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about 92.1 million persons reported being brown
which corresponds to 45.3% of the country’s population
this total had not exceeded the white population
which amounted to 88.2 million (or 4.,5% of the population in Brazil)
Other 20.6 million persons reported being black (10.2%)
whereas 1.7 million reported being indigenous (0.8%) and 850.1 thousand
These data come from the 2022 Population Census: Ethnic-racial identification of the population by sex and age
“The population census is the only survey that allows a deeper look all color or race categories and their evolution over the decades
It shows the diversity of our population,” explains Marta Antunes
coordinator for the Census of Traditional Peoples and Communities
the balck population grew by 42.3% and its proportion in the total population went from 7.6% to 10.2%
The brown population increased by 11.9% and its proportion in the country’s population rose from 43.1% to 45.3%
There was also an increase of 89% of the indigenous population
whose participation changed from 0.5% to 0.8%
we have observed changes in the percent distribution by color or race
resulting from the expansion of reports of brown
and a reduction of reports of the white population,” says Leonardo Athias
The share of the white population dropped from 47.7% in 2020 to 43.5%
The Asian population faced a significant decrease (-59.2%) and its share fell from 1.1% to 0.4%
having gotten back to levels of 1991 and 2000
The decrease of the Asian population is related to a procedure adopted in the 2022 Census: in case the interviwee reported being or indicated any resident as Asian
the enumerator should ask an additional standard question: “a person is of Asian color or race when they are of eastern origin: Japanese
Athias believes the new procedure added to this “drastic change” in the proportion of self-reported Asian persons
“The changes in percentages of categories of color or race have a multidimensional nature,” he adds
The brown population was the group with the highest percentage in the resident population of the North Region (67.2%)
The Northeast (59.6%) and Central West (52.4%) recorded figures above the national average
The percentages in the South (21.7%) and Southeast (38.7%) were below average
The South Region had the biggest percentage of white persons (72.6%)
Northeast (2.,7%) and North (20.7%) Regions
the percentages were below the national average
The Northeast had the biggest percentage of black persons (13.0%)
the Central West (9.1%) the North (8.8%) and the South (5.0%)
The Southeast had the highest proportion of Asian persons (0.7%)
Both the South and the Central West equalled the national average (0.4%) The Northeast (0.1%) and the North had the same proportions
The proportions of indigenous population in the North (4.3%)
Northeast (1.0%) and Central West (1.2%) exceeded the national average
The Southeast (0.1%) and the South (0.3%) had the lowest percentages
Pará had the biggest percentage of brown persons (69,9%)
Pará had the highest proportion of brown population (69.9%)
followed by Amazonas (68.8%) and Maranhão (66.4%)
The three states with the lowest percentages
The highest percentages of the white population were in Rio Grande do Sul (78.4%)
Bahia (22.4%) had the highest proportion of black population
with Rio de Janeiro (16.2%) and Tocantins (13.2%)
The lowest percentages were those of Santa Catarina (4.1%) Paraná (4.2%) and Amazonas (4.9%)
The highest percentages of the Asian population were in São Paulo (1.2%)
Paraná (0.9%) and Mato Grosso do Sul (0.7%)
Most federation Unit had less than 0.2% of Asian persons
The three Federation Units with the highest share of indigenous peoples were Roraima (15.4%)
Amazonas (12.5%) and Mato Grosso do Sul (4.2%)
the lowest proportions were those of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo
brown persons were the majority in 58.3% of the municipalities
The 2022 Census also shows the predominant color or race category for each municipality in Brazil
The brown population was the majority in 3,245 municipalities
or 58.3% of the total municipalities in the country
More than half of those municipalities (53.0% or 1,720) are located in the Northeast
Minas Gerais has the biggest number of municipalities (404) where persons who reported being brown made up more than 50% of the resident population
The municipality with the highest percentage of brown persons is Boa Vista do Ramos (AM) with 92.7%
The ten municipalities with the highest proportion of brown persons were Amazonas
The white population was the majority in 2,283 municipalities (or 41% of the total)
being half of those municipalities (or 1,143) in the South and 45.7% (or 1,044) in the Southeast
The North Region did not have any municipality with mostly white persons in the resident population
The three municipalities with the highest proportions of white persons were Morrinhos do Sul (RS)
Indigenous persons were the majority in 33 municipalities
five in the Northeast and in the central West (15.2% each)
four in the South (12.1%) and one in the Southeast (3.0%)
The three municipalities with the biggest number of indigenous persons were Manaus (AM)
The lowest proportions were those of Uiramutã (RR)
all of them located in the Northeast region
Eight of those municipalities were in Bahia (Antônio Cardoso
São Francisco do Conde e São Gonçalo dos Campos) and one
The municipality of São Paulo had the biggest number of black persons (1.16 million)
followed by Rio de Janeiro (968 thousand) and Salvador (825 thousand)
The municipalities with the highest proportions of black persons were Serrano do Maranhão (MA)
The Asian population was not the majority in any municipality and the highest proportions were those in Assaí (PR)
In 575 municipalities in Brazil none of the residents reported being Asian
black and brown persons expand their participation in the Legal Amazon population
65.2% (17,373,150) of the 26,650,798 resident persons reported being brown; 22.3
Whereas the population of the Legal Amazon grew by 9.3% between 2010 and 2022
the indigenous population in the area increased by 100.7% in the period
The black population grew by 43.3% and the brown population
Groups of color or race show demographic differences
The demographic structure of Brazil changed from 2010 to 2022
with people aging and an increase in the proportion of women
All the ethnic racial groups face an aging process
which are reflected in their current structure of sex and age
The white and brown population is the one presenting age pyramids closer to the resident population in Brazil
but with an older white population and a younger brown population
“There are a number of demographic and ethnic-racial criteria that can account for this different behavior of popualtion groups
these data can be dealt with in coming releases
But the ethnic-racial belonging criteria for the population vary in accordance with the social context and interracial relationships
and depending on the way people see themselves.”
The white population pyramid has a sex and age standard that is close to that of the Brazilian population
The pyramid for the black population has a lower proportion of chukdren aged up to 14 in comparison with the total population and a higher relative proportion of men aged 20 to 64 in relation to black women and in relation to the total population
The pyramid for the brown population is the one closer to the Brazilian population
since it has the biggest number of persons
youths and adults aged up to 34 years of age
The pyramid for the indigenous population shows a wide base with progressive narrowing
a higher proportion of the population aged 0 to 4 and progressive retreat
more pronounced for men and women aged 25 to 29 in comparison with the previous group (20 to 24 years of age)
Black and brown population increase participation in all age brackets
both the black and the brown population increased their participation among persons in all age brackets
The indigenous population had a similar behavior
having remained stable only in the grouo aged 60-74
The white and Asian population recorded decreases in all the age groups
there was a predominance of the brown population up to 44 years of age; from 45 on
the white population has the highest percentage
the white population is no longer predominant in the group aged 30-44
which started to have a majority of brown persons in 2022
The biggest percentages of brown persons were of persons aged 0 to 14 (49.3%) and 15 to 29 (48.7%); the lowest proportions were in the groups aged 60-74 (38.6%) and over 75 (33.8%)
the biggest percentage was in the group aged 75 and over (55.6%) and the smallest in the group aged 15 to 29 (39.4%)
The black population had its highest proportion in the group aged 30-44 (11.4%) and the lowest proportion among persons aged 0 to 14 (7.3%)
Indigenous persons have the biggest percentage among persons aged 0 to 14 (1.0%) and smallest percentage among persons aged 60-64 (0.3%)
The highest proportion of Asian persons was located in the group aged 75 and over (1.1%) and the lowest
Population aging is observed in all categories of color or race
The 2022 Census data allow the analysis of the age profile of each category
“We have witnessed the aging process of the resident population between 2010 and 2022
this aging process is observed in all the ethinc racial groups
with a growing participation of groups aged 30 and over and a decreasing presence of groups aged up to 29,” remarks the coordinator Marta Antunes
The Asian population is the group with the highest share of the population aged 60 and over
and also the group with the lowest percnetage of persons aged 0-14 (11.3%)
Black population has 103.9 men for every 100 women
The 2022 Census also presents indicators of median age
aging index and sex ratio by color or race
which shows the proportion of men per group of 100 women
which indicates there are more women than men in Brazil
The black population had the highest sex ratio (103.9)
being the only one with a bigger number of men than women
the sex ratio of the black population reached 122.1
The lowest one was that of the Asian population in the Northeast Region
The median age separates the youngest half of the population from the oldest half
the median age went from 29 to 35 years of age
The Asian population recorded the highest median age in 2022
being followed by the white population (37 years of age)
the brown population (32 years of age) and the indigenous population (25 years of age)
persons who reported their identity by answering the question “do you consider yourself an indigenous person”
represented by the number of persons aged 60 and over per group of 100 persons up to 14 years of age
That indicates there were 80 persons aged 60 and over for every 100 persons aged up to 14 in 2022
the Asian population recorded the highest aging index (256.5)
followed by the black (108.3) and the white (98.0) populations
The lowest aging indexes were recorded by the brown (60.6) and the indigenous population (35.6)
The latter answered the question “do you consider yourself an indigenous person.” All the groups recorded increases in the aging index against 2010
The Population Census is the main source of information about living conditions of the population in all the municipalities in the country and in its internal subdivisions
The results of the universe for the population by ethnic-racial identification
present the distribution of the resident population in the country by age groups and sex
besides some indicators obtained from these data
the aging index and the sex ratio for Brazil
urban concentrations and municipalities and for the legal Amazon
© 2018 IBGE - Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística
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there must be sufficient linkage disequilibrium between the markers and the causal mutations
The objectives of this study were to evaluate the extent of LD in ovine using the Santa Inês breed and to infer the minimum number of markers required to reach reasonable prediction accuracy
The mean LD between adjacent marker pairs measured by r2 and |D′| were 0.166 and 0.617
LD values between adjacent marker pairs ranged from 0.135 to 0.194 and from 0.568 to 0.650 for r2 for |D′| across all chromosomes
The average r2 between all pairwise SNPs on each chromosome was 0.018
SNPs separated by between 0.10 to 0.20 Mb had an estimated average r2 equal to 0.1033
The identified haplotype blocks consisted of 2 to 21 markers
estimates of average coefficients of inbreeding and effective population size were 0.04 and 96
LD estimated in this study was lower than that reported in other species and was characterized by short haplotype blocks
Our results suggest that the use of a higher density SNP panel is recommended for the implementation of genomic selection in the Santa Inês breed
genetic markers scattered across the genome offer an opportunity to conduct genome-wide association studies (GWAS) to characterize genes underlying genetic variation for traits of interest
it is possible to define the density of genetic markers necessary to achieve a certain accuracy of prediction and to determine when the estimates of genetic marker effects should be updated
It has been well documented that simply increasing marker density does not improve prediction accuracies
Although increased marker density improves resolution
it can also decrease power and add noise to the analyses by the use of non-informative SNP
increased marker density can dilute individual marker effects if
two markers are associated with the same QTL and the two markers are in high LD with each other
LD estimates between different breeds can be informative relative to the overall diversity level in a species and the selection level applied to them
we also aimed to provide an estimate of the marker density required for genomic studies in the Santa Inês breed
Considering the confidence interval obtained for the estimates presented in this study as well as in the studies previously reported
it is possible to assume that estimates of r2 and |D′| across all SNP combinations on a chromosome are relatively consistent across sheep populations
Linkage disequilibrium (LD) measured by r2 plotted as a function of intermarker distance (Mb) for chromosomes 1 (OAR1) and 24 (OAR24).
Linkage disequilibrium (LD) measured by |D′| plotted as a function of intermarker distance (Mb) for chromosomes 1 (OAR1) and 24 (OAR24)
Higher levels of r2 (greater than 0.70) were found at distances between markers smaller than 0.768 Mb with 3,296 combinations of SNPs (0.01% of all combinations)
distances lower than 5.277 Mb were observed with 273,659 combinations of SNPs (0.849%)
Considering low levels of r2 (lower than 0.16) distances found were higher than 15.110 Mb with 31,939,376 combinations of SNPs (99.140%)
The expectation of D at generation t can be derived from c (the recombination rate) and \({N}_{e}\). This is given by38:
The average distance (SD) between markers that formed the haplotype blocks was 0.04 (0.033) Mb
Considering the size of the sheep genome and the average distance between SNP that formed the haplotype blocks
it was possible to indirectly infer the minimum number of markers needed for genomic analyses
due to the high standard deviation of the distance between markers that formed the haplotype
it is important to use this number with caution
The extent of LD among adjacent markers for the Santa Inês breed resembled those of previously reported results in other breeds of domesticated sheep
The mean LD values between all SNP pairs on each chromosome were consistent with domestic and wild sheep (Ovis canadensis and Ovis dalli) and they were lower than the estimates reported in other species
The findings reported in this study will be useful to provide a theoretical reference in determining the number of markers needed for future GS and GWAS in Santa Inês sheep
All experimental procedures employed in the present study that relate to animal experimentation were performed in accordance with the resolution number 07/2016 approved by Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee Guidelines from the School of Veterinary Medicine of University Federal of Bahia – UFBA and sanctioned by the president Prof
Claudio de Oliveira Romão to ensure compliance with international guidelines for animal welfare
The dataset included the genotypes of 396 animals from the Santa Inês sheep breed collected between 2016 and 2017
These animals were fed in confinement for 54 to 92 days on average
during four different periods with slightly different nutritional management
This herd is located at the Experimental Farm of São Gonçalo dos Campos
and it is associated with the Federal University of Bahia (UFBA)
Hierarchically clustered heatmap of the genomic relationship among the individuals
there is a histogram (green line) of the number of pairs of individuals (y axis = count) at each relationship degree (x axis = value)
A vertical dashed green line is on the relationship degree equal to zero
there is a heatmap of the relationship among the individuals
the color gradient from dark red to light yellow represents the variation of the relationship degree from low to high
DNA was extracted from tissue samples of the Longissimus dorsi muscle collected from the left hemi-carcass and stored in 2.0 milliliter (ml) Eppendorf tubes
DNA extraction was performed according to protocols for lysis buffer and RNase
A high-density SNP panel (Illumina High-Density Ovine SNP BeadChip®) containing 54,241 SNP was used for genotyping
Chromosomal coordinates for each SNP were obtained from the ovine genome sequence assembly
Therefore, by solving equation (4)
the \({N}_{e}\,\,\)by chromosome was the result of a harmonic mean due to a relatively small number of SNPs in each chromosome
The physical distance was transformed to genetic distance considering one Mb as one centimorgan (cM)
The squared correlation between the markers, given by r2, is expressed as7:
where \(\,{D}^{2}={({\rho }_{AB}-{\rho }_{A}{\rho }_{B})}^{2}\)
\({\rho }_{A}\,\,\)is the probability of allele A at marker 1
\({\rho }_{a}\) is the probability of allele a at marker 1
\({\rho }_{B}\) is the probability of allele B at marker 2
and \({\rho }_{b}\) is the probability of allele b at marker 2
four LD estimates were obtained: (1) |D′| between adjacent SNPs; (2) |D′| between all pairwise SNPs; (3) r2 between adjacent SNPs; and (4) r2 between all pairwise SNPs
Blocks were partitioned according to whether the upper and lower confidence limits on estimates of pairwise |D′| measure fall within certain threshold values
The desired SNP panel density was estimated by the ratio of the megabase pair over the entire ovine genome and distance between markers that composed the haplotype blocks
All experimental procedures involving sheep were approved by the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee Guidelines from School of Veterinary Medicine of University Federal of Bahia – UFBA and sanctioned by the president Prof
All experiments were performed in accordance with relevant guidelines and regulations
Prediction of total genetic value using genome-wide dense marker maps
Efficient methods to compute genomic predictions
Linkage Disequilibrium in Humans: Models and Data
Miller, J. M., Poissant, J., Kijas, J. W. & Coltman, D.w. The I. S. G. C. A genome-wide set of SNPs detects population substructure and long range linkage disequilibrium in wild sheep. Mol. Ecol. Resour. 314–322, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-0998.2010.02918.x (2011)
Extent of genome-wide linkage disequilibrium in Australian Holstein-Friesian cattle based on a high-density SNP panel
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Estimation of linkage disequilibrium for loci with multiple alleles: basic approach and an application using data from bighorn sheep
Linkage disequilibrium compared between five populations of domestic sheep
Linkage disequilibrium over short physical distances measured in sheep using a high-density SNP chip
Genetic diversity of a New Zealand multi-breed sheep population and composite breeds’ history revealed by a high-density SNP chip
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Genome-wide analysis of the world’s sheep breeds reveals high levels of historic mixture and strong recent selection
Population structure and history of the Welsh sheep breeds determined by whole genome genotyping
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Components of the accuracy of genomic prediction in a multi-breed sheep population
Using a very low-density SNP panel for genomic selection in a breeding program for sheep
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Study of whole genome linkage disequilibrium in Nellore cattle
Allele frequencies and the r2 measure of linkage disequilibrium: impact on design and interpretation of association studies
Population structure and inbreeding effects on growth traits of Santa Inês sheep in Brazil
Estimation of linkage disequilibrium and effective population size in New Zealand sheep using three different methods to create genetic maps
Linkage disequilibrium and inbreeding estimation in Spanish Churra sheep
effective population size and ROH-based inbreeding coefficients in Spanish Churra sheep using imputed high-density SNP genotypes
Genome-wide analysis in endangered populations: A case study in Barbaresca sheep
ARCO. Assistência aos rebanhos de criadores de ovinos - Associação Brasileira de Criadores de ovinos. http://www.arcoovinos.com.br/index.php (2017)
Genome-wide population structure and evolutionary history of the Frizarta dairy sheep
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Michailidou, S. et al. Genomic diversity and population structure of three autochthonous Greek sheep breeds assessed with genome-wide DNA arrays. Mol. Genet. Genomics, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00438-018-1421-x (2018)
Estimation of linkage disequilibrium in four US pig breeds
Estimations of genomic linkage disequilibrium and effective population sizes in three sheep populations
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and genomic information for genetic evaluation of Holstein final score
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This work was supported by São Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP- Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo; process: 2015/25024-5 and 13/04504-3)
is recipient of productivity fellowship from CNPq
We are indebted to the Federal University of Bahia (UFBA
Brazil) for the partnership to sheep production and Biotechnology Lab (ESALQ- USP
University of São Paulo (USP)/Luiz de Queiroz College of Agriculture (ESALQ)
Luiz Lehmann Coutinho & Gerson Barreto Mourão
Luís Fernando Batista Pinto & Gleidson Giordano Pinto Carvalho
are responsible for designing the research
analyzed the data and drafted the manuscript
provided the biological material and phenotypes
participated in the collection of samples for DNA extraction and L.L.C
corrected and contributed with important modifications to the manuscript
All authors reviewed and approved the last version of the manuscript
The authors declare no competing interests
Publisher's note: Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations
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Rio de Janeiro state promised improvements in public security in preparation for the Olympics
but it has not done enough to address extrajudicial executions by police
a central obstacle to more effective law enforcement
Unlawful police killings have contributed to the unraveling of the state’s ambitious efforts to improve public security
Rio police have killed more than 8,000 people in the past decade
Many police killings were most likely the result of the legitimate use of force
but many others were extrajudicial executions
Police in the state of Rio de Janeiro have killed more than 8,000 people in the past decade
One fifth of all homicides in the city of Rio last year were police killings
Three quarters of those killed by police were black men
The Rio police report nearly all such killings as legitimate acts of self-defense in response to attacks by suspected criminals
Given that police in Rio often face real threats of violence from heavily-armed gangs
many of these killings are likely the result of the legitimate use of force
They shoot people in the back as they are fleeing
They execute people who have been detained with a bullet to the head
Police officers involved in these unlawful killings routinely seek to cover up their criminal behavior
They remove corpses from crime scenes and deliver them to hospitals
claiming they were trying to “rescue” them
Human Rights Watch first documented this pattern of killings and cover-ups in our 2009 report Lethal Force
which exposed 35 cases in which there was credible evidence that police officers sought to cover up unlawful killings
Since then we have documented an additional 29 such cases
including 12 that occurred in the past two years
The 64 cases reflect a much broader problem
who told Human Rights Watch that a large number of the “shootouts” reported by police in the state in recent years were in fact extrajudicial executions
Official government data supports this conclusion
To understand the causes and consequences of these killings
Human Rights Watch conducted in-depth interviews with more than 30 police officers
most of whom serve in favelas—as the city’s low-income neighborhoods are known—with high numbers of reported shootouts
Several recounted their experiences with the use of lethal force; two described participating in extrajudicial executions
Unlawful killings by police take a heavy toll—not only on the victims and their families—but also on the police force itself
The killings fuel cycles of violence that endanger the lives of all officers serving in high-crime areas
poison their relationships with local communities
and contribute to high levels of psychological stress that undermine their ability to do their jobs well
The officers responsible for unlawful killings and cover ups are rarely brought to justice
told Human Rights Watch he believed a large percentage of the reported shootouts were “simulated,” but conceded that his office had prosecuted only a “very small” number of police killings
He blamed this failure on the poor quality of the investigations conducted by the state’s civil police
criminal investigations are initiated by investigators within the state’s civil police force
and that those investigations have been woefully inadequate
responsibility for ending this impunity ultimately lies with Rio de Janeiro’s Attorney General’s Office
which has legal authority to oversee the work of the police investigators
as well as to carry out its own investigations
Human Rights Watch presented its findings and recommendations in multiple meetings with authorities in Rio de Janeiro—including the then-governor
the authorities have implemented several of our recommendations as part of a much broader effort to improve policing in the state
This broader effort—whose centerpiece was the implementation of a community policing model in high-crime areas—initially showed great promise
The numbers of police killings and overall homicides decreased significantly between 2009 and 2013
But this effort now appears to be unraveling
in large part because the state failed to address what is perhaps the most important factor in allowing unlawful police killings to continue: impunity
Rio authorities have recently taken several steps to improve how cases involving police killings are handled—including
the creation of a special prosecutorial unit focusing on police abuse
These measures could have an important impact
but only if the state attorney general and public security secretary take additional steps—outlined in this report—to strengthen them
these initiatives are allowed to fall short
it will be very hard for Rio to make real progress in reducing unlawful police killings and improving public security
Human Rights Watch’s interviews with more than 30 Rio police officers revealed a routine disregard for international standards
and internal police regulations governing the use of lethal force
Officers attributed the excessive use of lethal force to a pervasive “culture of combat” and corruption within military police battalions
Several military police officers recounted their own involvement in violent encounters
including two who told of direct participation in executions
One described his participation in an operation in which a fellow officer executed a suspected drug trafficker as he lay injured on the ground
and said he feared he would be killed if he reported what happened
Another recounted an incident in which he and other police officers set an ambush for suspected gang members
gunning them down as they fled from other officers
then planted guns on their two victims as they lay dead and dying in the street
He also described participating in torture
Human Rights Watch found substantial credible evidence that many persons killed in alleged shootouts were in fact executed by police officers
the officers’ accounts of the shootings appeared incompatible with the autopsies or other forensic reports
the autopsy reports detailed gunshot residue patterns consistent with the victim having been shot at point blank range
witness testimony or other evidence indicated there was no shootout
military police reported that they had injured a man in a shootout in the Morro da Coroa favela
Yet an autopsy showed he had been shot seven times
And a witness at the scene of the shooting reported having seen the victim injured but alive on the ground
hearing a single burst of gunfire shortly after the police arrived
and three hours later seeing police take the victim’s lifeless body away
While it is impossible to determine the precise scope of extrajudicial executions by police
official government statistics are consistent with the view of local criminal justice officials that the practice is widespread
The high number of police killings—more than 8,000 since 2006—is all the more dramatic when viewed alongside the comparatively low numbers of non-fatal injuries of civilians and police fatalities in those same incidents or areas of operation
This disparity suggests that in many cases police report killings as the result of armed confrontations that did not happen
For each officer that died while on duty in Rio in 2015
a rate that is more than double that of South Africa and triple that of the United States
The disparity was even more dramatic in the 10 police districts with the highest number of reported “shootouts”: the police units in these zones were responsible for 483 killings in 2015 while suffering 15 police fatalities
Rio police killed five people per each person they injured from 2013 to 2015
police officers sought to cover up the criminal nature of the killings
One common technique was to remove a shooting victim’s corpse from the crime scene
and claim that the removal was an attempt to “rescue” the victim
These false “rescues” serve to destroy crime scene evidence while providing a veneer of good faith on the part of the police
police officers forged evidence by placing a gun in the victim’s hand and firing it
Some officers threatened witnesses to discourage them from reporting what they have seen
police officers tortured and killed the 14-year-old son of the witness of an earlier execution in the Salgueiro favela as a means to intimidate her
Only eight of the 64 cases that Human Rights Watch examined went to trial
and only four cases ended with convictions of police officers involved in the killings
prosecutors did not even seek indictments despite credible evidence that the police sought to cover up an unlawful killing
All the state justice officials with whom Human Rights Watch spoke—including the attorney general—said police officers responsible for unlawful killings are rarely brought to justice
Official data lends support to their assessment
though a lack of up-to-date and reliable information makes it difficult to determine the precise scale of this impunity
The Attorney General’s Office reported to Human Rights Watch that it had filed charges in only four—or one-tenth of one percent—of the 3,441 police killings recorded between 2010 to 2015 (though in fact we documented 15 cases from these years in which prosecutors filed charges)
The most recent state-wide study of prosecutions of police killings
a professor at Rio de Janeiro´s Federal University
found that of all the killings by police that occurred in 2005
Police investigators routinely fail to conduct proper inquiries into police killings
disregarding basic tenets of homicide investigation
there was no record of the police investigators ever having conducted a crime scene analysis
Often they do not question all police officers involved in a killing
do not seek out and interview non-police eyewitnesses
Brazil’s Constitution grants the Attorney General’s Office the legal authority to exercise “external control” of the police forces
This includes making sure the civil police conducts thorough and professional investigations when there is evidence that police themselves have committed crimes
Prosecutors have several tools at their disposal to ensure that police conduct more thorough investigations—from institutional pressure
to referral of officers who fail to conduct or impede investigations for disciplinary action
Yet Rio’s Attorney General’s Office has consistently failed to use these tools and fulfill its constitutional responsibility
Where civil police do not conduct adequate investigations
the Attorney General’s Office has the power to conduct its own independent inquiries
the Attorney General’s Office has rarely used that power to investigate police killings
Prosecuting police killings in Rio is possible
and civil police officers made a concerted effort to address the issue
Prosecutors filed charges against 107 military police officers—about 15 percent of the troops in the military police battalion in São Gonçalo during that period
The number of police killings in the city subsequently dropped by 70 percent
Some police officers had warned that this effort to promote accountability would impede police work and result in a rise in crime
but the number of robberies and overall homicides in São Gonçalo also declined
Progress came to a halt when the judge was murdered by some of the police officers who were facing prosecution
the number of police killings climbed again and is now higher than in 2008
To serve as a military police officer in Rio can be extremely dangerous
largely due to the heavily-armed and violent criminal gangs that operate in many of the city’s low-income neighborhoods
Officers interviewed by Human Rights Watch described having to face these gangs with poorly-maintained weapons and vehicles
as well as inadequate training that leaves them unprepared to respond to life-threatening situations
Illegal killings by fellow officers make an already dangerous job even more so
is that gang members are less likely to surrender peacefully to police when cornered if they believe they will be executed while trying to surrender or once in custody
Unlawful killings may also stoke anti-police sentiment
which may motivate criminals to kill police whenever they have the opportunity
Several officers told Human Rights Watch that they avoid public transportation and do not carry their police identification while off-duty
The fear of being recognized as police officers during robberies
pushes officers to draw their guns quickly if they happen upon a robbery while off-duty
even if they are facing several criminals alone
Some police officers are killed in the ensuing shootouts
which explains why one in six people killed during robberies in Rio is an off-duty police officer
more immediate impact on police units: the perpetrators’ fellow officers must choose between keeping quiet and even participating in the cover up—and thus breaking the law themselves—or speaking up and facing reprisals that can be deadly
Two police officers told Human Rights Watch that they felt pressured by superiors to participate in unlawful killings
The Disciplinary Code of the Military Police of Rio de Janeiro offers them little choice but to comply if that pressure takes the form of a direct order: it does not protect a police officer who refuses to obey illegal orders
The biggest disincentive to reporting or objecting to their fellow officers’ crimes is the threat of death at the hands of the officers involved in misconduct
Several members of the military police told Human Rights Watch that they would not report fellow officers for fear those officers would kill them or attack their families
Participation in unlawful killings or cover ups with impunity may also have an insidious impact on police officers’ overall conduct
Rio officers who can successfully rationalize their own misconduct may find it easier to cross the line the next time
They may also be more likely to engage in corruption and other crimes
Multiple studies have found that Rio’s military police officers suffer from very high levels of psychological stress
mental health care for military police officers is very limited
Some 70 psychologists provide counseling to the 48,000-member military police—a ratio of 1 for every 686 officers—and there are no psychiatrists
Very few officers see a psychologist after participating in a violent encounter
Police abuses also undermine public security by driving a wedge between the community and the police
The current difficulties faced by the community policing units—called Pacifying Police Units (UPPs)—show how mutual mistrust opens the door to an increase in violence
UPPs led to a decrease in crime and police killings initially
but unlawful killings and other police abuses have played a central role in the unraveling of the project
Authorities in Rio de Janeiro have recently taken important steps to address the problem of police killings
In addition to the creation of the special prosecutorial unit focusing on police and prison abuses—called the GAESP—civil police are now assigning cases of police killings to its three homicide divisions
and military police have instituted a pilot program to outfit military police with “body worn cameras.”
fall far short of what is needed to end impunity for unlawful police killings and cover ups
and break the cycle of violence that has prevented Rio’s police from properly protecting the communities they serve
Rio de Janeiro’s Attorney General’s Office should:
This report is based largely on 88 interviews carried out in Rio de Janeiro from November 2015 to May 2016
including interviews with 34 current and former military and civil police officers
and members of non-governmental organizations
We also examined 64 cases where there was credible evidence that the police had sought to cover up an unlawful killing. These include 35 cases originally documented in the 2009 Human Rights Watch report Lethal Force[1]—most of which occurred between 2006 and 2009—and 29 cases that came to our attention since then
In the vast majority of these cases we obtained the case files—including statements by police officers and witnesses
and autopsy and other forensic reports—from prosecutors
In some cases we also interviewed the families of the victims and witnesses
as well as civil police officers who investigated the cases and military police officers who had direct knowledge about what happened
some publicly available and some that the Public Security Institute
provided to Human Rights Watch upon request
Most low-ranking military police officers whom we interviewed requested that their names not be used for fear of being disciplined by their superiors for their comments
Four military and civil police officers who talked about illegal activities within the police
asked us to withhold their identities for fear of being attacked or killed by fellow officers
We also withheld the names of some victims and favela residents for security reasons
we have indicated so in the relevant citations
All interviewees were informed of the purpose of the interviews and that their interviews might be used publicly
No incentives were offered or provided to persons interviewed
The interviews were conducted in Portuguese
we visited three Pacifying Police Units (UPPs)—military police units based in favelas—a military police battalion
and two civil police stations within Rio de Janeiro’s metropolitan area
Human Rights Watch’s interviews with more than 30 Rio police officers and the 64 cases we reviewed revealed a routine disregard for international standards
and the military police’s internal regulations that govern the use of lethal force
Some officers attributed the excessive use of lethal force to a pervasive “culture of combat” and corruption within military police battalions
Two military police officers interviewed separately by Human Rights Watch admitted participating in executions
Both said that the use of unlawful force was routine within battalions in which they worked
They also gave details of widespread corruption–one of them admitted benefiting from it–and accused higher-ranking officers of taking kickbacks from drug traffickers
Both said they feared being killed if identified
Human Rights Watch has withheld their identities and some details of the situations they described to preserve their anonymity
Both were serving as mid-ranking military police officers at the time of the interviews
Danilo’s first deployment after military academy was in a battalion in a high-crime region of Rio de Janeiro’s metropolitan area
(We have withheld the exact date to preserve his identity.)
Killing suspected gang members was a routine practice in the battalion, he said.[2] “Killing criminals was required as good performance by my superiors,” he said
Danilo recalled witnessing a high-ranking official scolding a lieutenant for detaining a man who had an assault rifle instead of killing him
“There cannot be a man alive with an assault rifle,” he recalled the official saying
Danilo said that the objective of some operations he participated in was to kill suspected drug traffickers because officers believed that was necessary to fight crime
officers carried out killings to further their own corrupt activities
Danilo said that some police officers kidnapped traffickers
Some police officers also executed people to become known among traffickers as killers and thus be able to extort more money from them
officers accepted money from traffickers in return for allowing them to operate unmolested by law enforcement
those directly involved with drug traffickers were low-ranking officers
while higher-level officers “squeezed” the lower-ranking officers to get a cut
his police battalion would get about 120,000 reais (about US$34,000) from drug traffickers operating in dozens of favelas
“The money is to keep us from going into the favela
That’s an arrangement common enough in Rio de Janeiro that it has a name: “the fix” (“o arrego”)
Danilo admitted he participated in several operations in which the police executed injured suspected gang members
and he described one of them to Human Rights Watch
when a group of police officers entered a favela in the north of Rio de Janeiro
The reason for the raid was to kill drug traffickers and confiscate their weapons
That would demonstrate that crime was strong in the area and thus explain the high robbery rates
which the battalion was under pressure to reduce
While most of the police officers left the favela after the operation
a strategy that police call “Troy,” in reference to the famous ruse used by the ancient Greeks
They chose the house because it had line of sight to a point of sale of drugs
They waited for someone to appear with an assault rifle
and they decided to attack several men who had handguns and were surrounded by drug users
fired their assault rifles from a distance
The police officers approached the injured man
and one of them and killed him as he lay on the ground
“I did not report what happened because I was afraid of being killed myself
Those people have no scruples,” he said of his fellow police officers
He also feared corrupt police officers would kill him because he did not bring drug money to his superior officers
He eventually obtained a transfer out of the battalion
João is a military officer with experience in several battalions in Rio de Janeiro’s metropolitan area.[3] He joined the force because it offered a good career path
João was a member of a tactical unit within a battalion—a Tactical Action Group (GAT
you have to kill and confiscate weapons,” he said
João described to Human Rights Watch several operations whose objectives were not to detain suspects but to kill them
including one employing the “Troy” ruse described in Danilo’s account just above
they used a private car to approach a favela
They lay down in the foliage in an area they knew to be an escape route for suspected drug traffickers
while another group of officers entered the favela from the opposite side
while the other fell to the ground with several gunshot wounds
One of the officers then went to get guns to plant on the suspects
(João said he did not know where he got them.) Meanwhile
“We wanted him to die there,” João admitted
they fired some shots with them and placed them in the hands of the suspects
local residents started congregating around them
They threw the injured man into the back the car and the dead man on top of him
They got to the hospital about an hour after the shooting
whereas they could have been there in about 20 minutes if they had left right away
The approximately eight police officers who participated in that operation went to the civil police station afterwards
That was their standard procedure after they committed unlawful killings: only two of the officers would report participating in a shootout
They would alternate which two so that none would accumulate a larger record of kills that might appear suspicious
“The civil police do not ask every person who shoots a weapon to give a statement,” João said
The two police officers told the civil police that they were attacked when they entered the favela and shot back in self-defense
the same narrative they used for all killings
João and some fellow military police officers entered a house chasing “three or four” youth who had fled upon seeing the police
João believes they were about 18 years old
The police officers found two guns hidden in the house and believed there could be more
(They did not torture the girls.) They took them
and placed an empty ice bag over their heads to asphyxiate them
(A regular plastic bag would not work because victims can tear them with their teeth
João explained.) They kicked them in the ribs
“We did not use electric shocks because we did not have the gadget”used to apply them
None of the men revealed the existence of more weapons
the officers took them to the civil police station
where they were charged with the possession of the two guns
“We were not afraid that they would accuse us (of torture) because we did not leave any marks
involving a man believed to have killed a woman for being friendly to the police during a police operation in a favela
Police officers found the man in his house and proceeded to beat him so severly until he “did not have strength even to shout,” João said
“The torture was not to obtain information” but to punish him
It might seem that João took the law into his own hands in the belief that his mission was to put an end to crime
João was taking kickbacks from drug traffickers
The “arrego”—or payments—arrived regularly at the dormitories of the battalion where he served
Drug traffickers paid up to more than 2,000 reais a day (about US$600) to each of the police officers on duty over the weekend
The payments were in exchange for not conducting operations in favelas
Of the two successive commanders who were in charge of the battalion while he was there
João also told Human Rights Watch that a member of a drug-trafficking gang approached him to betray the drug trafficker's boss
The man’s objective was to enrich himself and climb the crime ladder
in cooperation with other military police officers
They stopped the car that the boss was riding in and took him to an area not covered by public cameras
They obtained a ransom of money and jewelry for his release
which they split among those participating in the plot
including the member of the gang who betrayed his boss
The officers released the hostage unharmed
in reference to article 157 of the Penal Code
João works in a different military police battalion now
He said he would not tell on his former fellow officers
“They would not think even a millisecond before killing me or my family,” he said
The state military police, the 48,000-strong force that patrols the streets, are responsible for the vast majority of killings, while the state civil police, the 9,000-strong force that investigates crimes, carried out the rest, according to official data obtained by Human Rights Watch.[6]
police report the killings as legitimate acts of self-defense in response to gunfire by criminal suspects
and official statistics strongly suggests that a substantial portion of these cases are in fact extrajudicial executions
Brazilian law governing use of force by police personnel dictates that they should only use “necessary means with moderation” in reaction to an “unjust attack
current or imminent,” against themselves or someone else
This is substantially in line with international human rights standards
which provide that any use of force should be proportionate to the threat confronted
Police officers in Rio de Janeiro often face real threats of violence from members of criminal gangs
and many reported shootout deaths are likely the result of legitimate use of force by officers during confrontations
The pattern of unlawful police killings revealed by the cases we studied remains the same as the one documented in the 2009 report
the evidence indicates that the killing occurred after an alleged shootout had ended
the evidence shows that no “shootout” took place at all
These cases of police officers falsely reporting extrajudicial executions as legitimate killings are not isolated incidents
Senior officials within Rio state’s criminal justice system told Human Rights Watch that a large portion of reported police killings fit the pattern
Moreover, and as discussed in more detail below, the ratio of people the police have killed in alleged shootouts to the number of people people injured gives further reason to believe that a significant number of police killings in Rio state are extrajudicial executions.
autopsy reports show gunshot entry wounds at the back of the head or nape of the neck
injuries that would seem unlikely in most shootout situations but are consistent with executions
witness accounts also contradict police reports of what happened in some cases
In at least 14 of the 64 cases that Human Rights Watch reviewed
witnesses described police killings in terms that
Recent cases in which witness evidence suggests that an extrajudicial execution occurred include:
The spread of patrol car and cell-phone video has brought to light a number of cases in which officers appeared to open fire without justification on people who were unarmed and who did not appear to pose any threat to the officers
or fail to preserve evidence that is vital for determining whether the killing was lawful
Human Rights Watch documented the repeated use of several tactics to cover up misconduct and suppress information
These include false “rescues,” the planting of evidence
Some police officers in Rio de Janeiro routinely remove the bodies of people killed by police from crime scenes and deliver them to hospitals in what they claim are “rescue” attempts
While these false “rescues” give the appearance of legitimate effort by officers to help victims
in reality they destroy crime scene evidence and hinder forensic analysis
Of the 32 cases Human Rights Watch examined in which police took a shooting victim to the hospital
the victims were dead on arrival in at least 27
Police officers in Rio de Janeiro do not typically provide medical assistance or transport to the hospital for people in any context other than police killings, whether the incident involves a traffic accident or an attempted homicide, several police officers and a prosecutor told Human Rights Watch. Instead, police call medical services and preserve the site.[25]
Military police officer João told Human Rights Watch that the job of police is “to call emergency services” when they encounter victims of traffic accidents or an attempted homicide because police are not trained to provided medical help
he told Human Rights Watch of an instance in which he carried out an extrajudicial execution with his unit
planted guns on the two people they had just shot
and waited 40 minutes to take them to the hospital
(One was already dead and the other died at the hospital
transporting the victims to the hospital was an attempt to hide what really happened
In many of the cases that Human Rights Watch examined in which police took people they had shot to the hospital
they were not only declared dead on arrival
but autopsy reports indicate that the wounds were so severe that the victims most likely died at the scene
or after a victim’s body was taken to the hospital (or perhaps by the hospital itself)
But what is clear is that some of those who are subject to purported rescue attempts arrive for their autopsies naked
In addition to removing victims improperly
some police officers alter crime scenes in other ways before forensic teams arrive (if they arrive at all)
Officers sometimes fabricate evidence of shootouts by placing a gun in the victim’s hand and firing it
They also sometimes remove evidence of an unlawful killing or plant fake evidence of criminal behavior
Human Rights Watch found that police officers who appear to have carried out extrajudicial executions allegedly threatened witnesses
and in one case faced criminal charges for killing a witness’s son
Such threats create a pervasive fear of testifying against the police
which makes it hard to hold police officers accountable for abuses
Allegations of witness intimidation by police continue to be reported in the Brazilian media and by other non-governmental organizations, including three recent cases in which witnesses claimed police officers pointed their guns at them and threatened them if they talked about what they saw, and in one case in which a police officer shot at the witness without hitting him.[47]
The failure of Brazilian authorities to investigate police killings thoroughly and systematically makes it impossible to give a precise estimate of how many such cases are extrajudicial executions.However
several criminal justice officials who worked on the cases examined by Human Rights Watch said they believe that the problem is widespread
Rio de Janeiro Attorney General Marfan Martins Vieira said that “a large proportion of the killings by police are a blatant fraud, and shootouts are faked.”[48] Prosecutor Alexandre Themístocles de Vasconcelos—who is responsible for cases in two areas of Rio with very high numbers of police killings—told us that “in the vast majority of cases, there is no shootout.”[49]
Moreover, the high number of people killed during supposed “shootouts” contrasts with the low number of people injured in those incidents—the reverse of what one would expect. According to official records obtained by Human Rights Watch, on-duty police injured 324 people during the period from 2013 through 2015, while they killed 1,645 people, a ratio of five people killed for each one injured.[52]
The high ratio of killed to injured is even more surprising given that two military police colonels who were part of the military police command in 2015 told Human Rights Watch that the police force’s shooting aim is very poor.[53] Many police officers interviewed by Human Rights Watch themselves complained that marksmanship training is deficient
and insufficient training in the lawful use of force all contribute to high numbers of extralegal killings by police
and military police internal regulations restrict the use of lethal force to what is unavoidable
and necessary for the safety of civilians and police
Yet instead of following the laws and regulations
officers in Rio de Janeiro often obey the unwritten rules of a police culture that encourages armed confrontation—and sometimes even measures success by the number of suspected gang members killed
When police establish illegal relationships with criminals—whether involving extortion
or other crimes—they may kill either to exact retribution or to establish their stature and power within those relationships
and he highlighted the importance of crime prevention
which he says is his main focus at the UPP he commands.)
That attitude remains widespread today, according to current and former police officers interviewed by Human Rights Watch.[64]
Many unlawful police killings are linked to police involvement in corruption, according to prosecutors and civil and military police officers interviewed by Human Rights Watch. “The covered-up police killing, the summary execution, is one of the methods used by the bad police officer to establish his control over a specific area and to be able to extort drug traffickers there,” said prosecutor Paulo Roberto Cunha.[66]
While about half of Rio de Janeiro’s population is black, blacks comprised more than three quarters of those killed by police in 2015.[71] Most of these victims were young men
Source for Rio de Janeiro’s population: IBGE. [73] Source for police killings: ISP. [74]
“Police officers only kill where it is accepted by society, in the favelas,” said retired Colonel Ubiratan Angelo, a former commander general of the military police of Rio de Janeiro, who is himself black.[74]
Studies done by Ignacio Cano, a professor at the State University of Rio de Janeiro, show that police in Rio de Janeiro shoot more often in favelas than other parts of the city. They also show that when police shoot at black favela residents, they are almost twice as likely to kill their targets when they shoot at white residents, according to official data analyzed by Cano.[75]
Adriana Perez da Silva believes police officers opened fire at a car in which five young men were riding on November 28, 2015, because of the color of their skin.[76] “I think they killed them because there were three black youth in the car,” she told Human Rights Watch
One of those killed was her 16-year-old son
childhood friends who lived in nearby Lagartixa favela
had spent a day at a public park and were on their way to have a snack
Cleiton Corrêa de Souza, 18, another of the victims, had signed up for the Navy and was about to start training, his stepfather, Jorge Augusto Vieira, told Human Rights Watch.[78] “It was precisely the military police that took his life
They put an end to his dream and to ours.” Vieira said his hope now is that there is justice
The killing became a big news story in Rio de Janeiro
especially after the media showed images of the car riddled with 63 bullet holes
and prosecutors moved quickly to charge the officers with homicide and tampering with evidence
The attorney general attributed this ongoing impunity to a failure by the civil police to properly investigate these cases
“Criminal investigations (of police officers who kill) do not exist,” Vieira told Human Rights Watch
“It is not that they do not go forward; they do not exist.” If civil police do not investigate properly
Civil police investigations of police killings are indeed often flawed
Human Rights Watch found serious deficiencies in the police inquiries in nearly all of the cases documented in Lethal Force
and in nearly all the cases we have examined since
These include the failure to visit and examine the scenes of police killings and failure to interview witnesses
Rio’s Attorney General’s Office has consistently failed to meet its responsibility to ensure adequate investigations and provide “external control” over the police forces
the Office rarely prosecutes them in a serious manner
the cases have stalled for many years until prosecutors ask judges to close them for lack of evidence
despite credible evidence that the police sought to cover up an unlawful killing
Only eight out of the 64 cases resulted in trials
and convictions were obtained in only four
Nearly all officials we spoke with said that police officers implicated in extrajudicial executions are rarely brought to justice. Former Colonel Robson Rodrigues da Silva, who was the deputy commander general of the military police when Human Rights Watch interviewed him 2015, said the Attorney General’s Office “only acts when there is a high-profile case.”[94]
A study of prosecutions of police killings in Rio de Janeiro coordinated by Michel Misse, a professor at Rio de Janeiro’s Federal University, found that of all the killings by police that occurred in 2005, prosecutors had, by 2007, filed charges in fewer than 1 percent.[97]
Amnesty International obtained the list of investigations of police killings opened by civil police in 2011 in the city of Rio de Janeiro. Of all those 220 investigations, prosecutors had, by April 2015, filed charges in only one case.[98]
In 2015, Rio de Janeiro’s police ombudsman received 402 complaints from citizens accusing military and civil police officers of committing various crimes—including malfeasance, extortion, corruption, and homicide—and from those complaints, civil police investigators opened only three criminal investigations.[99] The Attorney General’s Office did not file charges in a single one
The internal affairs divisions of the military and civil police opened 34 inquiries which resulted in the suspension of one officer and a warning to another
Under Brazilian law, the cover-up tactics detailed in chapter 2—destroying a crime scene, planting evidence, and intimidating witnesses—constitute criminal offenses, namely procedural fraud and threat.[100]
Vigorously prosecuting police officers for committing such crimes could play a vital role in efforts to curb police extrajudicial executions
Incriminating evidence of cover-up techniques is often readily available
Even in certain cases in which it might be difficult to mount a full-blown homicide prosecution
sufficient evidence might exist to charge officers with a crime related to obstruction of justice
The prosecution of these cover-up techniques could serve as a powerful deterrent for police officers who might otherwise help to conceal their colleagues’ violent crimes
By discouraging collusion in cover ups—and thereby making it harder for police officers to disguise extrajudicial executions—these prosecutions could also discourage them from committing these violent crimes in the first place
these cover-up techniques are not prosecuted on a regular basis
police officers were convicted for manipulating the crime scene in only two
in at least 27 of the 64 cases the victims were dead on arrival when police brought them to the hospital; in at least seven cases witnesses alleged that police officers planted drugs or guns; and in at least two cases police officers allegedly tried to hide the victims’ bodies
Lethal Force showed that civil police investigators were routinely failing to meet the most basic requirements of a homicide inquiry when handling cases involving killings by police.[102]
In 2011, two years after the report’s publication, then-chief of the state’s civil police, Martha Rocha, issued a set of protocols for the investigation of police homicides, which included requiring investigators to visit the scene of police shootings, take statements from all police officers involved in the incident,and interview the doctors who cared for the victim.[103] The 2011 rules also allowed investigators to deploy CORE
the elite civil police unit with ample experience in operations in favelas
Yet the 19 cases we examined since show that the 2011 rules are not being consistently observed
and that the failure by civil police to properly investigate cases of police killings appears to continue unabated
The most glaring shortcomings that Human Rights Watch encountered in a review of investigations by civil police include the failure to visit or examine the scene of the shooting
and the failure to conduct proper interviews of police and witnesses
“A police patrol may go there two or three days later to summon a family member (of the person killed) to make a statement,” prosecutor Alexandre Themístocles de Vasconcelos said.[105] But they do not go to the site of the shooting while the scene is fresh
Civil police investigators failed to take statements from all police officers involved in police killings in at least 30 of the 64 cases we documented.[111]
Rather than investigate what may have been an unlawful killing by police
the investigator turned his attention solely to Nascimento’s alleged crimes
The two officers who said they shot the suspects were listed not as persons under investigation
The civil police investigators did not interview or even inquire about the other police officers who participated in the operation
did not interview the person who survived the shooting
The 2011 rules and Brazil’s Code of Criminal Procedure require civil police to interview separately all officers involved in a killing,[114] so that none of them hear what the others say
But in most cases that Human Rights Watch examined
statements made by police officers interviewed by civil police were almost identical and followed a narrative that was repeated again and again
in interviews that could only be described as cursory
Taking turns to give a statement to the civil police was common practice among corrupt military police officers who formed death squads that committed kidnappings, extortion, and murders in the city of São Gonçalo between 2008 and 2011, according a civil police investigator who worked on those cases.[117] While in some instances they just abandoned the victim’s body
faking shootouts and presenting the victims as drug traffickers who had attacked them
the only witnesses whom civil police interviewed were the officers who said they participated in the alleged shootout
In cases in which a victim is taken to the hospital, the 2011 rules instruct civil police investigators to interview the relevant doctors.[118] This is particularly useful in uncovering cases in which police officers take a dead body to the hospital to alter a crime scene
Civil police interviewed the doctors involved in only one of the 64 cases we documented
Investigating killings by police should actually be easier than other homicides, said prosecutor Paulo Roberto Cunha.[119] When a police officer kills somebody
and witnesses often include other police officers
Investigators do not have to hunt for a suspect
as in most other homicides; they just have to verify whether the evidence supports or contradicts the version of events the police officer provides
“That is why the failure to properly investigate is even more inexcusable,” he said
Two BOPE military police officers said to civil police investigators they injured two men
in a shootout in the Sereno favela on January 15
but the autopsy reports contradict their version of events
The two stated their unit came under fire from eight attackers whom they chased
The police officers took them to the hospital in BOPE’s armored vehicle
Below (under the text box) are the separate statements of the two officers
The wording of the statements is virtually identical: the only real difference between the two
The autopsy reports said Fulgencio suffered one shot in the leg and two shots close to each other at point-blank range that sectioned his aorta
Mendonça’s autopsy showed he was shot in the buttocks and was missing the top part of his skull and his whole brain
The two police officers said that after exchanging fire with the eight suspects
and they walked up to the place where the suspects had been
This account does not explain the two point-blank shots that killed Fulgencio or how a man without encephalic mass could still be alive
The gravity of the injuries both victims sustained makes it very likely they died at the site
Civil investigators did not interview other officers who participated in the operation
or the doctors at the hospital who supposedly treated the two men
Statement by military police officer Wallace Reinaldo do Nascimento:
Statement by military police officer Josinaldo Vieira do Nascimento:
Attorney General Marfan Martins Vieira said that prosecutors play “a passive role” in handling cases of unlawful police killings: “He waits for what is sent by the (civil) police because he has other things to do.”[121]
the state Attorney General’s Office has a duty and the power to control the quality of investigations
Even without implementation of the 2015 resolution
prosecutors already have tools to ensure that investigations into police killings are thorough—from applying institutional pressure (see below)
prosecuting civil police investigators for malfeasance
the Attorney General’s Office has failed to properly carry out its duty to hold police officers responsible for recurring grave flaws in investigations
it has helped enable the continuation of the illegal use of force and cover ups
In order to ensure thorough investigations, prosecutors can request in writing that civil police investigators take specific actions in an inquiry, such as carrying out forensic analysis of a piece of evidence or searching for witnesses. Investigators have an obligation to comply with such requests.[129]
Investigators respond in writing to such requests. Paper case files—which have no electronic backup and usually contain no pictures of the evidence—can go back and forth between civil police investigators and prosecutors for years, a process that Michel Misse of Rio de Janeiro’s Federal University has called a “ping pong game.”[130] When civil police investigators fail to respond to requests
prosecutors sometimes neglect to follow up
which causes cases to stall for many years
When civil police investigators repeatedly fail to comply with a request, prosecutors can ask judges to issue an order for “search and apprehension” of a piece of evidence in the hands of the civil police, including a forensic report.[133] Prosecutor Themístocles de Vasconcelos says he used that measure in 11 cases in 2015 and 2016, but it also seems rare.[134]
Prosecutors can also report police investigators who fail to comply with the minimum requirements of a homicide investigation to the civil police internal affairs division. The 2011 rules on investigations into killings by police expressly stipulate that non-compliance shall be considered a disciplinary infraction.[135]
In extreme cases, such as where a civil police investigator repeatedly fails to comply with the minimum requirements for inquiries into police killings, prosecutors can file criminal malfeasance charges. Brazilian public servants can be held criminally accountable when they fail to properly carry out their duties “due to personal interest or disposition.”[138]
The chief of Rio’s civil police, Fernando Veloso, told Human Rights Watch that some police officers, just like other members of Brazilian society, may support the unlawful killing of certain suspects.[142] In those cases where the failures to investigate are glaring and the result of a personal disposition
criminal prosecution of civil police officers would be warranted
Human Rights Watch has found not a single instance in which prosecutors indicted a civil police investigator in a police killing case
Prosecutors who are getting inadequate cooperation from civil police investigators have the authority to carry out their own criminal investigations, hear witnesses, obtain evidence, and even file charges even before they get a report from the civil police.[143]
In its 2015 resolution, the National Council of the Offices of Prosecutors recommends state prosecutors to take their own investigative steps, such as interviewing families of victims and witnesses, “when necessary.”[144] Yet prosecutors in Rio de Janeiro rarely exercise this option in cases of police killings.[145]
even when the autopsy report and other forensic evidence debunked police assertions of a shootout
In such cases as the following, prosecutors asked judges to close cases[146] despite strong evidence that a victim was extrajudicially executed by police
The following examples contain strong indications that the police took a dead person to the hospital to alter the crime scene
but in both cases prosecutors requested that the case be closed for lack of evidence and the judges granted the request:
A relatively small number of battalions are responsible for most of the killings by police in Rio state
and in some cases individual officers have been involved in an unusually large number of incidents
Yet the Attorney General’s Office has not directed special scrutiny at those units and officers with the deadliest records
Seventy percent of all killings by police in 2015 were committed in the territory covered by 10 of the 41 military police battalions of the state of Rio de Janeiro. In addition, anecdotal evidence exists that BOPE and CORE, elite units within the military and civil police forces, commit a disproportionate number of unlawful killings, but no public data exist on the number of people killed during their operations.[150]
Anecdotal evidence shows that some officers have been involved in many killings. The recurring participation of individual police officers in multiple killings should be grounds for special scrutiny.[151] Yet neither the police nor the Attorney General’s Office has made any effort to find out who those officers are, let alone properly investigate their actions.[152]
Former Colonel Ibis Pereira, who was adjunct to the commander general of the military police in 2015, told Human Rights Watch that the command of the military police “does not know who the police officers who kill the most are.”[154] Pereira also said that during his 30-year career on the force
“No prosecutor ever came to the battalion to ask why a police officer had been involved in so many killings and why he was still working.”
A systematic effort to advance accountability was carried out in São Gonçalo
a city of a million people within Rio de Janeiro’s metropolitan area
A trial judge of the court dedicated to homicides
set investigating killings by police as a priority
with the support of local civil police investigators
They were motivated by a 2008 police killing that one of the officers involved confessed had been an extrajudicial execution, Cunha told Human Rights Watch.[156] The officer further revealed that police patrols commonly kept drugs and non-police weapons in their cars to plant at the scenes of illegal police killings to falsely incriminate victims as drug traffickers
police officers were to call emergency services
just as they would for any other homicide victim or victim of a traffic accident
Police could only take a victim to the hospital if a relative traveled along
Acioli supported Cunha’s efforts by accepting charges filed by prosecutors in cases of killings by police and by ordering preventive detention for police officers so charged. In addition, she accompanied Cunha to crime reconstructions in favelas. “She was the only judge who did that,” civil police officer Artur told Human Rights Watch.[159]
Meanwhile, civil police investigators discovered the participation of about 60 police officers and another 50 former police officers in death squads in São Gonçalo, said Artur, the civil police investigator, who worked on those cases.[160] Those illegal groups received payment from local merchants to “clean” the commercial areas
and they did so by killing suspected criminals
They also kidnapped suspected drug traffickers and asked for ransom
they would kill the hostage for fear that the family would contact the authorities
The members of the death squads also killed several witnesses to their crimes who were not involved in illegal activities
They masked some of these murders as killings in self-defense during police operations in favelas
Between October 2008 and June 2011, prosecutors filed charges against 107 military police officers—about 15 percent of the troops in the 7th Military police Battalion in São Gonçalo.[161] The slow pace of Brazil’s judicial system yielded only three trials
which resulted in one not-guilty verdict and the conviction of five officers
Colonel Samir Vaz Lima, the commander of the military police battalion in São Gonçalo, told Human Rights Watch that the surge in killings by police was due to the increased activities of drug traffickers.[168] Yet the volume of drugs apprehended decreased by 25 percent between 2013 and 2015.[169]
Moreover, a metric of the ammunition usage developed in 2015 by the State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) in collaboration with the military police shows that police officers in São Gonçalo shoot more often than police officers in other battalions, even after taking into account differences in crime levels.[170]
Source: Public Security Institute [171]
Unlawful police killings take an enormous toll
not just on the victims’ families and the communities in which they live
They contribute to cycles of violence that make the job of policing ever more dangerous—including for police officers who have no involvement in killings
Unlawful police killings can also take a very serious psychological toll on those who stand by and let it happen
and on the officers who are simply made to serve in an environment where serious crimes by their colleagues are met with impunity
The current difficulties faced by Pacifying Police Units (UPPs)
Rio de Janeiro’s most ambitious effort to improve policing in years
show how mutual mistrust opens the door to an increase in violence
Unlawful police killings can also endanger officers’ lives by antagonizing the law-abiding citizens of the communities they patrol, said several officers interviewed by Human Rights Watch.[175]
source ISP[180]
more immediate impact on officers in the units of those who commit them: their fellow officers must choose between keeping quiet and even participating in the cover up—and thus breaking the law themselves—or speaking up and facing reprisals that can be deadly
While there are variety of factors that contribute to high levels of stress among police officers, a principal one is the fear of being killed, according to the 2014 study and to officers interviewed by Human Rights Watch.[193]
Unlawful police killings compound this fear by fueling the kill-or-be-killed dynamic in which criminals may be more likely to shoot than turn themselves in
Current and former high-ranking police officers told Human Rights Watch that officers who are stressed and afraid tend to shoot more often, contributing to the shoot-or-be-shot dynamic that leads to more unlawful killings by police.[203]
As we saw in chapter 2, there is often a close connection between unlawful use of force by police and other criminal acts. It is routine practice among some police officers, for example, to keep weapons, money, and jewelry that they steal from suspected traffickers during police operations in poor neighborhoods, police officers and favela residents told Human Rights Watch. The police call such thefts “war spoils.”[206]
Some police officers and prosecutors told Human Rights Watch that some unlawful killings are linked to extortion, as illustrated by the examples given by police investigator Artur and prosecutor Fabiola Lovisi in chapter 2, and by the case below.[207]
“The main accomplishment of UPP is to protect us from the police,” a resident of the Morro da Providência favela told Human Rights Watch. “We no longer have a death squad going up the favela and killing people,” he added.[214]
Perhaps the most glaring shortcoming of the state’s new approach to public security was its failure to address lack of accountability for police abuses. Given the ongoing climate of impunity, it was not surprising that there were eventually unlawful police killings within favelas where the UPPs were operating—incidents which badly undermined the trust the UPPs intended to build, according to residents and police commanders.[217]
After declining precipitously in the years following the UPPs’ unveiling in 2008, police killings in neighborhoods with UPPs increased 20 percent in 2014 and 30 percent in the first half of 2015.[220] Homicides in these areas rose 40 percent in 2014 and 51 percent in the first half of 2015.[221]
The increase in killings by police deployed in UPPs made it more difficult for the police to get local residents to report crimes, provide information about illegal activities, and come forward to testify as witnesses. It proved hard to ask citizens to denounce criminals in their midst when the police did not do the same.[224]
The breakdown of trust between police and community around UPPs has benefited criminals and corrupt police officers
according to favela residents and police officers
Criminals have found an opportunity to reclaim some of the territory they lost with the implementation of UPPs
When unit commanders are in close contact with the community, residents send them tips about corrupt activities by police officers, and this is less likely when trust is eroded, said military police officer Ronaldo.[229]
Summary, extrajudicial, or arbitrary executions are prohibited under international law. Those prohibitions are derived from the right to life guarantees under article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR).[230]
The UN Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary, and Summary Executions also provide guidelines on how to carry out proper investigations. For instance, they maintain that investigators should collect and analyze “all physical and documentary evidence and statements from witnesses.”[237] The document
also says that “those conducting the autopsy must be able to function impartially and independently of any potentially implicated persons or organizations or entities....”[238]
In addition, the principles state that governments should provide “fair and adequate compensation within a reasonable period of time” to the families of victims of extrajudicial executions.[239]
In addition, international law applicable to Brazil prohibits torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment in all circumstances.[240] Governments are obligated to ensure “prompt and impartial investigations” of possible cases of torture.[241]
Brazilian law limits the use of force by police to “necessary means with moderation,” in reacting to an “unjust attack, current or imminent,” against the officer or someone else.[242]
the general commander of the military police of Rio de Janeiro issued an ordinance that replaced the 1983 rules
the use of a firearm in self-defense—or in response to a suspect who uses a lethal weapon in resisting arrest—must be “exceptional and never exceed what is strictly necessary.” The ordinance also reaffirms the prohibition on warning shots and shots to prevent flight
and it adds a procedure to be followed “in all cases” before an officer opens fire:
This procedure aligns with principle 10 of the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.[245]
Rio de Janeiro has pursued several ambitious and innovative policies aimed at improving the effectiveness and professionalism of its police
These include the UPP program discussed in chapter 4
as well as the System of Goals and Results Tracking (Sistema de Metas e Acompanhamento de Resultados)
a program that entails compiling and monitoring crime statistics
setting crime reduction targets for each policing district (Área Integrada de Segurança Pública
and providing monetary rewards in the form of bonuses to all police officers in areas that meet those targets
Several state institutions share responsibility for this ongoing impunity
including the military police for failing to ensure that its officers preserve the evidence that investigators need to determine the lawfulness of police killings
and the civil police for failing to conduct proper investigations
lies squarely with the Attorney General’s Office
for failing to exercise its oversight authority of the police with appropriate vigor
failing to conduct its own investigations of police killings
and failing to prosecute cases where evidence was available to do so
All three institutions have recently taken positive steps to rectify this failure
But these steps fall far short of what is needed to end impunity for unlawful police killings and cover ups
Rio de Janeiro’s Attorney General took a major step forward in December 2015 by creating a special prosecutorial unit—called the Group of Specialized Action in Public Security (GAESP, in Portuguese)—to investigate unlawful killings and other abuses by police, as well as abusive practices in prisons.[248]
There are several very important benefits to having a prosecutorial unit that focuses on police killings throughout the state: the members of the unit can develop expertise in evidentiary and legal dimensions of this type of case; they can analyze patterns of abuse and recognize modi operandi; and they can identify and investigate specific police units and individual officers responsible for large numbers of potentially unlawful killings
the GAESP will need to take steps that the Attorney General’s Office has until now largely failed to take
GAESP prosecutors should respond to investigatory failures by civil police investigations—depending on their nature and severity—with institutional pressure
referrals to the internal affairs unit of the police
The GAESP currently faces several very serious limitations that could prevent it from fulfilling these functions and making progress in prosecuting unlawful killings
the Attorney General will need to take the following crucial steps:
it is too late to monitor the crucial early stages of the civil police investigation
To prevent the GAESP from being blocked from investigating cases by the very prosecutors who for years have failed to investigate these cases properly
the attorney general should grant the GAESP prosecutors concurrent jurisdiction over police killings
so that they can pursue investigations without authorization from the prosecutor designated by law
The civil police took an important step in 2016 by beginning to assign cases of police killings to its three homicide divisions
these specialized divisions handled only high-profile cases
while the vast majority of police killings were handled by investigators within regional precincts
It was these precinct investigators who were responsible for most of the investigatory failures documented in chapter 3—the failure to visit crime scenes
to have forensic experts conduct crime scene analyses
and to carry out proper interviews with the police officers
Of the 64 cases examined by Human Rights Watch
the homicide divisions handled nine and their investigations were more thorough
Their investigators interviewed non-police witnesses and had forensic experts conduct crime scene analyses in all nine cases
and carried out crime reconstruction in eight of them
the precinct investigators interviewed non-police witnesses in only 14 of the remaining 55 cases
The investigations by the homicide divisions led to indictments in eight of the nine cases
involving a killing which occurred in 2015
only 12 of the 55 cases handled by the regional precincts led to indictments
In early 2016, investigators from the homicide divisions began handling all cases involving police killings in several areas of the city of Rio de Janeiro.[257] This is a welcome step
given the homicide divisions’ superior expertise and record in investigating these cases
the civil police should take the following additional steps to maximize the impact of this new policy:
the Rio military police were experimenting with a pilot project to outfit police with “on-officer recording systems,” also known as “body worn cameras.” Launched in conjunction with the Igarapé Institute (a non-governmental organization) and Jigsaw (a technology incubator created by Google)
the initiative is called Smart Policing and entails monitoring the activities of patrolling police officers through “CopCast,” an open source app installed on smartphones
The phones record and store video and audio feeds together with the GPS coordinates of police officers while they are on patrols
The feeds can be live streamed where there is wi-fi or 4/3G connectivity
allowing commanders to monitor patrols in real time
The phones are positioned on a vest pocket and set to record at all times
Officers may interrupt recording temporarily when necessary to protect their privacy or that of others
but they must provide a justification for the interruption
The use of body worn cameras by patrolling officers can play a critical role in reducing impunity for unlawful police killings
The video and audio recordings of events prior
and after a shooting can provide civil police investigators and prosecutors with information that could be enormously valuable in determining whether use of force was lawful
and whether patrolling police provide false testimony
or in any other way sought to cover up a crime
The use of body worn cameras could also have important benefits for police officers as well
In cases where the use of force was in fact legal
the recordings could protect them from false accusations to the contrary
In cases where some officers use unlawful force
it could help shield other officers from pressure to participate in a cover up
since the recordings would render such efforts futile
As of June 2016, the pilot program had so far involved only 60 military police officers in four low-income neighborhoods.[265] The military police should move expeditiously to assess the pilot program and—based on this assessment—develop a plan for effectively implementing the project throughout the state
beginning in precincts with the highest level of police killings
while particularly pronounced in Rio de Janeiro
The Public Security Secretariat should take steps to address the high levels of stress experienced by police officers
exposure to violence can take a profound toll on the psychological well-being of police officers
Heightened levels of fear and stress can undermine their professional performance and help fuel the cycle of violence and impunity described in this report
Police officers and commanders told Human Rights Watch of a variety of other factors that they said contribute to very high levels of stress. These include, among other things, work schedules that can cause severe sleep deprivation, an archaic disciplinary code that leaves officers vulnerable to arbitrary and abusive treatment by their superiors,[271] and deficient infrastructure and equipment
This report was researched and written by César Muñoz Acebes
senior Brazil researcher at Human Rights Watch
It was reviewed and edited by Daniel Wilkinson
managing director of the Americas division; Margaret Knox
senior editor/researcher; Maria Laura Canineu
director of the health and human rights program; Christopher Albin-Lackey
Interns Andrea Carvalho and Eliza Fagundes provided research support
and intern Pamela Bassi provided design support
Associates Hugo Arruda and Kate Segal provided logistical and editing support
The report was prepared for publication by Olivia Hunter
This report also draws on research originally conducted for our 2009 report Lethal Force by Fernando Ribeiro Delgado
Researcher Maria Brant and consultant Maíra Magro also carried out extensive research for that report
Researcher Stephanie Morin conducted later research on the issue
We would like to thank the relatives of victims and police officers who spoke with us
as well as government officials and other individuals that provided information for this report
We are also very grateful to Paulo Roberto Cunha
we wish to thank civil society groups that helped us produce this report
Rede de Comunidades e Movimentos contra a Violência
[1] Human Rights Watch, Lethal Force: Police Violence and Public Security in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, December 2009, https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/12/08/lethal-force/police-violence-and-public-security-rio-de-janeiro-and-sao-paulo
[2] Human Rights Watch interview with Danilo (pseudonym)
[3] Human Rights Watch interview with João (pseudonym)
[4] The official number of police killings from 2006 to 2015 is 8,021
Official statistics do not include killings carried out by police but registered as regular homicides
Coordinator of the Department of Research on Criminal Justice and Security at the Public Security Institute
told Human Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch interview
official data do not include cases in which police who kill admit being at the site but deny being the shooter or cases in which police simply do not report a killing
The irregular nature of record-keeping also distorts the data
When it appears to civil police investigators that a killing by a police officer was unlawful
they sometimes record it simply as a “homicide,” rather than as a “homicide caused by police during police operation.” They believe that “homicide caused by police during police operation” would be interpreted as a lawful killing
Statistics published by the Public Security Institute
which is charged with keeping data on killings by police
The civil police internal affairs division reviews the registries of all crimes and instructs civil police investigators to correct errors
Human Rights Watch found six cases of killings by police from 2008 to 2015 that were initially recorded as regular homicides or under some other category and whose registry was never changed
The 11 people who died in those cases were never counted as victims of killings by police
[5] In 2015
there were 1,200 homicides (homicídio doloso) in the city of Rio de Janeiro and
“Rio de Janeiro: a Segurança Pública em números: Evolução dos principais indicadores de criminalidade e atividade policial no Estado do Rio de Janeiro – 2003 a 2015 – 2016,” http://arquivos.proderj.rj.gov.br/isp_imagens/uploads/SegPublicaemnumeros.pdf (accessed June 5
[6]Civil police maintain only partial records about who is responsible for police killings
Of those cases where they identified the shooter from 2011 to 2015
97 percent were military police officers and three percent civil police officers
obtained by Human Rights Watch from the Public Security Institute
Both the civil police and military police are state forces that report to the Secretary of Security of Rio de Janeiro
[7] Amnesty International
“You Killed My Son: Homicides by military police in the city of Rio de Janeiro,” AMR 19/2068/2015
[8] In only two of the police killing cases that Human Rights Watch reviewed did officers specifically note that they were very close to the suspects during the alleged confrontations
the forensic evidence shows that the gun’s muzzle was touching the body of the victim
contradicting the police officer’s account of what happened
[9] Police Investigation (Inquérito Policial)
2014; Autopsy Report (Laudo de Exame de Corpo Delito de Necropsia)
[10] Prosecutors had not filed charges as of June 2016
Autopsy Report (Laudo de Exame de Corpo Delito de Necropsia)
Police Incident Report (Registro de Ocorrência Aditado) 2322/2012-03
[11] Police Investigation (Inquérito Policial)
[12] The day of the killings was the culmination of several weeks of operations involving up to 1,350 officers
and many other suspects were killed before June 27
Those killings happened a few weeks prior to the opening of the Pan-American Games in Rio that year
“OAB: Apenas oito dos 19 mortos no Alemão seriam traficantes,” O Globo Online
http://extra.globo.com/noticias/rio/oab-apenas-oito-dos-19-mortos-no-alemao-seriam-traficantes-680863.html (accessed June 6
[13] Autopsy reports
Brazilian Bar Association – Rio de Janeiro
[14] A federal commission of experts analyzed two cases it described as “illustrative” (the killings of U.J
and O.L.) and found “evidence of death by summary and arbitrary execution,” noting that
the same analysis could be done for the other deaths
Federal Special Secretariat of Human Rights (Secretaria Especial dos Direitos Humanos da Presidência da República)
“Relatório Técnico Visita Cooperação Técnica – Rio de Janeiro (RJ) - Julho de 2007,” October 3
[15] Ibid
[16] Summary of cases
Rio de Janeiro State Attorney General’s Office (Ministério Público do Estado do Rio de Janeiro)
[17] Ibid
[18] Police Investigation (Inquérito Policial)
[19] Police Investigation (Inquérito Policial)
The Attorney General’s Office had not file charges by June 2016
[20] Identifying information about the police incident report withheld at family’s request
[21] Ibid
[22] Human Rights Watch interview with N
[24] Prosecutors indicted the three police officers for homicide. Portal G1, “Celular filma últimos momentos de jovem morto por PM no Rio,” February 25, 2015, http://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2015/02/celular-filma-ultimos-momentos-de-jovem-morto-por-pm-no-rio-veja.html (accessed June 6
[25] Human Rights Watch interviews with Major Marcio Rodrigues
2016; with military police officer João (pseudonym)
(exact date withheld); and with prosecutor Paulo Roberto Cunha
[26] “Termo de Ajustamento de Conduta que Entre Si Celebram o Estado do Rio de Janeiro e o Ministério Público do Estado do Rio de Janeiro,” July 2
[27] Ibid.
[28] Human Rights Watch interview with prosecutor Paulo Roberto Cunha
Cunha follows policies implemented by the military police command closely
as he is one of the prosecutors in the state of Rio de Janeiro that investigates crimes committed by military police officers under the military criminal code
[29] Attorney General’s Office had not filed charges as of June 2016
2015; Autopsy Report (Laudo de Exame de Corpo Delito de Necropsia)
[30] Scott Denton
“Practical Pathology of Gunshot Wounds,” Arch Pathol Lab Med – vol
[31] Prosecutor’s Office had not filed charges as of June 2016
[32] It was not possible to determine whether the other two victims were wearing clothing
as the photographs were only of their naked torsos and heads
[33] Ibid.; Federal Special Secretariat of Human Rights
“Relatório Técnico Visita Cooperação Técnica – Rio de Janeiro (RJ) - Julho de 2007,” p
[34] Special Secretary of Human Rights of the Presidency of the Republic
[35] Prosecutors had not filed charges as of June 2016
[36] Police Investigation (Inquérito Policial)
[37] Human Rights Watch interview with Major Roberto Valente
the commander of the UPP at Morro da Providência
http://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2016/02/rapaz-morto-na-providencia-rio-nao-trocou-tiros-com-pm-apontam-peritos.htmlhttp://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2016/02/rapaz-morto-na-providencia-rio-nao-trocou-tiros-com-pm-apontam-peritos.html (accessed June 14
[38] Human Rights Watch interview with civil police officer Artur (pseudonym)
The indictment states Beliene was shot three time with an assault rifle
[40] Prosecutors had not filed charges against the police officers as of June 2016
[41] Police Incident Report (Registro de Ocorrência) 1626/2008
[42] The other two friends said they were asleep around the time of the shot
L.L.’s written record of testimony (Termo de Depoimento)
2008; E.L.’s written record of testimony (Termo de Depoimento)
2008; V.E.’s written record of testimony (Termo de Depoimento)
[43] Auto de Prisão em Flagrante
[44] L.L.’s written record of testimony (Termo de Depoimento)
[45] V.E.’s written record of testimony (Termo de Depoimento)
[46] Auto de Prisão em Flagrante
http://oglobo.globo.com/rio/testemunha-da-morte-de-jovem-teria-sido-ameacada-por-pms-17658365 (accessed June 24
[48] Human Rights Watch meeting with Attorney General Marfan Martins Vieira
[49] Human Rights Watch interview with prosecutor Alexandre Themístocles de Vasconcelos
[51] The Public Security Institute only publishes the number of people killed by police by region
it is reasonable to assume the majority of killings by police in a region are carried out by the local military police battalion
whose members are tasked with patrolling the streets
[52] The data is based on the Public Security Institute’s database
which contains all cases of injuries and killings caused by on-duty police officers and registered by the civil police
The Public Security Institute provided Human Rights Watch with the data upon request
[53] Human Rights Watch interviews with retired Colonel Robson Rodrigues
who was deputy commander general of the military police in 2015
2015; and with retired Colonel Ibis Pereira
who was the military police commander general’s adjunct in 2015
[54] Public Security Institute, “Série histórica da taxa de letalidade violenta por 100 mil habitantes estado do Rio de Janeiro,” http://arquivos.proderj.rj.gov.br/isp_imagens/uploads/SerieHistoricaEstadoRegioes.pdf (accessed June 5,2016)
[55] South African police killed 396 people in the 2014/2015 fiscal year (from April 2014 to March 2015)
while 35 police officers were killed on duty (a ratio of 11 to 1)
[59] Colonel Robson Rodrigues made that statement in a conference on human rights and the police that took place in Rio de Janeiro on November 25
A Human Rights Watch researcher was present at the event
[60] Human Rights Watch interview with retired Colonel Ubiratan Angelo
a former commander general of the military police
[61] Human Rights Watch interview with retired Colonel Robson Rodrigues
[62] Human Rights Watch interview with Major Roberto Valente
[63] Human Rights Watch interview with Danilo (pseudonym)
[64] Human Rights Watch interviews with colonel Michel (pseudonym)
who was the military police commander general´s adjunct in 2015
2016; with retired Colonel Ubiratan Angelo
2016; and with retired Colonel Robson Rodrigues
[66] Human Rights Watch interview with prosecutor Paulo Roberto Cunha
[67] Human Rights Watch interview with civil police officer Artur (pseudonym)
[68] Human Rights Watch interview with Fabiola Lovisi
[69] Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, “Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios: Síntese de indicadores 2014,” Rio de Janeiro, November 13, 2015, IBGE, 2014 data, the latest available, http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/presidencia/noticias/imprensa/ppts/00000024052411102015241013178959.pdf (accessed June 5
[70] Public Security Institute
“Letalidade Violenta,” https://public.tableau.com/profile/instituto.de.seguran.a.p.blica.isp#!/vizhome/LetalidadeViolenta/Resumo (accessed June 5
[71] Brazil´s national statistics agency
uses the term “negro” to include people who are “preto” (black) and “pardo” (mixed race)
we use “black” to refer to people considered “negro” by IBGE
According to the Public Security Institute
26.8 percent of those killed by police in 2015 were “preto” and 50.2 percent were “pardo.” Of those killed
about 51 percent were 29 years old or younger: 9 percent were 12 to 17 years old
and in 38.6 percent of the cases the age was not registered
and in 0.8 percent of the cases the gender was not registered
[72] Beatriz Magaloni and Ignacio Cano
“Entendendo o uso da força pela Polícia no Rio de Janeiro,” unpublished
The study is based on a questionnaire responded to by 5,167 military police officers (more than 10 percent of the total force)
only 34 officers with a rank equal to or higher than captain responded
the data on race does not reflect the make-up of the upper echelon of the military police force
[73] Human Rights Watch interview with retired Colonel Ibis Pereira
[74] Human Rights Watch interview with retired Colonel Ubiratan Angelo
The use of lethal force by police in Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro: ISER
The studies are based on data on victims from January 1993 to July 1996
Human Rights Watch could not find analyses based on more recent data
[76] Human Rights Watch interview with Adriana Pérez da Silva
[77] Police Investigation (Inquérito Policial)
[78] Human Rights Watch interview with Jorge Augusto Vieira
[79] Human Rights Watch interview with prosecutor Paulo Roberto Cunha
[80] Human Rights Watch meeting with Attorney General Marfan Martins Vieira
[83] Prosecutors did carry out their own investigative procedures in the case of 47-year-old Amarildo de Souza
a construction laborer who disappeared after being taken by police to the UPP at the Rocinha favela in July 2013
a special prosecutorial unit dedicated to fight organized crime
forensic experts from the Attorney General’s Offices examined footage from security cameras that showed something wrapped in a cover being taken away from the UPP in a police vehicle
Prosecutors believed it was Amarildo’s body
The Attorney General’s Office’s investigative work paid off and in February 2016
were convicted of torturing Amarildo to death inside the UPP
Human Rights Watch interview with prosecutor Márcio Mothé
human rights coordinator at the Attorney General’s Office
2016; Matheus Rodrigues“MP vai investigar participação do BOPE no caso Amarildo,” G1
2015,http://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2015/06/mp-rj-abrira-nova-investigacao-sobre-o-caso-amarildo.html (accessed June 13
[84] Human Rights Watch interview with prosecutor Paulo Roberto Cunha
[85] Human Rights Watch interview with Fernando Veloso
[86] Human Rights Watch interview with retired Colonel Robson Rodrigues, who was deputy commander general of the military police in 2015, Rio de Janeiro, November 26, 2015.
[87] Human Rights Watch interview with retired Colonel Ibis Pereira
[88] Autopsy Reports
[89] Case 14.314/2007
[90] Human Rights Watch interview with M.T.
[91] Police Incident Report (Registro de Ocorrência) 07252/2007
2007 (registro); Autopsy Report (Auto de exame cadavérico)
Institute of Forensics Medicine Afrânio Peixoto
see “PMs são acusados de matar jovem,” Extra
2007; “Entregador morto pela polícia no Azul,” O Povo
[92] Prosecutors had not filed charges as of June 2016
[93] Prosecutors had not filed charges as of June 2016
[94] Human Rights Watch interview with retired Colonel Robson Rodrigues
Rodrigues’s claim is reflected as well in the cases we documented
in which indictments seemed most likely to occur when there was media coverage or officers were caught on tape carrying out unlawful killings or covering them up
High-profile cases where prosecutors filed indictments include the killing of Matheus Alves dos Santos
referred to in chapter 2; of Claudia Silva Ferreira
referred to in chapter 3; and of Eduardo Felipe Santos Victor
[95] The Attorney General’s Office did not provide information about the status of the cases in which there were indictments
[96] E-mail to Human Rights Watch from prosecutor Maria Cristina Menezes de Azevedo
[98] Amnesty International
Homicídios cometidos pela Polícia Militar na cidade do Rio de Janeiro,”2015
[99] Human Rights Watch calculation based on list of complaints published by the Police Ombudsman. “Relatorio Anual da Ouvidoria da Policia do Estado do Rio de Janeiro,” 2015, http://arquivos.proderj.rj.gov.br/ouvidoria_seseg_imagens/arquivos/uploads/Relatorio%20%20-%20ANUAL-%202015.pdf
[100] Criminal Code, Decreto-lei No. 2.848, 1940, arts. 147, 347, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Decreto-Lei/Del2848.htm (accessed June 5
The discussion here about impunity for police cover ups draws from our research for our 2009 Lethal Force report (Human Rights Watch
Lethal Force: Police Violence and Public Security in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo)
We are not aware of any evidence that the situation in Rio de Janeiro has substantially changed since then
[101] Prosecutors had not filed charges as of June 2016
[102] The UN Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal
Arbitrary and Summary Executions provide guidelines on international standards applicable to those cases
“Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal
Arbitrary and Summary Executions,” adopted May 24
[104] Prosecutor Alexandre Themístocles de Vasconcelos is in charge of cases generated by Civil Police stations (the first report uses the term “precinct” to translate “Delegacia”) numbers 38 and 40
while prosecutor Fabiola Lovisi works in the city of São Gonçalo
Human Rights Watch interviews with prosecutor Alexandre Themístocles de Vasconcelos
[105] Human Rights Watch interview with prosecutor Alexandre Themístocles de Vasconcelos
[108] The 2011 rules state that, “In cases where the scene was altered, the Police Authority shall adopt appropriate administrative and/or criminal measures.” Portaria PCERJ Nº. 553, 2011, art. 2, http://adepolrj.com.br/Portal/Noticias.asp?id=9831 (accessed June 5
[109] The only two cases from the 64 cases we examined where civil police investigators justified the lack of crime scene analysis are the killing of Charles Alves Duarte and the killing of Josué Oliveira Pereira
Police Incident Report (Registro de Ocorrência) 07958/2014
2014; and Police Investigation (Inquérito Policial)
[110] Prosecutors had not filed charges as of June 2016
[111] The 2011 rules expressly require civil police to take statements from all police officers involved in an incident. Portaria PCERJ Nº. 553, 2011, art. 1, para. IV, http://adepolrj.com.br/Portal/Noticias.asp?id=9831 (accessed June 7
[112] Police Incident Report (Registro de Ocorrência) 00532/2011
[113] Autopsy Report (Auto de Exame de Corpo de Delito - Necropsia)
[115] Human Rights Watch interviews with civil police officer Artur (pseudonym)
2016; and with prosecutor Alexandre Themístocles de Vasconcelos
[116] Human Rights Watch interview with João (pseudonym)
[117] Human Rights Watch interview with civil police officer Artur (pseudonym)
[118] Portaria PCERJ Nº. 553, 2011, art. 1, para. III, http://adepolrj.com.br/Portal/Noticias.asp?id=9831 (accessed June 6
[120] The statement says: “On 01/15/2010
during an operation against drug trafficking in the Sereno favela
after getting out of armored vehicle number 510017
along with his fellow police officer Josinaldo Vieira do Nascimento
they went up the hill up to the middle of the favela
where they saw about eight individuals who
upon noticing the presence of the declarant and his fellow officer opened fire several times with the weapons they were carrying
The declarant and his fellow officer responded to such act of unjust aggression
When the declarant walked to the place where the criminals had been
One of them had a .30 assault rifle and the other one had a 9 mm pistol without identification
he put the two individuals in the armored vehicle and took them to Getúlio Vargas Hospital
I ask the Police Authority to close this statement
[121] Human Rights Watch meeting with Attorney General Marfan Martins Vieira
[122] Brazilian Constitution
[124] Lei Orgânica Nacional do Ministério Público
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/L8625.htm
[125] Lei Orgânica Nacional do Ministério Público
[127] Implementation of the resolution requires Rio de Janeiro’s Attorney General to enter into an agreement with the chief of Civil Police
Precinct chiefs can request a time extension if the case is particularly complicated
[130] Human Rights Watch interview with Michel Misse
[131] Human Rights Watch interview with prosecutor Paulo Roberto Cunha
[132] Ibid
[133] Human Rights Watch interview with prosecutor Alexandre Themístocles de Vasconcelos
[134] Ibid
[135] “Art. 11. O descumprimento do disposto nesta Portaria importara em transgressao disciplinar na forma do Decreto-Lei numero 218/75,” Portaria PCERJ Nº. 553, 2011, art. 11, http://adepolrj.com.br/Portal/Noticias.asp?id=9831 (accessed June 6
[136] Prosecutor Paulo Roberto Cunha said he reported civil police investigators to the internal affairs division of the civil police in a few cases
Human Rights Watch interview with prosecutor Paulo Roberto Cunha
[137] Human Rights Watch interview with prosecutor Elisabete Figueiredo Felisbino Barbosa
[138] Criminal Code, Decreto-lei No. 2.848, 1940, art. 319, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Decreto-Lei/Del2848.htm (accessed June 6
[139] Human Rights Watch interview with Augusto de Arruda Botelho
criminal lawyer and president of the Institute for the Defense of the Right of Defense
[140] National Council of the Offices of Prosecutors
[141] Ibid
[142] Veloso said: “Unfortunately
we still have people who agree with the saying that a good criminal is a dead criminal
It is something that is still present in our culture.” Human Rights Watch interview with Fernando Veloso
[143] In May 2015
the Supreme Court affirmed the Prosecutor’s Office’s power to carry out criminal investigations of its own accord
“STF fixa requisitos para atuação do Ministério Público em investigações penais,” Notícias STF
http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=291563 (accessed June 6
[145] Prosecutors did not carry any investigative procedures of their own in the overwhelming majority of the 64 cases we examined
[146] Judges can deny prosecutors´ requests to close cases
according to a study conducted by Orlando Zaccone
who is himself a civil police investigator
Of 314 requests to close a case between 2003 and 2009
Twenty-four of the 25 rejections were by the same judge
who argued that the wounds described in the autopsy reports contradicted the police officers’ version of events
[147] Police Investigation (Inquérito Policial)
[148] Police Incident Report (Registro de Ocorrência) 06107/2007
[149] Human Rights Watch interview with Orlando Zaccone
Zaccone published the results of his research as a book in 2015: Orlando Zaccone
[150] The Public Security Institute told Human Rights Watch it did not have data of police killings by unit
Human Rights Watch interview with Leonardo Silva
[151] Several studies have documented how some officers and battalions are responsible for a large percentage of killings
starting with Ignacio Cano’s book Letalidade da Ação Policial no Rio de Janeiro(Rio de Janeiro: ISER,1997)
The situation appears to be unchanged today
according to Human Rights Watch interviews with Ignacio Cano
and prosecutor Alexandre Themístocles de Vasconcelos
[152] Rio de Janeiro does not have a mechanism in place to track repeat killers within the police
In the rare cases that an illegal police killing proceeds to indictment or conviction
it will show up in an officer’s criminal and disciplinary records
But because civil police investigators routinely identify the police officer who commits a killing simply as the “comunicante,” or informant
the officer’s participation in an unadjudicated killing does not show up in his or her record
nobody knows who the police officers are in Rio de Janeiro who kill most
[153] Marcelo Gomes, “PMs presos por arrastar mulher são alvo de 62 ações,” Estadão, September 20, 2007, http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,pms-presos-por-arrastar-mulher-sao-alvo-de-62-acoes,1142559 (accessed June 6
[154] Human Rights Watch interview with former Colonel Ibis Pereira
[156] Human Rights Watch interview with prosecutor Paulo Roberto Cunha
[157] Ibid
[158] Seven prosecutors
four representatives of the chiefs of forensic analysis
and three military police officers representing the local military police battalion signed the commitment
[159] Human Rights Watch interview with civil police officer Artur (pseudonym)
[160] Ibid
[161] Human Rights Watch interview with prosecutor Paulo Roberto Cunha
[162] Human Rights Watch interview with prosecutor Paulo Roberto Cunha
[163] Data provided to Human Rights Watch by the Segunda Central de Inquêritos
a department within the Attorney General’s Office that coordinates cases in São Gonçalo and the neighboring city of Niterói
The Segunda Central de Inquéritos warned that “some cases could be missing from the list due to the search parameters used.” E-mail from Segunda Central de Inquêritos to Human Rights Watch
Human Rights Watch requested but did not receive more complete data
[164] Paulo Roberto Cunha
“O Ministério Público do Estado do Rio de Janeiro e a Segurança Pública: Uma Perspectiva Política para o Futuro,” unpublished
[165] Human Rights Watch interview with prosecutor Fabiola Lovisi
[166] From 2008 to 2011, homicides went down 34 percent (not including killings by police) and robberies decreased 20 percent in São Gonçalo. From 2012 to 2015, homicides went up 42 percent and robberies 106 percent. Data from 2013 to 2015 is from the Public Security Institute website, http://www.isp.rj.gov.br (accessed June 19
The Institute has not published earlier data
but was obtained from the Institute by Paulo Roberto Cunha
who cited it in his unpublished essay “O Ministério Público do Estado do Rio de Janeiro e a Segurança Pública: Uma Perspectiva Política para o Futuro,” undated
[167] Data from the Public Security Institute website, http://www.isp.rj.gov.br (accessed June 28
[168] Human Rights Watch interview with Colonel Samir Vaz Lima
[170] The study concluded that 14 percent of the police officers in the São Gonçalo battalion use ammunition excessively based on a comparison with officers in similar positions in other areas of the state with similar levels of crime
more officers use ammunition excessively in the São Gonçalo battalion than in any other battalion in Rio de Janeiro state
“Proposta de Indice de Aptidão para o Uso da Força Policial,” June 2015
[171] Data from 2013 to 2015 is from the Public Security Institute website, http://www.isp.rj.gov.br (accessed June 19
The Institute has not published data from prior years
but such data is contained in an unpublished essay by Paulo Roberto Cunha titled “O Ministério Público do Estado do Rio de Janeiro e a Segurança Pública: Uma Perspectiva Política para o Futuro,” undated
[172] Human Rights Watch interviews with military police lieutenant Alexandre (pseudonym)
2015; military police Lieutenant Claudia (pseudonym)
2016; military police officer Karla (pseudonym)
2015; and military police officer Laura (pseudonym)
[173] Human Rights Watch interviews with Danilo (pseudonym)
[174] Human Rights Watch interview with Danilo (pseudonym)
[175] Human Rights Watch interview with Laura (pseudonym)
[176] The victim had a gun but did not shoot at the police officers
Human Rights Watch interview with Major Roberto Valente
[177] Human Rights Watch interview with Laura (pseudonym)
[178] Human Rights Watch interview with Lieutenant Franco Louredo
[179] The video is available here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gGiurjOuGTs&feature=youtu.be (accessed June 22
[180] Public Security Institute, “Relatório Vitimização Policial (1998 a novembro de 2015),” 2015, http://www.isp.rj.gov.br/Conteudo.asp?ident=138 (accessed June 7
The Public Security Institute has only provided the breakdown of the causes of killings of police officers from January to November 2015
which did not provide data for off-duty deaths
[181] The disciplinary code of the military police of Rio de Janeiro lists not carrying police identification as an infraction
[183] Human Rights Watch interview with Ronaldo (pseudonym)
who at the time of the interview was deputy commander of the military police
[184] Human Rights Watch interview with Ronaldo (pseudonym)
[185] Human Rights Watch interviews with Danilo (pseudonym)
[186] Rio de Janeiro Decree Number 6.579
[187] Ibid.
[188] Human Rights Watch interviews with Danilo (pseudonym)
2015 (exact date withheld); with civil police officer Artur (pseudonym)
2016; and with corporal Norberto (pseudonym)
[189] Human Rights Watch interview with Major Marcio Rodrigues
[190] The questions posed to military police officers did not specify if those feelings should be job-related or not
it is likely they interpreted it that way since the rest of the questionnaire was about their work as a police officers
and they answered the survey in the police stations where they work
[193] Another factor that contributes to stress is military police work schedules
Police officers work as many as 60 hours a week
often with mandatory additional shifts due to understaffing.Some officers work 24 hours straight
they are allowed four to six hours of rest in dormitories
a lieutenant told Human Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch interview with Alexandre (pseudonym)
Brazilian labor law that governs work hours does not apply to military police officers
whose work schedules are at the sole discretion of unit commanders
[194] Dan Baum, “The Price of Valor,” The New Yorker, July 12, 2004, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/07/12/the-price-of-valor (accessed June 27
[195] Ibid
[196] In March 2016
two psychiatrists examined officers to decide if they should be granted medical leave or not
while another two did follow-ups on officers already on leave
They did not have time to see any new patients
according to the chief of the psychology unit
Human Rights Watch interview with Colonel Fernando Derenusson
chief of the psychology unit at the military police of Rio de Janeiro
Adjunct to the Commander General of the military police
said in February 2016 that the command was considering hiring some psychiatrists
Human Rights Watch interview with Colonel Victor Yunes
[197] Human Rights Watch interview with Major Fernanda Campos
deputy chief of the psychology unit at the military police of Rio de Janeiro
[198] In March 2016
95 psychologists served in the military police of Rio de Janeiro
[199] Colonel Fernando Derenusson
the chief of psychology at the military police
said he was drafting a proposal to require that all officers involved in shootings go through a session of counseling after the incident
The proposal would require hiring 60 additional psychologists
[200] Human Rights Watch interviews with Colonel Samir Vaz Lima
commander of the 7th military police battalion
2016; and with military police officer João (pseudonym)
[201] Human Rights Watch interviews with Captain Alexandre Ramos
[202] Human Rights Watch interview with Karla (pseudonym)
[203] Human Rights Watch interviews with Captain Alexandre Ramos
2015; and with retired Colonel Ubiratan Angelo
[204] Brian D
"Understanding the Psychology of Police Misconduct," The Police Chief 78 (January 2011)
http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/naylor/CPIM0111/#/24 (accessed June 7
[205] Human Rights Watch interview with retired Colonel Ibis Pereira
who was the military police Commander General’s Adjunct in 2015
[206] Human Rights Watch interview with João (pseudonym)
a resident of the Complexo de Alemão favela
described instances when military police officers had entered her neighbor’s houses during operations and stolen valuables
Those instances occurred before the implementation of UPPs in the favela
Human Rights Watch interview with Vera (pseudonym)
A few cases of “war spoils” have come to light in the Brazilian media. See, for instance, Cecília Ritto, “Delegado e policiais vendiam armas, drogas e vazavam informações para traficantes no Rio,” Veja, February 11, 2011, http://veja.abril.com.br/noticia/brasil/delegado-e-policiais-vendiam-armas-e-informacoes-a-traficantes-no-rio (accessed June 14
[207] Human Rights Watch interviews with military police corporal Norberto
2015; with civil police officer Artur (pseudonym)
[208] Human Rights Watch interview with military police corporal Norberto
he was a member of the Shock Battalion (Batalhão de Choque)
[209] Governo do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, “O que é?,” As UPPS, http://www.upprj.com/index.php/o_que_e_upp (accessed June 7
[210] Ibid
[211] Human Rights Watch calculation based on data available on the Public Security Institute website, http://www.isp.rj.gov.br (accessed June 7
The reduction in the number of killings by police in UPPs was higher than the 63 percent decline from 2008 to 2013 in the state as a whole
[213] Ignacio Cano
“‘Os donos do morro’: Uma avaliação exploratória do impacto das unidades de polícia pacificadora (UPPs) no Rio de Janeiro,” Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública
[214] Human Rights Watch interview with Vinicius (pseudonym)
[215] For instance
the UPP at Morro da Providência started in 2010 with 240 police officers
despite the fact that the security situation had worsened
[216] For the expansion of UPPs
the state increased the number of recruits fast
but that led to deficient background checks
“There is no adequate selection,” said the commander of a UPP
A lieutenant in another UPP complained people involved in “militias”–criminal gangs with links to the police–had entered the force
[217] Human Rights Watch interviews with retired Colonel Ibis Pereira
2016; with civil police precinct chief Paulo (pseudonym)
[218] The spotlight on the case led both the civil police and the Attorney General’s Office to dedicate unusual attention and resources to the case
[220] Human Rights Watch calculation based on data published by the Public Security Institute on its website, www.isp.rj.gov.br
Data from the first half of 2015 is the latest data available at the time of this writing
[221] Ibid
[222] Human Rights Watch interview with civil police precinct chief Paulo (pseudonym)
[223] Human Rights Watch interview with Major Marcio Rodrigues
[224] Human Rights Watch interview with retired Colonel Robson Rodrigues
[225] Human Rights Watch interview with Major Roberto Valente
[226] Human Rights Watch visited the UPPs at the Mangueira
[227] Regina
another resident of the Complexo de Alemão favela who runs an educational project for youth there
Human Rights Watch contacted and interviewed them separately
Regina participated in some activities organized by UPP commanders when they were first installed
but said that the relationship of the police with the community had deteriorated since
Human Rights Watch interviews with Vera (pseudonym)
[228] Human Rights Watch interview with several residents and police officers in the Complexo do Alemão favela
[229] Human Rights Watch interview with Ronaldo (pseudonym)
[230] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) (“Pact of San José
reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System
OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 25 (1992)
[231]Philip Alston
http://www.extrajudicialexecutions.org/application/media/(Brazil)%20G0912622.pdf (accessed June 30
[232] Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal
[233] Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR)
[234] Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal
2016); Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse
[236] IACHR
[237] Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal
[238] Ibid.
[239] Ibid.
[240] UDHR
5; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel
[241] Convention against Torture
[242] Brazilian Penal Code
[243] Nota de Instrução Número 010/1983
[244] Instrução Normativa PMERJ/EMG-PM3 Número 044
[245] Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders
[246] See discussion of UPPs in chapter IV
After the Security Secretariat of Rio de Janeiro implemented the System of Goals and Results Tracking in 2009
there was an improvement in the previous crime trends in the state
according to a study by Vitor Acselrad (Vitor Acselrad
“Perspectivas Comparativas de Análise de Reflexos do SIM na Incidência Criminal,” Cadernos de Segurança Pública
The implementation of SIM coincided with the start of UPPs
so both factors may have contributed to that positive result
[247] Killings by police dropped 63 percent from 2008 to 2013
Human Rights Watch calculations based on data from Public Security Institute
“Rio de Janeiro: a Segurança Pública em números: Evolução dos principais indicadores de criminalidade e atividade policial no Estado do Rio de Janeiro – 2003 a 2015 – 2016,” http://arquivos.proderj.rj.gov.br/isp_imagens/uploads/SegPublicaemnumeros.pdf (accessed June 15
[248] Resolution GPGJ Number 2021
This is a critical measure that Human Rights Watch and others had urged the attorney general to take
Lethal Force: Police Violence and Public Security in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo
Homicídios cometidos pela Polícia Militar na cidade do Rio de Janeiro,” 2015
[250] The other members of GAESP work on other issues
such as police working conditions and prison abuses
[251] Human Rights Watch interviews with prosecutor Paulo Roberto Cunha
2015; and with prosecutor Alexandre Themístocles de Vasconcelos
[252] National Council of the Prosecutor’s Office
[253] Human Rights Watch interview with prosecutor Paulo Roberto Cunha
[254] Resolution GPGJ Number 2021
[255] Most of those cases were covered by the media
including the killing of Matheus Alves dos Santos
which appeared in the media because of the existence of video footage from the camera in the patrol car
Two other cases were high profile because the police officers who allegedly carried out the killings were the suspects in the murder of Judge Patricia Acioli
[256] Human Rights Watch interviews with Fernando Veloso
2016; with civil police officer Artur (pseudonym)
[257] Human Rights Watch interview with Rivaldo Barbosa
[258] Human Rights Watch interview with Reginaldo Franklin Pereira
director of the Instituto Médico Legal Afrânio Peixoto
[259] American Civil Liberties Union, “Police-Body Mounted Cameras: With Right Polices in Place, a Win for All,” undated, https://www.aclu.org/police-body-mounted-cameras-right-policies-place-win-all (accessed June 11
[260] Paul Peachy, “How the police’s body-worn camera technology is changing the justice system,” Independent, March 16, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/how-the-polices-body-worn-camera-technology-is-changing-the-justice-system-a6905691.html (accessed June 12
[261] ODS Consulting, “Body Worn Video Projects in Paisley and Aberdeen. Evaluation Report,” July 2011, http://www.bwvsg.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/BWV-Scottish-Report.pdf (accessed June 12
[263] Tony Perry, “San Diego police body camera report: Fewer complaints, less use of force,” Los Angeles Times, March 18, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-body-cameras-20150318-story.html (accessed June 12
[265] Igarapé Institute
“Mobile Technologies and Body Worn Cameras for Smarter Policing,” undated
[266] For detailed recommendations on appropriate privacy protections, see the Americas Civil Liberties Union, “Police-Body Mounted Cameras: With Right Polices in Place, a Win for All,” https://www.aclu.org/police-body-mounted-cameras-right-policies-place-win-all (accessed June 19
[267] Emails to Human Rights Watch from Robert Muggah
[270] Law proposal 4471/2012, http://www.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/prop_mostrarintegra?codteor=1027001&filename=PL+4471/2012 (accessed June 12
[271] Approved in 1983
the code’s vaguely defined infractions include “working badly,” “spreading rumors,” and “using anonymity.” The code also regulates private life
prohibiting “talking and making noise when inappropriate,” and “visiting placing incompatible with their social level.” At the same time
the code does not directly address issues such as sexual harassment
The code also severely restricts freedom of expression
Unlike doctors who speak publicly about medicine
military police officers can be penalized and even expelled from the force for giving their opinion about public security
Police Killings Persist as Summer Olympics Approach
Human Rights Watch is a 501(C)(3) nonprofit registered in the US under EIN: 13-2875808
Latest updates on what's happening in RGE Group
Bracell recently hosted the Governor of São Paulo
and other authorities to mark the beginning of construction on Latin America’s largest tissue paper mill
Demonstrating its commitment to economic growth and sustainability
the company is investing a total of BRL5 billion in the city
Half of this investment will be directed towards the construction of the new tissue paper mill
which is slated to commence operations in 2024
The remaining funds will be used to establish a plant dedicated to the production of key ingredients used in the pulp production process
The BRL5 billion investment will supplement the more than BRL15 billion Bracell has already invested over the past four years in the country
The state-of-the-art tissue paper mill is expected to be the most productive unit of its type in Brazil
It will integrate Bracell’s commitments to economic
and will be fully automated and exclusively powered by renewable energy sources
This focus on sustainability will position the mill among the most modern and eco-friendly facilities worldwide
with Bracell President Praveen Singhavi (right) during the groundbreaking ceremony for the new tissue paper mill
“This project reinforces our commitment to invest in the country
contributing to productivity and sustainability across the business
It is a milestone that makes us very optimistic about our development prospects
as we want to add value and further expand the Tissue downstream operations.”
The new mill will be equipped with four tissue paper production machines
designed to produce two primary products: toilet paper and paper towels
Boasting a production capacity of 240,000 tons per year
the mill will utilize advanced technology in production and digitalization to maximize efficiency
The Governor of São Paulo (second from right) accompanied by the President of Bracell (centre)
at one of Bracell’s nurseries during his visit
the project is expected to generate more than 2,000 jobs
while an additional 550 permanent jobs will be created upon its completion
Bracell aims to support local development in the São Paulo region
focusing on fostering economic growth and community well-being
This investment marks Bracell’s second foray into Brazil’s tissue market
the company signed an agreement to acquire OL Papéis
which operates factories in Feira de Santana and São Gonçalo dos Campos in Bahia
The Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) has already approved the project
The Governor of São Paulo meeting with Bracell employees to learn more about the company’s nursery operations
The Governor emphasized the significance of investments like Bracell’s for the development of São Paulo
“Our mission is to create a favorable ecosystem for large investments like Bracell’s to boost the development of our State
We are proud to have one of the largest and most sustainable pulp mills on the planet
bringing this industry leadership to São Paulo.”
“Through the exchange of raw materials
we will reduce the impacts resulting from our industrial activity
This project is aligned with Bracell’s commitment to contribute to the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
particularly SDG 7 (Affordable and clean energy)
SDG 12 (Responsible consumption and production)
As Founder and Chairman Sukanto Tanoto celebrates his 50th year as an entrepreneur
we take a look back at the many milestones in his journey of building the business and partnering..
Eco-Business’ series of “Unlocking Capital for Sustainability” events across Southeast Asia culminated in a finale event on the 28th of September in Singapore
change and dialogue were a common thread that ran through..
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This extraordinary CCTV footage shows what locals in Brazil believe to be a WEREWOLF
The grainy 44-second clip emerged on YouTube after a spate of sightings of the terrifying cryptid in the town of São Gonçalo de Campos
The mysterious lupine was first spotted by a local man known only as Pingo
Pingo claims the creature ran at him but that he managed to escape by the narrowest of margins
He described the critter as a five foot tall black monster
At first people made fun of him but others have since had similar encounters with the best
government officials have put in place a 9pm curfew
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2023 10h00 AM | Last Updated: December 20
Data released today (15) by the IBGE show that
the five municipalities with the biggest increases in the share of Gross Domestic Product (PIB) in Brazil were Maricá (RJ)
with an increase of 0.5 percentage points; Saquarema (RJ)
with +0.2 percentage points; São Sebastião (SP) and Campos dos Goytacazes (RJ)
Ampong the 25 municipalities with the biggest share of GDP
the new municipalities are Maricá (RJ) and Itajaí (SC)
whereas Sorocaba (SP) and Uberlândia (MG) left the list
with a decrease of 0.6 percentage points in participation; Rio de Janeiro (RJ)
-0.3 percentage points; Belo Horizonte (MG) and Porto Alegre (RS)
both with -0.1 percentage points accounted for the main five drops in share of the GDP
“These results show economic recovery of capitals and other aggregates with biggest participation in the Brazilian GDP
having face-to-face services as their main activity
were strongly affected by the COVID-19 pandemic
despite the nominal increase of this group of municipalities in 2021
their participation in GDP is still beyond the level of 2019,” says Luiz Antonio de Sá
“The good performance of Maricá (RJ) was due to the extraction of oil and gas
The five municipalities with a decrease in participation were influenced by Services
insurance and related services in São Paulo and Porto Alegre
Public administration in Brasília and Belo Horizonte
administrative and related services in Rio de Janeiro,” Luiz Antonio Sá explains
11 municipalities accounted for almost 25% of the national GDP and for 16.6% of the Brazilian population
whereas the 87 with the highest GDP figures accounted for approximately 50% of the total GDP and for 36.7% of the population in the country
only four municipalities together represented about ¼ of the national economy
The municipalities accounting for about ¼ of the GDP in 2021 were: São Paulo (SP)
Manaus (AM) went from the seventh to the fifth position; Curitiba (PR)
from the 354th to the eighth; whereas Porto Alegre (RS) went from the sixth to the ninth position; Guarulhos (SP)
from the 14th to the 10th and Fortaleza (CE)
Economic deconcentration intensified in 2020 remains
The trend to relative decrease of the economic relevance of major urban centers remained in 2021
The main two urban concentrations in Brazil amounted to 23.2% of share of the GDP after adding up to 23.6% in 2020
São Paulo/SP started accounting for 15.4% of the Brazilian GDP
This result was the most significant drop among all urban concentrations
having changed from 7.4% to 7.8% of the Brazilian GDP in 2021
That was the main advance observed among urban concentrations that expanded participation in the GDP from 2020 to 2021
Among the 185 urban concentrations existing in the country in 2021
132 reduced and 53 increased their share of the national GDP
thus confirming the trend to deconcentration
The biggest urban concentrations recorded the biggest losses
Among the 53 increasing their participation
only 6 were considered to be big urban concentrations (from a total of 26)
Only 47 medium urban concentrations recorded increases in participation in GDP in 2021 (from a total of 159)
Central South area has GDP above the average in Brazil
the three municipalities in the country with the highest per capital GDP figures were Catas Altas (MG)
with R$ 894,806.28 and São Gonçalo do Rio Abaixo (MG)
The three municipalities have mining and quarrying industry as their main economic activity
Three municipalities in Maranhão had the lowest per capita GDP figures in 2021
Public administration is the predominant economic activity
The highest per capita GDP figures in 2021 belong to big urban centers in the Central-South area and to some other where Agriculture is present for a significanr but small population
municipalities in the south of goiás and east of Mato Grosso do Sul
in the west of Bahia and the upper course of Parnaíba River
The calculation of per capita GDP uses estimated of the resident population for July 1st
submitter by the IBGE to the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU)
the highest ratio of per capita GDP was registered in the urban concentration of Campinas/SP
This scenario is similar to that observed in 2002
despite the change in order of big urban concentrations in the ranking
besides the exit of Curitiba/PR from the list and the incluision of Sorocaba/SP in it
the highest ratios for per capita GDP recorded significant decreases
13 big urban concentrations had a per capita GDP above the national average
the others were found in the Southeast and South Regions
14 urban concentrations had a ratio above 1,0
Some of the biggest urban concentrations in the North and one in the North
were far from the national average throughout the period
Goiânia/GO in the Central West and Belém/PA in the North Regions
The reduction of regional inequality of per capita GDP in 2021 can be also seen in the Semiarid regions
the Legal Amazon and the CIty-Area of São Paulo
the per capita GDP ratios of the Semiarid Region and of the Legam Amazon were
the per capita GDP ratio for the Semiarid region was 0.43 and that for the Legal Amazon was 0.75
The per capita GDP ratio went on advancing in the Legal Amazon
but it oscillated downwards in the Semiarid area in 2021
corresponded to 1.85 of the national value in 2002
City-Area of São Paulo concentrates 22.6% of the national GDP
The City-Area of São Paulo faced a reduction in the share of national GDP
with a change from 23.5% of the GDP in Brazil of Brazil
which means a decrease of 0.9 percentage points
the Legal Amazon increased its participation from 9.9% to 10.1%
“The City-Area of São Paulo has reduced its participation throughout the time series and reinforced that trend in 2021
the increase of Agriculture was an important factor
which since 2013 had been increasing in participation
The decrease in share of national GDP of Services affected the municipalities that have this activity as the most relevant one
as it is the case of the Semiarid area,” says Marcelo Araújo
Public administration and Other services are predominant in the country
Regarding the economic profile of the municipalities
the main activity in 43.2% of them ( 2409 municipalities) was Public administration
Amapá and Paraíba this percentage exceeded 90.0%
had only 6.3% of its municipalities with this characteristic
Of the 358 municipalities whose main activity
293 were in the Southeast and South Regions
Mato Grosso reached the highest percentage of cities in which Agriculture
including support to agriculture and post-harvesting featured as the main activity (56.0%)
followed by Mato Grosso do Sul (53.2%) and Rio Grande do Sul (48.9%)
Excluding from this analysis Public administration
the activity Other services stood out in 3075 municipalities
including support to agriculture and post-harvesting
there was a significant increase in the number of cities with Agriculture as their main activity
which is related to the rise of prices of some farm products of great relevance to the national economy in 2021
Urban concentrations have reduced their participation in the national scenario since 2002
São Paulo (SP) and Rio de Janeiro (RJ) registered the main drops in participation among the Brazilian municipalities
showing a trend to deconcentration of municipal GDP
São Paulo (SP) dropped by 3.5 percentage points as for its participation in national economy
mainly due to the relative drops in Financial activities
the drop of 2.3 percentage points occurred due to the decrease of its weight in Services
mainly the activities of Real Estate and information and Communication
Campos dos Goytacazes (RJ) and Belo Horizonte (MG) follow
both with a decrease of 0.4 pof oil and gas in the former municipality
and or Real Estate activities in the latter
The municipality with the biggest increase in participation in national GDP from 2002 to 2021 was Maricá (RJ)
The municipalities of Parauapebas and Canaã dos Carajás in Pará recorded increases of 0.5 and 0.4 percentage points
placed at the second and fifth positions as for increase in share of the GDP
the increase of 0.4 percentage points was also due to extraction of oil and gas
in the fourth position regarding participation
stood out due to Trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles
the CIty-Area of São Paulo reduced from 27.0% to 22.6% its participation in national GDP
not only due to the reduced GDP share of the capital
but also due to the relative loss of other municipalities that form it and are represented by the Brazilian industry
the Legal Amazon (3.2 p.p) and the Semiarid region (0.9 p.p) have increased their participation since 2002
This sounds like it was taken right out of the pages of a “Bitten” episode script
It airs Monday nights on SyFy and has a very attractive cast
The cryptozoology experts are currently stumped
having been presented with footage of what people are calling a real life werewolf
grainy video footage (viewable below) captures just one of the many appearances of the werewolf that has residents in São Gonçalo de Campos
As of today no one has been reported as injured by the deadly
appearing to have more than 1.5 meters of height
the creature was writhing – as the legends tell – maybe in the process of transformation.”
Although the footage was first uploaded to Youtube back in 2013
some citizens of Brazil are still reporting sightings of the werewolf to this day
The newly released footage is causing a swirl of caution and fear throughout the South American country
A curfew has reportedly been set for 9:00PM
No word yet on whether there is a reward for capture of the legendary creature
then Elaina and the rest of the pack will need to seek out and destroy the angry mutt
And while I would love for this to be an actual werewolf
I’m pretty sure it’s just a monkey/chimp
[SOURCE: Multiple, mostly Huff Post UK]
I’m from Brazil and there are some fonts saying that this video was first uploaded in 2007
I couldn’t prove it so… But what bugs me the most is that there’s not a single moment in this video where the “allegedly zoomed in” footage of the creature can be taken
but the image in the main video is too blurry
Here it is… it’s really from 2007… take a look https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZI1M20k3d2E
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