Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00 pm ET on May 2 ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment Russian gains along the frontline have slowed over the last four months but Russia continues to tolerate personnel losses comparable to the casualty rate Russian forces sustained during a period of intensified advances between September and December 2024 ISW assesses that Russian forces gained a total of 1,627 square kilometers in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast in January and daily Russian casualty reports from the Ukrainian General Staff indicate that Russian forces suffered 160,600 casualties during the last four months for an average of 99 casualties for every square kilometer taken over the last four months ISW assesses that Russian forces seized an estimated 496 square kilometers in January 2025; an estimated 313 square kilometers in February 2025; an estimated 601 square kilometers in March 2025; and an estimated 217 square kilometers in April 2025 Ukrainian General Staff reports indicate that Russian forces lost an estimated 48,060 casualties in January 2025 and 36,570 casualties in April 2025.[1] Russian advances significantly increased in March 2025 due to the elimination of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast coinciding with the temporary cessation of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine although Russian advances on average decreased between January Russian gains have also slowed as Russian forces come up against more well-defended Ukrainian positions in and around larger towns such as Kupyansk Russian forces are currently sustaining a higher casualty rate per square kilometer gained than in Fall 2024 Russian forces gained an estimated 2,949 square kilometers at the cost of 174,935 casualties between September and December 2024 — an average of 59 casualties per square kilometer taken.[2] Russian casualty rates consistently increased throughout September and December 2024 and peaked at an estimated 49,135 total monthly casualties in December 2024.[3] Monthly Russian rates of advance plateaued at 839 square kilometers in November 2024 and began to slow in December 2024 to an assessed 593 square kilometers and have continued to slow in 2025 (with the exception of the elimination of the Kursk salient) Russian gains have been 45 percent slower between January and April 2025 than in the period between September and December 2024 although Russian casualty rates have only decreased by 10 percent in that interval The Russian military command thus appears to be tolerating similar personnel loss rates despite a significant decrease in the rate of territorial gains Russia has thus far sustained these casualties and the current tempo of offensive operations by rapidly deploying low quality troops to frontline units although the reliance on such troops is also hindering Russia's ability to conduct complex operations and make rapid advances in Ukraine ISW has not observed a notable decrease in the tempo of Russian offensive operations along the frontline in recent months suggesting that Russia is generating enough forces to sustain these casualties without having to deprioritize any frontline area ISW has repeatedly observed reports that new Russian recruits only receive a month of training before deploying to Ukraine and this limited training is likely constraining recruits' combat capabilities and the Russian military's overall capacity to successfully conduct complex operations.[4] The Russian military command is currently prioritizing funneling poorly trained recruits into highly attritional infantry assaults to offset personnel losses in Ukraine while sustaining the current tempo of operations possibly at the expense of Russia's long-term warfighting capabilities.[5] The Russian military does not have a reserve pool of well-trained troops who are not currently engaged in combat in Ukraine and can rapidly deploy along the frontline and the Russian military command's decision to funnel poorly trained troops to the frontline in Ukraine is undermining Russia's ability to create a pool of such forces.[6] Russian President Vladimir Putin's commitment to maintaining the tempo of offensive operations despite diminishing returns underscores Putin's ongoing efforts to leverage further battlefield gains to generate pressure on Ukraine in ceasefire and peace negotiations or otherwise to force Ukraine's collapse ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to prolong negotiations to extract additional concessions from the United States and Ukraine and make additional battlefield gains.[7] Russian forces intensified offensive operations throughout the frontline in February and March 2025 including a limited offensive operation into northern Sumy Oblast as part of an ongoing Russian effort to slowly degrade frontline Ukrainian positions and make opportunistic tactical advances Putin may intend to leverage any gains over the last four months and in the near future to extract further Ukrainian and Western concessions during future peace negotiations It remains unclear if Russia will maintain sufficient force generation rates to sustain offensive operations in Ukraine indefinitely Western intelligence reportedly suggests that Putin may begin prioritizing short-term goals such as consolidating Russia's gains in Ukraine and Russia's immediate economic viability over seizing more territory but Putin's demonstrated commitment to maintaining the tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine despite continuing high casualty rates is a counter-indicator to this reported assessment CNN reported on May 1 that new intelligence reviewed by US and Western officials suggests that Putin may be pivoting his immediate focus to shorter-term objectives of cementing Russian control over occupied Ukrainian territory and boosting Russia's economy.[10] CNN reported that Putin may be concerned by the Trump administration's threats to apply more sanctions on the struggling Russian economy An unnamed official told CNN that Putin's willingness to settle for more limited objectives in Ukraine depends on whether Putin can portray Russia's gains in Ukraine as an acceptable victory domestically The source insinuated that Putin likely remains committed to revisiting his longer-term goals of subjugating all of Ukraine and undermining NATO after taking a "significant pause," however ISW has observed a variety of indicators suggesting that Putin is not reconsidering his short-term objectives in Ukraine Russian forces have increased the intensity of offensive operations throughout the theater particularly redoubling efforts to advance deeper in the Lyman and Novopavlivka directions and launching a limited offensive operation in Sumy Oblast.[11] Russian forces are rapidly integrating tactical innovations to optimize timely gains in response to Ukrainian drone operators including integrating motorcycles into offensive operations in Ukraine.[12] The Kremlin is also leveraging legal and socioeconomic measures to increase Russia's force generation capabilities and boost Russia's drone production capabilities to support the war in Ukraine.[13] A future slowing of Russian offensive operations and/or transition to defensive operations in all or part of the theater would be indicators that Putin is shifting his short-term goals from seizing more territory to consolidating previously held territory Putin could choose to pivot toward shorter-term objectives on account of mounting economic and manpower constraints that are increasingly hindering Russia's ability to perpetuate its war in Ukraine.[14] Russian forces could slow the tempo of offensive operations and work to implement policies and tactics to mitigate casualties if Putin issues an order to prioritize consolidating Russia's hold over occupied Ukraine instead of making further gains Russian forces would likely shift to defensive operations with the aim of fortifying and consolidating current positions on the frontline largely in an effort to safeguard battlefield gains and preserve increasingly limited manpower and materiel reserves Russian forces could begin constructing fortifications near frontline positions in response to such an order ISW would observe such indicators and will continue to monitor Russian and Ukrainian reporting for these indicators ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains committed to his long-term military objectives of seizing all of Ukraine and undermining NATO Senior US officials reportedly remain skeptical that Putin has eased his intransigence regarding a peace agreement and told CNN that Russia may resume the war and try to seize more Ukrainian territory even after agreeing to a US peace proposal.[15] CNN reported that unspecified officials maintain the belief that Russia will retain its aims of seizing the maximal amount of Ukrainian territory even if Putin signs a peace agreement despite the significant economic cost of this wartime economy to Russia’s population.[18] These factors indicate that Putin is not abandoning his territorial ambitions in Ukraine but is in fact preparing for a long war of attrition against Ukraine and likely the collective West Russian officials are also continuing to condition Russian society to support a long-term war effort in Ukraine and against NATO have consistently leveraged false claims about the war in Ukraine to make maximalist territorial demands including that Ukraine give up "Novorossiya" — an invented region of Ukraine that Kremlin officials have claimed includes all of southern and eastern Ukraine and is an "integral" part of Russia that Ukraine must concede for Russia to end the war.[19] Putin invoked the term "Novorossiya" as recently as April 21 indicating that the Kremlin has not abandoned this territorial objective.[20] Russian state media previously cautioned Russian domestic audiences in March 2025 against expecting "big agreements" from recent peace negotiations between Putin and US President Donald Trump.[21] A Verstka poll of 100 Russian military personnel published on April 29 indicates that only 18% of career Russian military personnel and officers most of whom have been fighting in Ukraine for over two years would support a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine prior to achieving Putin's stated goals (likely referring to the demilitarization and "denazification" of Ukraine).[22] Only about a fifth of surveyed Russian military personnel and civilians indicated that they believe the war will end in the coming months Verstka’s polling indicates that the Kremlin is not preparing the Russian information space for a peace agreement in the near future and that Russian forces and society do not anticipate an imminent end to the war This pattern of Kremlin informational activity and the resonance it has achieved in Russian society will make it much harder for Putin to present any long-term ceasefire that falls far short of his stated aims as any kind of victory to his domestic audience Statements by US officials suggest that the Trump administration is considering stepping back from intensified mediation efforts to end the war in Ukraine as the United States is changing its "style" and "methodology" and will no longer "fly around the world at the drop of a hat" to mediate negotiations."[25] Bruce reiterated that the United States is "still committed" to a lasting peace in Ukraine The US Department of State submitted a proposed license for defense exports to Ukraine to the US Congress on April 29.[26] The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is considering the proposal   We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation Limited fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on May 2 Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions in Gornal and the Gornal Monastery contrary to the Russian MoD's April 26 claim that Russian forces seized the settlement.[27] Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Gornal (southwest of Sudzha).[28] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that unattributed drones struck the Russian Zvezda military space intelligence facility in Stavropol Krai on May 2.[29] Kovalenko noted that facility is one of the Russian General Staff Main Directorate's [GRU] main electronic intelligence system stations and specializes in detecting foreign intelligence communication systems and commercial electronic signatures in orbit Kovalenko stated that Russia used the facility as a technical base to monitor Ukraine and conduct cyber intelligence operations Stavropol Krai Governor Vladimir Vladimirov claimed that Ukrainian drone fragments fell in Moskovskoe village in Izobilnensky Raion but caused no damage or casualties.[30] Fighting continued in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on May 2   A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting continued near Popovka and Demidovka (both northwest of Belgorod City) and that Russian forces are conducting drone operations in the area.[31] Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City) Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 2   Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Bilovody (northeast of Sumy City) while another milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized the majority of the settlement.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Loknya (southeast of Bilovody) toward Yablunivka (south of Bilovody).[33] Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Volodymyrivka and Vodolahy and northeast of Sumy City near Zhuravka and Loknya on May 2.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked west of Loknya.[35] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces are creating a "security strip" along the border of Sumy Oblast and a Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are shifting offensive operations towards Sumy Oblast.[36] Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in Bilovody.[37] Elements of the Chechen "Akhmat-Russia" Regiment are reportedly operating near Seredina-Budy (on the international border northwest of Sumy City).[38] Drone operators of the "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets in Sumy Oblast.[39] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City) Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on May 2 but did not advance Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on May 1 and 2.[40] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 2 but did not make confirmed advances   Russian forces attacked southeast of Kupyansk near Novoosynove and Hlushkivka on May 1 and 2.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Kupyansk near Zapadne and advanced to the northern part of the settlement on May 2.[42] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 2 but did not advance Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Nadiya and Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on May 1 and 2.[45] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on May 2 but did not make confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced near Zelena Dolyna and within central Lypove (all north of Lyman).[46] Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub and Lypove; northeast of Lyman near Novomykhailivka and Yampolivka; east of Lyman toward Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on May 1 and 2.[47] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on May 1 that Russian forces near the Serebryanske forest area unsuccessfully attempted to use anti thermal-imaging rain ponchos to evade Ukrainian drone operators.[48] Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA reportedly participated in the recent seizure of Nove.[49] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast) Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on May 2 but did not advance   Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 2 that Russian forces advanced south of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[50] Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and toward Hryhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on May 1 and 2.[51] Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA] formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Bilohorivka.[52] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 2 but did not make confirmed advances Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove; and south of Chasiv Yar towards Bila Hora and near Stupochky on May 1 and 2.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stupochky.[54] Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) the 2nd Airborne (VDV) Battalion of the 98th VDV Division and the "Burevestnik" detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[55] Elements of the Russian 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Stupochky.[56] Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid an intensified effort to advance along and up to the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway and eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk   Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 1 indicates that Russian forces advanced into Novoolenivka (southwest of Toretsk).[57] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division Southern Military District [SMD]) with motorcycle support participated in the advance into Novoolenivka and seized half of the settlement.[58] and the Russian military command appears to be tasking the 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th CAA) with eliminating the pocket.[61] Russian forces' advance into Novoolenivka will help Russian forces advance further along the T-0504 highway and Russian forces may intend to force Ukrainian troops to withdraw from the pocket under threat of envelopment if Russian forces can make further advances from Novoolenivka and Sukha Balka (southwest of Toretsk) Russian forces continued assaults near Toretsk itself; northeast of Toresk near Druzhba; north of Toretsk toward Dyliivka; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka and Nova Poltavka on May 1 and 2.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northwest of Vozdvyzhenka (southwest of Toretsk).[63] Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA]) are reportedly operating near Druzhba.[64] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 2 but did not make confirmed advances   Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 1 and 2 that Russian forces advanced into the southern outskirts of Pokrovsk two kilometers west of Novoukrainka (south of Pokrovsk) into the eastern outskirts of Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) and southeast of Novooleksandrivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[65] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a reconnaissance-in-force mission into southern Pokrovsk but did not suggest that Russian forces maintain enduring positions in the southern outskirts of the settlement.[66] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Yelyzavetivka (east of Pokrovsk) and Zvirove (west of Pokrovsk).[67] Russian forces attacked toward Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novotoretske; east of Pokrovsk near Malynivka and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne Ukrainian Commander in Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on May 1 that the Pokrovsk direction remains the most active section of the frontline.[69] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian infantry operating in this direction fear they will face retribution from frontline Russian commanders if they refuse to fight or attempt to retreat.[70] Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate) and the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions near Pokrovsk and attacking Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[71] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on May 2 but did not make confirmed advances   Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 1 and 2 that Russian forces advanced northwest of Nadiivka (east of Novopavlivka).[72] Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Novooleksandrivka; east of Novopavlivka near Nadiivka and Preobrazhenka; and southeast near Bohdanivka on May 1 and 2.[73] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 2 that elements of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA CMD) recently retreated from Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka) after frontline Russian commanders deployed poorly trained troops to combat operations in the area.[74] Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA CMD) are reportedly operating in Novooleksandrivka.[75] Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA CMD) are reportedly clearing Nadiivka (east of Novopavlivka).[76] Elements of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA CMD) are reportedly attacking eastern Kolyarivka (east of Pokrovsk).[77] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on May 2 but did not make confirmed advances Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove toward Oleksiivka and near Andriivka and Bahatyr on May 1 and 2.[78] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 2 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr.[79] Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 200th Artillery Brigade (29th CAA Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Bahatyr.[80] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on May 2 but did not advance Russian forces attacked northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Odradne and northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne.[81] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 2 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Vesele (north of Velyka Novosilka).[82] Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA EMD) are reportedly operating near Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[83] Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City) Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations east of Hulyaipole near Chervone on May 2.[84] Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast   Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 27 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northeast of Mali Shcherbaky (west of Orikhiv).[85 Russian forces conducted ground attacks southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove and Lobkove; and west of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky and Kamyanske on May 1 and 2.[86]   Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on May 1 and 2 but did not advance.[87]   Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on May 2 that Russian forces are intensifying offensive operations in the southern section of the Dnipro River Delta near Kizomys on the west (right) of the Dnipro River (southwest of Kherson City).[88] Voloshyn reported that Russian forces are attempting to create a bridgehead and cross the Dnipro River from the south Ukrainian forces conducted a series of overnight naval and aerial drone strikes targeting Russian military infrastructure objects in occupied Crimea on May 1 to 2 Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces launched 30 naval drones and at least 100 aerial drones and that Russian forces destroyed 10 Ukrainian naval drones and 100 aerial drones near occupied Sevastopol.[89] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian drones struck Russian airfields in occupied Kacha seven kilometers from the Russian military airfield in Kacha.[90] Russian forces typically station air defenses at the Belbek and Saky airfields and leverage the airfields to launch Shahed drones against Ukraine.[91] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported on May 2 that Ukrainian forces recently struck a Russian S-300 air defense system and a ST-68 radar station in occupied Crimea.[92] and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline) Russian forces launched a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 1 to 2 The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 150 strike and decoy drones from Bryansk City; Primorsko-Akhtarsk Crimea.[93] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 64 Shahed and other drones over eastern and central Ukraine and that 62 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference Ukrainian officials reported that drone strikes damaged civilian and commercial infrastructure in Kharkiv Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks) Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update [1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06W44ezsFpBSRJsouTmp812SQ22eLf3V1pzyMwF6YEE7koRcQq32JGzJ2HnzyWuvyl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20444 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031frKwcfzQKsFhG7kFj3hoVWG8FPvGbFatwKBLj8pEpH8CHiLWWGeHZCzPwjXpbzml ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22561 [Total losses generated from the Ukrainian General Staff's daily 0800 SITREP between January 1 and April 30 [2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2024 [3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024 [5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2025 [6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment [8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage [9] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage [10] https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/01/politics/intelligence-putin-war-goals-shifted-ukraine [11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041425 [12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042725 [13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-15-2025 [14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage [15] https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/01/politics/intelligence-putin-war-goals-shifted-ukraine [16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040825 [18] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage; [19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125 [21] https://tass dot ru/interviews/23001625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013025 [22] https://verstka dot media/chto-dumayut-rossiiskie-voennye-o-vozmozhnom-peremirii ; https://t.me/svobodnieslova/6761 [24] https://www.foxnews.com/video/6372195430112 [25] https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-may-1-2025/ [26] https://www.congress.gov/senate-communication/119th-congress/executive-communication/859?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%22Ukraine%22%7D&s=4&r=1 ; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/01/trump-administration-readies-first-sale-of-military-equipment-to-ukraine [27] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27947 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35133 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35194 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-26-2025 [31] https://rutube dot ru/video/cdffbed33da010ec8b3b7441618ce473/; https://t.me/rybar/70069 [32] https://t.me/yurasumy/22698 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26282 [33] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63929 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70321 [34] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63929 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22698 ; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5688 [36] https://t.me/rybar/70072 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52033 [40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789 [41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl [43] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9229; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/02/pozbavyly-okupantiv-10-motoczykliv-nashi-bijczi-znyshhyly-mobilni-shturmovi-grupy-rf-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku/; https://dpsu.gov dot ua/uk/news/47009-video-pomsta-znishuye-mobilni-shturmovi-grupi-voroga-na-kup-yanskomu-napryamku [44] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/02/pryvaryly-saraj-na-tank-poblyzu-kupyanska-rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-vygaduvaty-bronovanyh-monstriv/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dGVneFXTZ7U [45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27898; [47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27898; https://t.me/OMIBr_60/1015; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/deceptive-defense-russian-infantry-stormed-positions-wearing-anti-thermal-ponchos/ [48] https://t.me/OMIBr_60/1015; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/deceptive-defense-russian-infantry-stormed-positions-wearing-anti-thermal-ponchos/ [51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl [53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26282 [55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27910 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163254 ; https://t.me/rybar/70062 [57] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1918014207036960908; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9041; https://t.me/dva_majors/70304 [58] https://t.me/dva_majors/70304 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35140 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90948 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22699  ; [59] https://t.me/dva_majors/70303  ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70321 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22704  ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63935 [60] https://t.me/yurasumy/22704 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63935 [62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl [65] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163192; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90955; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163192; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35134; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35131; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35154; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35198 [67] https://t.me/yurasumy/22700; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35158 [68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63924; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27895; https://t.me/wargonzo/26282; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63935 [69] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/mayemo-pershij-rezultat-vatikanskoyi-zustrichi-yakij-robit-y-97493 [70] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/02/odyn-ne-hotiv-jty-jomu-postrilyaly-po-nogah-pid-pokrovskom-rosiyany-zhenut-vpered-navit-svoyih-poranenyh/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dGVneFXTZ7U [71] https://t.me/sashakots/53449; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90941 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90949; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90986 [73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl; [78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl ; https://t.me/rybar/70069; https://t.me/dva_majors/70321; [80] https://t.me/voin_dv/14701; https://t.me/voin_dv/14710 [81] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63928; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789 [85] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27812; https://t.me/IIsb_128ogshb/10 [86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70321 [87]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl [88] https://www.pravda.com dot ua/eng/news/2025/05/1/7510060/ [89] https://t.me/andriyshTime/36717 ; https://t.me/razvozhaev/11523; https://t.me/razvozhaev/11526 ; https://t.me/rybar/70080 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/23327 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/23084 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/23103 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52052 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/313074 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/313074 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52035 ; [90] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/836 ; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/839 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/78898 ; https://www dot idelreal.org/a/anneksirovannyy-krym-podvergsya-massirovannoy-atake-dronov/33402916.html ; https://t.me/astrapress/80242 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/36729 ; https://t.me/astrapress/80242 ; https://t.me/astrapress/80245 [91] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2025 [92] https://t.me/russianocontext/6658 ; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/prymary-strike-drones-flew-into-crimea-and-destroyed-air-defense-systems/ ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/19506 That’s according to the General Staff of Ukraine’s Armed Forces Russia also launched 5,550 artillery strikes of which 121 involved multiple rocket launchers and Tymonovychi in Sumy region; Zakharivka and Zelene Pole in Donetsk region; Novodarivka and Orikhiv in Zaporizhzhia region; Vesele missile and artillery units of Ukraine’s Defense Forces hit 14 Russian manpower and equipment clusters and another important target that has not been named five clashes occurred in the areas of Vovchansk Seven enemy attacks were recorded in the Kupiansk direction The Defense Forces repelled Russian assault efforts in the areas of Holubivka three clashes occurred in the directions of Hryhorivka and Verkhniokamianske All enemy attempts to advance were repelled 10 clashes were recorded in the direction of Maiske Russian troops launched 16 attacks in the areas of Toretsk Ukraine’s forces held back 115 Russian attacks toward the settlements of Hnativka the Defense Forces repelled 52 enemy assaults near Kostiantynopil Russian troops five times attacked the Defense Forces positions in the Vysoke area in the Huliaipole direction In the Orikhiv direction near Novoandriivka the enemy conducted no offensive operations Ukraine’s forces repelled 23 Russian attacks in the past day The invaders carried out 317 artillery strikes Russia’s war casualties in Ukraine are estimated at 958,070 including 1,260 killed or wounded in action in the past 24 hours While citing and using any materials on the Internet links to the website ukrinform.net not lower than the first paragraph are mandatory citing the translated materials of foreign media outlets is possible only if there is a link to the website ukrinform.net and the website of a foreign media outlet Materials marked as "Advertisement" or with a disclaimer reading "The material has been posted in accordance with Part 3 of Article 9 of the Law of Ukraine "On Advertising" No 1996 and the Law of Ukraine "On the Media" No 2023 and on the basis of an agreement/invoice Online media entity; Media identifier - R40-01421 According to Ukrinform, this was reported on Telegram by the Khortytsia Operational Strategic Group of Troops (OSGT) which also released a video footage of the operation "The operators of the Korsar strike UAV battalion tracked and accurately struck enemy armored vehicles with drones," the statement reads The Khortytsia OSGT specified that as a result the enemy lost several pieces of equipment: an MT-LB armored towing vehicle and a combat armored vehicle were all destroyed fighters of the 5th Separate Assault Kyiv Brigade of the Ukrainian Ground Forces used drones to destroy a mortar and Russian infantry hiding in a shelter on one of the key fronts According to Ukrinform, the video was posted on Syrskyi's Facebook page Video: Facebook page of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine “The commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is working in the Pokrovsk direction,” the video caption reads As Ukrinform reported earlier, according to the Khortytsia operational and strategic grouping of troops, Russian troops continue to accumulate forces for further attacks in the Pokrovsk direction. either observed and verified firsthand by the reporter or reported and verified from knowledgeable sources Translations may contain inaccuracies—please refer to the original content Russia's battle for the eastern Ukrainian town of Pokrovsk is a "failure," according to the head of a Ukrainian think tank after many months of bitter fighting and slow Russian gains around the settlement Russia has long hoped to take the Ukrainian stronghold of Pokrovsk but rather than attacking the settlement directly Moscow has skirted to the south of the Donetsk town and advanced toward the border of Ukraine's neighboring Dnipropetrovsk region Pokrovsk, a major logistics hub, has borne the brunt of the fiercest frontline clashes for much of the last year. The town has been referred to as a "fortress" settlement key to Ukrainian defenses in the east and connected to other critical defensive cities "We are seeing a coordinated Russian information campaign tied to their failure — the fact that they have lost the battle for Pokrovsk," Serhii Kuzan, from the Ukrainian Center for Security and Cooperation, a Ukrainian think tank, said in an interview with Ukrainian broadcaster, Radio NV progress has been incremental for Russian troops and the town remains in Ukraine's hands Ukraine has said Russia's casualty count is "many times higher" than Ukraine's around Pokrovsk but Russia is known for its "meat grinder" assault tactics or overwhelming Ukrainian defenses with high numbers of troops while racking up eyewatering casualties Kuzan said Ukraine had "properly executed" its defensive strategy for Pokrovsk disrupting Moscow's timelines for seizing the town and "foiling their much larger offensive plans for this summer." and now they are falling behind their own schedules — schedules that are critical for their summer offensive campaign," Kuzan said "They can't push us out of Donetsk Oblast because we stopped them under Pokrovsk," he added Kyiv has warned Russia is pulling together reserve forces for a major push, while senior Ukrainian officials say Moscow launched a concerted effort in two areas of northeastern Ukraine earlier this month Ukraine had said that it launched an incursion into Russia's Kursk region in August last year partly to pull Russian resources away from Donetsk settlements like Pokrovsk Russia has recently advanced along a railroad line west of the village of Shevchenko, which sits south of Pokrovsk, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) think tank, which tracks daily changes to the frontline, said on Tuesday. Ukraine's military said early on Wednesday it had "stopped" 75 Russian attacks around Pokrovsk over the previous 24 hours said Russia had "significantly increased" attacks close to Pokrovsk in a bid to reach the Dnipropetrovsk region despite announcing a unilateral ceasefire due to come into force in May "The Russian command daily throws new units into battle, drives its soldiers to their deaths, reports on illusory successes and victories," Syrsky said The Kremlin declared a ceasefire on Monday to observe the 80th anniversary of the Great Patriotic War This is the term used by Russia to describe its participation in World War II after it joined the Allies in 1941 Moscow has consistently claimed its invasion of Ukraine aimed to "de-Nazify" the country Russia will not conduct any military operations between midnight on May 8 and midnight on May 11 adding that "Russia believes that the Ukrainian side should follow this example." The announcement was greeted with skepticism by Ukraine Russia's Defense Ministry said on Wednesday its forces had seized a village in the the north of the Donetsk region Newsweek could not independently verify this The Russian government said on Wednesday: "As a result of active offensive actions units of the West military group liberated the settlement of Novoye in the Donetsk People's Republic." Syrsky said on Wednesday: "Despite loud statements about readiness for a ceasefire for the May holidays the occupiers have significantly increased the intensity of hostilities focusing their main efforts on the Pokrovsk direction." It is not clear yet if and how the failure to capture Pokrovsk will affect Russia's alleged plans for a new summer offensive, where Moscow allegedly hopes to deploy troops on motorcycles to counter Ukraine's drones Newsweek is committed to challenging conventional wisdom and finding connections in the search for common ground Newsletters in your inbox See all Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15 am ET on April 14 ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment Russian forces appear to be leveraging redeployed elements of the 8th Combined Arms Army to close the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk and level the frontline as part of ongoing Russian efforts to attack Kostyantynivka from the south Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on April 14 that elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA] Southern Military District [SMD]) recently seized Oleksandropil and Valentynivka (all southwest of Toretsk) and pushed Ukrainian forces from positions east of the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynopil highway.[1] Russian milbloggers also claimed on April 13 and 14 that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces from positions east of the H-20 highway The Russian military command redeployed elements of the 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk and eastern Pokrovsk directions in February 2025 and likely intended to leverage these redeployments to break out of Toretsk and advance towards Kostyantynivka along or parallel to the T-0516 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway.[5] Elements of the Russian 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC] SMD) previously operating in these two areas failed to break through Ukraine's defense in Fall 2024 and Winter 2024-2025 likely prompting the Russian military command to introduce elements of the 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions – potentially prematurely – into combat in order to maintain the operational tempo in these areas Russian forces marginally advanced along the frontline between Vozdvyzhenka (northeast of Pokrovsk) and Sukha Balka in February and March 2025 but have made more tactically significant advances near Kalynove and along the Sukha Balka-Oleksandropil line since early April 2025.[6] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may aim to eliminate the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk in order to level out their southern flank ahead of a planned push on Kostyantynivka and recent Russian redeployments and tactical activity supports this assessment.[7] Russian forces likely intend to leverage advances southwest of Toretsk to push along the H-20 highway and facilitate deeper advances northeast of Pokrovsk along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway toward Kostyantynivka advance toward Kostyantynivka broadly from the east or advance roughly 24 kilometers from Pokrovsk along the T-0504 highway to Kostyantynivka’s southwestern flank before Russian forces will pose any notable threat to seizing Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka and a Russian offensive to seize the city or Ukraine's wider fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast would likely be a years' long effort - assuming that the West continues to bolster Ukraine's defense.[8] Russian forces appear to be intensifying their use of armored vehicles throughout the theater after mainly relegating armored vehicles to fire support roles and relying on infantry assaults to advance in late 2024 and early 2025 Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on April 13 that Ukrainian forces repelled a reinforced company-sized Russian mechanized assault toward Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar) and Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) with 13 armored vehicles and an unspecified number of motorcycles on April 12.[9] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction published footage on April 14 showing Russian forces conducting a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault with over 20 armored vehicles including over 10 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and several tanks.[10] The Ukrainian brigade stated that Russian forces attempted to advance in a wave of motorcycles ahead of the attacking armored vehicles to swiftly reach Ukrainian positions Another Ukrainian brigade operating nearby stated that the Russian assault occurred near Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and that Ukrainian forces destroyed two tanks and 12 IFVs.[11] The Ukrainian National Guard published footage on April 14 showing Russian forces conducting a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault with three tanks an unspecified number of MT-LB armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) and 41 motorcycles in an unspecified area of the Zaporizhia direction.[12] The Ukrainian National Guard reported that Ukrainian forces repelled the assault and destroyed two IFVs and one AFV Russian forces have been augmenting mechanized assaults with civilian vehicles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) since late Fall 2024 after limiting their use of armored vehicles across the entire frontline Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov noted on April 14 that Russian forces are using more civilian vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction due to their high degree of maneuverability for evading Ukrainian drones compared to slower armored vehicles.[15] Trehubov reported that Ukrainian drone operations are rendering Russian armored vehicle usage ineffective in the Pokrovsk direction which is consistent with a long-term trend of Ukrainian drones discouraging Russian armored vehicle usage in this direction.[16] ISW has previously assessed that Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) cannot produce new armored vehicles and artillery systems at rates that can offset Russia's current tempo of losses in the medium- to long-term A Russian military court recently decided to keep former 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov in custody after reports that Popov would command a penal assault detachment in Ukraine Popov publicly appealed to Putin in March 2025 to reinstate him in active military service particularly within the Russian ultranationalist and veteran communities The court's seeming reversal of the decision to send Popov to the war in Ukraine suggests that the Kremlin continues to struggle to respond to situations in which the Kremlin's desired outcome is at odds with that of the Russian ultranationalist and veteran communities The Kremlin may be conflicted about how to punish Popov for weaponizing the information space in July 2023 when he attempted to reverse his removal from command The Kremlin likely fears that allowing Popov to return to the battlefield at his request would set a precedent in which popular commanders and officials could threaten to blackmail the Kremlin into accepting their demands Read more about Popov's arrest in ISW’s latest special edition Ukraine and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief Negotiations regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure are ongoing and the resolution of these negotiations remains unclear The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 14 without evidence that Ukrainian forces struck energy facilities in Belgorod and Bryansk oblasts and occupied Luhansk and Kherson oblasts eight times over the past day.[21] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin told Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestia on April 14 that Ukrainian forces have violated the ceasefire on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure almost every day since March 18.[22] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on April 13 that Russia is intensifying long-range strikes and offensive operations along the frontline despite that Ukraine and the United States offered Russia an unconditional general ceasefire in mid-March 2025.[23] Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast amid continued efforts to push Ukrainian forces out of their limited remaining positions in the area Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Guyevo (south of Sudzha).[24] Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Guyevo and are pushing Ukrainian forces out of the St Nicholas Monastery northeast of Gornal (southwest of Sudzha).[25] Fighting continued near Gornal and Oleshnya (southwest of Sudzha).[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Gornal and Oleshnya.[27] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a successful HIMARS strike on April 11 against the forward command post of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division Leningrad Military District [LMD]) in Guyevo wounding the regiment’s commander and killing the regiment's deputy commander and a communications platoon commander.[28] The Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces previously conducted drone and rocket strikes against the command post and that the Russian military command "made no effort" to move or conceal the command post A Ukrainian source reported on April 13 that a Ukrainian MiG-29 fighter aircraft conducted a AASM Hammer stand-off weapon strike against Russian positions in Tetkino (southwest of Kursk City).[29] Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces reported on April 14 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Stela-10 short-range surface-to-air missile system in Kursk Oblast.[30] LMD) and 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating near Guyevo.[31] Elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near the St Fighting continued in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on April 14 but Russian forces did not make confirmed advances Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have pushed Ukrainian forces out of most of Popovka (northwest of Belgorod City) but that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the settlement's western outskirts.[33] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Demidovka (southeast of Popovka) and that Russian forces are clearing the settlement.[34] Fighting continued in Popovka and Demidovka.[35] Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA] Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Demidovka and Popovka.[36] Elements of the "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) and 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th AC LMD) are reportedly operating near Popovka.[37] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Sumy direction on April 14 but did not make confirmed advances Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed on April 13 and 14 that Russian forces advanced northeast of Sumy near the international border in Zhuravka and northeast of Sumy near Loknya and Veselivka.[38] Russian state television program Vesti claimed that Russian forces occupy 70 square kilometers of Sumy Oblast though ISW has only collected evidence to assess that Russian forces occupy 43.61 square kilometers in Sumy Oblast.[39] Russian forces attacked near Basivka on April 13 and 14.[40] A milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Vodolahy (north of Sumy near the international border).[41] Order of Battle: Drone units of the Russian "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating near Oleksiivka (north of Sumy).[42] Elements of the Russian 1434th "Akhmat-Chechnya" Regiment are reportedly operating near Veselivka and Volodymyrivka (north of Sumy) and Vodolahy.[43] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on April 14 but did not advance Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on April 13 and 14.[44] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on April 14 that Russian forces used three armored vehicles and eight motorized vehicles to deliver infantry to frontline positions near Vovchanski Khutory and that Ukrainian strikes destroyed two armored vehicles and six motorized vehicles.[45] Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Stepove Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[46] Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on April 13 and 14.[47] A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces are using heavy equipment less frequently and are attacking with motorcycles and buggies.[48] The spokesperson stated that Ukrainian forces are trying to strike the Russian rear before Russian forces approach the frontline Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC] Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA] Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[49] Elements of the "Sheikh Mansur" volunteer battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Stroivka (northeast of Kupyansk near the international border).[50] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 14 but did not advance Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove; east of Borova near Nadiya and Serhiivka; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka Serhiivka on April 13 and 14.[51] Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA] MMD) are attacking along the Lozova-Pershotravneve line (northeast and east of Borova).[52] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on April 14 but did not make confirmed advances Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces entered Novomykhailivka (northeast of Lyman) and advanced within Nove (northeast of Lyman).[53] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Makiivka (northeast of Novomykhailivka) northwest of Novolyubivka (southwest of Novomykhailivka) north of Kolodyazi (south of Novomykhailivka) and to Zelena Dolyna (southwest of Novomykhailivka).[54] Mashovets stated that Russian forces advanced to the Zherebets River in an unspecified area between Yampolivka and Torske (east of Lyman).[55] Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Nove and Yampolivka and toward Zelena Dolyna and Ridkodub and east of Lyman near Torske on April 13 and 14.[56] Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 254th and 1428th motorized rifle regiments; 59th Tank Regiment; and 148th Reconnaissance Battalion (all of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division MMD) are attacking in the Nove-Lypove (northeast of Lyman) and Zelena Dolyna directions.[57] Mashovets noted that the 1428th Motorized Rifle Regiment is not operating at full strength and lacks one to two battalions Mashovets stated that elements of the 164th and 169th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 25th CAA with support from at least two motorized rifle regiments from the 67th Motorized Rifle Division (25th CAA) are attacking in the Yampolivka-Torske direction and south of Yampolivka Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 13 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[58] Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[59] Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[60] Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hyrhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on April 14.[61] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 14 but did not advance Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on April 13 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian reinforced company-sized mechanized assault toward Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar) and Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) with 13 armored vehicles Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Andriivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Predtechyne on April 13 and 14.[63] Ukrainian forces recently advanced within and northeast of Toretsk Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Korolenka Street in northwestern Toretsk.[64] See topline text for assessed Russian advances in the Toretsk direction Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Krymske (northeast of Toretsk) along the O-0519 Bila Hora-Druzhba road.[65] Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on April 14 that elements of the Russian 132nd and 9th motorized rifle brigades (all of the 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA] formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC] Southern Military District [SMD]) and 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th CAA SMD) are operating in the Toretsk direction.[66] Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 13 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in western Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[67] Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka and Oleksandropil; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove and Udachne on April 13 and 14.[68] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yelyzavetivka.[69] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reported on April 14 that Russian forces are using the largest number of vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction mainly as fire support and to support any Russian breakthroughs.[70] Trehubov noted that heavy armored vehicles are currently ineffective as "breakthrough weapons" and fire support - or even infantry transports - due to the number of drones in the air The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on April 14 that Russian forces have stopped conducting mechanized assaults in the area after experiencing significant armored vehicle losses a week ago (about April 7).[71] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces have reverted to deploying small infantry in groups of two to five and using civilian vehicles and motorcycles during attacks The spokesperson stated that Russian forces have been sending more mobilized personnel and less trained personnel on assaults in recent weeks A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed that a Russian soldier operating in the Pokrovsk direction recently complained that Russian forces are only receiving drones through humanitarian aid and Telegram channels' fundraisers and that this quantity of drones is insufficient.[72] The milblogger claimed that Russian drone technology is inferior to Ukraine's The milblogger claimed that these issues are systemic and exist in other unspecified areas of the frontline Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA SMD) are operating along the Tarasivka-Stara Mykolaivka-Oleksandropil line.[73] Drone operators of the "Smuglyanka" Detachment are reportedly operating near Myrne (east of Pokrovsk).[74] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 14 but did not make any confirmed advances Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Troitske are advancing west of Bohdanivka (both southeast of Novopavlivka) and entered Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka) from the east and south.[75] Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka and Preobrazhenka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka on April 13 and 14.[76] Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA Central Military District [CMD]) are operating in the Nadiivka-Kotlyarivka area (east of Novopavlivka).[77] Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division are reportedly also operating near Zaporizhzhia and Troitske (both southeast of Novopavlivka).[78] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on April 14 but did not make any confirmed advances Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 200 meters near Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove).[79] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the fields south of Bahatyr (southwest of Kurahkove).[80] Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and Andriivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on April 13 and 14.[81] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Bahatyr.[82] Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division and 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA SMD) are operating near Andriivka and that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA EMD) and 57th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA EMD) are operating near Rozlyv.[83] Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Bahatyr.[84] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on April 14 but did not make any confirmed advances Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south and southwest of Odradne (north of Velyka Novosilka) and east of Shevchenko.[85] Russian forces attacked north of Odradne; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele and Burlatske; west of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole Shevchenko and Pryvilne; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil and Novosilka on April 13 and 14.[86] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Odradne.[87] Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA EMD) are operating near Burlatske and Pryvilne.[88] Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA EMD) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[89] Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 14 but did not make any confirmed advances Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russan forces advanced north of Nesteryanka (northwest of Robotyne).[90] Russian forces conducted ground attacks northwest of Robotyne near Kamyanka and Mali Shcherbaky on April 13 and 14.[91] Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA] 392nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a reformed Soviet-era unit) and 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[92] Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Dnipro (Kherson) direction on April 13 and 14 but did not advance.[93] Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline) Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization) ISW is suspending Russian mobilization and force generation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW will be introducing a new product line tracking Russian mobilization, force generation efforts, and technological adaptations in the coming days. Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine) ISW is suspending Russian technological adaptations coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW will be introducing a new product line tracking Russian mobilization, force generation efforts, and technological adaptations in the coming days. Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems) ISW is suspending occupation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems. Click here to read the Russian Occupation Update. Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. [2] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31322 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63502 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63511 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34249 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22417 [4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2025 [5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040825 [6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-2-2025 [7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-16-2025 [9] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/13/pereterly-na-poroh-pid-stupochkamy-v-otu-lugansk-povidomyly-pro-vtraty-okupantiv/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2025 [10] https://t.me/immitis71/974 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/14/zgorily-pid-trykolorom-rosiyanam-na-pivdni-donechchyny-zlamaly-yih-bronovanyj-kulak/ [11] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=4915163665375755 [12] https://t.me/ngu_war_for_peace/26280 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/14/syly-oborony-zupynyly-masshtabnu-ataku-rosiyan-na-zaporizkomu-napryamku/ [15] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/14/bronetehnika-maloefektyvna-yak-zbroya-proryvu-na-shodi-rosiyany-vse-chastishe-viddayut-perevagu-shvydkosti/ [16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine [18] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/23660211 [19] https://dzen dot ru/a/Z_kkIPTgZEbmzbpc [20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin-sentenced-popular-russian-general-lead-penal-assault-detachment-ukraine [21] https://t.me/tass_agency/310473 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/310474 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/51281 [22] https://iz dot ru/1869382/anastasiia-kostina/my-natceleny-na-dostizhenie-konkretnogo-i-ustraivaiushchego-obe-storony-rezultata [24] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8883; https://t.me/rt_russian/237145 [25] https://t.me/dva_majors/69079; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89941 [27] https://t.me/dva_majors/69043; https://t.me/rusich_army/22575 [29] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/enemies-have-hard-times-ukrainian-aviation-bombed-russian-positions-at-tetkino-sugar-factory/; https://t.me/soniah_hub/10040 [30] https://x.com/usf_army/status/1911755730769543600 [31] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8883; https://t.me/rt_russian/237145; https://t.me/dva_majors/69082 [33] https://t.me/rybar/69630; https://t.me/dva_majors/69043; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26934 [34] https://t.me/rybar/69630; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89890; https://t.me/dva_majors/69043 [35] https://t.me/rybar/69630; https://t.me/dva_majors/69043 [36] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89890; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89903 [37] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89940; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/7570 [38] https://t.me/vestiru/160796; https://t.me/wargonzo/25908; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89891; https://t.me/rybar/69630 [39] https://t.me/vestiru/160796; https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375 [40] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89891; https://t.me/rusich_army/22575 [44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23084; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23081 [46] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8881; https://t.me/kcaebirds/1672 [47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23084; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23081 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7977 [48] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/14/mogylnyk-poblyzu-dvoh-spalenyh-derev-navkolo-kupyanska-czvyntari-znyshhenoyi-vorozhoyi-broni/ [49] https://t.me/dva_majors/69053; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89900 [51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23106; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23084 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23081; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7977; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63504 [53] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89902; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89936; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63517; https://t.me/yurasumy/22419 [54] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63504; https://t.me/yurasumy/22419 [56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23106; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23084 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23081; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7977; https://t.me/dva_majors/69043; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63517 [58] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27313; https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1Ag7AYZgZT/; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8899 [59] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27313; https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1Ag7AYZgZT/; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8899 [62] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/13/pereterly-na-poroh-pid-stupochkamy-v-otu-lugansk-povidomyly-pro-vtraty-okupantiv/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2025 [63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23106 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23084 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23081 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7977 [64] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1911763432359207155; https://t.me/BARS14GUMANITARKA/13477 [67] https://x.com/TeeterSweeper/status/1911530025733538244 ; https://t.me/si4eslavskabrygada/685 [68] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63496 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63498 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23106 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23084 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23081 [70] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/14/bronetehnika-maloefektyvna-yak-zbroya-proryvu-na-shodi-rosiyany-vse-chastishe-viddayut-perevagu-shvydkosti/ [71] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/14/kadrovi-profesionaly-zakinchylysya-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-vorog-atakuye-neshhodavno-mobilizovanoyu-pihotoyu/ [76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23106 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23084 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23081 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89912 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26958 [81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23106 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23084 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23081 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7977 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25908 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14418 [84] https://t.me/voin_dv/14412 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14409 [85] https://t.me/voin_dv/14418 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22415 [86] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26931 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23084 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23081 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0npjfmg7iG5xbfs543KUXStejoWcZaE34jZP1qdDcsJnAmDqNzF82yWXAiUSHYBQtl ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14418 [89] https://t.me/voin_dv/14418 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26940 [91] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23106; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23084; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23081; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0npjfmg7iG5xbfs543KUXStejoWcZaE34jZP1qdDcsJnAmDqNzF82yWXAiUSHYBQtl; https://t.me/yurasumy/22414 [92] https://t.me/mod_russia/51289; https://t.me/rusich_army/22565; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161259 [93] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23106; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23084; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23081; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0npjfmg7iG5xbfs543KUXStejoWcZaE34jZP1qdDcsJnAmDqNzF82yWXAiUSHYBQtl 20253:48 PM UTCHolding the line: Scenes from Ukraine's frontlines as ceasefire talks fadeFighting continues to rage along more than 600 miles of the frontline with Russian forces grinding on in the Ukrainian east [2/33]Servicemen of Ukraine's 49th Separate Assault Battalion Carpathian Sich prepare a T-80 tank captured earlier from Russian troops REUTERS/Anatolii Stepanov DONETSK REGION [3/33]A member of the White Angel unit of Ukrainian police officers who evacuate people from the frontline towns and villages accompanies residents during an evacuation in the frontline town of Pokrovsk in Donetsk region [5/33]Medics prepare for transportation of a wounded Ukrainian serviceman inside a medical stabilisation point of the 5th Separate Assault Kyiv Brigade [6/33]A member of Ukraine's 65th Separate Mechanized Brigade fires a RPG-7 grenade launcher which is mounted on an unmanned ground vehicle near the frontline town of Chasiv Yar in Donetsk region Oleg Petrasiuk/Ukrainian Armed Forces UKRAINE-CRISIS/CHASIV YAR [8/33]A serviceman of Ukraine's 68th Oleksa Dovbush Separate Jaeger Brigade fires a BM-21 Grad multiple-launch rocket system toward Russian troops [9/33]A resident smokes in a basement as she takes shelter from frequent shelling [10/33]Members of the White Angel unit of Ukrainian police officers who evacuate people from the frontline towns and villages check an area for residents in the frontline town of Pokrovsk in Donetsk region [11/33]Servicemen of 24th Mechanized brigade named after King Danylo of the Ukrainian Armed Forces fire a 120-mm mortar towards Russian troops at a frontline near the town of Chasiv Yar in Donetsk region Oleg Petrasiuk/Ukrainian Armed Forces DONETSK REGION [12/33]Ukrainian servicemen of the 49th Separate Assault Battalion Carpathian Sich rest at their position at a front line [13/33]Ukrainian servicemen from the anti-drone mobile air defence unit of 115th Separate Mechanized Brigad at their position in Donetsk region [14/33]Members of the White Angel unit of Ukrainian police officers try to persuade residents to evacuate in the frontline town of Pokrovsk in Donetsk region [15/33]Servicemen of Ukraine's 24th Mechanized Brigade prepare a heavy combat drone before flying over positions of Russian troops near the frontline town of Chasiv Yar in Donetsk region [16/33]An agricultural worker operates a tractor near newly installed anti-tank fortifications named 'dragon's teeth' and razor wire [17/33]A serviceman of Ukraine's 49th Separate Assault Battalion Carpathian Sich repairs a T-80 tank captured earlier from Russian troops [18/33]A member of the White Angel unit of Ukrainian police officers accompanies residents during an evacuation [19/33]A resident sits on a street near a building damaged by Russian military strikes in the frontline town of Pokrovsk in Donetsk region [20/33]A Ukrainian serviceman of the 108th Territorial Defence Forces Brigade fires a D-44 field artillery gun towards Russian troops at a frontline position More in this CollectionSee all picturesItem 21 of 33 Servicemen of Ukraine's 49th Separate Assault Battalion Carpathian Sich ride in a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle after a combat mission near the town of Toretsk in Donetsk region REUTERS/Anatolii Stepanov[21/33]Servicemen of Ukraine's 49th Separate Assault Battalion Carpathian Sich ride in a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle after a combat mission REUTERS/Anatolii StepanovShare this gallery , opens new tab Browse an unrivalled portfolio of real-time and historical market data and insights from worldwide sources and experts. , opens new tabScreen for heightened risk individual and entities globally to help uncover hidden risks in business relationships and human networks. © 2025 Reuters. 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#article-stream-0 .quote-embed .font-size p{font-size: 36px;}A Russian assault group attacks under a large flag It’s tempting fate to roll into a battle in Ukraine while flying a giant flag from your armored vehicle But that’s exactly what a Russian regiment did on Thursday as they attacked under the white blue and red banner of the Russian Federation Marshaling a dozen increasingly precious armored vehicles the Russians attacked toward the fortress city of Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine The Ukrainian 35th Marine Brigade and the Birds of Magyar drone group were waiting for them with drones and artillery the blood-red flag of the defunct Soviet Union The wholesale destruction of the flag-waving Russian assault group came as the Kremlin is once again increasing pressure on Pokrovsk the anchor of a chain of fortified settlements stretching toward the north Russian forces spent a year marching the roughly 25 miles from the ruins of Avdiivka to Pokrovsk But the offensive ground to a halt a few miles outside of Pokrovsk as it ran into the thickest concentration of Ukrainian drones and artillery last month a Russian regiment assembled a dozen armored vehicles in one column—an increasingly rare sight as Russian losses of armored vehicles and other heavy equipment exceed 20,000 and regiments turn to civilian vehicles to keep their troops moving The Russians were victorious in Kursk because the Ukrainians occupied a narrow salient with vulnerable supply lines—and the Russians deployed their best drones to sever the main road into the salient The only salients around Pokrovsk are held by the Russians And the only vulnerable supply lines are also Russian The doomed flag assault was “unnecessary confirmation of the offensive weakness of the Russians it was imprudent for Russian troops to call their shot—and attack under a giant Russian flag as though they’d already won the battle MP Serhii Sobolev told the news outlet Suspilne The ratification vote is scheduled for May 8 Attacks against the border villages of Bilopillia and Vorozhba damaged civilian infrastructure and triggered emergency evacuations the regional military administration reported "I look forward to working with President Erdogan on getting the ridiculous war between Russia and Ukraine ended — now!" U.S Putin's Victory Day truce "doesn't sound like much if you know where we started from," Trump told reporters at the White House on May 5 Far-right Euroskeptic candidate George Simion head of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) Bucharest Mayor Nicusor Dan placed second with 20.99% of the vote and the candidate from the ruling coalition "It requires the continuation of contacts between Moscow and Washington which have been launched and are now ongoing," Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said set to operate within the Council of Europe will focus on Russia's political and military leaders up to 20 Russian soldiers were killed and their equipment destroyed The move represents an apparent violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions passed in the wake of North Korea's intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests "We are ready to deepen our contribution to the training of the Ukrainian military," Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala said on May 5 Davis's arrival follows the resignation of Ambassador Bridget Brink by The Kyiv Independent news deskCommander Kucher (L) of the 21st Battalion awards his soldiers medals on Ukraine Defender Day for their outstanding courage and service on the front line on Oct (Pierre Crom/Getty Images)According to the April 5 evening report by the General Staff 152 military encounters were recorded since the start of the day “The most intense situation is in Pokrovsk, Lyman, Toretsk and Kursk directions,” the General Staff wrote Sixty-five clashes were reported near Pokrovsk alone dropping 106 guided bombs and using 844 kamikaze drones Russia has actively attacked Ukrainian civilian sites Russia attacked the city of Mykolaiv with Shahed-type drones A day prior, a Russian missile attack on the Ukrainian city of Kryvyi Rih killed 19 people, including nine children Zelensky said in his evening address “that Russia must be held accountable for everything it has done.” and Ukraine agreed to a full ceasefire on March 11 but Russia rejected it agreed on March 25 to a partial truce covering energy infrastructure and the Black Sea the Kremlin has blocked the partial ceasefire as well saying that the Black Sea truce would take effect only after some sanctions against Russia are lifted We are the news team of the Kyiv Independent We are here to make sure our readers get quick essential updates about the events in Ukraine Feel free to contact us via email with feedback and news alerts According to Ukrinform, this was reported by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on Facebook in an operational update as of 16:00 on Saturday Russian forces shelled the settlements of Mykolaivka in Chernihiv region; Izdetske Airstrikes targeted Mkhy in Chernihiv region and Myropilske and Krasnopillia in Sumy region the enemy twice attempted to assault the Ukrainian positions near Vovchansk Russian forces have been storming the Ukrainian defensive positions near Zahryzove since the beginning of the day the Russians attacked the Ukrainian positions nine times near Ridkodub the Ukrainian defenders repelled three enemy attacks near Chasiv Yar the Russians attempted one assault near Krymske with 46 engagements of varying intensity reported today Ukrainian units are defending against enemy assaults in areas around Stara Mykolaivka "Our defenders are giving the occupiers a worthy response; 10 battles are still ongoing," said the General Staff The enemy also struck Shevchenko Pershe with guided aerial bombs Russian forces attempted to break through 50 times in areas around Kostiantynopil the enemy used unguided air rockets against Malynivka and Huliaipole Ukrainian forces repelled two attacks near Novodanylivka and Kamianske the Ukrainian defenders repelled five attacks Russian forces conducted one airstrike using two guided bombs and carried out 119 shellings including five with multiple rocket launcher systems the enemy did not conduct offensive operations according to South Defense Forces Spokesman Vladyslav Voloshyn Russian troops have significantly increased attacks on the Ukrainian positions in the south Kagan with Nate Trotter and William Runkel Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on April 8 ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment Ukrainian forces recently captured Chinese nationals fighting in the Russian military in several areas of Donetsk Oblast Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on April 8 that Ukrainian forces captured several Chinese "fighters" who were fighting for Russia near Bilohorivka (east of Siversk) and Tarasivka (northeast of Pokrovsk) in recent attacks and that Ukrainian intelligence indicated that there are "significantly more Chinese nationals" in the Russian military.[1] Zelensky noted that Ukrainian forces came into contact with a group of six Chinese fighters during several recent attacks and captured two Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated that the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) summoned the Chinese charge d'affairs in response to the incident.[2] US Department of State Spokesperson Tammy Bruce characterized the Chinese nationals' involvement as "disturbing" on April 8 and stated that "China is a major enabler of Russia" that "provides nearly 80 percent of the dual use items Russia needs to sustain the war."[3] ISW has observed reports of various unspecified Russian entities recruiting vulnerable migrant workers into the Russian military to fight in Ukraine both in Russia and abroad Indian authorities revealed in 2024 that unspecified Russian entities were managing a human trafficking network that lured Indian citizens to Russia under false pretenses and then coerced them into signing military contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense to fight in Ukraine.[4] Indian and Russian authorities partnered to repatriate Indian citizens who had involuntarily joined the Russian military in October 2024 and the People's Republic of China (PRC) could demonstrate that its government was not involved in the participation of its citizens in this war by undertaking a similar effort in the future.[5] Beijing has not yet offered any formal response to these reports Russian and US authorities announced a second round of US-Russia bilateral discussions focused on normalizing diplomatic missions but not on discussing the ceasefire agreements offered jointly by the US and Ukraine will be held in Istanbul on April 10 Russian forces are currently pursuing three distinct tactical objectives in the Pokrovsk direction but Ukrainian drone operations and localized counterattacks are continuing to complicate Russian advances in the area Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on April 7 that Russian forces are trying to cut the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway northeast of Pokrovsk and attack in the Novopavlivka (southwest of Pokrovsk) direction.[10] Russian forces are making limited gains northeast of Pokrovsk toward the T-0504 highway and southwest of Pokrovsk toward Novopavlivka but appear to be struggling to advance immediately south and southwest of Pokrovsk — where Ukrainian forces have focused most of their counterattacks in February Russian advances northeast of Pokrovsk support both the ongoing Russian effort to envelop Pokrovsk from the east and west and the effort to pressure Kostyantynivka from the south by advancing along the T-0504 highway and eliminating the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk.[12] The Russian military command reportedly introduced additional units to offensive operations east and northeast of Pokrovsk in early 2025 but Russian forces have only made marginal gains toward Kostyantynivka (northeast of Pokrovsk) in recent months Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Russia redeployed elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA] formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) near Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk) in January 2025 and elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA prompting the Russian military command to prematurely introduce the 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions into combat in order to maintain their operational tempo in these areas Russian forces have not made significant advances northeast of Pokrovsk as a result and only advanced five to seven kilometers north of Vozdvyzhenka over the last two months Russian forces recently advanced beyond the western outskirts of Toretsk and southwest of Toretsk near Panteleymonivka and Oleksandropil and Russian forces may allocate additional troops and reprioritize offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk if Russian forces begin to make more significant advances from Toretsk toward Kostyantynivka.[15] The situation immediately south and southwest of Pokrovsk remains extremely dynamic amid intensified Russian offensive operations and localized Ukrainian counterattacks and drone operations in the area Russian forces intensified offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction in mid-March 2025 aimed at enveloping Pokrovsk and seizing Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (just east of Pokrovsk) but have not made significant advances since late Fall 2024 due to localized Ukrainian counterattacks and drone operations in the area.[16] Geolocated footage published on April 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced west of Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk) and Russian forces have slowly retaken most of Ukraine's marginal advances south and southwest of Pokrovsk in recent weeks Ukrainian forces are continuing to conduct sporadic likely in an effort to complicate Russian advances and threaten Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Russian salient immediately southwest of Pokrovsk Russian forces continue to deplete manpower and materiel in unsuccessful mechanized assaults and ongoing infantry assaults with armored vehicle support further southwest of Pokrovsk A Ukrainian tactical group operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on April 8 that Russian forces recently conducted a company-sized mechanized assault near Yasenove (southwest of Pokrovsk) in an attempt to seize Bohdanivka and Horikhove (all west of Yasenove) and that Ukrainian forces destroyed two tanks particularly west of Preobrazhenka (southwest of Pokrovsk) but Russian forces have not advanced the remaining three kilometers into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast as of this report.[24] Russian forces have only made marginal advances throughout the Pokrovsk direction due to localized Ukrainian counterattacks and improved integration of Ukrainian ground and drone forces The Russian military command has historically struggled to conduct and connect multi-directional offensive operations in Ukraine and Ukrainian drone operations are further complicating this effort Russian milbloggers have repeatedly claimed that Ukrainian drones have low altitude air superiority and are forcing Russian forces to conduct rotations on foot over 10 kilometers and complicating Russian supplies of ammunition and training issues to completely stall the Russian advance in Donetsk Oblast.[28] Russian forces have spent the last 13 months and lost over five divisions' worth of tanks and thousands of troops attacking towards Pokrovsk and trying to seize the town Ongoing Russian offensive operations to seize Pokrovsk and attack Kostyantynivka highlight Russian President Vladimir Putin's determination to seize all of Ukraine through military means at whatever cost if he cannot do so through negotiations Trehubov estimated in February 2025 that Russian forces were losing 14,000 to 15,000 casualties including roughly 7,000 killed in action (KIA) and Russian forces have only sustained further losses over the last six months.[31] ISW has previously assessed that Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) cannot produce new armored vehicles and artillery systems at rates that can offset Russia's current tempo of losses in the medium- to long-term.[32] Russian forces temporarily fielded fewer armored vehicles in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove direction in late 2024 likely in response to concerns about dwindling armored vehicle supplies although the recent uptick in Russian armored vehicle use in these areas highlights Russia's desperation to make further gains at any cost Future Russian attacks on and into Pokrovsk and Kostyantynivka would only generate greater manpower and materiel losses if the Russian military is even capable of conducting such operations after having suffered significant armored vehicle and personnel losses over the last three years of fighting Putin and the Russian military command appear determined to seize Pokrovsk and attack Kostyantynivka despite these losses Ongoing Russian attacks towards Kostyantynivka from several directions highlight Russia's ongoing efforts to seize the fortress belt despite the fact that an offensive operation against the wider Ukrainian fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast would likely take Russian forces several years to complete assuming that the West continues to provide aid to Ukraine.[33] ISW previously assessed that Russian commanders are likely willing to undertake these long-term operations because they are operating under the assumption or with direct knowledge that Putin does not intend to end the war in Ukraine in the near future.[34] Putin has previously articulated a theory of victory that assumes that the Russian military will be able to continue gradual which are the toppling of the current Ukrainian government and the categorical destruction of the Ukrainian military.[37] Russian forces renewed long-range missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 7 to 8 following a brief pause on April 6 to 7.[38] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched an Iskander-M ballistic missile from Kursk Oblast and 46 Shahed and decoy drones from the direction of Primorsko-Aktarsk Krasnodar Krai.[39] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed nine drones over northern and eastern Ukraine and that 31 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference Ukrainian sources reported that the Iskander-M missile struck a recreation center in Vysoky Kharkiv Oblast.[40] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also struck Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk oblasts.[41] Russian forces continue to innovate with long-range Shahed strike drone tactics to maximize the impact of strikes against Ukraine Ukrainian military journalist and aviation expert Vadim Kushnikov gave an interview to Ukrainian outlet Suspilne published on April 8 noting that Russian forces are now attempting to fly Shahed drones in the densest possible formations to hit targets simultaneously whereas Russian forces previously dispersed Shahed drones widely to make it more difficult for Ukrainian air defenses to intercept the drones.[42] Kushnikov stated that Russian forces will concentrate a group of 10 to 15 Shahed drones outside of a city before striking the city and that Russian forces launch a set number of drones and fly the drones along a set route in that formation German outlet BILD recently reported that Russian forces have altered their strike drone tactics and are loitering drones several kilometers from their targets at high altitudes before conducting synchronized strikes with multiple drones.[43] Kushnikov stated that Russian forces have also increased the number of drone launch sites from three to five and are focusing on Ukrainian targets closer to the border in northeastern Ukraine giving Ukrainian air defenses less time to react and intercept the drones Kushnikov noted that Ukrainian forces are developing countermeasures against Russian drone strikes including using first person view (FPV) drones as interceptors along with combat lasers Russian forces may be leveraging increased Shahed production rates to facilitate denser and more focused strike tactics as part of ongoing Russian efforts to innovate their long-range strike packages.[44] European states continue to provide financial and military aid to Ukraine The Norwegian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Prime Minister's Office announced on April 7 that Norway will provide four billion kroner (approximately 365.3 million USD) in grants to Czechia's artillery ammunition initiative for Ukraine in 2025 The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced an initiative ostensibly aimed at securing medical treatment and rehabilitation for wounded Russian troops but the MoD may weaponize this initiative against wounded servicemembers in practice Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov signed a decree on April 8 ordering the establishment of mobile medical commissions to examine wounded Russian forces in frontline positions and identify soldiers requiring treatment and rehabilitation.[49] The Russian MoD noted that the mobile medical commissions will include senior medical specialists The Kremlin may also be attempting to mitigate budgetary concerns by centralizing control over medical evaluations for wounded servicemembers and possibly limiting the number of future veterans of the war in Ukraine who qualify for state support that Ukrainian forces struck Russian energy infrastructure facilities in Kursk Oblast and occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[53] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed on April 8 that Ukrainian forces conducted roughly 300 strikes per day against civilian infrastructure in Russia and occupied Ukraine between March 31 and April 8.[54] Russian authorities have not provided evidence to support claims of Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure facilities Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting in the Kursk-Sumy Oblast border area Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 7 indicates that Russian forces advanced along a road northwest of Guyevo (south of Sudzha) during a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault.[55] Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed on April 8 that elements of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division possibly alongside elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) or 177th Naval Infantry Brigade (Caspian Flotilla) seized Guyevo.[56] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Gornal (southwest of Guyevo) and reached Oleshnya (west of Sudzha) but that Ukrainian forces still maintain positions in both settlements.[57] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced near Basivka (northeast of Sumy City across the international border) toward Loknya (south of Basivka) in Sumy Oblast.[58] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued ground attacks near Oleshnya and Gornal in Kursk Oblast and Loknya in Sumy Oblast.[59] Russian forces recently conducted a raid further into northern Sumy Oblast but likely did not establish new positions Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating fiber-optic drones along the H-07 Sudzha-Yunakivka highway.[63] Russian forces recently marginally advanced in Belgorod Oblast Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 8 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in southwestern Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[64] Russian sources claimed that fighting continues near Demidovka and Popovka (northwest of Demidovka).[65] A Ukrainian regiment operating in the Belgorod direction published footage on April 8 of Ukrainian forces destroying Russian bridges near Grafovka (southeast of Demidovka) and Nadezhevka (east of Demidovka) and the regiment reported that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are holding positions in the area.[66] Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA] Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Popovka.[67] Ukrainian forces continue striking Russian air defense assets A Ukrainian drone group operating near the Belgorod Oblast border published footage of Ukrainian drones striking a Russian Zoopark radar station in an unspecified location in Belgorod Oblast.[68] A Ukrainian drone regiment published footage of Ukrainian drones destroying two Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense systems in an unspecified location in either Russia or occupied Ukraine and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian Buk air defense system's radar station in an unspecified location.[69] Russian forces reportedly did not conduct assaults in the Kharkiv direction on April 7 or 8.[70] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian mechanized infantry company reported that Russian forces are trying to improve their tactical positions near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv).[71] The officer reported that Russian forces are using KAB glide bombs and artillery and are attacking in small infantry groups of five to six soldiers The officer also reported that Russian forces were taking cover in sewage systems The officer stated that Russian forces have increased drone strikes against Ukrainian positions and logistical routes and that Russian forces are using "scorched earth" tactics in Vovchansk to destroy all remaining buildings and communications Order of Battle: Drone elements of the Russian 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[72] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 8 but did not make confirmed advances Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in fields southwest of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk) and 300 meters east of Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[73] Russian forces continued ground assaults northeast of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka and Mala Shapkivka and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Stepova Novoselivka on April 7 and 8.[74] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 8 but did not advance Russian forces continued ground assaults north of Borova near Bohuslavka and Novoplatonivka; northeast of Borova near Zahryzove; east of Borova near Pershotravneve toward Shyikivka and Nadiya; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Olhivka on April 6 and 7.[75] Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 8 shows elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division Moscow Military District [MMD]) raising a flag in northwestern Katerynivka (northeast of Lyman) indicating that Russian forces have likely seized Katerynivka.[76] Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced in fields northwest and east of Katerynivka; in fields northwest of Novolyubivka (northeast of Lyman); and within Nove (northeast of Lyman).[77] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces cleared most of Torske (east of Lyman).[78] Russian forces continued ground assaults northeast of Lyman near Novomykhailivka and Yampolivka and east of Lyman near Torske on April 7 and 8.[79] the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas) Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on April 8 but did not make confirmed advances Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on April 7 and 8 that Russian forces advanced east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske along a ridge north of the settlement.[83] Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka and southwest of Siversk near Vasyukivka on April 7 and 8.[84] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 8 but did not make confirmed advances Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed on April 8 that Russian forces seized the northern shore of Dniprovskyy Pond in northwestern Chasiv Yar.[85] Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar toward Bila Hora on April 7 and 8.[86] Ukrainian forces reportedly attempted to counterattack in central Chasiv Yar.[87] Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division 3rd AC) are reportedly operating near Predtechyne (south of Chasiv Yar).[88] Elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment and 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (both of the 98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[89] Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in fields northwest of Toretsk.[90] Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on April 7 and 8 that Russian forces advanced northeast of Toretsk near Ozaryanivka and advanced a total of one kilometer west of Panteleymonivka (southwest of Toretsk) as well as in the western outskirts of the settlement.[91] Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk toward Dyliivka and Dachne; northeast of Toretsk near Ozaryanivka; east of Toretsk near Druzhba; and west of Toretsk toward Petrivka and Shcherbynivka on April 7 and 8.[92] Ukrainian forces are reportedly counterattacking in the western outskirts of Toretsk itself.[93] Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[94] See topline text for reports of Russian activity in the Pokrovsk direction Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on April 8 but did not make confirmed advances Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on April 7 and 8 that Russian forces advanced west of Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove) and 300 meters near Kostyantynopil (west of Kurakhove).[95] Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Andriivka and Kostyantynopil and toward Ulakly and Oleksiivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv and Burlatske on April 7 and 8.[96] Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Bahatyr and drone operators of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove).[97] Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 8 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Burlatske (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[98] Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on April 7 and 8 that elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA EMD) advanced from Burlatske toward Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA EMD) advanced north of Noyvi Komar (north of Velyka Novosilka) and that unspecified Russian forces advanced 200 meters near Vesele (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[99] Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Velyka Novosilka near Skudne and Dniproenerhiya and northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and toward Shevchenko on April 7 and 8.[100] Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 656th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA EMD) and 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a mobilized unit and elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) and 200th Artillery Brigade (29th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[101] Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes) Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 8 but did not advance Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Robotyne near Mali Shcherbaky Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on April 8 that Russian forces continue to attack with small groups and drone support to exert fire control over Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) from Zaporizhzhia City to the east of Zaporizhia Oblast.[103] Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[104] Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Dnipro direction on April 8 The Kremlin is considering passing a bill that may incentivize volunteer recruitment for conscription-age men ages 18 to 30 years old and other bodies of the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) from conscription The Kremlin may be attempting to incentivize recruitment efforts directed at a younger demographic to augment more immediate Russian force generation needs by passing such laws that promise to stave off conscription TASS reported on April 7 that the Russian Ministry of Justice proposed a bill that would introduce amendments to the "On Military Duty and Military Service" federal law enabling stateless persons to sign military contracts with the Russian MoD.[106] TASS reported that the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and the MoD as well as the Governmental Legislative Commission already approved the proposed bill The bill would apply corresponding amendments to the laws "On the Status of Military Personnel," "On Defense," "On State Pension Provision in the Russian Federation," "On the System of Civil Service in the Russian Federation," and several other unspecified laws if it passes Chairperson of Russia's Association of Lawyers Board stated that the bill would grant stateless persons who signed a military contract with the MoD the same rights and obligations as foreign citizens Russian President Vladimir Putin has signed decrees including a decree on March 20 called "On the Peculiarities of the Legal Status of Certain Categories of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons in the Russian Federation" which grant Russian authorities the ability to classify Ukrainian citizens living in occupied Ukraine who refuse or have not obtained Russian citizenship as "foreigners."[107] These provisions may grant Russia additional legal tools to force Ukrainians living in Russian-occupied Ukraine into military service Russian news organization Vedomosti noted on April 7 that this proposed bill would provide stateless persons a mechanism for obtaining Russian citizenship through a simplified process.[108] Russian officials may be attempting to leverage legislative powers to offset low recruitment rates by expanding Russia's recruitment pool including by coercing Ukrainians in Russian-occupied Ukraine into serving in the Russian military Russia continues to leverage its "Time of Heroes" program to appoint veterans of its war in Ukraine to governmental positions and state-owned entities as part of a long-term effort to militarize Russian society and form a cadre of Russian officials loyal to the Kremlin alone Russian authorities appointed "Time of Heroes" participant Artem Nikolaev as Deputy Chairman of the Penza Oblast regional government on April 7.[109] Authorities appointed "Time of Heroes" participant Vasily Vinnikov on April 8 Director of the Kemerovo Oblast branch of Rostelecom PJSC — one of Russia's largest telecommunications operators Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural ISW is suspending occupation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments ISW is introducing a new product line tracking activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine The occupation updates will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural Click here to read the April 8 Russian Occupation Update Russian President Vladimir Putin held a phone conversation with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko on April 7 to discuss upcoming bilateral meetings in Volgograd City the upcoming Russian-Belarusian "Zapad-2025" combined military exercise [1] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13812 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1909586461029965871 [2] https://x.com/andrii_sybiha/status/1909596394580476252 [3] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qleyEt38Kwo [4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-9-2024 ; [5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2024 [6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2025 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/23628589 [7] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/08/04/2025/67f55db59a7947e0afa06bda [8] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qleyEt38Kwo [9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030525 [10] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/07/pererizaty-dorogu-na-kostyantynivku-namagayutsya-rosiyany-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/ [12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-7-2025 [13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625 [15] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-2-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2025 [16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2025 [17] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27156; https://t.me/ewoks152bbs/144 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8834; https://t.me/ombr_155/175 [18] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/989757-postijno-vidbuvautsa-sturmi-fakticno-bez-zupinok-rosijski-vijska-tisnut-na-pokrovskomu-napramku-zivou-silou/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_z6CKc54-k&ab_channel=%D0%A4%D0%B0%D0%BA%D1%82%D0%B8ICTV.%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8 [19] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-30-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2025 [20] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/08/na-pivdni-donechchyny-protyvnyk-zdijsnyv-chergovu-masovanu-ataku/ ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7621 [21] https://t.me/BULAVA72b/208; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1909356390545850772; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1909356394525995238; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1909356398070182223; [22] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/08/ataky-klunyamy-na-kolesah-pid-pokrovskom-vorozhu-tehniku-vse-vazhche-identyfikuvaty/ [23] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/02/pislya-balachok-pro-peremovyny-vtraty-voroga-zrosly-vtrychi-poblyzu-pokrovska-tryvayut-intensyvni-boyi/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-2-2025 [24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032925 [25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-2-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021525 [28] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine [29] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/18/okupanty-vtratyly-momentum-u-rosiyan-pid-pokrovskom-vtraty-bilshi-nizh-u-srsr-v-afganistani/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc [30] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2025#:~:text=Russian%20forces%20recently%20advanced%20in%20the%20Toretsk%20direction.&text=The%20spokesperson%20of%20a%20Ukrainian,casualties%20in%20the%20Toretsk%20direction [31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2024 [32] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage [33] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625 [34] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2025 [35] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024 [37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012425 [38] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2025 [40] https://t.me/synegubov/13743 ; https://www.pravda dot com.ua/news/2025/04/8/7506530/; https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/rf-vdarila-balistikoyu-bazi-vidpochinku-pid-1744093924.html [42] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/989003-kulak-dla-prorivu-ppo-ogladac-militarnogo-pro-novu-taktiku-udariv-dronami-po-harkovu/ [43] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2025 [44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2024 [46] https://suspilne dot media/989977-belgia-vidilae-milard-evro-na-dopomogu-ukraini/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/08/belgiya-nadast-ukrayini-novyj-paket-oboronnoyi-dopomogy-na-milyard-prezydent/; https://www dot belganewsagency dot eu/belgium-pledges-1-billion-in-annual-aid-to-ukraine-as-defence-ties-deepen; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/belgian-pm-pledges-1-bln-new-aid-package-2025-ukraine-2025-04-08/ [47] https://www.belganewsagency dot eu/belgium-pledges-1-billion-in-annual-aid-to-ukraine-as-defence-ties-deepen [48] https://suspilne dot media/989977-belgia-vidilae-milard-evro-na-dopomogu-ukraini/ [49] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/23623389 [50] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-31-2024 [51] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/08/gepatytnyj-bataljon-na-pivdni-rosiyany-planuyut-kynuty-na-shturmy-vazhkohvoryh-zekiv/ [52] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-28-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020525 ; [55] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1909305359832952957; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1909303937791836476; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1909322862147551566; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/08/zrobyly-vorogu-guyevo-na-kurshhyni-dystanczijne-minuvannya-znyshhylo-kupu-rosijskoyi-tehniky/; [56] https://t.me/mod_russia/51046 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/51047 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/51054 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63396 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63398 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/23042; https://t.me/sashakots/52927; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34119; https://t.me/rybar/69488 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89612 [57] https://t.me/tass_agency/309696; https://t.me/dva_majors/68571; https://t.me/yurasumy/22279; https://t.me/rusich_army/22407; [59] https://t.me/dva_majors/68571; https://t.me/yurasumy/22279; https://t.me/rusich_army/22407; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63392; https://t.me/wargonzo/25795 [60] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27162; https://t.me/ukr_sof/1540;; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8840 [64] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8842; https://t.me/pentagonkh/222 [65] https://t.me/smotri_z/42028 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/44951; https://t.me/wargonzo/25795; https://t.me/dva_majors/68571 [66] https://t.me/OSHP_225/4960; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/08/vysadyly-v-povitrya-mosty-i-zachystyly-nashi-na-bilgorodshhyni-nyshhat-duzhe-poganu-brygadu-rf/ [68] https://t.me/requiemgroupsof/56; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/08/zgoriv-zoopark-na-bilgorodshhyni-znyshhyly-vorozhu-rls/ [69] https://t.me/fedorenkoys/1231; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/07/probyly-panczyri-i-spalyly-28-mln-dolariv-dronari-vpolyuvaly-dvoh-hortiv/; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22858 [70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22845 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7604 [71] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/08/lyuky-yak-mozhlyvist-perebigty-i-prosunutys-u-vovchansku-okupanty-ne-zabuvayut-pro-taktyku-shhuriv/; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/989609-vovcansk-mae-girsij-viglad-za-bahmut-abo-avdiivku-pro-situaciu-u-misti-42-ompb/ [72] https://t.me/bella_Ciao44/7794; https://t.me/bella_Ciao44/7794; https://t.me/voin_dv/14294 [74] .https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Nqit3C3KUMEABsjCh1Lr2hCWUkhJqcQmN6joifZNpSXkrsosaGkskm391Q5wmCWvl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26604; [75]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22845 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22858 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Nqit3C3KUMEABsjCh1Lr2hCWUkhJqcQmN6joifZNpSXkrsosaGkskm391Q5wmCWvl [76] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1909481621470035995; https://t.me/operationall_space/3249; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8838; https://t.me/yurasumy/22275; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/19344 [77] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31256; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34110; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89604; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63387 [79] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Nqit3C3KUMEABsjCh1Lr2hCWUkhJqcQmN6joifZNpSXkrsosaGkskm391Q5wmCWvl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22858; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22845; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7604; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63386 [80] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/07/bytva-mahnovskyh-tachanok-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-peresily-na-mototehniku [81] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/08/prosto-z-golymy-golovamy-jdut-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-atakuyut-bez-kasok-i-bud-yakogo-zahystu/ [82] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/989527-ukrainski-vijskovi-sposterigaut-tendenciu-do-majbutnogo-zagostrenna-na-limanskomu-napramku/ [83] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63391; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/160606 [84] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22858; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22845; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7604; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63391; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Nqit3C3KUMEABsjCh1Lr2hCWUkhJqcQmN6joifZNpSXkrsosaGkskm391Q5wmCWvl [85] https://t.me/tass_agency/309654; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26645 [86] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Nqit3C3KUMEABsjCh1Lr2hCWUkhJqcQmN6joifZNpSXkrsosaGkskm391Q5wmCWvl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22858; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22845; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7604; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/160568; [87] https://t.me/tass_agency/309654; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26645 [90] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1909505896637493324; https://t.me/voron1OO/140 [91] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26606; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/160568 https://t.me/boris_rozhin/160606 [92] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7604; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Nqit3C3KUMEABsjCh1Lr2hCWUkhJqcQmN6joifZNpSXkrsosaGkskm391Q5wmCWvl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22858; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22845; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26606 [94] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34113; https://t.me/voin_dv/14303 [95] https://t.me/wargonzo/25795; https://t.me/dva_majors/68571; https://t.me/voin_dv/14304; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26613 [96] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Nqit3C3KUMEABsjCh1Lr2hCWUkhJqcQmN6joifZNpSXkrsosaGkskm391Q5wmCWvl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22858; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22845; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7604; https://t.me/dva_majors/68571; https://t.me/wargonzo/25795 [97] https://t.me/voin_dv/14297; https://t.me/voin_dv/14300 [98] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8841; https://t.me/tivaz_artillery/5057 [99] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26613; https://t.me/voin_dv/14304; https://t.me/dva_majors/68595 [100] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Nqit3C3KUMEABsjCh1Lr2hCWUkhJqcQmN6joifZNpSXkrsosaGkskm391Q5wmCWvl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22858; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22845; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0ofLBdyrcfvE96MHpYBowcPsbFCRyhwkPVBkgow2wFKz47XTzFNNx8zQxk8Pzf36Vl [101] https://t.me/voin_dv/14290; https://t.me/voin_dv/14299 [103] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/08/gepatytnyj-bataljon-na-pivdni-rosiyany-planuyut-kynuty-na-shturmy-vazhkohvoryh-zekiv/ [105] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/23600077 [106] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/23618175 [107] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-march-31-2025 [108] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/society/articles/2025/04/07/1102885-litsa-bez-grazhdanstva [110] https://t.me/pul_1/16365 ; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/52184 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76658 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/309624 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/309625 ; https://t.me/pul_1/16365 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/55158 The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported this on Facebook at 8:00 Russian forces launched one missile strike 101 airstrikes (including 183 guided aerial bombs) including 131 from multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) Russian forces carried out airstrikes near the settlements of Turya and artillery struck 11 clusters of enemy personnel the enemy attacked near Vovchansk and Kamianka the Ukrainian defenders repelled six attacks near Kolisnykivka Russian forces launched 27 attacks attempting to advance near Nove Ukraine’s forces halted one attack near Bilohorivka eight enemy assaults were recorded near Chasiv Yar and toward Novomarkove and Bila Hora the Russians carried out eight attacks near Toretsk the Ukrainian defenders halted 83 Russian attacks in the areas of Vodiane Druhe 23 Russian assaults were repelled near Rivnopil six clashes occurred near Vysoke (formerly Chervone) Russian forces conducted five assaults near Shcherbaky no offensive actions by Russian forces were recorded Ukraine’s Defense Forces repelled 20 enemy attacks Russian forces conducted 235 artillery strikes (15 from MLRS) and launched 14 airstrikes no signs of enemy offensive group formations were spotted Russia has already suffered an estimated 955,470 combat casualties in Ukraine since the large-scale invasion including 1,170 killed or wounded in action over the past day by Tim ZadorozhnyyServicemen of the 155th Brigade of Ukraine's Armed Forces operate French-made CAESAR 155mm self-propelled howitzers on the frontline near Pokrovsk on Feb (Pierre Crom / Getty Images)Russia is concentrating its main offensive efforts on the Pokrovsk sector in Donetsk Oblast but is "stalling" and failing to advance Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi said on March 31 Pokrovsk, situated about 70 kilometers northwest of Donetsk, remains one of the most hotly contested areas of the front. Syrskyi previously claimed that 7,000 Russian soldiers were killed near the town in January alone In February, the situation near Pokrovsk somewhat stabilized, with the Ukrainian military saying that Russian troops were "bogged down" near the city The commander-in-chief said Ukraine's main tasks are holding defensive lines and stabilizing threats "At the same time, our troops use active defense tactics wherever possible. In some areas of the front line, they are advancing, improving the tactical situation, restoring dozens of positions, and restraining significant enemy forces," Syrskyi posted on Facebook In March, Russia made major advances in its Kursk Oblast a territory that Ukrainian forces took in August that Zelensky's administration had hoped to use as leverage in negotiations Capturing more Ukrainian territory would likely encourage Russian President Vladimir Putin to seek even harsher conditions in a potential peace deal that the U.S Tim Zadorozhnyy is a news editor at The Kyiv Independent he is pursuing studies in International Relations Tim began his career at a local television channel in Odesa he joined the Belarusian opposition media outlet NEXTA starting as a news anchor and later advancing to the position of managing editor by Kateryna DenisovaUkrainian National Guard soldiers stand in a trench under camouflage netting as they fire the Soviet D-20 artillery in the direction of Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast (Diego Herrera Carcedo/Anadolu via Getty Images)The 14th Chervona Kalyna Brigade of Ukraine's National Guard has repelled a Russian offensive near Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast on April 17 According to Zelensky Ukrainian forces killed around 200 Russian soldiers and injured 30 others as well as destroyed 115 units of Russian military equipment There has been a notable slowdown in Russia’s offensive operations after months of steady territorial gains across eastern Ukraine. In recent weeks, Ukrainian forces have liberated approximately 16 square kilometers of territory near Pokrovsk Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi said on April 17 The massive attack near Pokrovsk involved Russian armored combat vehicles and motorcycles, as well as about two companies, National Guard Commander Oleksandr Pivnenko said earlier in the day "This battle is yet another proof of the coordinated and professional actions of our defenders who are holding the front line," the commander said shared by National Guard Commander Oleksandr Pivnenko on April 17 shows Ukrainian forces repelling a Russian assault near Pokrovsk (National Guard Commander Oleksandr Pivnenko/Telegram)The Kyiv Independent could not verify these claims Ukrainian troops fended off 48 attacks in the Pokrovsk sector over the past day alone, Ukraine's General Staff said in its latest update on April 17 Zelensky warned that Russia would likely make several attempts to launch offensives in Sumy because they have not attacked there for a long time," he said Kateryna Denisova works as a News Editor at the Kyiv Independent She previously worked as a news editor at the NV media outlet for four years covering mainly Ukrainian and international politics Kateryna holds a bachelor’s degree in journalism from Taras Shevchenko University of Kyiv She also was a fellow at journalism schools in the Czech Republic and Germany By Grace Mappes Russia dedicated staggering amounts of manpower and equipment to several major offensive efforts in Ukraine in 2024 intending to degrade Ukrainian defenses and seize the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts These Russian efforts included major operations in the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast area Russia has achieved relatively faster gains in 2024 than throughout most of the war after the initial invasion and developed a blueprint for conducting slow tactical envelopments to achieve these advances but Russian forces have failed to restore the operational maneuver necessary to achieve operationally significant gains rapidly Russia has thus paid an exorbitant price in manpower and equipment losses that Russia cannot sustain in the medium term for very limited gains Russian losses in massive efforts that have failed to break Ukrainian lines or even drive them back very far are exacerbating challenges that Russia will face in sustaining the war effort through 2025 and 2026 as ISW's Christina Harward has recently reported.[1] Russia likely cannot sustain continued efforts along these lines indefinitely without a major mobilization effort that Russian President Vladimir Putin has so far refused to order has shown its ability to fight off massive and determined Russian offensive efforts even during periods of restricted Western aid The effective failure of these major and costly Russian offensive operations highlights the opportunities Ukraine has to inflict more serious battlefield defeats on Russia that could compel Putin to rethink his approach to the war and to negotiations if the United States and the West continue to provide essential support Russian forces seized the theater-wide initiative following the culmination of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in late 2023 and held it throughout 2024 Russian forces began several offensive operations with the intent of breaking Ukraine: a renewed offensive on the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis in Winter 2023-2024 and September 2024 and an offensive across the international border in northern Kharkiv Oblast in May 2024 Russian forces have been conducting these operations in an effort to achieve the Kremlin's long-held operational goal of seizing the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by the end of 2024 and to exhaust Ukraine's defensive capabilities.[2] Russian forces significantly increased their rate of advance particularly in Fall-Winter 2024 when Russian forces advanced at least 1,103 square kilometers between September 1 and November 14 compared to seizing 387 square kilometers in the entirety of 2023 due to Ukrainian counteroffensives.[3] Russian forces utilized astounding numbers of personnel and equipment to achieve these gains but still failed to make operationally significant gains proportionate to the costs in combat power Russian forces' main achievements in 2024 were the seizures of Avdiivka but no amount of Kremlin rhetoric attempting to paint these as significant victories will change the fact that these are mid-size settlements the largest of which had a pre-war population of just over 31,000 people.[4] The Russian military proved that it was and remains willing to sustain horrific battlefield losses for disproportionately small gains and economic resources at scale to sustain its war effort in Ukraine Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces suffered 300,000 to 350,000 killed and 600,000 to 700,000 wounded in Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022.[5] These Ukrainian numbers suggest that Russian forces suffered 41 to 48 percent of all their battlefield casualties since the start of the war in 2024 alone ISW assessed that Russian forces advanced roughly 4,168 square kilometers in 2024 and Syrskyi's statement indicates that Russian forces suffered approximately 104 casualties per square kilometer of advance in 2024.[6] Russian forces conducted multiple mechanized pushes in the latter half of 2024 to enable their gains but ultimately failed to restore operational maneuver to the battlefield in Ukraine Russian forces ended 2024 and began 2025 by conducting grinding infantry-heavy assaults in multiple areas of the battlefield in tactical envelopments and taking heavy personnel losses in the process Russian forces attempted a multi-axis offensive operation on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line in Winter 2023-2024 but this large effort quickly fizzled out into occasional offensive pushes Russian forces intended this effort to be a cohesive operation across four distinct axes of advance: northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka southeast of Kupyansk towards Kruhlyakivka and west and southwest of Kreminna towards Lyman – all to advance the Kremlin's objective of seizing all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.[7] This was the first cohesive Russian offensive effort across multiple axes since the initial invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and elements of the Moscow and Leningrad military districts (MMD and LMD both formerly Western Military District [WMD]) were responsible for all four efforts on this line.[8] Russian forces failed to make significant gains along this line in the initial months of 2024 likely because Russian forces were unable to conduct the significant mechanized maneuver necessary to make such gains.[9] Russian forces occasionally conducted intensified offensive pushes in individual directions along the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis starting in Summer 2024 but could not simultaneously maintain multiple efforts.[10] Russian forces revived their efforts to advance towards the Oskil River in the Borova direction in September 2024 likely to set conditions for the future envelopment of Ukrainian positions on the east (left) bank of the river.[11] Russia made a tactical breakthrough towards Kruhlyakivka in late August 2024 and eventually expanded their salient and reached the east (left) bank of the Oskil River in November 2024 bisecting the Ukrainian presence on the east bank.[12] Russian forces likely hoped that cutting the ground lines of communication (GLOCs) between Ukrainian forces operating in the area east of Kupyansk and those further south on the Svatove-Kreminna line in combination with striking Ukrainian crossings over the river would allow them to advance and envelop Ukrainian forces on the east bank more quickly Russian forces struggled to make significant gains anywhere along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line after reaching the Oskil River southeast of Kupyansk Russian forces gradually widened the Kruhlyakivka salient but failed to make more than marginal gains elsewhere on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line in the following months The Russian military command was and likely remains willing to accept gradual advances across the theater in Ukraine Russian forces completed their two-year effort to seize Avdiivka in February 2024 following an arduous and costly campaign Russian forces intensified their offensive operations in the Avdiivka area in October 2023 to increase their tempo of offensive operations across the theater after Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast slowed throughout September and October 2023.[16] Russian forces had conducted relatively little offensive activity around Avdiivka in Summer 2023 and ISW has previously assessed that the Russian military command likely chose to increase offensive operations around Avdiivka in Fall 2023 because Russian forces had set favorable conditions to encircle Avdiivka in a prior offensive operation during the Winter 2022-2023 offensive operation.[17] Russian forces initially began offensive operations near Avdiivka with multiple waves of battalion- to brigade-sized mechanized assaults but these attacks initially failed to make tactically significant advances.[18] Russian forces switched tactics to primarily conducting mass infantry assaults in the Avdiivka direction in November 2023 after suffering high vehicle losses likely to maintain consistent offensive pressure on Ukrainian forces Russian forces abandoned their efforts to encircle Avdiivka along with these mechanized pushes and began attritional infantry assaults with little to no armored vehicle support in the Avdiivka direction in mid-November 2023.[19] Russian forces did resume mechanized assaults near Avdiivka in late November but at a smaller scale than the up-to-brigade-sized mechanized assaults in October.[20] Russian forces set conditions in December 2023 and January 2024 to make tactically significant advances in the Avdiivka direction Russian forces had redeployed the remaining elements of the Central Military District (CMD) from the Lyman direction to the Avdiivka direction by January 2024 and significantly intensified glide bomb strikes against Avdiivka in the first half of the month.[21] Russian forces intensified offensive efforts around Avdiivka around the same time as they launched the Winter-Spring 2024 offensive effort in Luhansk Oblast in mid-January 2025 likely to prevent Ukrainian forces from transferring manpower and materiel to defend against Russian advances in one area of the front perhaps particularly the Avdiivka direction.[22] Russian forces abandoned efforts to encircle Avdiivka operationally (over a wide area) in January 2024 and achieved a tactical penetration into Avdiivka in early February.[23] Russian forces seized Avdiivka in mid-February 2024.[24] The relatively successful envelopment of Avdiivka did serve as a blueprint for Russian offensive operations elsewhere in the theater in the second half of 2024 and into 2025.[25] Russian forces began attempting tactical and operational level envelopments through attritional infantry assaults rather than encirclements The battle for Avdiivka was brutal and the steep price Russia paid for its seizure prompted intense backlash from the Russian ultranationalist information space undermining the Kremlin's efforts to portray the seizure of Avdiivka as a significant victory to a domestic Russian audience Forbes estimated that Russian forces may have lost up to 13,000 personnel killed and wounded near Avdiivka between mid-October and early December 2023 and a Ukrainian official estimated that Russian forces lost 20,607 personnel and 492 armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) from January 1 to February 16 2024.[29] Russian forces likely lost at least a battalion tactical group's (BTG) worth of armored vehicles just in the first three days of renewed mechanized assaults near Avdiivka on October 10 to 12 and reportedly suffered 1,000 to 2,000 killed and wounded personnel near Avdiivka in the same time period.[30] Russian milbloggers were routinely critical of the Russian operation to seize Avdiivka and the extent of this information space backlash prompted significant Kremlin efforts to coopt the milblogger community and censor complaints of Russian battlefield failures Ukrainian military officials stated in October 2023 that Russian forces near Avdiivka were refusing to conduct assault operations due to extensive losses and US officials stated that Russian military commanders ordered the executions of Russian soldiers who refused to fight near Avdiivka.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed in October 2023 that Russian "Storm-Z" detachments irregular assault units composed of penal recruits were destroyed after just a few days of assaults in the Avdiivka direction and that the detachments lost between 40 and 70 percent of their personnel.[32] The milbloggers correctly attributed these high losses to the Russian military command's poor conduct of the war overall including inadequate training for new personnel lack of artillery support for attacking forces and poor communication and coordination with neighboring units The information space outcry peaked in late February 2024 after prominent independent Russian milblogger Andrei Morozov (alias Boytsovskiy Kot Murz) published a suicide note claiming that a Russian military commander had ordered him to remove a Telegram post in which Morozov claimed that nearly 16,000 Russian personnel died in combat for Avdiivka.[33] Morozov criticized the Russian military command and propagandists for hiding the battlefield reality and claimed that the Russian military command may have sought to kidnap or murder him Morozov justified his suicide by claiming that he no longer wanted to continue fighting against the military bureaucracy and serving under a poor and abusive commander The Russian information space largely coalesced around Morozov and blamed Russian military and political actors for his death.[34] A Russian milblogger recently claimed that "Storm-Z" detachments fighting in Donetsk Oblast continue to suffer high casualty rates and need to be completely restaffed within one or two months.[35] Russian forces have been conducting intensified offensive efforts to seize Chasiv Yar since May 2024 but still have not completely seized the town would be operationally significant since it would facilitate future Russian offensive operations directly against the critical fortified cities of Kostyantynivka Russian forces began their campaign for Chasiv Yar soon after seizing Bakhmut in May 2023 and conducted localized offensive operations from November 2023 to March 2024 to recapture areas that Ukrainian forces had seized during their Summer 2023 counteroffensive and to seize Chasiv Yar likely to take advantage of weakened Ukrainian defenses in the area.[36] Ukrainian forces largely stalled the Russian offensive here and Russian forces only made marginal gains in those four months.[37] ISW forecast in March 2024 that Russian forces were unlikely to seize Chasiv Yar rapidly as Russian forces had not set conditions to envelop Chasiv Yar from its flanks – a tactic Russian forces have since successfully employed on other areas of the front.[38] Russian forces entered Chasiv Yar from the east in April 2024 and re-intensified offensive operations against Chasiv Yar again in May 2024 with a series of mechanized assaults in the eastern part of the town.[39] The intensified Russian effort to seize Chasiv Yar has been characterized by attritional urban combat within Chasiv Yar itself and Russian forces seized the eastern half of Chasiv Yar in July 2024 Russian gains in and around Chasiv Yar slowed in August and September 2024 but Russian forces managed to establish enduring positions on the west (right) bank of the Siverskyi Donets Donbas Canal both within and south of Chasiv Yar in October 2024 They still struggle to transport armored vehicles across the canal however.[40] Russian forces continued attritional predominantly infantry assaults in the area through Winter 2024-2025 and have seized most but not all of Chasiv Yar as of this publication without setting good conditions to capitalize on these gains for future offensives in this area at this time The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) could not have the Wagner Group take on the bulk of the effort and casualties for the Chasiv Yar effort as the Wagner Group did for Bakhmut because Wagner had been disbanded The Wagner Group reportedly recruited at least 48,000 prisoners from Russian penal colonies to fight in Ukraine in the fighting for Bakhmut.[41] The Wagner Group reportedly spent 108 billion rubles (about $1.18 billion) alone on death payments for deceased personnel not including compensation for injuries or salaries.[42] This was money and casualties that the Russian MoD did not have to expend itself to make attritional gains in the Bakhmut effort but now had to expend for the Chasiv Yar effort following the Wagner Group rebellion under then-Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin The Russian force composition fighting for Chasiv Yar has remained largely consistent throughout the campaign affording Russian forces in this area little of the rest and reconstitution necessary to make rapid gains Elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC] 3rd CAA (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC and 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC LMD) as well as select Chechen Akhmat forces and Russian Volunteer Corps elements have comprised the bulk of the Russian forces participating in the fighting for Chasiv Yar since 2023.[43] The seizure of Chasiv Yar and the deployment of fresh forces or significant reconstitution of the forces already there would afford Russian forces several different opportunities for further offensive operations including advancing on the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk-Kostyantynivka fortress belt supporting an offensive effort in the Siversk direction or evening out the frontline between the Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk directions Russian forces will likely continue struggling to make rapid gains and instead accept gradual attritional gains for as long as they continue to make them especially if the Russian force grouping continues these operations without adequate rest and reconstitution or reinforcement Russian forces launched an offensive into northern Kharkiv Oblast across the international border in early May 2024 likely in an effort to take advantage of the remaining time before renewed US military assistance – passed by the US Congress in April 2024 – reached frontline Ukrainian forces.[44] Russian forces committed limited manpower to heavy infantry assaults north and northeast of Kharkiv City on May 10 and initially made tactically significant gains north and northeast of Kharkiv City but their pace quickly slowed.[45] Ukrainian officials announced that Ukrainian forces largely stabilized the situation along the northern border as of May 16.[46] Russian forces began transferring additional forces to the northern Kharkiv Oblast frontline by late May 2024 likely to draw and fix as many Ukrainian forces as possible and maintain a relatively high tempo of offensive operations in the area.[47] Zelensky stated that the casualty ratio of Russian forces to Ukrainian forces was eight-to-one in northern Kharkiv Oblast during the first two weeks of fighting.[48] Russian forces continued to slog towards Lyptsi north of Kharkiv City and within Vovchansk northeast of Kharkiv City but largely deprioritized the northern Kharkiv Oblast effort in August 2024 Russian forces stalled on the northern bank of the Vovcha River within Vovchansk and still have not reached Lyptsi which is roughly eight kilometers from the border Russian forces likely launched their offensive north and northeast of Kharkiv City prematurely to fix Ukrainian forces at the northern border in support of Russian offensives elsewhere in eastern Ukraine Russian forces initially attacked with limited elements of the 11th AC and 44th AC (both LMD]) and expanded to include elements of the 6th CAA (LMD) in the following weeks.[49] The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces was reportedly understrength in May 2024 The Kremlin initially signaled its intent to attack across Ukraine's northern border by promoting the idea of a demilitarized "sanitary zone," which Putin first introduced in January 2024 and other senior Kremlin officials continued promoting throughout Spring 2024.[53] Kremlin officials claimed that Russian forces had to push the frontline farther into unoccupied Ukraine to place Russian settlements outside of Ukrainian strike range but the vague definition of this buffer zone provides an informational justification to attempt to seize most if not all of Ukrainian-held territory The Kremlin likely also intended to use this narrative to deter further Western military assistance to Ukraine justify the war to its domestic population and allow Russian forces in northern Kharkiv Oblast and elsewhere to take advantage of weakened Ukrainian defensive capabilities The Kremlin largely dropped this rhetorical line in Fall 2024 after the battlefield focus shifted to Kursk Oblast and eastern Ukraine Russian forces intensified localized offensive operations in the Toretsk direction in mid-June 2024 after having been generally inactive in this area since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 Russian forces likely aimed to reduce the Ukrainian salient in the Toretsk direction as the prospect of Ukrainian fires or counterattacks from the Toretsk salient threatened the Russian flanks in the Chasiv Yar and Avdiivka/Pokrovsk directions the more that Russian forces made gains in those areas without making similar gains in the Toretsk direction Russian forces made only marginal gains east of Toretsk in the initial weeks of this effort and dedicated limited manpower to this area indicating that Russian forces continued to prioritize gradual attritional advances over attempting more rapid gains.[54] Elements of one motorized rifle brigade of the Russian 51st CAA and of two motorized rifle regiments of the Russian Territorial Troops were the main forces committed to these initial offensive operations units that are generally less combat-effective than conventional Russian forces.[55] The Russian military command assigned elements of the CMD to the Toretsk effort by late July 2024 including by redeploying the majority of its 27th Motorized Rifle Division from the Avdiivka direction to conduct assaults south of Toretsk near Niu York.[56] This redeployment was part of a wider expansion of the CMD's area of responsibility (AoR) from the Avdiivka direction alone to the bulk of Donetsk Oblast.[57] Russian forces have continued to make gradual gains in the Toretsk direction across Fall 2024 and Winter 2024-2025 but largely did not prioritize this direction in 2024 which has been on the frontline since 2014 and have continued to gradually advance east and south of Toretsk into the town primarily by conducting infantry assaults.[58] Russian forces have seized most of Toretsk as of this publication but have not made or attempted to make significant gains beyond it Russian forces may prioritize this direction in the anticipated Spring-Summer 2025 offensive operation to level the frontline between the Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk directions and set conditions to attack the southern edge of the Ukrainian fortress belt at Kostyantynivka and have recently begun transferring some forces to the Toretsk direction from the other directions in Donetsk Oblast possibly for this aim.[59] Russian forces took a year to advance roughly 11 kilometers from Marinka to Kurakhove and seize the latter settlement in December 2024.[60] Russian forces intensified offensive operations towards Kurakhove in late July 2024 and conducted several roughly company- and battalion-sized mechanized assaults west and southwest of Donetsk City within five days in late July the largest Russian mechanized assaults in Ukraine between October 2023 and July 2024.[61] Ukrainian forces largely blunted these attacks and inflicted heavy armored vehicle and personnel losses on Russian forces Russian forces likely intended to cut the T-0524 Vuhledar-Kostyantynivka highway southwest of Marinka to force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the area The intensified Russian mechanized assaults in the Kurakhove direction in July 2024 marked the start of a dedicated Russian effort to advance along multiple operational axes on the southern flank in Donetsk Oblast while suffering high equipment and personnel losses Russian forces conducted periodic platoon- and company-sized attacks throughout the Donetsk Oblast frontline in Summer 2024 all of which quickly turned into attritional infantry assaults.[62] Russian forces struggled to conduct these mechanized pushes in more than one area of the frontline simultaneously and likely conducted them opportunistically in attempts to exploit weak spots in Ukraine's defense partly for informational purposes.[63] The Russian intensification in the Kurakhove direction indicated that the Russian military command was willing to accept costly armored vehicle losses without conducting a large-scale multi-directional offensive operation or making operationally significant advances and proved burdensome to the Russian military as ISW has previously assessed.[64] Russian forces began grinding efforts to close Ukrainian pockets along these mutually reinforcing efforts in October-November 2024 to advance on Kurakhove and successfully level the frontline.[65] These advances towards Kurakhove from the east intended to level the frontline between Pokrovsk and Vuhledar Russian forces became bogged down in direct assaults within Kurakhove itself in mid-October 2024 before seizing the settlement in late December 2024.[68] Russian forces have largely struggled to close a small Ukrainian pocket west of Kurakhove along the Dachne-Andriivka line in January and February 2025 likely due to degraded combat capabilities from months of ongoing offensive efforts completing the effort only on February 21.[69] Russian forces reportedly concentrated up to 36,000 personnel in the Kurakhove direction in the months leading up to seizing it and conducted multiple mechanized assaults in pushes to seize the settlement likely taking significant personnel and materiel losses.[70] Russian forces struggled to make rapid advances further west of Kurakhove in the beginning weeks of 2025 and have significantly reduced the number of armored vehicles fielded likely due to extensive losses and possibly due to increasing shortages of armored vehicles.[71] Russian forces reportedly redeployed elements of the 51st CAA as well as the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA from the Kurakhove direction to elsewhere in Donetsk Oblast in January and February 2025 indicating that the Russian military command may be prioritizing a new offensive effort elsewhere over further advances west of Kurakhove in the near term.[72] The year-long Russian effort to seize Pokrovsk has so far failed and Russian forces appear to have abandoned the effort to take the city directly preferring instead to conduct a wide envelopment The Kremlin may have abandoned even that effort for now in the fact of increasing Ukrainian resistance in the area and extremely high Russian losses Russian forces first renewed offensive operations towards Pokrovsk in late February 2024 after a several-day pause following the seizure of Avdiivka.[73] Elements of the Russian 51st CAA were tasked with exploiting the seizure of Avdiivka and making further gains west and Russian forces resumed their high tempo of assaults in late February and early March 2024 and Ukrainian forces had to withdraw across the river by August 2024.[77] Ukrainian officials described Russia's significant artillery and air support as the largest factors contributing to Russian forces' advance west of Avdiivka in this time period and noted that Russian forces rarely conducted mechanized assaults instead advancing in infantry assaults using ATVs or motorcycles.[78] Russian forces likely fielded fewer mechanized vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction in this time due to the heavy losses incurred in earlier fights for Avdiivka and elsewhere Russian advances on Pokrovsk from the east slowed over the summer and stalled in September 2024 as the Russian military command reallocated assets to the Selydove direction and elsewhere in Donetsk Oblast.[79] The Russian military command appears to have given up the effort to take Pokrovsk directly or through narrow envelopment at this time Russian forces likely redesigned their campaign to seize Pokrovsk through a wider envelopment in July and August 2024 starting a towards Selydove southeast of Pokrovsk.[80] Russian forces forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Hrodivka and Novohrodivka in late August 2024 via turning movements instead of having to conduct costly frontal assaults against well-fortified Ukrainian positions The Russian military command had likely decided to level the frontline by seizing Selydove and Kurakhove before launching intensified offensive operations against Pokrovsk itself.[81] Russian forces seized Selydove in late October 2024 and exploited this seizure to make further gains near Pokrovsk.[82] Russian forces suffered their greatest casualty rates in the war up until this point in Fall-Winter 2024 and the Russian military command was likely willing to accept these high casualties in exchange for relatively rapid territorial advances Russian forces reportedly suffered a record average of 1,523 personnel casualties per day in November 2024 and this loss rate reportedly increased to an average of 1,585 casualties per day in December 2024.[83] Russian forces reprioritized the Pokrovsk direction in January 2025 Russian forces assembled a strike group of elements of the 2nd and 41st CAAs (both CMD) southwest of Pokrovsk by mid-January and reportedly redeployed elements of the 51st CAA and 8th CAA (both SMD) from the Kurakhove direction to the Pokrovsk direction in January and February 2025 respectively.[84] Russian forces are likely attempting to envelop Pokrovsk from the west but these advances will likely take months at the current Russian rate of advance in the area if they succeed at all Russian forces cut the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway east of Pokrovsk and the T-0406 Pokrovsk-Mezhova highway southwest of Pokrovsk in mid-January 2025 as part of these envelopment efforts but notably have not made significant advances beyond these highways in the following weeks.[85] The Russian rate of advance near Pokrovsk slowed in the first two weeks of February 2025 suggesting that the Russian military command may be deprioritizing offensive operations near Pokrovsk at least for now.[86] Russian advances south of Pokrovsk may be slowing due to the degradation of forces fighting on the frontline as Russian forces reportedly suffered 7,000 killed in action just in the Pokrovsk direction in January 2025.[87] The Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction since the seizure of Avdiivka have largely not followed the Avdiivka blueprint but are instead emblematic of the Russian military learning throughout three years of war Russian forces fighting for Avdiivka relied on heavy and frequent mechanized assaults which Russian forces have not been able to conduct in further operations in the Pokrovsk effort due to the unsustainable vehicle loss rate.[88] Russian forces also lack the extreme artillery advantage they held over Ukrainian forces during the final months of the Avdiivka campaign and have not been conducting heavy glide bomb strikes to set conditions for ground operations against obliterated urban defenses Russian forces' previous 5:1 artillery advantage over Ukrainian forces was reduced to a 1.5:1 artillery advantage as of December 2024 for example.[89] Russian forces have made gains in the Pokrovsk direction by exploiting weaknesses in Ukrainian defenses and utilizing the most effective tactics for the current battlespace.[90] Ukrainian soldiers and some Russian sources have attributed Russian successes near Pokrovsk to conducting assaults with small fire-team sized groups and using windbreaks and buildings for cover against Ukrainian drone operations approaches that are nevertheless constraining Russian forces' ability to concentrate for frontal assaults with larger groups.[91] Russian forces seized Vuhledar in October 2024 after a two-year effort fraught with high losses and repeated tactical failures Russia’s attritional Winter 2022-2023 effort provoked significant backlash in the Russian information space and significantly degraded the Russian forces participating in the assault most notably the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) which reportedly had to be reconstituted eight times between February 2022 and March 2023 largely due to losses sustained in offensive operations in the Vuhledar area.[92] Russian forces periodically intensified offensive efforts against Vuhledar in 2023 and 2024 frequently sustaining heavy losses and evoking wrath in the Russian information space Russian forces renewed a sustained offensive effort against Vuhledar in August 2024 and successfully enveloped and seized the settlement in October 2024 likely drawing from lessons learned in the envelopment of Avdiivka and exploiting Russian gains in the Kurakhove and Pokrovsk directions.[93] Russian forces intensified assaults in the Velyka Novosilka direction in early November 2024 The Russian seizure of Vuhledar and further gains to the northwest allowed Russian forces to exploit Ukrainian defenses near Velyka Novosilka Russian forces bypassed Velyka Novosilka from the east in lieu of conducting frontal assaults from the south but Ukrainian defenses in the area were reportedly optimized to defend against those frontal assaults from the south Russian forces continued efforts to break past Ukrainian forces north of Velyka Novosilka and reportedly temporarily seized Novyi Komar in early December 2024 Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces from Novyi Komar shortly thereafter The Russian seizure of Velyka Novosilka helped Russian forces level the frontline in the Kurakhove freeing up combat power for further offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast particularly as the Russian military command prepares for its anticipated Spring-Summer 2025 offensive operations Elements of the Eastern Military District (EMD) were largely responsible for this area of the front.[98] Russian forces could redeploy these EMD elements to other priority sectors such as the Pokrovsk or Toretsk directions or could have the EMD continue to press towards the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border for informationally-significant gains.[99] Russian forces could also keep some EMD elements in the Velyka Novosilka area while redeploying the remainder to pin Ukrainian forces here These EMD elements are likely degraded after months of combat such that their combat effectiveness and ability to make rapid advances in any offensive effort in the near term is unclear Redeployments of elements of the EMD to areas elsewhere on the frontline are an indicator of the Russian military command's priority areas for Spring-Summer 2025.[100] Ukrainian forces launched their incursion into Kursk Oblast in early August 2024 forcing Russian forces to divert manpower and resources from across the theater to defend against it The Russian defense in the initial days of the incursion was disorganized and confused; the Kremlin had failed to adequately man the border with Ukraine and Rosgvardia personnel.[101] The roughly 11,000 Russian personnel in Kursk Oblast at the start of the incursion were poorly trained and ill-equipped and were surprised by the time and manner of the Ukrainian incursion which seized an area of 1,153 square kilometers as of September 6 which became the base of Ukrainian operations in the salient.[102] The Russian military command quickly redeployed forces from across the theater to stabilize the line in late August 2024 after Ukrainian forces achieved an operational penetration Elements of the LMD redeployed from northern Kharkiv Oblast Chechen forces from unspecified rear or frontline areas irregular Russian units from frontline areas including in Donetsk Oblast and additional conscripts from garrisons within Russia and arrived in late August.[103] The Russian military command even reportedly redeployed at least a company of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA) from the Pokrovsk direction to Kursk Oblast in late August 2024 which ISW has previously assessed indicates that the Russian military struggled briefly to insulate its priority offensive operation from the theater-wide impacts of the Kursk incursion.[104] Russian forces also redeployed naval infantry elements and additional VDV elements from Kharkiv and Zaporizhia oblasts within the first month of the incursion and appear to have tasked these combat-experienced elements with leading conscripts and other less-trained units in Kursk Oblast.[105] Ukrainian officials estimated that 30,000 to 45,000 Russian personnel had concentrated in Kursk Oblast as of mid-September 2024.[106] Russian forces conducted several phases of limited counterattacks in an attempt to bisect the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and eliminate the western part of the salient Russian forces conducted mechanized counterattacks in the western part of the salient near Korenevo in early September all intended to bisect the main Ukrainian salient but failed to make significant gains in each phase.[107] Russian forces focused on attritional infantry assaults to make creeping but steady gains in most of November and December 2024 and introduced 11,000 to 12,000 North Korean forces into combat in November but have since taken high losses.[108] Russian forces again intensified efforts to push Ukrainian forces from the salient again in January 2025 likely in preparation for a future offensive operation to seize Sudzha itself and have concentrated roughly 78,000 total personnel in Kursk Oblast as of February 2025.[109] Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has drawn and fixed Russian forces to the area and reportedly spoiled several Russian offensive efforts Ukrainian officials warned about Russian preparations for possible offensive efforts in 2024 and have since stated that the Kursk Oblast incursion complicated Russian efforts to intensify offensive operations in northern Kharkiv and Zaporizhia oblasts.[110] The Kursk Oblast incursion also highlighted Russia's inability to rapidly respond to unexpected Ukrainian activity in one sector of the front without limiting or deprioritizing another sector and has prevented experienced Russian VDV and naval infantry units from redeploying to support offensive operations in priority areas and drawn significant amounts of equipment from operations in Ukraine.[111] Russian forces failed to break Ukraine despite expending tremendous military and economic resources to multiple offensive efforts Ukrainian forces continue to deny Russian forces the ability to routinely stage massive assaults in most areas of the front forcing Russian forces to conduct the majority of their assaults in small infantry groups rather than significant mechanized or even motorized pushes.[112] Ukrainian forces blunted many of the Russian offensive operations and drove Russian forces to sustain these casualties for their slow and limited gains.[113] Ukrainian forces are conducting their own strike campaign to degrade Russian offensive and defense industrial capabilities chiefly targeting energy and oil infrastructure but also including Russian military command posts and force concentrations.[114] Ukrainian forces launched their incursion into Kursk Oblast which has drawn and fixed Russian forces from across the theater reportedly spoiled additional Russian offensive pushes across Ukraine's northern border and forced Russia to rely on North Korean military personnel to defend its territory.[115] Russian forces continue to make tactical gains especially in Russia’s priority sectors of the frontline but Ukraine’s defense has forced Russian forces to pay substantial costs for advances that remain far below a rate normal for modern mechanized militaries and that are not sustainable in the medium term Russia’s offensive operations as of Winter 2024-2025 are slowing down and do not threaten to break the Ukrainian frontline anytime in the near term The scale of the Russian manpower and materiel losses in 2024 have set conditions for several material and manpower constraints in 2025 and beyond as ISW has recently reported.[116] The Russian defense industrial base (DIB) cannot keep up with the pace of armored vehicle and artillery shortages and Russia is unlikely to be able to recruit the manpower it needs to continue sustaining these losses without another round of partial mobilization which the Kremlin remains reluctant to conduct.[117] Russia’s liquid financial reserves and economy writ large are unlikely to be able to support Russia’s current loss rates for another two years.[118] Russia’s losses are mounting and will generate opportunities for the US and Ukraine to extract a deal from Russia that benefits US national security The West should continue supporting Ukraine to maintain the loss rate that can provide the US leverage in negotiations The last year of the war has been a gloomy one for Ukraine which has been forced to stand on the defensive and absorb continuous and intensive Russian offensive operations as well as increasingly effective Russian drone and missile strikes on critical infrastructure But the gloom has obscured an important reality: The Kremlin threw everything it had at breaking Ukraine in 2024 and failed Ukrainian forces held in the face of Russian assaults conducted with a shocking disregard for losses in men and equipment and despite shortages imposed by delays in the provision of Western equipment and Russian forces can continue their pressure for many months to come The end of US and Western support could lead to a relatively rapid collapse of Ukraine's defense But the key lessons from 2024 are that Ukraine can withstand enormous Russian pressures and that the Kremlin has not figured out how to convert its overall numerical advantages into decisive battlefield gains These lessons should guide Western thinking about the war and Ukraine's prospects throughout any negotiations They should above all guide thinking about the prospects of developing a 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https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2025 [99] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2025 [100] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2025 [101] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment; https://isw.pub/UkrWar091424 [102] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment; https://isw.pub/UkrWar091424; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-6-2024 [103] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082224 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2024 [104] https://isw.pub/UkrWar083124; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment [106] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment [107] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment [109] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment [110] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment [111] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment [112] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2025 [113] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-24-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-7-2025 [115] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment [116] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage [117] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage [118] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage The Khortytsia Operational and Strategic Group of Forces said this in a post on Telegram the enemy launched assaults on our defensive positions in Yelyzavetivka the enemy continues to amass forces for further offensives,” the statement reads Russian forces attempted an assault on Ukrainian positions in Vovchansk the aggressor’s army failed in its efforts to improve its tactical position near Hlushkivka occupying forces launched attacks on Ukrainian positions near Nadiya all of which were successfully repelled by Ukrainian defenders four enemy motorcycles carrying personnel were destroyed Ukrainian forces successfully repelled enemy attacks near Hryhorivka and Verkhniokamianske Russian troops attempted to breach Ukrainian defensive positions near Kostiantynopil Ukrainian Defense Forces continue to withstand the assault inflicting losses on the enemy’s superior numbers Russian forces carried out assault operations near Markove Intense urban combat remains ongoing in Chasiv Yar and Toretsk which were subsequently damaged and destroyed by Ukrainian defensive fire 199 combat engagements between the Ukrainian Defense Forces and Russian invaders were recorded at the front yesterday This website is using a security service to protect itself from online attacks The action you just performed triggered the security solution There are several actions that could trigger this block including submitting a certain word or phrase You can email the site owner to let them know you were blocked Please include what you were doing when this page came up and the Cloudflare Ray ID found at the bottom of this page Lviv (EFE).- The Ukrainian army continues to repel Russia’s attempts to advance toward Pokrovsk in the Donetsk region as the city’s remaining civilians endure daily bombardments and a collapsing infrastructure The entrance of Russian troops into the city looked imminent in February they were only 2-3 kilometers away from Pokrovsk threatening to cut the key supply lines into it Ukraine’s dogged resistance has reversed the tide halting Russia’s momentum and reclaiming small but critical areas along the frontline Ukrainian forces continue systematic counter-attacks which have allowed them to stabilize the situation in the last few months a military analyst at the Information Resistance Group things have improved after Mykhailo Drapatyi’s appointment a well-respected General in charge of the Ukrainian forces in the east of the country The coordination between the units is better now while Ukraine has also amassed significant forces to stop Russia from gaining yet another symbolic victory in the Donetsk region Ukraine’s counter-attacks in the village of Shevchenko after the Skala regiment pushed the enemy away in a surprise operation in early March Though Russia has regained some positions since the cost has been steep: 800 soldiers killed and 300 gravely wounded in Shevchenko alone the regiment’s press service reported on Thursday Russia’s pressure near Pokrovsk remains high with over a third of all clashes on the frontline occurring there according to daily reports by Ukraine’s Army The invading troops continue their attempt to encircle Pokrovsk from the east and west a sergeant with the “Aidar” battalion and military blogger said they are trying to regain ground in Kotlyne located on an important supply line to Pokrovsk from the nearby Dnipro region “They are looking for ‘gaps’ between our brigades to collapse the defense line and break through to our rear,” he wrote in Telegram though Russia has been sending into battle more armored combat vehicles and experienced drone operators redeployed from Kursk Russia’s leadership appears determined to seize Pokrovsk and other Ukrainian strongholds in Donetsk even if it takes several years of high losses in soldiers and equipment the US-based Institute for the Study of War concluded in its recent overview that Ukraine needs to address recruitment and training challenges to fully halt Russia’s advance in Donetsk Getting into the city has become a deadly gamble war photographer Kostiantyn Liberov told Ukrainian TV on Thursday guided by fiber-optic cables to evade jamming Artillery and airstrikes also batter the city daily prompting local authorities to encourage evacuation Of the 60,000 residents who lived there before Russia’s invasion in 2022 Ukrainian volunteers risk their lives to deliver food and supplies and evacuate survivors Makeshift graves now scar once-tranquil yards as the deceased are buried near their homes amid risks of venturing to the cemetery Statna recounted a harrowing tale of a woman who died in her unheated home spent eight days with the body until neighbors buried it in their yard after the frosts eased “Her daughter is now psychologically scarred and refuses to leave,” Statna said “It’s a tragedy what Russia has done to this city which still pulsed with life last spring,” she told EFE That’s according to a morning update by the General Staff of Ukraine’s Armed Forces the Russians carried out 91 airstrikes on the positions of Ukrainian units and at settlements the enemy launched almost 5,900 artillery strikes including 95 involving multiple rocket launchers Russian airstrikes targeted the areas of Semenivka in Chernihiv region; Myropillia Zapsillia in Sumy region; Duvanka in Kharkiv region; Berezove in Dnipropetrovsk region; Volodymyrivka and Novoandriivka in Zaporizhzhia region; as well as Kherson missile and artillery units of Ukraine’s Defense Forces hit 15 Russian manpower and equipment clusters Ukrainian troops held back two enemy attacks in the areas of Vovchansk and toward Kamianka Nine Russian attacks were recorded in the Kupiansk direction The Defense Forces repelled Russian assaults near Zahryzove and toward Petropavlivka and Nova Kruhliakivka Russian troops attacked the positions of Ukrainian defenders four times near Bilohorivka and Verkhniokamianske 13 clashes were recorded in the areas of Maiske the enemy carried out six attacks near Dachne Ukrainian defenders held back 75 offensive attempts in the areas of Stara Mykolaivka the Defense Forces stopped 13 enemy attacks near Kostiantynopil the Russians went for an offensive that was repelled Ukraine’s units held back 25 attacks The enemy launched eight airstrikes using 19 guided bombs and also 250 artillery attacks on positions of Ukrainian troops and settlements including 19 involving multiple rocket launchers The Russian army conducted no offensive moves in the Huliaipole and Orikhiv directions Russia’s war casualty toll in Ukraine has climbed to an estimated 951,960 including 1,100 killed or wounded in action in the past 24 hours Russian troops continue to amass forces for further attacks in the Pokrovsk direction This was reported by the Khortytsia operational-strategic group of troops on Telegram the enemy attacked our defensive fortifications in the areas of Yelyzavetivka The Russian forces continues to amass forces for further assaults," the statement said the Russian forces attacked our troops' positions in Vovchansk — without success the Russian army unsuccessfully tried to improve its tactical position near Hlushkivka the Russian army attacked our positions near the settlements of Nadiia Four motorcycles with personnel were destroyed in the Yampilivka area Russian forces attacks were repelled near the settlements of Hryhorivka and Verkhniokamianske they (Russians) carried out assault operations near Markove Heavy urban fighting continues in Chasiv Yar and Toretsk the Russian troops attempted to break through the defenses of our defenders in the area of Kostiantynopil Defense Forces units continue to contain the pressure destroying the Russia’s superior forces by Anna FratsyvirCommander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi awards Ukrainian fighters of the 10th Mountain Assault Brigade “Edelweiss” in the Soledar direction in Donetsk Oblast (Yuriy Mate / Getty Images)Ukrainian forces have liberated approximately 16 square kilometers of territory near Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast in recent weeks Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi said on April 17 There has been a notable slowdown in Russia’s offensive operations after months of steady territorial gains across eastern Ukraine. According to battlefield monitoring group DeepState, Russian troops have captured just 133 square kilometers in March The recently recaptured territory by Ukrainian troops includes areas near the settlements of Udachne, Kotlyne, and Shevchenko, according to Syrskyi. He made the announcement after a three-day visit to the Operational-Tactical Group Donetsk, which he described as the strongest formation within the Armed Forces of Ukraine I visited almost all brigades of this most powerful grouping of the Ukrainian Defense Forces which bears the brunt of the enemy's spring offensive and destroys its best forces and means," Syrskyi said According to Syrskyi, Ukrainian forces are halting around 30 Russian assaults daily in the Pokrovsk sector in Donetsk Oblast, inflicting significant losses on Russian troops Syrskyi met with commanders at front-line command posts and reviewed operational plans with Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi commander of the operational-tactical group He said that on-site problems related to logistics and combat organization were being addressed Despite continued Russian efforts to push Ukrainian troops out of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and reach the administrative borders of these regions Syrskyi said those objectives remain unfulfilled and are achieving certain successes," Syrskyi said Russian forces controlled around 60% of Donetsk Oblast and approximately 98.5% of Luhansk Oblast Anna Fratsyvir is a news editor at the Kyiv Independent with a background in broadcast journalism and international affairs she worked as a TV journalist at Ukraine’s public broadcaster Suspilne covering global politics and international developments Anna holds a Bachelor's degree in International Communications from Taras Shevchenko National University and is currently an MA candidate in International Relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported this on Facebook in their 22:00 operational update Russian forces carried out 70 airstrikes using 129 guided bombs (KABs) they deployed 1,112 kamikaze drones and launched nearly 4,500 shelling attacks at the Ukrainian positions and populated areas Ukrainian forces repelled one enemy attack toward Kamianka Russians attempted nine assaults near Zahryzove the Russian invaders attacked the Ukrainian positions 21 times near Lypove and Yampolivka; five engagements are still ongoing three Russian assaults occurred near Bilohorivka and Verkhniokamianske 13 combat clashes were recorded near Maiske Russian forces conducted six assaults near Dachne there were 51 attempts to breach the Ukrainian defenses near 11 settlements and Andriivka; nine engagements are currently underway The enemy has suffered great losses in this sector of the front today as the Ukrainian defenders eliminated 359 personnel the Russians carried out 12 attacks near Kostiantynopil The Ukrainian defenders halted all assaults there was one unsuccessful enemy offensive action Ukrainian forces repelled 15 enemy attacks The Russians also launched seven airstrikes with 18 guided bombs and 220 artillery shellings Situation on other fronts remains largely unchanged Russian forces are continuing to build up manpower and are attempting to cross the Oskil River in the Kupiansk sector The Ukrainian Defense of Pokrovsk Has Compelled Russia to Change Its Approach in Eastern Ukraine Russian forces launched offensive operations intended to seize Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast during Spring 2024 at the moment of greatest constraints on Ukraine's manpower and materiel following the suspension of US assistance in Fall 2023 Russian forces have not taken Pokrovsk after eight months of grinding but consistent advances in western Donetsk Oblast based on the integration of successful Ukrainian drone innovators and operators with ground forces combined with constraints on Russia's strategic and operational-level manpower and materiel reserves have forced the Russian military command to abandon its original campaign design of a frontal assault on Pokrovsk The Russian military command is currently attempting to envelop Pokrovsk from the southwest via Selydove and to even out the frontline west of Kurakhove and north of Vuhledar Russian forces recently seized Selydove and are currently leveraging the seizure of Vuhledar to advance towards Kurakhove but Russian advances have come at very high costs in troops and armored vehicles and months of time Ukrainian drone operations continue to play a critical role in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver and preventing Russian forces from fully exploiting Ukraine's ongoing manpower constraints Ukraine’s ability to stave off the seizure of Pokrovsk thus far and force the Russian military to divert its efforts to advances in arguably the least operationally significant sector of the frontline is a positive indicator of Ukraine’s ability to continue fighting this war despite the challenges Ukraine faces and the setbacks it has suffered Russian forces are currently attempting to conduct two simultaneous and supporting offensive operations to seize Pokrovsk through a turning maneuver via Selydove and to level the frontline from Pokrovsk to Yasna Polyana in order to collapse the Ukrainian salient west of Donetsk City and set conditions for future possibly more operationally significant gains in Donetsk Oblast Russian forces have consistently been advancing in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions since March 2024 but have yet to make operationally significant advances in either direction which are relevant at the tactical level of war in the near vicinity of fighting which are significant at the operational level of war and affect large sectors of the entire frontline successfully diverted Russian forces from a direct assault on Pokrovsk and convinced the Russian military command to expend manpower equipment and time on less operationally significant gains in western Donetsk Oblast and subsequent Russian advances north of Vuhledar are not yet operationally significant gains and have cost the Russians tremendous manpower and materiel losses Russian forces will eventually make operationally significant gains if Ukrainian forces do not stop the ongoing Russian offensive operations although Ukraine’s ability to inflict notable manpower and materiel losses on the Russian military continues to depend on the provision of sufficient and regular Western military assistance Significant Russian advances in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions would be but one step in Russia’s ongoing offensive campaign to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and would not portend the immediate collapse of the frontline in Donetsk or throughout Ukraine Ukrainian drone operations continue to be the backbone of Ukraine's war effort particularly in western Donetsk Oblast where successful Ukrainian drone operations contributed to forcing the Russian military command to reorient its primary operational effort for 2024 Ongoing Ukrainian manpower constraints and morale issues are currently creating vulnerabilities in Ukraine's defensive lines and Russia has consistently underestimated the impact and influence of Ukraine’s asymmetric drone capabilities and innovations throughout the war and evidence is mounting that Russia cannot sustain the current rate of armored vehicle and tank losses in the medium term.[5] Ukrainian drone operators have successfully degraded Russian forces’ mechanized capabilities and have slowed Russian forces’ ability to make gains by forcing Russian infantry to advance primarily at foot pace.[6] The integration of Ukrainian drone operations with sufficiently resourced artillery and committed Ukrainian infantry units is and will remain essential in defending against Russian advances throughout the frontline             The seizure of Pokrovsk and leveling of the frontline in western Donetsk Oblast are two subordinate efforts of the Kremlin's wider campaign to seize the remainder of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts Putin identified the complete seizure of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as a priority goal of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and Russian officials have reiterated this goal over the past three years.[7] Western and Ukrainian sources assessed in 2023 and 2024 that Russia intended to seize the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk by the end of 2024.[8] Russian offensive operations in the Siversk and Velyka Novosilka directions are currently all aimed at seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast Russian forces intensified localized assaults in the Velyka Novosilka and Siversk directions in October and November 2024 respectively but it remains unclear if the Russian military command is willing to allocate the manpower necessary to launch a more concerted offensive operation or make operationally significant advances in these lower priority directions.[9] Russian advances near Chasiv Yar have largely stalled in 2024 and Russian forces have yet to advance into the center of the settlement although the settlement remains at high risk ISW has previously assessed that the Russian offensive effort to seize Chasiv Yar offers Russian forces the most immediate prospects for operationally significant advances in Donetsk Oblast as the seizure of Chasiv Yar would likely allow Russian forces to launch subsequent offensive operations against Ukraine’s fortress belt – a group of major cities that form a significant defensive belt in Donetsk Oblast.[10] The Russian military command has opted to prioritize offensive operations in the Toretsk which provide Russian forces with less direct paths to operationally significant Ukrainian objects Russian forces have yet to make operationally significant advances in exchange for notable manpower and materiel losses in 2024 Russian forces seized a little over 2,000 square kilometers in Ukraine between October 1 mostly in fields and small settlements and towns They must seize an additional 9,322 square kilometers including several large urban areas in order to take the remainder of Donetsk Oblast as of November 14 and the seizure of Pokrovsk will likely only result in several tens of additional square kilometers Assessed Russian positions south of Pokrovsk near Vyshneve and Sontsivka are currently Russian forces’ closest positions to the Donetsk Oblast administrative boundary in the Toretsk or Kurakhove directions and are roughly 22-23 kilometers from the boundary as of November 14 Russian advances in the Toretsk direction have been slow in 2024 as Russian forces have largely spent the last five months struggling through highly urbanized areas and Russian forces’ rate of advance is unlikely to increase significantly in this sector until Russian forces advance through Toretsk and its more urbanized suburbs Russian gains in the Kurakhove pocket will result in additional territorial advances but these gains do not shift Russian positions significantly closer to the Donetsk Oblast administrative boundaries than Russian forces' current closest assessed point of advance Russian forces could attempt to connect the Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk-Kurakhove efforts in the future by trying to advance north from Pokrovsk towards Toretsk and to force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from positions in Toretsk although it would likely take the Russian military months to make gains of this scale at its current rate of advance.[11] It remains unclear if Russian forces would be sufficiently combat capable to conduct such an operation without an operational pause to reconstitute after evening out the frontline in western Donetsk Oblast and seizing Pokrovsk Russian forces launched offensive operations intended to seize Pokrovsk during Spring 2024 following the seizure of Avdiivka and at a moment when Ukraine's manpower and materiel constraints reached their peak Russian forces intensified offensive operations in Pokrovsk Raion in October 2023 when they began the four-month-long battle for Avdiivka and maintained a consistent tempo of operations in the area until seizing Avdiivka on February 17 partially driven by delays in Western-provided military assistance between March and June 2024 and made consistent gains west of Avdiivka in the direction of Pokrovsk.[15] Ukrainian officials and frontline servicemembers consistently warned about an increasing disparity between Russian and Ukrainian artillery use during this time and suggested that Ukrainian forces were increasingly husbanding ammunition and relying on drone operators to defend against Russian infantry and mechanized assaults.[16] Russia’s likely intended primary offensive effort for Summer 2024 was a direct assault on Pokrovsk following the railway line west of Avdiivka and the seizure of both Myrnohrad and Pokrovsk The Avdiivka-Ocheretyne-Zhelanne-Novohrovika-Pokrovsk railway line proved to be an advantageous path for Russian advances during Spring and Summer 2024 as settlements along the railway line were critical lynchpins in Ukraine’s defensive lines in this direction Russian forces advanced northwest from Avdiivka along the railway line and west from Avdiivka towards Ukraine’s main defensive line along the Berdychi-Orlivka-Vodyane line in March and April 2024 and elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces reportedly exploited a bungled Ukrainian rotation to make a narrow penetration near Ocheretyne in late April 2024.[17] The Russian exploitation force mainly comprised of Central Military District [CMD] brigades and elements of the 51st CAA continued to advance west of Ocheretyne in May and June 2024 and forced Ukrainian forces to retreat from the Berdychi-Orlivka-Tonenke to more defensible positions along the Prohres-Skuchne-Karlivka line on the east (left) bank of the Vovcha River.[18] Russian materiel advantages peaked during May and June 2024 inhibiting Russian offensive operations in the area – and more effective Ukrainian drone operations in this direction likely played a role in the Russian military command’s decision to limit mechanized activity in this direction moving forward.[21 frontal assaults.[23] Russian milbloggers claimed on August 29 that likely Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups advanced into the southeastern outskirts of Myrnohrad (immediately east of Pokrovsk) and began small arms combat with Ukrainian forces in the town but ISW has yet to observe confirmation of Russian forces operating in Myrnohrad.[24] These reports suggest that Russian forces may have temporarily advanced into Myrnohrad and that Ukrainian forces later pushed Russian forces from the town and have consistently defended against Russian advances into the town since late August 2024 Russian advances along the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka-Myrnohrad-Pokrovsk line stalled as of September 2024 as the Russian military command increasingly devoted manpower and resources to offensive operations along the Selydove-Hirnyk line and in the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions Russian forces also renewed offensive operations aimed at seizing Toretsk and intensified offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City in June 2024 The Russian military command redeployed some elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces and 51st CAA including the CMD’s 27th Motorized Rifle Division from the Pokrovsk direction to renewed assaults in the Toretsk direction in mid-June 2024.[25] The decision roughly doubled the length of the Central Grouping of forces area of responsibility (AOR) and drew some units away from the CMD’s exploitation force in the Pokrovsk direction.[26] The Russian military command likely intended to eliminate the Ukrainian salient in the Toretsk direction to deny Ukrainian forces the ability to shell rear Russian areas of the Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk directions but Russian forces have yet to make gains significant enough to deny Ukrainian artillery operations in the area as of November 2024.[27] Russian assaults in the Toretsk direction have been characterized by infantry-heavy assaults in highly urbanized areas that have slowed Russian advances – as Russian forces have historically struggled with urban combat in Ukraine.[28] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi noted in mid-June 2024 that Russian forces were also concentrating efforts and assault units in the Kurakhove direction The Russian military command amended its Summer 2024 campaign design likely after assessing that Russian forces were unlikely to seize Pokrovsk in a frontal assault and decided instead to attempt to envelop Pokrovsk from the south via Selydove and to intensify offensive operations west of Donetsk City and near Vuhledar in order to eliminate the Ukrainian salient in western Donetsk Oblast along the Hirnyk-Kurakhove-Vuhledar line the Russian military command decided to attempt a turning maneuver via Selydove in order to avoid fighting through more built-up Ukrainian defenses immediately east of Pokrovsk and reprioritized leveling the frontline in western Donetsk Oblast The Russian military command likely identified the seizure of Selydove and Kurakhove and leveling of the frontline in western Donetsk Oblast as desired prerequisites for launching an intensified offensive effort against Pokrovsk itself Shortening and leveling the frontline in western Donetsk Oblast will free up Russian troops currently attacking all along the Ukrainian pocket north and south of Kurakhove to redeploy to the Pokrovsk effort and will secure Russian forces’ southern flank for a renewed assault on Pokrovsk The Russian military command’s new campaign design sought to take advantage of the most effective tactics in each respective frontline sector A Ukrainian drone operator told the Associated Press (AP) in August 2024 that Russian forces had been relatively successful in the Pokrovsk direction because they were conducting ground attacks in groups of two to four soldiers under the cover of trees making them harder for Ukrainian drone operators to detect.[33] An official in a Ukrainian brigade operating near Selydove reported in mid-September 2024 that Russian forces began moving in small infantry groups and using windbreaks and buildings for cover instead of conducting head-on frontal assaults with larger groups.[34] A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor noted on November 16 that small infantry-led assaults are not the most efficient tactic for expedient advances in the rural settlements and fields near Selydove where Russian forces have very little coverage from Ukrainian drone operations.[35] The milblogger suggested that Ukrainian drone operations are constraining Russian forces' ability to bring reinforcements and supplies to forward positions Russian forces’ ability to utilize windbreaks and forested areas as cover against Ukrainian drone operators and advance into vulnerable Ukrainian positions has been a critical aspect of their ability to advance in the Pokrovsk direction in recent months particularly since Russian forces have not widely utilized armored vehicles in this area.[36] Russian forces may increase their use of armored vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction if muddy ground conditions begin to significantly constrain infantry movement Russian mechanized activity in the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions has been notably more successful than in the Pokrovsk direction or other sectors of the frontline and more effective mechanized activity has facilitated marginally more rapid Russian advances in western Donetsk Oblast ISW observed a notable intensification in Russian mechanized activity in the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions in October 2024 when Russian forces began conducting regular platoon- to battalion-sized mechanized assaults in these directions.[37] Russian mechanized assaults in this direction have been significantly more successful than in other frontline sectors Russian mechanized assaults frequently fail to result in advances and typically only result in armored vehicles losses in most sectors of the frontline but Russian mechanized activity in the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions has repeatedly resulted in several kilometers of advances Russian forces notably advanced several kilometers to the outskirts of Hostre (northeast of Kurakhove) in September 2024 and Russian mechanized activity has been the foundation of Russian advances north and northwest of Vuhledar in October and November 2024.[38] Russian mechanized activity in these directions is not indicative of a substantial improvement in Russian forces’ ability to conduct the kind of rapid mechanized maneuver that would be necessary to restore mechanized maneuver to the battlefield at scale The most successful Russian assaults in this area still result in high armored vehicle losses in exchange for a few kilometers of gains but the increased efficacy of Russian mechanized activity in the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions is still notable Recent mechanized assaults in September and November 2024 also resulted in tactically significant Russian advances in the Kupyansk direction and the Russian miliary may be looking to replicate the conditions that have increased the efficacy of mechanized activity in the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions in other areas of the frontline.[39] Russian forces also continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction during late Summer and Fall 2024 but the pace of Russian advances has remained slow as Russian forces have largely relied on infantry to make advances in this direction.[40] Ukrainian forces have consistently and successfully counterattacked in the Toretsk direction more than in any other sector of western Donetsk Oblast and successful Ukrainian counterattacks have helped limit the scope and rate of Russian advances in the area.[41] ISW assessed that Russian forces have seized 23.1 percent of Toretsk itself as of November 13 and Russian forces have advanced fewer than 10 kilometers in this direction from the June 2024 frontline as of November 14 Russian forces in Toretsk do not currently pose any significant threat to Ukrainian positions west of Toretsk and have likely taken notable manpower losses in exchange for these marginal gains as in other frontline sectors The Russian military command’s new campaign design also may have sought to minimize the impact of increased Russian manpower constraints caused by the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024 Russian authorities were reportedly aware of the threat of a Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in the months leading up to August 2024 but the incursion has undoubtably tested Russia’s ability to generate and redeploy forces in response to an unexpected attack.[42] ISW has observed indications that the Russian military command redeployed forces from almost all sectors of the frontline including elements of one unit from the Pokrovsk direction to Kursk Oblast to address the incursion.[43] Russian forces have redeployed elements of several elite formations to Kursk Oblast including: the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet and 11th and 83rd VDV brigades.[44] The Russian military command generally regards VDV and naval infantry elements as more “elite” forces (despite the fact that these forces have been degraded and misused during the war) and tends to deploy these forces to prioritized directions.[45] The Russian military command would have likely redeployed these forces to reinforce efforts in the Pokrovsk direction if Ukrainian forces had not launched the Kursk incursion in August 2024 Ukrainian officials noted in September 2024 that the incursion “slowed” Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast and complicated Russia’s plans for offensive operations including in Russia’s “main direction” – likely referring to the Pokrovsk direction.[46] Russian forces notably launched their offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast in mid-May 2024 several months before the incursion and the operation has also placed increased pressure on Russia’s manpower reserves by committing forces that could have otherwise fought in the Pokrovsk offensive.[47] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated in October 2024 that the Russian military command originally intended to commit most of Russia's manpower reserves to the Kharkiv and Pokrovsk-Toretsk directions during late Summer and Fall 2024 but that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and slowing Russian advances in northern Kharkiv Oblast complicated this plan.[48] Recent Russian advances and Russian forces’ ability to exploit the recent seizure of Selydove and Vuhledar could force Ukrainian forces to withdraw to more defensible positions in western Donetsk Oblast Russian forces have not turned north towards Pokrovsk following the seizure of Selydove but rather have continued to advance south as Russian forces operating southeast of Selydove intensified offensive operations along the Tsukuryne-Hirnyk-Kurakhivka line[49] Russian forces operating southeast of Selydove currently appear to be attempting to eliminate the Ukrainian salient north of the Kurakhivske Reservoir and to envelop Kurakhove from the reservoir’s northwestern edge Russian positions in Sontsivka (south of Selydove) are currently four kilometers from the northwestern edge of the reservoir and it remains unclear how long Ukrainian forces operating east of the Sontsivka-Stary Terny line will be able to hold positions in this small salient Russian forces have also successfully exploited the seizure of Vuhledar to make tactically significant advances south of Kurakhove and recent Russian advances in the area may force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the fields southeast and south of Kurakhove to more defensible positions further west[50] A more level frontline in western Donetsk Oblast will provide Russian forces a more easily defensible flank should they turn north and attempt to envelop Toretsk from the west and attack Kostyantynivka and Ukraine's fortress belt from the south but the leveling of the frontline does not immediately portend such advances Russian forces could also attempt to advance further towards the Donetsk Oblast administrative boundaries along the Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia City H-15 highway or conduct an assault on Velyka Novosilka from the east Russian forces are unlikely to be sufficiently combat effective to undertake a major offensive effort without conducting at least a temporary pause for rest and reconstitution and several settlements west of Kurakhove could afford strong defensive positions for Ukrainian forces In the unlikely event that Russian forces could advance to the Donetsk Oblast administrative boundary west of Kurakhove and Toretsk directions are still roughly 70 kilometers from the Donetsk Oblast administrative boundary at their closest point Russian forces remain unable to conduct the kind of rapid mechanized maneuver necessary to make advances to that magnitude with the kind of speed or surprise that could collapse Ukraine’s defenses in Donetsk Oblast The seizure of Pokrovsk remains an important operational and informational goal for the Kremlin and Russian forces will likely pursue the seizure of Pokrovsk in Winter 2024-25 and Kurakhove and improving Russia's drone operations during Winter 2024-25 as Russian forces currently "cannot advance" due to Ukrainian drone operations The Russian military command will likely task Russian forces with seizing Pokrovsk should Russian forces successfully level the frontline between Selydove and Yasna Polyana (northwest of Vuhledar) in the coming weeks and months although Russian forces may have to conduct a short operational pause to redeploy and reconstitute before beginning the assault on Pokrovsk The Russian military command is unlikely to abandon the seizure of Pokrovsk as a major objective as control over Pokrovsk would provide Russian forces with a defensible position that could support Russia’s envisioned new defensive line in western Donetsk Oblast The Kremlin is also unlikely to support abandoning the seizure of Pokrovsk given how many lives and how much materiel Russia has expended in pursuit of the town and the Kremlin likely intends to exaggerate the importance of seizing Pokrovsk to domestic and international audience as part of Putin’s ongoing narrative about the inevitability of Russian victory in Ukraine Russia’s offensive effort to seize Pokrovsk and level the frontline in western Donetsk Oblast is emblematic of Putin's theory of victory The Russian military command appears to have willingly abandoned its original campaign design and intention to make the CMD a rapid exploitation and maneuver force and accepted of the realities of positional warfare and slower Russian advances in the Pokrovsk and Vuhledar directions.[53] It is too soon to judge the impact of this decision on the war’s eventual resolution The Russian military command’s decision to embrace and exploit the characteristics of positional warfare are based on the assumption that Russia’s war machine can outlast Ukraine and its Western allies ISW has recently observed indications to the contrary Russian forces lost roughly 80,000 troops during September and October 2024 but likely only recruited an estimated 60-70,000 into military service– indicating that the Russian military’s recruitment rates have begun to fall behind Russia’s previous one-to-one loss replacement rate.[54] Ukrainian and Western assessments repeatedly place Russian domestic production rates of tanks and artillery systems far below estimated rates of loss for these systems in Ukraine.[55] Apathy towards the war and resistance to greater social and economic hardship also appears to be growing within Russian society as the war drags on – suggesting that it is also in the Kremlin’s interest to resolve the war as soon as possible in order to avoid exacerbating domestic discontent.[56] Putin’s theory of victory does not account for these issues nor for the impact of Ukraine’s increasing asymmetric capabilities Ukrainian forces have repeatedly demonstrated their commitment and ability to develop and employ alternative and asymmetric capabilities to partially counter Russia's artillery advantage in Ukraine and to defend against Russian mechanized and infantry assaults often generating outsized effects considering the inexpensive systems Ukrainian forces are employing Ukrainian drone operators have played a key role in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver in western Donetsk Oblast and Russian infantry assaults throughout the frontline in Ukraine.[57] Ukraine’s long-range drone strikes against Russian oil depots and warehouses storing military equipment continue to complicate Russian logistics force Russia to reallocate air defense assets and burden Russia’s war chest.[58] Russian defeat rests on Ukraine’s ability to further leverage these asymmetric capabilities to support successful ground operations and directly challenge Russian forces’ control over the theater-wide initiative.[59] Ukrainian forces have stalled Russia's main offensive efforts for the Summer-Autumn 2024 campaign and forced the Russian military command to expend significant resources and valuable time on advances that have not brought Russian forces geographically closer to their main operational objective Ukraine’s ability to trade space for time undermines the Kremlin's theory of victory and narrative of an inevitable Russian victory in Ukraine Ukrainian forces have successfully stalled Russian forces near Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk for many months and continue to complicate Russian offensive operations in the Siversk and Lyman directions Russian forces are currently exploiting localized Ukrainian vulnerabilities to advance in the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions but Ukrainian forces are attempting to counterattack into the flanks of advancing Russian forces in these directions.[60] The leveling of the frontline in western Donetsk Oblast does not bring Russian forces substantially closer to their main operational objective of seizing Pokrovsk and only brings Russian forces several kilometers closer to their longer-term objective of seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast Ukrainian forces have inflicted significant losses on the Russian military but must completely stop Russian advances in western Donetsk Oblast or risk Russian forces eventually advancing into more operationally significant areas of Donetsk in the medium- to long-term Ukraine’s ability to defend against more operationally significant Russian advances is still largely dependent on the delivery of timely Western aid and Ukraine's ability to overcome its manpower constraints Ukraine will have an opportunity to contest the initiative following the future culmination of Russian offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast if Ukraine receives sufficient and proactive Western military assistance Previous delays in Western security assistance undermined Ukraine’s Summer 2023 counteroffensive effort and Ukraine’s ability to defend itself in Spring and Fall 2024.[61] Delays and hesitation in Western aid only further convince Putin that his theory of victory is valid and embolden Putin to further escalate his war of aggression towards Ukraine and preparations for his future envisioned war against NATO The West must fulfill its current pledges to Ukraine and proactively arm Ukraine in preparation for future Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in 2025 and beyond or face the risk of encouraging Putin’s aggressive and expansionist desires and the possible future where those desires turn further westward   [1] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024 [2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024 [3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-strikes-have-changed-russian-naval-operations-black-sea ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20and%20the%20Problem%20of%20Restoring%20Maneuver%20in%20Contemporary%20War_final.pdf ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0 [4] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024 [5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar100624 [7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-ukraine-warning-update-russia-likely-pursue-phased-invasion-unoccupied-ukrainian ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033023 [8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121523 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042724 ;  https://isw.pub/UkrWar050324 [9] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101324 [10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2024 [12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021824 [13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021724 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2024 [14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2024 [15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042724 [16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041524 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041024 [17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031324 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2024 [20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2024 [21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2024 [22] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0 [23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082724 [25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2024 [26] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2024 [27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2024 [28] https://wp.towson.edu/iajournal/2023/01/13/russias-response-to-the-challenges-of-urban-warfare-in-the-russo-ukrainian-war/ ; https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/04/russia-ukraine-urban-warfare-kyiv-mariupol/ [29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2024 [30] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024 [31] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2024 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2063 [32] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2024 [33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2024 [34] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2024 [35] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1722 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024 [36] https://www.cnn.com/2024/09/08/europe/ukraine-military-morale-desertion-intl-cmd/index.html [37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2024 [38] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar091324 [39] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2024 [40] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-12-2024 [41] https://isw.pub/UkrWar092424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101024 [43] https://isw.pub/UkrWar083124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082524 [44] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081124 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar083124 [45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2023 [47] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051024 [48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2024 [49] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101824 ; [51] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2024 [52] https://t.me/rybar/65439 ; https://t.me/rtvimain/104838 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uN99eOO1074 [53] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/assessing-significance-current-russian-and-ukrainian-operations-course-war [54] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2024 [55] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar100624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar073024 [56] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar083024 [57] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2024 [58] https://isw.pub/UkrWar101024 ;  https://isw.pub/UkrWar092424 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2024 [59] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20and%20the%20Problem%20of%20Restoring%20Maneuver%20in%20Contemporary%20War_final.pdf [61] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv by Kateryna DenisovaA man rides a bicycle along the road in Pokrovsk (Yevhen Titov/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images)Russian forces have resumed their attacks in the Pokrovsk sector in Donetsk Oblast the spokesperson of Ukraine's National Guard's Chervona Kalyna brigade The embattled town of Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast is among the most hotly contested areas of the front. Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi previously claimed that 7,000 Russian soldiers were killed near Pokrovsk in January alone In recent weeks, the situation near Pokrovsk has been somewhat stabilized, with the Ukrainian military saying that Russian troops were bogged down near the city they (Russian soldiers) have become more active We have successfully repelled the assaults but the enemy is trying to break through our defense line and reach our positions and gain a foothold in some positions daily," Koval told Kyiv24 Channel the Russian military attacks Ukrainian positions "as at the beginning of the active phase" in the Pokrovsk sector involving more first-person-view (FPV) drones and artillery "And it's very difficult to deter the enemy with such an influx," he added Earlier this month, President Volodymyr Zelensky said that Russia is attempting renewed offensives in various parts of the front line In recent weeks, Kyiv has also reportedly lost much of the territory captured during the operation in Russia's Kursk Oblast The roots of Russia's invasion of Ukraine go back decades and run deep The current conflict is more than one country fighting to take over another; it is — in the words of one U.S official — a shift in "the world order."Here are some helpful stories to make sense of it all the embattled Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk suddenly went dark long battered by Russian drones and artillery failed on Monday for what the city's military administration said would be the last time "The past year has been extremely difficult," local officials said in a post on the Telegram messaging app "We started 2024 with hope but the community has faced large-scale destruction." believed by officials to still be hanging on in Pokrovsk were enduring the winter and the war without running water Gas pipelines used to heat homes and businesses have also been shut down In public statements, Ukraine's general military staff says Russia's most intense ground assaults along the entire eastern front are currently taking place in the Pokrovsk region NPR found Svitlana Storozhko still operating a small grocery store and café it's extra," she said to an elderly woman making a purchase as the thunder of artillery echoed in the empty streets outside "There will be bread tomorrow," Storozhko promised the shopkeeper laughed and confessed she had already sent her pets to live with friends in a safer community away from the front lines But she had decided to stick it out a little longer "We believe in God and in Ukraine's armed forces," Storozhko said with a shrug But remaining in Pokrovsk is an increasingly perilous choice "There are already battles on the outskirts," said Vasyl Pipa He's acting head of an evacuation team made up of police officers from around Ukraine that helps civilians leave the Pokrovsk military district it's often difficult to convince Ukrainian families to leave even when the war is at their doorstep "There are families who have come back to the city even with children and it's devastating," he said but staying near and helping them [make the decision to go]." Asked about the danger his own team faces in Pokrovsk Pipa said it's hard after nearly three years of war to remember what safety and normal conditions feel like have moved and shifted and changed," he said The Russian government has long seen this hardscrabble industrial town as a strategic prize Pokrovsk's mines produce coal that's vital to Ukraine's steel industry Rail and road crossings make the city a key transportation hub A grinding siege began last spring as waves of Russian soldiers backed by artillery and remote-controlled drones advanced slowly through nearby farms and villages Moscow has gained ground steadily but at an extremely high cost An analysis by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), a think tank in Washington, D.C., estimated Russia had lost roughly 3,000 soldiers killed and seriously wounded while trying to capture Pokrovsk It's unclear how many soldiers Ukraine's forces have lost defending the city but generally you would expect for defenders to take fewer casualties," said George Barros But he acknowledged that Russia holds the advantage: "The Ukrainians are holding large swaths of territory with very few men," he said As NPR's team drove through the ghostly city there were Ukrainian soldiers and civilians who appeared to be barely hanging on An elderly couple shuffled quickly down a sidewalk One weary-looking Ukrainian soldier named Vitalii was driving a heavily damaged U.S.-made Bradley Fighting Vehicle on the outskirts of town those interviewed for this article gave only their first name for security reasons "The situation is pretty bad," Vitalii said Vitalii used a curse word to describe the hovering machines that rain grenades and bombs almost hourly from the sky Asked if he thinks Ukraine can hold out in Pokrovsk "If it doesn't work we at least have to try." For much of the war it was relatively safe Russia carved deeper into Ukrainian territory along a wide swath of the eastern front Local officials said in their year-end message on Dec that 95% of industrial facilities and 70% of homes have been damaged or destroyed "The guys are holding on by every means," said a gray-bearded military ambulance driver in a green cap The 58-year-old is commander of the "Shark" medical evacuation unit of the 117th Separate Heavy Mechanized Brigade He added that some units defending the city are frustrated because they "aren't getting the support they need." "We don't have enough shells and other supplies." In December, Ukraine's military replaced the general who was leading the defense of Pokrovsk after he failed to stop Russia's advance But most military analysts say the stark reality is that Russia's army is simply much larger Ukraine has scrambled to respond by using drones of its own NPR was able to observe as a team on the outskirts of Pokrovsk used remote-controlled hovering aircraft to hunt and kill Russian soldiers on the battlefield But soldiers involved in the operation said these measures likely won't be enough "We try to take out as many [Russians] as we can before they reach our positions," said a drone technician who also identified himself by a single name But for now Pokrovsk is still held by the Ukrainians a significant accomplishment for Ukraine's beleaguered army The fortifications and trench lines here are a part of nearly 600-mile-long defensive system holding Russia back from the heartland of Ukraine said in 2024 Ukraine was forced to retreat But its forces have also slowed Russia's advance while killing or injuring as many as 30,000 Russian soldiers every month along the entire front according to estimates compiled by Barros' group and other military analysts He believes losses on that scale may be unsustainable for Moscow "Russia's manpower is actually quite limited Russians are struggling to offset that 30,000 casualties per month figure," Barros said "They have a system that's allowed them to sustain that [loss] for the last two and a half years It's not clear how much longer Ukraine's defense of Pokrovsk can hold Military officials told NPR Russian troops and drones now regularly threaten the main highway into the city which makes it increasingly difficult to supply troops NPR found roughly a dozen people gathered at an evacuation checkpoint They had decided it was finally time to leave most too frightened or distressed to speak always the loud bombs," said a man who gave his name as Serhii but declined to give his last name because of the risks of living near an area occupied by Russian forces He said the rest of his family had already fled but he had chosen to stay until the last possible minute "I didn't want to go because I was born here NPR field producer Polina Lytvynova contributed reporting to this story Become an NPR sponsor Moscow claims recapture of some Russian territory held by Ukrainian troops in Kursk; ‘security guarantees’ hole in US-Ukraine mineral deal Ukrainian troops on Wednesday announced a successful counterattack to retake the settlement of Kotlyne near the key city of Pokrovsk, which many Russian forces have died trying to take over the past year. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) said: “The year-long Russian effort to seize Pokrovsk has so far failed in the fact of increasing Ukrainian resistance in the area and extremely high Russian losses.” The Russian defence ministry said its forces had recaptured the settlements of Pogrebki and Orlovka in Kursk oblast where Ukraine has held territory inside Russia since August 2024 The ministry added that Russian forces had struck Ukrainian units and positions near more than a dozen settlements noted it was nearly seven months that Ukrainian forces “have been holding the buffer zone on the aggressor’s territory in Russia The Ukrainian military said it had attacked Russia’s Tuapse oil refinery on the Black Sea coast and that at least 40 explosions had been recorded at the site Tuapse is home to one of Russia’s biggest oil refineries and has been targeted by Ukrainian drones several times before The Ukrainian military also said it had attacked two military airfields in Russia-controlled Crimea but gave no further details Russia confirmed drones attacked its southern Krasnodar region Drones also attacked the Russian regions of Bryansk and Kursk Ukraine said Russian strikes on Kostyantynivka city in the east killed at least five people and wounded eight more Russian drones also killed two people near Kyiv including the Ukrainian journalist Tetiana Kulyk who worked for the Ukrinform news agency Ukraine’s interior ministry said separately that two people were wounded in Kharkiv city during a drone attack said one of its facilities had been damaged in the Dnipropetrovsk region Any peace deal for Ukraine must include “security guarantees” involving the “Atlantic alliance”, according to Giorgia Meloni, who was referencing Nato. The Italian prime minister spoke as it emerged a draft deal between the US and Ukraine does not include security guarantees but only references Ukraine somehow obtaining them Peace in Ukraine “can only be achieved if Kyiv is given adequate security guarantees to make sure that what we have seen over the past three years does not happen again” While Donald Trump said Ukraine’s president would sign their “very big agreement” in Washington on Friday Zelenskyy insisted that “guarantees of peace and security” remained vital as he prepared for “talks” with Trump it’s important that US support is not stopped Strength is needed on the path to peace,” Zelenskyy said during his evening address to Ukrainians on Wednesday Zelenskyy elsewhere suggested the deal provides a “framework” under which security guarantees would be agreed jointly with the US and Europe Trump said “we’re going to have Europe do that” and Ukraine should forget about joining Nato The Romanian parliament has authorised its army and allies to shoot down drones illegally breaching Romanian airspace The EU and Nato member has had Russian drone fragments repeatedly fall on to its territory as Moscow has attacked Kyiv’s ports Russian forces are using the full spectrum of military equipment and weaponry on the Pokrovsk front spokesman for Ukraine’s Khortytsia operational-strategic group Tregubov described the situation as "consistently difficult," noting that although Russian troops are not currently advancing “They’re using everything there — from heavy and light vehicles to small infantry groups anti-drone netting to protect ammunition supply routes unlike other fronts where specific equipment is more prominent such as lighter gear in the Lyman direction everything they have — they use.” He also highlighted increased Russian offensive activity west of Pokrovsk and along the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka highway “The intensity isn’t as high as it was in February but it's still very high — higher than anywhere else,” he said Commenting on the use of heavy armor in the Kupiansk area Tregubov explained that much of it has been repurposed to transport infantry on the outside well-prepared Ukrainian fortifications and constant aerial surveillance with FPV drone strikes make that increasingly difficult “They try to break through using either very fast vehicles or tank columns,” he added Tregubov also pointed out the growing impracticality for Russian infantry to operate on foot across difficult terrain “It’s often five kilometers on foot under full gear — and not all of them are athletes,” he said “Dodging FPV drones while doing that is even harder So they now try to close that gap with motorcycles are now rarely observed on the battlefield by Kateryna DenisovaLocal residents walk past destroyed houses in the city of Pokrovsk (Vlada Liberova/Libkos/Getty Images)Russian troops have been bogged down near Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast a spokesperson for Ukraine's Khortytsia group of forces told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty on Feb Ukrainian forces repelled 33 Russian attacks in the Pokrovsk sector over the past day, the General Staff said in its latest update According to Trehubov Russia's offensive from the south and an attempt to bypass Pokrovsk from the west failed The spokesperson claimed that Russian forces deployed in the area are becoming exhausted "I am not saying that Ukrainian forces caught some second But Russian troops have indeed begun to show some physical and material exhaustion," Trehubov said The spokesperson attributed the situation's improvement mainly to Ukrainian drone units, which established "effective defense" and cooperated with the infantry. He said that after the start of U.S.-Russian negotiations Russian soldiers' motivation to fight decreased in the sector where the Khortytsia group of forces operates A day before, the 25th Separate Airborne Brigade reported that Ukrainian troops had regained control of the village of Kotlyne, near Pokrovsk. Kotlyne and Pokrovsk are connected by the T 0406 highway, which also leads to Dnipropetrovsk Oblast She also was a fellow at journalism schools in the Czech Republic and Germany.