Critical Conversations: bridging pathways forward to greater understanding and creative solutions “3 Paintings respond to 7 pieces of Music: Live performance Tutzing, Germany” is a collaboration between Exclusive Steinway Artist, Helge Antoni, and Undergraduate Architecture Adjunct Associate Professor, Lex Braes It was inspired by an idea from art collector Michael Langen Scotland) lives in the US are both friends of Michael The artists had never met but were open to exploring the idea A conversation and a four-month period of listening and looking began From an online ping-pong across the Atlantic a shape began to emerge that would frame and structure the idea of a painted response to a solo piano a Romantic beginning influenced by Folk music Grieg Satie and Feuchtwanger’s harmonic experimentations before an introspective piece by Arvo Part completes the performance A triptych design allowed the painter’s response maximum space between motifs for thematic interpretation and improvisation throughout three interrelated yet independent panels The artists met for the first time in Munich three days before the performance As a way of maintaining the collaborative energy for a live performance they decided against joint rehearsals or even run-throughs the collaborative element would remain unpolished fresh in that it would be performed as a one time only event providing an authentic experience for audience and performers alike Faculty submit news for the school to post The views and opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of Pratt Institute Please enable JS and disable any ad blocker Declassified documents show security assurances against NATO expansion to Soviet leaders from Baker Slavic Studies Panel Addresses “Who Promised What to Whom on NATO Expansion?” Page from Stepanov-Mamaladze's notes from February 12 reflecting Baker's assurance to Shevardnadze during the Ottawa Open Skies conference: "And if U[nited] G[ermany] stays in NATO we should take care about non-expansion of its jurisdiction to the east."  Shevardnadze (right) greets Hans-Dietrich Genscher (left) and Helmut Kohl (middle) on their arrival in Moscow on February 10 The agreement to begin the Two Plus Four talks is presented to the press by the six foreign ministers at the “Open Skies” Conference in Ottawa on February 13 Photo: Bundesbildstelle / Presseund Informationsamt der Bundesregierung First official round of the Two Plus Four negotiations From right to left: Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FRG) Minister President Lothar de Maizière (GDR) and Foreign Ministers Roland Dumas (France) and James Baker (USA) sign the so-called Two Plus Four Agreement (Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany) in Moscow on September 12 The working sessions at Camp David met on the deck Vice President Dan Quayle (the only one in a tie) President Bush greets Czech President Vaclav Havel outside the White House Credit: George Bush Presidential Library and Museum Foreign Minister Genscher presents President Bush with a piece of the Berlin Wall 1989. Credit: George Bush Presidential Library and Museum The principals gathered for a group photo at Camp David all smiles except for the Soviet marshal at right.  From left featured high ceremony on the White House lawn here with formal greetings from President Bush for Mikhail Gorbachev now president of the USSR.  (Credit: George H.W The documents show that multiple national leaders were considering and rejecting Central and Eastern European membership in NATO as of early 1990 and through 1991 that discussions of NATO in the context of German unification negotiations in 1990 were not at all narrowly limited to the status of East German territory and that subsequent Soviet and Russian complaints about being misled about NATO expansion were founded in written contemporaneous memcons and telcons at the highest levels.  The documents reinforce former CIA Director Robert Gates’s criticism of “pressing ahead with expansion of NATO eastward [in the 1990s], when Gorbachev and others were led to believe that wouldn’t happen.”[1] The key phrase President George H.W. Bush had assured Gorbachev during the Malta summit in December 1989 that the U.S. would not take advantage (“I have not jumped up and down on the Berlin Wall”) of the revolutions in Eastern Europe to harm Soviet interests; but neither Bush nor Gorbachev at that point (or for that matter, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl) expected so soon the collapse of East Germany or the speed of German unification.[2] This latter idea of special status for the GDR territory was codified in the final German unification treaty signed on September 12 by the Two-Plus-Four foreign ministers (see Document 25) The former idea about “closer to the Soviet borders” is written down not in treaties but in multiple memoranda of conversation between the Soviets and the highest-level Western interlocutors (Genscher and others) offering assurances throughout 1990 and into 1991 about protecting Soviet security interests and including the USSR in new European security structures The two issues were related but not the same Subsequent analysis sometimes conflated the two and argued that the discussion did not involve all of Europe The documents published below show clearly that it did The “Tutzing formula” immediately became the center of a flurry of important diplomatic discussions over the next 10 days in 1990 meeting in Moscow between Kohl and Gorbachev when the West German leader achieved Soviet assent in principle to German unification in NATO as long as NATO did not expand to the east The Soviets would need much more time to work with their domestic opinion (and financial aid from the West Germans) before formally signing the deal in September 1990 The conversations before Kohl’s assurance involved explicit discussion of NATO expansion and how to convince the Soviets to accept unification when Genscher met with British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd “The Russians must have some assurance that if the Polish Government left the Warsaw Pact one day they would not join NATO the next.” (See Document 2) Having met with Genscher on his way into discussions with the Soviets Baker repeated exactly the Genscher formulation in his meeting with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on February 9 (see Document 4); and even more importantly Baker tried out the “not one inch eastward” formula with Gorbachev in the February 9 He agreed with Gorbachev’s statement in response to the assurances that “NATO expansion is unacceptable.” Baker assured Gorbachev that “neither the President nor I intend to extract any unilateral advantages from the processes that are taking place,” and that the Americans understood that “not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.” (See Document 6)  Baker wrote to Helmut Kohl who would meet with the Soviet leader on the next day Baker reported: “And then I put the following question to him [Gorbachev] Would you prefer to see a united Germany outside of NATO forces or would you prefer a unified Germany to be tied to NATO with assurances that NATO’s jurisdiction would not shift one inch eastward from its present position He answered that the Soviet leadership was giving real thought to all such options [….] He then added ‘Certainly any extension of the zone of NATO would be unacceptable.’” Baker added in parentheses NATO in its current zone might be acceptable.” (See Document 8) Well-briefed by the American secretary of state the West German chancellor understood a key Soviet bottom line 1990: “We believe that NATO should not expand the sphere of its activity.” (See Document 9) After this meeting Kohl could hardly contain his excitement at Gorbachev’s agreement in principle for German unification and as part of the Helsinki formula that states choose their own alliances Kohl described in his memoirs walking all night around Moscow – but still understanding there was a price still to pay All the Western foreign ministers were on board with Genscher the East Germans had voted overwhelmingly for the deutschmark and for rapid unification in the March 18 elections in which Kohl had surprised almost all observers with a real victory Kohl’s analyses (first explained to Bush on December 3 1989) that the GDR’s collapse would open all possibilities that he had to run to get to the head of the train that unification could happen faster than anyone thought possible – all turned out to be correct Monetary union would proceed as early as July and the assurances about security kept coming Hurd reinforced the Baker-Genscher-Kohl message in his meeting with Gorbachev in Moscow saying that Britain clearly “recognized the importance of doing nothing to prejudice Soviet interests and dignity.” (See Document 15) The Baker conversation with Shevardnadze on May 4 as Baker described it in his own report to President Bush most eloquently described what Western leaders were telling Gorbachev exactly at the moment: “I used your speech and our recognition of the need to adapt NATO and to develop CSCE to reassure Shevardnadze that the process would not yield winners and losers it would produce a new legitimate European structure – one that would be inclusive giving Gorbachev his “nine points,” which included the transformation of NATO and taking Soviet security interests into account “Before saying a few words about the German issue I wanted to emphasize that our policies are not aimed at separating Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union But today we are interested in building a stable Europe and doing it together with you.” (See Document 18) The French leader Francois Mitterrand was not in a mind-meld with the Americans as evidenced by his telling Gorbachev in Moscow on May 25 that he was “personally in favor of gradually dismantling the military blocs”; but Mitterrand continued the cascade of assurances by saying the West must “create security conditions for you as well as European security as a whole.” (See Document 19) Mitterrand immediately wrote Bush in a “cher George” letter about his conversation with the Soviet leader that “we would certainly not refuse to detail the guarantees that he would have a right to expect for his country’s security.” (See Document 20) Bush went out of his way to assure Gorbachev that Germany in NATO would never be directed at the USSR: “Believe me we are not pushing Germany towards unification and it is not us who determines the pace of this process That is why we are speaking in favor of German unification in NATO without ignoring the wider context of the CSCE taking the traditional economic ties between the two German states into consideration corresponds to the Soviet interests as well.” (See Document 21) in her meeting with Gorbachev in London on June 8 Thatcher anticipated the moves the Americans (with her support) would take in the early July NATO conference to support Gorbachev with descriptions of the transformation of NATO towards a more political She said to Gorbachev: “We must find ways to give the Soviet Union confidence that its security would be assured… as well as being the forum which brought the Soviet Union fully into discussion about the future of Europe.” (See Document 22) 1990 had quite a positive effect on deliberations in Moscow giving Gorbachev significant ammunition to counter his hardliners at the Party Congress which was taking place at that moment Some versions of this history assert that an advance copy was provided to Shevardnadze’s aides while others describe just an alert that allowed those aides to take the wire service copy and produce a Soviet positive assessment before the military or hardliners could call it propaganda As Kohl said to Gorbachev in Moscow on July 15 as they worked out the final deal on German unification: “We know what awaits NATO in the future and I think you are now in the know as well,” referring to the NATO London Declaration Bush meant to reinforce the success of the Kohl-Gorbachev talks and the message of the London Declaration Bush explained: “So what we tried to do was to take account of your concerns expressed to me and others and we did it in the following ways: by our joint declaration on non-aggression; in our invitation to you to come to NATO; in our agreement to open NATO to regular diplomatic contact with your government and those of the Eastern European countries; and our offer on assurances on the future size of the armed forces of a united Germany – an issue I know you discussed with Helmut Kohl We also fundamentally changed our military approach on conventional and nuclear forces stronger CSCE with new institutions in which the USSR can share and be part of the new Europe.” (See Document 24) The documents show that Gorbachev agreed to German unification in NATO as the result of this cascade of assurances and on the basis of his own analysis that the future of the Soviet Union depended on its integration into Europe for which Germany would be the decisive actor He and most of his allies believed that some version of the common European home was still possible and would develop alongside the transformation of NATO to lead to a more inclusive and integrated European space that the post-Cold War settlement would take account of the Soviet security interests The alliance with Germany would not only overcome the Cold War but also turn on its head the legacy of the Great Patriotic War a debate about relations between NATO and Eastern Europe but the suggestion from the Defense Department as of October 25 1990 was to leave “the door ajar” for East European membership in NATO (See Document 27) The view of the State Department was that NATO expansion was not on the agenda because it was not in the interest of the U.S to organize “an anti-Soviet coalition” that extended to the Soviet borders not least because it might reverse the positive trends in the Soviet Union (See Document 26) The Bush administration took the latter view according to the diary of the British ambassador to Moscow British Prime Minister John Major personally assured Gorbachev “We are not talking about the strengthening of NATO.” Subsequently when Soviet defense minister Marshal Dmitri Yazov asked Major about East European leaders’ interest in NATO membership “Nothing of the sort will happen.” (See Document 28) When Russian Supreme Soviet deputies came to Brussels to see NATO and meet with NATO secretary-general Manfred Woerner in July 1991 Woerner told the Russians that “We should not allow […] the isolation of the USSR from the European community.” According to the Russian memorandum of conversation “Woerner stressed that the NATO Council and he are against the expansion of NATO (13 of 16 NATO members support this point of view).” (See Document 30) Gorbachev went to the end of the Soviet Union assured that the West was not threatening his security and was not expanding NATO the dissolution of the USSR was brought about by Russians (Boris Yeltsin and his leading advisory Gennady Burbulis) in concert with the former party bosses of the Soviet republics The Americans had tried to keep the Soviet Union together (see the Bush “Chicken Kiev” speech on August 1 and more assurances would come to Russian leader Boris Yeltsin The Archive compiled these declassified documents for a panel discussion on November 10 2017 at the annual conference of the Association for Slavic East European and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES) in Chicago under the title “Who Promised What to Whom on NATO Expansion?” The panel included:  * Mark Kramer from the Davis Center at Harvard, editor of the Journal of Cold War Studies, whose 2009 Washington Quarterly article argued that the “no-NATO-enlargement pledge” was a “myth”;[4] * Joshua R. Itkowitz Shifrinson from the Bush School at Texas A&M, whose 2016 International Security article argued the U.S. was playing a double game in 1990, leading Gorbachev to believe NATO would be subsumed in a new European security structure, while working to ensure hegemony in Europe and the maintenance of NATO;[5] * James Goldgeier from American University, who wrote the authoritative book on the Clinton decision on NATO expansion, Not Whether But When, and described the misleading U.S. assurances to Russian leader Boris Yeltsin in a 2016 WarOnTheRocks article;[6] * Svetlana Savranskaya and Tom Blanton from the National Security Archive, whose most recent book, The Last Superpower Summits: Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush: Conversations That Ended the Cold War (CEU Press, 2016) analyzes and publishes the declassified transcripts and related documents from all of Gorbachev’s summits with U.S. presidents, including dozens of assurances about protecting the USSR’s security interests.[7] [Today’s posting is the first of two on the subject The second part will cover the Yeltsin discussions with Western leaders about NATO.] One of the myths about the January and February 1990 discussions of German unification is that these talks occurred so early in the process with the Warsaw Pact still very much in existence that no one was thinking about the possibility that Central and European countries could in the future become members of NATO the West German foreign minister’s Tutzing formula in his speech of January 31 explicitly addressed the possibility of NATO expansion as well as Central and Eastern European membership in NATO – and denied that possibility as part of his olive garland towards Moscow Embassy Bonn cable reporting back to Washington details both of Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s proposals – that NATO would not expand to the east and that the former territory of the GDR in a unified Germany would be treated differently from other NATO territory This concise note to President Bush from one of the Cold War’s architects Paul Nitze (based at his namesake Johns Hopkins University School of International Studies) captures the debate over the future of NATO in early 1990 Nitze relates that Central and Eastern European leaders attending the “Forum for Germany” conference in Berlin were advocating the dissolution of both the superpower blocs until he (and a few western Europeans) turned around that view and instead emphasized the importance of NATO as the basis of stability and U.S FOIA 199504567 (National Security Archive Flashpoints Collection Although heavily redacted compared to the Soviet accounts of these conversations the official State Department version of Secretary Baker’s assurances to Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze just before the formal meeting with Gorbachev on February 9 with the two being the Germanies and the four the post-war occupying powers; argues against other ways to negotiate unification; and makes the case for anchoring Germany in NATO “A neutral Germany would undoubtedly acquire its own independent nuclear capability a Germany that is firmly anchored in a changed NATO by that I mean a NATO that is far less of [a] military organization would have no need for independent capability have to be iron-clad guarantees that NATO’s jurisdiction or forces would not move eastward And this would have to be done in a manner that would satisfy Germany’s neighbors to the east.” this American transcript of perhaps the most famous U.S assurance to the Soviets on NATO expansion confirms the Soviet transcript of the same conversation Repeating what Bush said at the Malta summit in December 1989 Baker tells Gorbachev: “The President and I have made clear that we seek no unilateral advantage in this process” of inevitable German unification “We understand the need for assurances to the countries in the East If we maintain a presence in a Germany that is a part of NATO there would be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east.” Later in the conversation Baker poses the same position as a question “would you prefer a united Germany outside of NATO that is independent and has no US forces or would you prefer a united Germany with ties to NATO and assurances that there would be no extension of NATO’s current jurisdiction eastward?” The declassifiers of this memcon actually redacted Gorbachev’s response that indeed such an expansion would be “unacceptable” – but Baker’s letter to Kohl the next day This Gorbachev Foundation record of the Soviet leader’s meeting with James Baker on February 9 has been public and available for researchers at the Foundation since as early as 1996 but it was not published in English until 2010 when the Masterpieces of History volume by the present authors came out from Central European University Press The document focuses on German unification but also includes candid discussion by Gorbachev of the economic and political problems in the Soviet Union and Baker’s “free advice” (“sometimes the finance minister in me wakes up”) on prices and even the policy of selling apartments to soak up the rubles cautious Soviet citizens have tucked under their mattresses The key exchange takes place when Baker asks whether Gorbachev would prefer “a united Germany outside of NATO absolutely independent and without American troops; or a united Germany keeping its connections with NATO but with the guarantee that NATO’s jurisdiction or troops will not spread east of the present boundary.” Thus secretary of state three times offers assurances that if Germany were allowed to unify in NATO not once does he use the term GDR or East Germany or even mention the Soviet troops in East Germany For a skilled negotiator and careful lawyer it seems very unlikely Baker would not use specific terminology if in fact he was referring only to East Germany The Soviet leader responds that “[w]e will think everything over We intend to discuss all these questions in depth at the leadership level It goes without saying that a broadening of the NATO zone is not acceptable.” Baker affirms: “We agree with that.” This conversation is especially important because subsequent researchers have speculated that Secretary Baker may have been speaking beyond his brief in his “not one inch eastward” conversation with Gorbachev the former top CIA intelligence analyst and a specialist on the USSR in his office at the Lubyanka KGB headquarters exactly what Baker told Gorbachev that day at the Kremlin: not one inch eastward Gates was the top deputy to the president’s national security adviser so this document speaks to a coordinated approach by the U.S whom Gorbachev appointed to replace Viktor Chebrikov at the KGB in October 1988 comes across here as surprisingly progressive on many issues of domestic reform He talks openly about the shortcomings and problems of perestroika the need to abolish the leading role of the CPSU the central government’s mistaken neglect of ethnic issues When the discussion moves on to foreign policy “What did Kryuchkov think of the Kohl/Genscher proposal under which a united Germany would be associated with NATO but in which NATO troops would move no further east than they now were It seems to us to be a sound proposal.” Kryuchkov does not give a direct answer but talks about how sensitive the issue of German unification is for the Soviet public and suggests that the Germans should offer the Soviet Union some guarantees He says that although Kohl and Genscher’s ideas are interesting “even those points in their proposals with which we agree would have to have guarantees We learned from the Americans in arms control negotiations the importance of verification This key document first appeared in Helmut Kohl’s scholarly edition of chancellery documents on German unification, published in 1998. Kohl at that moment was caught up in an election campaign that would end his 16-year tenure as chancellor, and wanted to remind Germans of his instrumental role in the triumph of unification.[9] The large volume (over 1,000 pages) included German texts of Kohl’s meetings with Gorbachev Thatcher and more – all published with no apparent consultation with those governments representing the American or British originals rather than German notes or translations Baker debriefs Kohl the day after his February 9 meeting with Gorbachev (The chancellor is scheduled to have his own session with Gorbachev on February 10 in Moscow.) The American apprises the German on Soviet “concerns” about unification and summarizes why a “Two Plus Four” negotiation would be the most appropriate venue for talks on the “external aspects of unification” given that the “internal aspects … were strictly a German matter.” Baker especially remarks on Gorbachev’s noncommittal response to the question about a neutral Germany versus a NATO Germany with pledges against eastward expansion and advises Kohl that Gorbachev “may well be willing to go along with a sensible approach that gives him some cover …” Kohl reinforces this message in his own conversation later that day with the Soviet leader when he first heard from Gorbachev that the Soviet leader saw German unification as inevitable that the value of future German friendship in a “common European home” outweighed Cold War rigidities but that the Soviets would need time (and money) before they could acknowledge the new realities Prepared by Baker’s letter and his own foreign minister’s Tutzing formula Kohl early in the conversation assures Gorbachev “We believe that NATO should not expand the sphere of its activity I correctly understand the security interests of the Soviet Union and the Soviet leadership will have to clearly explain what is happening to the Soviet people.” Later the two leaders tussle about NATO and the Warsaw Pact But we could also ask: what is the WTO without the GDR?” When Kohl disagrees Gorbachev calls merely for “reasonable solutions that do not poison the atmosphere in our relations” and says this part of the conversation should not be made public.  Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze was particularly unhappy with the swift pace of events on German unification especially when a previously scheduled NATO and Warsaw Pact foreign ministers’ meeting in Ottawa that was meant to discuss the “Open Skies” treaty turned into a wide-ranging negotiation over Germany and the installation of the Two-Plus-Four process to work out the details wrote notes of the Ottawa meetings in a series of notebooks which needs to be read along with the notebooks for the most complete account these excerpts of the Stepanov-Mamaladze notes and diary record Shevardnadze’s disapproval of the speed of the process but most importantly reinforce the importance of the February 9 and 10 meetings in Moscow where Western assurances about Soviet security were heard and Gorbachev’s assent in principle to eventual German unification came as part of the deal.  Notes from the first days of the conference are very brief but they contain one important line that shows that Baker offered the same assurance formula in Ottawa as he did in Moscow: “And if U[nited] G[ermany] stays in NATO we should take care about nonexpansion of its jurisdiction to the East.” Shevardnadze is not ready to discuss conditions for German unification; he says that he has to consult with Moscow before any condition is approved “I am in a stupid situation – we are discussing the Open Skies but my colleagues are talking about unification of Germany as if it was a fact.” The notes show that Baker was very persistent in trying to get Shevardnadze to define Soviet conditions for German unification in NATO while Shevardnadze was still uncomfortable with the term “unification,” instead insisting on the more general term “unity.” This diary entry from February 12 contains a very brief description of the February 10 Kohl and Genscher visit to Moscow about which Stepanov-Mamaladze had not previously written (since he was not present) Stepanov reflects on the hurried nature of the Moscow discussions: “Before our visit here Kohl and Genscher paid a hasty visit to Moscow And just as hastily – in the opinion of E.A [Shevardnadze] – Gorbachev accepted the right of the Germans to unity and self-determination.” This diary entry is evidence that the United States and West Germany did give Moscow concrete assurances about keeping NATO to its current size and scope the diary further indicates that at least in Shevardnadze’s view those assurances amounted to a deal – which Gorbachev accepted On the second day of the Ottawa conference Stepanov-Mamaladze describes difficult negotiations about the exact wording on the joint statement on Germany and the Two-Plus-Four process Shevardnadze and Genscher argued for two hours over the terms “unity” versus “unification” as Shevardnadze tried to slow things down on Germany and get the other ministers to concentrate on Open Skies The day was quite intense: “During the day active games were taking place between all of them talked with Fischer [GDR foreign minister] and the ministers of the ATS countries,” and finally using the word “unity.” The final statement also called the agreement on U.S and Soviet troops in Central Europe the main achievement of the conference “ the ‘Open Sky’ [was] still closed by the storm cloud of Germany.” National Security Archive Flashpoints Collection likely authored by top Baker aide Robert Zoellick at the State Department contains the candid American view of the Two-Plus-Four process with its advantages of “maintain[ing] American involvement in (and even some control over) the unification debate.” The American fear was that the West Germans would make their own deal with Moscow for rapid unification giving up some of the bottom lines for the U.S. that Kohl had announced his 10 Points without consulting Washington and after signals from Moscow had found out about Kohl going to Moscow from the Soviets The memo pre-empts objections about including the Soviets by pointing out they were already in Germany and had to be dealt with The Two-Plus-Four arrangement includes the Soviets but prevents them from having a veto (which a Four-Power process or a United Nations process might allow) while an effective One-Plus-Three conversation before each meeting would enable West Germany and the U.S. Especially telling are the underlining and handwriting by Baker in the margins “you haven’t seen a leveraged buyout until you see this one!” George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, Memcons and Telcons (https://bush41library.tamu.edu/) These conversations might be called “the education of Vaclav Havel,”[10] as the former dissident-turned-president of Czechoslovakia visited Washington only two months after the Velvet Revolution swept him from prison to the Prague Castle Havel would enjoy standing ovations during a February 21 speech to a joint session of Congress and hold talks with Bush before and after the congressional appearance Havel had already been cited by journalists as calling for the dissolution of the Cold War blocs so Bush took the opportunity to lecture the Czech leader about the value of NATO and its essential role as the basis for the U.S Havel twice mentioned in his speech to Congress his hope that “American soldiers shouldn’t have to be separated from their mothers” just because Europe couldn’t keep the peace and appealed for a “future democratic Germany in the process of unifying itself into a new pan-European structure which could decide about its own security system.” But afterwards the former dissident clearly had gotten the message Havel said he might have been misunderstood assuming more Czechoslovak cooperation on this issue This memcon after Havel’s triumphant speech to Congress contains Bush’s request to Havel to pass the message to Gorbachev that the Americans support him personally and that “We will not conduct ourselves in the wrong way by saying ‘we win “tell Gorbachev that … I asked you to tell Gorbachev that we will not conduct ourselves regarding Czechoslovakia or any other country in a way that would complicate the problems he has so frankly discussed with me.” The Czechoslovak leader adds his own caution to the Americans about how to proceed with the unification of Germany and address Soviet insecurities This is the reason why I talked about the new European security system without mentioning NATO if only because of the element of prestige But if NATO can transform itself – perhaps in conjunction with the Helsinki process – it would look like a peaceful process of change not defeat.” Bush responded positively: “You raised a good point Our view is that NATO would continue with a new political role and that we would build on the CSCE process We will give thought on how we might proceed.” Kohl expresses gratitude for Bush and Baker’s support during his discussions with Gorbachev in Moscow in early February especially for Bush’s letter stating Washington’s strong commitment to German unification in NATO Both leaders express the need for the closest cooperation between them in order to reach the desired outcome I don’t see how we can persuade any other ally on the continent to retain these weapons.” He refers sarcastically to criticisms coming from Capitol Hill: “We have weird thinking in our Congress today We can’t do that in these uncertain times.” Both leaders are concerned about the position Gorbachev might take and agree on the need to consult with him regularly Kohl suggests that the Soviets need assistance and the final arrangement on Germany could be a “matter of cash.” Foreshadowing his reluctance to contribute financially “you have deep pockets.” At one point in the conversation Bush seems to view his Soviet counterpart not as a partner but as a defeated enemy Referring to talk in some Soviet quarters against Germany staying in NATO We cannot let the Soviets clutch victory from the jaws of defeat.” Foreign Minister Shevardnadze delivers a letter to Bush from Gorbachev in which the Soviet president reviews the main issues before the coming summit Economic issues are at the top of the list for the Soviet Union specifically Most Favored Nation status and a trade agreement with the United States Shevardnadze expresses concern about the lack of progress on these issues and the U.S efforts to prevent the EBRD from extending loans to the USSR He stresses that they are not asking for help “we are only looking to be treated as partners.” Addressing the tensions in Lithuania Bush says that he does not want to create difficulties for Gorbachev on domestic issues but notes that he must insist on the rights of Lithuanians because their incorporation within the USSR was never recognized by the United States both sides point to some backtracking by the other and express a desire to finalize the START Treaty quickly Shevardnadze mentions the upcoming CSCE summit and the Soviet expectation that it will discuss the new European security structures Bush does not contradict this but ties it to the issues of the U.S presence in Europe and German unification in NATO He declares that he wants to “contribute to stability and to the creation of a Europe whole and free A[n] idea that is very close to our own.” The Soviets—wrongly—interpret this as a declaration that the U.S Ambassador Braithwaite’s telegram summarizes the meeting between Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Douglas Hurd and President Gorbachev noting Gorbachev’s “expansive mood.” Gorbachev asks the secretary to pass his appreciation for Margaret Thatcher’s letter to him after her summit with Kohl she followed the lines of policy Gorbachev and Thatcher discussed in their recent phone call on the basis of which the Soviet leader concluded that “the British and Soviet positions were very close indeed.” Hurd cautions Gorbachev that their positions are not 100% in agreement but that the British “recognized the importance of doing nothing to prejudice Soviet interests and dignity.” Gorbachev speaks about the importance of building new security structures as a way of dealing with the issue of two Germanies: “If we are talking about a common dialogue about a new Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals that was one way of dealing with the German issue.” That would require a transitional period to pick up the pace of the European process and “synchronise it with finding a solution to the problem of the two Germanies.” However if the process was unilateral – only Germany in NATO and no regard for Soviet security interest – the Supreme Soviet would be very unlikely to approve such a solution and the Soviet Union would question the need to speed up the reduction of its conventional weapons in Europe Germany’s joining NATO without progress on European security structures “could upset the balance of security which would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union.” He further comments that reasonable voices are no longer heard: “Genscher from time to time continues to discuss accelerating the movement toward European collective security with the ‘dissolving of NATO and WTO into it.’ .. But very few people … hear Genscher.” Falin proposes using the Soviet Four-power rights to achieve a formal legally binding settlement equal to a peace treaty that would guarantee Soviet security interests as “our only chance to dock German unification with the pan-European process.” He also suggests using arms control negotiations in Vienna and Geneva as leverage if the West keeps taking advantage of Soviet flexibility The memo suggests specific provisions for the final settlement with Germany the negotiation of which would take a long time and provide a window for building European structures But the main idea of the memo is to warn Gorbachev not to be naive about the intentions of his American partners: “The West is outplaying us promising to respect the interests of the USSR Folder “Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 – June 1990 [3]” The secretary of state had just spent nearly four hours meeting with the Soviet foreign minister in Bonn on May 4 covering a range of issues but centering on the crisis in Lithuania and the negotiations over German unification As in the February talks and throughout the year Baker took pains to provide assurances to the Soviets about including them in the future of Europe “I also used your speech and our recognition of the need to adapt NATO not exclusive.” Shevardnadze’s response indicates that “our discussion of the new European architecture was compatible with much of their thinking though their thinking was still being developed.” Baker relates that Shevardnadze “emphasized again the psychological difficulty they have – especially the Soviet public has – of accepting a unified Germany in NATO.” Astutely Baker predicts that Gorbachev will not “take on this kind of an emotionally charged political issue now” and likely not until after the Party Congress in July This fascinating conversation covers a range of arms control issues in preparation for the Washington summit and includes extensive though inconclusive discussions of German unification and the tensions in the Baltics particularly the standoff between Moscow and secessionist Lithuania Gorbachev makes an impassioned attempt to persuade Baker that Germany should reunify outside of the main military blocs in the context of the all-European process Baker provides Gorbachev with nine points of assurance to prove that his position is being taken into account Point eight is the most important for Gorbachev—that the United States is “making an effort in various forums to ultimately transform the CSCE into a permanent institution that would become an important cornerstone of a new Europe.” when Gorbachev mentions the need to build new security structures to replace the blocs Baker lets slip a personal reaction that reveals much about the real U.S position on the subject: “It’s nice to talk about pan-European security structures then he would “announce publicly that we want to join NATO too.” Shevardnadze goes further offering a prophetic observation: “if united Germany becomes a member of NATO People will say that we ended up the losers the French president was his closest ally in the construction of a post-Cold War Europe because the Soviet leader believed Mitterrand shared his concept of the common European home and the idea of dissolving both military blocs in favor of new European security structures Gorbachev is still hoping to persuade his counterpart to join him in opposing German unification in NATO telling Gorbachev that it is too late to fight this issue and that he would not give his support because “if I say ‘no’ to Germany’s membership in NATO I will become isolated from my Western partners.” However Mitterrand suggests that Gorbachev demand “appropriate guarantees” from NATO He speaks about the danger of isolating the Soviet Union in the new Europe and the need to “create security conditions for you particularly when I proposed my idea of creating a European confederation It is similar to your concept of a common European home.”  Mitterrand is basically repeating the lines of the Falin memo (see Document 16) He says Gorbachev should strive for a formal settlement with Germany using his Four-power rights and use the leverage of conventions arms control negotiations: “You will not abandon such a trump card as disarmament negotiations.” He implies that NATO is not the key issue now and could be drowned out in further negotiations; rather the important thing is to ensure Soviet participation in new European security system He repeats that he is “personally in favor of gradually dismantling the military blocs.” Gorbachev expresses his wariness and suspicion about U.S effort to “perpetuate NATO,” to “use NATO to create some sort of mechanism a kind of directory for managing world affairs.” He tells Mitterrand about his concern that the U.S is trying to attract East Europeans to NATO: “I told Baker: we are aware of your favorable attitude towards the intention expressed by a number of representatives of Eastern European countries to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and subsequently join NATO.” What about the USSR joining?  Mitterrand agrees to support Gorbachev in his efforts to encourage pan-European processes and ensure that Soviet security interests are taken into account as long as he does not have to say “no” to the Germans He says “I always told my NATO partners: make a commitment not to move NATO’s military formations from their current territory in the FRG to East Germany.” Mitterrand writes a letter to George Bush describing Gorbachev’s predicament on the issue of German unification in NATO not “fake or tactical.” He warns the American president against doing it as a fait accompli without Gorbachev’s consent implying that Gorbachev might retaliate on arms control (exactly what Mitterrand himself – and Falin earlier – suggested in his conversation) Mitterrand argues in favor of a formal “peace settlement in International law,” and informs Bush that in his conversation with Gorbachev he “indicated that we would certainly not refuse to detail the guarantees that he would have a right to expect for his country’s security.” Mitterrand thinks that “we must try to dispel Mr Gorbatchev’s worries,” and offers to present “ a number of proposals” about such guarantees when he and Bush meet in person Gorbachev Foundation Archive, Moscow, Fond 1, opis 1.[13] and Soviet delegations deliberate over the process of German unification and especially the issue of a united Germany joining NATO Bush tries to persuade his counterpart to reconsider his fears of Germany based on the past and to encourage him to trust the new democratic Germany corresponds to the Soviet interests as well.” Baker repeats the nine assurances made previously by the administration including that the United States now agrees to support the pan-European process and transformation of NATO in order to remove the Soviet perception of threat Gorbachev’s preferred position is Germany with one foot in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact—the “two anchors”—creating a kind of associated membership saying that “the simultaneous obligations of one and the same country toward the WTO and NATO smack of schizophrenia.” After the U.S president frames the issue in the context of the Helsinki agreement Gorbachev proposes that the German people have the right to choose their alliance—which he in essence already affirmed to Kohl during their meeting in February 1990 and incurs the ire of other members of his delegation especially the official with the German portfolio Gorbachev issues a key warning about the future: “if the Soviet people get an impression that we are disregarded in the German question including the negotiations in Vienna [over conventional forces] It is simply that the people will force us to stop and to look around.” It is a remarkable admission about domestic political pressures from the last Soviet leader Margaret Thatcher visits Gorbachev right after he returns home from his summit with George Bush the center of gravity is on German unification and NATO Gorbachev’s “views were still evolving.” Rather than agreeing on German unification in NATO Gorbachev talks about the need for NATO and the Warsaw pact to move closer together from confrontation to cooperation to build a new Europe: “We must mould European structures so that they helped us find the common European home Neither side must be afraid of unorthodox solutions.” While Thatcher speaks against Gorbachev’s ideas short of full NATO membership for Germany and emphasizes the importance of a U.S she also sees that “CSCE could provide the umbrella for all this as well as being the forum which brought the Soviet Union fully into discussion about the future of Europe.” Gorbachev says he wants to “be completely frank with the Prime Minister” that if the processes were to become one-sided “there could be a very difficult situation [and the] Soviet Union would feel its security in jeopardy.” Thatcher responds firmly that it was in nobody’s interest to put Soviet security in jeopardy: “we must find ways to give the Soviet Union confidence that its security would be assured.” This key conversation between Chancellor Kohl and President Gorbachev sets the final parameters for German unification Kohl talks repeatedly about the new era of relations between a united Germany and the Soviet Union and how this relationship would contribute to European stability and security Gorbachev demands assurances on non-expansion of NATO: “we must talk about the nonproliferation of NATO military structures to the territory of the GDR and maintaining Soviet troops there for a certain transition period.” The Soviet leader notes earlier in the conversation that NATO has already began transforming itself the pledge of NATO non-expansion to the territory of the GDR in spirit means that NATO would not take advantage of the Soviet willingness to compromise on Germany He also demands that the status of Soviet troops in the GDR for the transition period be “regulated it needs a legal basis.” He hands Kohl Soviet considerations for a full-fledged Soviet-German treaty that would include such guarantees He also wants assistance with relocating the troops and building housing for them Kohl promises to do so as long as this assistance is not construed as “a program of German assistance to the Soviet Army.” Memcons and Telcons ((https://bush41library.tamu.edu/) President Bush reaches out to Gorbachev immediately after the Kohl-Gorbachev meetings in Moscow and the Caucasus retreat of Arkhyz leaving only the financial arrangements for resolution in September Gorbachev had not only made the deal with Kohl but he had also survived and triumphed at the 28th Congress of the CPSU in early July the last in the history of the Soviet Party Gorbachev describes this time as “perhaps the most difficult and important period in my political life.” The Congress subjected the party leader to scathing criticism from both conservative Communists and the democratic opposition He managed to defend his program and win reelection as general secretary but he had very little to show from his engagement with the West especially after ceding so much ground on German unification While Gorbachev fought for his political life as Soviet leader the Houston summit of the G-7 had debated ways to help perestroika opposition to credits or direct economic aid prior to the enactment of serious free-market reforms no concrete assistance package was approved; the group went no further than to authorize “studies” by the IMF and World Bank Gorbachev counters that given enough resources the USSR “could move to a market economy,” otherwise the country “will have to rely more on state-regulated measures.” In this phone call Bush expands on Kohl’s security assurances and reinforces the message from the London Declaration: “So what we tried to do was to take account of your concerns expressed to me and others stronger CSCE with new institutions in which the USSR can share and be part of the new Europe.” Staffers in the European Bureau of the State Department wrote this document and addressed it to senior officials such as Robert Zoellick and Condoleezza Rice participants at the final ministerial session on German unification on September 12 The document features statements by all six ministers in the Two-Plus-Four process – Shevardnadze (the host) and De Maiziere of the GDR – (much of which would be repeated in their press conferences after the event) along with the agreed text of the final treaty on German unification The treaty codified what Bush had earlier offered to Gorbachev – “special military status” for the former GDR territory British and American concerns that the language would restrict emergency NATO troop movements there forced the inclusion of a “minute” that left it up to the newly unified and sovereign Germany what the meaning of the word “deployed” should be Kohl had committed to Gorbachev that only German NATO troops would be allowed on that territory after the Soviets left even though the “minute” was meant to allow other NATO troops to traverse or exercise there at least temporarily Gorbachev aides such as Pavel Palazhshenko would point to the treaty language to argue that NATO expansion violated the “spirit” of this Final Settlement treaty soon after German unification was completed for the discussion inside the Bush administration about the new NATO role in Europe and especially on NATO relations with countries of Eastern Europe were interested in becoming full members of international community looking to join the future European Union and potentially NATO.  prepared for a discussion of NATO’s future by a Sub-Ungroup consisting of representatives of the NSC posits that "[a] potential Soviet threat remains and constitutes one basic justification for the continuance of NATO.” At the same time in the discussion of potential East European membership in NATO the review suggests that “In the current environment it is not in the best interest of NATO or of the U.S that these states be granted full NATO membership and its security guarantees.” The United States does not “wish to organize an anti-Soviet coalition whose frontier is the Soviet border” – not least because of the negative impact this might have on reforms in the USSR NATO liaison offices would do for the present time but the relationship will develop in the future In the absence of the Cold War confrontation NATO “out of area” functions will have to be redefined George H. W. Bush Presidential Library: NSC Philip Zelikow Files, Box CF01468, Folder “File 148 NATO Strategy Review No. 1 [3]”[16] This concise memorandum comes from the State Department’s European Bureau as a cover note for briefing papers for a scheduled October 29 1990 meeting on the issues of NATO expansion and European defense cooperation with NATO Most important is the document’s summary of the internal debate within the Bush administration primarily between the Defense Department (specifically the Office of the Secretary of Defense OSD “wishes to leave the door ajar” while State “prefers simply to note that discussion of expanding membership is not on the agenda….” The Bush administration effectively adopts State’s view in its public statements yet the Defense view would prevail in the next administration Rodric Braithwaite personal diary (used by permission from the author) National Security Archive FOIA 20120941DOD109 These memcons from April 1991 provide the bookends for the “education of Vaclav Havel” on NATO (see Documents 12-1 and 12-2 above) Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz included these memcons in his report to the NSC and the State Department about his attendance at a conference in Prague on “The Future of European Security,” on April 24-27 During the conference Wolfowitz had separate meetings with Havel and Minister of Defense Dobrovsky Wolfowitz thanks him for his statements about the importance of NATO and US troops in Europe Havel informs him that Soviet Ambassador Kvitsinsky was in Prague negotiating a bilateral agreement and the Soviets wanted the agreement to include a provision that Czechoslovakia would not join alliances hostile to the USSR Wolfowitz advises both Havel and Dobrovsky not to enter into such agreements and to remind the Soviets about the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act that postulate freedom to join alliances of their choice Havel states that for Czechoslovakia in the next 10 years that means NATO and the European Union.  Wolfowitz remarks that “the very existence of NATO was in doubt a year ago,” but with U.S and NATO allied (as well as united German) support its importance for Europe is now understood and the statements of East European leaders were important in this respect Dobrovsky candidly describes the change in the Czechoslovak leadership’s position President Havel had urged the dissolution of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO,” but then concluded that NATO should be maintained “the CSFR was attracted to NATO because it ensured the U.S State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF) This document is important for describing the clear message in 1991 from the highest levels of NATO – Secretary General Manfred Woerner – that NATO expansion was not happening The audience was a Russian Supreme Soviet delegation which in this memo was reporting back to Boris Yeltsin (who in June had been elected president of the Russian republic but no doubt Gorbachev and his aides were hearing the same assurance at that time The emerging Russian security establishment was already worried about the possibility of NATO expansion so in June 1991 this delegation visited Brussels to meet NATO’s leadership Woerner had given a well-regarded speech in Brussels in May 1990 in which he argued: “The principal task of the next decade will be to build a new European security structure to include the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations The Soviet Union will have an important role to play in the construction of such a system If you consider the current predicament of the Soviet Union then you can understand its justified wish not to be forced out of Europe.” Woerner responds to the Russians by stating that he personally and the NATO Council are both against expansion—“13 out of 16 NATO members share this point of view”—and that he will speak against Poland’s and Romania’s membership in NATO to those countries’ leaders as he has already done with leaders of Hungary and Czechoslovakia Woerner emphasizes that “We should not allow […] the isolation of the USSR from the European community.” The Russian delegation warned that any strengthening or expanding of NATO could “seriously slow down democratic transformations” in Russia and called on their NATO interlocutors to gradually decrease the military functions of the alliance This memo on the Woerner conversation was written by three prominent reformers and close allies of Yeltsin—Sergey Stepashin (chairman of the Duma’s Security Committee and future deputy minister of Security and prime minister) Konstantin Kobets (future chief military inspector of Russia after he was the highest-ranking Soviet military officer to support Yeltsin during the August 1991 coup) and Gen Dmitry Volkogonov (Yeltsin’s adviser on defense and security issues future head of the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on POW-MIA and prominent military historian) [1] See Robert Gates [2] See Chapter 6 “The Malta Summit 1989,” in Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton [3] For background “The Diplomatic Path to Germany Unity,” Bulletin of the German Historical Institute 46 (Spring 2010) Elbe was Genscher’s chief of staff at the time [4] See Mark Kramer “The Myth of a No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia,” The Washington Quarterly [5] See Joshua R Offer to Limit NATO Expansion,” International Security [6] See James Goldgeier Decision to Enlarge NATO (Brookings Institution Press What Yeltsin was told about NATO in 1993 and why it matters,” War On The Rocks [7] See also Svetlana Savranskaya “Masterpieces of History”: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe for extended discussion and documents on the early 1990 German unification negotiations [8] Genscher told Baker on February 2 “NATO would not extend its territorial coverage to the area of the GDR nor anywhere else in Eastern Europe.” Secretary of State to US Embassy Bonn “Baker-Genscher Meeting February 2,” George H.W Folder “Germany-March 1990.” Cited by Joshua R [9] The previous version of this text said that Kohl was “caught up in a campaign finance corruption scandal that would end his political career”; however after the September 1998 elections swept Kohl out of office Jansen for the correction and his careful reading of the posting [10] See Andrei Grachev [11] For an insightful account of Bush's highly effective educational efforts with East European leaders including Havel – as well as allies – see Jeffrey A Bush and the End of the Cold War (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt [12] See George H.W [13] Published in English for the first time in Savranskaya and Blanton [14] Anatoly Chernyaev Diary, 1990 translated by Anna Melyakova and edited by Svetlana Savranskaya [15] See Michael Nelson and Barbara A [16] The authors thank Josh Shifrinson for providing his copy of this document [17] See Memorandum of Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and John Major published in Mikhail Gorbachev [18] See Rodric Braithwaite “NATO enlargement: Assurances and misunderstandings,” European Council on Foreign Relations The Last Superpower SummitsJanuary 23 The Shevardnadze File: Late Soviet Foreign Minister Helped End the Cold WarJuly 24 The Washington/Camp David Summit 1990: From the Secret Soviet, American and German FilesJune 13 The Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, 1990May 25 Bush and Gorbachev at MaltaDecember 3 Gelman LibraryThe George Washington University2130 H Street Phone: 202/994-7000Fax: 202/994-7005Contact by email     ​ support our work - donate The National Security Archive is committed to digital accessibility. If you experience a barrier that affects your ability to access content on this page, let us know via our Contact form Contents of this website (c) The National Security Archive 1985-2025For educational or noncommercial use contact the Archive using the form above for permission Felix started dancing at the age of seven with Flora Neves de Almeida at the Tanzstudio Tutzing He gained multiple awards both at the national and international level he won 1st place in the competition Deutscher Jugend Tanzpreis – Dance Art Classic he was awarded the 1st and 3rd place in pre-competitive and contemporary category at the Youth Grand Prix Berlin he was delighted to score 2nd place of the Junior classical category and to be among the top 6 of the contemporary category at the Youth America Grand Prix Christopher Powney first saw Felix dance at the Youth America Grand Prix Finals in Tampa and invited him to participate in the Royal Ballet School International Scholars Programme [email protected] © 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between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin PhosAgro/UNESCO/IUPAC green chemistry research grants awarded for the 8th time to world's best young scientists Download the pdf version Download the pdf version Download the pdf version Download the pdf version The origins of the current Russian demands to halt Nato’s expansion eastwards go right back to just before the fall of the Soviet Union Then Mikhail Gorbachev was negotiating with German chancellor Helmut Kohl on the reunification of Germany in the course of which the Communist Party general secretary was promised by multiple Western leaders as well as US Secretary of State James Baker that Nato would expand “not one inch” to the east The existence of the promises has been hotly disputed for years, but they are central to the current demands Russia is making to stop, and to some extent reverse, the expansion of Nato since 1999 Russian President Vladimir Putin has brought the promises up many times. They were central to Putin’s now famous speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007 when he called the West to account for reneging on the verbal commitments Putin brought up it again most recently at his annual press conference at the end of the year where he again explicitly referred to the “verbal promises” made in the twilight years of the Soviet Union to Gorbachev that Nato would not expand the West became defensive and denied the Soviet leader was given any assurances or that accepting new members is any way a threat to Russia Nato itself declared in 2014 during the spiking tension following the annexation of Crimea: “No such pledge was made and no evidence to back up Russia’s claims has ever been produced.”   The fact of the promises is now a matter of historical record after dozens of embassy, government and other documents were declassified and now freely available on the internet the fact Gorbachev was only ever made verbal pledges and nothing was ever put in writing means the claims remain highly controversial after a decade of denial “The sceptics are correct that the two sides never codified a deal on Nato’s future presence in the east But they misinterpret the precise implications of negotiations that took place throughout 1990 scholars and practitioners have long recognised that informal commitments count in world politics,” Professor Joshua Shifrinson said in a paper documenting the promises entitled “How the West Broke Its Promise to Moscow” citing 30 documents from the US national security archives that detail all key conversations Gorbachev had with Western leaders in 1990 including from European and Russian official sources The secrecy around the promises at the time has muddied the water. Gorbachev himself contributed to the confusion in an interview where he denied those promises were made saying that the topic of Nato expansion “was not brought up at all in those years.”   What motivated Gorbachev to deny the promises remains a matter of speculation but the declassified documents are absolutely clear that the promises were made many times At a meeting between US Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on February 9 the “not one inch expansion of Nato east” formula according to the official State Department write-up of the meeting Baker said the same to Gorbachev at a meeting on the same day saying: “neither the President nor I intend to extract any unilateral advantages from the processes that are taking place,” and that the Americans understood that “not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of Nato not an inch of Nato’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction,” according to the declassified State Department’s official write-up of the meeting The idea of the promise of no Nato expansion was the brainchild of Germany’s Hans-Dietrich Genscher the attempt by West Germany to normalise its relations with Eastern Europe between 1969 and 1974 Genscher realised that the Soviet Union would see any Nato expansion as very threatening Years later bne IntelliNews met with Genscher in Berlin at the premier of the play Democracy by Michael Frayn that was set in Berlin and about the changing relations between east and west that featured Genscher as a character This correspondent asked Genscher about the relations with Russia and the meetings with Gorbachev but he too refused to divulge any details or comment on his conversations with Gorbachev Genscher made the West’s first concrete assurances of no Nato expansion eastwards at a major public speech at Tutzing Genscher said that “the changes in Eastern Europe and the German unification process must not lead to an ‘impairment of Soviet security interests.’ Therefore Nato should rule out an ‘expansion of its territory towards the east moving it closer to the Soviet borders.’,” according to the declassified US embassy cable sent back to report on the speech to Washington The “Tutzing formula” immediately became the centre of a flurry of important diplomatic discussions over the next ten days in 1990 that also involved US President George Bush UK Prime Minister Margret Thatcher and Nato General Secretary Manfred Woerner in his Munich address in 2007 Putin specifically referred to a speech given by Woerner in Brussels a few months later on May 17 1990 citing him saying: “The fact that we are ready not to place a Nato army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee.” Putin went on to ask in Munich: “Where are these guarantees?” Genscher actively promoted the Tutzing formula in the month following his speech He met with British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd a few days before the Gorbachev-Baker meeting and the British record shows Genscher saying: “The Russians must have some assurance that if they would not join Nato the next.”   Shifrinson’s paper goes on to show how most of the West’s leaders in the following months all gave Gorbachev concrete verbal assurances that Nato would not expand to the east all backed up by official declassified records It is the basis of these broken promises to Gorbachev that is driving Putin’s insistence that Nato give Russia concrete “legal guarantees” of no further Nato expansion now At the first meeting this week on December 10 in Geneva Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov laid out in explicit detail what Putin is now demanding legally binding guarantees – not promises or assurances – but precise guarantees This is a matter of Russia's national security," Ryabkov said The promises made to Gorbachev were verbal and never codified in a treaty and so have no legal standing the promises were made to the leader of a nation that no longer exists But Putin has made it plain that he insists that the West now keep its promises made in 1990 but this time put them down on paper And he has threatened to go to war with Ukraine if the West does not acquiesce to this demand Check the box to receive the e-magazine to your inbox every month for free Get notified when there's a new bne IntelliNews Podcasts added History News Network puts current events into historical perspective Subscribe to our newsletter for new perspectives on the ways history continues to resonate in the present Explore our archive of thousands of original op-eds and curated stories from around the web and that subsequent Soviet and Russian complaints about being misled about NATO expansion were founded in written contemporaneous memcons and telcons at the highest levels The documents reinforce former CIA Director Robert Gates’s criticism of “pressing ahead with expansion of NATO eastward [in the 1990s], when Gorbachev and others were led to believe that wouldn’t happen.”[1] The key phrase Even professional writers and editors make mistakes in grammar and usage Perhaps you’ve even thought: Where are the editors but when you’re publishing 125,000 or more words a day at blinding speed catching every single error is harder than it looks One unpleasant part of my job as The Times’s standards editor and stylebook overseer is pointing out those mistakes in memos to my colleagues Below are 10 passages from Times articles that I cited in recent newsroom memos Each passage contains at least one clear error in grammar or usage (I’m not counting less-than-elegant phrasing that could be improved) You don’t have to explain the error or fix it; just click on the word or words you think are wrong We should have published that story already What did you think of this quiz? Let us know in the comments. tags.",html:!0},image:{placeholder:"Requires Scoop image id"}}},questions:[{type:"multiple choice",text:"",image:"",meta:{image:{placeholder:"Requires Scoop image id"},text:{placeholder:"Question text HTML is OK",html:!0},type:{readonly:!0}}}]}},function(e,t){e.exports={}},function(e,t){e.exports={project:{text:"Even professional writers and editors make mistakes in grammar and usage I could catch those errors.\n\nThis isn’t an excuse they just love the feedback.\n\nNow here’s your chance Each passage contains at least one clear error in grammar or usage (I’m not counting less-than-elegant phrasing that could be improved).\n\n**You’re not getting paid for this We should have published that story already!",responses:[]},questions:[{intro:"",question:"The of laws governing background checks assault-weapons limits and open-carry practices explain why people continue to be wounded and killed.",response:'The subject is the singular noun "patchwork," not “checks,” “limits” or “practices.” It needs a singular verb “helps.”'},{intro:"",question:" his doctorate at Princeton hired him as an assistant professor and promoted him to full professor in 1965.",response:'The introductory modifying phrase is a so-called dangler “receiving” should apply to the noun (or pronoun) immediately following the modifying phrase But here it doesn’t — the university did not receive a doctorate One simple fix is to make the initial phrase a separate clause with its own subject "After he received …"'},{intro:"",question:"He has been dogged by reports — many published in Newsday — that he had received and vacations from a longtime friend a Long Island restaurateur with about 30 businesses in the area and several government contracts.",response:"Yes “Free” is redundant with “gifts.”"},{intro:"",question:"The names of the sergeant Chief Nikunen said was an eight-year veteran of the New York Police Department and the woman were not released.",response:'This should be "who." The relative pronoun is the subject of "was," not the object of “said.” To test the grammar turn the sentence around: “Chief Nikunen said he [not him] was an eight-year veteran …”'},{intro:"",question:"The total amount available to will be $150 million annually.",response:'“Disperse” means “scatter.” We wanted to say "disburse," meaning “pay out.” This is a surprisingly common error given how infrequently the verbs appear.'},{intro:"",question:"In Tutzing the Prince's three-story villa is defended from prying eyes by a fence and hedge more than tall.",response:"No hyphens are called for in this phrase."},{intro:"",question:"HERNDON Trump on Monday called for strengthening the nation's defenses against cyberattacks saying that as president he would create a joint law enforcement task force to handle cybersecurity offensive cyberwarfare.",response:'Make it "both … and," not "both … as well as."'},{intro:"",question:"Though the terminology and process (wildly the advice is simple for anyone wanting to borrow $25,000: Take out federal student loans from the government not private ones that come from a bank or similar institution.",response:'Another agreement problem Occasionally two terms are so closely linked that it makes sense to treat them as a singular unit grammatically: *Gin and tonic is my favorite cocktail.* But in the vast majority of cases a compound subject joined by "and" needs a plural verb Make this "the terminology and the process are … complex."'},{intro:"",question:"The only that the player played for five seasons made one All-Pro team or Pro Bowl and has been retired for five full seasons.",response:'A very common error Make it "The only criteria are … ”'},{intro:"",question:"It occurred when American aircraft were called in to a police post that was under attack in Uruzgan At least seven police officers were killed Afghan officials said.",response:'An easy one "+i(e.message+"",!0)+"";throw e}}var p={newline:/^\n+/,code:/^( {4}[^\n]+\n*)+/,fences:l,hr:/^( *[-*_]){3,} *(?:\n+|$)/,heading:/^ *(#{1,6}) *([^\n]+?) *#* *(?:\n+|$)/,nptable:l,lheading:/^([^\n]+)\n *(=|-){2,} *(?:\n+|$)/,blockquote:/^( *>[^\n]+(\n(?!def)[^\n]+)*\n*)+/,list:/^( *)(bull) [\s\S]+?(?:hr|def|\n{2,}(? )(?!\1bull )\n*|\s*$)/,html:/^ *(?:comment *(?:\n|\s*$)|closed *(?:\n{2,}|\s*$)|closing *(?:\n{2,}|\s*$))/,def:/^ *\[([^\]]+)\]: *]+)>?(?: +["(]([^\n]+)[")]) The Sunday TimesSituated in one of the most affluent corners of Germany Tutzing is a popular haunt for celebrities the views of Lake Starnberg are magnificent and the locals seem content to mind their own business the picturesque Bavarian town was abuzz with chatter about a colourful and extremely wealthy resident who bought a mansion on the lake shore last year the 64-year-old prince is next in line to the throne in Bangkok King Maha Vajiralongkorn of Thailand has been living a life that many of us cannot even imagine living who acceded to the throne more than two years after the death of his father King Bhumibol in 2016 is famous for his lavish lifestyle and outlandish taste He is seen as an absentee monarch who spends most of his time in Europe and is fond of all the finer things in life He is also one of the world's wealthiest rulers He has a staggering £24 billion fortune and is a qualified pilot as well He also owns the largest faceted diamond in the world The Golden Jubilee Diamond remains at the Royal Thai Palace under heavy security His coronation took place in May 2019 in a huge ceremony that saw 1,300 people in attendance. According to a report in DW, the Thai king also owns a €10 million house in the lakeside town of Tutzing in Bavaria He also owns an impressive fleet of aircraft and keeps adding more to his collection King Vajiralongkorn has also been at the centre of controversy since he took over the throne His absence from the country has been a subject of dissatisfaction amongst his countrymen He has often been photographed scantily clad at airports in Europe and elsewhere the then-prince was photographed at Munich airport wearing faded jeans and a tight white crop top showed the monarch walking through a shopping mall in Munich with a woman believed to be one of his mistresses Facebook users in Thailand were blocked from viewing the video of their new King since the monarchy is revered in the country the monarch is portrayed as above reproach and any criticism of the ruler is considered taboo as well as illegal Any criticism of Thailand's monarchy can land you in jail for decades Thailand has had about a dozen coups in the last century with protestors demanding that the military and monarchy become more accountable to the country's 70 million citizens the royal family continues to hold power even after the absolute monarchy was transformed into a constitutional monarchy in 1932 a court in Thailand sentenced a former civil servant to a record prison term of 43 years and six months for breaching the country's strict law against insulting or defaming the monarchy Read moreHalf a century after the release of Revolver the Beatles album hailed not only as the group’s creative summit but arguably pop’s greatest achievement the artist who designed the record’s monochrome sleeve – itself acclaimed as one of the finest pop artworks – has revealed how he did it: on a kitchen table in an attic flat Klaus Voormann – veteran Beatles confidant and member of the group’s inner circle of friends since their formative years playing Hamburg bars and strip joints – has decided to tell the story of his relationship with the Fab Four not in words opens with his first encounter with the group one night in 1960 in a Hamburg bar and traces their metamorphosis in five years from leather-clad rockers to multimillionaire psychedelic potentates Revolver, the Beatles’ seventh album, was released in the UK on 5 August 1966. England had just won the World Cup and London was swinging. “Things stay in my memory because people keep on asking me about that time,” Voormann, now 78 and based in his native Germany were quintessential continental beatniks when they befriended the Beatles – sporting black clothes and a moody face beneath a low fringe Voormann went on to spend much of the 60s and 70s alternating stints on the pop and rock circuit George Harrison and John Lennon – including on Lennon’s Imagine – with his work in graphic design and fine art Klaus Voormann with Astrid Kirchherr and original Beatles bassist Stuart Sutcliffe at a party in Hamburg Photograph: K & K Ulf Kruger OHG/Redferns“1966 was the time when the Beatles were really They were just happy by then that they were spending more time in the studio They had just a few more weeks available to work on their new LP I came to Abbey Road Studios to listen to the tracks for that album as they were recording them.” The commission for the album cover design was unexpected characteristically spontaneous and left-field He just said: ‘Got any ideas for our new album cover?’ I thought: ‘Shit Doing a cover for the most famous band in the world!’ At moments like that you could suddenly forget that they had once been scruffy little Liverpool boys As a freelance graphic designer in the early 60s Voormann had created artworks for vintage jazz albums issued by Deutsche Grammophon But to come up with ideas for a groundbreaking Beatles record “So the band all asked me to come down to Abbey Road Studios This was when they had recorded about two-thirds of the tracks for that album But it was frightening because the last song that they played to me was Tomorrow Never Knows.” a sonic collage heavily influenced by hallucinogens and hash and held together with a hypnotic drum pattern baffled many fans and disorientated critics but fed into the thinking for a design for the album’s cover “Tomorrow Never Knows was so far away from the early Beatles stuff that even I myself thought the normal kind of Beatles fan won’t want to buy this record,” says Voormann Voormann chose to work in pen and black ink dotted with cut-out portions of photographs of the band members and forming a “waterfall” of imagery He says: “When I had finished my work for the cover [Beatles manager] Brian Epstein was really moved by my design I was scared that the band’s new material wasn’t going to be accepted by their audience Voormann adds: “It took me about three weeks to create the cover about a week.” Much of that time was spent with scissors selecting and arranging fragments of photographs within line drawings of the band members The cover of the Beatles’ seventh album Photograph: Alamy“In choosing to work in black and white but I wanted also for the work to stand out in a muddle of colour But a psychedelic influence in the Revolver cover But I know that whatever is inside of you doesn’t have to come out through drugs.” Creating one of the most recognised and acclaimed covers for one of the greatest pop albums brought Voormann scant reward in the material world I would have done it for nothing – and I didn’t feel I was in a position to make it hard for them ‘You have to pay me this or that much.’ They [EMI] said £50 is the absolute limit for a record sleeve come up [in money].’ Brian just left it to EMI Following the success of Revolver and its cover – which won Voormann a Grammy award for artwork in 1966 – the Beatles looked to Peter Blake and Jann Haworth leading figures of the British pop art movement the group approached another British pop artist who came up with the white minimalist cover for the 1968 double album The Beatles – each one an individual artwork thanks to its unique number embossed on the cover Revolver stands out as not only the best Beatles cover but also one of the great works of 20th-century graphic design “What was captured in the Revolver artwork was almost the first revolt against the San Francisco hyper colour,” says Professor Lawrence Zeegen “Voormann was brave … he kept things very stark It fits the sound of the album – this very British version of what was happening with psychedelic music was important to capture visually.” Copies of Birth of an Icon: Revolver 50 can be bought via www.voormann.com This is the archive of The Observer up until 21/04/2025 The Observer is now owned and operated by Tortoise Media Tutzing, Germany-based no-code data integration and digital process automation software suite maker Lobster has been acquired by Northern European private equity investment house FSN Capital for an undisclosed figure Lobster offers mid-to-large-sized companies no-code data and application integration and product information management software solutions the company’s logistics-focused offer enables vendors and logistics service providers a digitaised supply chain solution the company counts approximately 250 staff members supporting some 1,500 clients in industries including logistics since 2013 they’ve delivered profitable revenue growth of more than 20% per year “In a world of exponentially growing amounts of data complexity of data flows and application stacks economic and powerful software solutions to integrate data and processes of all forms and variations,” commented FSN’s Robin Mürer “We are highly impressed by what the Lobster founders and management team have built over the past 20 years and see enormous potential for Lobster’s product on a global scale We are excited to support Lobster with our proven operational playbooks to deliver this potential in the coming years.” Thailand's King Maha Vajiralongkorn, seen here in December 2019, reportedly returned to Germany on a Thai Airways flight Nov. 8. © Reuters HAMBURG, Germany -- Thailand's King Maha Vajiralongkorn was spotted in Germany for the first time since October 2020, a visit that comes amid yearlong protests in the kingdom by younger citizens demanding monarchy reform. The 69-year-old king went to Germany on a Thai Airways International flight Monday, according to a report Wednesday by top German tabloid Bild. midgardhaus.de Sundays are for relaxing and enjoying. To recharge your batteries and gather experiences. So a classic brunch is probably the best way to start celebrating this day. Our new favourite for all kinds of culinary delights between breakfast and lunch: the Midgardhaus. In a prime location, directly on the shores of Lake Starnberg, the restaurant, which opened in 2020, invites guests to an eight-course brunch on Sundays from 11 a.m. to 2 p.m. that is as luxurious as it is remarkable. From the classic bread basket to fruit salad, egg and fish dishes, salads, truffle pasta, crêpe Suzette and waffles, the entire culinary spectrum from sweet to savoury is played out. Live cooking is part of the impeccable, friendly service, and the Black Angus beef fillet is flambéed in style on a trolley, cut and served. Owner Michael Urban, the proprietor of La Bohème, a high-class steakhouse in Schwabing, knows how to delight guests: "Our brunch is a breakfast experience like no other. Unlike many restaurants, we don't offer a buffet, but eight fine courses served directly at the table - there's truly nothing left to be desired!" Bestellen Sie jetzt Ihren individuellen Newsletter Note: Our newsletter is only available in German Bitte schicken Sie mir bis zum Widerruf meiner Einwilligung den Newsletter mit Informationen zu neuen Beiträgen. Die Datenschutzerklärung habe ich zur Kenntnis genommen und akzeptiere diese Would you like to discover more beautiful things heißt es in einem der letzten Bücher von Jürgen Moltmann: “Jetzt kommt es auf die Hoffnung an.” Der Glaube an eine bessere Welt war das Lebensthema des großen evangelischen Theologen Am Montag starb der Ausnahmegelehrte im Alter von 98 Jahren in Tübingen wie seine Familie dem Evangelischen Pressedienst (epd) am Dienstag mitteilte Bis zuletzt meldete sich Jürgen Moltmann zu aktuellen politischen Themen zu Wort. So regte er Ende 2021 ein jährliches Gedenken für Corona-Tote an Sollten die Zehntausenden von Toten “nicht zu einem Volkstrauertag in jedem Jahr führen?” erklärte er: “Wir gedenken doch auch der Kriegstoten.” Moltmann stammte aus einer kirchenfernen Familie April 1926 in Hamburg geborene Sohn einer kirchenfernen Lehrerfamilie war zunächst Professor für Dogmengeschichte an der Kirchlichen Hochschule Wuppertal Von 1967 bis zu seiner Emeritierung 1994 lehrte er in Tübingen.  international renommierten feministischen Theologin Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel verheiratet Intensive religiöse Fragen in Kriegefangenschaft Jürgen Moltmann wird durch den Zweiten Weltkrieg tief geprägt Als junger Luftwaffenhelfer bei der Alster-Flakbatterie erlebt er das Bombeninferno mit Feuersturm Ein Schulfreund wird dabei neben ihm zerrissen Mit 19 Jahren kommt er in britische Kriegsgefangenschaft Dort beschäftigt er sich intensiv mit religiösen Fragen Gegner: Moltmann “taufte” ein neomarxistische Werk Sein Erstlingswerk “Theologie der Hoffnung” von 1964 galt damals als Aufbruch in der Theologie In den USA wurde er nach dem Erscheinen als “Herold eines neuen Protestantismus” gerühmt wie es in einem “Spiegel”-Artikel Ende der 1960er Jahre hieß: Moltmann propagiere ein umstürzlerisches Dagegen argwöhnte die Schweizer Theologielegende Karl Barth (1886-1968) mit seiner Theologie der Hoffnung habe Moltmann das legendäre “Prinzip Hoffnung” - Hauptwerk des neomarxistischen Philosophen Ernst Bloch - christlich “getauft” Man dürfe Moltmann nicht auf seine “Theologie der Hoffnung” reduzieren In “Der gekreuzigte Gott” von 1972 entfaltet er eine Theologie nach Auschwitz und fragt nach der Bedeutung des Todes Jesu für die Gegenwart.  Zwischen 1980 und 1995 legt er die Kernthemen christlicher Theologie in fünf Bänden neu aus: die Lehre von Gott vom Heiligen Geist (Pneumatologie) sowie der Lehre von den letzten Dingen im Leben jedes Menschen der ganzen Welt und des Kosmos (Eschatologie) Zentrales Thema von Moltmanns Denken ist schon früh die globale ökologische Krise Die Herausforderung der Klimakrise durchzieht auch sein Spätwerk “Politische Theologie in der modernen Welt” (2021) wie ein roter Faden so einmal der evangelische Sozialethiker Jörg Hübner.  Moltmann fordere darin eine “grüne Reformation” eine “Liebe zur Erde” mit all ihren Kreaturen Intensives Nachdenken über Tod und Auferstehung Mit über 90 Jahren dachte Moltmann neu über Tod und Auferstehung nach Nach dem Tod seiner geliebten Frau Elisabeth “hat sich sein Dasein radikal verändert” heißt es im Schweizer Kirchenportal “ref.ch”.  Damit sei das Thema für ihn auch zum persönlichen Problem geworden In seinem 2020 erschienenen Buch “Auferstanden in das ewige Leben: Über das Sterben und Erwachen einer lebendigen Seele” verband er theologische Überlegungen mit persönlichen Gedanken und Erfahrungen Moltmann steht in einer Reihe mit großen theologischen Denkern wie Wolfhart Pannenberg (1928-2014), Johann Baptist Metz (1928-2019) Hans Küng (1928-2021) und Eberhard Jüngel (1934-2021).  “Hundert Jahre alt möchte ich nicht mehr werden" Geburtstages: "Aber wir leben in die Auferstehung hinein Die Ratsvorsitzende der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland (EKD) würdigte Moltmann als meisterhaften Theologen der philosophische Traditionen mit Gegenwartsthemen verbunden habe Moltmann habe Kirche und Gesellschaft international beeinflusst sagte Fehrs am Dienstag in Hannover.  Der Vorsitzende der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz, Georg Bätzing beschrieb Moltmann als einen der "prägendsten und prägnantesten" Theologen der Gegenwart der der Theologie einen Sitz im Leben verschafft hat" Juni auf dem Tübinger Stadtfriedhof beigesetzt Bischof Ernst-Wilhelm Gohl von der württembergischen Landeskirche würdigte Moltmann als "großen Lehrer der Kirche" der Menschlichkeit und der gesellschaftlichen Verantwortung einzutreten REDAKTION KIRCHE+LEBENPOSTFACH 4320, 48024 MÜNSTERCHERUSKERRING 21, 48147 MÜNSTERTEL.: 0251 / 4839-120redaktion@kirche-und-leben.de #29293a);margin:auto;margin-top:32px;max-width:calc(640px + (2 * 12px));padding:0 12px;}@media screen and (min-width: 768px){.css-9uetne{margin-top:72px;}}.css-1lgqo8v{color:var(--sz-basic-text-color-primary 11:15 Uhr.css-rhp0z0{color:var(--sz-basic-border-color-secondary #c0c1c6);display:inline-block;margin:0 12px;}|.css-13l0r79{display:inline-block;}Lesezeit: 5 Min .css-y4bre2{display:block;height:auto;width:100%;}.js .css-y4bre2{cursor:pointer;}.css-1hdpxq{-webkit-align-items:center;-webkit-box-align:center;-ms-flex-align:center;align-items:center;background-color:rgb(255 #fff);display:-webkit-box;display:-webkit-flex;display:-ms-flexbox;display:flex;height:inherit;-webkit-box-pack:center;-ms-flex-pack:center;-webkit-justify-content:center;justify-content:center;-webkit-transform:translateY(100%);-moz-transform:translateY(100%);-ms-transform:translateY(100%);transform:translateY(100%);-webkit-transition:-webkit-transform 600ms cubic-bezier(0.23 1);transition:transform 600ms cubic-bezier(0.23 #fff);padding:8px 12px 0;color:var(--sz-basic-text-color-primary #29293a);font-family:'SZSansDigital','Neue Helvetica','Helvetica',sans-serif;font-size:0.875rem;line-height:1.5;}.css-1vyk908 p{display:inline;}.css-1vyk908 small{color:var(--sz-basic-text-color-secondary #71737f);}.css-1vyk908 small{display:block;}.css-1vyk908 a{border-bottom:1px solid var(--sz-basic-text-color-primary #29293a);color:var(--sz-basic-text-color-primary #29293a);padding-bottom:2px;-webkit-text-decoration:none;text-decoration:none;-webkit-transition:border-bottom 150ms ease-in-out;transition:border-bottom 150ms ease-in-out;}.css-1vyk908 a:focus,.css-1vyk908 a:hover{border-bottom-color:transparent;}Strahlen um die Wette Klar: Für Maria Theresia von Thurn und Taxis und ihren Hugo haben die Tutzinger extra einen Toilettenwagen aus dem Sichtfeld geräumt Dort stellt man sich vor allem eine Frage: Wohin mit dem Toilettenwagen Von Jana Stegemann Tutzing am Starnberger See ist an diesem Samstagnachmittag ziemlich verschlafen Feiner Nieselregen tropft auf die verlassenen Straßen Gegenüber der katholischen Kirche rechts vom Rathaus haben sie ein großes weißes Zelt aufgebaut Davor dreht ein Kinderkarussell ohne Fahrgäste seine Runden gebrannte Mandeln kosten zwei Euro und im Zelt stellen sich die Vereine vor: Volksfest in Tutzing Das wahre Volksfest findet an diesem Tag jedoch wenige Meter entfernt statt: In der katholischen Kirche wird in einer Stunde ein Mitglied des europäischen Adels heiraten: Maria Theresia die älteste Tochter von Gloria von Thurn und Taxis Bekannteste Vertreterin des Hauses Thurn und Taxis: Gloria Und weil die 33-jährige Maria Theresia gute Erinnerungen an ihre Ferien auf der Sommerresidenz der Familie hat die bei Thurn und Taxis nur Gloria verstehen: Tochter Maria Theresia arbeitet als Journalistin und Künstlerin in London Der Bräutigam verließ als 17-Jähriger sein elitäres Elternhaus um sich in Italien als Maler durchzuschlagen Mittlerweile stellt er unter anderem in New York und Los Angeles aus seine Tierporträts erzielen weltweit satte Erlöse der bisher der protestantischen Kirche von England angehört Nicht alle Einwohner waren im Vorfeld begeistert von den Feierlichkeiten, wie den lokalen Medien zu entnehmen war. Schließlich kollidiert die Hochzeit mit dem viertägigen Volksfest zwischen 16 und 18 Uhr die Blasmusik im Zelt zu unterbrechen Der grüne Toilettenwagen wurde nach längeren Diskussionen hinter Büschen versteckt Ansonsten hätte das Brautpaar beim Hinausgehen aus der Kirche direkt auf das mobile Klohäuschen geblickt und das sollte den Liebenden offenbar nicht zugemutet werden Es sollen sich einige im Ort über solche Ausnahmeregelungen sehr aufgeregt haben Bürgermeister Rudolf Krug will davon nichts wissen Man freue sich auf die Zeremonie und die Hochzeit sei doch eine besondere Ehre Das Brautkleid hat die britische Designerin Vivienne Westwood entworfen Zumeist ältere Damen kämpfen bereits eine Stunde vor Beginn der Trauung um die besten Plätze die in ihrem Blickfeld Regenschirme aufspannen Die ersten Gäste werden um 15.44 Uhr in einem dunklen VW-Bulli vorgefahren Weil das Brautpaar sich vor fünf Jahren an einer vornehmen Londoner Kunst-Uni kennenlernte und in der dortigen Kunstszene sehr aktiv ist sind viele Gäste aus der britischen Hauptstadt nach Tutzing gereist Gepoltert wurde den Abend zuvor in der Münchner Nobeldisco P1 Einige Gäste tragen trotz Nieselregens Sonnenbrillen vielleicht wollen sie die Spuren der Nacht kaschieren Wenn Londoner Shabby-Chic auf bayerische Festtagstracht trifft bietet das natürlich reichlich Gesprächsstoff unter den Zaungästen Man sieht sowohl ältere deutsche Frauen in pastellfarbenen glänzenden Kostümen mit Hut oder Fascinator Auffallend viele der jungen Männer aus London tragen zum vornehmen Cutaway Vollbart und zotteliges Schrillste Gäste: der Designer Philip Colbert und seine Frau Charlotte Sie ein extravagantes Kleid in in Fischoptik mit gelber Schleppe - soll nach Aussage der Trägerin Englands inoffizielles Nationalgericht "Fish and Chips" symbolisieren - und eine Handtasche in Form einer Wassermelone Eigenwilliger Stil: Designer Philip Colbert und seine Frau Charlotte Die Wassermelonen-Handtasche ist ebenso gut versteckt wie der Toilettenwagen Mittlerweile warten Hunderte Schaulustige auf dem Kirchvorplatz Direkt vor den Kirchentüren ist ein Stehpult aufgebaut Dort kontrollieren Mitarbeiter des Fürstenhauses wer Zutritt zur Kirche hat und binden den Gästen hellblaue oder rosafarbene Bänder ums Handgelenk kann sich - in Begleitung mehrerer Männer - unbemerkt vom tratschfreudigen Publikum einen Weg durch die Menge bahnen Bis auf den langhaarigen VIP-Fotografen erkennt ihn niemand als ein großgewachsenes Paar - er mit zurückgegelten Haaren sie im lilafarbenen Satinkleid - auf die Kirche zuläuft Der älteste Sohn von Caroline von Monaco mit seiner Frau Tatiana Santo Domingo eine weiße Pelzstola und ihr jahrzehntelang einstudiertes Lächeln Sie wird von ihrem jüngeren Bruder Albert zum Altar geführt Die Messe wird vom Londoner Priester Alexander Sherbrooke gehalten liest aus dem ersten Brief des Apostels Johannes vor der örtliche Kirchenchor singt die seit Wochen einstudierten Lieder von Mozart nur das Weinen eines kleinen Jungen stört die Szenerie Dezente Blumenarrangements aus lachsfarbenen Rosen schmücken die Kirche Diese finden sich auch auf dem cremefarbenen schulterfreien Brautkleid der britischen Designerin Vivienne Westwood wieder Brautmutter Gloria und Designerin Westwood teilen ihre Leidenschaft für Punk doch das Outfit der Braut ist bis auf den signalroten Lippenstift das genaue Gegenteil: Ein romantisches Kleid aus Seide ein zarter Schleier und ein filigranes Diadem in den gewellten rötlichen Haaren Anderthalb Stunden hat Promi-Friseur Gerhard Meir die Haare der Braut frisiert und gesteckt Geschminkt habe sich Maria Theresia übrigens ganz alleine der in den Achtzigern die schrillen Frisuren der Brautmutter verantwortete Nach der Trauung stimmen Chor und Hochzeitsgäste das Lied "Großer Gott wir loben dich" an Kurz vor Schluss verliest Sherbrooke am Altar noch ein Schriftstück des päpstlichen Kardinalstaatssekretärs: Papst Franziskus gratuliert darin zur Vermählung und schickt dem Brautpaar seinen Segen aus Rom Als das Brautpaar nach draußen tritt und nicht auf den Toilettenwagen sondern erneut auf die Schaulustigen blickt Dann steigen die Frischvermählten in ein mit Dutzenden Herzchenluftballons dekorierten Wagen und verschwinden in Richtung Schloss Die Gäste des Brautpaares stehen unterdessen im Tutzinger Nieselregen vor der Kirche und warten auf den Bus In anspruchsvollen Berufsfeldern im Stellenmarkt der SZ. .css-5x0u19{-webkit-text-decoration:none;text-decoration:none;}Gutscheine.css-pcxqtt{border:0;clip:rect(0 0 0 0);height:1px;margin:-1px;overflow:hidden;padding:0;position:absolute;white-space:nowrap;width:1px;}: