With this series of weekly updates, WOLA seeks to cover the most important developments at the U.S.-Mexico border. See past weekly updates here Your donation to WOLA is crucial to keeping these paywall-free and ad-free Updates going. Please contribute now and support our work. There’s a phone on this desk.PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP: I could.TERRY MORAN: You could pick it up you could call up the president of El Salvador and say “Send him back,” right now.PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP: And if he were the gentleman that you say he is I would do that.TERRY MORAN: But the court has ordered you —PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP: But he’s not.TERRY MORAN: — to facilitate that — his release–PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP: I’m not the one making this decision We have lawyers that don’t want —TERRY MORAN: You’re the president.PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP: — to do this but the — but the buck stops in this office —PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP: I — no If I were the president that just wanted to do anything I’d probably keep him right where he is — Subscribe to get the latest on analysis and policy Washington Office on Latin America1666 Connecticut Ave NW, Suite 400Washington, DC 20009(202) 797 2171info@wola.org Subscribe with your email to receive exclusive reports and expert research directly to your inbox every week (Your privacy is important to us; your information will be kept confidential and secure.) Rarely considered a priority region for U.S Latin America has come to the forefront during the first few months of President Donald Trump’s second term control over the Panama Canal and to intervene militarily in Mexico the imposition of steep tariffs on Mexico as well as Canada and subsequently throughout the world and the in some cases unlawful outsourcing of U.S immigration and protection responsibilities confront Latin American countries with a complex new era of engagement with the United States the administration’s relationship with El Salvador’s authoritarian-trending government lies at the heart of one of the most severe constitutional crises in modern U.S President Trump has launched his second term at a frenetic pace, issuing more than 135 executive orders in the first hundred days. This torrent of presidential directives has touched virtually every aspect of the federal government, part of a deliberate strategy to “flood the zone” and stay on the offensive The administration’s actions have already brought massive changes to U.S domestic and foreign policy while also dismantling diversity leaving vulnerable communities unprotected. these steps signal a dramatic retreat from the long-professed U.S role of supporting human rights and democracy worldwide and could have repercussions for decades to come. While the administration’s moves have been welcomed by Latin American leaders considered “friends” of the new administration Trump’s whirlwind of statements and actions in these early months of his second term have been met with trepidation and dismay by others including civil society and press freedom organizations throughout the region Many such organizations have not only lost crucial U.S but now fear that the Trump administration will either sit silently instead of denouncing attacks against them or even worse support for governments that are wielding their power against civil society that these leaders were too often ignored by a Biden administration that was at the same time too lenient on U.S we kind of ignored you and in some cases actually treated you bad … [W]e made deals with the people that hated us and we either neglected or sometimes were outright hostile towards the countries that were pro-American relations with President Gustavo Petro are strained as evidenced by the ugly Petro-Trump fight on X whether directly from Venezuela or indirectly through third parties.” A militarized campaign of fear against migrants And the promised mass deportation offensive has not yet begun in earnest That won’t happen until the administration has the money and the personnel to carry it out Doing that will require the Republican-majority Congress to pass a stunningly massive funding bill which it will do under a rarely invoked rule called “Reconciliation” that will allow it to pass without a single Democratic vote It may also mean embarking on what could be the largest internal mission for the United States military since the Civil War And the reconciliation bill could include many billions more for mass deportation in the budgets of the Departments of Defense and Justice detention and deportation machinery may be fed by the administration’s abrupt cancellations of documented statuses granted by the Biden administration paroles for people who made “CBP One” appointments at border ports of entry and usually have humanitarian needs—somehow constitute an “invasion.” The disappearance of asylum has meant a sharp artificial drop in the number of asylum seekers apprehended at the border which the administration’s supporters and even some simplistic media coverage have been portraying as a “success.” In order to spread fear further among the migrant population the administration began sending citizens of countries to which deportation is difficult to third countries Thousands of non-Mexicans have been pushed across the border into Mexico and Eastern Europe were unlawfully sent to Costa Rica and 299 more people from these regions were sent to Panama over 200 remain in those two countries in a precarious status because they fear for their lives if returned to their home countries extrajudicial transfers to foreign prisons The list of known innocent victims of these renditions is long. It includes Kilmar Abrego García, a Salvadoran father of three from Maryland, whose expulsion ICE has even admitted was an error but who the Trump administration is now slandering as a terrorist apparently rendered to the CECOT because he had tattoos reading “Mom” and “Dad.” Still the administration clings to a story that these and many more individuals have violent gang ties six of them being strapped to restraint chairs to avoid self-harm The administration has deployed Stryker combat vehicles intelligence gathering aircraft and drones and naval guided-missile destroyers in the oceans next to both coastal borders with Mexico The administration plans to use military bases as spaces to detain migrants Military planes are being used for deportations The armed forces will be expected to play a major role in the logistics of mass deportation because ICE simply does not have enough personnel This, along with a possible future invocation of the Insurrection Act of 1807—which gives the President wide latitude to use the military against what he perceives to be disturbances of public order—could lead to a historic disfigurement of the U.S will set a terrible civil-military relations example for Latin America a region where most nations only emerged from military dictatorship within the last 40 years Looming escalation of the “war on drugs” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) show a 24 percent drop in such deaths in the 12-month period from October 2023 through September 2024. The Trump administration has thus inherited the first positive signs in years regarding the country’s horrendous drug overdose crisis, and the government’s own data point to public health-based measures as key to reducing deaths related to illicit fentanyl and other drugs. The CDC attributes the decline to multiple factors data-driven distribution of naloxone” (an overdose-reversing medication) and “better access to evidence-based treatment for substance use disorders,” among other prevention and response policies. Drone strikes present obvious risks of harm to civilians without offering any reasonable prospect of meaningfully or sustainably reducing drug production in Mexico or drug availability in the United States Just as decades of an often-militarized drug war in the region have not stemmed the illicit drug supply military strikes be expected to bring solutions. over 70 percent of 115 organizations working on immigration or women’s rights in Latin America that were surveyed by WOLA in late January and early February reported that they would have to cut projects and reduce staff and/or consultants Only three programs that include the word climate All 12 programs addressing gender based violence globally were also eliminated and in a reflection of the administration’s overall priorities support for democracy and human rights globally through USAID has all but ended A search of the word democracy in the table provided to Congress suggests that only two democracy programs were preserved globally while the only surviving program supporting human rights was also for Cuba. A WOLA analysis that filtered the data for all USAID programs that specifically mentioned Latin America and the Caribbean or specific countries (this leaves out global programs that might have benefited Latin America) identified programs whose multi-year cost totaled $6.67 billion the Trump administration has eliminated fully 84 percent leaving a multi-year commitment of just $1.04 billion of which $122 million remains unobligated. and Related Programs Appropriations Act) the cancellation of funding has also impacted other agencies within the State Department. A WOLA analysis filtered data for all programs managed by non-USAID State Department offices and bureaus that specifically mentioned Latin America and the Caribbean or specific countries (this leaves out global programs that might have benefited Latin America) We identified programs whose multi-year cost totaled $1.96 billion the Trump administration has eliminated 22 percent leaving a multi-year commitment of $1.54 billion The reduction in funding through the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), where over $543 million in funds had been obligated for the Western Hemisphere in fiscal year 2023 alone, has closed down government regularization programs and ended much of the humanitarian and legal assistance provided to refugees and migrants by civil society and international organizations in the region which also provides key support to civil society organizations some of which will require congressional approval both PRM and DRL would be placed under a new Coordinator for Foreign and Humanitarian Assistance (They were previously the purview of the Under Secretary for Civilian Security slated for elimination.) The “L” will be removed from DRL The administration has not deeply cut INL’s government-to-government aid which is largely equipment and training for uniformed security forces within the old “drug war” framework it has drastically reduced INL’s grant aid programs that sought to protect populations and weaken organized crime via judicial and citizen security reform initiatives or been taken over by members of the Department of Government Efficiency The impacts of the aid cuts throughout the region have been widespread terminated USAID programs include even projects in areas linked to Trump administration priorities These include programs to disrupt youth recruitment by Transnational Criminal Organizations and to improve the effectiveness and accountability of Mexico’s justice institutions Other terminated activities in Mexico include anti-corruption initiatives human rights accountability projects (including measures to address Mexico’s disappearance crisis) and work to protect human rights defenders and journalists. While many of USAID’s programs in Guatemala have been preserved likely as a result of Rubio’s visit with Guatemalan President Arevalo and USAID Guatemala in February the chart presented to Congress points to only one remaining project that focuses on addressing impunity in the country which will hold general elections in November 2025 domestic electoral observation by interdisciplinary groups such as churches and universities has been suspended due to the cuts This has also affected the electoral institutions themselves which received technical assistance to ensure free and fair elections. independent media outlets and organizations working on human rights and anti-corruption efforts have had to cut staff and operations In an informal survey conducted by WOLA of 21 partner organizations in Central America over 90 percent had been impacted by the elimination of USAID funding: 70 percent had to cut staff half reported a serious impact on their budget and another 25 percent reported a very serious impact on their budget an estimated.40 percent of USAID funding went to address the needs of Venezuelan migrants which has now been reduced to two programs USAID’s human rights program bolstered Colombian institutions’ ability to prevent and protect against human rights violations provide justice to persons in conflict regions and implement gender-related policies and services The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights received funds to advance sustainable development through human rights implement the UN framework on business and human rights enhance equality and counter discrimination and strengthen the Colombian institutions’ response to human rights violations where the Institute for Peace and Development (INDEPAZ) reports that from January 2024 up until March 14 illegal armed groups committed 90 massacres (a total of 343 victims) and killed 211 social leaders. In his March 4 speech to the U.S Congress President Trump boasted about ending the $60 million 5-year program for Indigenous and Afro-Colombians (ACIP) as part of DOGE’s efforts to cut U.S the project supported the implementation of the Ethnic Chapter of the 2016 peace accord The funds went to building the Juntanza Étnica to strengthen 113 local ethnic and indigenous organizations to guarantee their communities’ food sovereignty The ACIP programformed 44 public-private partnerships created the first Business Advisory Board for Ethnic Inclusion and strengthened the Pacific Business Platform. more than 29,000 ethnic persons benefited from the program to build their entrepreneurship and leadership and $35 million were mobilized from private-public and ethnic entities that led to more than 80 projects implemented in 31 municipalities throughout Colombia. sought to support efforts for the integration of migrants and refugees to other countries which was to some extent aimed at preventing their migration to the U.S The majority of those programs have now been terminated The assistance freeze likewise puts at serious risk the situation of civil society and the preservation of civic space as the Venezuelan regime has enacted a law designed to cripple NGOs’ capacity to operate specifically criminalizing those civic organizations and independent media outlets that receive funding from foreign sources more broadly and U.S Many Venezuelan organizations receiving U.S support have not been public about being funding recipients due to security concerns Stalling funding for democracy programs allocated by Congress ultimately favors Maduro’s efforts to consolidate an authoritarian regime Apart from the impact on Venezuelan organizations and media outlets, the cuts to USAID and impact on NED funding have also curtailed the operations of independent press from Cuba and Nicaragua who are primarily operating abroad. the months ahead will put Congress in the spotlight With Republicans in control of both the House and Senate it remains to be seen whether and to what extent GOP leaders will assert Congress’s constitutional powers to set funding priorities even if they go against Trump’s wishes. In this context, we should keep in mind that Latin American civil society is rich with experience defending human rights and working to restore democracy after decades of dictatorships and wars foreign policy lurches into a new era under Trump 2.0 civil society organizations throughout the hemisphere should assess advocacy strategies to adapt to the current moment examining best practices and lessons learned in the region and globally Building new relationships and strengthening alliances will be essential to defend past gains and resist the further erosion of democratic norms and the rule of law. The 1973 Chilean coup spurred the creation of WOLA to advocate for human rights and connect Washington policymakers with firsthand accounts of abuses under military dictatorships WOLA partners with diverse groups to address issues like climate change and migration while upholding democracy and justice Learn more about WOLA’s roots in our historical book WOLA continues to be at the center of every major policy debate about human rights in Latin America To learn more about WOLA’s work and trajectory For press requests or to contact Adam Isacson and peacebuilding in Latin America since 1994 He now directs WOLA’s Defense Oversight program cooperation with Latin America’s security forces and security engagement and their implications for human rights and civil-military relations throughout the Americas This involves frequent liasoning with the defense community and maintaining a vast database of up-to-date information on military assistance and other security issues Isacson has also focused on border security He has visited the U.S.-Mexico border about 20 times and has also completed field research along nearly the entire border between Mexico and Guatemala Together with WOLA’s Border Security and Migration program agencies’ security buildup at the border and its human impact Isacson continues to accompany WOLA’s Colombia program on peace and security issues This country has been a central focus for Isacson’s Defense Oversight work as Colombia has been the primary recipient of U.S security assistance in the Western Hemisphere since the early 1990s and advocating for peaceful resolution to Colombia’s long armed conflict has led him to visit Colombia more than 70 times He has done work in 23 of the country’s 32 departments Isacson worked on Latin America demilitarization at the Center for International Policy (CIP) he joined with Latin America Working Group and WOLA in creating a longstanding project that thoroughly monitors U.S Isacson has produced over 250 publications and policy memos over the course of his career from universities to grassroots gatherings to government agencies He has testified eight times before the U.S Isacson worked on the Central America Demilitarization Program at the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress in Costa Rica in International Relations from Yale University and a B.A “People aren’t worried about buoys and barbed wire 4 is driving people to choose to avoid Texas.” much harder for migrants to make it to the U.S The real question is when does the dam burst in Mexico?” “I've counted at least 10 policies that have been put in place to try to push the numbers down Every single one of those policies does push the numbers down for a few months and they come right back because there's not that much you can do to make the experience more miserable for people at the border than the conditions that they're fleeing to begin with.” Here are five of the most notable migration and security trends at the U.S.-Mexico border in 2024: 2,135,005 people entered CBP’s custody at the U.S.-Mexico border between October 2023 and September 2024 (combining people who came to the official border crossings plus people apprehended by CBP’s Border Patrol component) and 14 percent fewer people than in fiscal 2023 Between the border crossings, Border Patrol’s apprehensions of migrants dropped 25 percent from 2023 (from 2,045,838 to 1,530,523) The decline is the result of two ongoing crackdowns on migrants Data table Data table Data table The administration’s asylum curbs led to a sharp drop (blue in the chart below about -95 percent from December to September) in the number of asylum seekers released into the U.S The new procedure requires people to voluntarily express fear of return in order to start an asylum process and usually to prove a higher standard of threat in an interview with an asylum officer shortly after arrival often while in custody in expedited removal proceedings Combining Border Patrol and those at ports of entry the nationalities most frequently encountered at the border in 2024 were Mexico (-9% from 2023) Data table The crackdowns that reduced migration in 2024 have not been free of a painful human cost, as WOLA reported at the end of August: Ample evidence points to this lull in migration being temporary though that does not necessarily mean that migration will return to the record highs of late 2023: Of the 2,135,005 migrants encountered in 2024 The percentage was consistent for Border Patrol apprehensions alone with 655,282 of 1,530,523 involving families Forty-three percent represent the second-highest share since 2012 when family status records for Border Patrol apprehensions began to be publicly available and is quite likely the second-highest ever Data table when nearly two thirds of Border Patrol apprehensions were of family members and unaccompanied children authorities to rapidly expel migrants from the border over 2.9 million times had the unintended effect of easing repeat border crossings for single adults as “expelled” migrants were not punished for attempting new crossings As single adults were more likely to attempt repeat crossings their share of “migrant encounters” grew during the Title 42 period while child and family migrants’ share shrank there has been some reversion to the 2019 pattern Single adults’ share of migration declined while child and family migrants’ share increased The top five nationalities of child and family migrants encountered in 2024 were Mexico Border Patrol divides the U.S.-Mexico border into nine sectors one of these sectors would be migrants’ top destination for many years leading all others in agents’ apprehensions California was number one from 1973 through 1997; Tucson Arizona led from 1998 to 2012; Rio Grande Valley Texas was first from 2013 through December 2021 Since 2022 the identity of the number-one sector has changed every few months five of Border Patrol’s nine border sectors have been the busiest at different times Data table either Tucson or San Diego has been the number-one sector That represents some westward movement in migration and El Paso sectors had been in the lead earlier in the post-pandemic period that the Texas state government’s “Operation Lone Star” border crackdown is working the record month for Border Patrol migrant apprehensions these have declined 78 percent border-wide Texas (-86 percent) and Arizona (-85 percent) led the four U.S.-Mexico border states with almost identical rates of decrease from December to September since the Biden administration asylum crackdown—California “Operation Lone Star” has cost over $11 billion and raised many human rights concerns but has not deterred migration to Texas any more than to states where governments are not carrying out border crackdowns A shocking number of migrants continue to perish on U.S Border Patrol’s official count of migrant remains (which humanitarian workers say is an undercount) surpassed 10,000 for this century Data table Though the overall number of deaths is down from the horrific high of 2022 it is similar as a proportion of the overall migrant population as measured by Border Patrol apprehensions Though the 2024 number is incomplete and may end up higher for now it represents 37 migrant remains recovered per every 100,000 Border Patrol apprehensions up somewhat from 2023 (34 per 100,000) and down slightly from 2022 (41 per 100,000) Seizures of the potent opioid fentanyl fell for the first time since the drug began appearing CBP seized 21,148 pounds of the drug in 2024 Data table The reduction is happening even as CBP has deployed more scanners and other technology to detect it and carried out more targeted operations against smugglers Though fentanyl production has since increased in other Mexican states this disruption may at least partially explain the 2024 drop in CBP seizures There is no significant connection between migration and fentanyl smuggling Also similar to past years, 97 percent was seized in California or Arizona. “Half of the fentanyl coming into the U.S. is seized at the Mariposa Port of Entry” in Nogales, Arizona, CBP’s top official, Troy Miller, told the Arizona Republic Heroin fell 21 percent and marijuana 8 percent The 2024 decline in migrants arriving at the border may have decreased the salience of border security and migration in the U.S the drop is a result of sharply limiting persecuted and threatened people’s ability to seek protection at the U.S.-Mexico border Large numbers of people coming to the border are certain to remain a reality regardless of the U.S The experience of the past 10 years shows not only the futility of “crackdowns,” but the value of maintaining and expanding well-managed legal migration pathways family reunification and temporary protection programs and a functioning asylum system with a restored right to seek protection at the border A better policy would strengthen those pathways as part of an overall long-overdue immigration reform that would vastly reduce pressure on the border It would be implemented by border management professionals who are held fully accountable when they violate human rights It would be accompanied by a diplomatic and foreign assistance strategy that addresses the factors causing people to flee eases other nations’ efforts to integrate migrants into their societies and upholds reformers fighting corruption and communities fighting for dignified lives where they live now The past few years’ very modest progress toward this better policy should continue rather than doubling down on enforcement efforts and limiting access to asylum Gimena Sanchez is a human rights and anti-racism advocate at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) This independent organization promotes human rights and justice in the U.S she has brought to DC the voices of people affected by U.S Her work focuses on dismantling illegal armed groups promoting peace agreements and anti-racism measures she worked with Peace Brigades International where she provided unarmed physical accompaniment to defenders and communities during the conflict in Colombia and Latin America as an advisor to the UN Representative for Internally Displaced Persons from South Sudan at the Brookings Institution and the New York State Attorney General’s Department of Environmental Protection Gimena has received numerous awards for her work and the Mayor’s Office of Washington She is the author of numerous publications and appears regularly in the media she was forced to live in several countries due to the Dirty War in Environmental Science and Dance from Columbia University and an M.A in International Law and International Economics from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) “Petro’s point of view is completely different it’s his views on drugs that are seen by the upper classes in Colombia and the drug warriors in the United States as completely worrisome.” “This [apology] is incredibly important to the victims' families Those family members had to deal with the stigma of supposedly being family members of guerrillas.” has always had a close relationship with the Colombian elite Petro’s administration is a complete change it’s no longer the same families who ruled the past 200 years.” For press requests or to contact John Walsh John Walsh has led WOLA’s efforts to promote more humane and effective drug policies documenting the damage caused by punitive policies and promoting alternatives to the U.S ‘war on drugs.’ John’s research and advocacy encompass developments within U.S John has focused on reform opportunities around legal regulation of cannabis and the coca leaf he explores strategies to ensure that cannabis and coca regulation modernize the prohibitionist global drug treaty regime and that begin to repair historical harms He also leads WOLA’s efforts to confront the challenges posed by the rise of potent synthetic drugs such as illicitly-manufactured fentanyl the expansion of transnational criminal organizations and climate-threatening deforestation driven by illicit drug trafficking and other extractive industries that are heavily financed by the drug trade These problems all stem from the perverse incentives created by the global drug prohibition; they will require solutions that stretch beyond prohibition’s abject failures and constraints John served as director of research at Drug Strategies and worked at the Center of Concern on the “Rethinking Bretton Woods Project,” an effort to forge consensus on ideas for reform of the World Bank and for the world’s largest economy and historically the largest emitter of carbon dioxide to absent itself from that .. drug warrior position is even more potent than fentanyl “[Apart from its illicit use to make cocaine coca has healthy uses in teas and medicines.] Also related to - identified with culture and cultural rights and Indigenous rights And it's a denial of those rights and cultures to classify it as something that needs to be abolished.” most programs remain on long-term hold even though they support priorities that the Trump administration claims to uphold and contractors region-wide- : they are being forced to cancel events and determine how or if they will be able to honor commitments. The freeze applies beyond development and human rights efforts to encompass programs that groups like WOLA have often critiqued including training programs and counter-drug eradication and interdiction funded through the State Department’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) Bureau the pause in funding and uncertainty about future funds undermine fundamental U.S interests to an extent that is difficult to comprehend It is actively weakening efforts to address the reasons millions are fleeing Latin America and the Caribbean The aid freeze is an exquisitely wrapped gift to the United States’ regional adversaries from dictators to drug lords to human smugglers to great-power rivals like China. support for Latin America and the Caribbean According to Congressional Research Service funding priorities for foreign assistance in the region have included addressing the underlying drivers of migration from Central America combating drug production and supporting peace accord implementation in Colombia and strengthening security and the rule of law in Mexico agencies also have prioritized programs intended to counter HIV/AIDS and instability in Haiti address security concerns in the Caribbean and respond to the political and humanitarian crises in Venezuela and their impact on the broader region.” FY2023 appropriations are primarily passed through the Development Assistance (DA and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE which promotes microenterprises and community development throughout the Latin American and Caribbean region also received an additional $52 million in funds The region also received a share of global accounts and initiatives most notably programming from the State Department’s Population and Migration Bureau (PRM) that is helping millions of migrants to settle there instead of proceeding further north. The FY2024 budget approved by Congress in March 2024 included several areas that Republican legislators have long supported including $25 million in Cuba democracy programs $50 million for democracy programs in Venezuela $15 million for democracy and religious freedom programs for Nicaragua and not less than $125 million under ESF and INCLE accounts for programs to counter the flow of fentanyl and other synthetic drugs into the United States A multiple of that goes to states like Colombia and Costa Rica to counter the production and transshipment of cocaine $70 million was appropriated to support “programs to reduce violence against women and girls including for Indigenous women and girls” in Central America At least $12.5 million seeks to combat human trafficking Much of the $134.5 million in INCLE and NADR (Nonproliferation and Related Programs) funding for Central America seeks to dismantle and protect people from gangs while fortifying borders tax dollars do not go to security forces that violate human rights with impunity. In a context of shrinking financial support in Latin America for human rights and democracy promotion foreign assistance—particularly through USAID—has become a vital way for civil society partners throughout the region to continue with their work WOLA lays out some of the main impacts that even a pause—let alone an elimination—of U.S Much recent U.S. assistance to Mexico has focused on strengthening the rule of law and addressing crime with the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) working to build capacity in Mexican security and justice institutions As the current funding pause halts State Department programs to combat transnational crime it is paradoxically freezing and threatening to defund U.S engagement on some of the very issues the current administration identifies as key to improving not just Mexico’s security For its part, USAID has provided important support for Mexican institutions’ efforts to address the country’s devastating disappearance crisis, as well as assistance that aims to improve human rights, protect journalists and human rights defenders, and support economic development and state-level justice institutions Cutting off such programs would not only harm people and groups in Mexico but could undermine the current administration’s focus on migration weakening efforts to address the root causes of why people migrate government’s top-priority countries for assistance in the Western Hemisphere. the cuts affected “65 of the State Department’s 168 projects Agency for International Development’s 114 projects”; in Honduras for instance USAID had to cancel an $8 million project that was reducing criminal recidivism among at-risk youth. which seek to “support avenues for meaningful public participation and oversight as well as for substantive separation of powers through institutional checks and balances,” will grind to a halt in a context of deteriorating democratic values and human rights measures to improve government’s transparency and citizen-responsiveness will be affected during the crucial runup to the November 2025 general elections. and health assistance allocated from annual appropriations for Venezuela totaled around $336.2 million. have been helping to reduce Venezuelan migration through the Darién Gap and toward the United States Many who might otherwise continue migrating are now benefiting from more humane conditions and integration efforts where they are both in Venezuela and in receiving countries throughout the hemisphere they are benefiting from support to maintain civic space and resist authoritarianism. Colombia is the United States’ top aid recipient and significant ally in the region on issues including defense, security, counter-narcotics, and migration. U.S. assistance has totaled about $14 billion this century The United States has a preferential trade status in Colombia Both nations collaborate closely on intelligence As the world’s number one cocaine producer and the only country in the hemisphere with as many as eight active internal armed conflicts despite a peace process that ended one of them Our nations have built extensive counternarcotics assistance first focused heavily on anti-narcotics and security; later it evolved into a sophisticated package that included trade and economic development In the country that tops the global charts in killings of social leaders this human rights support has been lifesaving. Assistance to Colombia has long enjoyed bipartisan support; Republican and Democratic administrations have agreed it is necessary USAID’s cooperation supports the country’s efforts to consolidate peace in conflict areas It focuses explicitly on vulnerable populations disproportionately affected by violence USAID efforts are crucial to advancing citizen security and reconciliation in one of the most violent and conflictive countries in the region In one of the most biodiverse and mineral-rich countries in the world USAID has sought to preserve Colombia’s natural resources Colombia also receives the largest share of the migration from Venezuela, with over 2.8 million—about 5 percent of its population—remaining within its borders Colombia has been a regional leader in efforts to share the cost of integrating migration. Cutting foreign assistance to Colombia goes against U.S It punishes its most loyal economic partner in South America pushing it to increase relationships with rival outside powers like China The result could be the sacrifice of a quarter-century of U.S aid investments and the loss of a key partner in the search for solutions to the Venezuelan political and humanitarian crisis. and breakdowns in hydroelectric power threaten to worsen the drivers of migration. Apart from ceasing support for efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions the elimination of this assistance will mean less support for countries throughout the region as they contend with natural disasters several Latin American countries have been strategic partners for addressing regional migration support has been critical for reception and integration services as well as strengthening asylum systems throughout the region the total in the Migration and Refugee assistance obligations was $543.9 million; the majority of these funds supported the needs and integration of Venezuelan migrants and refugees who have settled throughout the region In part, according to the Congressional Research Service, this aid sought “to prevent migrants from abandoning their initial destinations and engaging in secondary migration toward the U.S Southwest border.” If it fails to address the needs of host communities and support vulnerable populations applying for protection closer to home a single-minded focus on border security and enforcement will contribute to greater secondary migration toward the United States and worsen already difficult humanitarian situations in several countries along the migration route An informal survey distributed to WOLA partners between January 28 and 30 about the impact of the executive order on operations of Latin American human rights and other civil society groups presents a grim picture of the near future The organizations surveyed represent a broad range of issues primarily self-identifying their missions as working with migrants and refugees; defending human rights; promoting good governance and transparency; strengthening civil society; or women’s rights. The survey included two multiple-choice questions the majority of responding organizations indicated that they will have to cut projects and reduce staffing Some organizations said they will have to shut down their operations entirely A vibrant civil society is needed in any healthy democracy Apart from the impact on service provision–from defending victims of human rights violations to protecting journalists at risk to supporting Venezuelans who have fled the humanitarian crisis and human rights violations under the Maduro regime–the weakening of civil society will hamper long-term development and stability in Latin America and citizen efforts to hold governments accountable and promote democracy. Many of the aid programs affected by the new administration’s freeze originated from the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: a bipartisan initiative to compete with the Soviet Union for influence and goodwill in the developing world government to partner with regimes that did great harm to rights and democracy—a central reason WOLA was founded in 1974—it still makes sense to partner with democratic states in order to deny access and influence to other actors that are more authoritarian and less rights-respecting than the United States China, with its one-party regime, curbs on basic freedoms, violent persecution of ethnic minorities, and high-tech societal surveillance model is one such authoritarian actor. China also happens to be dramatically ramping up its grants of development assistance around the region buying goodwill and partnerships through initiatives like the Belt and Road initiative which now has 22 signatories in Latin America and the Caribbean While WOLA does not endorse a “Cold War 2.0” model of tit-for-tat competition with China in the Americas—the potential is too great that it could become a pretext for backing malign regimes in the region—we note that if one uses that frame the current aid freeze is a stunning act of unilateral disarmament Freezing and cutting aid not only increases China’s numerical advantage: it devastates the United States’ reputation and credibility as a reliable partner in all of the development and civil society initiatives discussed here It will take many years to recover that credibility years during which China and other competitors will be able to make important strategic gains U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean has enjoyed bipartisan support for decades: programs have built on past lessons and become more sophisticated and cost effective Foreign aid can be an important tool to advance U.S including addressing the factors driving migration refugees and asylum seekers to reduce secondary migration expanding state presence in ungoverned territories strengthening criminal justice institutions and the rule of law and working with constructive partners in governments Cutting or eliminating assistance in Latin America badly disrupts that long-term It will make the region less safe and give governments fewer tools to respond to the drivers of migration During Trump’s first term, Congress—including in 2017-18 when Republicans held the majority in both chambers—rejected proposed cuts to many programs. In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, U.S. assistance ranged from $1.67 billion to $1.8 billion per year between 2018-2021 At this critical moment, the Trump administration should spend U.S. foreign assistance as appropriated by Congress. Members of Congress should do everything in their power to exercise their authority in determining the budget. While the Office of Management and Budget has rescinded its January 27 memo freezing all federal grants this is not the case for the pause on foreign assistance which appears in an earlier executive order despite its impact on civil society organizations and others providing vital assistance worldwide undoubtedly wishes to put its stamp on U.S foreign policy and on the priorities that guide U.S The new administration will have every chance to do so through Congress’s normal budgeting and appropriations legislative processes Trump’s GOP will control both houses of Congress through which those priorities and spending bills emerge and the new administration’s officials will have innumerable opportunities to try to make the case for changes they consider necessary But the pre-emptive pause of vast swathes of U.S without warning and without any assurances that programs will resume undermines other governments’ confidence in U.S and is causing harm to civil society organizations that play a vital role in the life of any democratic society Join the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) on Wednesday, April 30, 2025, from 4:30 to 5:30 PM (EDT) for a virtual expert webinar examining the economic and political implications of recent U.S. measures affecting Venezuela. The event will be held via Zoom in English, with live Spanish interpretation available.Moderated by: Laura DibFeaturing: President Donald Trump issued an Executive Order that imposes a 25 percent tariff on all goods imported into the U.S from any country that imports Venezuelan oil was followed by the revocation of key licenses for companies operating in Venezuela with activities required to wind down by May 27 This rapidly evolving context poses numerous questions: Will the U.S.’s decisions create a shift in the oil markets What are the broader implications of these measures for Venezuela This event is particularly relevant for policymakers and researchers focused on Latin America and U.S We hope you’ll join us for this timely conversation policymakers from both sides of the aisle have a long history of denouncing authoritarian power grabs under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela that support for democracy in Venezuela has translated into support for the Venezuelan diaspora in the U.S the Trump administration moved to scrap two major legal pathways—Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and humanitarian parole—that shield hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans from deportation and allow them to work legally in the U.S These decisions have sent shockwaves through Venezuelan communities in the U.S as many now scramble to find alternative pathways to being deported directly into the hands of Nicolás Maduro’s authoritarian regime On January 20, President Trump issued an executive order instructing the secretary of Homeland Security to terminate parole programs, including those for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans. As of December 2024, 117,330 Venezuelan nationals had entered the U.S Then on February 3, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) rescinded the Biden administration’s January 10, 2025 extension of the Venezuela TPS designation, meaning 348,202 recipients will be stripped of their status in April A further 242,700 Venezuelans who were granted TPS under a 2021 designation are likely to face the same fate when their protections expire in September some 700,000 Venezuelans will lose their work authorizations and face deportation if they are unable to acquire another legal status. Congressional offices—Democratic and Republican alike—who once championed these protections must act to restore them The Migration Policy Institute estimates there are 13.7 million unauthorized migrants in the U.S. Although the total number is estimated to be larger, according to the most recent data by the U.S. Census Bureau (2023) 75.1 percent entered the country after 2010 in the context of Venezuela’s long-standing political It is now unclear whether these individuals will still have access to legal pathways available in these host countries Venezuelans who were processed through the SMO in Colombia and approved for resettlement in the U.S had to give up their temporary protection status in Colombia as part of the process TPS protections may be granted to citizens of specific countries when conditions in those countries prevent nationals from returning safely. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with appropriate agencies of the U.S. government and in line with the Immigration and Nationality Act first designated Venezuelans as eligible for TPS on March 9 anyone convicted of a felony or two misdemeanors is not eligible for TPS or may lose their status In her agency’s termination notice for TPS, DHS secretary Kristi Noem reasoned that “Venezuela no longer continues to meet the conditions for the 2023 designation,” without elaborating how. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) rejected this notion some of the political instability in the country has increased following the recent elections.” In 2021, DHS designated Venezuelans as eligible under these considerations: Venezuela is currently facing a severe humanitarian emergency the country “has been in the midst of a severe political and economic crisis for several years.” Venezuela’s crisis has been marked by a wide range of factors including: Economic contraction; inflation and hyperinflation; deepening poverty; high levels of unemployment; reduced access to and shortages of food and medicine; a severely weakened medical system; the reappearance or increased incidence of certain communicable diseases; a collapse in basic services; water and fuel shortages; political polarization; institutional and political tensions; human rights abuses and repression; crime and violence; corruption; increased human mobility and displacement (including internal migration and return); and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic using the same terminology with which it once described the heinous human rights violations of Southern Cone dictatorships in the 1970s This repression unfolds amid an ongoing humanitarian emergency. Even while some economic indicators such as household income have moderately improved in the last year, humanitarian indicators paint a challenging picture. HumVenezuela’s 2024 household survey revealed that seven in ten Venezuelan households turned to alternative strategies to feed their families while half of those with serious health problems did not receive medical attention in 2024 due to the country’s collapsed health system The study shows that at least 13.5 million people face critical humanitarian needs and 5.6 million face severe humanitarian deprivations President Trump has previously acknowledged the risk that Venezuelans fleeing persecution could face if repatriated. On January 19, 2021, his administration determined “that it is in the foreign policy interest of the United States to defer the removal of any national of Venezuela or alien without nationality who last habitually resided in Venezuela subject to the conditions and exceptions provided.” President Trump thereby deferred for 18 months the removal of Venezuelans present in the U.S bipartisan recognition of Venezuela’s severe human rights violations and political crisis has led to broad support for legal pathways for Venezuelans in the U.S Even after the most recent decision to repeal TPS, Republican Representatives Carlos Giménez, Mario Díaz-Balart, and María Elvira Salazar issued a joint statement in solidarity with the Venezuelan people Revoking the legal status of hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans would be detrimental to the U.S as people with valid work permits under the humanitarian parole and TPS are already active contributors to the labor force has always shown support and solidarity for Venezuela’s fight for democracy it needs to show solidarity for Venezuelans who have fled Maduro’s authoritarian regime It is up to policymakers to adopt measures that are coherent with that view and reinstate the protection granted lawfully to these Venezuelan nationals. WOLA urges members of Congress to use their authority and consider the following actions: Latin America faces a transformative and turbulent period in its relations with its neighbor to the north Trump’s first term was defined by transactional dealings and sidelining human rights for short-term political gains—a pattern that could intensify in his second term including Marco Rubio as Secretary of State Christopher Landau as Deputy Secretary of State ambassadors to several Latin American countries indicate that the region will be a higher U.S especially regarding migration and illicit drugs often authoritarian leaders in Latin America could embolden anti-democratic actors and threaten the region’s democratic institutions WOLA anticipates significant setbacks to democratic norms There could be disagreement with historic allies on long-standing bipartisan strategies to address protracted issues such as internal armed conflicts and organized illegal armed groups Prioritizing militarized drug enforcement strategies and restrictive immigration policies along with a preference for transactional diplomacy at the expense of other issues risks further entrenching authoritarianism and reform-minded officials under greater threat As democratic norms and institutions come under increasing attack and as commitments to diversity and inclusion weaken it will be even more important to foster solidarity and coordination among civil society actors across the region and beyond This will be essential to resisting the erosion of democratic freedoms and protecting human rights and the rule of law WOLA has outlined key areas of concern and potential countermeasures to address these risks Even as the Biden administration placed the U.S asylum system out of reach for many migrants arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border it did open up and preserve other pathways to protection—and protection from deportation—in the United States Programs such as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and humanitarian parole status for citizens of Cuba and Venezuela could be terminated under Trump which offer screening and processing for potential pathways for certain migrants currently in Colombia likely employing military personnel domestically in ways unprecedented in modern U.S could eject millions of people from the United States through sweeps and raids A renewed “Remain in Mexico” program could send tens of thousands of asylum seekers to await their U.S proceedings inside Mexico if the Mexican government is compelled to agree to it Nonprofits and charities that assist and defend migrants may find themselves under concerted legal attack and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) will see their already troubled organizational cultures worsen amid weak risking increased misuse of force and other abuses ranging from family separations to uprooted lives to brutal treatment in custody and detention favor by accepting deportees and cracking down on migrants leading to counterproductive outcomes rather than effective policy solutions Decades of a militarized “war on drugs” in Mexico have failed to protect Mexico’s population from violence and curb illicit drug use in the United States but they have resulted in serious human rights violations Rather than a focus on drug enforcement and interdictions effectively addressing crime in Mexico instead requires reducing impunity and corruption To the extent that the Trump 2.0 administration prioritizes harmful militarized actions that look ‘tough’ on crime or the border little room may be left for cooperation in the areas actually relevant to strengthening the rule of law but it is yet unclear what his stance is and how his position will articulate with that of the State Department raising new questions about the future of the relationship between both countries Colombia has made great strides in addressing its internal armed conflicts over the past two decades where both conflict and drug violence were out of control The 2016 peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) pivoted Colombia towards solutions-based approaches that are more sustainable in the long term for addressing the root causes of conflict it is also clear that Colombia’s extensive inequality requires addressing the lack of state presence in remote areas and impoverished urban centers differentiated approaches that include their active participation and humanitarian problems persist in Colombia Notable rights violations include the high number of murders and attacks against social leaders While it remains unclear what policies the incoming Trump Administration will adopt toward Colombia it is evident that the lessons from the past cannot be ignored ineffective policies that characterized the first years of “Plan Colombia,” like a hardline security approach to combat drugs—which often leads to abuses—will not solve the problem of illicit economies as the U.S.-Colombia bilateral relationship is mutually beneficial Colombia is the U.S.’s primary partner in addressing migration from Venezuela and also a key commercial partner that prioritizes the U.S Although Trump has not yet proposed specific measures for Central America his administration is likely to dismantle the Biden administration’s U.S Strategy to Address the Root Causes of Migration and the Vice President Harris-led Call to Action engagement with the region will shift drastically The new administration is unlikely to prioritize addressing the underlying driving factors of migration such as violence and climate change–issues exacerbated by endemic corruption and weak governance in the region. there is room for positive change in the case of Nicaragua as there is bipartisan support and interest in restoring democracy in the country the private sector in Central America and the U.S could play a key role in urging the Trump administration to implement investment initiatives With Marco Rubio poised to become U.S. Secretary of State and other Cuba-American hardliners likely to occupy key positions in the administration and in Congress the limited engagement established during the Biden administration with Cuba will end Although the administration should raise concerns about the human rights situation in Cuba and push for the release of all those unjustly detained and the respect and guarantee of fundamental civil liberties following the dramatic uptick in repression following the July 11 this should not be paired with another increase in restrictions on Cuba which have only worsened the humanitarian crisis on the island and failed to advance meaningful political reforms but his administration failed to embrace harm reduction strategies with the first signs that drug overdose deaths are falling Trump should intensify federal support for harm reduction more than 1 million Americans have died from drug overdose the toll of overdose deaths remains shockingly high Walking away from harm reduction now would imperil these first signs of progress Such misadventures will leave a trail of destroyed lives and communities and deliver no benefit where it matters most to Americans–reducing the toll of drug overdose The United States cannot seal itself off from those regional consequences engagement to help prevent global temperatures from rising even further Supporting our neighbors in the Americas to build resilience to climate shocks and to recover from the damage should be understood to be both a moral and practical imperative for every U.S government–including the incoming Trump administration We anticipate this administration will curtail U.S government efforts to advance gender justice and the protection of vulnerable groups in both U.S foreign policy and within the State Department The reinstatement of the Mexico City policy is expected assistance to organizations involved in abortion services or advocacy for changes to abortion laws. These shifts may exacerbate structural inequalities and undermine U.S Addressing reproductive health and the specific needs and challenges faced by gender and vulnerable populations makes countries stronger commercial partners and helps mitigate illicit economies domestic and gender-based violence require protection increased participation and equal rights for women and ethnic minorities fostera innovation through the inclusion of different perspectives and makes the country better prepared to address complex global challenges Initiatives like the U.S.-Colombia Racial Action Plan and Joint Action Plan to Eliminate Racial and Ethnic Discrimination and Promote Equality (JAPER) demonstrate the importance of advancing rights and economic opportunities including the incoming administration Trump will have a Republican-controlled Congress that will advance several of his priorities particularly his restrictive immigration agenda eliminating or dramatically cutting funding for international bodies and countering the role of China globally. As Trump gears up for a second term Latin America faces the prospect of deepened authoritarianism and a further erosion of democratic principles with many leaders likely to find an ally in the new U.S administration for their conservative agendas together with civil society in Latin America must brace for these challenges and work together to uphold human rights On November 25, president-elect Donald Trump pledged to impose a 25 percent tariff on all goods from Mexico and Canada until these countries “solve” undocumented migration and illicit fentanyl trafficking into the United States Trump also announced plans for an additional 10 percent tariff on goods from China we take a look at the implications of Trump’s tariff threats for migration Mexico is already carrying out its most aggressive crackdown ever on migrants and asylum seekers and has been doing so since the second half of 2023 During the first Trump administration (2017-2021), Mexican authorities reported blocking or encountering migrants an average of 10,531 times per month During the Biden administration’s first 28 months when it kept in place the Trump-era “Title 42” pandemic expulsions policy Mexico’s count of blocked or encountered migrants tripled to 33,128 per month without any public threats from the Biden administration Mexico all but stopped issuing short-term Humanitarian Visitor Cards to migrants transiting its territory Data table Mexico’s 2024 crackdown has been its most intense ever Mexico has averaged 115,636 blocked or encountered migrants per month—11 times the monthly average during Trump’s first administration Mexico’s number has equaled or even exceeded Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) and Border Patrol’s count of migrants encountered at the border Mexico cracked down so swiftly that Border Patrol’s migrant apprehensions plummeted 50 percent in a single month from December 2023 to January 2024: the sharpest month-to-month drop of the 21st century so far This happened without a mention of tariffs or other punishments usually dropping them in cities in the country’s far south Mexico’s crackdown has stranded tens of thousands of people in the country delaying or denying protection to many seeking safety in the United States and forcing many to live in squalid encampments in Mexico City and in cities elsewhere in southern Mexico Those prevented from moving through Mexico have opted to wait ports of entry using the CBP One smartphone app The Trump administration is very likely to end the CBP One option Mexico’s crackdown has reduced migration in the short term The reasons people are fleeing remain in place immigration and asylum systems remain broken and backlogged and a smuggling industry enabled by official corruption continues to thrive and find ways around “get-tough” strategies Crackdowns don’t “solve” migration challenges with deeper causes: they only delay them Trump intoned that “Both Mexico and Canada have the absolute right and power to easily solve this long simmering problem.” From this view and if Mexicans lack enough will to get the job done Whether or not Trump actually believes that Mexico can easily solve drug trafficking by placing the onus on the Mexican government political tradition of blaming foreigners–and especially Latin Americans–for U.S Trump implicitly absolves himself from any responsibility for the U.S It’s important to recognize that after increasing for years drug overdose deaths in the United States are finally going down overdose deaths caused by synthetic opioids such as fentanyl quadrupled decline in overdose deaths continues–something we should all hope will be the case–we should expect that Trump will point to his tariff threats to take credit It seems clear that Trump’s tariff threat is about setting himself up to take credit for good outcomes and to deny responsibility and blame others if things don’t work out The reality is that neither the threat of tariffs nor their actual implementation would do anything to affect the fundamentals of drug prohibition that drive illicit drug trafficking The enforcement actions that make the headlines–arrests shoot-outs–provide a sensation of government determination and impact on supply played up by drug enforcement agencies to bolster their own reputations and budgets Product losses and organizational disruptions caused by enforcement operations are built into the business model of drug traffickers; they just make more drugs and new leaders step up (often with enormous bloodshed) when previous leaders are removed either by rivals or by the government. If down the road Trump brags about increased arrests and drug seizures as the outcome of his tariff threats, there’s no reason to believe that such indicators have any bearing on the actual flow of drugs. First, according to CBP, more than 90% of U.S. seizures of fentanyl at the ports of entry, involve U.S. citizens we don’t really know how much supply is arriving precisely because traffickers use methods and modes to conceal their product and ensure its delivery the quantity needed to supply the entire U.S So the drug war theater of arrests and interdiction doesn’t mean traffickers aren’t supplying the market Given the huge profits to be made under conditions of prohibition and the fact that Mexico is at the doorstep of the world’s wealthiest country and most lucrative market for illegal drugs and the power to shape the market will be almost entirely in the hands of outlaws Prohibition also incentivizes traffickers to favor drugs that are cheap to produce and easy to smuggle which is why traffickers transitioned from a plant-based drug like heroin to a highly potent very compact synthetic opioid like fentanyl If Trump really wants to shake up a failed status quo and find real solutions to illicit drug trafficking and the overdose crisis he should point to the real problem: our catastrophic commitment to drug prohibition itself meaning the domestic impacts could be dramatic Retaliatory tariffs could add to the level of economic disruption and merely serve as a threat to obtain promises from Mexican authorities of yet more (or continued) migration crackdowns or drug interdiction this approach will only replicate ineffective tried-and-failed strategies in the U.S.-Mexico relationship Attempting to block migration through crackdowns pushes migrants to take riskier routes to avoid detection fueling human smuggling by criminal organizations and exposing migrants to extortion and violence Militarized drug control actions in Mexico over the past few decades have been far from effective as a strategy against the illicit drug trade or violence in general and have resulted in serious human rights violations For more information listen to our podcast episode. The many actions and changes following Donald Trump’s January 20 inauguration force a change in this week’s Border Update format Instead of narratives organized under three or four topics this Update organizes brief points under the following headings: Customs and Border Protection (CBP) reported a sharp drop in the number of migrants that its agents and officers encountered at the U.S.-Mexico border in January 2025 a month during which the Biden administration managed the border for the first 19 1/2 days and the Trump administration took over for the final 11 1/2 days which incorporates Border Patrol agents operating between ports of entry (official border crossings) and Field Operations officers operating at the ports of entry took 61,465 people into custody last month That was 36 percent fewer than in December 2024 and the fewest in any month since September 2020 Data table Thirty-two percent of migrants encountered in January were citizens of Mexico Mexican people have made up 31 percent of all encountered migrants Of the 16 nationalities that CBP reports that had more than 100 encounters all decreased from December to January; the nationalities that dropped most steeply were Guatemala (-51%) Migration had been falling steadily at the border for 13 months since Mexico’s government launched a crackdown on northbound migration in January 2024 and since the Biden administration implemented a rule in June 2024 that ended asylum access between ports of entry in most cases The further December-to-January drop is a result of the Trump administration acting on January 20 to close the border to all undocumented people and shut down asylum access CBP’s Border Patrol component apprehended 29,116 people That was 38 percent fewer than in December 2024 and the fewest in any month since May 2020 Data table and those individuals “were released to assist with criminal prosecutions as witnesses.” the Trump administration abruptly stopped honoring appointments that the Biden administration had been allowing asylum seekers to arrange using the CBP One smartphone app As the new administration canceled CBP One’s use for appointments CBP’s encounters at ports of entry between January 20-31 were 93 percent fewer than the preceding 11 days’ average the number of migrants encountered for the entire month of January 2025 dropped sharply after holding steady since July 2023 when the CBP One program had begun functioning at 1,450 daily appointments Data Table CBP’s Field Operations component encountered 32,349 people Port-of-entry encounters exceeded Border Patrol apprehensions during the third straight month and almost certainly for the third time ever January’s port-of-entry encounters were 34 percent fewer than in December 2024 and the fewest in any month since April 2023 Sixty-one percent of migrants encountered in January were single adults 34 percent were family unit members (parents and children) That is similar to proportions measured overall since October 2023 (57 percent single adults Data table Of the nine geographic sectors into which Border Patrol divides the border was the number one sector for migrant apprehensions with 6,397 San Diego has been the number-one sector for migrant apprehensions since June 2024 when agents apprehended more migrants in the easternmost sector Data table While data since Donald Trump’s January 20 inauguration are not yet fully available The drop in migration is a direct result of the impossibility of seeking asylum at the border under the Trump administration’s border policies, like summarily deporting all undocumented people and ending CBP One appointments, which several organizations are currently challenging in federal court “The right to seek asylum in the United States is non-existent at the U.S.-Mexico border,” read a February 20 Amnesty International brief based on fieldwork in Tijuana which found that thousands are stranded and vulnerable in Mexico as a result Banks, the Border Patrol chief, agreed in a CBS News interview that asylum is no longer an option for those who cross between ports of entry. “You do not cross the border illegally and then make an asylum claim,” he told CBS reporter Camilo Montoya-Gálvez or you can go to one of the embassies in your country and make your claim for asylum.” Those options are nearly impossible to pursue as ports of entry and embassy entrances are tightly guarded The new administration is adopting a layered approach stacking overlapping bans on asylum access on top of each other First, and most indiscriminately, a January 20 executive order suspended the entry of undocumented migrants to the United States under any circumstances using the presidential power to block the entry of classes of people granted by Section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act This order restricts people from invoking the right to asylum at the border citing the existence of an “invasion” under Article IV of the U.S Border Patrol agents and CBP officers are essentially authorized to ignore asylum claims A Just Security analysis from Elizabeth Goitein and Katherine Yon Ebright of the Brennan Center for Justice warned that Trump is using his invocation of an “invasion” as a way “to lay claim to vast presidential powers that don’t exist in peacetime or wartime launching a direct assault on the constitutional separation of powers and the rule of law.” Meanwhile, even as it professes concern for cross-border spread of disease, the new administration has fired hundreds of federal health inspectors who had been posted at ports of entry to detect communicable diseases in arriving cargo and people, the New York Times revealed Third, one of the January 20 executive orders would revive the “Remain in Mexico” policy which sends asylum seekers into Mexico to await their U.S While the administration refuses to hear asylum claims it is not clear who would be sent to Mexico to await asylum proceedings The government of Panama published data about migration through the Darién Gap a treacherous jungle region straddling its border with Colombia It reported that just 2,229 people—72 per day—migrated through the Gap last month That was 54 percent fewer than in December 2024 and the fewest in any month since February 2021 Data table Venezuela was the number-one nationality of people who migrated through the Darién route Venezuelan citizens made up just 50 percent of the migration flow Venezuela (1,114 people) was followed on the list of nationalities by Colombia (136) The number of people traveling through the 70-mile Darién Gap route has declined sharply despite the January inauguration of Nicolás Maduro, the Venezuelan president who—as a February 17 Carter Center final report makes clear—declared himself re-elected after a fraudulent July 2024 vote There has not been a new wave of migration away from the entrenched dictatorship in part because it is known that the United States has inaugurated a president promising a historic crackdown on migrants The Trump administration has begun to implement so-called “bridge deportations”: compelling nations to accept deported migrants who are citizens of third countries whom those nations would then have to repatriate These deportations appear to be taking place without taking into account the deported migrants’ fear of returning to their home countries government sent three military planes to Panama carrying migrants from several Asian nations In response to a direct request from the Trump administration Panama’s government agreed to receive 299 individuals from Afghanistan Panamanian officials could produce no document or agreement explaining the legal basis for this transfer of people from third countries Upon arrival, the deported people were confined to a hotel in Panama City and barred from leaving for several days, their passports and most mobile phones taken away from them. “Lawyers have said it is illegal to detain people in Panama for more than 24 hours without a court order,” the Times noted Several migrants told the New York Times reporters that at least one person in the hotel attempted suicide and another broke his leg trying to escape At the hotel, a vivid New York Times report documented many communicated to reporters by cellphone or by writing on windows and holding up signs using hand gestures through the hotel window communicated that she could be killed if returned to Kabul “I would rather jump off a plane than go back to China,” a Chinese Christian man told the Times On February 19 the UN International Organization for Migration (IOM) assisted the voluntary repatriations of 12 people from Uzbekistan and India, the Times reported Those who refuse repatriation are now being taken to the San Vicente reception center on the edge of Panama’s Darién Gap wilderness about a five or six-hour drive from the capital where they will be confined for an unclear amount of time When the deported migrants were confined to the Panama City hotel Panamanian authorities were reportedly preparing the San Vicente facility On the night of February 18, Panamanian authorities transferred 97 people to San Vicente, the New York Times reported that had been used to register northbound migrants arriving from the Darién Gap They will be held at that site, unable to leave six weeks,” Costa Rican President Rodrigo Chaves said as IOM helps arrange their U.S.-funded repatriation to their home countries It is not clear whether those repatriations will be voluntary and what might happen if people express fear of death President Chaves told reporters that Costa Rica is helping its “economically powerful brother from the north,” in part to avoid economic retaliation thank God … love is repaid with love … 200 will come A statement from an IOM spokesperson characterized the UN agency’s role as “providing humanitarian support and facilitating return when it is safe to do so.” When it is not safe to do so—for instance when people credibly fear return to their countries—it is not clear what the agency’s role might be Faced with long-term confinement in a primitive camp in a remote part of a Central American country some threatened individuals might opt for a highly risky return Badilla said that some may have the option to seek refugee status in Costa Rica El Salvador and Guatemala have also agreed to accept third countries’ citizens but no such “bridge deportation” flights have yet arrived received Venezuelan citizens sent from the U.S but they never left the airport before being transferred to Venezuela While they do not want to return to Venezuela some migrants interviewed by reporter Ángeles Mariscal said they were considering moving south to Costa Rica because the United States is closed off and conditions in Mexico are too hostile The Miami Herald noted that Venezuelans stranded in Mexico who lack passports cannot purchase plane tickets home even if they want to “because the Venezuelan embassy in Mexico is refusing to issue a letter of safe conduct to return home.” Developing note: On the afternoon of February 20, a civilian Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) flight took 177 Venezuelan citizens from the Guantánamo Bay base to Honduras a Venezuelan government plane retrieved them and brought them back to Caracas As of late February 20, we lack more information. A February 20 Justice Department court filing noted that 178 people were detained at the base on February 19. Of that number, all but one, who was brought back to the United States, are now in Venezuela What follows is the text of this update’s original Guantánamo narrative They have arrived aboard 13 military aircraft “All have been described as Venezuelans who have been issued final deportation orders,” the Times explained “But it is not known why these men in particular were sent there.” Rosenberg reported that about 700 military and 150 civilian personnel are now carrying out migrant operations at the base “A military blueprint for the migrant operation shows plans to house more than 3,500 U.S forces near tent encampments for more than 11,000 migrants.” The Times overview discussed “concern about mission creep and the militarization of a civilian security challenge,” as well as “whether it is legal Of the 178 people being held on February 19 127 were considered “high threat” detainees the medium-security military prison that held so-called “enemy combatants” during the United States’ 2000s-2010s “global war on terror.” The rest are in the base’s Migrant Operations Center a DHS-run facility that for three decades has held migrants apprehended on the high seas Reports continue to emerge about detainees at Guantánamo who have no criminal records. At his “Huddled Masses” newsletter at the Bulwark, Adrián Carrasquillo spoke to the mother of Mayfreed Durán-Arape a 21-year-old man who had been in ICE detention for 18 months after being apprehended at the border His mother said that he faces charges after he “intervened to stop an officer from repeatedly hitting a friend during an altercation” in the detention center where he was being held last November Senate met through the night on February 20-21 to consider and approve a budget resolution that would create a framework for massively increasing spending on tough border measures and mass deportation The bill is moving forward despite disagreement between House and Senate Republican leadership about how to proceed which will likely delay consideration well into March The budget resolution would pave the way for a future bill granting DHS an additional $175 billion, with more going to the Departments of Justice and Defense. (For comparison, currently the entire annual DHS budget—including non-border agencies like FEMA and the Coast Guard—is just over $100 billion.) An unidentified Senate Republican aide told the Washington Post that the $175 billion “is expected to go toward pay raises hiring and retention bonuses for ICE agents; immigration judges and support staff; assistant U.S attorneys; the border wall; additional detention space; and local and state law enforcement agencies to support ICE.” Senate Republicans control 53 out of 100 seats a Senate rule (the “filibuster”) requires 60 votes to end debate and proceed to a vote is proceeding under a complicated rule called “reconciliation,” which can only be invoked occasionally but allows a bill to pass with a simple majority—without a single Democratic vote—if all of its provisions can be shown to have a budgetary impact Under that procedure, senators spent the night of February 20-21 considering dozens of amendments, mainly brought by Democrats. These failed along party lines but were introduced for their symbolic value. Politico had reported that most expected Democratic amendments would center on Trump administration cuts and spending freezes—not border or migration issues The Senate passed the budget resolution at 4:46 AM on February 21. The House is expected to pass a different version next week or possibly the following week both houses must pass an identical resolution “Both chambers must pass the same resolution in order to kick off reconciliation in earnest Then Republicans can begin constructing the package that will contain the policies in Trump’s agenda,” Punchbowl News explained House and Senate Republican leaderships disagree on whether the resolution should separate the party’s priorities—taxes and “border plus immigration”—into two bills or one and are moving ahead with border-immigration first with a razor-thin Republican majority that might not sustain two votes want to combine taxes and border-immigration into one bill and President Trump has endorsed that approach The bill that Senate Republicans just passed, then, is “widely seen as a backup plan for now,” and not the actual framework for the big spending package, Punchbowl News explained In other budget developments, the Washington Post revealed a memo from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth instructing the U.S military to prepare for an 8 percent budget cut over the next 5 years One of 17 Defense Department categories that would be exempted from cuts is military “operations at the southern U.S Customs and Border Protection (CBP) reported a sharp drop in the number of migrants its agents and officers encountered at the U.S.-Mexico border in February 2025 to levels probably not seen since the 1960s Data table Data table Data table Data table Following the January 26 diplomatic crisis between Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro and U.S. President Donald Trump on X, and as a way to reduce its dependence on the United States, Colombia is working to diversify its economy including enhancing its engagement with China While a shift toward China was already underway the most recent row between the Colombian and U.S will likely accelerate Colombia’s pivot towards the rival superpower. seven of the thirteen governments maintaining relations with Taiwan were located in Latin America and the Caribbean though that number has been steadily dropping also known as the New Silk Road initiative China has aimed to establish new trade routes and strengthen the interdependence of member nations on its economy Over the last decade, China has also increased financing to the region. The largest recipients of Chinese financing in descending order in Latin America are Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, and Argentina. China is a donor member of the Inter-American Development Bank holds observer status at the Organization of American States (OAS) and actively participates in the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) which the U.S Overall, Latin American countries have preferred not to choose between China and the U.S. but they have sought to diversify their economies and secure loans with fewer environmental and other conditions imposed by the U.S China claims it will not interfere with governance leading some leaders in the region to welcome this lack of scrutiny it collaborates with the regimes in Venezuela and Cuba left-leaning governments like Brazil and Colombia The primary interest of the Chinese Communist Party is to secure raw materials and expand markets for its technologies in the region It also seeks to maintain power, which requires high rates of economic growth to pursue its goal of creating a “Chinese dream” centered on middle-class security and to support its territorial claims within its perimeter Efforts to increase collaboration between China and Colombia have been underway in recent years. In October 2023, President Petro visited Beijing to strengthen ties. During his visit, he formalized a strategic partnership that included 12 cooperation instruments Colombia has since committed to supporting China’s One-China principle On January 26, President Petro refused to accept a U.S. military plane carrying Colombian nationals and publicly denounced the use of “inhumane treatment” against the returned migrants. This led to a rapid escalation of tensions with the Trump administration threatening on X tariffs on Colombia and halting visa processing in the U.S while Petro threatened retaliation tariffs Colombia agreed to receive deportation flights and the trade war was avoided Following this very public conflict, Trump’s tactics may be pushing Colombia further away from the U.S. We already saw during Trump’s first term, how his confrontational approach pushed other Latin American countries like Peru closer to China and the Dominican Republic turned away from Taiwan and recognized the One China principle. foreign assistance drew further disapproval from Colombia Sources in Colombia who’ve talked to WOLA on the condition of anonymity hold a different view They state that the aid suspension is devastating to independent media that covers corruption and illegal armed groups’ activities and to civil society organizations working on peace Lifesaving protection support for social leaders in the country that ranks top in the world for killings of social leaders Particularly impacted are Afro Descendants youth at risk of recruitment by illegal actors in rural areas affected by internal armed conflict and urban communities where criminal groups dominate funded migration integration and humanitarian efforts. Colombia is the U.S.’s main ally in South America regarding trade and cooperation on migration and tackling the humanitarian and migration crises assistance continues to be frozen or is canceled leading it directly into the open arms of China. President Donald Trump unleashed a series of executive orders crafted under the banner of his “America First” agenda seek to reshape everything from immigration policy to foreign aid we are closely monitoring these developments and have broken down what they mean for the people of Latin America and for U.S.-Latin America relations moving forward Below we explore key executive orders already enacted by the new administration and their far-reaching implications From the shuttering of asylum pathways at the U.S.-Mexico border to a 90-day suspension of critical foreign aid programs policy that will reverberate across the region. Section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act states clearly that anyone physically present in the United States has the right to apply for asylum if they fear for their life or freedom due to race applies regardless of how the non-citizen entered the United States as of January 20 there is virtually no way to access the U.S A crackdown on asylum seekers and the closure of legal pathways is sure to reduce the number of migrants coming to the U.S.-Mexico border in the short term the first months of the last Trump administration saw the fewest Border Patrol apprehensions of migrants during the 21st century: fewer than during the first months of the COVID pandemic The closure of safe pathways to protection will undoubtedly cause an increase in deaths as a share of the overall population of border crossers Measures like the ban on all entries of undocumented people rest on the existence of an “invasion” and won’t get lifted until President Trump decides that the “invasion” has concluded citizens’ right to Habeas Corpus under the Constitution’s Suspension Clause past administrations have sought to minimize these exceptions’ footprint and scope The mission foreseen in the new executive order is different. It will likely encourage Northern Command to emulate the model that the state of Texas has adopted for National Guard personnel at the command of Gov. Greg Abbott (R). At the borderline since 2021, Texas troops have sustained numerous aggressive encounters with migrants including the discharge of weapons against civilians and allegations of human rights abuse There is now a significant danger that this confrontational military posture on U.S creating a dark precedent for democratic civil-military relations in the United States could allow Trump to deploy soldiers not just against migrants citizens participating in political protests An executive order creates “Homeland Security Task Forces” to manage deportation operations in all 50 states It calls for a dramatic expansion of detention facilities and the enlistment of state and local law enforcement to assist in the deportation effort It calls for cutting federal funds to states and municipalities that do not fully cooperate with ICE including those who fear that such cooperation would hobble policing in communities with significant undocumented populations The new administration would further speed deportations by applying expedited removal in the U.S Usually used only at the U.S.-Mexico border this procedure adjudicates claims quickly without involving an immigration judge Trump administration officials charged with managing “mass deportation” indicate that they will focus initially on migrants with criminal records, then expand to the larger undocumented population, which could be as many as 13 million people (over 3 percent of the U.S With promises of “shock and awe” ICE raids in major U.S cities during the administration’s first days those officials are deliberately spreading fear in migrant communities right now We add concerns that mass deportations could drive Latin American economies into recession—the effect of a sudden increase in the unemployed population and perhaps the harm done by tariffs—which An executive order calls for adding Mexican “cartels” (to be specified later) and two Latin American gangs—the El Salvador-originated MS-13 and the Venezuela-originated Tren de Aragua—to the State Department’s listing of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) This would be the first time that purely criminal groups—generating profits for their own enrichment instead of using them for a claimed religious or political objective—would appear on the FTO list (The order also references the possibility of naming such groups Specially Designated Global Terrorists) An FTO listing could free up some defense and intelligence resources to pursue these groups. However, it does not give the Trump administration the right to carry out military strikes inside the territory of a state like Mexico without that government’s consent. The 2001 “Global War on Terror” Authorization for the Use of Military Force allows such strikes only against terrorist groups with a tie to the September 11 An FTO listing would also have little effect on the penalties cartel and gang leaders already face under existing U.S adding criminal groups to the “terrorist list” is a complicated proposal for several reasons One of Trump’s executive orders ends all federally funded DEI and DEIA “mandates and activities” and all employees of DEIA offices have been put on administrative leave and protections for all persons who work in U.S agencies result in better working environments and retention of professionals from all backgrounds If people with different backgrounds and life experiences can speak and contribute freely without fear of harm at work it leads to better decision-making For work on Latin America to be sustainable and to advance different opinions based on life experiences are needed Cutting out all DEI and DEIA mandates sends a terrible message to Latin American countries where a main root cause of violence and illicit economies is inequality and exclusion of groups due to class Programming that seeks to address such disparities is needed to curb organized crime Another of the EOs mandates a system of institutional discrimination against trans and other gender-diverse people by stating that U.S policy will now divide all people into only two categories: male (defined as “a person belonging to the sex that produces the small reproductive cell”) and female (“a person belonging to the sex that produces the large reproductive cell”) the binary reproductive-cell-based identity system will impact everything from government-issued identification documents to who can seek refuge at a given anti-violence shelter The EO also mandates partial or total cancellation of prior government guidance on such subjects as “Creating Inclusive and Nondiscriminatory School Environments for LGBTQI+ Students,” “Confronting Anti-LGBTQI+ Harassment in Schools,” harassment in the workplace and several support and equality measures specifically designed for intersex and trans people These measures increase and foment discrimination against populations already facing marginalization with countries copying these ideas and making the overall region more intolerant Such intolerance can lead to conflict and violence Foreign aid should not be conditioned with such requirements but remain flexible so that policymakers can determine the best course of action to achieve U.S Another executive order would freeze all U.S foreign development assistance for 90 days while the State Department and White House Office of Management and Budget review all programs The goal would be to cancel and reprogram funding for aid programs that “destabilize world peace by promoting ideas in foreign countries that are directly inverse to harmonious and stable relations internal to and among countries.” An aid freeze that leads to cuts in assistance would endanger numerous efforts in Latin America supporting U.S goals and interests that the new administration claims to uphold The goal of reducing U.S.-bound migration flows would be undermined by cuts to “root causes” strategies creating employment enabling nations to integrate migrants on their own and attacking the corruption that strengthens the criminal groups that cause many to migrate The goal of reducing illicit drug supply is undone by cutting efforts to increase government presence in the lawless areas where such illicit drug crops are produced or to strengthen the investigation and prosecution of members of organized criminal groups A lesson learned from the U.S.-led “Plan Colombia” effort is that addressing violence and guaranteeing security requires investment in building institutions Pulling out those funds will be destabilizing and undermine U.S It also will open the door for other competing powers like China and Russia to fill the gap the U.S to take the lead on climate policy and to shape the international environmental agenda. rising sea levels–amplified by climate change–pose an existential threat simply taking part in the Paris agreement does not mean that a country has effective environmental protection and climate policies in place. But the climate agreement does create a framework that encourages countries to set ambitious climate targets and provides a basis for burden sharing especially in terms of financing to recover from disasters and build resilience. As the United States prepares for a new administration and the fundamental rights of individuals across the Americas we highlight the critical human rights issues that should be at the forefront of policy discussions during this pivotal time WOLA works with partners to address the reasons why people are compelled to leave their homes As these challenges require long-term solutions large numbers of people will continue to migrate in the meantime They deserve a rights- respecting regional response centered on access to protection and expanded legal pathways We advocate for policies guided by these five principles: The culture of border security and migration agencies should treat migrants and asylum seekers as people who need protection and due process—not as adversaries It should be a given that government agents throughout the migration route respect migrants’ basic human rights and avoid corrupt practices The right to asylum is an international standard implemented after the horrors of World War II The United States and countries throughout the region must guarantee everyone’s right to seek and enjoy asylum including more temporary work programs and clearer and broader pathways to legal status despite the challenges posed by our current polarized politics Root causes strategies can be effective if they are well-funded and supported with a long-term commitment Strategies should include support for democratic practices and accountability for corruption and human rights violations coordination and cooperation should strengthen states’ ability to regularize and integrate migrants Read the full series The Trump administration’s restrictive immigration measures have rapidly brought about a humanitarian crisis at the U.S.-Mexico border With the termination of the CBP One program asylum seekers with scheduled appointments were left stranded The following notes summarize the tangible impacts we have observed over the last 14 days on the border of Nogales November 16 marked the 35th anniversary of the killing of six Jesuit priests of the Central American University (Universidad Centroamericana, UCA), their housekeeper, and her daughter. Congressman Jim McGovern traveled to El Salvador to commemorate the legacy of these martyrs and WOLA had the opportunity to accompany him during his visit and gather information on the current context of human rights and democracy in the country. El Salvador faces a high concentration of power and a deterioration of democratic institutions with the recent election of Donald Trump as president of the United States gaining importance in the country due to Bukele’s strong ties to the Republican Party and close circles of the president-elect. Below we highlight some major findings from the visit: The possibility of a constitutional reform presented amidst a context of erosion and co-optation of the legislative and judicial branches of government Recently, the Legislative Assembly elected two thirds of the magistrates, plus two vacancies in the Supreme Court of Justice in a process that lacked transparency as required by national and international standards The Legislative Assembly is controlled by President Nayib Bukele’s Nuevas Ideas party with a supermajority of 54 seats out of 60 as well as the election of public officials which is a serious threat to the standards of a democratic state In this same context, in January 2025 the Legislative Assembly must elect a new Attorney General, whose role is indispensable for criminal investigation and access to justice, which has not been fulfilled due to the overflow of the system under the state of exception. Only two people have presented themselves as candidates and it is likely that the current Attorney General with neither respect for nor full compliance with the constitution At least one out of every ten persons deprived of liberty under the state of exception are innocent which means that at least one out of every ten people detained are innocent The release of these people is difficult to corroborate because the lack of transparency reliable data and access to information is a serious problem the recognition made by President Bukele should be subject to international scrutiny including crimes under international criminal law since there is an explicit acceptance of violations to human rights the documentation work of human rights organizations and complaints from many relatives of those detained indicate that there are probably many other innocent people who have been detained under the state of emergency Independent press and civil society are under attack The organizations with which WOLA had the opportunity to speak with during the visit condemned the censorship Many people reported being victims of digital harassment which has led to self-censorship and anxiety WOLA also notes a widespread fear that civic space will continue to shrink gradually until an authoritarian regime such as the one in Nicaragua is consolidated: a single couple controls the three branches of government criminalizing critical voices whose only option is exile or imprisonment Sweeping government layoffs have increased public discontent The International Monetary Fund is a key player On the other hand, in its most recent statement the IMF reports that it has reached preliminary agreements with Salvadoran authorities on a “multi-year global strategy” on issues including governance and transparency While the statement mentions proposed legislation on money laundering and corruption and improvements in the public procurement process civil society actors expressed concern that the IMF’s conception of governance and transparency does not appear to address the concentration of power and increasingly authoritarian practices by the government that threaten financial stability as well as the democratic order we call on the international community to monitor the situation in the country will urge an end to the indefinite state of emergency despite serious human rights violations although it is important members of Congress continue to denounce the situation as some have done in recent years. Below are urgent actions to consider to address the human rights and democracy crisis in the country: alongside its sponsors and longtime supporters hosted the 50th Anniversary WOLA Human Rights Awards Ceremony and Benefit Gala and future work while commemorating the dedication and impact of our 2024 honorees Senator Patrick Leahy Venezuela Program Education-Action on Human Rights (PROVEA) and the Collectives of Family Members of the Disappeared in Guanajuato See the photo album here and watch our 50th anniversary playlist In reaching our remarkable 50th anniversary milestone the Washington Office on Latin America has undergone a transformative journey growing to meet the challenges of the times and emerging as a crucial force in social justice and human rights advocacy throughout the Americas As we reflect on five decades of human rights advocacy WOLA remains steadfast in shaping a future in Latin America where democracy thrives and human rights prevail The collectives of family members of the disappeared in Guanajuato, Mexico, were one of the recipients of WOLA’s 2024 Human Rights Award for their essential role in the search for truth and non-repetition in the face of a disappearance crisis numbering over 116,000 victims nationally WOLA recognized Olimpia Montoya of the search collective Proyecto de Búsqueda for her role in advancing efforts to create the National Forensic Data Bank and Bibiana Mendoza and Verónica Durán of the Hasta Encontrarte collective for her unwavering voice against militarization in Mexico we launched our 50th Anniversary celebrations with a series of events On November 15, 2024, Venezuela enacted a regressive law tightening state control over non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Popularly referred to as the Anti-NGO or Anti-Society Law, the Law on Oversight, Regularization, Operation, and Financing of Non-Governmental and Non-Profit Social Organizations requires NGOs to be authorized by the government to operate The bill grants authorities discretion to deny authorization based on information about their sources of funding to be evaluated according to political criteria or a perceived terrorism threat coupled with the Trump administration’s rollback of U.S foreign assistance allocated through cooperation programs with multilateral agencies and international organizations has dealt a one-two punch to Venezuelan civil society Hundreds of organizations now face the grim choice of going underground the White House’s efforts to discredit USAID and other channels of foreign funding have emboldened Venezuelan authorities who have long sought to justify a crackdown against internationally funded human rights monitors and aid groups. Despite immense threats to their personal safety and freedom human rights defenders have played a vital role in documenting rights abuses over decades of the declining rule of law in the country the new NGO Oversight Law and cuts to vital U.S and criminalizing cooperation with multilateral organizations to illegitimately consolidate power they evade their constitutional and international obligations and avoid accountability to citizens and human rights organizations. Authorities reserve the right to dissolve organizations accused of promoting “fascism” (Articles 15 and 23) or engaging “in activities inherent to political parties or organizations with political purposes” (Article 23) The Venezuelan government regularly labels the country’s opposition as “fascist,” allowing for broad discretion to apply the law to organizations that promote ideals or causes that are perceived as contrary to the ruling party High on their priority of organizations to be targeted are likely to be those that expose human rights violations or oppose policies that undermine democracy. How does the new NGO Oversight Law compare to other regressive laws enacted in Venezuela The NGO Oversight Law is the culmination of a decades-long assault on freedom of expression in Venezuela. Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, widely viewed as the architect of the Venezuelan state’s repressive apparatus, has called for NGOs receiving U.S. funding to face investigations since at least 2014 which prohibited the international funding of civil society organizations for purposes related to promoting civic participation and allowed Venezuelan authorities to impose severe sanctions on organizations that failed to comply. Successive measures have sought to criminalize certain forms of political speech while attempting to create a regulatory regime for NGOs. Following the July 28, 2024 elections in which the Maduro government claimed victory despite overwhelming evidence of its resounding defeat authorities redoubled efforts to criminalize civil society pushing through the NGO Oversight Law and advancing several other regressive measures. Summary of Measures Restricting Venezuelan Civil Society How are NGOs reacting to the NGO Oversight Law After the law went into effect in November 2024 Venezuelan NGOs have two deadlines to comply with: by February 13 2025 (90 days after the law came into effect) they had to obtain certification proving they have submitted the required documentation to the Public Registrar’s Office—with vague and arbitrary specifications—and by May 14 2025 (180 days after the law came into effect) they must update their statutory bylaws and obtain registration certification All organizations are required to submit detailed assembly minutes that include funding sources and audited financial statements Some organizations have been ordered to turn over financial records since their founding These requirements exceed what is constitutionally mandated and are prohibitively expensive since organizations must cover the costs of certified audits for each year of financial records Organizations have faced the difficult decision of submitting the documentation to continue operating Organizations whose bylaws and institutional missions are determined to not satisfy the law must amend them by May 14 after which date the state will proceed to dissolve or fine organizations not in compliance Since it is in the Venezuelan government’s interest to allow humanitarian assistance it is likely that the application of the law will be targeted at organizations that are inconvenient to those in power foreign aid freeze: A convenient measure for Maduro and human rights groups that he accuses of conspiring with USAID but rather to private implementing partners that managed and disbursed them Department of State and if that has translated into a restoration of the funds for local organizations pause and subsequent cancellation of most U.S pose an existential threat to the country’s civil society it is difficult—if not impossible—to recover unless it reverses course through new programming or reversing cancelation notices it would appear that the United States has all but withdrawn its backing for organizations crucial to collecting reliable data on the country’s human rights and humanitarian conditions. more organizations are forced to lay off staff more valuable human rights defenders and humanitarian workers are fleeing the country If Venezuelan civil society is to survive this latest wave of state repression must act urgently to express its backing of civil society organizations including through retaining programs that support human rights They exist to defend a state against aggression who are civilians charged with protecting and serving the population with minimal violence And soldiers are absolutely not trained to be migration agents This is not a population demanding a response from combat-trained soldiers: not in the United States or anywhere else When governments make soldiers perform internal security missions involving long-term especially vulnerable and trauma-affected civilians like migrants the probability of human rights abuses skyrockets Long-term missions seeking to curb highly profitable illicit transactions—like cross-border drug or migrant smuggling—carry a high probability of corruption This poses a threat to the integrity and capacity of military institutions which are often difficult to hold accountable in the first place Using extremely harsh measures to control migration is a very political mission Treating migrants like an “invasion” is a very political choice If militaries become accustomed to taking on a politicized mission like this one what happens when a president calls on them to carry out other politicized missions like confronting peaceful protesters or labor movements The migration mission sets a dangerous precedent Mexico had already been undergoing a historic reversal in civil-military relations, conferring a long list of internal roles on its armed forces; WOLA has called it a “militarized transformation.” Its government transferred soldiers into a new military federal police force giving it full power to police the country while placing it that new branch of Mexico’s armed forces has participated heavily in migration enforcement alongside other branches of Mexico’s military While WOLA has not seen evidence of direct U.S training and equipping of Mexico’s National Guard the Trump administration is aggressively supporting the Mexican government’s expansion of the military’s internal migration mission as was also the case during Trump’s first term In order to stave off a threat to impose tariffs at the beginning of February President Claudia Sheinbaum agreed to deploy 10,000 additional National Guard personnel to Mexico’s northern border region ostensibly to control migration and seize fentanyl The additional troops are now carrying out checkpoints they are patrolling the quiet border jointly with U.S Border Patrol and Mexican National Guard carry out “mirrored” patrol in Arizona. Source: Border Patrol Tucson Sector on Twitter This response further expands the military role in Mexico’s internal security with all the risks that it entails for human rights as well as corruption and civil-military relations. The deployment, meanwhile, makes no strategic sense It is difficult to interdict illicit synthetic drugs these illicit substances are more likely to get interdicted at transit bottlenecks in Mexico’s interior than along a 2,000-mile-long border must already run a gauntlet of patrols and checkpoints run by civilian and military forces and organized criminals as they cross Mexico requiring most to pay smugglers and corrupt officials There is no reason to expect that adding more National Guard personnel will make it harder for a smuggler to bring migrants to the border Past experience indicates that it will just create an additional “cost of doing business” for smugglers By signaling that Mexico’s internal troop deployment appeased its demand for action to stave off tariffs the Trump administration sent a strong message that this is the model of security and civil-military relations that the United States wants Latin American nations to follow in the 21st century the Mexican military’s role in counter-drug operations for decades expanding this support to immigration enforcement is a major escalation of this model. the Trump administration is actively encouraging a big new military role in migration control During Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s February 5 visit to the country Guatemalan President Bernardo Arévalo announced that the U.S government would be assisting the formation of new border task forces combining Guatemalan police and military personnel. These will be charged with combating organized crime and interdicting drugs and smuggled migrants in Guatemala’s border regions. The first began operating along Guatemala’s border with El Salvador and Honduras on February 25 This will expand the internal policing roles of a military with a serious history of human rights abuses, including what a Truth Commission reporting on Guatemala’s 1960-1996 armed conflict called genocide accountability has been very difficult to achieve. to exert civilian control over the armed forces and to keep soldiers in the barracks by trimming internal security roles Those steps built on the promise of the 1996 peace accord which created a civilian police force and placed internal security more firmly under civilian control. This big new internal border role is a setback to this past progress to confront civilians whom they believe to be in the United States without authorization Border Patrol Chief Mike Banks (center, back to camera) deputizes National Guard personnel in south Texas. Source: Border Patrol Rio Grande Valley Sector on Twitter National Guard members are military personnel They undergo the same training as do regular U.S law—the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878—seeks to prevent exactly these kinds of long-term open-ended internal missions involving regular contact and confrontation with civilians on U.S The risks of such missions for democratic civil-military relations are too great The National Guard mission at the border relies on one of the legal exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act—the vaguely worded Sec Code—to use the National Guard in “support of operations or missions undertaken…at the request of the President or Secretary of Defense.” There is no emergency to justify such a mission. In Border Patrol’s Rio Grande Valley Sector, where the first deputized soldiers are operating, 3,000 Border Patrol agents are apprehending just 50 migrants per day: a rate of 0.5 migrant apprehensions per agent per month WOLA and partners have already documented how frequently the Texas National Guard has been improperly using both lethal and non-lethal force against migrants, in many cases to deny them the legal right to seek asylum, and even denying water and first aid to families and children. WOLA called this aggressive use of soldiers on U.S If the Trump administration is permitted to declare an “invasion” to give soldiers a big open-ended role on U.S we should fear the use of other emergency measures to use soldiers for other internal political purposes This mission opens the possibility of big further distortions in the U.S It’s so quiet that the border-wide number of troops is greater than the monthly number of apprehended migrants, estimated at 8,450 in February. Yet the troops deployed come “from some of the most experienced and highest readiness elite units in the Army,” noted Jennifer Kavanagh of Defense Priorities The politicized push to rush troops to the border is idling personnel in whom the Defense Department has invested heavily Active-duty soldiers put up concertina wire near San Diego. Source: Border Patrol San Diego Sector on Twitter like Buckley Space Force Base in Colorado and Fort Bliss in El Paso are being used as staging and transportation areas for the administration’s growing mass deportation campaign ICE does not have the personnel to carry out “mass deportation” on its own We can expect to see more soldiers playing supporting roles in deporting people all over the U.S through an invocation of the rarely used Insurrection Act of 1807 Shackled migrants board a C-17 military aircraft being used to deport them. Source: CBP on Twitter More than 700 military personnel are expanding the Guantánamo Bay Naval Station to accommodate potentially as many as 30,000 migrants. The administration has still given no reason why it would take migrants—many with no criminal records at all some of them asylum seekers—to an inaccessible base far from contact with attorneys or loved ones Using the military and the Guantánamo base exhibits a reckless disregard for costs at a time when the new administration is seeking to slash the federal government, including the Defense Department. Though it can only offer educated guesses because much data is classified, a Niskanen Center analysis estimated that Guantánamo detentions cost U.S taxpayers well into the millions of dollars per inmate per year the current cost of detention in ICE facilities on the U.S mainland—estimated to accommodate approximately 41,000 individuals—is roughly $260 per migrant (adjusted for inflation) per day Contributing to the logistics of mass deportation by running transportation and staging “camps” means playing non-combat roles with big human rights implications Soldiers’ training offers little preparation for that military in mass deportation is to involve our nation’s fighting force in a politicized internal mission military—which prides itself on being apolitical—is being forced to lend itself to the current administration’s domestic political priorities This threatens a historic break with more than a century of restraint in the United States’ democratic civil-military relations As the Trump administration expands and supports military roles in migration enforcement some of its domestic efforts will run into judges who find these activities unconstitutional But many efforts will not stop in the courts assistance and pressure on countries in Latin America These activities carry grave risks for human rights and democracy in both Latin America and in the United States using the excuse of migration and the false argument of an “invasion,” needs to stop as soon as possible before it expands or comes to be seen as normal. it threatens to accelerate the reversal of a key element of the region’s transitions from dictatorship to democracy going back to the 1980s which saw the armed forces return to the barracks while states created civilian public security ministries and professional police forces it also promises to dilute armed forces’ focus on their core mission: defending their nations from aggression Turning militaries into an all-purpose domestic tool blunts both their readiness and their morale It demands greater vigilance from members of Congress and all citizens who value the military’s role in democracy We must raise our voices and not look away which calls for global action to combat racism and address systemic injustices faced by Afro-descendants Gimena Sánchez emphasized the significance of this renewed commitment noting that it provides an invaluable opportunity to advance racial justice on a global scale “This is a new opportunity to truly advance racial justice increase global political participation of Afro-descendants Sánchez also affirmed WOLA’s intention to working with policymakers like Congressman Johnson and others to advance this agenda which will play a crucial role in dismantling the barriers of systemic racism that affect Afro-descendants both in the United States and around the world The resolution has garnered international support with 87 UN Member States co-sponsoring the initiative It reflects a shared commitment to address the historical and ongoing impacts of racism ensuring that the contributions of people of African descent are recognized globally while working toward a more just and inclusive world This Decade will serve as a platform to push for policies and actions that tackle the deep-rooted inequities facing Afro-descendant communities including the fight for reparations and equal rights WOLA remains committed to highlighting the unique challenges faced by Afro-descendants in Latin America advocating for policies that promote racial equity and justice for these communities we summarize some aspects and probable impacts of the judicial reform bill focusing on the bill’s proposal that judicial authorities be elected by popular vote Election of judicial authorities: democratization or political capture The judicial reform proposes the popular election of all judges and magistrates of the Federal Judicial Branch (Poder Judicial de la Federación, PJF). In other words, the selection system for federal judges and magistrates would change from one based on professional examinations to one based on the popular vote currently appointed through a procedure involving the federal executive branch and the Senate The reform also mandates that each of Mexico’s 32 states replicate this same model for state judiciaries. Such a system of election of judicial authorities at all levels would be unparalleled in the region In this new system, candidates for judicial positions would be nominated by the three branches of government: executive, legislative, and judicial. The current version of the reform bill specifies that each branch would create an expert Evaluation Committee to select a short list of candidates That list would then be cut down further by a lottery system and the final names would be sent to the branch in question for approval if a certain political party dominates the executive and legislative branches (as is currently the case for MORENA) that party would have an outsized role in the designation of the Evaluation Committees and/or the approval of new candidates for judicial posts A foreseeable result of this process would be a judiciary more aligned with the party in power (perpetuating the risk of political influence in future candidacies) The proposed model could thus facilitate the political capture of the judiciary The reform would also establish an elected Judicial Discipline Tribunal (Tribunal de Disciplina Judicial) with broad powers to supervise and sanction judicial personnel the Tribunal would evaluate judges’ and magistrates’ performance during their first year in office Any political party that exerts influence over this body would attain significant power to pressure the rest of the judiciary In recent years, López Obrador and members of his government have continually accused the judiciary of causing impunity in Mexico. They have publicly criticized judges who free detained people suggesting that such liberations are the product of judges’ corrupt or overly formalistic practices and promoting the idea that punishment should prevail over due process the proposed judicial reform would lead to the continuation and deepening of patterns of impunity and abuse against the population If the government’s message is that a ‘good judge’ is one who does not free detained people this logically encourages the election of judicial candidates perceived as unlikely to authorize liberations which could further weaken judicial control over the actions of prosecutors and military and police forces The result would be a justice system with even more margin for omissions in criminal investigations and for illegal practices such as arbitrary detentions disproportionately affecting the most vulnerable sectors of society The problem with the proposed judicial reform is not that electing judges gives ‘too much’ power to the people The problem is quite the opposite: the election of judicial authorities filtered by political interests and hampered by the flaws cited above would weaken the protection of human rights and security leaving the population exposed to impunity and abuse Mexico deserves an independent judiciary committed to human rights as well as prosecutors’ offices with greater capacity to solve crimes and prosecute perpetrators based on solid evidence The proposed reform falls far short of advancing these objectives essential to guarantee access to justice in Mexico WOLA joins the global community in mourning the passing of President Jimmy Carter whose contributions to human rights and democracy left a lasting impact worldwide During his tenure as the 39th President of the United States foreign policy and his post-presidential work through the Carter Center further advanced these principles through initiatives promoting justice and democratic governance foreign policy by prioritizing human rights and working to free prisoners held under the dictatorship regimes in the Southern Cone his policies were not evenly applied throughout the region while cutting off direct military aid to Guatemala in 1977 the Carter administration continued to support the military regime in El Salvador; U.S assistance was not suspended until after the murder of the four churchwomen in December 1980 Carter named the first Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs at the State Department and during his term expanded the number of foreign service officers focused on human rights and asylum He was instrumental in working with Congress to pass the Refugee Act of 1980 providing a legal framework for granting refugee and asylum status to people fleeing persecution worldwide. One of Carter’s administrations contributions was the ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties This decision not only reflected Carter’s commitment to fairness but also marked an important point in U.S.-Latin American relations by respecting the sovereignty and self-determination of the Panamanian people and shifted the opinion of the region toward the U.S policy toward the hemisphere and it stuck despite repeated efforts to roll it back It represented a sea change in hemispheric relations – and literally saved the lives of countless detainees enduring the trauma of unjust treatment His light penetrated the darkness for countless numbers of prisoners unjustly jailed by the dictators who then ruled the region.” Carter’s human rights advocacy extended far beyond his presidency he and Rosalynn Carter founded the Carter Center the Carter Center became a beacon for electoral observation and democratic integrity monitoring more than 100 elections in 39 countries Carter himself often traveled to conflict-ridden regions lending his presence and credibility to ensure free and fair electoral processes These efforts restored trust in democracy and empowered millions to exercise their right to vote in nations emerging from dictatorship or strife President Jimmy Carter’s work reminds us that the fight for human rights is an enduring responsibility WOLA extends its deepest condolences to the Carter family and the countless lives touched by his work and that of the Carter Center May his legacy continue to inspire future generations President Donald Trump invoked the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 for only the fourth time in U.S His administration sent hundreds out of the country on mere suspicion of ties to a criminal organization In this explainer episode recorded on March 21, with help from WOLA’s Venezuela Director Laura Dib and Central America Director Ana María Méndez Dardón, Defense Oversight Director Adam Isacson walks through what has happened over the past six dark days in U.S but this episode lays out some of the most pertinent facts and context in half an hour With this series of weekly updates, WOLA seeks to cover the most important developments at the U.S.-Mexico border. See past weekly updates here Support ad-free, paywall-free Weekly Border Updates. Your donation to WOLA is crucial to sustain this effort. Please contribute now and support our work. Migration at the border remains at its lowest level since the fall of 2020 according to new CBP data released in August following a crackdown on migratory movements that Mexico launched in early 2024 and a June Biden administration ban on most asylum access between border ports of entry was 3 percent greater than July—the first month-to-month increase in six months—which may indicate that these crackdowns’ deterrent impact is flattening or even eroding Kamala Harris called out the Trump campaign’s “mass deportation” plans Donald Trump and running mate JD Vance doubled down on false and racist claims about Haitian immigrants living and working legally in Ohio A national poll revealed immigration and the border remains among voters’ top concerns A report from Arizona attorneys revealed a high portion of unaccompanied children reporting verbal and physical abuse while in Border Patrol custody A FOIA result points to more than 200 CBP personnel under investigation for serious misconduct Texas school shooting response and complications in prosecuting migrant smugglers in Arizona Border Patrol’s recoveries of migrant remains in its El Paso Sector now stand at a record 171 since October and the Border Network for Human Rights and Texas Civil Rights Project reveal troubling aspects of the Texas state government’s “Operation Lone Star.” Customs and Border Protection (CBP) released data about migration and enforcement at the U.S.-Mexico border through August which was followed in June by a sweeping Biden administration restriction on access to asylum The Washington Post covered Mexico’s ongoing crackdown, which it called “the merry-go-round” (the Wall Street Journal, in August, called it a “chutes and ladders” policy) The Mexican government has acted to reduce migration to the U.S border by massively busing about 10,000 non-Mexican migrants per month to the country’s south “It’s unclear whether the results are sustainable The number of migrants camped out in Mexican cities is rising,” noted Post reporter Mary Beth Sheridan the city’s only migrant shelter is at double last year’s capacity The administration continues to enforce this rule very strictly. Border Patrol released fewer people into the U.S interior with “notices to appear” in August (9,936) than in any month since February 2021 An additional 49,465 people were able to enter custody at ports of entry (official border crossings) About 44,700 of that total were people who had made appointments using the CBP One app CBP continues to allow about 1,450 CBP One appointments per day; the monthly port-of-entry total has changed little since June 2023 Combining Border Patrol and ports of entry, the nationalities most frequently encountered in August were citizens of Mexico (37,601) Nearly all encounters with Cubans and Venezuelans took place at ports of entry California (14,436) measured the most migrant apprehensions Texas-New Mexico (13,282) was in second place; it was last in the “top two” in April 2023 CBP has seized 18,981 pounds of fentanyl at the border during the first 11 months of fiscal year 2024 For the first time since fentanyl first appeared in the mid-2010s border seizures of the drug are almost certain to be fewer than they were in the year before (26,719 pounds in 2023) Fiscal 2024’s fentanyl seizures are on pace to be 23 percent fewer than in 2023 88 percent of fentanyl has been seized at ports of entry and another 5 percent at Border Patrol’s interior vehicle checkpoints protection for “DREAMers” (undocumented immigrants who were brought to the United States as children) and an “earned pathway to citizenship,” while ensuring that “our border is secure.” Harris attacked Republican opponent Donald Trump for presiding over family separations during his 2017-2021 term, and for his campaign’s plan to carry out mass deportations if elected “Imagine what that would look like and what that would be At Mother Jones, Isabel Dias noted Trump’s use of the term “remigration” instead of “deportation” in a recent post to his social network “The word stands in for a policy that entails the forced repatriation or mass expulsion of non–ethnically European immigrants and their descendants Ohio—and the origins of the especially virulent strain of racism that gets aimed at Haitians in the United States A Scripps News/Ipsos poll found that 39 percent of U.S after “inflation,” among the most important issues facing the United States 72 percent listed addresses in those states in counties that voted for Joe Biden in 2020 “From what I’ve read and seen from Vice President Harris, I think she tries to take a balanced approach,” Adriel Orozco of the American Immigration Council told Mother Jones “She tries to take a humanistic lens to migration considering her background as a child of migrants Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs at a hearing on the “Remain in Mexico” policy Isacson highlighted the human rights violations and dangers faced by migrants forced to remain in unsafe conditions while awaiting asylum processing and also emphasized the enrichment of organized crime in Mexico as a direct result of the policy He called on policymakers to prioritize solutions that uphold the right to asylum and protect the human rights of migrants. the United States returned nearly 71,000 asylum seekers to Mexico to await their cases it is estimated that the cartels profited millions of dollars off of migrants taking advantage of their precarious situations. “People truly did suffer while remaining in Mexico Nearly all of that abuse was the work of organized crime groups “Remain in Mexico proved to be no substitute for a functional Watch the full hearing here.Read the summary or full testimony here.Learn more about the impact of the “Remain in Mexico” policy here WOLA will not publish Border Updates for the next two weeks With this series of weekly updates, WOLA seeks to cover the most important developments at the U.S.-Mexico border. See past weekly updates here Support ad-free, paywall-free Weekly Border Updates. Your donation to WOLA is crucial to sustain this effort. Please contribute now and support our work. November data showed migration levels at the border continuing to decline following Donald Trump’s election port-of-entry arrivals exceeded Border Patrol apprehensions some reports from Texas point to an increase in mid-December as some people try to reach U.S Rumors sent some migrants to attempt to turn themselves in at a border wall gate in El Paso where state forces repelled them violently Caravans continue to form in southern Mexico but none remain intact beyond Mexico’s southernmost states As Trump administration officials ramp up plans to deport undocumented migrants on a massive scale likely requiring the use of military aircraft concern is sweeping throughout communities where many families are “blended”: citizens living with non-citizens while council members and law enforcement in San Diego disagree on cooperation Conservative media and Donald Trump complained bitterly about the Biden administration’s auctioning off of border wall parts left over when construction halted after Joe Biden’s January 2021 inauguration the selloff was mandated by the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act Border Patrol apprehended migrants 46,612 times at the U.S.-Mexico border in November, according to data that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) published on December 19 That is the smallest monthly apprehensions number since July 2020 a few months into the pandemic during Donald Trump’s first presidency the number of people who came to the border’s ports of entry green in the chart below) exceeded Border Patrol apprehensions Donald Trump does away with the CBP One appointment program for asylum seekers after his January 20 inauguration we can expect Border Patrol apprehensions (blue in the chart) to revert to being a multiple of port-of-entry encounters again Combining Border Patrol apprehensions and ports of entry 94,190 people ended up in CBP custody in November 2024 This total is 61 percent fewer than in November 2023 which was one of the border’s busiest months ever Data table Of nationalities CBP reported with over 100 migrants in a month The steepest drops were in encounters with citizens of Nicaragua (-87%) The nationalities that declined the least from November to November were Cuba (-43%) Even amid continued declines through November ahead of Donald Trump’s January 20 inauguration who also noted increases in mid-Texas’s Del Rio Sector It is the first quantitative indicator of an increase in migration since the U.S which raised expectations—so far unmet—that many migrants might rush to enter the United States before Election Day authorities were commemorating International Migrants’ Day (December 18) by allowing asylum seekers to cross and turn themselves in without first making port-of-entry appointments using the CBP One app La Jornada reported about an attempted caravan of about 1,500 people departing Tapachula on December 15. Milenio covered another similarly sized group departing Tapachula on December 18 “No major caravans have reached the United States in nearly six years,” the Washington Post recalled in a piece explaining methods Mexico’s government employs to diffuse or dismantle large groups of migrants traveling through its territory “But while caravans have become a ho-hum issue in Mexico they continue to alarm American politicians—and one in particular.” Reporting from Mexico’s southern border-zone city of Tapachula Madeleine Wattenbarger documented the brazenly open nature with which organized criminals operate as they massively kidnap migrants for ransom the military’s presence has coincided with an increase in migrant kidnappings.” Reuters published a demographic overview of the undocumented migrant population vulnerable to “mass deportation” from the United States which it estimated as ranging from 11 million to 14.5 million people.” The latter estimate comes from the advocacy group FWD.us what’s known as a ‘mixed-status household.’” Tom Homan, the former Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) official who will serve as White House “Border Czar” after Donald Trump takes office, told the Washington Examiner that ICE will need additional military aircraft beyond its fleet of about 13 private contractor planes While the next administration’s “mass deportation” campaign will first target migrants with criminal records it will be likely to carry out many “collateral arrests” of others accused of no offenses except unlawful entry Despite Homan’s pledges to ramp up deportations on day one of the Trump administration, “mass deportation plans rely on others’ cooperation. And the Constitution provides guidance and protections to meet this moment,” recalled Josh Rosenthal and Shayak Sarkar of the University of California at Davis, in a column at Newsweek CBS News and the Guardian profiled Federico Arellano whose undocumented wife and four children—three of them U.S citizens—got deported by ICE after she reported for an appointment with the agency The attorney representing the family “said he has not seen an instance like this one that involves a family.” The New York Times reported on undocumented migrants living near the border where Border Patrol operates who “fear that they will be easy targets.” An organizer for La Unión del Pueblo Entero a migrants’ rights defense group in south Texas that estimates 75,000 children in the Rio Grande Valley region live in “blended families,” warned a gathering “to have a plan in place in case they found themselves in an immigration jail including securing power of attorney to give custody of their children to a legal resident so that their children would not end up in foster care.” In San Diego, county officials plan to oppose mass deportation operations, but the Sheriff’s office, which is independent, wants to cooperate with them, the Los Angeles Times reported “Hondurans, Guatemalans, Salvadorans should be very, very nervous because (Trump officials) are going to push the boundaries of the law,” former Biden-era ICE official Jason Houser told the Associated Press in a report about the likely massive economic and social impact that mass deportations may have on Central American nations including “self-described ‘abolitionists,’” for abandoning pragmatism in the fight for immigration reform A New York Times feature told the story of Jaime Cachua Georgia who may face deportation although he has lived in the United States since his infancy in a conservative area represented by exuberantly pro-Trump Rep voted in November for a candidate whose policies may deport him Joe Biden ordered a halt to construction begun during Trump’s first term The 2024 National Defense Authorization Act included a provision requiring the Defense Department or donate” all “excess construction materials on the southwest border.” The Department had sold the materials to an auction platform in June 2024 Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Arkansas), a border and military policy hardliner, sent a letter to Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin demanding that the Department keep all records related to the sale of border wall materials Texas’s lieutenant governor, Dan Patrick (R), said that the state decided not to purchase any of the wall materials because they were “mostly junk with most panels covered in concrete and rust.” In other “border barrier” news, the New York Times reported that in late 2022 the Biden administration seriously considered installing a “wall of buoys” to block migrants from crossing the Rio Grande a sharp critic of the administration’s border policies installed a similar floating barrier in Eagle Pass the administration challenged it in federal court (For links to sources used to derive this table, see this blog post from WOLA’s Adam Isacson.) “The reason we’re here is because the government of the United States wants you to leave the United States,” Judge Ubaid ul-Haq presiding from a courtroom on Varick Street told a group of about a dozen children on a recent morning on Webex “It’s my job to figure out if you have to leave,” ul-Haq continued “It’s also my job to figure out if you should stay.” wearing a shirt emblazoned with a pizza cartoon who spun a toy windmill while the judge spoke There was an 8-year-old girl and her 4-year-old sister who squeezed a pink plushy toy and stuffed it into her sleeve None of the children were accompanied by parents or attorneys only shelter workers who helped them log on to the hearing the families still lack access to truth and justice FGR) to conduct the criminal investigation In the last two years, however, the progress made has suffered new setbacks and obstacles, including a growing discourse by the president of discrediting the families and their representatives, in particular the Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez Human Rights Center of longstanding mechanisms of State opacity and lack of accountability The upcoming inauguration of president Claudia Sheinbaum on October 1 thus marks a decisive moment for the Ayotzinapa case and for the country’s disappearance crisis The new president and her government have an obligation to take up the case and the crisis it represents not only to search for and identify the direct victims but to break the cycle of disappearances in Mexico Three key pending tasks in the case for the new federal government are: It is vital that all documents and evidence possessed by the armed forces and any other institution be shared so that authorities can deploy all necessary actions in the search for the students and the truth will serve as indicators of whether access to justice will improve the ones who lost our children to a crime of enforced disappearance” Moving the case forward requires sharing information and listening to the proposals of the families and their representatives in a respectful and fact-based dialogue It is crucial for the Sheinbaum administration to renew this dialogue the end of the López Obrador administration was marked by setbacks in search and identification Meanwhile, the family collectives that have formed throughout the country continue to carry out field searches in precarious and often high-risk conditions. Tragic proof of these risks are the dozens of cases of murdered family searchers Strengthening the work of search and identification institutions should be a priority for the new government as well as implementing effective mechanisms for attention to victims The Ayotzinapa case exemplifies a national crisis That crisis must be addressed by the incoming government not only to provide truth and justice to the families but to begin to put an end to the phenomenon of disappearances in Mexico so that no family has to spend 10 years—or even a single day—searching for their loved ones This Update is the product of interviews and the review of over 210,000 words of source documents since January 18. Your donation to WOLA is crucial to keeping these paywall-free and ad-free Updates going. Please contribute now and support our work. The many actions and changes following Donald Trump’s January 20 inauguration force a change in the format of this week’s Border Update “How far-reaching the impact and harm will be but also just in terms of the sheer willingness to break the law and attempt to unilaterally rewrite the Constitution.” *This information in this article comes from interviews done with civil society, local officials and members of the peace table during the November 2024 Congressional visit led by Rep. Hank Johnson and seven follow up interviews WOLA did in the past two weeks has led to indignation and reignited the #SOSBuenaventura calls. a warning began to circulate on WhatsApp calling for a “Pandemiaplomo”—that is a COVID-style lockdown under the threat of being shot (“plomo” is slang for gunfire) Illegal armed groups also issued their own order stating they would shoot anyone in the streets on sight. This almost two year-long negotiation—the first peace effort to attract media attention as part of the Total Peace policy since Petro took office—has seen both progress and setbacks invisible barriers lifted and persons felt free to go about their daily activities without fear it remains the best path for dismantling the illegal armed groups that terrorize the residents of this city Colombia’s main port is located on Cascajal Island in the District of Buenaventura on Colombia’s Pacific Coast. The total population of the district is over 450,000 people, most of whom live on the island and the surrounding urban settlements on the mainland. In Buenaventura, over 88 percent of the inhabitants are Afro-Colombians and the unemployment rate hovers at around 66 percent Many of Buenaventura’s residents come from the Valle del Cauca and Chocó River basins which are home to the ancestral lands of many traditional rural Afro-descendant communities in Colombia A smaller Indigenous Emberá-Wounaan population also lives in Buenaventura many of whom are internally displaced from their territories in the southern Chocó department. In December 2023, Colombia’s Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office reported that illegal armed groups were present in 112 of Buenaventura’s 136 neighborhoods, where they have committed serious human rights violations. Since 2018, this same office has issued thirteen early warning alerts for Buenaventura which contain recommendations to the security forces and civilian authorities for how to safeguard civilians in light of imminent threats. and the persecution of social leaders and any other individuals that the illegal armed groups have viewed as enemies or “military targets.” Colombia’s structural racism undermines the lives of Afro-descendants throughout the country while its classism devalues the lives of poor rural communities and internally displaced persons combined with the perception that the port is merely an economic asset where commercial interests and systemic corruption rule helps explain why such severe abuses occur in this highly militarized area organized criminal group “La Local” dominated drug operations in the city and its fluvial areas Members of “La Local” terrorized the local population extorting businesses and kidnapping people for profit The group fragmented in 2019 after the Colombian national police arrested and jailed its leaders Disagreements regarding who should lead the group resulted in the formation of two rival factions that became known as the Shottas and the Espartanos these factions fight over illicit commercial interests and territory With over 1,500 members– primarily Afro-Colombian youths– they operate in 40 neighborhoods and nine villages the groups’ leaders control these operations from jail cells Map by Pares, a leading Colombian conflict think tank, of the urban war taking place in Buenaventura between the illegal groups (July 2023) The larger illegal armed groups operating in the region—FARC dissident groups and Gulf Clan/AGC—subcontract jobs and parts of their operations to these urban criminal groups These groups are present in the rural areas surrounding the port with killings taking place on all sides and civilians caught in the crossfire Pares 2023 graphic shows the drop in homicides after the 2022 truce. Elaboración: Unidad de Monitoreo y Evaluación FIP The graph shows how the truce and the installation of the socio-legal table led to a drop in homicides. This shows that a future agreement could significantly reduce homicides and violence Total Peace Efforts Offer a New Way Forward the Petro government recommitted to the urban peace process aimed at de-escalating violence and establishing a pathway for armed groups to transition into civil and democratic life Despite an initial push by Pacto Historico Members of Congress the legal framework needed to advance negotiations with the urban illegal armed groups never materialized This included failing to pass a law to allow judicial authorities to lift warrants and provide incentives for demobilization The two groups remain heavily involved in their illicit activities including some specialized in intelligence This agreement is a step towards reducing the involvement of minors in the rampant violence affecting the country’s primary international port which recently launched a maritime trade route with China It is a minor victory for the Colombian government as achieving total peace with the country’s long list of illegal armed groups each with its unique complex characteristics The question now is how to transform Buenaventura’s urban peace dialogue into tangible results? and locals) for their views on the recruitment agreement and what the national government and international community could do to strengthen the process. Stopping Forced Recruitment is Vital to Peace there is a broad consensus that ending the forced recruitment of minors is vital for advancing peace while strides have been made in urban peace processes forced recruitment continues to be a concerning reality The recruitment of children and youth is one of the most egregious violations in Buenaventura in which children as young as ten are recruited to join the ranks of illegal groups The lack of employment and desperate socio-economic conditions faced by community members provide fertile ground for young people to be recruited. The illegal groups persuade young people to join them by presenting themselves as a “solution” to poverty receive death threats and many are forced to leave the city In cases where an adolescent or child becomes a target the entire family is often forced to flee as the illegal armed group may occupy their home and seize their assets and belongings and young women are particularly affected by the situation as they are subjected to sexual and other forms of violence and exploitation Strategies like implementing community protection programs and fostering coordination between institutions and civil society organizations have reduced children’s vulnerability to recruitment raising awareness of the issue has enhanced institutional commitment to prevent and address cases of forced recruitment The urban peace process faces legal and structural challenges and the persistent influence of illegal armed groups in various neighborhoods all parties involved must demonstrate a serious commitment to ensure the effective implementation of any future agreement another significant obstacle is that the Colombian Congress has not passed the necessary legislation to provide the required legal framework for full progress This deficiency undermines the trust established at the negotiation table and leaves the process vulnerable to the ongoing dynamics of violence in the city Communities are also distrustful of the process as armed groups continue committing crimes and abuses even while dialogue roundtables are underway have been restricted in specific neighborhoods where armed groups forbid people from conducting these rituals in their homes illustrating the pervasive imposition of violence in daily life.The contradiction between what is discussed at the peace tables and the reality on Buenaventura’s streets fosters widespread skepticism and erodes hope This is compounded by the public security forces’ inability to protect residents and their lack of adequate action when violations occur While authorities may patrol certain areas locals point out that the illegal armed groups exert absolute control over many neighborhoods Complaints made by citizens are ignored and can lead to direct reprisals including threats against those who dare to speak out citizens have even been compelled to remove their security cameras from their homes to avoid retaliation from criminals. Many in the community point to the corruption, complicity, and omission of some members of the public forces, the region’s political leaders, and members of the legal branch as highly problematic. News reports indicate that some authorities have maintained working relationships with the illegal armed groups such as the case of the director of Buenaventura’s technical investigative unit the regional administration and certain judges do not send criminals to prison allowing them to continue to commit crimes with impunity many of these leaders continue to direct illicit activities from prison perpetuating the cycle of violence and chaos These situations foster local distrust in the security forces and institutions with people reluctant to report crimes for fear of reprisals Another challenge is the illegal armed groups’ connections to other regions Some leaders of the groups operating in Buenaventura reside in other Colombian cities or even abroad as it ties the violence to illicit economic dynamics since this industry thrives on war and illegality resulting in agreements with the national government to address the inequality gap for Buenaventura’s residents who have yet to advance sufficiently in meeting these needs Persons interviewed by WOLA indicate that they want other options for survival for themselves and the communities in their neighborhoods Victims of the groups point out that institutions are too weak and poor at coordinating efforts that can put in place care and protection routes for victims of forced recruitment Locals also point to multinational corporations and the private sector more broadly as complicit in the violence. While Buenaventura is responsible for facilitating 48.4 percent of Colombia’s exports those benefiting from the commerce do not invest in the local communities Some locals believe it is in the private sector’s interest not to help them so that they will become displaced leaving room for the port operations to expand The violence and conflicts in Buenaventura are structural and endemic The international community must embrace and provide political support to the socio-legal negotiations to ensure their progress and facilitate the demobilization of illegal groups should support Buenaventura’s civil society groups and the Catholic Church in their efforts to broker peace and address the significant socio-economic disparities in the region Here are some additional steps that can be taken to impact the violence and advance the socio-legal table in Buenaventura: 1) The Colombian Congress should pass a legal framework that ensures judicial security for all participants in the socio-legal effort. According to Pares and the absence of strategic planning highlight the urgent need for sustainable measures to consolidate peace in the region.” 2) The national government should prioritize and carry out the 2017 Civil Strike agreements. It should invest as much or more in the people of the port as it does in its commercial operations 3) Social, business, government, national, departmental, and local sectors should unite to implement the Special Comprehensive Plan for the Development of Buenaventura 2040 (PIEDB 2040) This involves advancing the Fund for Buenaventura and changing its executor implementing social projects focused on people rather than solely on the port’s infrastructure strengthening the institutional framework of the district of Buenaventura Additional efforts would include campaigns against corruption and establishing schools that provide political training and leadership should demonstrate that they take the process seriously by ceasing violence towards each other and the general populace They should stop forcibly recruiting minors they should cease their criminal activities toward the locals 5) Corruption within the security forces and local judicial institutions must be addressed Public forces should maintain their presence in neighborhoods experiencing conflict Recent intelligence scandals need resolution and new players should be introduced to build trust with the local population The authorities must apprehend those responsible for their financing and assets and ensure a more substantial national government presence in the territory In December, WOLA examined what Donald Trump’s proposed policies on fentanyl and the U.S.-Mexico border might mean for Mexico raising key questions about his approach to trade we are starting to see how these policies are taking shape—some developments aligning with expectations To better understand the implications of Trump’s early actions we spoke with WOLA experts John Walsh and Stephanie Brewer they break down the latest on Trump’s proposed tariffs and the broader impact of his administration’s stance on drugs and migration. you may recall that Trump announced his intention to impose 25% tariffs on Mexican goods and also Canadian goods supposedly as a measure to motivate those countries to stop the flow of illicit drugs across borders and stop undocumented migration. There were many reasons to question whether the true intention was to implement these tariffs because this type of tariff would have quite a negative impact on both sides of the border in terms of trade and could trigger increased migration from Mexico to the United States it looked like this tariff threat might have been less an announcement of true policy intentions and more of a threat designed to get attention and send a message of taking tough action and being a tough negotiator even if there was no real change of existing policy he announces that he will in fact be imposing these tariffs through executive orders they are announced in connection with the flow of illicit drugs alleging this time that the government of Mexico has an alliance with organized criminal organizations there is a high-level phone call [with Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum] And the agreement that has been announced is that Mexico’s government will send an additional 10,000 National Guard troops to the U.S.- Mexico border Those troops would be tasked to focus on illicit drug flows and they would also be participating in migration enforcement tasks John: Just to add that it’s unclear if this pause that was agreed upon is going to actually end with a decision to impose tariffs or another pause after one month it’s unclear what would be the rationale for continuing the pause or going ahead with the 25% or some other level tariffs that Trump initially threatened. Stephanie: Fentanyl cooperation has been a focus now for the last several years with the crisis in overdose deaths in the United States the United States has been cooperating with foreign aid with different types of training and collaboration between U.S there is a lot to be said about the ineffectiveness of a model of cooperation that continues to be centered on the “war on drugs” as it’s currently produced and smuggled rather than something that can realistically be stopped with that model. government for Mexico to prioritize fentanyl in its counter drug efforts This was on the agenda of the bilateral discussion prior to these tariff threats I would say the picture is even more extreme The Mexican government has been carrying out a historic It is detaining record numbers of migrants in Mexico It has increased many fold its average of monthly detentions and it is especially during 2024 that we see a pattern where Mexican authorities are bussing large numbers of migrants from the north of Mexico back towards the south of Mexico which largely sets them on this endless cycle of trying to migrate north through the country which of course exposes them to violence and extortion again and again at every step of their journey. a lot needs to change with the current model of trying to manage migration through Mexico and towards the United States But if we look just at the level of emphasis on this topic in the bilateral relationship the level to which Mexico is already cooperating with the United States on this agenda it seems like the least logical time to then say that it’s necessary to use this heavy tariff threat to obtain cooperation or obtain a further crackdown. is what would be the benchmarks to assess in a period of as little as a month Whether we’re going to go ahead with tariffs or whether Trump would be just as happy to keep the threat of tariffs looming and to supposedly gauge progress as we go along it does raise the question of who’s interpreting the outcome have been taken very seriously because of the damage that they would do to the Canadian economy and to the Mexican economy and even if the tariff wasn’t imposed If cooperation ultimately needs to be part of the equation it’s hard to see how alienating your key partner governments with whom you share large borders is going to help achieve closer and better cooperation. what is the ultimate policy goal here from from the perspective of a citizen who’s concerned with a gigantic problem like fentanyl overdose deaths the toxic nature of our street drug supplies rightly upset about the mayhem caused by organized crime in terms of violence and what it means for Mexicans Those are long past being alarming problems Those are nightmare level problems in both countries so it’s right to be concerned about them as a basic public policy question. So if we were concerned about these issues And what would be the reasonable solutions What is happening with respect to overdoses and what does history tell us about our ability to “seal the borders” and diminish the flow of drugs I think history tells us that it’s very difficult This is a million needles in 10 million moving haystacks Right about the time that Trump was issuing his tariff threats and about to impose them these [tariffs] will be removed once Americans stop dying from fentanyl That just indicates to me that there is no end game quite yet for the White House but the Trump administration enters into its second term with that good news to build on and now Trump is seeking credit for something that was already happening without any clear connection on this question of what needs to change to avoid the tariffs permanently has been this deployment of 10,000 National Guard troops to the Mexican side of the border But it’s important to put that into context Mexico has already been stationing tens of thousands of military personnel at its borders over the last several years we saw this same script play out during the first Trump presidency in 2019 when in response to a tariff threat Mexico agreed to deploy National Guard troops to its borders in migration control tasks some additional troops are now arriving that were not there before but it’s highly unclear why further militarization is expected to be a solution now when it hasn’t been a solution up until now. And if there is a real change on the ground because military deployment in migration control tasks brings a lot of human rights risks that we’ve seen play out if Trump’s view is truly that the Mexican government is in an “alliance” with criminal organizations why would deploying that government’s troops be expected to solve those problems So we see a lot of contradictions and a lot more questions than answers on what concrete changes are being demanded or expected or could occur but certainly we haven’t seen any radical shifts in policy yet we see the deepening of a tried and failed strategy military action in Mexico and the announced plans to designate Mexican criminal groups as terrorist organizations These new actions would add in a new layer of risks and complications within and beyond the human rights realm such as sending special forces into Mexico what he is moving forward is this proposal to designate certain international criminal organizations In the case of foreign terrorist organization designations one of the most salient effects would be to trigger a legal framework in the United States centered on the concept of criminalizing “material support” to terrorist organizations and that could open up the risk of prosecutions for people on both sides of the border who have somehow found themselves obligated to pay organized crime an example at the forefront of our minds would be asylum seekers who are essentially forced to pay smugglers to try to get to the United States to request asylum or any range of other people in Mexico who to survive day to day or operate their businesses find themselves extorted by organized crime companies, and organizations could also find themselves either caught up in this net censoring themselves or being unable to operate for fear of running afoul of this legal framework that comes with the FTO designations. especially if it occurs without the Mexican government’s consent unprecedented and disastrous impacts across the entire bilateral relationship we would be talking about launching military attacks on the soil of our neighboring country What should be the focus of bilateral cooperation if the goal on the Mexican side is to reduce violence and to reduce the power of these organized criminal groups the reason that organized criminal groups are able to operate with the level of power and influence that they do in Mexico is not for lack of military intervention It’s rather because of different types of relationships that range from tolerance to outright collusion between criminal actors and state actors in Mexico It’s because of overwhelming levels of impunity. Another aspect is the flow of high powered firearms very largely from the United States into Mexico and into the hands of these cartels So those would be much more logical areas to tackle and there has been cooperation between U.S But to the extent that your northern neighbor is threatening to deploy military actions in your territory and is threatening you with cycles of tariffs that could have devastating economic impacts it is illogical to expect there to be any room for trust and the space for fruitful institutional collaboration or cooperation against these networks of corruption. John: The Foreign Terrorist Organization designation possibility alongside of the threats of unilateral U.S and the use of the term “invasion” in many of executive orders and language from members of his administration is to prepare public opinion to be supportive of big risks that might be taken in the name of repelling an invasion that threatens our sovereignty It creates the language that would mesh legally with authorizations for treating the phenomenon literally as invasions that require and justify and underpin the use of actual military force whether it be assignment of active duty forces within the United States thinking about overseas operations with or without consent of Mexico or another country So I think that’s also seems to be built into the strategy both with respect to the discourse around immigration We also need to recognize that we’re dealing with the failure and the counterproductive impacts of enforcing a prohibition regime Global commodity drug markets haven’t shrunk or disappeared as was intended 60 years ago they’ve actually grown and become more and more lucrative and profitable for those who supply them we hand the power to people who operate outside of the law to shape these illicit markets Prohibition also creates an enormous markup in price and those are the profits that enrich them and empower them to be such corrupting forces Unless we start to ask the right questions we’re going to continue to be either deceived by the failure of a drug war that can’t possibly deliver on what we’re asking law enforcement to do or we’re going to buy into it and we’re going to double down on all the failures of the past literally killed through violence and premature death millions of people and blighted lives all over the planet for decades If that’s our model and we’re going to continue to tweak that model and expect anything different To kick off our series for International Women’s Month we sat down with WOLA President Carolina Jiménez Sandoval to discuss gender justice in the Americas In this episode of the WOLA Weekly Podcast Carolina reflects on her decades of experience as a human rights advocate and the crucial role of feminist movements in defending democracy Carolina has chosen to make gender justice a strategic priority of the organization She shares with us her perspective on the troubling backlash against gender rights why these rollbacks signal a deeper threat to democracy itself Despite her analysis of a very difficult moment in history she leaves us with a hopeful message: to remember the achievements of women from our past and to draw inspiration from their struggles. Tune in for an inspiring conversation on resistance As President Bernardo Arévalo enters his second year in office Guatemala faces a challenging political landscape His first year was marked by a mix of hope and frustration with his administration attempting to push for change while contending with political opposition While some strides have been made in areas like social justice and addressing corruption expectations have often clashed with the realities of governance we take a closer look at the key issues and challenges facing Arévalo’s presidency as he navigates a complex web of political Central America Program Director Ana María Méndez Dardón answers five key questions about Arévalo’s first year in office and her analysis on bilateral relations between the U.S and Guatemala as Trump prepares to take office as president of the United States. which I think was the key factor that allowed him to take office on January 14 In September 2024, Arévalo ranked the fourth most popular president in Latin America with an approval rating of 54 percent, since then some media outlets reported that his popularity has dropped – he’s not as popular and I think that people are frustrated particularly some members of civil society organizations and this is because they were expecting more of a bold style of leadership. there is a law that requires due process for the removal of the attorney general Arevalo believed it was important to respect the rule of law and democratic norms Another reason is that people were expecting a more populist narrative which is very popular in the region right now What we’re seeing is that people are willing to have a lead with authoritarian tendencies when it comes to security This has become something that some citizens are expecting One of the biggest issues that Guatemala and even Bernardo Arévalo are facing is the lack of judicial independence both in the Attorney General’s office and the high courts the Attorney General’s office has not only become a tool of repression but it also blocks access to justice for Guatemalan citizens for Arévalo demonstrated openness for international scrutiny but unfortunately Congress elected candidates that have been criticized for a lack of qualifications and bias that compromises the independence of the judiciary. this is something that has been criticized by civil society specifically that some members of the Semilla party in Congress have aligned with the traditional political parties in Guatemala The final challenge has been the turnover rate in Arévalo’s cabinet. There are a lot of ministers that have resigned and there has been a lot of back and forth, particularly with the communication minister. So there is what I would say is a weakness in his cabinet and the people that are advising him Right now, the private sector is displeased about this and several other measures. For instance, in early February last year, Arévalo signed an agreement with Guatemala’s Indigenous groups, which was The agreement establishes a state of the art policy that addresses the lack of access to land and creates a space for permanent communication but traditional elites in the private sector are not happy about that some members of the private sector and the big business association known for its Spanish acronym have blocked structural change in different moments of Guatemalan history they did it in 1996 when the peace accords were signed and in 2015 after mass demonstrations against corruption that resulted in the resignation of former president Otto Perez Molina Under the current context of lack of judicial independence they have failed to express concerns over the Attorney General. trying to address all these issues like social injustice but also trying to balance the demands of the private sector without confronting them Navigating between these two forces is very complicated in a country like Guatemala will need to be carried out over the long-term some measures will be difficult to implement given the complexity of Guatemala’s security situation as well as the country’s long history where its security forces not only have failed to protect citizens they have been a direct threat. So trying to overcome this reality of the military is complex. One thing that personally surprised me is that Bernardo Arévalo announced that the police were going to have joint efforts with the military to address insecurity. He announced that the military would be involved in citizen security measures a mistake because of the long history of violations that the military committed during the armed conflict in Guatemala. At the community level in rural areas, however, Guatemala has been a good example on how to counter violence because of Indigenous groups that implement their own systems to address insecurity I think Arévalo would be more successful if he considered their security models but overall his plan is very comprehensive and even touches on environmental security I think the bilateral relationship between the Biden administration and Bernardo Arévalo were good in terms of the bilateral agenda and cooperation that they have tried to pursue Fostering economic growth to prevent irregular migration along with promoting security for Guatemalans were the top priorities of the Biden administration. one issue that hasn’t had a lot of attention in Guatemala is inequality While promoting economic growth has been the main focus for the U.S. it hasn’t been able to actually democratize the economy So the issue is inequality and the fact that the economic elites in Guatemala have a lot of power The Biden administration is also very committed to human rights and democracy but the majority of the economic elites are not We will see how this plays out with the Trump administration For some Republicans, Bernardo Arévalo is seen as a good ally, and he has for instance, demonstrated he’s committed to democracy and human rights, not just in Guatemala, but in the region, like in Venezuela. Arévalo also received the 135 Nicaraguans that were expelled from Nicaragua — they were political prisoners So I think Guatemala could be a key ally for the Trump administration but we will see how the negotiations play out between the two governments on the key issues The Asylum Cooperation Agreement, more commonly known as the “third safe country agreement” was signed with Guatemala under the first Trump administration with Jimmy Morales as president I don’t believe that Arévalo would sign something similar but there will be a lot of pressure on Guatemala on migration and on issues like the deportation flights What I think is going to happen is that there will be a huge shift in terms of a focus on the root causes of migration which will not be a priority for the Trump administration as it was with the Biden administration This is very problematic because it is important to continue working on justice and security because these are the main causes of migration Based on Trump’s first term, we are almost 100 percent certain that he will not be prioritizing justice, rule of law, and human rights, which is a huge error in my opinion. From an economic perspective, I think Guatemala will be negatively impacted by Trump’s proposed mass deportations given that the Guatemalan economy depends on the remittances that are sent by Guatemalan migrants So it’s not just the human aspect of mass deportation. we’ll have to acknowledge that some corrupt actors have implemented a sophisticated lobby in Washington D.C using a narrative that has grabbed the attention of some Republican party members This relationship will impact the future of bilateral relations and the overall ability of Arévalo to implement his agenda or even finish the rest of his term as the coup d’etat denounced by Arévalo continues to be a threat especially if Republicans continue to support Consuelo Porras. To know more listen to our podcast episode From Promise to Pressure: Bernardo Arévalo’s First Year in Power in Guatemala with Ana María Mendez Dardón and Adam Isacson This podcast episode features Kendra McSweeney and Fritz Pinnow part of a team investigating a new trend: the emergence of coca cultivation in Central America a professor of geography at Ohio State University has research human-environment interactions Pinnow is a Honduras-based journalist and documentary photographer specializing in illicit economies violence and development in Central America McSweeney and colleagues have published an article in the journal Environmental Research Letters examining the recent and growing appearance of coca leaf cultivation in Central America a crop historically associated with the Andean region McSweeney and Pinnow discuss the environmental and market conditions driving coca cultivation in Honduras and Guatemala They note that those attempting coca cultivation in the region have competitive advantages over Colombian growers They stress that it would be a serious error to respond to this phenomenon with another forced eradication program which have almost always been uncoordinated with governance have failed and in fact ended up encouraging the planting of coca in new areas gains much of its power and wealth from the price premium made possible by the coca plant’s illegality The inflated prices make it very difficult to offer viable economic alternatives in poor rural areas “systematically undermines any other efforts at rural or urban development in these countries.” “If we’ve learned anything from supply side drug control in South America it’s that eradicating coca crops and trying to shut down trafficking organizations and trying to go after the Pablo Escobar’s and their successors– it generates a lot of Netflix content but it doesn’t do anything to reduce the amount of drugs that make it into the United States and other countries… What we’ve seen from these approaches and after 40 years of the drug war and billions of dollars spent to eradicate the cocaine trade is more coca being produced in Colombia than ever before the price of cocaine is lower than it’s been in decades the quality of the cocaine is the highest it’s ever been and it’s easier to get than it ever was before.” To stay engaged with drug war reform, McSweeney and Pinnow recommend connecting with Students for Sensible Drug Policy (SSDP) and The Centre for the Study of Illicit Economies, Violence and Development (CIVAD) Since March 2021 the state government of Texas, under Gov. Greg Abbott (R), has carried out “Operation Lone Star” (OLS) a crackdown on migration along the state’s border with Mexico and legal aspects have received much attention an equally alarming issue has been relatively overlooked: the use of excessive force by Texas police and national guardsmen against civilians at the borderline which range from firing projectiles at unarmed migrants to physically pushing them back across the border violate nearly any democratic law enforcement agency’s standards and set a dangerous precedent for civil-military relations on U.S Abbott and officials carrying out OLS label migrants—many of them children, families, and asylum seekers—as “invaders” against whom Texas must defend itself. At a cost of more than $11 billion in state funds OLS has deployed thousands of state police and national guardsmen Despite these measures, OLS has not deterred migration to Texas WOLA is especially concerned about an element of OLS that has grown more troubling since mid-2023 Texan forces stationed on the banks of the Rio Grande—usually a few dozen yards in front of the federal border wall and the federal Border Patrol—have been using “less-than-lethal” force against unarmed migrants and asylum seekers even when there is no self-defense justification This behavior is unacceptable and dangerous It carries great potential for human rights abuse It ignores best practices for managing crowds and disturbances unnecessarily escalating situations that need not be adversarial And it represents a dangerous internal exercise of military force in a democracy Reports of abuse by Texas law enforcement and National Guard under “Operation Lone Star” have included firing rubber bullets and pepper balls those targeted are on the Mexican side of the U.S side but separated from Texas forces by tall they are families with children and others seeking to turn themselves in to apply for protection in the United States Though not always occurring right at the borderline, it is important to note that Texas national guardsmen assigned to OLS have discharged weapons at civilians on three known occasions since the mission began: This situation is intolerable and raises significant human rights and civil rights issues It requires the intervention of federal agencies with oversight responsibilities: the U.S WOLA calls for federal intervention on several grounds law enforcement agency has use-of-force guidelines that would allow firing projectiles at people who pose no imminent threat unless their presence seriously violated the law and peaceful means had been exhausted Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the federal agency that includes Border Patrol, has a use-of-force policy requiring that a law enforcement officer (LEO) “has a reasonable belief that the subject of such force poses an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the LEO or to another person.” Most U.S state and local police departments adhere to a similar standard In all known cases involving Operation Lone Star at the borderline the individuals targeted have been unarmed those targeted are on the other side of a difficult-to-penetrate They do not pose a threat of death or serious bodily injury and do not warrant anything near this level of force soil is not a crime meriting the use of force If those present are expressing fear of return it is illegal to push them back into Mexico although people subject to the rule must now prove a higher standard of fear while being processed Turning away someone who requests protection is called “refoulement” and it is an international human rights violation It is especially illegal to turn people away violently when they are unarmed and pose no threat of harm The state of Texas is bound by this commitment and cannot make up its own human rights policy at the border Law enforcement agencies in the United States and elsewhere have spent decades refining approaches to disturbances and crowd control These incidents are troubling because those carrying out the alleged abuses are military personnel Under Title 32 of the U.S Texas national guardsmen are mobilized under Gov they are soldiers who receive the same Defense Department combat training and use much of the same equipment that regular Their uniforms bear patches that read “U.S It is very rare to see U.S. military personnel placed in a position where they might be compelled to use force on civilians on U.S The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 makes it illegal except in emergency circumstances Episodes like the 1970 Kent State massacre of student protesters had made leaders even more reluctant to use soldiers or guardsmen in this role When presidents have called them to do so—the Los Angeles riots of 1992 or the 2020 George Floyd protests—military leaders have either sought to end the deployments as soon as possible or pushed back against civilian leaders with this many alarming incidents involving guardsmen and civilians By placing troops in a civilian law-enforcement role for this long and with such apparently loose guidelines Texas is setting a terrible precedent for U.S This requires the federal government to act WOLA calls on the Justice Department to open an investigation of use-of-force violations committed by Texas personnel especially its federally trained National Guard The behavior of Texas forces along the borderline rises to a similar standard of seriousness including the unresolved death of the Honduran man That these incidents involve soldiers under the command of a governor who conflates asylum seekers with “invaders” greatly amplifies the urgency of launching an investigation The number of people at the line between Ciudad Juárez and El Paso has plummeted The causes are heat exhaustion and dehydration along with some fatal falls from the border wall The Texas state government’s use of force is an urgent human rights concern but it is far from the only cause of needless preventable death and suffering at the borderline The federal government’s insistence on “deterrence,” while keeping its asylum system starved of resources administration needs to rethink it drastically We would like to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Jocelyn Vasquez-Tax in the creation of this commentary Although the government and the opposition Unitary Platform had signed the Barbados Agreement on Electoral Conditions in October of last year this election is not taking place under free and fair conditions Venezuela’s authoritarian government has banned candidates and imposed restrictions that raise serious concerns about the fairness of the electoral process the opposition and civil society remain committed to mobilizing in hopes of ushering in a democratic transition Here are the main takeaways from our conversation: the transparency of the electoral process rests on three pillars: the work of the poll watchers and members of each “table” or voting station Some 600 credentials—fewer than what ROAE had requested—were finally delivered last week There are other three groups that have received credentials and Griselda Colina explained that there is little information about their trajectory as observers: Centro de Estudios Superiores Without formal accreditation but rather in their role as civil society, a coalition of civil society organizations named Red Electoral Ciudadana will carry out independent activities of contextual observation with a human rights perspective Other organizations will be monitoring restrictions and human rights violations new missions have been announced from Colombia and Brazil it’s political accompaniment,” according to Martínez They could contribute to the oversight of the transparency of the process The only two technical international observation missions are the Carter Center and the UN Panel of Electoral Experts “The [automated voting] system has been audited the system will function… The problem lies in the environment surrounding the voting process.” Meaning but there are other irregularities that undermine the transparency of the process and that could become more acute on the day of the elections coercion of voters in places controlled by the government extending the hours in which the polling stations are open limiting the access of poll watchers and observers the opposition was able to request accreditation of at least one poll watcher from the opposition in 98 percent of the 30,026 polling stations nationwide the CNE had not granted them credentials to be able to conduct their work The expectation is that those credentials will be issued throughout this week but it is not clear whether they will be granted access to the country The international community’s reaction to the election results be it favorable to Maduro or to the opposition Should the Maduro government recognize its defeat negotiations will need to establish conditions for a transfer of power by January 2025 If the Maduro government claims victory despite evidence of irregularities or otherwise disregards the results international actors are likely to issue a resounding condemnation of the election the election will likely trigger a complex negotiation process Eugenio Martínez suggests that Venezuela might face a scenario in which the results are not published immediately on the night of July 28 With institutions under the control of the ruling party until the start of the next presidential term in January 2025 the country’s governability remains uncertain Colina offered another possible panorama in which the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) might accept defeat in the face of a landslide opposition victory party machinery would turn to preserving its political viability at local and state levels ahead of the upcoming 2025 regional and parliamentary elections This strategy would depend on party officials’ cost-benefit calculations regarding their long-term political survival Venezuelans’ commitment to the right to vote and have autonomy over their destiny calls for international support in the defense of their political rights should aim to re-institutionalize the country For more information don’t miss our video playlist featuring the latest updates on the Venezuelan elections by our Director for Venezuela, Laura Dib which is not a solution to lasting security the state of exception has become a permanent policy based on mass incarceration rather than on providing justice or preventing violence claiming that he “negotiated with officials of the government of El Salvador and obtained benefits and concessions” Since the declaration of the state of exception, the overall homicide rate has fallen by more than 80%, as reported by the National Civil Police The government of El Salvador is emphasizing its hardline anti-gang policy and has promoted its strategy as the “Bukele Model” with the aim of extending it to other countries in the region serious human rights violations and a worrying democratic backsliding persist In the context of the third year of the state of exception we answer four key questions about the broader implications of this policy on human rights in El Salvador and what this security model means for society in the long term What is the situation in the country three years into the state of exception Following the violence generated by El Salvador’s civil war (1980-1992) a new form of violence began to plague the Salvadoran population and femicides by criminal youth structures originally formed by Central Americans in the U.S who were later deported to their countries of origin known as gangs without any access to effective justice and where multiple governments failed to develop effective programs based on human rights to guarantee the security of the population President Bukele’s strategy has been one of mass incarceration using excessive force -including the military- as a method of establishing and maintaining order The underlying problem of citizen insecurity is not being resolved because the focus has been only to control and contain the criminality of these groups through arrests in the face of a weakened justice system Within the justice system, there have been a series of legal reforms to create new crimes and new models of criminal prosecution the crime of illicit association is used to prosecute several people together which breaches international standards of justice large groups of people can be imprisoned at the same time and are not prosecuted as individuals where Venezuelans were recently taken by the U.S What is the situation for access to information about the detainees And what are the human rights concerns for the people detained it would appear that the Bukele government has turned migration into a business another element to consider is the lack of access to accurate information Official police data claims that as of March 19 there were 64 days without any homicides in El Salvador and 861 murder-free days during the Bukele administration It is also important to emphasize that the “Bukele Model” has not dismantled nor disarticulated the gangs because these structures continue to operate in other countries The “model” is also not providing effective justice There is a need for strong criminal justice institutions that can actually investigate these gangs and begin prosecutions in order to dismantle these groups The United States recently designated MS-13 as a foreign terrorist organization How would you characterize this criminal group Being designated as a terrorist organization opens up the possibility of combating this group and the people who support it in a more aggressive way the category of “terrorist” used by the United States is normally applied to organizations that use violence for political and ideological purposes and there is not necessarily evidence that the gangs are like that as they use violence more for economic ends justice system about Bukele’s links with the gang leadership What are WOLA’s recommendations for improving the human rights situation On the other hand, it is important to highlight that the state of exception has ceased to be a security policy to contain the violence caused by the gangs, and has become an authoritarian instrument to repress, persecute, and silence critical and dissident voices, as has been documented in several cases, such as that of the human rights defender Fidel Zavala and other human rights defenders There must be a comprehensive reform of the prison and justice systems, especially so that there is a judicial solution for all the people who are being prosecuted. Due to the number of cases, adequate criminal investigations are not being carried out and justice is not being served The justice system is unable to meet the demand for people to receive a fair trial A person cannot receive a fair trial in mass trials with 900 people and a judge cannot review the evidence when they are judging groups and not individuals The U.S. should evaluate its security assistance. There are certain measures available, such as the Leahy Law which prohibits providing support to security agents or units involved in human rights violations these kinds of violations have been sufficiently documented should focus its cooperation on projects to strengthen the justice system to improve criminal investigation mechanisms in the Public Prosecutor’s Office among other areas that are aimed at solving the root of the problem of insecurity Support for civil society and independent journalism is also fundamental as they have played an important role in documenting and providing support to victims and their families With the freeze and subsequent cancellation of many programs funded by the United States the work of these groups has been impacted and this only further deteriorates the state of democracy in the country With this series of weekly updates, WOLA seeks to cover the most important developments at the U.S.-Mexico border. See past weekly updates here Support ad-free, paywall-free Weekly Border Updates. Your donation to WOLA is crucial to sustain this effort. Please contribute now and support our work. The Biden administration’s June rule keeps asylum out of reach for most people who cross between ports of entry but would restore asylum access if migrant encounters average 1,500 per day for a week With encounters averaging over 1,800 per day the administration is now reportedly considering moving the goalposts requiring the average to remain below the 1,500 threshold for a month and including unaccompanied children in the count Though migrant encounters have dropped in recent months in the United States Mexico recorded its fifth-largest-ever number in July as a crackdown on in-transit migration continues Mexico announced that it will provide security to buses transporting migrants who have secured a limited number of appointments at U.S Escorted buses will depart the southernmost states of Chiapas and Tabasco The measure raises hope for a reduction in organized crime groups’ ransom kidnappings of northbound migrants continues to voice strong support for the “Border Act,” a bill that failed in the U.S Senate in February 2024 following negotiations that led to a bipartisan compromise that the Democratic Party did not support during the Trump years Links to updates and analyses about Border Patrol’s flawed missing migrant program humanitarian groups’ efforts to rescue migrants and locate remains a tragic train derailment near Ciudad Juárez not counting unaccompanied children and “CBP One” appointments People who cross between ports of entry are placed into expedited removal a rapid process that denies a hearing; if they specifically express fear of return they may get an interview with an asylum officer but must quickly meet a very high standard of fear Asylum is currently “shut down” because numbers have not dropped to 1,500 per day plus 4,917 people who came to ports of entry without CBP One appointments three months after the Biden administration began implementing this rule Numbers of migrants transiting Panama and Honduras have also declined In July 2024, for the first time, Mexico’s reported migrant encounters exceeded the United States’ encounters at the U.S.-Mexico border (116,626 compared to 104,116) combining Border Patrol apprehensions and CBP’s encounters at ports of entry including appointments made using the CBP One smartphone app Buses will depart from Mexico’s southern-border states of Chiapas and Tabasco to the U.S WOLA and other organizations have received reports of people—many with appointments at U.S ports of entry—being kidnapped by organized crime while trying to travel across Mexico to attend appointments made using CBP’s app INM calls the route an “Emergent Secure Mobility Corridor”; those boarding the buses will receive a document granting 20 days’ permission to be in Mexico Following the Mexican government’s announcement, 100 people with confirmed dates at U.S. ports of entry lined up outside a migration facility in Tapachula, in Mexico’s southernmost state of Chiapas. One man from Guatemala told EFE that he managed to secure an appointment in only four days—a highly unusual case A woman from Honduras told EFE that she began attempting to apply for an appointment last December The Mexican daily Milenio meanwhile reported on a criminal group that is kidnapping U.S.-bound migrants for ransom as they cross into Mexico from Guatemala near Tapachula One Venezuelan man released from the group’s custody told of “25 criminals in charge and practically a hundred kidnapped people” being held in a wire cage which is charged with investigating and documenting migrant kidnappings “only had two investigation files registered in 2023 In a prime-time CNN interview alongside running mate Tim Walz voiced support for stricter border enforcement and for addressing “root causes” of migration from Central America “I will make sure that it comes to my desk and I would sign it,” Harris said of the Border Act recalling that Donald Trump pressured Republican senators to oppose the bill as it neared consideration “I believe there should be consequences” for crossing the border without authorization ‘stupid,’ ‘useless,’ and a ‘medieval vanity project.’” Harris’s opponent continues to occupy far more extreme ground on the border issue. Roll Call spoke to former officials and security experts about how Donald Trump military to carry out deportations and build up border security who was acting director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) under Trump and remains an enthusiastic Trump backer raised the possibility of redeploying active soldiers from overseas to the U.S.-Mexico border With this series of weekly updates, WOLA seeks to cover the most important developments at the U.S.-Mexico border. See past weekly updates here This Update is the product of interviews and the review of over 270,000 words of source documents since January 23. Your donation to WOLA is crucial to keeping these paywall-free and ad-free Updates going. Please contribute now and support our work. This update is later than usual because of staff travel and congressional testimony in recent days It reflects events as of the end of January 17 Weekly publication will resume on time on Friday Media are reporting that about 100 executive orders will follow Donald Trump’s inauguration We can expect an end to the CBP One mobile phone app and humanitarian parole programs for Cubans We can expect a push to renew “Remain in Mexico,” possibly Title 42 and “safe third country” agreements: programs that require the cooperation of Mexico and other nations A gigantic piece of spending legislation to fund this The Wall Street Journal reported that ICE may begin raids seeking to detain undocumented migrants in Chicago immediately after Inauguration Day Border Patrol agents spread fear among farmworkers by carrying out a large-scale operation of their own Officials like “Border Czar” Tom Homan are promising conflict with so-called “sanctuary cities” as they call for more detention and deportation capacity while Mexico prepares to receive large numbers of people Enough Democratic senators voted “yes” to break a filibuster and permit likely passage of the Laken Riley Act named for a woman murdered by a Venezuelan migrant would allow migrants with pending immigration cases to be detained even if just arrested and charged with a petty crime and would empower state attorneys-general to challenge aspects of U.S The Senate’s cloture vote passed with the votes of 10 of 45 Democratic-aligned senators present all of them from electorally competitive states December 2024 saw the fewest Border Patrol apprehensions per day of the entire Biden administration The administration’s June rule barring most asylum access between ports of entry is the main reason more migrants were encountered at the official border crossings than apprehended by Border Patrol between them Texas’s Rio Grande Valley Border Patrol Sector measured the most apprehensions many of them cracking down on the border and migration by implementing new policies or undoing Biden administration policies Stephen Miller, the anti-immigration official who will serve as White House deputy chief of staff for policy, intends a blitz of initiatives that, he hopes, will overwhelm migrants’ rights advocates’ capacity to oppose them by “flooding the zone,” the New York Times reported Miller is accompanying this with tight secrecy in the run-up to the policy changes’ announcement In addition to the promised “mass deportation” campaign discussed in this Update’s next section the upcoming changes may include the following measures and 80 percent of those go to the United States a 25 percent tariff would be catastrophic” and would likely spur more U.S.-bound migration especially the mass deportation effort described below The incoming administration and key members of the Republican Party’s two-house congressional majority continue to discuss details of a giant spending package for border and migration controls this so-called “reconciliation” package could pass the chamber without a single Democratic vote avoiding the filibuster rule by sticking to provisions that have budgetary impact “Early estimates of border funding needed have come in at $85 billion or higher,” Bloomberg Government reported The “reconciliation” bill appears likely to begin moving in Congress by the end of February or early March Noem sent contingents of South Dakota National Guard personnel to the border but did not deploy the Guard after her state was hit by heavy flooding The outgoing Homeland Security secretary, Alejandro Mayorkas, told Bloomberg Government that he had spoken to Noem several times during the transition and was “very impressed and very pleased with the discussions.” However and that includes extending humanitarian relief to those who qualify is an important component of a functioning immigration system.” but no committee hearing has yet been scheduled The New York Times profiled two other high-profile top officials who will run border and migration policy from perches in the White House and thus will not require Senate confirmation Starting on January 9, about 60 Border Patrol agents carried out a series of immigration raids in farmland in Kern County, California, around Bakersfield. The so-called “Operation Return to Sender” resulted in 78 arrests of undocumented people “With our border under control in El Centro we go where the threat is,” the chief of Border Patrol’s El Centro Sector the Republican member of Congress representing the region “Those sites are unlikely to meet ICE safety and detention standards.” Behind the scenes, CNN reported Homan has been telling Republican legislators that the initial mass deportation effort would not be as vigorous as the new administration’s rhetoric indicates The infrastructure to carry it out is not in place and won’t be for some time while many migrants will seek to challenge their deportation orders After this initial focus, though, Homan “has also promised that the effort’s reach would eventually be broader,” using new technologies to track down people in the United States without authorization, the New York Times reported and perhaps of third countries’ citizens—will profoundly impact Mexico which shares a 1,950-mile land border with the United States It could potentially mean millions of deportations into the country’s northern border cities and a sharp decline in remittance funds sent home from people who had been working in the U.S Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum told reporters that her government has “a well-elaborated plan” to support deported Mexican migrants but that its details were secret pending the Trump administration’s first steps The federal government plans to implement a “panic button” app that Mexican migrants can use inside the United States to alert consulates about raids and deportation operations as Mexico’s federal government implements “double digit-budget cuts for the foreign ministry and National Migration Institute” in 2025 The Los Angeles Times noted that a “less clear and more problematic” challenge for Mexico’s government is a possible Trump administration demand that Mexico accept more deportees of non-U.S citizens from the border (as Mexico currently is doing for some citizens of Cuba In Mexico’s southernmost state of Chiapas, reporters from the Mexican daily Milenio spoke to migrants some of them participating in impromptu “caravans,” who say they remain determined to come to the United States despite the Trump administration’s policy changes because the conditions they are fleeing in places like Venezuela are even worse Guatemala, too, is preparing an operation to receive deportees, dubbed “Return Home.” According to Milenio “the plan contemplates three phases and the setting up of temporary shelters in different parts of the country to ensure a dignified return of Guatemalans.” few details about this additional support are currently evident named for a Georgia nursing student murdered by a Venezuelan migrant last year appears certain to pass and get signed into law by President Trump The Act requires that migrants—including those with documented status like DACA and TPS recipients and people with pending asylum cases—be detained until an immigration judge resolves their cases if they are accused of minor crimes like shoplifting The word “accused” is key: the text of the law reads “is charged with is arrested for,” so the migrant subject to the Act does not have to be found guilty in court a false accusation of petty theft that leads to an arrest would be enough to send the migrant to detention The bill also would give state attorneys-general powers to sue to block aspects of U.S. immigration law, distorting the federal government’s ability to carry out immigration policies. As the New Republic’s Greg Sargent pointed out this could even cause a schism among Donald Trump’s supporters Trump backers who oppose legal immigration have been in a public fight with Trump’s tech-sector backers Bannon will need only enlist an attorney-general like Texas’s Ken Paxton to sue to block migrants from countries like India from where companies like Musk’s hire many immigrants of voting for Republican legislation that they don’t seem to truly believe in and eventually live to regret.” Border Patrol apprehended 47,330 migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border in December the Biden administration’s last full month that is the smallest per-day average of any month of the Biden presidency Data table A Department of Homeland Security (DHS) fact sheet recalled that Border Patrol’s apprehensions—which are of migrants who cross the border improperly between ports of entry—have dropped 60 percent since May 2024 This is mainly due to a June 2024 Biden administration rule that places asylum out of reach for most people who cross the border this way “the number of individuals released by the U.S Border Patrol pending immigration court proceedings is down 89 percent.” The rule makes asylum available mainly to people who use the CBP One app inside Mexico to await appointments at U.S. border ports of entry. As a result, November and December 2024 were the first times ever that more migrants were encountered at ports of entry than apprehended by Border Patrol Combining port-of-entry encounters and Border Patrol apprehensions a total of 96,048 people without documentation entered U.S Border Patrol divides the U.S.-Mexico border into nine geographic sectors. For the first time since May 2024, its sector in San Diego, California, was not the busiest. The agency apprehended slightly more migrants in south Texas’s Rio Grande Valley region which saw apprehensions double to 10,128 from November’s 5,120 was the only border state to measure an increase in Border Patrol apprehensions from November to December: Texas was up 21 percent month-to-month The DHS fact sheet also revealed that Border Patrol’s estimate of migrants who evaded capture known as “gotaways,” dropped approximately 60 percent from fiscal 2023 to fiscal 2024 and that Border Patrol migrant encounters during the first half of January were 50 percent lower than during the same period in January 2021 “The 7-day daily average of encounters currently sits at 1,150 and has been below 1,500 for 21 consecutive days,” it adds Should the average remain below 1,500 for 28 days the Biden administration’s June 2024 asylum rule gets suspended between the border’s ports of entry—unless the new Trump administration finds another way to block asylum seekers We can expect migration at the border to remain low for much of 2025 The first months of Donald Trump’s last term saw the smallest monthly migration totals of the entire 21st century Apprehensions and encounters recovered to near earlier levels Migration to the U.S.-Mexico border has plummeted in 2024: this summer has seen some of the fewest migrant arrivals in four years While this might suggest that migration is now “under control,” a closer look at the data reveals a stark humanitarian cost as enforcement policies grow more aggressive in the United States The numbers show that more migrants and asylum seekers are being denied protection often bottlenecked along the route and preyed upon by criminal groups The numbers contradict the narratives of hard-liners who insist that harsh crackdowns on protection-seeking migrants are effective And they offer no evidence that the present migration decline will be long-lasting ten years of repeated crackdowns have failed to limit migration for more than a matter of months and the current push is unlikely to yield a different outcome The data tell us a lot about the impact that harsher policies and an underlying lack of basic immigration and asylum reform are having right now on migration at the U.S.-Mexico border and along the U.S.-bound route The most recent data comes from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which released information on August 16 about the agency’s encounters with migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border through July 2024 Data table That caused migration between ports of entry to drop by 50 percent from December 2023 to January 2024 Data table the additional measure has cut migration in half again: a 52 percent drop in Border Patrol apprehensions from May to July 2024 Border Patrol is rapidly removing those who make it across Mexico but do not schedule an appointment at a port of entry using the “CBP One” smartphone app—either because their protection needs are too urgent to allow them to endure the months-long wait, or because they are not aware of this requirement. (As noted in item 6 below these appointments are limited and CBP is not moving to increase them.) U.S. law states that people who fear return to their country have the right to seek asylum if they are on U.S regardless of whether they crossed at a port of entry or whether they crossed “improperly.” The June 2024 rule has suspended that right during busy periods with hard-to-attain exceptions for those able to prove they face the most immediate danger Combining Border Patrol apprehensions and port-of-entry arrivals, CBP’s migrant encounters dropped 39 percent from May to July. Encounters with citizens of Peru (-82%), Nicaragua (-63%), and Ecuador (-59%) dropped most sharply. (See item 12 below about Peru.) Encounters with citizens of Cuba (-8%) Data table a single-month record 37,285 members of Mexican family units came to the border But a look at the data reveals that this is not happening All states are seeing declining Border Patrol apprehensions despite the state government’s multi-billion-dollar “Operation Lone Star” border crackdown Looking at Border Patrol apprehensions by state reveals that Texas has not experienced a steeper migration decline than Arizona where the Democratic governor has not pursued similar hard-line measures The Biden administration asylum rule’s early-June rollout caused arrivals of migrants between ports of entry to drop sharply for a few weeks and the rate of decline has since smoothed out to near zero This pattern of a sharp drop followed by a period of stagnation is familiar from past border crackdowns like Mexico’s mid-2010s “Southern Border Plan,” the Trump administration’s 2017 arrival in power or the pandemic-era Title 42 expulsions policy and its expansions Migrants and smugglers go into a sort of “wait and see” mode as they learn how the new policy is being implemented After migration “bottoms out,” it begins to recover and rise again Data table Border Patrol’s El Paso Sector (far west Texas and New Mexico) has seen apprehensions drop 35 percent since 2023 (comparing an average month last year to an average month in this still-incomplete year) deaths in this sector—the only one for which we have seen current data—are not dropping along with overall migration with six very hot weeks remaining in the 2024 fiscal year It is difficult for asylum-seeking migrants to access the U.S. asylum system in El Paso. The Biden administration asylum rule has made port-of-entry appointments via the CBP One app the only real option, yet the sector offers just 200 appointments per day Some asylum seekers might try to cross the narrow Rio Grande and turn themselves in to Border Patrol anyway hoping to pass one of the new rule’s more stringent credible fear interviews because Texas’s state government has arranged concertina wire in front of the border wall with state police and National Guardsmen carrying out illegal orders to push asylum seekers back into Mexico successfully crossing is next to impossible the treacherous desert route may seem to be the only option Deaths appear to be concentrated in areas that are a short drive from El Paso and other populations where water and first aid would be available “The stretch of desert south of NM State Road 273 (McNutt Drive) and south of NM 9 (Columbus Highway) has become a graveyard,” wrote Julián Resendiz of Border Report Here is that area on a map created by No More Deaths, which recently began keeping a database of recovered remains in the El Paso sector This map covers less than 35 miles from its western to eastern edge The Biden administration’s rule-making has made it so that turning oneself in to Border Patrol is no longer an option for accessing the U.S CBP has not adjusted the number of available appointments since June 2023. The border-wide maximum is 1,450 per day. In the vast area between Calexico, California and Eagle Pass, Texas—nearly half of the border’s miles—there are just 300 appointments per day Data table Before the Biden administration shut down asylum access for those crossing between ports of entry government invested hundreds of millions of dollars into building up Border Patrol’s capacity to process asylum seekers who came into the agency’s custody Some Border Patrol sectors have giant processing centers staffed with several hundred newly hired processing coordinators these facilities are standing nearly empty even as the ports of entry receive 1,450 asylum seekers per day This calls for creative and humane solutions like busing asylum seekers from the ports of entry to the empty nearby Border Patrol processing sites which would allow an expansion of CBP One appointments At the U.S.-Mexico border in December 2023, Border Patrol released 191,782 apprehended migrants into the U.S interior with “notices to appear” (NTAs) in immigration court placed in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention or—if they were unaccompanied minors—transferred to the Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Refugee Resettlement.) That was 77 percent of the record 249,741 migrants whom the agency apprehended between ports of entry during that record-setting month Due to strict implementation of the Biden administration’s asylum ban releases from Border Patrol custody have plummeted: 12,110 people received NTAs or paroles in July 2024 94 percent fewer than last December and the fewest since January 2021 Only 21 percent of migrants apprehended between ports of entry in July were released the smallest percentage since January 2021 Nearly half of migrants apprehended by Border Patrol in July 2024 (27,313 of 56,408, 49%) were placed in expedited removal proceedings, a rapid process for deporting people without giving them hearings usually while they are still in custody at the border That is the largest monthly percentage ever of apprehended migrants placed in expedited removal While the Biden administration has offered a “humanitarian parole” status to the same monthly number of those countries’ citizens who apply online that process requires applicants to have a passport and a U.S.-based sponsor which excludes many of the poorest and those who need to flee most urgently (Data table for port of entry encounters – all migrant encounters) Border-wide through April, 11 percent of migrants apprehended by Border Patrol in fiscal 2024 (which began last October) were from Europe That has never happened before: 2023 saw a record 9 percent which in turn broke a 2022 record of 4 percent Data table That alone won’t deter Darién Gap migration, especially if turmoil and repression following Venezuela’s July 28 elections bring a new wave of migration But it is enough to place would-be migrants (and smugglers) in a “wait and see mode” as they evaluate these new measures’ impact That is far less than the daily average for the first six months of 2024 (1,105) and the more than 2,000 per day who traveled this route in August and September 2023 As with all “wait and see” responses to news of a crackdown as the drivers of migration continue (and in Venezuela are intensifying) and the Darién wilderness remains very difficult to control Migration is likely to increase again in a matter of months Peruvians were the nationality whose Border Patrol apprehensions declined the most from May to July Combining Border Patrol apprehensions and port of entry arrivals just 587 Peruvians came to the U.S.-Mexico border in July down from 3,333 in May: an 82 percent drop in 2 months (The April to July drop was even steeper: 91 percent.) While the Biden administration asylum rule was a factor, Peruvian arrivals declined mainly because Mexico, in early May, began requiring visitors from Peru to have a visa Peruvians could arrive in Mexico by air without arranging for a visa ahead of time Data table This change is likely to have grave unintended consequences we should expect to see a sharp increase in the currently low number of Peruvian citizens migrating through the Darién Gap We have seen this before. Mexico blocked visa-free air travel of Ecuadorians in September 2021, and of Venezuelans in January 2022. Within a few months, both nationalities’ presence in the Darién Gap skyrocketed; even now, in 2024, they are the number one and number three nationalities passing through the Darién Data table resulting from Mexico’s crackdown and new asylum restrictions The present reduction is a short-term phenomenon It is likely to reverse in a matter of months as the conditions and root causes for migration remain the same The administration and allied candidates should have no illusions that the reduction is consequence-free The choices that brought it about carry a painful human cost Thousands are stranded and exposed to exploitation and even death if they decide to migrate in hazardous regions The next administration must act to adapt the U.S immigration system to the reality of the past 10 years and adjudication more efficient would slash wait times for asylum decisions while strengthening due process people request asylum because it is the only legal option available to them It is urgent to expand other legal pathways That is the only viable way to guarantee rights while breaking out of this frustrating cycle of ever-harsher crackdowns Several media reports documented a small but steady southbound flow of migrants who have given up on trying to apply for asylum in the United States as the Trump administration has placed the U.S asylum system out of reach at the U.S.-Mexico border government is funding those deported migrants’ subsequent flights to their home countries and whether they occurred at ports of entry (where CBP Field Operations officers operate) or between them (where Border Patrol agents operate) Drug seizure data through January 2025 show continuations of some notable trends began appearing in significant quantities in the mid to late 2010s so did CBP’s seizures of the drug at the border CBP seized 30,383 pounds of cocaine at the border in fiscal 2024 up 10 percent from 27,569 pounds in 2023 and up 23 percent from 2018-19 The first four months of fiscal 2025 are nearly identical to a year earlier about 1 percent behind October 2023-January 2024 Data table CBP seized 157,559 pounds of methamphetamine at the border in fiscal 2024 up 30 percent from 121,184 pounds in 2023 but down 8 percent from 170,999 pounds in 2022 though seizures have remained in a range between 121,000 and 182,000 pounds since 2019 The first four months of fiscal 2025 are running about 26 percent lower than October 2023-January 2024 Data table Data table Data table Mexico’s legislature quickly approved a series of constitutional reforms at the behest of outgoing president Andrés Manuel López Obrador fundamentally change the nature of the country’s judiciary and fundamentally and permanently change the role of the armed forces in public security citizens will now directly elect all judges increasing the likelihood of eroding the judicial branch’s independence could complicate accountability for organized crime activity a recently created internal security force whose members are mostly former soldiers This further cements significant increases in military participation in internal security and the economy during the López Obrador administration These changes pose likely setbacks to the struggle to hold people and institutions accountable for human rights abuse and corruption and they threaten to weaken the quality of Mexico’s democracy In this episode, WOLA’s director for Mexico, Stephanie Brewer, and Lisa Sanchez, the director of México Unido Contra la Delincuencia (MUCD) explain the constitutional reforms and their likely consequences “This particular constitutional reform fully militarized public security at the federal level by turning the National Guard into a fourth armed force,” said Sánchez “What we did was to fully and permanently militarize public security at the federal level in Mexico for good.” While these reforms are not a “fatal blow” for Mexico’s democracy they create even more adverse conditions for “victims and others” working for rights and justice in the country and our support from the international community