Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 25, 2025
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine
This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine
Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine
These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline
ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on February 25
ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
Russian President Vladimir Putin implicitly acknowledged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the legitimate president of Ukraine and Russia's future negotiating partner while promoting a new information operation that aims to destabilize Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian military from within
Putin gave an interview with Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on February 24 in which Putin stated that "elections in Ukraine are not held under the pretext of martial law" — Putin's first acknowledgment that Ukrainian law prohibits elections during martial law.[1] Putin claimed that Zelensky is "toxic" for Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian military and that Zelensky would lose any future presidential election to other Ukrainian political and military leaders
Putin's statements are likely aimed at Ukrainian and Russian audiences
Putin's claims that Zelensky is unpopular and harmful to Ukraine are attempts to drive a wedge between the legitimate government of Ukraine and the Ukrainian military and population
Putin has repeatedly claimed that Zelensky is not the legitimate leader of Ukraine after Ukraine did not hold elections in 2024 — in accordance with Ukrainian law — as part of Russian efforts to claim that Russia cannot negotiate with Zelensky.[2] US President Donald Trump has stated that Putin and Zelensky must engage in negotiations
and Putin is likely shifting his rhetoric in order to explain to Russian domestic audiences his decision to engage in any future negotiations with Zelensky.[3] Putin and other Kremlin officials will likely attempt to exploit any Ukrainian military setbacks or differing opinions among Ukrainian officials to intensify this information operation and sow discord in Ukraine
Putin attempted to use new language to repackage the calls for regime change in Ukraine that he has demanded since 2021
The Kremlin has previously used thinly veiled calls for "denazification" to demand regime change in Ukraine
and Putin appears to be using new language to make these same demands.[5] Putin has demanded Ukrainian regime change since Summer 2021.[6]
Putin offered to make a deal with the United States on Russian rare earth minerals as part of efforts to outbid Ukraine on this matter and to push the United States to accept Russian offers of economic measures in lieu of any actual Russian concessions on Ukraine
Putin claimed to Zarubin on February 24 that Russia has an "order of magnitude" more rare earth materials than Ukraine and stated that Russia can cooperate with both the US government and US companies in capital investment projects for rare earth materials.[7] Putin included mineral reserves both within Russia and within occupied Ukraine in his attempts to appeal to the United States to invest in Russian rare earth minerals
Putin also offered to conclude deals with the United States on the supply of Russian aluminum
Putin held a meeting with senior Kremlin officials on February 24 specifically about the importance of further developing Russia's domestic rare earth minerals industry and identified this as a priority effort.[8]
The Kremlin is framing any future US-Russian cooperation on rare earth minerals as conditional on the conclusion of a Russian-friendly peace deal on the war in Ukraine
Putin attempted to claim that he supports Europe's participation in negotiations on Ukraine while continuing to show his unwillingness to make concessions and seemingly proposing Russian allies as possible future negotiating parties
Putin responded to Zarubin's question about Putin's assessment of Europeans' "demands" for the "right to vote in negotiations" about Ukraine
stating that he "does not see anything bad here."[11] Putin then claimed that "probably no one can demand anything here
especially from Russia" but they can try to make demands of someone else — signaling Russia's unwillingness to make compromises in future negotiations
Putin claimed that Moscow respects the positions of Russia's "friends" from BRICS and that "other countries have the right and can participate" in discussions about issues about the war and efforts to achieve peace
Putin specifically highlighted his recent call with People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping and applauded PRC efforts to discuss peace in Ukraine
The PRC and Brazil — two members of BRICS — have put forth peace proposals for the war in Ukraine that heavily favored Russia
and Putin appears to be posturing these states as possible participants in future negotiations.[12]
Kremlin officials continue to exploit diplomatic engagements with Russia's allies to reinforce Moscow's narrative that Russia invaded Ukraine to protect Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Tehran.[13] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated that the delegations "touched upon" the situation in Ukraine and that Lavrov expressed gratitude to Iranian authorities for their "balanced position" and their understanding of the "root causes" of the war
which Lavrov defined in December 2024 as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to advance eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine.[16] Lavrov met with PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi on February 20
and the Russian MFA claimed that Wang emphasized that the PRC's approach to resolving the war in Ukraine focuses on addressing the war's "root causes," while the PRC's MFA official readout of the Wang-Lavrov meeting attributed all talk of the "root causes" of the war to Lavrov and not Wang.[17] Russia is attempting to use meetings with its allies to publicly reiterate its calls for regime change in Ukraine and posture Russia's allies as supportive of these efforts
A delegation from North Korea's Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) arrived in Moscow on February 25 at the invitation of Russia's ruling party
amid reports that North Korea may be shipping more material to Russia.[18] Russian and North Korean state media reported that Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Consular Department Head Andrei Klimov and North Korean Ambassador to Russia Sin Hong Chol met with a high-ranking North Korean delegation
including North Korean Politburo member Ri Hi Yong
The vessel reportedly arrived at the inner side of Rason Port's pier on February 20 and moved to the outer side on February 21
indicating that the vessel unloaded containers on the pier's inner side and loaded new containers on the outer side before departing
ISW reported that North Korea likely used Rason Port to transfer munitions to Vladivostok
Western officials continue to highlight the scale of European military aid to Ukraine
reported on February 25 that European Union (EU) countries
and Norway provided Ukraine with military assistance worth approximately $25 billion in 2024 and that this is more than the United States sent to Ukraine in 2024.[23] An unspecified Western official also told the WSJ that Europe supplies about 25 percent of Ukraine's military hardware and that the United States supplies about 20 percent
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting
We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas
We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast
Fighting continued northwest of Sudzha near Pogrebki
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Pogrebki.[25]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Pogrebki
and Novaya Sorochina and advanced near Maryevka (just east of Pogrebki) and Kurilovka (south of Sudzha).[26]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast; elements of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA]
Southern Military District [SMD]) and 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division
Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Pogrebki; elements of the 22nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in Novaya Sorochina; and elements of the 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Sverdlikovo (northwest of Sudzha).[27]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near the international border in Sumy Oblast on February 25 but did not make any confirmed advances
Fighting continued near Novenke and Basivka.[28]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces seized Novenke and advanced in northern Zhuravka.[29]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on February 25 but did not advance
Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on February 24 and 25.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).[31]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced on the eastern outskirts of Vovchansk.[32]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating near Vovchansk stated that snowy weather is complicating Russian assaults.[33]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division
Leningrad Military District {LMD]) and the "Sheikh Mansur" volunteer battalion are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[34]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction
Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Kupyansk near Dvorichna
and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on February 24 and 25.[35]
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 25 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of the P-79 Dvorichna-Kupyansk highway northeast of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[36]
Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 25 indicating that Russian forces advanced northwest of Tabaivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[37]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and west of Topoli (along the international border northeast of Kupyansk)
north of Kucherivka (just east of Kupyansk)
northwest of Ivanivka (southeast of Kupyansk)
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 153rd Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division
Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Stepova Novoselivka.[39]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 25 but did not make any confirmed advances
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced west of Makiivka (southeast of Borova)
and Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near Makiivka and Novovodyane (north of Makiivka).[42]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction
Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Novolyubivka and Yampolivka and toward Zelena Dolyna
and Katerynivka and east of Lyman near Dibrova and in the Serebryanske forest area on February 24 and 25.[43]
Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 25 indicating that Russian force advanced southwest of Terny (northeast of Lyman).[44]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman) and Torske (east of Lyman).[45]
Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov stated that elements of the Russian 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA]
Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are operating in the Lyman direction.[46]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on February 25 but did not make any confirmed advances
Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka
and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on February 24 and 25.[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bilohorivka.[48]
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Bilohorivka.[49] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have seized most of Bilohorivka but not the entire settlement.[50] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the outskirts of the settlement
that fighting continues in western Bilohorivka
and that northern Bilohorivka is a contested "gray zone."
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA]
formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]
Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in Bilohorivka.[51]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on February 25 but did not make any confirmed advances
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in and near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on February 24 and 25.[52]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern and southern Chasiv Yar and along the T-0504 Bakhmut-Kostyantynivka highway northeast of Stupochky.[53]
Servicemembers of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported on February 25 that Russian forces
and vehicles and occasionally attack with armored fighting vehicles and tanks.[54] The spokesperson of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated that Russian forces are taking advantage of their manpower advantage and conducting frontal assaults with small infantry groups.[55] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces sometimes use mechanized equipment
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment and 299th and 331st airborne (VDV) regiments (all part of the 98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in and near Chasiv Yar.[56] Elements of the 2nd Artillery Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA]
Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Hryhorivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar).[57]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on February 25 but did not advance
Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself and east of Toretsk near Krymske on February 24 and 25.[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near the Toretska mine in northern Toretsk.[59]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Toretsk.[60] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Toretsk.[61]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division
Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Toretsk.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian military command redeployed three unspecified regiments to Toretsk.[63] ISW recently observed reports that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA
including its 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment
from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk direction.[64]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on February 25 but did not advance
Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka and Vodyane Druhe; east of Pokrovsk near Promin; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Nadiivka
and Udachne and toward Molodetske and Troitske on February 24 and 25.[65]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Uspenivka and Nadiivka.[66] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces out of Uspenivka
while another Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces only pushed Russian forces out of central Uspenivka.[67]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are using donkeys to transport infantry to near the frontline and that Russian forces are only using infantry in assaults after having suffered heavy equipment losses in the first half of February 2025.[68] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are using first-person view (FPV) drones with fiber optic cables to destroy Ukrainian heavy bomber drones.[69]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and " Vizantiya” detachment are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[70]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on February 25 but did not make any confirmed advances
Russian forces continued assaults west of Kurakhove near Andriivka
and Oleksiivka on February 24 and 25.[71] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian counterattack near Kostyantynopil.[72]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Andriivka and Rozdolne (southeast of Kurakhove) and pushed Ukrainian forces to the western outskirts of Kostyantynopil.[73]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC
Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynopil; elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA
formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC
SMD) are reportedly operating near Oleksiivka; and elements of the "Somalia" Battalion (132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade
51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynopil and Bohdanivka.[74] Drone operators of the Russian "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Vuhledar (southwest of Donetsk City) direction.[75]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction
Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Velyka Novosilka near Skudne and Dniproenerhiya; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Burlatske and Pryvilne; and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on February 24 and 25.[76]
Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 25 indicating that Russian forces advanced in fields north and west of Velyka Novosilka.[77]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further north of Velyka Novosilka and seized Skudne.[78] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced east and southwest of Burlatske
and southwest of Novosilka.[79] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces have "practically" surrounded Burlatske from two sides.[80]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA
EMD) are reportedly operating between Novoocheretuvate (north of Velyka Novosilka) and Pryvilne.[81]
Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Obast on February 25 but did not make any confirmed advances
Russian forces attacked northwest of Robotyne near Kamyanske
and Pyatykhatky on February 24 and 25.[82] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Lobkove and Stepove (both northwest of Robotyne).[83]
Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern Pyatykhatky
and towards Shcherbaky (northwest of Robotyne) and Mali Shcherbaky.[84] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces cleared Pyatykhatky
while another Russian source claimed that Russian forces have not seized the entire settlement.[85]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Pyatykhatky
and Stepove.[86] Drone operators of the Russian “BARS-Sarmat” volunteer detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) reportedly continue operating in the Orikhiv direction.[87]
A Ukrainian source posted footage on February 24 showing a Ukrainian drone striking a Russian 9A82 transporter erector launcher and radar (TELAR) of an S-300V air defense system in an unspecified area in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[88]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on February 25 but did not advance
Russian forces attacked in the direction of Sadove (east of Kherson City on west [right] bank Kherson Oblast) on February 24 and 25.[89]
and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 24 to 25
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 213 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Oryol
Krasnodar Krai.[90] The Ukrainian Air Forces reported that Russian forces also launched seven Kh-101 cruise missiles from Tu-95MS strategic bombers.[91] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 133 drones over Poltava
and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts and that 79 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference
Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Zhytomyr
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Samara Oblast authorities reduced one-time payments to soldiers who sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) after temporarily increasing these payments in January 2025
Samara Oblast Head Vyacheslav Fedorishchev stated on February 21 that Samara Oblast is reducing the regional one-time payments from 3.6 million rubles (about $41,571) to 2.1 million rubles (about $24,249) starting on February 24.[93] Samara Oblast temporarily increased one-time payments from January 1 to February 23.[94] Authorities in Kosinsky Municipal Okrug
Perm Krai announced on February 25 a 100,000-ruble (about $1,154) one-time payment to Russian citizens and foreigners who sign contracts with the Russian MoD between March 1
The BBC Russian Service reported on February 25 that over 100 Russian government
and security officials accused and convicted of various corruption charges are fighting in Ukraine.[96] The BBC Russian Service noted that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) decides which of these officials can fight in Ukraine in lieu of serving their sentences and applies the rules arbitrarily
The BBC Russian Service reported that one condition of this deal is that the officials admit guilt of their crimes and that the FSB will not accept individuals facing or convicted of charges related to terrorism
The BBC Russian Service reported that many officials accepted this offer believing that they will not see combat but are suffering high casualties on the front
The BBC Russian Service noted that Russian authorities are not granting many of these officials combat veterans status but that some of the officials return to Russia and take up new posts
including through the federal government's "Time of Heroes" veteran program
The Kremlin continues efforts to use its "Time of Heroes" program
which places veterans of the war in Ukraine in government positions
to form a new Russian elite composed of loyal and ultranationalist veterans that will continue to militarize Russian society over the long term.[97] The Time of Heroes program announced on February 25 that its participant
became the Russian Presidential Administration's Head Advisor for Monitoring Analysis of Social Processes.[98]
Russia may be reopening a Soviet-era submarine base in occupied Crimea
Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group "Atesh" reported on January 19 that Russian authorities began using the "825 GTS" submarine base in occupied Balaklava Bay
Crimea for military purposes and noted on February 13 that Russian authorities installed anti-naval drone barriers in Balaklava Bay.[99] Jamestown Foundation analyst John C
Daly told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty for an article published on February 25 that Russia would likely use the base for surface vessels because the submarine base is too small for Russia's Kilo-class submarines.[100]
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural
ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source
and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports
References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update
[1] http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76331
[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-21-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2024
[3] https://www.bbc.com/news/live/cn489e05k09t?page=4#:~:text=Zelensky%20and%20Putin%20have,do%20it%2C%22%20he%20adds
[4] http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76331
[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2024
[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Ukraine%20Indicators%20Update.pdf ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/weakness-lethal-why-putin-invaded-ukraine-and-how-war-must-end; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/66181 ; https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-putin-lanned-ukraine-invasion-march-2021-vyorstka/32379171.html
[7] http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76331
[8] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76330; https://t.me/tass_agency/302440; https://t.me/tass_agency/302442
[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825
[11] http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76331
[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121224; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102424; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101824; https://isw.pub/UkrWar092724
[13] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1999840/; https://t.me/MID_Russia/52962
[14] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1999840/; https://t.me/MID_Russia/52962 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/12/07/3264996
[15] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/12/07/3264996
[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024
[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2025
[18] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/23234891 ; https://kcnawatch dot org/newstream/1740465426-892058820/wpk-delegation-arrives-in-moscow/
[19] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/23234891 ; https://kcnawatch dot org/newstream/1740465426-892058820/wpk-delegation-arrives-in-moscow/
[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2024 ; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/23234891
[21] https://koreajoongangdaily.joins dot com/news/2025-02-24/national/northKorea/Ship-likely-carrying-arms-to-Russia-spotted-at-North-Korean-port-as-Pyongyang-upgrades-drone-force-Reports/2248655
[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/north-korea-joins-russias-war-against-ukraine-operational-and-strategic-implications
[23] https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/without-u-s-aid-ukraine-would-lose-some-of-its-most-sophisticated-weapons-e3bf6cb7
[24] https://t.me/wargonzo/24977; https://t.me/dva_majors/65334; https://t.me/yurasumy/21389
[25] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8485; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24432;
[26] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32790; https://t.me/dva_majors/65334; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86906 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24993; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/155781 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/155788 ; https://t.me/zovpobedy/14536; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24436; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62421; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32800; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86908
[27] https://t.me/wargonzo/24974; https://t.me/mod_russia/49371; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24420; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86906 ; https://t.me/sashakots/52141 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22597 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24438 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/65372; https://t.me/notes_veterans/22163 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24432; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32777; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32790; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32796; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86877; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86908
[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21384; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21352; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21349; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5700; https://t.me/otukharkiv/4587
[31] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24446; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24397
[33] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kA5EvhyCugE; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/25/shturmovykiv-vydno-na-bilomu-pokryvali-na-vorozhyh-pihotyncziv-polyuyut-yak-na-kuripok/
[34] https://t.me/epoddubny/22587; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5518
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21384; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21352; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21349; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5700; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32762
[36] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8482; https://t.me/kcaebirds/1581
[37] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=985347260445019&set=pcb.985347813778297
[38] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32762; https:// t.me/boris_rozhin/155767; https://t.me/rybar/68328; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32764
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21384; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21352; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21349; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5700
[41] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5682; https://t.me/fedorenkoys/1054
[42] https://t.me/rybar/68316; https://t.me/dva_majors/65334
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21384; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21352; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21349; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5700
oto?fbid=985347213778357&set=pcb.985347813778297
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21384; https://t.me/rybar/68319
[49] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32797; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30957; https://t.me/shock3OA/605; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86880; https://t.me/yurasumy/21388
[51] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30957 ; https://t.me/shock3OA/605
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21384; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21352; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21349; https://t.me/wargonzo/24977; https://t.me/yurasumy/21387 ; https://t.me/rybar/68331
[53] https://t.me/yurasumy/21387 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24977
[54] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/25/vidbyttya-banzaj-atak-shtorm-z-na-motoczyklah-pid-royem-droniv-ta-navaloyu-kabiv-armiyainform-na-gostynah-u-30-yi-ombr/
[55] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ScdUZNkwcYc; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/25/lobovi-ataky-bagatopoverhivok-v-chasovomu-yaru-tryvaye-zhorstka-vijna-v-ruyinah/
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21384; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21352; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21349; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5700; https://t.me/b4_101/105; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32771
[59] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24429; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32771; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24429
[60] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24429; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32771
[62] https://t.me/verumreactor/17790; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1894105573819310402
[64] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-21-2025
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21384; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21352; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21349; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5700; https://t.me/rybar/68330
[67] https://t.me/yurasumy/21386; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32776
[68] https://youtu.be/HFgWwiWYcv4; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/25/dovoyuvalysya-do-vislyukiv-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-kynuly-v-bij-nezvychajnu-kavaleriyu/
[69] https://youtu.be/HFgWwiWYcv4; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/25/optovolokno-proty-vampiriv-rosiyany-namagayutsya-zdolaty-nash-bombery/
[70] https://t.me/tass_agency/302529; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24416
[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21384; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21352; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21349; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5700; https://t.me/dva_majors/65334; https://t.me/wargonzo/24977; https://t.me/yurasumy/21385; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62419
[72] https://t.me/tass_agency/302521; https://t.me/tass_agency/302525
[73] https://t.me/dva_majors/65334; https://t.me/wargonzo/24977; https://t.me/yurasumy/21385
[74] https://t.me/wargonzo/24974; https://t.me/sashakots/52132; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62419
[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21352; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21349; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02EtqFfzsraLvWfqYtxVUxjCEHL4pHcoMEvtoqn1Tedcpo1B43XVxS8hCCJXyevmEJl; https://t.me/rybar/68321; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62420; https://t.me/yurasumy/21384
[77] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0uD3LT788UNEzsqU4YebHAXkuMvPrWgbupuJekWn9CTBabC8dqro3LRZMWffwWH5hl?rdid=5ObyDDHvQVvADjEy#
[78] https:// t.me/boris_rozhin/155767; https://t.me/yurasumy/21384;
[79] https:// t.me/boris_rozhin/155767; https://t.me/yurasumy/21384; https://t.me/rybar/68321; https://t.me/yurasumy/21384
[82] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21384; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21352; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21349; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02EtqFfzsraLvWfqYtxVUxjCEHL4pHcoMEvtoqn1Tedcpo1B43XVxS8hCCJXyevmEJl; https://t.me/yurasumy/21383
[84] https://t.me/tass_agency/302524; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32740; https://t.me/yurasumy/21383; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24398 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24977
[85] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24398; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32740
[88] https://x.com/ColbyBadhwar/status/1894154477269111110 ; https://t.me/proofs_dnepr/51852
[89] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21384; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21352; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21349; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02EtqFfzsraLvWfqYtxVUxjCEHL4pHcoMEvtoqn1Tedcpo1B43XVxS8hCCJXyevmEJl
[92] https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/33896; https://t.me/prokuraturasumy/3992; https://armyinform.com doy ua/2025/02/24/na-sumshhyni-okupanty-atakuvaly-bezpilotnykom-czyvilne-avto-odna-lyudyna-zagynula-odna-distala-poranennya/ ; https://t.me/zhytomyrskaODA/11131; https://t.me/synegubov/13225; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/21581; https://t.me/kpszsu/29483
[93] https://t.me/Fedorischev63/2288; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/23206915
[94] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/23206915
[95] https://t.me/msu_pk/705; https://t.me/idelrealii/40163
[96] https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c5yxwn1w9dpo
[97] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putin-unlikely-demobilize-event-ceasefire-because-he-afraid-his-veterans
[98] https://t.me/vremyageroev2024/859; https://t.me/yurasumy/21380
[99] https://t.me/atesh_ua/6341; https://t.me/atesh_ua/6215
[100] https://www.rferl.org/a/crimea-claims-secret-soviet-submarine--reactivated-russia-ukraine-base/33327280.html
Ukrainian forces continue to take control of the previously occupied part of the Kharkiv region – up to and including 13 September
they have seized an area of nearly 4,000 km² with 300 villages and 150,000 inhabitants
A further 4,000 km² of recaptured territory awaits so-called stabilisation operations
The Ukrainian side reports that the counter-offensive is underway with the aim of fully driving the enemy out of the entire Kharkiv Oblast
Units are probing a new Russian defence line on the Oskil River – according to unofficial reports they were due to cross it in the Borova area northeast of Izyum
The Ukrainian army has entered Sviatohirsk and is continuing to push back the enemy from the Donetsk Oblast
failed to break through the Russian defences near Lyman
Invading forces continue to attack defender positions in the Donbas
They have made slight progress with strikes towards Bakhmut from the south (along the road from Horlivka)
but are being held back on another line of defence near Odradivka
The Ukrainians continue to repel attacks on Bakhmut from the east
as well as to the northeast and southeast of the town
Attacks on Avdiivka (there was a massive shelling of the city on the night of 14 September) and to the north and west of it
as well as in the Siversk and Horlivka areas
a relative calming of the situation occurred southwest of Donetsk
Aggressor activity on the right bank of the Dnieper increased
but repeated attempts to advance in the Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasts were repulsed by the defenders
Russian artillery and aviation continued to shell and bombard the positions and facilities of Ukrainian forces along the entire line of contact
as well as in the border areas of the Chernihiv (sporadically) and Sumy oblasts (with greater intensity)
The shelling of Mykolaiv (a massive attack on the town on the night of 14 September) and Nikopol was intensified
Kramatorsk and Kostiantynivka in the Donetsk Oblast
the Bashtanka and Mykolaiv Raions in the Mykolaiv Oblast
and the Kryvyi Rih and Nikopol Raions in the Dnepropetrovsk Oblast
The Kherson Oblast remains an area of particular Ukrainian air and artillery activity
Attacks included the pontoon crossings on the Dnieper near Nova Kakhovka and on Inhulets in Dar’ivka and – once again to hamper the occupying forces’ repair work – the Antonivskyi and Kakhovskyi bridges
Ukraine’s Defence Minister Oleksii Reznikov admitted that the lightning offensive had gone much better than expected
the success of the offensive remains a challenge for Ukrainian forces because of the need to ensure the conditions for holding the recaptured territory
Reznikov indicated that there was a threat of a Russian counterattack on the supply lines and that the Ukrainians could be surrounded if they went too far
Referring to the situation in the Kherson Oblast
he said that the progress of the offensive there was much less due to the need to operate in difficult agricultural terrain criss-crossed by irrigation canals used by the enemy to create further lines of defence
Danish Defence Minister Morten Bødskov has announced that a training course for Ukrainian soldiers will be organised on Danish territory along the lines of the one conducted in the UK
German sources report that Kyiv will receive the first two IRIS-T anti-aircraft missile launchers by the end of the year
followed by two more in 2023 – a further two
The Rheinmetall concern has refurbished 16 Marder infantry fighting vehicles and has begun repairing another 14 (despite the lack of permission from the Chancellery to hand them over to Ukraine)
It also expresses its readiness to overhaul a further 70 vehicles of this type
The head of the occupation administration of Crimea
acknowledged that pro-Ukrainian sentiment is on the rise on the peninsula
He pointed out that videos of public events in the region
during which pro-Ukrainian slogans are chanted and ‘nationalist’ songs are sung
He also stated that both the organisers and participants of such events should be brought to justice and deprived of their jobs
The authorities in Moscow are trying to sort out the message describing the situation on the frontline
they are marginalising the losses suffered and claiming that Ukrainian successes have allegedly had no impact on the combat operations of Russian forces
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov announced that the special military operation was continuing and would continue until the original objectives were achieved
He added that Russia has no plans to withdraw its troops from the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant site
Criticism of the military appearing in the official media space is
Peskov also stated that the issue of full or partial mobilisation is not discussed in the Kremlin and its announcement is not an option
Head of the President’s Office Andriy Jermak and former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen presented recommendations for a Kyiv Security Compact reaffirming the strategic partnership between Ukraine and the countries that guarantee its security (the United States
It is to be concluded after the end of the war
The security guarantees would take the form of legal and political declarations by the signatories of the document towards Ukraine containing both preventive measures and commitments to take action in the event of another breach of its sovereignty and territorial integrity
The package of guarantees is also to include
among other things : the implementation of long-term investment in the country’s defence industry
training missions and joint exercises under the auspices of the EU and NATO
Receiving security guarantees does not exclude Ukraine’s aspiration to join the Alliance
The publication of the document was met with a sharp reaction from the Kremlin
Peskov stated that the draft means that Russia must continue to effectively conduct a special military operation
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Olha Stefanishyna said that the Russian side had approached the Kyiv authorities several times in recent days with a proposal to start peace talks
the Kremlin’s sudden readiness to negotiate stems from its desire to stop the Ukrainian counter-offensive
Kyiv should only enter talks when Moscow rejects its policy of ultimatums and the terms of a potential agreement not only guarantee an end to the war
but also prevent Russia from resuming hostilities in the future
stated that Ukraine does not rule out negotiations with Russia
but can only agree to them after full restoration of territorial integrity
there is currently no indication that the aggressor is ready to enter into serious negotiations
Russia will show interest in real peace talks when it realises that its position has been weakened to the maximum and comes to terms with the fact that it is unable to maintain control over the seized territories
The Council of Ministers has approved and forwarded the draft budget for 2023 to the Verkhovna Rada for consideration
Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated that almost half of next year’s projected funding – 1 trillion 136 billion hryvnia (approximately over 30 million euro) – would be allocated to strengthening the defence sector
Explaining the fourfold increase in military spending
the head of government said that the structure of the budget was subordinated to the priority goal of defeating Russia militarily
The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
announced on 12 September that he had initiated consultations with Ukraine and Russia on the creation of a ‘safety zone’ around the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant
he stressed that he remains seriously concerned about the possibility of further shelling of the power plant
‘we are one step away from a nuclear accident’
while ‘the safety of the power plant is hanging by a thread’
The situation around the facility was also the subject of a telephone conversation between the Russian President and the German Chancellor on 13 September
Olaf Scholz was said to have convinced Vladimir Putin to immediately implement the measures recommended in the IAEA report
He also called on Russia to ‘completely withdraw its troops from Ukraine’ and to ‘find a diplomatic solution to the conflict as soon as possible’
Minister Kuleba expressed disappointment at the failure of the authorities in Berlin to agree to the delivery of German Leopard tanks to Ukraine
‘Not a single rational argument on why these weapons cannot be supplied
only abstract fears and excuses,’ he wrote in reaction to a statement published the day before by German Defence Minister Christine Lambrecht
who refused the delivery because ‘no country has yet supplied infantry fighting vehicles or Western-made battle tanks’ and ‘Germany would not take such a step unilaterally’
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