Click <a href="https://arcg.is/09O0OS">here</a> to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine
This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report
 Russian government sources confirmed that Russia is bringing Ukrainian children to Russia and having Russian families adopt them
Russian federal subject (region) Krasnodar Krai’s Family and Childhood Administration posted about a program under which Russian authorities transferred over 1,000 children from Mariupol to Tyumen
and Altay Krai where Russian families have adopted them.[1] The Administration stated that over 300 children are still waiting to “meet their new families” and that citizens who decide to adopt these children will be provided with a one-time bonus by the state.[2] Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) additionally reported that Russian officials transferred 30 Ukrainian children from Khartsyzk
and Zuhres in occupied Donetsk Oblast to Nizhny Novgorod under the guise of having the children participate in youth educational-training programs.[3] The forcible transfer of children of one group to another “with intent to destroy
racial or religious group“ is a violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[4]
Russian authorities are deploying security forces to Luhansk Oblast likely in response to waning support for the war and growing unwillingness to fight among Luhansk residents
The LNR Internal Ministry reported on August 23 that LNR Internal Ministry personnel conducted joint patrols with consolidated police detachments from the Internal Ministries of St
Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast in Starobilsk
occupied Luhansk Oblast.[5] The LNR Internal Ministry also reported on August 22 that Rosgvardia (Russian national guard) units conducted security for Russian Flag Day celebrations in Starobilsk.[6] Ukraine‘s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Rosgvardia elements in Dovzhansk (formerly Sverdlovsk)
and Russian authorities may be increasing Russian security forces’ presence in Luhansk to suppress any internal instability and/or because they are losing confidence in indigenous Luhansk forces.[9]
Russian authorities’ deployment of Rosgvardia elements to security duties in occupied Luhansk Oblast diverts these forces from operations elsewhere in Ukraine
likely contributing to the broader Russian failure to translate limited tactical gains into operational successes
ISW previously assessed that Russian forces had likely exhausted their momentum from territorial gains around Avdiivka and Bakhmut
Donetsk Oblast – a very small section of the whole Ukrainian theater – partially due to their inability to allocate sufficient resources to offensive operations.[10] LNR forces’ unwillingness to fight in the war
coupled with Rosgvardia forces’ presence in the rear instead of near the front will likely contribute to continued Russian failures to make significant territorial gains
Russian officials may have conducted a false flag event in Donetsk City on August 23 to justify attacks against Ukrainian government buildings on August 24
Social media networks in Donetsk City reported that a strike caused damage to the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) administrative building
where DNR Head Denis Pushilin works.[11] Pushilin was reportedly absent at the time of the strike
Russian media framed the attack as a direct Ukrainian strike on a DNR government building
which could have been conditions-setting for a false-flag attack.[14]
Unverifiable sources reported that axis commanders in Ukraine are reporting directly to Russian President Vladimir Putin
bypassing both the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov in the chain of command
Independent Russian outlet Vazhnye Istorii or iStories quoted unnamed sources within the Russian General Staff stating that Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu has lost Putin’s trust after the initial phase of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine that failed despite Shoigu’s assurances of a swift victory.[15] The sources claimed that Putin now bypasses Shoigu and interacts directly with Commander of Central Military District Alexander Lapin who oversees the “central” group of forces in Ukraine
and the Commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces Sergey Surovikin who commands the “southern” group of forces
ISW cannot independently verify the validity of this report
it indicates that Putin is also bypassing Gerasimov
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting
We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas
We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict
and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports
Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts
the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks between Izyum and Slovyansk on August 23
A Ukrainian volunteer claimed that Russian troops launched several attacks around Izyum on August 22 but did not specify exactly where these attacks occurred.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported that Russian forces conducted airstrikes on Bohorodychne (20km northwest of Slovyansk) and continued shelling settlements near the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border.[17]
which reaffirms ISW’s assessment that Russian forces have been unable to conduct a contested river crossing of the Siverskyi Donets and advance on Slovyansk from its due north.[19] Russian forces additionally shelled residential infrastructure in Slovyansk on the night of August 22 to 23.[20]
Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks toward Siversk on August 23
Siversk’s Civil Military Administration reiterated that the city remains under Ukrainian control but that Russian forces constantly conduct artillery strikes on Siversk and surrounding environs.[21]
Russian forces continued ground attacks to the northeast and south of Bakhmut on August 23
including elements of the Luhansk People’s Republic 6th Cossack Regiment
about 10km northeast of Bakhmut.[22] Russian forces additionally continued attempts to advance on Bakhmut from the south
specifically from around Kodema and Zaitseve.[23] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces have encircled Kodema (13km southeast of Bakhmut) from three sides and are advancing on Zaitseve (9km southeast of Bakhmut).[24]
Russian forces conducted ground attacks on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City on August 23
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops attempted to break through Ukrainian defensive lines and advance towards Krasnohorivka
and Nevelske- which form a line along Donetsk City’s northwestern outskirts
[25] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces are continuing to focus on the encirclement of Adviivka (north of Donetsk City) and are in control of 75% of Marinka
on the southwestern outskirts of Donestk City.[26] Russian forces continued to fire on Ukrainian positions along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City-Marinka frontline.[27]
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks southwest of Donetsk City on August 23
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops attempted to improve their tactical positions near Novomykhailivka and Zolota Nyva 25km and 60km southwest of Donetsk City
respectively.[28] Russian troops additionally continued offensive operations around Vuhledar
<a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Donetsk%20Battle%20Map%20Draft%20August%2023%2C2022.png"></a>
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum and prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)
Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground assaults around Kharkiv City on August 23
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces focused on maintaining current positions.[30] The Derhachi City Council reported that Ukrainian forces attempted to break through Russian defensive lines near Dementiivka
which may suggest that Ukrainian forces are continuing limited ground attacks to contest Russian-held lines in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[31] Russian forces conducted airstrikes near Pytomnyk
and Verkhnii Saltiv.[32] Russian forces continued shelling Kharkiv City and settlements along the line of contact.[33]
<a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Kharkiv%20Battle%20Map%20Draft%20August%2023%2C2022.png"></a>
Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces made limited territorial gains east of Mykolaiv City and in northwestern Kherson Oblast
The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces took control of Blahodatne (which the Russian MoD referred to as Komsomolske) about 45km due east of Mykolaiv City.[34] The Russian MoD added that Russian forces have established a 12 square km zone of control around Blahodatne by advancing three kilometers into Ukrainian defenses
Geolocated footage posted on August 22 also showed Russian forces reportedly firing TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems at Ukrainian forces in the northern part of the settlement on an unspecified but likely recent date.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 22 that Russian forces had unspecified “partial” success in the direction of Blahodatne
and Russian forces likely advanced into the settlement.[36] The Russian MoD also claimed control over Blahodativka
near the Ukrainian bridgehead over Inhulets River
and unspecified settlements in its vicinity.[37] Geolocated footage showed Ukrainian forces striking a Russian BMD-2 airborne infantry fighting vehicle in Blahodativka
which indicates that the settlement is contested.[38] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Oleksandrivka
and reached the Kherson-Mykolaiv Oblast administrative border.[39] ISW cannot independently verify this claim
for which the Russian MoD did not provide visual evidence
Ukrainian military officials claimed several strikes on Russian positions
and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Kherson Oblast
in February and March and suffered heavy losses.[41] It is unclear how long elements of the 331st Regiment have been operating in Kherson Oblast.[42] Elements of the 247th Regiment have been operating in Kherson Oblast since February 24
the first day of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[43] The Ukrainian Southern Command also confirmed Ukrainian strikes on the Antonivsky and Kakhovka bridges over the Dnipro River
and the destruction of a Russian ammunition depot in Kakhovka on August 22.[44]
Russian forces are attempting to repair damaged GLOCs across the Dnipro River
but Ukrainian forces will likely continue to strike Russian attempts to establish a river crossing
Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces continued to accumulate military equipment at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and are setting conditions to manipulate the public’s perception of the situation in Enerhodar
which contain toxic substances and a radiation level 1.5 times above normal levels
The GUR argued that by striking the ash pits
Russian forces can create a cloud of smoke with radioactive dust for which Russian forces can blame Ukraine
Russian forces continued to target Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv Oblasts with missile and MLRS strikes on August 23
Dnipropetrovsk officials reported that Russian forces struck Dnipro City with unspecified missiles
fired Grad MLRS at Marhanets and Nikopol (across the Dnipro River from Enerhodar)
Russian-appointed officials in occupied Crimea claimed shooting down another drone in Sevastopol on August 22.[51] Social media footage showed Russian air-defense systems striking an unspecified object in Sevastopol on August 22.[52]
<a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Kherson-Mykolaiv%20Battle%20Map%20Draft%20August%2023%2C2022.png"></a>
Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian federal subjects (regions) are continuing to increase one-time enlistment bonuses for recruits
likely due to a shortage of interested volunteers
Other Russian federal subjects are also likely increasing payments to generate more volunteers for the 3rd Army Corps or for regional volunteer units.[55] It is also unclear if the volunteer battalions in Buryatia and Tatarstan will join the 3rd Army Corps
Russian federal subjects are forming specialized military units with likely volunteers without prior military experience
The Republic of Udmurt claimed to have recruited seven volunteers who are currently undergoing training in Tolyatti for the “Italmas” SPETSNAZ unit.[56] Local military recruitment centers in Udmurt announced the recruitment for the ”Italmas” unit on July 23 and did not specify previous military experience as a requirement.[57] There was no information about the ”Italmas” unit prior to this July 23 announcement
suggesting that it is a new volunteer unit
Some local outlets claimed that the unit is recruiting reservists
while others noted that anyone interested in signing a military contract with the unit may do so at a local military recruitment center.[58] The recruitment of only seven volunteers since late July further confirms that Russian federal subjects continue to face challenges in recruiting the planned number of volunteers
Tatarstan local outlets also reported that 21 recruits are undergoing combat coordination activities in Orenburg Oblast with the ”Alga” and ”Timer” volunteer battalions
despite previously claiming to have recruited over 300 volunteers as of June 23.[59]
 <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Federal%20Subjects%20Generating%20Volunteer%20Units%20As%20Of%20August%2023%2C%202022.png"></a>
Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] The original post has since been removed from the administration website, but Ukrainian sources reposted screenshots of the post and ISW was able to locate an archived version.
https://web.archive.org/web/20220823081906/https://uvsd.ru/news/info/339-malyshi-iz-mariupolja-ishhut-novye-semi.html; https://suspilne dot media/273917-vtorgnenna-rosii-v-ukrainu-den-181-tekstovij-onlajn/; https://uvsd dot ru/news/info/339-malyshi-iz-mariupolja-ishhut-novye-semi.html; https://t.me/andriyshTime/2469
[2] https://suspilne dot media/273917-vtorgnenna-rosii-v-ukrainu-den-181-tekstovij-onlajn/; https://uvsd dot ru/news/info/339-malyshi-iz-mariupolja-ishhut-novye-semi.html; https://t.me/andriyshTime/2469
[3] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/okupanty-pohrozhuiut-shtrafamy-batkam-iaki-vidmovliaiutsia-viddavaty-ditei-v-rosiiski-shkoly-takozh-prodovzhuietsia-nezakonne-vyvezennia-ditei-na-terytoriiu-rf.html
[4] https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf
[5] https://telegra dot ph/Sotrudniki-BPKS-MVD-LNR-i-Svodnogo-otryada-policii-GU-MVD-Rossii-po-gorodu-Sankt-Peterburgu-i-Lenoblasti-proveli-patrulirovanie--08-23; https://t.me/mvdlnr_official/1530; https://t.me/mvdlnr_official/1530; https://t.me/mvdlnr_official/1532
[6] https://t.me/mvdlnr_official/1533; https://t.me/mvdlnr_official/1534; https://t.me/mvdlnr_official/1544
[7] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/v-lnr-namahaiutsia-provesty-zahalnu-zahalnu-mobilizatsiiu-ta-provodiat-poshuk-rashystivdezertyriv.html 
[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15
[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/5156; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/5174 
[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21
[12] https://twitter.com/KyivPost/status/1562019295332278272 https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39535; https://www.svoboda.org/a/separatisty-zayavili-o-povrezhdenii-pri-obstrele-administratsii-dnr-/32000824.html;  https://www.interfax dot ru/world/857821; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/15538959
[13] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/rus/news/2022/08/21/7364206/; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/16769; https://t.me/donrf22/4034; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39488  
[15] https://storage dot googleapis.com/istories/opinions/2022/08/23/kto-upravlyaet-rossiiskimi-voiskami/index.html
[16] https://twitter.com/donikroman/status/1561791088557449216; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=txXb0s98nlc; https://t.co/rWlMvmYxlD; https://t.me/romandonik/3305  
[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02GfC7o4QgR9yXhenYHLYGoyDgZcQUwfwTP332qwCmD25HVzhLawBj2jLwcXtKWdJKl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0izc8c2fssB2UFEdEvqdophhwYnan51xUz7qzMbEFQDCMZVFBhyK5S2Qx4t1U4WLbl
[21] https://www.facebook.com/Gromadasiversk/posts/pfbid02ZdiqDLz3WWN5sB2rUNjajQJ1S6M3RfN1F2sYqGVyyMyXqPLELAp9JeUyEeUyCs7bl; https://suspilne dot media/274114-siversk-znahoditsa-pid-kontrolem-ukraini/; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02GfC7o4QgR9yXhenYHLYGoyDgZcQUwfwTP332qwCmD25HVzhLawBj2jLwcXtKWdJKl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0izc8c2fssB2UFEdEvqdophhwYnan51xUz7qzMbEFQDCMZVFBhyK5S2Qx4t1U4WLbl
[22] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02GfC7o4QgR9yXhenYHLYGoyDgZcQUwfwTP332qwCmD25HVzhLawBj2jLwcXtKWdJKl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0izc8c2fssB2UFEdEvqdophhwYnan51xUz7qzMbEFQDCMZVFBhyK5S2Qx4t1U4WLbl; https://t.me/rybar/37618
[23] https://t.me/mod_russia/19029; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02GfC7o4QgR9yXhenYHLYGoyDgZcQUwfwTP332qwCmD25HVzhLawBj2jLwcXtKWdJKl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0izc8c2fssB2UFEdEvqdophhwYnan51xUz7qzMbEFQDCMZVFBhyK5S2Qx4t1U4WLbl
[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02GfC7o4QgR9yXhenYHLYGoyDgZcQUwfwTP332qwCmD25HVzhLawBj2jLwcXtKWdJKl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0izc8c2fssB2UFEdEvqdophhwYnan51xUz7qzMbEFQDCMZVFBhyK5S2Qx4t1U4WLbl; https://t.me/rybar/37616
[28] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02GfC7o4QgR9yXhenYHLYGoyDgZcQUwfwTP332qwCmD25HVzhLawBj2jLwcXtKWdJKl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0izc8c2fssB2UFEdEvqdophhwYnan51xUz7qzMbEFQDCMZVFBhyK5S2Qx4t1U4WLbl
[29] https://t.co/hLT08VL1Vp; https://t.co/uQaXlMFzsB; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/61159
[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0izc8c2fssB2UFEdEvqdophhwYnan51xUz7qzMbEFQDCMZVFBhyK5S2Qx4t1U4WLbl
[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02GfC7o4QgR9yXhenYHLYGoyDgZcQUwfwTP332qwCmD25HVzhLawBj2jLwcXtKWdJKl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0izc8c2fssB2UFEdEvqdophhwYnan51xUz7qzMbEFQDCMZVFBhyK5S2Qx4t1U4WLbl; https://t.me/mod_russia/19029
[33] https://t.me/mod_russia/19029; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02GfC7o4QgR9yXhenYHLYGoyDgZcQUwfwTP332qwCmD25HVzhLawBj2jLwcXtKWdJKl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0izc8c2fssB2UFEdEvqdophhwYnan51xUz7qzMbEFQDCMZVFBhyK5S2Qx4t1U4WLbl; https://t.me/synegubov/3966; https://t.me/stranaua/59360 ; https://t.me/stranaua/59381; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/437; https://t.me/rlz_the_kraken/52110; https://t.me/der_rada/2398
[35] https://twitter.com/Mr_Hornblower/status/1561781024777961475
[36] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22
[40] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1292020424664692
[41] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61966317
[42] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1505140495256891399; https://vk dot com/wall-26673779_77322
[43] kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/373907/… https://elista.bezformata.com/listnews/serzhantom-vdv-maksimom-medvedevim/103209896/… https://vk.com/public104933948?w=wall-104933948_66928… https://riakalm.ru/index.php/news2/32030-glava-kalmykii-batu-khasikov-vyrazil-soboleznovaniya-rodnym-i-blizkim-serzhanta-vs-rf-maksima-medvedeva; https://golosstepi.ru/news/54889/
[44] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1292020424664692; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22
[45] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1561957400420274176  
[46] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22
[48] https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/17492; https://t.me/energoatom_ua/9114; https://t.me/spravdi/15788
[49] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/okupanty-obstriliuiut-zolovidvaly-zaporizkoi-tes-shchob-pidniaty-khmary-radioaktyvnoho-pylu.html; https://t.me/energoatom_ua/9127
[50] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1292020424664692; https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/618; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/1648; https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/17503; https://t.me/vilkul/1764
[52] https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1561747373411520515 https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1562068846055415808  
[53] https://samara dot tsargrad.tv/news/bojcam-samarskogo-batalona-uvelichat-edinovremennuju-denezhnuju-vyplatu_610880
[54] https://newsorel dot ru/fn_1133279.html
[55] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22
[56] https://glazovlife dot ru/?p=48019; https://vk.com/wall-187448798_89638; https://udm-info dot ru/news/society/23-08-2022/6-glazovchan-zapisalis-v-podrazdelenie-spetsnaza-italmas-dlya-uchastiya-v-svo-v-ukraine
[57] https://vk dot com/wall-187448798_89638
[58] https://glazovlife dot ru/?p=48019; https://udm-info dot ru/news/society/23-08-2022/6-glazovchan-zapisalis-v-podrazdelenie-spetsnaza-italmas-dlya-uchastiya-v-svo-v-ukraine
[59] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-0
[60] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1562036489768386560; https://t.me/rian_ru/175281; https://t.me/Stremousov_Kirill/233; https://t.me/readovkanews/40640 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/40644; https://t.me/stranaua/59434 https://t.me/milinfolive/89286; https://t.me/rybar/37606 ; https://iz dot ru/1383931/2022-08-23/zamglavy-vga-stremousov-soobshchil-o-pokushenii-na-khersonskogo-chinovnika-telegina
[61] https://t.me/stranaua/59434 https://t.me/milinfolive/89286; https://t.me/rybar/37606 ; https://iz dot ru/1383931/2022-08-23/zamglavy-vga-stremousov-soobshchil-o-pokushenii-na-khersonskogo-chinovnika-telegina
[62] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/rashysty-rozrobyly-metodychku-dlia-svoikh-ahitatoriv-na-okupovanykh-terytoriiakh-shchob-perekonuvaty-naselennia-shcho-vony-ne-marodery-i-vbyvtsi-dokument.html
[64] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/08/23/rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-zvozyty-gaulyajteriv-na-okupovani-terytoriyi/ 
[65] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/08/23/rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-zvozyty-gaulyajteriv-na-okupovani-terytoriyi/ 
[66] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/08/23/rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-zvozyty-gaulyajteriv-na-okupovani-terytoriyi/ 
[67] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-14; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-27
[68] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7
[69] https://ria dot ru/20220823/referendum-1811536717.html
[70] https://ria dot ru/20220823/referendum-1811536717.html
[71] https://ria dot ru/20220823/referendum-1811536717.html
[72] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/okupanty-pohrozhuiut-shtrafamy-batkam-iaki-vidmovliaiutsia-viddavaty-ditei-v-rosiiski-shkoly-takozh-prodovzhuietsia-nezakonne-vyvezennia-ditei-na-terytoriiu-rf.html
[73] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/okupanty-pohrozhuiut-shtrafamy-batkam-iaki-vidmovliaiutsia-viddavaty-ditei-v-rosiiski-shkoly-takozh-prodovzhuietsia-nezakonne-vyvezennia-ditei-na-terytoriiu-rf.html
Judging solely by the confirmed territorial changes from May 18 to May 24, it would seem that the Russian-Ukrainian war is going through a phase of relative calm. However, as Tatarigami_UA, a reserve officer of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) and founder of OSINT group Frontintelligence Insight, <a href="https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1793743639924920327" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">notes</a>
fierce fighting in fact continues in many sectors along the line of engagement
and the Russian Armed Forces retain reserves for potential further pressure on the Ukrainian defenses
Sodol&#x2019;s tenure in charge of Ukraine&#x2019;s Marine Corps earned him the reputation of a &#x201C;butcher general.&#x201D;
which allowed for the Russians&apos; initial successful breakthrough into Kharkiv Oblast
the AFU has managed to saturate this area with FPV drones
creating numerical superiority and thus opening up a chance to seize the initiative
appears to be advocating for Washington to reconsider its policy
while recognizing the enemy&apos;s &#x201C;partial success&#x201D; in advancing into the city
the Ministry&apos;s newest claims have not been independently verified
As for the Russian military command, the purge among Defense Ministry officials and high-ranking military officers continues. The Insider has put together an <a href="https://theins.ru/news/271867" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">infographic</a> highlighting the arrests and resignations that have taken place so far
Russia also caused multiple (<a href="https://t.me/astrapress/55876" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">1</a>,<a href="https://t.me/astrapress/55927" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"> 2</a>,<a href="https://t.me/astrapress/56019" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"> 3</a>,<a href="https://theins.ru/news/271845" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"> 4</a>) unintended drops of FAB aerial bombs on its own Belgorod Oblast
Ukrainian forces struck a large number of diverse targets in Russia and the occupied territories this week
including the grouping commander Gennady Anashkin
On May 21, the AFU launched a cluster munitions<a href="https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/2451" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"> attack</a> (most likely, with ATACMS missiles) on occupied Dovzhansk (before 2016, Sverdlovsk) in Luhansk Oblast. <a href="https://t.me/astrapress/55952" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Allegedly</a>
the Ukrainians hit a base of Russian soldiers
On May 22, several ATACMS <a href="https://t.me/TyskNIP/11174" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">went off</a> near Mospyne in Donetsk Oblast, with available reports suggesting the <a href="https://t.me/dosye_shpiona/531" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">destruction</a> of multiple S-400 SAM system vehicles, including an <a href="https://t.me/russianocontext/3151" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">&#x201C;anti-ballistic&#x201D;</a> radar system
As Yuriy Butusov <a href="https://t.me/ButusovPlus/10460" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">writes</a>
ever more footage is appearing that shows the destruction of Russian &#xAB;tsar-mangal&#xBB; or &#xAB;turtle&#xBB; tanks furnished with a shed-like full set of additional armor
The Ukrainian war correspondent published one such video
commenting that Ukrainian fighters of the 2nd Battalion of the National Guard&apos;s Rubezh Brigade &#x201C;did a great job&#x201D; in the Lyman sector
&#x201C;One can only guess how the [Russian] crew of such a &apos;monster&apos; must feel
moving around in what is essentially a mass grave,&#x201D; Butusov added
A strike on a Russian police department in the occupied town of Skadovsk in Kherson Oblast left 11 staff members injured, ASTRA <a href="https://t.me/astrapress/56028" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">writes</a>
The missile destroyed a building five meters from the police station
For four months, Ukrainian fighters have been trying to evacuate a Russian T-90M tank left behind by its crew from the battlefield. Finally, they <a href="https://t.me/OSHB_225/4583" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">succeeded</a> on the sixth attempt
This week was marked by the announcement or finalization of major shipments of the following arms and military equipment to Ukraine:
A noteworthy photo of a Ukrainian &#x201C;FrankenSAM&#x201D; has surfaced: an Osa-AKM outfitted with R-73 air-to-air missiles instead of surface-to-air missiles
In addition, the Metinvest group of companies has <a href="https://metinvest.media/ua/page/pdhodyat-dlya-tankv-abrams-staleviy-front-rozpochav-vipusk-dlya-zsu-stalevih-ekranv-protid-fpv-dronam" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">mastered</a> the production of &#x201C;barbecue grill&#x201D; armor for T-64
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