on the final version for the present study Download citation DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-62700-w Sign up for the Nature Briefing: Microbiology newsletter — what matters in microbiology research Members of a rescue team search for victims after a tailings dam owned by Brazilian mining company Vale SA collapsed in Brumadinho Experts say the industry needs to adopt newer technology and receive stricter oversight Update: In a press statement on January 29 Vale announced the decommissioning of all the company's dams that use the upstream method (see below) The cost of the change is estimated at R$ 5 billion ($1.3 billion U.S.) and decommissioning will occur over the next three years.Only 1,177 days separate accidents of the Fundão ore reject dams in Mariana and the Córrego do Feijão mine in Brumadinho in the metropolitan region of Belo Horizonte the toxic sludge expelled by the structure killed 19 people At the time it was considered one of the country's biggest socio-environmental disasters in the mining sector another tragedy struck in the state of Minas Gerais The full impact of the Brumadinho accident is still being evaluated but at least 65 people have been reported dead victims of the tailings mud stored at Dam I of the Córrego do Feijão Mine and about 280 were missing at the time of this writing Leonardo Ivo, director of the Association of Observers of the Environment of Minas Gerais, has been in Brumadinho over the last few days in the aftermath of the accident. "It is necessary to rethink this practice of storing mud," he says. The anthropologist Andréa Zhouri, coordinator of the Environmental Issues Studies Group of the Federal University of Minas Gerais, says tragedies such as Brumadinho's are not "natural disasters," but "political-institutional failures." And the state’s recent efforts to simplify the environmental licensing process and the monitoring of dams is at least partly to blame. "In Brazil and Minas, it is the ore above everything and everyone," says the researcher. For the superintendent of the Association of Environmental Defense, Maria Dalce Ricas, Vale's confidence in the safety of the dam was so strong that the company's facilities were located nearby. The company’s buildings and employees were among the victims of the disaster. "These dams are time bombs that can explode at any moment," says the environmentalist. "A good part of these dams are inactive, but this one was also inactive and even so it collapsed." "It is worrying that the dam has been evaluated by competent institutions and external audits and found there was no risk of breaking," says Ivo. Built in 1976 by Ferteco Mineração, the dam used the upstream method, which, although common, is the least safe, according to experts. This method was the same in the Fundão dam in Mariana. According to the G1 report, there are another 130 dams of this type in the country. Upstream upheaval is the process where the dam uses the tailings itself to lift the mud up in steps. Zhouri says upstream dams should be banned from mining in Brazil. "This technique is outdated and obsolete, used only in developing countries. It is not safe for the population, but it is the cheapest," she says. "There are alternatives, such as dry containment, and Vale has this technology. The state must demand it." "We learned very little from Mariana's tragedy. The rupture of the dam of Fundão should have been a huge alert," says Ricas. “Costs shouldn’t justify avoidance of technical measures that guarantee the safety of the population, of biodiversity, and of the environment." An aerial view of an area affected by a mudslide after the dam's collapse. In addition, an environmental licensing law approved in Minas Gerais in 2017 allows, in some cases, three-phase licensing (prior licenses, installation, and operation licenses) to be approved simultaneously. Yet that can be too rushed, says Ivo, increasing the chance of accidents. The state law that governs the safety regulations of dams in Minas Gerais, 15056/2004, says that in case of an environmental accident, the emergency measures are assumed by the company, either directly or in reimbursement to the state. At the federal level, Law No. 12334/2010, known as the National Dams Security Policy (PNSB), aims to ensure that dam safety standards are followed. Neither law, however, was able to avoid the tragedies in Mariana and Brumadinho. For Zhouri, the Brazilian state needs to do more in regulating the mining industry. "Mining has to be subjected to society, not the other way around," she says. What, then, are the alternatives to ore tailings dams? Ricas says the problem is complex and there are no simple solutions. However, she says it is not acceptable to store sludge above communities because of the risk of rupture. Other options include drainage cells, in which the material is disposed of in piles to dry; transforming waste into raw materials for construction; and dry crushing. Ricas says each technology would be applied to a particular type of tailings, depending on the ore, and that viability should be studied in each specific case. Ivo believes that the technology of dry treatment should be adopted as soon as possible by mining companies in Brazil. "They prefer to take the risk of collapsing because of the economic aspect, but studies show that the technology of dry treatment would increase the cost by only 20 percent, which is plausible for a miner," he argues. According to Ivo, some companies already do the dry treatment of ore tailings, in cities like Ouro Preto and Nova Lima. Ricas understands that it will be difficult for the government to monitor the hundreds of dams in the country and that even a stricter licensing process would not necessarily solve the issue. She believes the answer lies in technology. "A dam must always be the last option," she says. An aerial view of an area affected by a mudslide after the dam's collapse The charges were announced by state prosecutors in Minas Gerais days before the first anniversary of the disaster, which sent a torrent of liquid mining waste across the picturesque countryside and killing guests at a nearby countryside guesthouse Vale’s former CEO Fabio Schvarstman and 10 other employees were charged, along with five employees of German company TÜV SÜD. Read moreProsecutors said in a statement that there was a relationship of “pressure rewards and conflict of interest between Vale and TÜV SÜD” They alleged that Vale hid information about the dam’s instability to avoid hurting the company’s reputation and TÜV SÜD issued reports saying it was safe “The object of these omissions was to avoid any negative reputational impacts to Vale that could affect its market value,” the prosecutor William Garcia told reporters on Tuesday “TÜV SÜD and Vale systematically concealed from society shareholders and investors the real gravity of the situation.” “acted directly to create this false impression of complete safety in Vale’s dams” Police detective Eduardo Figueiredo praised the work of teams which recovered and identified the victims’ shattered bodies “This was fundamental for the investigations,” he said Vale and a representative for Schvartsman told Reuters it was premature to assign fault for the rupture given that other prosecutorial bodies were still looking into the matter ÜV SÜD said it was “deeply affected by the tragic collapse of the dam” and added: “The causes of the dam breach have still not been conclusively clarified.” Vale said it would review all the details of the charges adding that it found the fraud accusation “perplexing” “It is important to note that other authorities are investigating the case and it is premature to claim there was conscious assumption of risk to cause a deliberate breach of the dam,” the company said The Guardian reported in February that workers had repaired a leak at the dam months before it broke but Vale failed to alert staff or move a canteen or administrative centre destroyed by the tidal wave of mud a Vale spokeswoman stated that “there was no leak in the dam” The charges come amid widespread frustration in Brazil over the justice system’s failure to punish anybody over a similar disaster four years earlier in the same state Another tailings dam operated by Samarco – a joint venture between Vale and BHP Billiton – collapsed in November 2015, killing 19 people and causing an environmental catastrophe. Prosecutors investigating the disaster have said Samarco was aware the dam was unstable Guest particularly tailing dam failures is threatening both the large portion of the Mineiro population that works in the mining sector and the precious ecology in the surrounding area On January 25th, a tailings dam in the Córrego do Feijão iron ore mine near the small town of Brumandinho, Minas Gerais collapsed. A wave of mud flooded the region covering houses and businesses, and inevitably people and animals. One month after the incident, the official death toll is at 186 individuals Many of the victims were employees and subcontractors of the mine’s owner the consensus among first responders is that it is extremely unlikely that any more survivors will be recovered from the mud and diminish the fertility of riverbanks and farmland where floodwater passed with the Anglo-Australian conglomerate BHP and these dams are constructed and raised in stages The Columbia Water Center’s 2017 report on Assessing the Risks of Mine Tailing Dam Failures gives recommendations on understanding and assessing the risk of tailing dam failures The report points out that the majority of mine tailing dam failures are a result of faulty design or construction The researchers recommend creating an inventory of existing tailings dams worldwide The researchers also developed a hazard rating index to analyze dangers to people and ecosystems downstream in the event of a failure and to inform investors about potential risks of tailings dams In terms of the construction and use of tailings dams the Columbia Water Center report recommends the following: dead or missing victims are expected to file suit for claims since Vale is financially responsible for those deaths under the Brazilian Federal Constitution criminal investigations are just a band-aid solution because without substantial changes to mining regulation and industry practices these kinds of accidents will become more and more common The outlook for regulations that will incorporate the Columbia Water Center’s best practices are slim but this is not enough to ensure that these kinds of accidents won’t happen again Recently elected President Jair Bolsonaro has endorsed through his finance minister Paulo Guedes the deregulation of the Brazilian private sector so it is unlikely that more firm regulations on mining companies will be imposed In the aftermath of the incident in Mariana a few years ago the more progressive administration of Dilma Rousseff also failed to pass substantial regulations The latest estimates suggest that there are more than 15,000 mine tailings dams worldwide, the World Mine Tailings Failures organization predicts that 19 similar accidents could happen throughout the world between 2018 and 2027 another tragedy could be right around the corner Clara Langevin is a Master’s in Public Administration in Development Practice candidate at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) and is currently an intern at the Earth Institute Clara worked at the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization in Washington where she assisted with various information and communications technology-related projects ranging from rural broadband programs to emergency connectivity initiatives and is a member of both the Latin American Student Association and Brazil Talk The first Earth Day in 1970 ignited a movement to stop polluting our planet. This Earth Month, join us in our commitment to realizing a just and sustainable future for our planet. Visit our Earth Day website for ideas Δdocument.getElementById( "ak_js_2" ).setAttribute( "value" Get the Columbia Climate School Newsletter About Contact Media Ask a Question/Suggest a Story ©2024 Columbia University Three employees of Vale and two subcontracted engineers held over Brumadinho disaster Brazilian police have arrested five people in an investigation into the causes of the Brumadinho dam disaster The dam break on Friday at an iron ore mining complex operated by the minerals firm Vale killed at least 65 people, and a further 279 are missing. Federal and state prosecutors said 30-day arrest warrants had been issued “aiming to establish criminal responsibility for the rupture of dams at the Córrego de Feijão mine maintained by Vale”. Arrests were carried out in São Paulo and Belo Horizonte on Tuesday morning, prosecutors said. Searches were carried out at a Vale building in Nova Lima and a subcontracted company in São Paulo that provided services and consultancy to Vale. “Three Vale employees directly employed and responsible were arrested. In addition, subcontracted engineers who recently attested to the stability of the dam were arrested,” the prosecutors said. Last Friday, after the dam broke, Vale said it had “declarations of the condition of stability” from TÜV SÜD, a German company with headquarters in São Paulo, given on 13 June and 26 September last year. The news site G1 named the arrested engineers as Makoto Namba and André Yum Yassuda. It said Namba, a civil engineer and geo-technician, was one of the signatories to the September declaration of stability. Another news site, R7, named the Vale employees held as Rodrigo de Melo, Ricardo de Oliveira and César Granchamp. It said Granchamp also signed the September declaration. TÜV SÜD said its Brazilian arm had carried out two assessments at the dam on behalf of Vale: “a periodic review of dam safety (June 2018) and one regular inspection of dam safety (September 2018) Due to ongoing investigations TÜV SÜD Brasil cannot comment further on this case at the moment The company collaborates with the authorities providing all requested information.” Its website says TÜV SÜD is the “the world’s No 1 brand of choice for premium quality safety and sustainability solutions that add tangible value to your business” Vale said on Tuesday it was fully cooperating with the authorities and would continue to support the investigations into the disaster Three years ago, a similar disaster in the same state, Minas Gerais, at a mine run by Samarco, a joint-venture between Vale and BHP Billiton, killed 19 people, poisoned the drinking water of hundreds of thousands and sent mining waste down the river Doce to the sea said on Tuesday that nearly 4,000 dams in Brazil were classified as having “high damage potential” or being at high risk He added that 205 of those dams contained mineral waste 276 Missing in Mining Waste Sludge in Brumadinho Before: © CNES 2019 - Airbus DS; Source ESRI After: © 2019 Planet Labs Satellite imagery recorded before and after the collapse of a tailing dam near the city of Brumadinho The dam collapse in Brazil last week that killed 84 was the second such tragedy in just over three years pointing to weak oversight by the government and urgent need for reforms On January 25, a dam with mineral waste collapsed in the city of Brumadinho, leaving 84 dead and 276 missing in addition to catastrophic environmental damage a similar dam collapsed in November 2015 in the city of Mariana in what is regarded as the worst environmental disaster in Brazilian history A criminal investigation for the loss of 19 lives and massive environmental damage is ongoing The Mariana dam was operated by a joint venture between Anglo-Australian BHP Billiton and Brazilian Vale Given the clear risks shown by the Mariana collapse the government should have done more to prevent similar accidents from happening The Brumadinho dam collapse comes as a tragic reminder of the weakness in the regulatory and monitoring regime In 2018, Brazil’s national water agency – ANA – reported that not all dams are officially registered and only 3 percent of those that are were inspected in 2017 The agency’s report also included a list of the 45 dams at highest risk The fact that Brumadinho was not on that list raises serious questions about how Brazil monitors the safety of dams Brazil should monitor and effectively enforce compliance by public and private actors with its regulatory and environmental standards Guided by the Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment released last year by the United Nations Rapporteur on human rights and environment Brazil should also not reduce the levels of environmental protection and more generally After flying over Brumadinho, Bolsonaro promised to assist victims, investigate what happened, seek justice and work to prevent further similar tragedies This will require stronger action to protect the environment from the risks posed by mining companies and other industries – a change in course from the promises of less regulation Mr Indigenous Community Facing Lack of Space and Rising Seas Plans Relocation Get updates on human rights issues from around the globe Human Rights Watch is a 501(C)(3) nonprofit registered in the US under EIN: 13-2875808 Efforts to find remaining survivors have ramped up in towns devastated by the collapse of a huge dam which released a torrent of muddy iron-ore waste in Southeast Brazil owned by the Brazilian mining company Vale sending tons of sludge down into the valley below Authorities have reported at least 60 deaths with another 290 people still listed as missing—and warnings have been issued about another dam nearby that is also at risk of failure We want to hear what you think about this article. Submit a letter to the editor or write to letters@theatlantic.com A collection of winning and honored images from this year’s nature-photo competition A collection of amazing recent images made with the Hubble Space Telescope Mourners of Pope Francis gathered at the Vatican scenes from the the second weekend of Coachella 2025 and landscapes of the Earth’s arctic and subarctic regions Five years ago, on January 25, 2019, the B1 tailings dam belonging to the Brazilian mining giant Vale collapsed at the Córrego do Feijão mine in the town of Brumadinho, state of Minas Gerais. The structure could not support the weight of 12 million cubic meters of mud and waste including two babies still in their mothers’ wombs The dirty and contaminated water that flowed down the River Paraopebas affected 26 municipalities devastating communities and the region’s flora and fauna The environmental and social impact was enormous. A study by the Polytechnic University of Catalonia released by the Federal Prosecutor’s Office in 2021 identified that the cause of the collapse was the liquefaction of the tailings during a drilling in the dam the solid waste turned into fluid and overburdened the structure Despite the scale of this environmental and social crime relatives of the people in Brumadinho who lost their lives when the dam collapsed are still waiting for justice. Vale agreed to pay at least BRL 37.68 billion in collective damages nearly BRL 1.3 billion was for direct reparations to the families of the victims But the Brumadinho case is still being heard Two companies are defendants: the mining company Vale and the German consulting firm Tüv Süd Another 16 people are also standing trial in the case They are accused of 270 counts of premeditated murder (when there is the intention to commit the crime) in addition to several environmental crimes The lives of the unborn babies were excluded from the case The relatives of the victims of the dam collapse in Brumadinho complain that Vale did not contact them to offer condolences or support or to recognize the services provided by the employees who died while at work Some of the employees had been working at the company for more than 30 years This stance by Vale caused even more pain in the mourning of people who lost family members according to Avabrum (Association of Relatives of the Victims and People Affected by the Collapse of the Córrego do Feijão Dam) The initial request from the Minas Gerais state government and the Public Prosecutor’s Office in the settlement agreement for environmental and social damages was BRL 54 billion The disagreement led to an extension of deadlines and debates over the settlement amount an agreement worth BRL 37.68 billion was sealed The amount could be higher because the agreement provides for the full recovery of the environment It took a year for the first complaint to be filed and another three years to define where the case should be heard determining whether the case should be judged in the state or federal courts The Brazilian justice system is considered “guaranteeist” meaning that it respects the right of the accused to a full defense If on the one hand this prevents innocent people from being sentenced without being able to present their defense which allows for appeals and requests for the extension of deadlines the defense counsels of two engineers who are defendants in the case requested an extension of the deadline to analyze the case They argued that the document platform of the Minas Gerais State Court had more than 1 million pages of raw files from the mobile phones of all the people involved The court accepted the request and the deadline for the defense counsels to present their arguments was extended The pandemic struck just over a year after the collapse of the dam in Brumadinho which delayed the progress of the case when staff at the court had to work from home the procedure was entirely physical and could only be resumed after the lifting of restrictions on social contact There are also other initiatives that try to amplify the voice of the victims. One is the Observatory of the Criminal Cases of Brumadinho which was created out of the need for a system to make it easier for the relatives of the 272 victims and other interested parties to understand the legal cases and administrative proceedings underway in Brazil and Germany for the purpose of exposing the truth and applying criminal justice to all those responsible for the murders and other crimes related to the collapse of Vale’s dam in Brumadinho the Minas Gerais State Public Prosecutor’s Office filed a complaint with the state’s justice system requiring social isolation and delaying the case. the time began for the defense counsels to present their arguments presented the argument that the case should be heard by the federal courts since it includes charges of making false statements to a federal agency non-compliance with the National Dams Policy and possible damage to archaeological sites – which come under federal jurisdiction. The Superior Court of Justice (STJ) agreed and annulled the receipt of the complaint by the state courts claiming that it did not have the jurisdiction to judge these crimes. the case was returned to the state of Minas Gerais restored the jurisdiction of the state courts to analyze the case and the process resumed where it had stopped. Fachin’s decision was reviewed by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court which accepted the argument of the defense and restored the jurisdiction of the federal courts to hear the case. the Federal Court of Minas Gerais accepted the complaint and the process was restarted from scratch the defense of the former president of Vale is attempting to remove the charge of premeditated murder his lawyers filed a habeas corpus petition It was analyzed by the rapporteur of the Federal Appeals Court of the 6th Region The federal judge Flávio Boson Gambogi gave his approval to the request if the other two judges follow the same reasoning Schvartsman will be discharged from the case The analysis has been suspended due to a request for adjournment (when a judge asks for more time to analyze the case) 2025 - Conectas Human Rights - Postal Code 47 - São Paulo (SP) Brazil - ZIP: 01032-970 - Phone: +55 (11) 3884-7440 which runs through the state of Minas Gerais Along its 510-kilometer (317-mile) stretch the river still passes through 35 cities in the state Its “dead” state is visible at a glance now — once a clean water source it has been substituted by the devastating reality of a river basin contaminated by 13 million cubic meters (459 million cubic feet) of mining waste The rupture of the Córrego do Feijão tailings dam owned by Vale S.A. on Jan. 25, 2019, in Brumadinho (MG), resulted in the deaths of 272 people — one of the most expressive and visible consequences of predatory mining practices that have masqueraded as one of Minas Gerais’ main economic activities the railway cutting across the state carries trains loaded with tons of iron ore blowing their whistles day and night — reminders of the fact that little has changed since one of the worst environmental crimes in Brazil’s history was committed Analyses carried out by the cities of Brumadinho São Joaquim de Bicas and Juatuba found the waters of the Paraopeba River unsuitable for use and not recommended for any purpose The 26 municipalities in the Paraopeba River Basin are home to some 200,000 people Vale and TÜV Süd — the German company that certified the dam’s safety before it burst — still have not offered a legal response to the environmental crimes and homicides caused by the dam’s failure living throughout the entire extension of the Paraopeba’s territory The Pataxó and Pataxó Hã-hã-hãe are among the Indigenous groups affected by the disaster have been trying to gain recognition and compensation for the violations they are finding it impossible to continue their traditional ways of living some 25 families of Indigenous people from the villages of Coroa Vermelha They aimed to secure territory where they could build and sustain a better way of life able to live according to traditions and far from increasing urban violence which had become more common in their original territories They established the village of Naô Xohã in the rural zone of São Joaquim de Bicas less than 20 km (12 mi) from the Córrego do Feijão dam The space they occupied along the Paraopeba River far from urban centers and near the Atlantic Rainforest was seen by the Indigenous families as a chance to live close to nature according to their ancestral knowledge They sought to sustain themselves with farming ethno-tourism and by selling their handicrafts the proximity to the rainforest offered a connection to the Earth less than 100 meters (328 feet) from their village fished for their sustenance and held rituals at the Paraopeba River But not 24 hours after the Córrego do Feijão dam burst iron ore rejects washed into the place where the community lies “The mud arrived here at our community the next day I saw a river of mud,” recalls Célia Angohó who lived in Naô Xohã at the time and today is chief of Katurãma village The disaster rendered all water in the river’s basin unusable the Minas Gerais state government advised the population to “not use raw water from the Paraopeba River for anything until the situation is normalized.” This advisory has still not been repealed and the community’s routine has never been the same Children and adults are no longer able to use the river as they were accustomed to and the changes to their daily lives went far beyond water issues alone The dead river and dead animals composed scenes that are hard to forget “We would see homes and pieces of animals floating by The fish were jumping out of the river,” recalls Angohó Even though the village was evacuated a day after the dam burst the people of Naô Xohã decided to stay on the land where their homes were Chief Sucupira, the current leader at Naô Xohã, claims that Vale’s relocation proposal did not consider the prior consultation protocols with the community and would have placed its people in an area much smaller than the territory they occupied They put part of our people in an area with no forest Staying at Naô Xohã was an important act of resistance for the group Even given the uncertain scenario regarding contamination and other consequences of continued exposure to heavy metals found in the mining rejects part of the community opted to remain on their land Today they depend on governmental assistance programs and the sale of handicrafts to survive “As leader of the people who stayed at Naô Xohã the gods and the spirits who tell us how to rebuild Things will never be like they were before the dam burst but we will get used to it,” says Sucupira flooding caused by Paraopeba’s rising waters also affected Naô Xohã Rainfall in January 2022 caused such intense flooding that the village had to be evacuated in order to keep people from being exposed to the high levels of heavy metals in the tailings-contaminated river: iron Contamination of the water and the soil in the river’s path means that the soil in the village may also be contaminated because the flooding covered the crops the people had planted there farming was no longer an option for the community Instead of eating what they plant and harvest the people now eat ultra processed and industrialized foods The result has been an epidemic of diabetes among most of the people in the community We weren’t used to eating anything from packages we’ve had to buy our food at the supermarket — rice We have to spend our money on it,” says Chief Sucupira the village’s people have also suffered from intoxications fevers and respiratory problems caused by the iron ore in the river Without an adequate alternative from mining giant Vale some of the families from Naô Xohã who chose not to stay in the village ended up dispersing to the Belo Horizonte Metropolitan Area where they lived under precarious conditions school gymnasiums and slum houses on the outskirts of Belo Horizonte — for many in the Pataxó and Pataxó Hã-Hã-Hãe community the slum called Jardim Vitória was one of the most complicated locations With little space and unfamiliar daily routines the Indigenous people were subject to racial discrimination Indians belong in the Amazon’ or ‘Indians belong in the forest,’” tells Chief Angohó referring to the location where the new village of Katurãma is being built There were many stories of racial discrimination All of those who stayed temporarily in Jardim Vitória were called “urban Indians” and their ethnic heritage was constantly under question “They said racist things to us — that they had never seen Indians with light-colored eyes and dark skin the security guards would follow us around the whole time.” The people from the Naô Xohã and Katurãma communities are looking for solutions and are managing to survive because of donations and humanitarian aid These are necessary because not all the groups are included in Vale’s Preliminary Emergency Compensation Agreement The most help these people have received came neither from the government nor from the mining company: The Minas Gerais Nippo-Brazilian Cultural Association negotiated a Private Reserve of Natural Heritage in São Joaquim de Bicas with the community Part of the land was donated and part was sold for part of the compensation agreement the 36-hectare (89-acre) piece of land on the outskirts of São Joaquim de Bicas and just a few kilometers from Naô Xohã was chosen as the site for Katurãma village in 2021 the community continues to face a series of other problems One is the constant presence of squatters and wildcat miners in the territory a conflict that has been intensifying since the Pataxó moved there Community leaders tell of episodes ranging from threatening anonymous phone calls to poisoning of dogs belonging to the people living in the village The people had expected to gain support and protection from agencies like the Federal Police and Funai (the National Indigenous Peoples Foundation) These have not become a reality because their land is private property and not a federally demarcated territory why do we have to have demarcated land to be considered Indigenous Is our own demarcation not worth anything?” asks the chief of Katurãma Nearly two years after moving to the Japanese Forest the families still have not managed to build their homes due to the lack of resources and are still living in precarious structures built outhouses and three bathrooms for the 25 families living in Katurãma And as they are closer to the city than they were in Naô Xohã verbal assault and racism have become a larger part of the community’s day-to-day reality “We hear people say that this isn’t our place If we want to live in this forest inside the city We aren’t going to accept being told where we can live by other people,” affirms Angohó “We just want to live where we were meant to live: in the forest We want to eat fish baked in patioba leaves drink water from a spring and plant corn on our own land We just want to be free of sickness and of racism children of this land and we just want to be respected so we can live.” “We signed a Preliminary Emergency Adjustment Agreement which allows for actions to evaluate and remediate the impacts caused to the community that lived near to the Paraopeba Basin and maintain a permanent dialogue with the impacted communities always respecting their traditions and recognizing the autonomy and protagonism assured them by the Constitution.” The communities of Naô Xohã and Katurãma deny they are receiving the help they should from the company This story was reported by Mongabay’s Brazil team and first published here on our Brazil site on June 26 After the Mariana dam disaster in 2015 this time causing an even greater loss to human life Nearly 300 people died when a tailings dam collapsed in Brumadinho toxic sludge was released into the environment and contaminated water supplies and has continued harming ecological systems and individuals Pogust Goodhead is looking to hold TÜV SÜD to account after they certified the Brumadinho dam’s stability despite the clear warnings about its potential for destruction TÜV SÜD is a German industrial inspection company that granted the dam a safety certificate just months before its collapse The elements of the catastrophe were evident before it struck; news reports detailed structural problems blocked drainage pipes and water seeping from areas of the dam and the subsequent phenomenal force of mud We represent a diverse range of clients against multi-national corporations Pogust Goodhead (a trading name of PGMBM Law Ltd) SRA License Number 512898 Pogust Goodhead is authorised and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and complies with the Solicitors Code of Conduct, a copy of which can be located here Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome Content does not constitute legal advice or the creation of an attorney-client relationship You should not act or rely on the basis of information on this site without seeking the advice of an attorney is a limited liability company registered at Chamber of Commerce (no 83137718) with its registered office at Herengracht 433 is a Dutch law firm that has entered into a partnership with the law firms PGMBM Law Ltd and PGMBM Ltd with the purpose to cooperate in accordance with section 5.2 of the Legal Profession Byelaw (in Dutch: Verordening op de Advocatuur) focuses (as the other partners within the said partnership) on collective actions is the contracting entity in relation to services provided by lawyers working at PGMBM Nederland B.V Pogust Goodhead (a trading name of PGMBM Law Ltd) SRA License Number 512898.Pogust Goodhead is authorised and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and complies with the Solicitors Code of Conduct, a copy of which can be located here Science of the Total EnvironmentCitation Excerpt :Moreover human diseases could also occur through the incorporation of metallic elements into the trophic chain (Romão et al. more than four years after the B1 dam collapse severe risks to the environment persist in the Paraopeba River with potentially acute toxicological effects (Souza et al. The risks persist because the release of pollutants (e.g. metals) from the tailings deposit into the water column continues the event made its mark on the recent history of Brazil the intern Marina Costa had taken homemade bread and cake to eat with Lieuzo and her other colleagues in the blue tent erected at the top of the dam she was set to make her engagement official and also turn 25 years old the assistant Olímpio Gomes Pinto noticed the restless behavior of the oxen that were grazing in the region the supervisor Noel Borges de Oliveira felt hungry and decided to take his colleagues down and have lunch in the cafeteria The assistant Miraceibel Rosa was already gathering up the materials when Lieuzo noticed the blue tent sway despite being dragged for nearly a kilometer as she explains in the book “Arrastados: Os bastidores do rompimento da barragem de Brumadinho o maior desastre humanitário do Brasil” (Dragged: Behind the scenes of the Brumadinho dam collapse the biggest humanitarian disaster in Brazil) In the book in which she investigates the story of Lieuzo and other victims she says that Vale already knew there would be no chance of escape from the place that the company itself described as a “self-rescue zone”. “The mud continued on its course and, after passing over the railroad terminal, found no obstacle to prevent it from turning Vale’s administrative area, below the B1, into rubble. Just like the company predicted in its Flood Map, when it analyzed the possibility of a collapse of the dam nine months earlier,” wrote Arbex in her book “In the event of a hypothetical bursting of the dam the workshops and the Center for Discarded Materials the flow of mud could kill more than 200 people The final number was 270 – and firefighters are still looking for six more. nobody has been arrested or prosecuted in the case Vale and TUV SUD (which attested to the dam’s stability) were charged by the Federal Police While the Public Prosecutor’s Office waits for the case to be brought before the federal courts to file the complaint the Office of the Public Prosecutor for Labor Issues and Vale signed an agreement that provides compensation of BRL 700,000 to each spouse in addition to BRL 150,000 for siblings and a lifetime pension for dependents. According to Vale, more than 11,400 people have been compensated through individual agreements and labor compensation to date A total of BRL 2.7 billion has been committed of which BRL 2.5 billion has already been paid. The agreement also provides compensation for third parties. This is the case for the technician Lieuzo, who was up at the dam with his colleagues. However, in a statement on the television program Fantástico he said he never even received a call from the company. Vale also signed a BRL 37.7 billion settlement agreement with the Minas Gerais state government The agreement provides for cash transfer programs school renovations and public health clinics in the municipalities of the Paraopeba river basin basic sanitation projects and even the construction of a ring road in the metropolitan region of Belo Horizonte and improvements to the subway system. technical advisor for Caritas Minas Gerais the company conveys an image of ‘responsibility’ and of ‘settling due obligations’ although the situation has not essentially changed for the affected families there are many other dams still at risk of bursting in the same state driving even more families from their homes,” she said The company also benefits from the fact that it will be in charge of implementing some programs and works and from the elimination of some judicial investigations that would have been carried out independently thereby remaining in control of the reparation process.” In the third quarter of 2021 alone, Vale reported a net profit of USD 3.886 billion (more than BRL 21 billion), an increase of 33.6% from the same period a year earlier. The data were released by the company. Another factor that concerns organizations working in the field of social and environmental rights is the passage through the Senate of the bill that relaxes environmental licensing some types of dams may even be exempted from licensing with the exception of projects classified as having significant potential environmental impact the only requirement will be the so-called License by Adherence and Commitment which is issued automatically without verification to entrepreneurs who declare they will comply with environmental regulations Automatic licenses for entrepreneurs will therefore become the rule and licensing coordinator of the Defense of Socioenvironmental Rights program at Conectas “the draft text creates loopholes so that licenses for dams like the Rio Doce and Brumadinho tailings dams have less oversight and control making the occurrence of other large-scale environmental crimes possible”. In addition to all this, there is also the new Mining Code, which is being discussed in the Lower House of Congress. In a statement civil society organizations claim that the bill “centralizes excessive duties in the federal government and restricts the oversight of mining activities to the National Mining Regulatory Agency”. “The bill is not only technically and legally inconsistent but it also represents another dangerous risk to the environment and to all Brazilian society to facilitate access to mineral resources by misguidedly and dangerously relaxing rules and procedures to control environmental and social impacts and damages,” reads the statement signed by Conectas INESC (Institute for Socio-Economic Studies) 2025 - Conectas Human Rights - Postal Code 47 - São Paulo (SP), Brazil - ZIP: 01032-970 - Phone: +55 (11) 3884-7440 the report said.The Brumadinho dam burst in January 2019 in Minas Gerais state unleashing an avalanche of muddy mining waste which killed an estimated 270 people burying many of them alive.The internal report serves as a damning condemnation of the firm some of its employees and various auditors While concerns were raised at various points in time about the dam's safety those concerns were repeatedly ignored or minimized over the course of 16 years.In January state prosecutors charged Fabio Schvartsman the chief executive at the time of the burst A Brazilian state judge last week accepted the charges.The investigating team concluded that the dam burst was due to structural instability caused by liquefaction citing among other factors inadequate drainage of the reservoir and a dam that was not designed to contain liquefied material.Among their recommendations mostly referring to improved operating procedures the investigators said the company should evaluate the potential risks at other similar dam structures.Vale said in a securities filing that it has already addressed most of the issues mentioned in the recommendations with numerous steps to improve its internal controls.The company said it will announce a timetable for implementing all the those actions within 30 days.The report said that studies in 2016 had determined the dam was in "fragile" condition and subsequent 2017 studies determined its state was "barely marginal."However "resisted when it came to accepting the results of the 2017 study," the report said.The report added that in July 2016 then-Director of Coal and Ferrous Metals Peter Poppinga ordered that tailings cease to be deposited at the B1 dam reservoir "possibly as a result of security concerns relating to B1."Poppinga could not immediately be reached on Thursday evening.The move by a judge in Brazil's mining heartland of Minas Gerais follows charges filed by state prosecutors on Jan 21 accusing the former CEO and other 15 people of homicide.The report on Brumadinho was announced hours after Vale reported quarterly results that showed the company was still reeling from the disaster despite managing to limit the apparent effects of the dam burst on output.In a securities filing the company reported a $1.56 billion net loss in the fourth quarter.Vale severely missed quarterly profit and margin estimates largely due to impairments related to its base metal and coal operations and the lingering effects of the dam burst.Reporting by Anthony Boadle in Brasilia and Gram Slattery in Rio de Janeiro; Additional reporting by Marta Nogueira in Rio de Janeiro; Editing Sandra Maler Applied GeochemistryCitation Excerpt :Most studies were focused on specific impacts such as threats to water supply systems (Pacheco et al. 2022a) or impacts to the riverine ecosystem and adjacent affected areas (Buch et al. or human health (Cavalheiro Paulelli et al. A fewer number of studies were centered on causes recovery measures and prospective management or prognosis of contaminant evolution in the short to the long terms (Abreu and Andrade Reviews on the history of tailings dams' ruptures are also available (Islam and Murakami Science of the Total EnvironmentCitation Excerpt :In that regard precipitation may not reach 500 mm/year in the dry years but can be larger than 2000 mm/year in the rainy years the period from October to March concentrates 85–90 % of the annual precipitation (Pacheco et al. The relief of Paraopeba River basin is characterized by plateaus resulting from the action of morphoclimatic processes Please enable JS and disable any ad blocker