Operators of the Phoenix UAV unit are inflicting significant losses on russian forces in the Kreminna and Serebrianskyi Forest area The pilots have successfully eliminated enemy personnel According to the Khortytsia operational-strategic group the drone unit’s latest strikes resulted in the destruction of russian tank The success of the operation underscores the growing role of advanced UAV systems in modern warfare The rapid response and precision targeting offered by the Phoenix unit continue to provide a critical advantage on the battlefield contributing to the ongoing efforts to disrupt hostile operations and maintain strategic control in the region The Russian Defense Ministry claimed on Thursday that its forces have taken control of the village of Kreminna Balka in Ukraine's Donetsk region the village came under Russian control following an operation led by the Tsentr (Center) group of forces Kreminna Balka is situated in the Pokrovsky district of the Donetsk region approximately 15 kilometers (9.3 miles) south of Selidovo town which the Russian military reported capturing at the end of October Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy described the Pokrov area as one of the most challenging regions for Ukrainian forces The Ukrainian General Staff similarly identified it as the "hottest" section of the front In an attempt to alleviate pressure on the Pokrov front Ukraine launched an incursion into Russia’s Kursk region but failed to alter the battlefield dynamics Authorities in the Pokrovsky district are urging residents to evacuate as certain city areas are restricted due to defense preparations Ukraine has yet to respond to Russia's claims and independent verification is difficult amid ongoing hostilities either observed and verified firsthand by the reporter or reported and verified from knowledgeable sources Translations may contain inaccuracies—please refer to the original content Russian forces have retreated from positions in a contested forest in eastern Ukraine's Luhansk region as heavy fighting blazes on further south in the war-torn country the deputy commander of Ukraine's Azov Brigade said on Saturday that the brigade's fighters had pushed Russian forces out of several positions in the Serebryansky Forest close to the Moscow-controlled Luhansk city of Kreminna a spokesperson for the Ukrainian forces operating in the northeast and east of the country suggested in separate remarks that Kyiv's forces had some success close to Kreminna which tracks Russian and Ukrainian positions along the front line said Russian forces had retreated around Serebryansky Forest and close to Klishchiivka a contested settlement southwest of the Russian-held Donetsk city of Bakhmut Newsweek has reached out to the Russian Defense Ministry for comment via email The forest has long been on the front lines in eastern Ukraine Ukraine's military shared footage it said showed the damage inflicted on the forest by Russia's invasion followed by another video appearing to show the destruction of the territory Ukraine's Azov Brigade is reported to have been fighting around the Serebryansky Forest since at least fall 2023 Earlier this week, the U.S. State Department reversed a decision made back in 2014 to stop the Ukrainian brigade receiving American weapons, a move Azov's commander hailed as key to the unit's "effectiveness." The Azov Brigade rose out of the volunteer Azov Battalion with its roots in far-right and ultranationalist ideology The fighters were on the front lines fighting pro-Moscow separatists in Ukraine from 2014; the battalion's founders were accused of having neo-Nazi sentiments The brigade's current members have rejected those ties distancing themselves from the battalion's reputation since the outbreak of full-scale war in Ukraine in February 2022 The brigade is now a part of Ukraine's National Guard and has been lauded as one of the most effective fighting forces The Azov Brigade said on Sunday that its troops along with another brigade in the National Guard had "advanced" just over a mile along the front lines during an operation back in April that had not been previously confirmed Russia's Defense Ministry said its forces had attacked Ukrainian troops in several areas in the east of the country The Deep State project also said on Saturday that Russian troops had advanced south of the Serebryansky Forest including east of the strategic Donetsk town of Pokrovsk west of the Russian-controlled city of Avdiivka has been the site of the fiercest clashes in recent months local time on Sunday that the highest number of clashes along the front line took place east of Pokrovsk Newsweek is committed to challenging conventional wisdom and finding connections in the search for common ground Newsletters in your inbox See all As reported by Ukrinform, the Khortytsia Operational-Strategic Group of Troops announced this on Telegram, also sharing a corresponding video. "In Luhansk region near Kreminna, strike drone operators successfully hit one tank, 11 military trucks, and three enemy vehicles," the statement reads. As previously reported by Ukrinform, the total combat losses of the Russian forces in Ukraine since February 24, 2022, amount to approximately 863,580 personnel. Online media entity; Media identifier - R40-01421. © 2015-2025 Ukrinform. All rights reserved. The Russian Defense Ministry has published video clips that intend to testify to the Russian army's successes in battles with Ukrainian troops in the Kursk Region The day before, on August 9, the Defense Ministry published a video clip illustrating what it claimed to be new strikes by the Russian military against the AFU in Sumy Oblast However, this video was recorded some time ago — it was published by the Russian state-run news agency TASS on July 14 Simultaneously, other reports have indicated that Ukrainian forces remain on the offensive, attempting to break through to the town of Rylsk. The Russian pro-war channel Dva Maiora (lit “Two Majors”) noted that it won't be possible to dislodge the Ukrainian forces from the Kursk Region “in half a day,” as they have already begun consolidating occupied positions and organizing supply lines We really need your help! Subscribe to donations! Сделано в Charmer К сожалению, браузер, которым вы пользуйтесь, устарел и не позволяет корректно отображать сайт. Пожалуйста, установите любой из современных браузеров, например: Reporting By Pavel Polityuuk and Aleksandar Vasovic Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles., opens new tab , opens new tab Browse an unrivalled portfolio of real-time and historical market data and insights from worldwide sources and experts. , opens new tabScreen for heightened risk individual and entities globally to help uncover hidden risks in business relationships and human networks. © 2025 Reuters. All rights reserved This website is using a security service to protect itself from online attacks The action you just performed triggered the security solution There are several actions that could trigger this block including submitting a certain word or phrase You can email the site owner to let them know you were blocked Please include what you were doing when this page came up and the Cloudflare Ray ID found at the bottom of this page Ukrainian forces have carried out "tactically significant and successful localized counterattacks" against Russian troops along two sections of the front line, according to a new assessment, as NATO member states pledge future aid for Kyiv's war efforts against Moscow Ukrainian fighters have counterattacked along the border of the country's northeastern Kharkiv region and around Kreminna, a Russian-controlled city in Ukraine's eastern Luhansk region that sits close to the Donetsk border, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) In early May, Moscow launched a cross-border offensive into the Kharkiv region, quickly gaining a handful of villages across the border, including those north of Kharkiv City. It is Ukraine's second-largest city, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has said Kyiv "cannot afford to lose Kharkiv." Russian troops also attacked further east along the border around the city of Vovchansk and Starytsya Ukrainian officials warned that Russia hopes to divide Kyiv's scarce resources pulling soldiers and equipment from other parts of the front line Ukraine said shortly after the offensive began that it had stemmed Russia's advances while reporting intensified pushes from Moscow in the east of the country Ukraine has been counterattacking along the Kharkiv border and around Kreminna for around two months Russia has pulled elements of forces from other parts of Ukraine which is a "strong indicator that Russian forces are beginning to feel the pressure of Ukrainian counterattacks." Newsweek has reached out by email to the Russian Defense Ministry for comment The ISW previously said Ukraine had retaken positions north of Kharkiv City while Russia was still making slow but steady gains in the east Russia has "recently marginally advanced northwest of Kreminna" while attacking down from the Kharkiv city of Kupiansk to Svatove Kyiv's ability to "launch more powerful and organized counterattacks" is determined by Western military aid Ukraine is heavily reliant on security assistance from its international supporters Russia quickly mobilized its defense industry and Western officials say Moscow has been receiving weapons from allies such as North Korea House approved more than $60 billion in military aid for Ukraine after months of delays and political infighting During the congressional delay on aid authorization Ukraine's forces struggled to keep up supplies of key assets like ammunition and air defense missiles "I apologize for the weeks of not knowing what's going on in terms of funding," President Joe Biden told Zelensky in early June Ukraine's NATO backers used this week's summit in Washington to unveil fresh aid for Kyiv including four Patriot air defense systems and "dozens" of other air defense systems in the next few months NATO also confirmed on Wednesday that its members would provide "a minimum baseline funding" of more than $43 billion in security assistance for Ukraine in the next year the Netherlands and Denmark said the first of Ukraine's pledged F-16 fighter jets were on their way to Kyiv Please enable JS and disable any ad blocker The Russian Winter-Spring 2024 Offensive Operation on the Kharkiv-Luhansk Axis Kagan with Nicole Wolkov and Christina Harward Russian forces are conducting a cohesive multi-axis offensive operation in pursuit of an operationally significant objective for nearly the first time in over a year and a half of campaigning in Ukraine The prospects of this offensive in the Kharkiv-Luhansk sector are far from clear but its design and initial execution mark notable inflections in the Russian operational level approach Russian efforts to seize relatively small cities and villages in eastern Ukraine since Spring 2022 have generally not secured operationally significant objectives although these Russian operations led to large-scale fighting and significant Ukrainian and Russian losses.[1] Russian forces likely pursued more operationally significant objectives during their Winter-Spring 2023 offensive but that effort was poorly designed and executed and its failure to make any substantial progress precludes drawing firm conclusions about its intended goals.[2] Russian offensives to this point have generally either concentrated large masses of troops against singular objectives (such as Bakhmut and Avdiivka) or else have consisted of multiple attacks along axes of advance that were too far away to be mutually supporting and/or divergent The current Russian offensive in the Kharkiv-Luhansk sector involves attacks along four parallel axes that are mutually supporting in pursuit of multiple objectives that would likely generate operationally significant gains The design of this offensive operation is worth careful consideration regardless of its outcome as a possible example of the Russian command’s ability to learn from and improve on its previous failures at the operational level Russian tactical performance in this sector does not appear to have improved materially on previous Russian tactical shortcomings a factor that may well lead to the overall failure even of this better-designed undertaking Russia’s Western Grouping of Forces has recently intensified operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and is focusing on four directions of advance Russian forces are currently pursuing offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk but the WMD appears to have taken over responsibility for the northern portion of the Lyman direction after the Russian command transferred significant elements of the CMD to support the offensive effort to seize Avdiivka in Donetsk Oblast in early October 2023.[4] The WMD‘s 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) and 1st Guards Tank Army (1st GTA) resumed a localized offensive effort northeast of Kupyansk on October 6 2023 and sporadically intensified operations elsewhere in the Kupyansk direction.[5] This localized Russian offensive effort to advance towards Kupyansk from the northeast had resulted in only marginal tactical gains by January 2024 Ukrainian officials increasingly began to report in January 2024 that Russian forces were setting conditions for a larger offensive effort in both the Kupyansk and Lyman directions.[6] WMD elements began to intensify operations in four directions of advance along the line in early January and Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov announced by January 30 that the Russian 2024 winter-spring effort on the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis was underway.[7] The Russian offensive campaign is currently proceeding along four axes from north to south: 1) around Kupyansk and Synkivka; 2) from Tabaivka toward Kruhlyakivka; 3) from Makiivka toward Raihorodka and/or Borova; and 4) from near Kreminna to Drobysheve and/or Lyman Elements of the 6th CAA are currently conducting offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka in an ongoing effort to advance towards east bank Kupyansk and Ukrainian military officials have identified the Synkivka area as providing the most rapid route for Russian forces to reach the two settlements on the east bank of the Oskil River.[10] Likely elements of the 6th CAA’s 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 128 Motorized Rifle Brigade conducted relatively large company-sized mechanized assaults in the Synkivka area in December 2023 that resulted in significant Russian armored vehicle losses and no notable tactical gains and Russian forces have since heavily relied on infantry assaults with limited armored vehicle support in the area.[11] Elements of the Russian 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade are currently conducting assaults on Synkivka and elements of the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade are reportedly operating in the Vilshana area.[12] Russian forces have reportedly made tactical gains in the Synkivka area in intensified assaults in late January although ISW has not seen confirmation of any recent notable tactical gains near the settlement.[13] Ukrainian officials continue to assess that Russian assaults near Synkivka aim to facilitate Russian advances to Kupyansk and Kupyansk-Vuzlovy where there are two bridges crossings over the Oskil River.[14] Elements of the 1st GTA are reportedly still operating near Synkivka although it is unclear if they are conducting assaults in the area.[15] Elements of the 1st GTA’s 2nd Motorized Rifle Division reportedly conducted attacks near Orlyanka (east of Kupyansk) in early January 2024 although it is unclear if some of these elements are still in the area.[16] Elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division participated in offensive efforts near Stepova Novoselivka (south of Orlyanka) in early February 2024 suggesting that they may have shifted their focus to the Russian effort further south.[17] have intensified operations northwest of Svatove have recently made tactical gains around Tabaivka and appear to be pushing west toward the Oskil Reservoir in the direction of Kruhlyakivka and northwest along the P07 highway toward Kupyansk-Vuzlovy Russian forces intensified operations northwest of Svatove in January 2024 more than anywhere else along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line Elements of the 47th Tank Division began what Russian sources described as a “massive offensive” in the direction of Krokhmalne and Tabaivka on January 19.[18] Geolocated footage published on January 20 indicated that Russian forces had quickly captured Krokhmalne and elements of the 47th Tank Division reportedly captured Tabaivka as early as January 27 although ISW has still not observed confirmation of Russian forces capturing the settlement as of February 20.[19] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also entered Ivanivka (north of Tabaivka) and advanced closer to Kyslivka (immediately north of Tabaivka) as of February 1.[20] Russian sources have claimed that Russian forces may have captured Kotlyarivka (immediately north of Tabaivka) and elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st GTA) have reportedly advanced near Berestove (just south of Krokhmalne).[21] Russian forces have also resumed assaults near Stelmakhivka (south of Krokhmalne) and near Pishchane (immediately southwest of Tabaivka).[22] Elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division's 1st Tank Regiment and 15th Motorized Rifle Regiment unsuccessfully attempted to encircle Ukrainian forces near Stepova Novoselivka (north of Kyslivka) in early February as elements of the 4th Tank Division (1st GTA) reportedly tried to push through Ukrainian defenses near Kyslivka.[23] Elements of the 47th Tank Division appear to be the main force committed to the effort northwest of Svatove but the participation of elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 4th Tank Division in offensive operations in the area suggests that the wider 1st GTA is responsible for offensive operations this area of the line and is not actively committed to the effort northeast of Kupyansk Russian operations around Tabaivka appear to be pushing along diverging axes to the northwest and west-southwest and it is not yet clear which is the main effort Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are currently developing an offensive in the direction of Pishchane from Tabaivka in an effort to reach the Oskil River.[24] Pishchane and Berestove are located along a country road connecting the P07 highway to Kruhlyakivka where one of the six bridges crossing the Oskil River is located There is also a country road that begins west of Kyslivka and Kotlyarivka and connects the P07 highway to Kurylivka and southern Kupyansk-Vuzlovy where a railway and roadway bridge across the Oskil River are located The Russian tactical effort to seize settlements along the P07 highway likely aims to open routes of advance for Russian forces to reach Kurylivka and Kruhlyakivka and threaten Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting the east and west banks of the Oskil River in the area Elements of the 20th CAA’s 3rd Motorized Rifle Division are attacking southwest of Svatove although they are currently conducting a lower tempo of operations in the area than Russian forces elsewhere along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line Russian forces attacked southwest of Svatove particularly near Makiivka on the Zherebets River although at a slower tempo than other areas along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.[25] Geolocated footage published on January 27 indicates that Russian forces have recently advanced east of Makiivka and elements of the 20th CAA’s 3rd Motorized Rifle Division have reportedly recently increased efforts to advance near the settlement.[26] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported positional engagements in the area throughout January 2024.[27] Russian and Ukrainian sources also stated that Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Makiivka throughout December 2023 but ISW did not observe visual confirmation of any Russian advances in the area during this time.[28] Russian forces consisting mostly of elements of the 2nd CAA (CMD) previously conducted offensive operations southwest of Svatove along the Raihorodka-Karmazynivka-Novovodyane line further north of Makiivka in the summer and early fall of 2023 with Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stating in August 2023 that the Raihorodka area was one of the most intense sectors of the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.[29] ISW has not observed reports of the CMD’s 2nd CAA operating southwest of Svatove in 2024 suggesting that the transfer of elements of the CMD‘s 2nd CAA from the area and subsequent transfer of elements of the WMD’s 20th CAA may be part of an effort to cohere a large effort around WMD forces along the entire Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated the Russian forces intended to reach Borova before the start of winter 2023-2024 during localized Russian offensive operations in the area in early Fall 2023.[30] The CMD forces failed to achieve that goal but there is no reason to assess that WMD elements in the area have shifted their goal away from Borova Makiivka and Raihorodka are located on country roads that connect the P66 Svatove-Kreminna highway to Borova where there is a crossing over the Oskil River is more direct than the route from Makiivka to Borova suggesting that Russian forces may choose to resume offensive operations near Raihorodka aimed at advancing to Borova country roads from Makiivka lead southeastward to Lyman and current Russian activity near Makiivka could additionally be aimed at supporting offensive efforts to cross the Zherebets River west of Kreminna Country roads from Makiivka also lead to several settlements south of Borova along the Oskil River and Oskil City and Russian efforts near Makiivka may be ultimately aimed at securing the southern edge of the Oskil Reservoir (before it narrows at the Oskil Hydroelectric Power Plant) Elements of the 20th CAA’s 144th Motorized Rifle Division have intensified an effort to push Ukrainian forces off the left bank of the Zherebets River west of Kreminna while non-WMD elements continue routine positional fighting elsewhere in the Lyman direction.[31] Russian and Ukrainian sources have stated that elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division were pursuing this effort as early as November 2023 although ISW did not observe a concerted offensive effort to push towards the Zherebets River until early January 2024.[32] Likely elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division notably intensified this effort around January 20 with reports of Russian forces using a significant number of tanks and armored vehicles in a relatively large number of assaults in the area.[33] Geolocated footage published on January 21 showed at least 20 new Russian vehicle losses following unsuccessful assaults near Terny (west of Kreminna).[34] The most recent intensified Russian assaults have focused on Terny and Torske — three settlements on the Zherebets River with nearby crossings — and Russian forces have made recent minor marginal tactical gains in the area.[35] Russian milbloggers have claimed that Russian forces have advanced close to the outskirts of Torske although ISW has yet to observe confirmation of these claims.[36] Russian forces have advanced within two kilometers of the eastern outskirts of Terny as of February 12.[37] Elements of the newly created 25th CAA (CMD) have also conducted localized offensive operations in the area since October 2023 Elements of the 90th Tank Regiment (41st CAA CMD) were reportedly participating in positional engagements southwest of Kreminna in December 2023 although other elements may still remain in the Kreminna area.[42] It is unclear what elements of the CMD may still be deployed in rear areas of occupied Luhansk Oblast although any remaining elements likely represent only a fraction of the combat power that the CMD had previously deployed in the area Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) 2nd Army Corps (AC) elements and Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz forces are operating around Kreminna and have reportedly intensified operations south of Kreminna but are likely not directly participating in the concerted Russian effort in the Lyman direction.[43] Russian milbloggers have claimed that Russian forces intensified offensive operations near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) in mid-January 2024 and have made tactical advances in the area although ISW did not observe evidence of any Russian advances in the area until early February and has not observed a significant intensification of the tempo of Russian operations near Bilohorivka.[44] LNR 2nd AC and Akhmat Spetsnaz elements are likely engaged in tactical efforts that have little relevance to the wider operational effort in the Lyman direction Reaching the Zherebets River and pushing Ukrainian forces across to the right bank of the river is only an immediate tactical objective and Russian forces likely have more ambitious subsequent operational objectives in the area Russian forces may have attempted to recapture Lyman Donetsk Oblast during the failed Russian Winter-Spring 2023 offensive campaign in Luhansk Oblast although the Russian failure to make any meaningful advances makes determining the ultimate objective of the offensive difficult.[45] Recapturing Lyman is the most likely operational objective for Russian forces in the area as the settlement opens routes of Russian advance both to the northwest towards Oskil City (southeast of Izyum) and to the southwest towards Slovyansk Russian forces may alternatively intend to advance north of Lyman towards Drobysheve in an effort to support planned advances towards the Oskil River and set conditions for the later seizure of Lyman Russian Operational Planning and Objectives The apparent coordination of Russian offensive efforts along the four axes on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line is likely reflective of a wider operational objective and higher-level operational planning Russian objectives in each direction of advance appear to add up to a wider cohesive operational objective to seize the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast Russian operations on each axis share similarities in design and support one another in ways that suggest that the command of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces has planned a larger operation in pursuit of this cohesive operational objective These four directions of Russian advance along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and the apparent Russian objectives in those directions suggest that the Russian Western Grouping of Forces is undertaking a larger months-long cohesive operational effort to seize the east bank of the Oskil River from Kupyansk to Oskil City The fact that these directions of advance all fall under the operational responsibility of a cohesive Russian grouping of forces suggests that the Russian command has tasked the Western Grouping of Forces to pursue a coordinated operational objective on the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis The clear delineation of those directions among elements of the 6th CAA the 20th CAA’s 3rd Motorized Rifle Division and the 20th CAA’s 144th Motorized Rifle Division suggests that the Western Grouping of Forces deployed relatively cohesive formations in distinct areas of operation well in advance of this effort The intensification of Russian offensive operations along these axes of advance at the same time suggests that this activity is part of a wider operation and not four separate localized offensive efforts The likely planned Russian objectives of advancing to and seizing east bank Kupyansk and areas near or north of Lyman would all support a coordinated objective of pushing Ukrainian forces off the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast Russian advances to and the seizure of these settlements would otherwise only have limited tactical significance An operation to push Ukrainian forces off the east bank of the Oskil River offers the Russian military an attainable goal that would generate operationally significant effects and areas near or north of Lyman as well as corresponding areas where there are river crossings would likely create conditions that would make continued Ukrainian operations on the east bank of the Oskil River untenable This operation would also allow Russian forces to safely consolidate after the offensive’s planned culmination as there would be little risk of serious Ukrainian counterattacks back across the river It would be surprising if the Russian command did not plan this operation with this relatively attainable objective and favorable conditions for consolidation but rather chose a less cohesive and less attainable effort--but Russian commanders have made similarly poor choices repeatedly throughout the war.[46] The Kremlin has often prioritized military efforts to achieve informational or political objectives over those with wider operational significance in Ukraine but an operation to reach the Oskil River offers Russia opportunities for both kinds of gains.[47] Ukrainian military officials have noted that Russian forces may be intensifying offensive operations to take territory ahead of Russia’s March 2024 presidential elections suggesting that Russian President Vladimir Putin intends to secure an informational victory in Ukraine to bolster his reputation as a capable war-time leader amid his certain re-election.[48] Operations northwest of Svatove and near Kreminna offer the Russian military the opportunity to seize the remainder of unoccupied Luhansk Oblast and the Kremlin has long pursued the seizure of all of Luhansk Oblast as one of its main objectives in eastern Ukraine.[49] The more operationally significant effort to reach the Oskil River would achieve this informational objective and more But seizing the remainder of Luhansk Oblast could still be an attainable objective even if the wider operation fails since Ukrainian forces only control a small sliver of Luhansk Oblast south of Kreminna and west and southwest of Svatove The seizure of all of Luhansk Oblast may be a subordinate objective but three of the axes of the Russian offensive effort are focused on territory in Kharkiv and Donetsk oblasts suggesting that the primary objective is reaching the Oskil River and possibly taking Kupyansk The Kremlin could settle for this secondary objective for its informational benefits but only if it appears unable to achieve its primary goals The Western Grouping of Forces appears to be conducting the initial stages of an intensified cohesive offensive operation to reach the Oskil River on a broad front but the Russian command could decide to pursue other objectives that diverge from this cohesive effort Potential Russian advances towards Lyman would divert Russian forces along diverging axes of advance towards separate operational objectives that are not necessarily mutually supporting The Russian command could decide to break the Lyman effort off from the overall operation to reach the Oskil River if the wider operation makes little progress or if the capture of Lyman and advances south of the settlement look more attractive than trying to advance all the way towards Oskil City The terrain south of Lyman would likely be less favorable to Russian advances Lyman also offers a less attractive position either to consolidate gains or to resume subsequent attacks because of the forest belts around it and the open flanks it would offer to Ukrainian counterattacks Lyman’s position on a seam between groupings of forces would also pose greater command and control challenges to Russian efforts to consolidate and defend or exploit its seizure Russian forces appear to be attacking along mutually supporting axes something Russian forces have often failed to do in the past which suggests possible improvements in Russian operational planning at least in this sector of the front.[50] The areas in which Russian forces are trying to advance are mutually supporting because they are roughly parallel with one another and close enough together to generate pressure on the same groupings of Ukrainian defenders The flank of one direction of advance is close enough to the flank of the adjacent direction to create synergistic effects a Russian tactical advance northwest of Svatove could also be seen as a tactical advance on the northern flank of the Russian effort west and southwest of Svatove or as an advance on the southern flank of the effort northeast and east of Kupyansk A Russian advance in one of these directions places pressure not just on the Ukrainian forces defending in the immediate tactical area but also on Ukrainian forces that are defending against Russian offensive operations north or south of the direction in which Russian forces advanced Mutually supporting operations also set conditions for the tactical envelopment or encirclement of Ukrainian forces in some areas if Russian forces can advance rapidly enough or if Ukrainian defenders make mistakes Many of the settlements along the Oskil River that Russian forces are apparently trying to capture can be reached by forces advancing along adjacent axes which could allow Russian forces to envelop or encircle a settlement instead of attacking it frontally Russian forces can approach northern Kupyansk-Vuzlovy by advancing from Synkivka and can approach southern Kupyansk Vuzlovy from the direction of advance northwest of Svatove the Russian advances towards Kruhlyakiva from settlements along the PO7 highway northwest of Svatove and advances southwest of Svatove from Makiivka can set conditions for Russian forces to envelop or encircle Ukrainian forces defending Borova The four mutually supporting directions present Russian forces with opportunities to envelop or encircle east bank Kupyansk and Borova depending on the rate and timing of Russian advances The mutually supporting operations do not provide these opportunities for areas near or north of Lyman as Lyman is on the flank of the overall operational effort along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line The likely Russian offensive operation towards the Oskil River appears to be a much more sustainable effort than previous Russian offensive operations in Ukraine The following observations are based on the current tempo of Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and it is unclear if many of them would hold in the event of a significant intensification of the Russian offensive effort Ukrainian artillery shortages and delays in Western security assistance are creating uncertainty in Ukrainian operational planning and are likely prompting Ukrainian forces to husband materiel.[51] These constraints on Ukrainian operations are likely limiting Ukraine’s ability to degrade and pressure Russian forces and logistics along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and it is unclear if the Russian military would be able to conduct a relatively sustainable offensive operation in the absence of these Ukrainian constraints Russian forces attacking along the Luhansk-Kharkiv axis appear to be attempting to use some of the principles of Soviet deep battle theory particularly the principle of conducting multiple simultaneous attacks to pin the defender’s frontline forces and reserves.[52] Russian forces have shown a pattern of activity along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line that suggests that Russian forces are alternating intensified attacks along certain axes with regrouping and consolidation along others This rotating intensification throughout the frontline likely aims to maintain pressure on Ukrainian defenders all along the east bank of the Oskil River even as some Russian groupings regroup and reconstitute This approach likely also aims to prevent Ukrainian forces from concentrating on a single Russian axis of advance This rotating intensification pressures the entire Ukrainian force grouping defending in the area and complicates Ukraine’s ability to transfer forces between different defensive directions The current tempo of Russian offensives along the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis and the Russian ability to conduct operational-level rotations will likely allow Russian forces to conduct offensive operations along each axis of advance without pulling manpower away from another thereby making Russian offensive efforts at current levels of intensity sustainable.[58] The losses Russian forces have taken in their effort to seize Avdiivka prompted the Russian command to transfer elements from other sectors of the front to support that effort but the Russian elements attacking along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line are doing so in a way that has not thus far required the commitment of reserves from other sectors of the front.[59] The 6th CAA and the 20th CAA’s 144th Motorized Rifle Division will likely be able to continue to replenish their losses and rotate degraded units at the current operational tempo without drawing on Russian reserves from other formations The Russian military is replenishing losses with poorly trained and relatively combat ineffective personnel losses over time will likely degrade the combat effectiveness of the attacking WMD elements and hinder their ability to sustain effective offensive operations.[60] The Russian offensive effort toward the Oskil River will thus likely culminate at or before the river line and the Russians will likely have to conduct a fundamental reconstitution of the formations involved in this offensive before using them in subsequent major offensive operations The apparent Russian ability to conduct routine regroupings and resume offensive operations on individual axes without drawing combat power from other axes is letting Russian forces sustain operations on each axis at their own pace The degradation of Russian forces on one axis does not appear to influence the tempo of operations on other axes along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line Russian forces on a given axis could even potentially culminate short of the river line without fully disrupting the overall operational scheme The limited number of crossings and the vulnerability of those crossings to Russian fires also mitigates the risks caused by the premature culmination of a given axis—Ukrainian forces could be driven to withdraw from the entire east bank by the threat of being cut off even if they manage to stop one or more axes of Russian advance short of the river if the Ukrainian forces managed to block one or more of the Russian advances in such a fashion that the Russian command had to divert effort from another axis to sustain its coherent drive The apparent sustainability of the Russian offensive effort and the mutually reinforcing directions of Russian advance suggests that the Russian command may be learning from previous operational design failures The Wagner offensive ultimately took Bakhmut but did so in a way that left Russian forces unprepared to defend against Ukrainian counterattacks and required the deployment of significant Russian reserves drawn from elsewhere in the theater to hold most of the gains made.[63] The seizure of Bakhmut combined with the Wagner Group‘s abortive armed rebellion also led to the effective destruction of the Wagner Group as a fighting force The apparent relatively sustainable operation to reach the Oskil River is notable in this context and suggests that the Western Grouping of Forces has intentionally designed operations to avoid a premature culmination of its ongoing effort Russian forces have also routinely attacked along diverging axes throughout the Russian invasion of Ukraine an approach that has regularly prevented Russian forces from capitalizing on tactical gains and translating them into operationally significant [64] The Western Grouping of Forces appears to be learning from this mistake as well The Southern Military District’s [SMD] 58th CAA proved during its defensive effort in western Zaporizhia Oblast against the Ukrainian summer 2023 counteroffensive that at least some Russian formations can internalize lessons learned and successfully adapt campaign designs and tactical preparations to the battlefield realities in Ukraine.[65] ISW has yet to observe a Russian formation demonstrate this adaptation for operational planning at scale while conducting an offensive operational effort and recent waves of mass mechanized assault around Avdiivka in October and November 2023 suggested that the Russian command has not disseminated tactical lessons learned from previous failed Russian offensive efforts.[66] The Western Grouping of Forces‘ current offensive operation may be the first instance of a large formation capturing and implementing at least campaign design lessons Russian offensives along the Oskil River have not shown tactical improvements or innovations Russian tactical engagements continue to display many of the same mistakes Russian offensive operations have repeatedly shown causing high losses of men and materiel for limited gains Russian learning and innovation thus appear to be partial and possibly confined thus far to operational level planning and force generation Prospects of the Russian Offensive Operation on the Kharkiv-Luhansk Axis Russian forces will likely struggle to translate minor tactical advances into operationally significant maneuver towards the Oskil River and the effort will likely take months of campaigning regardless of its ultimate success or failure if Ukrainian forces retain the material capability to continue resisting as they have Russian forces have not learned how to restore mechanized maneuver to the positional battlefield in Ukraine and have not conducted any offensive operation that has resulted in a rapid mechanized advance since spring 2022.[67] A successful Russian advance to the Oskil River would very likely result from months of accumulated marginal tactical Russian gains at very high cost Russian forces are very unlikely to advance fast enough to encircle sizable pockets of Ukrainian forces The likely gradual rate of Russian advance will allow Ukrainian forces to prepare positions and logistics around settlements on the east bank of the Oskil River well ahead of any potential Russian advance towards these settlements A threatened Russian encirclement of Ukrainian forces in these settlements rapid enough to prompt Ukrainian forces to withdraw to the west bank of the Oskil River is highly unlikely The gradual rate of Russian advance will thus likely culminate in attritional frontal attacks against entrenched Ukrainian positions in and near settlements along the Oskil River before the final Ukrainian forces withdraw Russian forces have previously struggled to conduct significant operational encirclements and likely will continue to do so even if they can gradually envelop settlements along the Oskil River Russian forces failed to operationally encircle Bakhmut in March 2023 and proceeded to fight through the city for two months in highly attritional assaults.[68] Russian forces have also failed more recently to operationally encircle smaller settlements such as Marinka and Avdiivka although the threat of a tactical Russian encirclement forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Avdiivka on February 16.[69] Russian forces can advance in areas north and south of settlements along the east bank of the Oskil River and may envelop Ukrainian forces but Russian forces are very unlikely to complete operational encirclements The fact that these settlements are backed up against a water feature may give Russian forces a better chance to trap Ukrainian forces against the river (effectively an encirclement) but only if the Russians can advance more rapidly than they have generally been able to do or if the Ukrainians either choose to defend a settlement to the last or make a mistake in timing their withdrawal Russian forces will likely have to conduct assaults into and through east bank Kupyansk and Borova if they wish to capture these settlements Russian offensive operations to capture even relatively small settlements with entrenched Ukrainian positions have lasted months and there is no reason to assess that fighting into and through these relatively small settlements will be much easier for Russian forces as long as Ukrainian forces have the materiel needed to continue defensive operations effectively Russian interdiction efforts will likely have greater chances of isolating the battlespace on the east bank of the Oskil River than elsewhere in Ukraine where Russian forces are conducting offensive operations Six bridges (both railway and roadway bridges) cross the Oskil River between Kupyansk and the Oskil Hydroelectric Power Plant Satellite imagery from mid-January suggests that many of these bridges have sustained some damage and a few appear unlikely to be usable by heavy equipment.[70] Russian forces likely damaged these bridges during a coordinated strike campaign on crossings along the Oskil River in September and October 2023 although this effort did not isolate the Ukrainian defense northeast of Kupyansk and Ukrainian forces have not yet shown any signs of suffering from serious difficulties in supplying positions on the east bank of the Oskil River.[71] Russian forces may resume this effort to degrade Ukrainian logistics and force Ukrainian forces to transfer heavy equipment across the river with more vulnerable crossing equipment Russian forces may also hope that advances closer to the Oskil River will allow Russian fire to interdict the Ukrainian GLOCs running along the west bank of the Oskil River (especially the P-79 and P-78 highways) Russian forces may envision conducting an interdiction effort that eliminates existing Ukrainian crossings to the east bank while also degrading logistics supporting areas on the west bank from where Ukrainian forces could deploy new crossings The Russian command likely hopes that the isolation of the battlespace will allow Russian forces to conduct the operational encirclements and envelopments that they have previously failed to conduct Elements of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces began this operation less degraded and better rested than Russian forces elsewhere along the frontline which may allow these elements to conduct more effective offensive operations than other Russian force groupings These elements may not necessarily have the combat capabilities required to conduct successful maneuver to the Oskil River line A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger questioned the Russian Western Grouping of Forces’ ability to conduct successful offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction after footage published in late December 2023 showed Ukrainian artillery in which Ukrainian forces destroyed columns of Russian armored vehicles.[76] The manpower fill and combat-effectiveness of the newly formed 25th CAA may affect the Russian military’s ability to conduct and support successful offensive operations west of Kreminna where the formation is operating Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov stated in late August 2023 that Russian forces formed the 25th CAA as a “strategic reserve” and did not intend the formation to be combat ready before October or November 2023.[77] Budanov also stated that elements of the 25th CAA deployed to Luhansk Oblast in late August 2023 and were poorly trained and staffed with 80 percent of their planned manpower and only 50 percent of the necessary equipment likely due to their rushed deployment.[78] The likely limited combat power of the 25th CAA may affect the Russian military‘s ability to hold positions near Kreminna as the 144th Motorized Rifle Division pursues advances toward the Zherebets River Advances towards the Oskil River will likely require successful mechanized maneuver in many places and Russian forces remain unlikely to be able to conduct such maneuver across the entire Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line Many of the areas where Russian forces are currently attacking are heavily forested Ukrainian military personnel have previously noted that Russian forces take advantage of this terrain to provide cover for infantry heavy assaults.[79] The land further west of the frontline in the direction of the Oskil River Russian advances through this terrain will likely require at least some successful mechanized assaults while under Ukrainian fire with high visibility Recent chaotic and costly Russian mechanized assaults throughout the theater including along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line suggest that WMD elements will struggle to advance in these areas and that assaults will likely produce significant armored vehicle losses that slow and disrupt the offensive operations.[80] Russian forces have proven more capable of making marginal tactical gains in urban or semi-urban environments although at the expense of heavy personnel losses as seen with the seizure of Bakhmut and Avdiivka.[81] Russian forces throughout much of the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line would have to advance roughly between eight and 35 kilometers through rural and open terrain to reach such semi-urban areas The Kremlin may believe that delayed Western security assistance to Ukraine will give Russian forces opportunities to accelerate advances in the coming months although it is unclear if this belief is accurate Delays in Western security assistance are likely forcing Ukrainian forces to husband materiel The longer the Russian military maintains the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine the more opportunity the Western Grouping of Forces has to achieve its operational objective of pushing Ukrainian forces off the east bank of the Oskil River Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov assessed on January 30 that Russian forces will fail to reach the administrative borders of Luhansk Oblast or the Zherebets River and will likely be “completely exhausted” by the beginning of Spring 2024.[86] Russian forces around Synkivka conducted a localized offensive operation for four months without showing any signs that the effort was near culmination although it is possible that further significant intensification of the Russian operation throughout the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line could result in an operational culmination by the time Budanov identified The Russian ability to conduct routine regroupings and rotations alongside the current operational tempo suggests that Russian forces may be able to continue operations along the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis for longer Budanov may be suggesting that muddy ground conditions in early spring 2024 would force the Russian operation along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line to culminate since the ground will no longer be conducive to mechanized maneuver Heavy spring rains can also interfere with drone operations Russian forces notably launched localized offensive operations throughout eastern Ukraine in Fall 2023 Russian forces could alternatively conduct the operation to reach the Oskil River in several active phases interspersed with operational pauses aimed at resting and preparing forces for resumed attacks in each direction of advance The command of the Western Grouping of Forces has a wide range of options in determining both the tempo and the duration of its offensive effort precisely because the Russian military has the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine Russian forces will be able to determine the location and duration of fighting in Ukraine if Ukraine commits itself to defensive operations throughout 2024.[89] The Western Grouping of Forces may intend to conduct a much longer effort or resume it at a later date in case of its initial failure if it concludes that there is no credible threat of a Ukrainian counteroffensive in the area or elsewhere along the front Operational Effects of a Successful Russian Operation to Reach the Oskil River The Russian seizure of the left bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast would generate immediate operational benefits for Russian forces along the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis and throughout the theater while also setting favorable conditions for future Russian offensive efforts Russian forces have not conducted offensive operations that have led to immediate operational-level benefits or set operational-level conditions for subsequent operations since Spring 2022.[90] Russian forces conducted nominally successful operations to seize Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in summer 2022 and Bakhmut in May 2023 and a nominally successful localized offensive effort to seize Avdiivka in February 2024 but those efforts have only generated limited tactical benefits for Russian forces.[91] A successful Russian operation to reach the Oskil River line would therefore be a significant inflection in over a year and a half of Russian campaigning in Ukraine A successful Russian operation to push Ukrainian forces off the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast would deprive Ukraine of a potential area from which to launch a future counteroffensive operation into northwestern Luhansk Oblast Ukrainian forces previously attempted to advance towards Svatove and Kreminna after liberating Lyman in October 2022 but would also likely ensure that Ukrainian forces were not able to reverse the Kremlin’s achievement anytime soon Russian forces captured all of Luhansk Oblast in July 2022 a victory that the Kremlin soon had spoiled by the Fall 2022 Ukrainian counteroffensive’s advance into Luhansk Oblast.[94] The Kremlin likely hopes that positions along the Oskil River will prevent a scenario in which Russian forces have to routinely fight to retain or recapture Luhansk Oblast and allow the Kremlin to tout the occupation of all of Luhansk Oblast as a permanent victory The Russian seizure of the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast would also likely secure several Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Luhansk Oblast from regular Ukrainian interdiction efforts Russian positions along the P66 (Svatove-Kreminna) highway would be well out of range of Ukrainian tube artillery on the west bank of the Oskil River and Ukrainian tube artillery would have to be deployed very close to the river to strike sections of the P07 (Svatove-Kupyansk) highway Russian forces may also hope to be able to conduct counterbattery fire further into Kharkiv Oblast and push long-range Ukrainian artillery systems and HIMARS launchers out of range of Russian logistics facilities and GLOCs further in the rear Moving Ukrainian fire further west would essentially allow Russian forces to turn a considerable section of Luhansk Oblast into near and deep rear areas and establish less vulnerable logistics to support operations further west and south of the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line Ukrainian forces could still conduct long-range strikes against Russian targets in rear areas of Luhansk Oblast although Ukraine has limited numbers of long-range systems A successful Russian effort to seize the east bank of the Oskil River from Kupyansk to Oskil City would also create a defensible frontline very difficult for Ukrainian forces to attack and thereby allow Russian forces to transfer materiel and manpower to other efforts in Ukraine The Oskil River would act as a significant water obstacle along a sizable sector of the frontline from the international border with Belgorod Oblast all the way to the Donetsk-Kharkiv Oblast border area The only other sector of the frontline along a notable water barrier in Ukraine is the front along the Dnipro River in east (left) bank Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts The Western Grouping of Forces likely envisions a frontline along the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast resembling the frontline along the Dnipro River in some way The Oskil River is nowhere near as wide or as deep as the Dnipro River (excluding in areas of the dried up Kakhovka Reservoir) and some sections of the Oskil River are narrow enough to ford with limited river crossing equipment and possibly even with armored vehicles The Oskil Reservoir from southern Kupyansk-Vuzlovy to west of Oskil City is the Oskil River’s widest section before it narrows at the Oskil Hydroelectric Power Plant This wide section of the Oskil River would be an easily defensible front and even narrower sections of the river are still challenging terrain for Ukrainian forces to conduct counterattacks across Ukrainian forces could more easily conduct cross-river tactical activity along the Oskil River than along the Dnipro River but such activity would likely have poor prospects for reestablishing positions on the east bank of the Oskil River absent a larger Ukrainian crossing effort The relatively defensible frontline would likely require less Russian combat power to hold and allow the Russian command to transfer formations to other efforts in Ukraine or prepare for a subsequent offensive effort in northeastern Ukraine The reduction in routine positional fighting along this frontline would allow the Russian command to transfer manpower and materiel currently operating in the northern sections of advance on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line relatively freely without endangering Russian positions in the area Conditions Setting for Subsequent Operations A successful Russian operation to advance towards the Oskil River would also set conditions for potential subsequent campaigns in northern Donetsk Oblast and/or eastern Kharkiv Oblast and the Russian command may have designed the Winter-Spring 2024 offensive effort on the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis to prepare for successive campaigns in 2025 and beyond The months-long effort to seize the east bank of the Oskil River will likely require the Western Grouping of Forces to consolidate its gains and rest and reconstitute over several months before committing to another large offensive operational effort Russian forces would likely be unable to launch a subsequent campaign from the area until winter 2024-2025 and any Ukrainian counteroffensive operation would likely delay such a subsequent campaign well into 2025 or beyond Russian forces previously attempted to seize the Ukrainian stronghold of Slovyansk in Spring 2022 as part of a wide campaign in eastern Ukraine that failed and the seizure of the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast would set several conditions for Russian forces to revive that effort The Russian military intended to encircle Ukrainian forces in Donetsk Oblast in spring 2022 and attempted to conduct three corresponding maneuvers west from Severodonetsk-Lysychansk and north from Bakhmut to surround and seize Slovyansk.[98] The Russian command likely intended advances along the E40 highway (Izyum-Slovyansk-Bakhmut) highway and the capture of Slovyansk to facilitate the quick encirclement of Ukrainian forces in eastern Donetsk Oblast and open routes for further advances to the western borders of Donetsk Oblast.[99] Russian forces did not advance at the speed required to encircle Ukrainian forces and by summer 2022 Russian forces prioritized the seizure of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk over the wider operational encirclement.[100] The Russian effort to drive on Slovyansk from Izyum culminated in mid-May 2022 and Russian forces likely intended to revive the effort from the Izyum-Lyman area at a later date.[101] Ukrainian forces liberated Izyum in early September 2022 and Lyman in early October 2022 effectively ending any Russian designs to resume a drive on Slovyansk.[102] The Russian seizure of the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast secures what would otherwise be a wide operational flank for a Russian effort to drive on Slovyansk from the northeast A Russian effort to drive on Slovyansk from the Lyman direction would effectively be an offensive effort from an unstable salient unless Russian forces north of Lyman seize the Oskil River line A Ukrainian presence along the east bank of the Oskil River would allow Ukrainian forces to counterattack a Russian drive on Slovyansk from the north The Russian seizure of the east bank of the Oskil River from Kupyansk to Oskil City would secure this operational flank and allow Russian forces to attack along a wider front north of Slovyansk from positions backed by a secure Russian rear with the threat of Ukrainian counterattack confined to the south and west Advances towards Oskil City can set conditions for Russian forces to interdict and possibly cut the E40 highway between Izyum and Slovyansk Oskil City and positions to the southeast are securely within tube artillery range of the section of the E-40 highway connecting Izyum and Slovyansk Russian indirect fire in the area could disrupt the major Ukrainian GLOC connecting Kharkiv Oblast to northern Donetsk Oblast and force Ukrainian forces to reorient GLOCs towards Slovyansk from the northwest and west along smaller country roads or longer routes The Russian command may also envision a subsequent operation from positions near Oskil City to reach and cut the E-40 highway Interdicting and possibly cutting the E40 would recreate some of the effects of the northern envelopment of Slovyansk that Russian forces had initially created from positions near Izyum in Spring 2022.[103] The Russian command could alternatively attempt to conduct a sweeping envelopment of Ukrainian forces in eastern Donetsk Oblast as it had initially planned in spring 2022 by conducting simultaneous maneuvers from the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv and Donetsk oblasts and north from Bakhmut The Russian command has previously shown an affinity for attempting wider operational maneuver across simultaneous axes in Ukraine even if those efforts have been poorly planned and not parts of a cohesive operation with a coordinated objective.[104] The seizure of the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast would allow Russian forces to reattempt the operational encirclement of eastern Donetsk Oblast using two operational offensive maneuvers instead of three Russian forces could revive the initial effort to drive up the E-40 from Bakhmut while also attacking north and northeast of Slovyansk in a narrower and theoretically more manageable operational encirclement of eastern Donetsk Oblast The prospects of Russian success in such a massive undertaking remain highly questionable as long as Ukraine retains anything like its current defensive capabilities The Russian command may also envision that the seizure of the east bank of the Oskil River could facilitate a subsequent drive further west into Kharkiv Oblast although such an operation from these positions would likely be much more difficult than a drive on Slovyansk The Kremlin has indicated that it aims to recapture territory in Kharkiv Oblast and occupy Kharkiv City.[105] The seizure of the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast offers little change to the Russian military's current prospects for trying to secure parts of Kharkiv Oblast Russian forces would need to attack across the Oskil River first and likely would need to operationally encircle west bank Kupyansk or capture Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk) before being able to advance further west into Kharkiv Oblast Neither of those undertakings would be easy Russian forces would need to cross large areas of open rural terrain interspersed with a few small settlements before reaching relatively sizable settlements such as Chuhuiv or Velykyi Burluk Russian forces have not conducted such a long drive since the initial phase of the full-scale invasion and would be highly unlikely to be able to pursue such an effort.[106] Russian forces could alternatively try to capture Izyum from the southeast although such an advance would either likely turn into a vulnerable salient or require similar wide operations across the Oskil River These prospects for Russian advances into Kharkiv Oblast from the east bank of the Oskil River are as challenging as the prospects of advance elsewhere along the international border with Belgorod Oblast if not more so If Russian forces are currently pursuing an operation to reach the Oskil River as a months-long conditions setting effort for a subsequent larger campaign that subsequent larger campaign likely does not aim to advance further west into Kharkiv Oblast The Russian ability to conduct operationally significant offensive efforts is still largely dependent on the level of Western support for Ukraine Well provisioned Ukrainian forces with superior capabilities have previously prevented Russian forces from making even marginal gains during large-scale Russian offensive efforts and have proven effective at causing lasting degradation to Russian logistics and combat capabilities.[107] Ukraine’s current capabilities are denying Russian forces the ability to restore the types of maneuvers required to conduct operationally significant advances but many of those capabilities rely on key systems and materiel from the West and specifically the US.[108] The West has yet to provide Ukraine with certain capabilities that could allow Ukrainian forces to further constrain Russia’s ability to pursue operationally significant advances particularly long-range strike capabilities that could degrade Russian logistics in depth and attack aircraft that could contest Russian aviation operations Ukraine is attempting to rapidly expand its defense industrial base (DIB) to produce many of these capabilities itself and Ukrainian forces are also developing technological innovations and adaptations that aim to offset Russian advantages in manpower and materiel.[109] These Ukrainian efforts will take time to produce results at scale time that Russian forces will use to improve their own capabilities and to conduct potentially significant offensive operations such as their ongoing operation to reach the Oskil River line Delays in Western security assistance have forced Ukrainian forces to husband materiel and have generated uncertainty in Ukrainian operational planning vulnerabilities that Russian forces will increasingly exploit to facilitate gains on the battlefield.[110] Ukraine’s ability to defend itself in the long-term relies on its ability not only to prevent Russian forces from seizing operationally significant ground but also to launch successful counteroffensive operations to liberate strategically vital areas.[111] The Ukrainian ability to seize and retain the theater-wide initiative and to liberate territory is an assured path to denying Russian forces opportunities to pursue strategically significant gains in Ukraine Ukraine therefore needs security assistance that allows it to prevent ongoing Russian efforts to make operationally significant gains while also preparing for operations of its own that can liberate further Ukrainian territory [1] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021424 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2023 ; [2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2023 [3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2023 [4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101623 [5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-12-2023 [6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010524 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-6-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2024 [7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar013024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-19-2024;%C2%A0https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-5-2024 [8] https://vk dot com/wall-170770667_203231 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-12-2023 [10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2024 [11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-12-2024 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1483 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1491 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1519 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/3730?single [12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2024 [13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2024 [14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2024 [15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-13-2024 [16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2024 [17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2024 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1608 [18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-19-2024 [19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2024 [20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2024 [21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-30-2024 ; [22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2024 [24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2024 [26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2024 [30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2023 [33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2024 ; https://suspilne dot media/665728-rosijski-vijska-vikoristovuut-novu-taktiku-na-limanskomu-napramku-recnik-21-ombr/ [34] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1749105243277652257?s=20 ; https://t.me/BALUhub/7890 [35] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2024 ; [36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2024 [37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2024 [38] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2024 [39] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2024 [40] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1491 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1468 ; [41] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101623 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-23-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2024 ; [42] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2024 [44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-19-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-22-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-9-2024 [45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2023 [46] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-28 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-19 [47] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut [48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2023 [49] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar03052023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033023 [50] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut [54] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-1-2023 ; [55] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2023 [57] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2024 [58] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2024 [59] https://isw.pub/UkrWar101623 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-18-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101623 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-23-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2024 ; [60] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2024 [61] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut [62] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023 [63] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023 [64] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut [65] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120923 [68] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut [69] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122623 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-25-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021524 [70] Commercially available satellite imagery via Planet Labs LLC [72] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-5-2024 [73] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-5-2024 [74] https://t.me/rybar/55875 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/3730 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-12-2024 [76] https://t.me/rybar/55875 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-1-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-23 [77] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2023 [78] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2023 [79] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2024 [81] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2024 [82] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2023 [83] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2023 [84] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2024 [85] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-18-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2024 [86] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-30-2024 [87] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121223 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120923 [88] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121223 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120923 [90] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut [91] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021424 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28 [92] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4 ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct1 ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignSept23 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033023 [93] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar03052023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033023 [94] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3 [95] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11 [97] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2023 [98] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11 [99] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11 [100] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Operations%20Assessments%20May%2013.pdf [101] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12 [102] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1 [103] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12 [104] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut [105] https://isw.pub/UkrWar013124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121523 ; [106] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122623 [109] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021424 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base [110] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-18-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2024 [111] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/lands-ukraine-must-liberate You don't have permission to access the page you requested What is this page?The website you are visiting is protected.For security reasons this page cannot be displayed ShareSaveComment@font-face{font-family: "Schnyder"; src: url("https://i.forbesimg.com/assets/fonts/schnyders/schnyders-bold-webfont.woff2") format("woff2") url("https://i.forbesimg.com/assets/fonts/schnyders/schnyders/schnyders-bold-webfont.woff") format("woff"); font-weight: 700; font-style: normal;} @font-face{font-family: "Merriweather"; src: url("https://i.forbesimg.com/assets/fonts/merriweather/merriweather-bold-webfont.woff2") format("woff2") url("https://i.forbesimg.com/assets/fonts/merriweather/merriweather-bold-webfont.woff") format("woff"); font-weight: 700; font-style: normal;} @font-face{font-family: "Euclid"; src: url("https://i.forbesimg.com/assets/fonts/euclidcircularb/euclidcircularb-bold-webfont.woff2") format("woff2") url("https://i.forbesimg.com/assets/fonts/euclidcircularb/euclidcircularb-bold-webfont.woff") format("woff"); font-weight: 700; font-style: normal;} @font-face{font-family: "Schnyder"; src: url("https://i.forbesimg.com/assets/fonts/schnyders/schnyders-light-webfont.woff2") format("woff2") url("https://i.forbesimg.com/assets/fonts/schnyders/schnyders-light-webfont.woff") format("woff"); font-weight: 400; font-style: normal;} @font-face{font-family: "Merriweather"; src: url("https://i.forbesimg.com/assets/fonts/merriweather/merriweather-regular-webfont.woff2") format("woff2") url("https://i.forbesimg.com/assets/fonts/merriweather/merriweather-regular-webfont.woff") format("woff"); font-weight: 400; font-style: normal;} @font-face{font-family: "Euclid"; src: url("https://i.forbesimg.com/assets/fonts/euclidcircularb/euclidcircularb-regular-webfont.woff2") format("woff2") #article-stream-0 .headline-embed .color-accent{color: #000000;} #article-stream-0 .headline-embed.bg-accent #article-stream-0 .headline-embed .bg-accent{background-color: #000000;} #article-stream-0 .headline-embed.color-base #article-stream-0 .headline-embed .color-base{color: #FFFFFF;} #article-stream-0 .headline-embed.bg-base #article-stream-0 .headline-embed .bg-base{background-color: #FFFFFF;} #article-stream-0 .headline-embed.font-base #article-stream-0 .headline-embed .font-base{font-family: Schnyder,"Noto Sans","Droid Sans","Helvetica Neue",Corbel,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;} #article-stream-0 .headline-embed.font-size #article-stream-0 .headline-embed .font-size{font-size: 54px;} #article-stream-0 .quote-embed.color-accent #article-stream-0 .quote-embed .color-accent{color: #FFFFFF;} #article-stream-0 .quote-embed.bg-accent #article-stream-0 .quote-embed .bg-accent{background-color: #FFFFFF;} #article-stream-0 .quote-embed.color-base #article-stream-0 .quote-embed .color-base{color: #000000;} #article-stream-0 .quote-embed.bg-base #article-stream-0 .quote-embed .bg-base{background-color: #000000;} #article-stream-0 .quote-embed.font-accent #article-stream-0 .quote-embed .font-accent{font-family: Schnyder,"Noto Sans","Droid Sans","Helvetica Neue",Corbel,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;} #article-stream-0 .quote-embed.font-size p #article-stream-0 .quote-embed .font-size p{font-size: 36px;} #article-stream-0 .subhead-embed.color-accent #article-stream-0 .subhead-embed .color-accent{color: #333333;} #article-stream-0 .subhead-embed.bg-accent #article-stream-0 .subhead-embed .bg-accent{background-color: #333333;} #article-stream-0 .subhead-embed.font-accent #article-stream-0 .subhead-embed .font-accent{font-family: Euclid,"Noto Sans","Droid Sans","Helvetica Neue",Corbel,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;} #article-stream-0 .subhead-embed.font-size #article-stream-0 .subhead-embed .font-size{font-size: 26px;} #article-stream-0 .subhead3-embed.color-body #article-stream-0 .subhead3-embed .color-body{color: #333333;} #article-stream-0 .subhead3-embed.color-body-border{border-top-color: rgba(51,51,51 #article-stream-0 .subhead3-embed .color-body-border{border-top-color: rgba(51,51,51 0.8);} .bg-body{background-color: #333333;} #article-stream-0 .subhead3-embed.font-accent #article-stream-0 .subhead3-embed .font-accent{font-family: Euclid,"Noto Sans","Droid Sans","Helvetica Neue",Corbel,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;}A Ladoga Soviet authorities asked the Kirovsky Design Bureau in Saint Petersburg to develop a nuclear reconnaissance and command vehicle And not just any nuclear reconnaissance and command vehicle self-contained and thickly armored turretless tank with remote cameras and its own oxygen supply One spent some time in the fallout zone around the nuclear power plant in Chernobyl following the plant’s deadly 1986 meltdown Aside from another that landed in a museum That gap between the newly generated vehicles—500 or 600 tanks a year plus a thousand or so fighting vehicles—and annual losses that average 1,300 tanks and 1,700 fighting vehicles helps to explain why some very strange vehicles have showed up along the front line The Ladoga has a mast-mounted television camera and a full suite of radios that would have allowed the vehicle to work in a doomsday command role Imagine Soviet leaders speeding to safety inside of a Ladoga directing their own nuclear forces as NATO nukes rain down Now imagine some Russian colonel commanding his battalion from a Ladoga’s cozy interior during an attack on Ukrainian forces around Kreminna The tiny force of Ladogas got a workout around Chernobyl but never performed its primary role in an atomic apocalypse Surely no one at Kirovsky imagined aged Ladogas eventually finding their way to the front line of a non-nuclear war in 2024 it’s hard to imagine the engineers in Saint Petersburg 50 years ago could imagine Russia losing 16,000 armored vehicles in a little over two years in a war with It remains to be seen whether they turn up in Ukraine—and whether they survive Andrew Perpetua: https://twitter.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1772650520743645222 Jakub Janovksy: https://x.com/OSINTua/status/1805682646980379109 Oryx: https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html Topwar: https://en.topwar.ru/24858-ot-peredvizhnoy-aes-do-yadernogo-razvedchika-ladoga.html Luhansk city could be step towards launching offensives on Russian-held Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk • Russia-Ukraine war – latest news updates Russia-Ukraine war – latest news updates Ukrainian forces appear to have edged closer to recapturing the key-Russian controlled city of Kreminna in Luhansk province as heavy fighting continued in the east and south of the country. Read moreThe regional governor of Luhansk said fighters in part of the city controlled by Russian command were forced to retreat to Rubizhne as a result of Ukrainian military pressure “The Russians understand that if they lose Kreminna their entire line of defence will fall,” Haidai wrote on the Telegram messaging app on Tuesday “The Russian occupation troops managed to build a very powerful defence in a month They are bringing there a huge amount of reserves and equipment They are constantly renewing their forces.” The Guardian could not independently confirm the battlefield developments Recapturing Kreminna and nearby Svatove could open the way for Kyiv to launch an offensive on Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk, two cities Ukraine lost in the summer. The fierce fighting continues amid no sign of imminent peace talks. Late on Monday Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, said Kyiv must accept Moscow’s demands of “demilitarisation and denazification” or suffer defeat on the battlefield. Lavrov’s statements show the Kremlin has no intention of climbing down from its maximalist goals of regime change in Ukraine, despite Vladimir Putin’s claims on Sunday that Russia was ready for talks to end the war. Read moreIn its daily military briefing on Tuesday Britain’s defence ministry said Russian troops continued to focus their efforts on capturing the city of Bakhmut in the Donetsk region alongside fighters from the Wagner private military group have been trying to seize Bakhmut since July Bakhmut has been largely ravaged after nearly five months of fighting and has been referred to by both sides as the “Bakhmut meat-grinder” The battle for Bakhmut is seen as an important test for the Wagner head, Yevgeny Prigozhin who is believed to have recruited thousands of Russian convicts to help storm the city Prigozhin has previously criticised the Russian defence ministry for its performance in Ukraine and has lauded Wagner as the country’s most capable fighting force In a video published on Monday and purportedly filmed near Bakhmut that will further fuel speculations over tensions within the Russian forces two apparent Wagner soldiers are seen insulting the chief of general staff we have no shells,” one of the men is heard saying The Guardian could not independently verify the footage but when asked about the video by Russian journalists Prigozhin appeared to express his approval for the actions of the soldiers saying he travelled to Bakhmut to meet them “The guys asked me to convey that when you sit in a warm office the problems of the frontline are hard to hear,” Prigozhin said in a statement in an apparent dig at the country’s top military command Last Thursday, Ukraine claimed Russia had “relocated” some of its aircraft away from the Engels airfield, which Moscow said was struck by a Ukrainian drone a day earlier, resulting in the death of three Russian servicemen. “After yesterday’s well-known events, we see that the planes are dispersed there, namely strategic aviation … Of course, a certain number of aircraft still remain there, but many of them have already been relocated to various airfields,” Col Yuriy Ignat, the chief spokesperson for the Ukrainian Air Force Command, told Ukrainian media. Russia’s security services claimed they had “liquidated” four Ukrainian soldiers who were on a reconnaissance mission in Russia’s southern Bryansk region the incident sheds light on the ongoing activities of Ukrainian saboteurs inside Russian territory including oil and weapon depots have been damaged after catching fire Kyiv does not publicly admit to attacks inside Russia but has previously cheered such incidents as payback Putin concluded his two-day “informal summit” in St Petersburg with the heads of the Commonwealth of Independent States a Moscow-led group consisting of former Soviet states by gifting the eight leaders present gold rings The meeting came on the back of growing unease between the Russian president and the rest of the CIS bloc as nations have sought to distance themselves from Moscow’s faltering war Ukraine launched a limited offensive strike to the east to liberate the town of Kriminna and perhaps cut off a north/south supply line of the Russian army in the Luhansk region There are preliminary reports that Ukraine launched a limited offensive push in the direction of the town of Kreminna in the Luhansk region on Christmas Eve with enough success that the Russian military is said to have withdrawn its command staff from the town and evacuated to the East to the town of Rubizhny The evacuation suggests the fear of being enveloped as Ukrainian forces tie down Russian troops to their front and then envelope the town and cut off retreat In a move reminiscent of Washington’s attack on Trenton New Jersey on Christmas night 1776 Washington’s forces caught a regiment of Hessian mercenaries sleeping in after a night of drunken Christmas celebrations and routed them killing and wounding more than 100 and leaving 800 more captured or missing Ukrainian forces are believed to have first captured the towns of Chervonopopivka and Dibrova The current temperature in the area is 35 degrees with snow on the ground and more on the way this week Russian Forces captured Kriminna in April 2022 and it occupies a strategic location in Luhansk Oblast along the North/South supply route of the P-66 highway Ukraine’s recapture of this town threatens the supplies of Russian units stationed north of Kreminna and receiving supplies from the hub in Severodonetsk to the South East It also gives Ukraine a ready route of advance to Severodonetsk as it continues limited offensive operations in the bitter cold and snow winter offensives are notoriously difficult to sustain in terms of distance Troops are slogging through snow and exposed to freezing temperatures tanks are confined to main roads to reduce the risk of bogging down in deep snow drifts The need to shelter your troops indoors if possible means offensive operations tend to be directed towards objectives that provide shelter to the army rather than just grabbing open terrain the cold can produce more casualties than bombs and bullets frostbite frequently involves the amputation of lower extremities Recovery from such injuries takes far longer and the soldier is unable to return to the battlefield missing things like his feet or hands According to the Ukrainian news source Ukrinform.net the Defence Ministry of Ukraine is not claiming to have occupied the Kriminna as of this moment saying in a statement by spokesman Serhil Haidai “The reports that our military has already liberated Kreminna or at least advanced to its outskirts are not true but the fighting is going on near the city and I can say that the command of a certain echelon that was stationed in Kreminna has now been moved to Rubizhne,” This is a developing story that we will follow and update As someone who’s seen what happens when the truth is distorted I know how unfair it feels when those who’ve sacrificed the most lose their voice you’re not just leveling the playing field—you’re standing with those who’ve already given so much ensuring they continue to serve by delivering stories that matter Every subscription means we can hire more veterans and keep their hard-earned knowledge in the fight You must become a subscriber or login to view or post comments on this article Anduril Is the Netflix of War—and the Old Defense Giants Are About to Get Blockbuster’d SOFREP Evening Brief: Trump Annoys 1.4 Billon Catholics by Posting Pic of Himself As Pope Putin Says He Hopes He Won’t Have to Use Nukes in Ukraine Mexico Rejects US Offer to Send Troops Across the Border British Special Air Service Compromised: How a Decade-Long Security Oversight Put Elite Operatives at Risk The Great Goat Heist: Inside the Navy’s Mascot Snatch · 4 hours ago SOFREP Evening Brief: Israel Approves Gaza Seizure Plan, Pakistan Conducts Second Missile Test · 5 hours ago Anduril Is the Netflix of War—and the Old Defense Giants Are About to Get Blockbuster’d · 9 hours ago SOFREP Evening Brief: Trump Annoys 1.4 Billon Catholics by Posting Pic of Himself As Pope, Putin Says He Hopes He Won’t Have to Use Nukes in Ukraine, Mexico Rejects US Offer to Send Troops Across the Border · 10 hours ago SOFREP Evening Brief: Trump Annoys 1.4 Billon Catholics by Posting Pic of Himself As Pope, Putin Says He Hopes He Won’t Have to Use Nukes in Ukraine, Mexico Rejects US Offer to Send Troops Across the Border · 1 day ago Your Subscription Supports our Veteran Staff Barrett is the world leader in long-range, large-caliber, precision rifle design and manufacturing. Barrett products are used by civilians, sport shooters, law enforcement agencies, the United States military, and more than 75 State Department-approved countries around the world. Our ultra-portable washing machine makes your journey easier. This convenient, pocket-sized travel companion allows you to travel lighter while helping you save money, time and water. Our roots in shooting sports started off back in 1996 with our founder and CEO, Josh Ungier. His love of airguns took hold of our company from day one and we became the first e-commerce retailer dedicated to airguns, optics, ammo, and accessories. Over the next 25 years, customers turned to us for our unmatched product selection, great advice, education, and continued support of the sport and airgun industry. RecPak is a meal replacement for the outdoors that saves you weight, space and time in the most challenging environments, just add water. © 2025 Military Content Group. All Rights Reserved. The Russian Foreign Ministry’s ambassador-at-large for the crimes of the Kyiv regime told RIA Novosti on Thursday. The Ukrainian armed forces have launched massive shelling in the city of Kremennaya (also known as Kreminna) in the Luhansk People’s Republic, injuring at least one civilian, Rodion Miroshnik. “More than 30 projectiles, including those equipped with cluster warheads, were fired by the Ukrainian armed forces at a residential district in Kremennaya. “Houses and an administrative building were severely damaged,’’ Mr Miroshnik said. The attack cut power to a large part of the city. “At least one civilian is reported to be wounded. Local authorities are conducting house-to-house checks and taking measures to respond to the consequences of the shelling of civilian infrastructure,’’ Mr Miroshnik said. Kremennaya sits on the border between the Luhansk and the Donetsk People’s Republics, on the road to Krasny Liman (Lyman) and further to Slavyansk (Sloviansk). The Luhansk People’s Republic took control of the city in April 2022, which at the time had a population of less than 19,000.  We encourage you to join the conversation on our stories via our Facebook (adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({}); The federal government has urged stakeholders in the agriculture and finance sectors in the West Africa region to leverage financing strategies to enhance agroecology practices “Katsina State is Atiku’s political base because it is his second home.” He mentioned that 10 kilometres of the Sokoto-Badagry road project would also be inaugurated before May 25 Mr Trump has threatened certain unauthorised immigrants with prosecution Twenty fellows will be selected—ten from the African continent and ten from the global African diaspora Mr Bwala argued that another achievement of Mr Tinubu’s government is the increased monthly allocation to states Dangote expressed confidence that the new leadership of NNPC Limited will propel the country’s energy industry to new heights and respect for constitutional rights are foundational pillars of the Nigerian Republic © 2025 Peoples Gazette™ Limited 2023Members of Ukraine's 95th Air Assault Brigade defend an area near the front line of fighting on Jan located on the western edge of the Luhansk region has seen fierce fighting between Ukraine and the Russian forces who occupy it (Photo by Spencer Platt/Getty Images)This has not been the winter Vladimir Putin wished for The Russian president expected temperatures to plummet and with them Ukrainian resolve as well as Western resilience France’s recent decision to deliver tank-killing armored combat vehicles to Ukraine softened reservations among allies about sending heavier Western-made equipment for fears that such a move would represent escalation against Russia Polish President Andrzej Duda has expressed his readiness to cross yet another threshold, that of main battle tanks, by offering to deliver Leopard 2 as part of a larger European coalition He thus adds pressure on Chancellor Olaf Scholz since the German-made tanks require Berlin’s approval to be sent anywhere The weapons would be a big boost for Ukraine’s military but Germany since the beginning of the war has constantly refused to create precedents in military support The current level of pressure might not yet be untenable but it is very high and might deepen cracks in the country’s governing coalition These new deliveries are pivotal for several reasons they meet Ukrainian demands and needs to fight off Russian forces Ukraine’s most critical needs rest on two types of capabilities: air defense systems for shooting down missiles and drones and armored combat vehicles for breaking through enemy lines and liberate territories The latter might indeed prove more challenging as Russia has fallen back to more defensive positions recruited fresh troops through mass conscription returned to frenetic industrial production (40 to 50 heavy armored vehicles per month) and is crowding its best tanks Yet this new wave does not come without risks. The reluctance to give Ukraine domestically designed heavy armored fighting vehicles was grounded in fears that this could be used by Russia as an excuse to escalate. In the present case, escalation could entail increased use of largely untapped tactical weapons and, ultimately, a potential nuclear option. The reality is that qualitative upgrades in military aid to Ukraine are likely to change the tactical landscape for Russia but not its strategic equation. In any event, it is up to the Ukrainians to say if they are willing to bear the risks of escalation rather than for the West to decide for them. And Ukrainian calls in this regard could not be more clear: Heavier, more sophisticated equipment is not a fear-enhancer, but a fear-eraser. On the nuclear equation, the only escalation that the new deliveries might incur would be related to Moscow’s rhetoric. Russia is all too aware that nuclear threats have no impact on Ukrainian resolve. The main objective of Moscow’s nuclear saber-rattling is therefore to scare the West so that it restrains its support to Ukraine. This, too, seems to have failed. This new wave of military support to Ukraine can be a watershed moment. It might have the ability to decisively reverse the tide, if it is swiftly implemented, sustained, and ideally enhanced. Mathieu Droin is a visiting fellow at the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program of the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies. A career diplomat with the French Foreign Service, he most recently served as deputy head of the Strategic Affairs Division at the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs. Facebook pageTwitter feedRSS feedDefense News © 2025 The Ukrainian armed forces have launched a massive attack in the city of Kremennaya (also known as Kreminna) in the Luhansk People’s Republic The Russian Foreign Ministry’s ambassador-at-large for the crimes of the Kiev regime including those equipped with cluster warheads were fired by the Ukrainian armed forces at a residential district in Kremennaya “Houses and an administrative building were severely damaged,” Miroshnik said the attack cut power to a large part of the city “At least one civilian is reported to be wounded Local authorities are conducting house-to-house checks and taking measures to respond to the consequences of the shelling of civilian infrastructure,” Miroshnik added DAILY POST reports that Kremennaya sits on the border between the Luhansk and the Donetsk People’s Republics on the road to Krasny Liman (Lyman) and further to Slavyansk (Sloviansk) It was also gathered that the Luhansk People’s Republic took control of the city in April 2022 which at the time had a population of less than 19,000 I would’ve publicly criticised Tinubu govt even as member of his cabinet – El-Rufai to Bwala 20 American mercenaries missing in Ukraine conflict War: I’ve had good discussions on Russia Putin speaks on use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine Several residential buildings on fire in Russia’s drone attack Ukraine War: Russia unleashes several drone attacks on Ukraine’s Kyiv War: Ukraine claims history as it downs Russian fighter jet May 10 uncertain for Ukraine – Russia on Zelenskyy’s warning to visiting leaders Copyright © Daily Post Media Ltd New footage appears to show a Ukrainian attack on a Russian state media team that Moscow-backed media said killed a Russian Defense Ministry press officer and wounded two others Russian state media reported that Yevgeny Polovodov a press officer with Russia's Western group of forces was killed by Ukrainian shelling near the Luhansk city of Kreminna He was part of a camera crew working for the All-Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company "We convey our condolences to the family of the deceased Yevgeny Polovodov," Vesti Luhansk said in a post to the Telegram messaging app shared by state outlet Russia-1 and widely circulated on social media appears to show the crew under fire and evacuating through a wooded area Vesti Luhansk also posted a shorter version of the footage to social media Newsweek could not independently verify the footage Ukrainian forces chased the Russian crew with unmanned aerial vehicles "We demand that relevant international structures resolutely condemn and take appropriate measures to respond to the ongoing series of terrorist attacks by the Kyiv clique and its agents against representatives of the domestic media sphere," Zakharova added Russia's investigative committee has launched an investigation Newsweek has reached out to the Ukrainian military for comment Moscow has annexed Ukraine's eastern Luhansk region and Kyiv has vowed to roll back the Kremlin's grip on the territories Kreminna sits east of the current front lines and the area east of the city has been a fighting hot spot There were no confirmed changes along the front line sweeping down from the east of the Kharkiv city of Kupiansk, past the Russian-held city of Svatove and down to Kreminna, the U.S. think tank, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) said on Wednesday Russia's Defense Ministry said on Wednesday that its Western group of forces "improved the situation along the front line" close to Kupiansk and three armored combat vehicles in the area over the previous 24 hours Ukraine's military reported little Russian activity around Kupiansk over the past day (Photo by Diego Herrera Carcedo/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)Editor’s note: The Kyiv Independent is not disclosing the full names or deployed positions of the Ukrainian soldiers interviewed in the story due to security concerns amid the ongoing war partly destroyed road through the Serebrianskyi Forest in the northern part of Donetsk Oblast is constantly targeted by Russian artillery The road is one of the very few pathways Ukrainian troops can still use to reach their front-line positions near the Russian-occupied town of Kreminna on the Lyman axis "The fire is so dense that if they wanted to they could hit everything," said Vitaly a 27-year-old acting platoon commander with the 63rd Separate Mechanized Brigade while driving to the front-line position through the forest "They are throwing all they have at us." the task is to hold on to positions as long as possible while hoping their comrades deliver results on other axes where the Ukrainian counteroffensive is ongoing And they are intensifying their artillery fire and approaching Ukrainian positions Soldiers who spoke with the Kyiv Independent said that despite constant assaults Russian troops have only advanced about 500 meters over the past two months – the distance of roughly five football fields The Russians are always looking for weak points Russians have been amassing forces in the northeast over the recent weeks, with the Ukrainian military reporting that Moscow has gathered over 100,000 personnel and 370 rocket systems in the northeastern Lyman-Kupiansk direction say it has been a challenge to hold on with very few resources – an ongoing problem that has only worsened with time "There are not enough evacuation cars “Not enough people – that is the primary problem." was already gone when Vitaly's 63rd Separate Mechanized Brigade was transferred to the Kreminna front from Bakhmut in March The soldiers said that their experience fighting near Kreminna has been tough because there is nowhere to hide – especially compared to Bakhmut a city in Donetsk Oblast once home to 70,000 people which had many high-rising buildings that defenders used to shelter burned-down trees make it easy for both Ukraine and Russia to spot each other's equipment and infantry positions – a major headache for both sides Russia is sending waves of assault groups of up to 10 people Ukrainian soldiers say that Russians had a brief pause in the attacks in June but got back at it again in July – increasing their frequency and intensity Russian forces use aerial reconnaissance drones to locate Ukrainian positions They also send small infantry groups to gather information such as to observe break schedules and how rotation works – and sometimes begin shooting to find Ukrainian positions based on the return fire and Grad rockets begin bombarding Ukrainian positions The Russian assault groups always have enormous artillery support Artillery stops firing only when Russians are already nearby – leading to a close-range shooting battle The Russian assault soldiers can shoot just as well as the Ukrainians said it's extremely difficult because Russia often jams the radio connecting the front-line positions to the headquarters during assault operations Even if the Russians don't completely shut off the radio network missing a few words of the command can be detrimental Every word from the radio is important information," Vasyl said While his unit has been able to hold the position thus far Vasyl said it had taken a heavy toll near Kreminna When they arrived at the Kreminna front in March his unit had 80 infantrymen – though an infantry company should have 100-120 people the unit had 34 active service members – the rest were killed an infantryman with the Dnipro Battalion who was also deployed in the area said the only thing that helps survive is digging deep into the ground it's almost impossible to prepare a very good dugout in the forest and there are other complicating factors as well – rain the mosquitoes are more annoying than the Russians," he joked "The survival chance of infantry in urban conditions is higher than in the forest," Denys said "It's easier to be killed in the forest Russia has outgunned Ukraine throughout the entire war with Ukraine concentrating a magnitude of firepower on the southern and eastern fronts soldiers near Kreminna are facing an unprecedented lack of manpower and fire support This leads to stretched hours on the front line – with 59-year-old Dmytro saying that he stood 22 days on the first line of defense without rotation or a proper break The assaults and artillery fire are endless and it's like that constantly," Dmytro explained says some of the losses could have been avoided if there were more armored vehicles that could get close to the positions through the forest Another problem is with thermal imagers: Each position only has one device The soldiers add that communication appears to be poor with their own fire support often hitting close to their trenches Mortarmen Serhiy and Anton with the 63rd brigade say that it is difficult to hit the required target as Russian infantry stands close to Ukrainian positions Aerial reconnaissance is key in this regard the better they will be protected because the Russians would be afraid to bring their equipment closer Serhiy said Ukrainian soldiers in all parts of the front line have consistently said they don’t have enough always seem to have an endless supply of men ______________________________________________________ Thank you for reading our story. Despite fending off intensifying Russian offensive with limited resources, the way the soldiers supported each other touched my heart. To help the Kyiv Independent continue telling stories that may otherwise be untold, please consider becoming our supporter. real incomes would only exceed 2021 levels by 2% by the decade's end and a middle class that grew after Vladimir Putin became president in 2000 would shrink markedly.Reporting by Mike Collett-White west of Kreminna Pavel Polityuk in Kyiv and Reuters bureaux; Writing by Peter Graff and David Brunnstrom; Editing by Philippa Fletcher The head of the Severodonetsk District Military Administration, Roman Vlasenko, said this on Telegram analysts reported that the enemy retreated in the Serebryansky forest and Klishchiivka confirmed that Ukrainian defenders had driven out the occupiers in the Serebryansky forest," the statement reads nine battles continue in the Pokrovsk direction While citing and using any materials on the Internet links to the website ukrinform.net not lower than the first paragraph are mandatory citing the translated materials of foreign media outlets is possible only if there is a link to the website ukrinform.net and the website of a foreign media outlet Materials marked as "Advertisement" or with a disclaimer reading "The material has been posted in accordance with Part 3 of Article 9 of the Law of Ukraine "On Advertising" No 1996 and the Law of Ukraine "On the Media" No 2023 and on the basis of an agreement/invoice Online media entity; Media identifier - R40-01421 Brendan Cole is a Newsweek Senior News Reporter based in London He also covers other areas of geopolitics including China Brendan joined Newsweek in 2018 from the International Business Times and well as English You can get in touch with Brendan by emailing b.cole@newsweek.com or follow on him on his X account @brendanmarkcole The bloody fight for the Donetsk town of Soledar has taken a heavy toll on Russian and Ukrainian forces amid speculation over what it might signify for the next stage of the war British defense officials said that as of Sunday Ukrainian forces have "almost certainly maintained positions" in the town Former British military intelligence officer Philip Ingram told Newsweek that reported Russian gains in Soledar were "tactically important" as Wagner continued to try to surround and capture Bakhmut "But the battle for Bakhmut has been going on for six months and progress for the Russians has been painfully slow and at huge cost," he said the longer they can keep the Russians tied up focusing more and more resources on Bakhmut the more it gives Ukrainian formations time to prepare get additional equipment and plan for their next counteroffensive "The Ukrainians have fixed Russian attention onto Bakhmut and fixing a formation is a military operation," he added comprise of a single segment of the frontline and are treated as a unit by both Kyiv and Moscow The independent Russian language news outlet said that the loss of Soledar would threaten Ukrainian positions around Bakhmut as well as the supply lines west of the urban area it said a Ukrainian breakthrough by Kreminna on the northern flank of the Russian grouping would endanger the Russian offensive on Bakhmut Ministry of Defense said that intense fighting continued in both the Kreminna and Bakhmut sectors of the Donbas front There have been attacks and counterattacks in wooded country around Kreminna but Ukrainian armed forces "continue to gradually advance their front line east on the edge of Kremina town," the update added the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) outlined on Sunday its long-term predictions for the next steps in the war in the coming months The first is for Moscow to seek to conduct a major offensive in the Luhansk oblast The second would be a Russian defensive operation to defeat and exploit a Ukrainian counteroffensive This follows the Kremlin's redeployment of units from Kherson to Luhansk and the Russian oblasts of Belgorod and Kursk after its withdrawal from Kherson Moscow's intentions for a counteroffensive have been predicted by Kyiv and Russian military bloggers because "the full capture" of that and the Donetsk region "remain the Kremlin's official war goals and are among Russia's most achievable," the ISW said What Moscow does next will depend on what President Vladimir Putin does with the troops called up during a partial mobilization drive Amid accusations that the new reservists are ill equipped and ill trained analysts have cast doubt on whether such troops would be used for offensive operations or whether they are more likely to hold the line and only push forward incrementally "I think even if you could mobilize 300,000 plus people you're going to utilize them to maintain the terrain that you have out of Crimea and the Donbas and not have them go down the offensive plan again to retake ground you already lost," Dale Buckner CEO of international security firm Global Guardian Isabel van Brugen is a Newsweek Reporter based in Kuala Lumpur Her focus is reporting on the Russia-Ukraine war Isabel joined Newsweek in 2021 and had previously worked with news outlets including the Daily Express You can get in touch with Isabel by emailing i.vanbrugen@newsweek.com or by following her on X @isabelvanbrugen Russia seems to be reinforcing a portion of its front line as Ukraine edges closer to recapturing a key city in the Donbas Britain's Ministry of Defence (MOD) said on Wednesday In recent days, Russian forces in Luhansk have likely reinforced positions in the strategically important Russian-controlled city of Kreminna in the eastern Luhansk region, the U.K. ministry said in its daily intelligence update on the war in Ukraine Russian and Ukrainian forces have clashed recently around the small city, which is located near to Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk—two larger, industrial cities that were seized by Russian President Vladimir Putin's troops in the summer Britain's defense ministry said Russia is facing continued pressure from Ukrainian operations in Kreminna which has been relatively vulnerable since Ukrainian forces advanced through the town of Lyman "Russia has constructed extensive new defences in the area and will likely prioritise holding the line here," the MOD said The report notes that the area is logistically important for Russia's Donbas front and it is also a significant town in Luhansk Oblast "The Kremlin claims that the 'liberation' of this area is a core justification for the war," the ministry said Latest Defence Intelligence update on the situation in Ukraine - 28 December 2022 Find out more about the UK government's response: https://t.co/KOvHhO8Y9i🇺🇦 #StandWithUkraine 🇺🇦 pic.twitter.com/otCtc6tEr4 Serhiy Haidai, governor of the Luhansk region said Wednesday on his Telegram page that Russian nationals are fleeing Kreminna "Military commanders have really moved to other settlements nearby," the governor said "All Russians who came here to work—civilians or some kind of repair crews—have already cut their work short and returned to the Russian Federation Work that had been started is now frozen." He added that once Ukraine liberates Kreminna "the turn of other towns in Luhansk will come because they've been ruined to such an extent that they are indefensible." The governor previously said that Russian forces have built up reinforcements in the region as they fear losing Kreminna "The Russians understand that if they lose Kreminna their entire line of defense will fall," Haidai wrote on his Telegram channel on Tuesday "The Russian occupation troops managed to build a very powerful defense in a month They are constantly renewing their forces." Recapturing the city would allow Ukraine to control key roads leading to Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said in his nightly address on Monday that the situation in Kreminna and other areas in Ukraine's east is "difficult "The occupiers are using all the resources available to them—and these are significant resources—to squeeze out at least some advance," he said Newsweek reached out to Russia's Foreign Ministry for comment ET: This article was updated with an amended headline Do you have a tip on a world news story that Newsweek should be covering Do you have a question about the Russia-Ukraine war Russian commentators sharply criticized military leaders after a shocking report said a large Russian force was struck at a position close to the front and within range of Ukraine's artillery.  Some reports put the number of dead as high as 100 troops and the total casualties as high as 200 making the reported incident in the city of Kreminna potentially one of the more deadly strikes by Ukraine in the nearly 16-month war The casualty figures from the incident behind Russian lines could not be independently assessed but reactions in the information space showed Russian nationalists quickly turning on military leaders "The Armed Forces of Ukraine have no merit in this war We are at war with our own stupidity and sloppiness." Accounts differed on why the Russian soldiers had been massed with some suggesting it was to load supplies and weapons and others saying it was to await a general's pep talk before a dangerous mission an expert on the Russian military with the Foreign Policy Research Institute was later promoted and is now a major general Russian milbloggers shared a photo of him in a dress uniform in response to the reports Wednesday It wasn't clear if the latest casualties also included troops from the naval infantry that Akhmedov had led before commanding a Russian field army.   faulted the troops themselves for using their cell phones Serhiy Haidai says Moscow’s forces are trying unsuccessfully to advance westwards in ‘maximum’ escalation Russia has launched a major offensive in eastern Ukraine and is trying to break through defences near the town of Kreminna the governor for the Luhansk region said on Thursday Serhiy Haidai told Ukrainian TV that Russian troops had gone on the attack and were trying to advance westwards across a winter landscape of snow and forests. There had been “maximum escalation” and a big increase in shooting and shelling, he said. “These attacks are practically a daily occurrence. We see small groups [of Russian soldiers] trying to advance, sometimes with the support of heavy armour – infantry fighting vehicles and tanks – and sometimes not. There is continuous firing.” Read moreHe claimed the offensive had not worked Our defenders have been able to hold them back completely,” he said Western governments believe Russia is planning a major assault on Ukraine possibly as early as next week before the 24 February anniversary of its full-scale invasion Its main goal is believed to be to capture the Donbas region Ukrainian government sources say one scenario would include ballistic missile strikes on large cities including Kyiv and an attempt to cut off the east of the country by bombing bridges and advancing in a sweeping arc from the north and south Military analysts are sceptical that Russia has enough infantry units to advance rapidly into Ukrainian territory that some sections of the Ukrainian-Russian border are lightly defended with the bulk of Ukrainian forces located in the eastern Donetsk province where fighting rages around the city of Bakhmut There are growing signs that even with Russia’s wider battle strategy unknown a substantial offensive in the east has already started which dug in and brought in reinforcements after Ukrainian troops retook almost all of Kharkiv province and pushed into Luhansk last autumn are now moving forward along a broad front west of the towns of Svatove and Kreminna Punching through Ukrainian lines there would take Russian forces a step closer to the much larger city of Kramatorsk Haidai said Ukraine needed “heavy equipment and artillery ammunition then we will not only be able to maintain the defence but also make a good counter-offensive operation.” which lies about 60 miles (100km) north-west of the regional capital Before the Ukrainian counter-offensive last year They launched another offensive last night We have many injured but they have many more casualties.” Free weekly newsletterThe most pressing stories and debates for Europeans – from identity to economics to the environment The Institute for the Study of War confirmed a “marked increase” in operations in the area over the past week in its latest report It said Russia had made marginal gains along the border between Kharkiv and Luhansk provinces The offensive had probably not yet “reached its full tempo” “The commitment of significant elements of at least three major Russian divisions to offensive operations in this sector indicates the Russian offensive has begun even if Ukrainian forces are so far preventing Russian forces from securing significant gains,” the ISW report said who advises the interior ministry in Kyiv and runs a popular Telegram social media channel also suggested Russia’s offensive had started “Russia throws colossal amounts of weapons and people to attack Ukraine and has been for some time,” he posted We keep hearing reports that Russia is about to launch a huge offensive in the East of Ukraine (sometimes other regions are mentioned).In fact, the offensive is already going on. Russia throws colossal amounts of weapons and people to attack Ukraine and has been for some time. pic.twitter.com/8CYfM5ONG2 Videos and photographs indicate that Russian forces have recently taken losses. Haidai, on his Telegram channel, linked to an interview on Russian state TV with the crew of a tank support fighting vehicle known as a Terminator The triumphant report on Channel One was filmed in the woods of Luhansk province Haidai wrote that the tank, which starred in the “main propaganda TV show”, had now been eliminated “So many beautiful words about the tank being almost impossible to destroy….almost😂😂,” the governor wrote Ukraine released video on Thursday that suggested Russia had lost more than 20 armoured vehicles near the Ukrainian-held town of Vulhedar Ukraine’s 72nd separate mechanised brigade wiped out nearly a third of all Russian combat vehicles in the area in a lethal counterattack The battle for the large-scale de-occupation of the Luhansk region begins from Kreminna and Svatovo The enemy has already begun to move equipment closer to these cities This was reported by the governor of Luhansk Oblast Kreminna is completely empty – the Russian army has left the city The Ukrainian flag raised by the partisans is fluttering there,” Mr Haidai stated The region was occupied at the end of July [email protected] [email protected] FB: @uwcongress Kyiv's fighters "crushed" a convoy of Russian armored vehicles in northeastern Ukraine ahead of an anticipated Russian push as early as next month Ukrainian reconnaissance assets zeroed in on an armored column close to Ukrainian positions near the Russian-controlled eastern city of Kreminna which is now part of Ukraine's National Guard Russia launched an assault on the Donetsk city of Avdiivka in mid-October 2023 and captured the strategic settlement in mid-February While Moscow's main efforts concentrated on that settlement clashes have continued along the long front line snaking from Kreminna down to Ukraine's southern Kherson region "The soldiers of the 12th Azov Brigade and the 95th Air Assault Brigade crushed the enemy convoy" near the village of Terny the Azov Brigade said in a post to messaging app Telegram Russian forces lost 11 pieces of equipment and the Ukrainian brigade took a T-72B2M tank A total of 50 Russian fighters were killed sharing footage purportedly showing the attack The video appears to show Ukrainian kamikaze drones heading for a line of armored vehicles with airborne drones capturing footage of explosions along the convoy A final shot in the video appears to show the captured Russian tank Newsweek could not independently verify the brigade's claims The Russian Defense Ministry has been approached for comment via email Russian forces have slowly advanced towards the village of Terny, west of their current positions. The U.S.-based think tank, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) recently evaluated that Moscow's troops were within around 700 meters of the village Russia loses 11 pieces of equipment in repelled attack near Terny, Donetsk obl. As well, Azov soldiers trophied a damaged tank Terny has been a focal point of Russian attacks in recent days. 🇺🇦Intel spotted an armored group of Russians moving toward Ukrainian positions in the… pic.twitter.com/PB5tjbFpR4 Ukraine's military said on Sunday that its forces "repelled" seven Russian attacks around Terny in the past day "The enemy tried to break through our troops' defenses," Kyiv said in a statement Russia's Defense Ministry said on Sunday that it had fought off "two counterattacks by assault groups from the 95th Airborne Assault Brigade" around Terny Ukraine's Azov Brigade rose out of the Azov Battalion and has roots in far-right ideology and ultranationalism from which it has sought to distance itself over the course of the full-scale war the brigade has been absorbed into Ukraine's National Guard Kyiv has warned that Russia will likely start a new offensive in late May or during the summer and that it is amassing new troops for the effort have suggested that Russia may focus on the western parts of Ukraine's eastern Donetsk region "in hopes of building upon Russian forces' steady but marginal advances in this sector." Russian forces are attacking in waves with air support in eastern Ukraine as Moscow's long-anticipated spring offensive appears to be getting underway "The Russians attack in 'waves' with the support of aviation," Serhiy Haidai the governor of the eastern Donbas' Luhansk region noting that the Luhansk settlement of Belogorivka was one area where the Russians were attacking the Institute for the Study of War think tank said it maintained its assessment that Russia's most likely cause of action was to launch "an imminent offensive effort" in the contested Luhansk region Ukraine's General Staff of the Armed Forces said Russia's goal was still to assert control over the Luhansk and Donetsk regions "Over the past 24 hours, units of the Defense Forces have repelled attacks of occupiers in the areas of more than 20 settlements," the General Staff wrote on Facebook listing Belogorivka and the Luhansk city of Kreminna among the locations where Russian attacks had been repulsed On Wednesday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's office also said Ukraine had fended off attacks in eastern parts of Luhansk But the "situation in the region remains difficult," the president's office added But Russia's Defense Ministry said on Wednesday that Russian forces had pushed back Ukrainian lines in Luhansk Moscow said Kyiv's forces had "retreated to a distance of up to 3 kilometers [two miles] from the previously occupied lines." Russian troops had broken through a second line of Ukrainian defense in Luhansk It did not specify which part of Luhansk this report referred to Haidai said reports from Russian sources do "not correspond to reality." On Tuesday, Haidai said Ukrainian forces were expecting "massive attacks" in Luhansk, and had warned on February 6 that an "enemy offensive can begin at any time after February 15." Speaking to British broadcaster BBC's Radio 4 program on Wednesday the deputy director-general of the Royal United Services Institute think tank in London said neither Moscow nor Kyiv currently have an advantage over the other Russian advances do not "look anything like the large-scale capture of Ukrainian territory which we saw in the initial phases of the invasion," according to Professor Malcolm Chalmers said on Monday that Russia has not been able to muster a single force "to punch through" Ukrainian defenses He told the same program that British military intelligence estimates that 97 percent of the Russian army has been deployed in Ukraine the U.K.'s defense ministry said in its daily update that Russian forces "are making continuous offensive efforts" in the Kreminna-Svatove area of Luhansk But "each local attack remains on too small a scale to achieve a significant breakthrough," the government department said