*Ali Gunes is professor of English literature at Istanbul's Sabahattin Zaim University
When I read news of agreement between Bahrain and Israel
I recalled at once the so-called “normalization” agreement between the United Arab Emirates and Israel on Aug
who called it a “historic breakthrough” toward “peace,” aimed not only to suspend Israel’s “controversial plan to annex parts of the occupied West Bank” but also to other interrelated bilateral agreements “regarding investment
and other areas of mutual benefit” between the two countries
it sounds nice and promising in the sense that the longstanding conflicts between the Gulf countries and Israel
particularly the conflict between Palestine and Israel
might be resolved through diplomatic negotiations in the Middle East
According to the contemporary perception of international relations and politics
as well as according to the common-sense view of life
it is what is expected of the countries to solve their disputes through political dialogues
the ambivalent and untrustworthy attitudes of the US and Israel
never assure us that they are sincere and reliable in their attempts to bring peace to the already-wrecked region because everyone knows that the US and Israel have never complied with any resolutions taken against their atrocities in the region
it is impossible to count how many peace attempts have failed without a genuine and fair end so that no one believes any peace attempt initiated by the US and Israel
just after the announcement of the so-called "normalization” agreement
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that “he had only agreed to "delay" the annexation
and that he would "never give up our rights to our land.” 
He continued to state that “There is no change to my plan to extend sovereignty
in full coordination with the United States.” 
just one day after the signing of the UAE and Bahrain deal
“the Israeli military carried out a series of air raids on the besieged Gaza Strip” targeting “areas in Deir al-Balah
as well as parts of Khan Younis in southern Gaza.” 
How could one trust this agreement which aims at bringing so-called “normalization” and “peace” to the Middle East
If this agreement does not give a sense of confidence
there may be several reasons that the US and Israel may have wanted to put into practice
the agreement allows both the US and Israel to employ the imperial “divide and conquer” policy to control and condition Gulf countries under the guise of so-called “normalization” and “peace” in a position
in which these countries have no chance but to follow what is ordered – that is
they organize their policies in line with what they are ordered
This coverup policy is a well-known tactic
often applied by neo-imperial powers to control their interest in a country or a region because they do not like to see a strong unity or a resilient leader against them
is using a “divide and conquer” policy
The “divide and conquer” policy could also be seen in the so-called “normalization” agreement between the UAE and Israel
This policy has broken up further not only the already-shaking Arab Unity and regional balance but it has also left Palestine alone in its rightful struggle against the Israeli occupation
Arab countries are divided among themselves
and probably Saudi Arabia and Oman may join them very soon
are on the one side with a sense of enmity
other Arab countries such as Qatar and Kuwait
They feel enmity towards each other as witnessed in the Qatar crisis in 2017
and Bahrain not only cut off their relations with but also imposed sanctions on Qatar
Arab countries seem to have lost both confidence and a sense of unity; when the sense of confidence is seriously damaged
makes Arab countries and their leaders dependent on external forces for their security and existence
Besides the “divide and conquer” policy
what is also of vital significance is that the so-called “normalization” agreement softens the Arab reaction against the Israeli occupation and gradually accustoms the Arab public to the new situation
and Arab countries have reacted strongly to the Israeli occupation of Palestine
which has brought about the confiscation of Palestinian land
and the death and immigration of millions of Palestinians since 1947
Egypt and Jordan signed peace accords with Israel
and recently the UAE and Bahrain joined them
the so-called “normalization” agreement may create a perception in the region that signing agreements and establishing diplomatic relations with Israel is not something scary but normal
yet it may give rise to a perception that justifies Israeli’s legitimacy and occupation in the region
Who will compensate for all the suffering and injustice committed against the Palestinians
Another result of the so-called “normalization” agreement between the UAE and Israel may be a veiled effort not only to expand the imperial space but also to form a bloc against Iran and Turkey in the Middle East
Iran is a non-Arab country and seems an arch-enemy of the US and Israel; Iran collaborates with Russia and China
which may threaten both the US imperial interest and Israeli security in the region
Hence Iran’s regional power and influence should be jettisoned and driven into a corner
Although Turkey is a NATO country and seems a close US ally
US policy towards Turkey in the region is ambivalent
and elusive in the sense that the US still continues to support the YPG/PKK terrorist group in Syria that has been carrying out terrorist acts against Turkey and killing civilians for decades
do not want a strong Turkey because a strong Turkey may influence Arab countries particularly using Islam and then turn them against the exploitation of the Middle East and its oil and resources by neo-imperial powers
yet the US and other imperial power will never allow Turkey to easily stand on its feet in the region
What they may prefer is that a weak and fragile Turkey
the impact of the so-called “normalization” agreement may also be seen in Turkey’s Libyan initiatives
Turkey has started developing political and economic relations with the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya under the leadership of Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj to help the war-torn country restore itself
But Turkey’s well-intentioned endeavor has been met with immediate reactions in the Middle East
probably taking courage from recent political maneuvers of the US and Israel in the Middle East
whose forces fight the GNA; they support Haftar politically and financially against Turkey
and Russia are against Turkey’s Libyan politics
it is also interesting that the UAE supports Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean
the UAE sent “four F-16 fighter jets to the Greek island of Crete for joint training exercises with its Mediterranean ally
Greece,” and “the jets will be deployed to Souda Air Base on Crete along with support staff
engineers and ground personnel and will carry out joint training with the Greek Armed Forces over the Eastern Mediterranean.” 
Is a country like UAE capable of acting in such ways
But how and why could the UAE act in such ways
These are the questions that must be asked
although the so-called “normalization” agreement among the UAE
and Israel was launched as a “historic breakthrough” to bring “peace to the Middle East
Countries like the UAE and Bahrain are seen in the foreground and used as pawns so that the story has multi-layered faces hidden from the public – Israeli security
the isolation of Turkey and Iran in the region
and the struggles over who will eat how much of the cake
Given these multi-layered facets of the story
the agreement appears beyond so-called “normalization” but targets a new strategic design of the Middle East whose further implications will be seen in the months and years to come
*Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu Agency
RIO DE JANEIRO — Brazil has suffered another mining dam collapse
though this time there are no reports of dead or missing
The Rondonia state environment secretary says the dam in Oriente Novo gave way after a waterspout damaged its structure on Friday
Authorities say there’s no risk of contamination from the water
sand and clay that spilled from the dam owned by the Metalmig company
A dam owned by mining giant Vale collapsed on Jan
killing at least 217 people and leaving 84 missing in Minas Gerais state
Vale said last week that auditors have determined that another dam in that state could collapse at any time and people in three cities practiced evacuation drills on Wednesday
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Just over two centuries since Napoleon's arrival in Egypt heralded the advent of the modern Middle East—some 80 years after the demise of the Ottoman Empire
and less than 20 years after the end of the Cold War—the American era in the Middle East
Much more likely is the emergence of a new Middle East that will cause great harm to itself
All the eras have been defined by the interplay of contending forces
What has varied is the balance between these influences
The Middle East's next era promises to be one in which outside actors have a relatively modest impact and local forces enjoy the upper hand—and in which the local actors gaining power are radicals committed to changing the status quo
Shaping the new Middle East from the outside will be exceedingly difficult
but it—along with managing a dynamic Asia—will be the primary challenge of U.S
The modern Middle East was born in the late eighteenth century
the signal event was the 1774 signing of the treaty that ended the war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia; a stronger case can be made for the importance of Napoleon's relatively easy entry into Egypt in 1798
which showed Europeans that the region was ripe for conquest and prompted Arab and Muslim intellectuals to ask—as many continue to do today—why their civilization had fallen so far behind that of Christian Europe
Ottoman decline combined with European penetration into the region gave rise to the "Eastern Question," regarding how to deal with the effects of the decline of the Ottoman Empire
which various parties have tried to answer to their own advantage ever since
and the division of the spoils of war among the European victors
dominated by France and the United Kingdom
This second era ended some four decades later
after another world war had drained the Europeans of much of their strength
and the two superpowers had begun to lock horns
"[He] who rules the Near East rules the world; and he who has interests in the world is bound to concern himself with the Near East," wrote the historian Albert Hourani
who correctly saw the 1956 Suez crisis as marking the end of the colonial era and the beginning of the Cold War era in the region
outside forces played a dominant role in the Middle East
But the very nature of U.S.-Soviet competition gave local states considerable room to maneuver
The high-water mark of the era was the October 1973 war
which the United States and the Soviet Union essentially stopped at a stalemate
including the Egyptian-Israeli peace accord
Yet it would be a mistake to see this third era simply as a time of well-managed great-power competition
The June 1967 war forever changed the balance of power in the Middle East
The use of oil as an economic and political weapon in 1973 highlighted U.S
and international vulnerability to supply shortages and price hikes
And the Cold War's balancing act created a context in which local forces in the Middle East had significant autonomy to pursue their own agendas
which brought down one of the pillars of U.S
showed that outsiders could not control local events
attempts to persuade them to join anti-Soviet projects
Israel's 1982 occupation of Lebanon spawned Hezbollah
And the Iran-Iraq War consumed those two countries for a decade
The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union brought about a fourth era in the region's history
during which the United States enjoyed unprecedented influence and freedom to act
Dominant features of this American era were the U.S.-led liberation of Kuwait
ground and air forces on the Arabian Peninsula
and an active diplomatic interest in trying to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict once and for all (which culminated in the Clinton administration's intense but ultimately unsuccessful effort at Camp David)
this period exemplified what is now thought of as the "old Middle East." The region was defined by an aggressive but frustrated Iraq
a radical but divided and relatively weak Iran
Israel as the region's most powerful state and sole nuclear power
top-heavy Arab regimes that repressed their peoples
uneasy coexistence between Israel and both the Palestinians and the Arabs
What has brought this era to an end after less than two decades is a number of factors
The most significant has been the Bush administration's decision to attack Iraq in 2003 and its conduct of the operation and resulting occupation
One casualty of the war has been a Sunni-dominated Iraq
which was strong enough and motivated enough to balance Shiite Iran
have come to the surface in Iraq and throughout the region
Terrorists have gained a base in Iraq and developed there a new set of techniques to export
democracy has become associated with the loss of public order and the end of Sunni primacy
And by tying down a huge portion of the U.S
It is one of history's ironies that the first war in Iraq
marked the beginning of the American era in the Middle East and the second Iraq war
One is the demise of the Middle East peace process
The United States had traditionally enjoyed a unique capacity to work with both the Arabs and the Israelis
But the limits of that capacity were exposed at Camp David in 2000
and the Israeli embrace of unilateralism have all helped sideline the United States
a shift reinforced by the disinclination of the current Bush administration to undertake active diplomacy
Another factor that has helped bring about the end of the American era has been the failure of traditional Arab regimes to counter the appeal of radical Islamism
Faced with a choice between what they perceived as distant and corrupt political leaders and vibrant religious ones
many in the region have opted for the latter
leaders to draw the connection between closed societies and the incubation of radicals
But their response—often a hasty push for elections regardless of the local political context—has provided terrorists and their supporters with more opportunities for advancement than they had before
It is now less difficult for radicals to acquire funding
has turned the Arab world into a "regional village" and politicized it
Much of the content shown—scenes of violence and destruction in Iraq; images of mistreated Iraqi and Muslim prisoners; suffering in Gaza
and now Lebanon—has further alienated many people in the Middle East from the United States
governments in the Middle East now have a more difficult time working openly with the United States
The outlines of the Middle East's fifth era are still taking shape
but they follow naturally from the end of the American era
A dozen features will form the context for daily events
the United States will continue to enjoy more influence in the region than any other outside power
but its influence will be reduced from what it once was
This reflects the growing impact of an array of internal and external forces
the United States will increasingly be challenged by the foreign policies of other outsiders
The European Union will offer little help in Iraq and is likely to push for a different approach to the Palestinian problem
China will resist pressuring Iran and will seek to guarantee the availability of energy supplies
will resist calls to sanction Iran and will look for opportunities to demonstrate its independence from the United States
Both China and Russia (as well as many European states) will distance themselves from U.S
efforts to promote political reform in nondemocratic states in the Middle East
Iran will be one of the two most powerful states in the region
Those who have seen Iran as being on the cusp of dramatic internal change have been wrong
is the most powerful external influence in Iraq
and holds considerable sway over both Hamas and Hezbollah
with ambitions to remake the region in its image and the potential to translate its objectives into reality
Israel will be the other powerful state in the region and the one country with a modern economy able to compete globally
The only state in the Middle East with a nuclear arsenal
it also possesses the region's most capable conventional military force
But it still has to bear the costs of its occupation of the West Bank and deal with a multifront
Israel is in a weaker position today than it was before this summer's crisis in Lebanon
And its situation will further deteriorate—as will that of the United States—if Iran develops nuclear weapons
anything resembling a viable peace process is unlikely for the foreseeable future
In the aftermath of Israel's controversial operation in Lebanon
the Kadima-led government will almost certainly be too weak to command domestic support for any policy perceived as risky or as rewarding aggression
Unilateral disengagement has been discredited now that attacks have followed Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon and Gaza
There is no obvious partner on the Palestinian side who is both able and willing to compromise
further hindering the chances of a negotiated approach
The United States has lost much of its standing as a credible and honest broker
Israel's settlement expansion and road building will continue apace
it will become a failed state wracked by an all-out civil war that will draw in its neighbors
the result of strong demand from China and India
limited success at curbing consumption in the United States
and the continued possibility of supply shortages
The price of a barrel of oil is far more likely to exceed $100 than it is to fall below $40
and other large producers will benefit disproportionately
and Palestinian areas are already growing more powerful
will emerge wherever there is a perceived or an actual deficit of state authority and capacity
The recent fighting in Lebanon will exacerbate this trend
since Hezbollah has gained by not suffering a total defeat
while Israel has lost by not realizing a total victory—a result that will embolden Hezbollah and those who emulate it
defined as the intentional use of force against civilians in the pursuit of political aims
and in societies where radical groups seek to weaken and discredit the government
Terrorism will grow in sophistication and remain a tool used against Israel and the presence of the United States and other nonindigenous powers
Islam will increasingly fill the political and intellectual vacuum in the Arab world and provide a foundation for the politics of a majority of the region's inhabitants
Arab nationalism and Arab socialism are things of the past
and democracy belongs in the distant future
The influence of Iran and groups associated with it has been reinforced
and efforts to improve ties between Arab governments and Israel and the United States have been complicated
tensions between Sunnis and Shiites will grow throughout the Middle East
causing problems in countries with divided societies
Arab regimes are likely to remain authoritarian and become more religiously intolerant and anti-American
Two bellwethers will be Egypt and Saudi Arabia
which accounts for roughly one-third of the Arab world's population
has introduced some constructive economic reforms
the regime seems intent on repressing what few liberals the country has and presenting the Egyptian people with a choice between traditional authoritarians and the Muslim Brotherhood
The risk is that Egyptians will one day opt for the latter
less because they support it outright than because they have grown weary of the former
the regime might take on the colors of its Islamist opponents in an effort to co-opt their appeal
in the process distancing itself from the United States
the government and the royal elite rely on using large energy proceeds to placate domestic appeals for change
The problem is that most of the pressure they have responded to has come from the religious right rather than the liberal left
which has led them to embrace the agenda of religious authorities
excludes the region's two most powerful states
The enduring Arab-Israeli rift will continue to preclude the participation of Israel in any sustained regional relationship
The tension between Iran and most Arab states will also frustrate the emergence of regionalism
Trade within the Middle East will remain modest because few countries offer goods and services that others want to buy on a large scale
and advanced manufactured goods will have to continue to come from elsewhere
Few of the advantages of global economic integration will come to this part of the world
Although the basic features of this fifth era of the modern Middle East are largely unattractive
There is a fundamental difference between a Middle East lacking formal peace agreements and one defined by terrorism
and civil war; between one housing a powerful Iran and one dominated by Iran; or between one that has an uneasy relationship with the United States and one filled with hatred of the country
Eras in the Middle East can last for as long as a century or as little as a decade and a half
It is clearly in the interest of the United States and Europe that the emerging era be as brief as possible—and that it be followed by a more benign one
The first mistake would be an overreliance on military force
As the United States has learned to its great cost in Iraq—and Israel has in Lebanon—military force is no panacea
It is not terribly useful against loosely organized militias and terrorists who are well armed
Nor would carrying out a preventive strike on Iranian nuclear installations accomplish much good
Not only might an attack fail to destroy all facilities
but it might also lead Tehran to reconstitute its program even more covertly
and persuade Iran to retaliate (most likely through proxies) against U.S
interests in Afghanistan and Iraq and maybe even directly against the United States
It would further radicalize the Arab and Muslim worlds and generate more terrorism and anti-American activity
Military action against Iran would also drive the price of oil to new heights
increasing the chances of an international economic crisis and a global recession
military force should be considered only as a last resort
The second mistake would be to count on the emergence of democracy to pacify the region
It is true that mature democracies tend not to wage war on one another
creating mature democracies is no easy task
and even if the effort ultimately succeeds
government must continue to work with many nondemocratic governments
It is plausible that young men and women coming of age would be less likely to become terrorists if they belonged to societies that offered them political and economic opportunities
But recent events suggest that even those who grow up in mature democracies
The fact that both Hamas and Hezbollah fared well in elections and then carried out violent attacks reinforces the point that democratic reform does not guarantee quiet
And democratization is of little use when dealing with radicals whose platforms have no hope of receiving majority support
More useful initiatives would be actions designed to reform educational systems
promote economic liberalization and open markets
encourage Arab and Muslim authorities to speak out in ways that delegitimize terrorism and shame its supporters
and address the grievances that motivate young men and women to take it up
the first is to intervene more in the Middle East's affairs with nonmilitary tools
troops and training of local military and police
the United States should establish a regional forum for Iraq's neighbors (Turkey and Saudi Arabia in particular) and other interested parties akin to that used to help manage events in Afghanistan following the intervention there in 2001
Doing so would necessarily require bringing in both Iran and Syria
which can affect the movement of fighters into Iraq and arms into Lebanon
should be persuaded to close its borders in exchange for economic benefits (from Arab governments
and the United States) and a commitment to restart talks on the status of the Golan Heights
there is a danger that Syria might be more interested in working with Tehran than with Washington
But it did join the U.S.-led coalition during the Persian Gulf War and attend the Madrid peace conference in 1991
two gestures that suggest it might be open to a deal with the United States in the future
But since regime change in Tehran is not a near-term prospect
military strikes against nuclear sites in Iran would be dangerous
diplomacy is the best option available to Washington
comprehensive talks that address Iran's nuclear program and its support of terrorism and foreign militias
Iran should be offered an array of economic
It could be allowed a highly limited uranium-enrichment pilot program so long as it accepted highly intrusive inspections
Such an offer would win broad international support
a prerequisite if the United States wants backing for imposing sanctions or escalating to other options should diplomacy fail
Making the terms of such an offer public would increase diplomacy's chances of success
The Iranian people should know the price they stand to pay for their government's radical foreign policy
With the government in Tehran concerned about an adverse public reaction
Diplomacy also needs to be revived in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
which is still the issue that most shapes (and radicalizes) public opinion in the region
The goal at this point would be not to bring the parties to Camp David or anywhere else but to begin to create the conditions under which diplomacy could usefully be restarted
The United States should articulate those principles it believes ought to constitute the elements of a final settlement
including the creation of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 lines
(The lines would have to be adjusted to safeguard Israel's security and reflect demographic changes
and the Palestinians would have to be compensated for any losses resulting from the adjustments.) The more generous and detailed the plan
the harder it would be for Hamas to reject negotiation and favor confrontation
officials ought to sit down with Hamas officials
much as they have with the leaders of Sinn Féin
some of whom also led the Irish Republican Army
Such exchanges should be viewed not as rewarding terrorist tactics but as instruments with the potential to bring behavior in line with U.S
The second opportunity involves the United States' insulating itself as much as possible from the region's instability
dependence on the Middle East's energy resources
goals that could best be achieved by reducing demand (by
increasing taxes at the pump—offset by tax reductions elsewhere—and promoting policies that would accelerate the introduction of alternative sources of energy)
Washington should also take additional steps to reduce its exposure to terrorism
vulnerability to terrorism cannot be entirely eliminated
But more can and should be done to better protect the U.S
homeland and to better prepare for those inevitable occasions when terrorists will succeed
Avoiding these mistakes and seizing these opportunities would help
but it is important to recognize that there are no quick or easy solutions to the problems the new era poses
The Middle East will remain a troubled and troubling part of the world for decades to come
It is all enough to make one nostalgic for the old Middle East
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 <a href="/authors/dana-stroul">Dana Stroul</a>
 <a href="/authors/christopher-s-chivvis">Christopher S. Chivvis</a>
 <a href="/authors/michael-knights">Michael Knights</a> and Hamdi Malik
 <a href="/authors/robert-s-ford">Robert S. Ford</a>
 <a href="/authors/patrick-vinck">Patrick Vinck</a>, <a href="/authors/salam-alsaadi">Salam Alsaadi</a>, <a href="/authors/geoff-dancy">Geoff Dancy</a>, <a href="/authors/oskar-timo-thoms">Oskar Timo Thoms</a>, and <a href="/authors/phuong-pham">Phuong Pham</a>
 <a href="/authors/philip-h-gordon">Philip H. Gordon</a>
 <a href="/authors/nataliya-gumenyuk">Nataliya Gumenyuk</a>
 <a href="/authors/ivo-h-daalder">Ivo H. Daalder</a> and <a href="/authors/james-m-lindsay">James M. Lindsay</a>
 <a href="/authors/tong-zhao">Tong Zhao</a>
 <a href="/authors/jenna-bednar">Jenna Bednar</a> and <a href="/authors/mariano-florentino-cuellar">Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar</a>
 <a href="/authors/zongyuan-zoe-liu">Zongyuan Zoe Liu</a>
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