Ukrainian forces continue to deliver decisive blows to russian logistics in the east of Ukraine soldiers of the Nemesis 412th Regiment destroyed critical russian river crossing over the Zherebets River near the town of Svatove located on the border between Kharkiv and Luhansk regions The river crossing was being actively used by russian forces as a key supply route to support their operations on the Kharkiv front In addition to eliminating the crossing itself Ukrainian fighters struck a significant amount of enemy equipment amassed in the area Among the destroyed assets were infantry fighting vehicles and various other logistical and combat vehicles belonging to the occupiers This operation holds particular strategic significance The Svatove region serves as an important logistical hub for russian forces enabling the movement of reinforcements and supplies toward the Kupiansk and Kharkiv directions It also plays a role in supporting potential river crossings over the Oskil River Ukrainian forces have not only inflicted material losses but also seriously disrupted russian plans for strengthening their positions in the region The strike dealt a blow to russia's ongoing attempts to increase pressure on Ukrainian defenses along the Kupiansk axis where russian forces have recently concentrated significant efforts Ukrainian military sources report that the enemy's efforts to build up forces in this sector have been thwarted dealing yet another setback to russia's already strained operational capabilities Ukraine recaptured the village of Nadiya in Luhansk Oblast which is west of Svatove and is so small if you blink while driving through you’ll miss it Russia occupied the village at the start of the invasion then Ukraine recaptured it during its autumn counter-offensive in 2022 and then Russia re-occupied it 18+The Defense Forces of Ukraine, particularly the 3rd Assault Brigade, have announced the liberation of the village of Nadiya in the Luhansk region from Russian terrorist formations. During the battle, the 752nd and 254th mechanized regiments of the Russian forces were decisively defeated.[image or embed] Ukrainian defenders have released the hamlet of Nadiya from occupation by the russian fascist invaders They've reached the natural line of the Zherebets' River The foreign invaders from Muscovy do not fully occupy any region of Ukraine except Crimea.[image or embed] four helicopters shot down would be — as Joe Biden might say — a big fucking deal Woooohooo 🔥💥🔥💥 Big news - Ukrainian sources write that today soldiers of the army special forces shot down/destroyed 4 Russian helicopters Waiting for confirmation.[image or embed] After five days the oil terminal at Kavkazskaya is still burning fiercely Last night, another epic explosion rocked the “Kavkazskaya” oil transshipment point in Krasnodar Krai. The fire show at this hub blazes on for the 5th day. Is this the kind of "ruckus" Putin was talking about, or not yet?[image or embed] 1470 Losers.     903,480[image or embed] Russian militants filmed their vehicle blowing up on a mine. A massive fireworks display, then everything’s ablaze. That’s what happens when “liberators” stumble into Ukrainian surprises.[image or embed] Could be a terrorist attack or it could be another instance of Russia persuading some local person to plant a bomb somewhere and then detonating it remotely to eliminate the witness ❗️Terrorist attack in Odesa region: woman carried an explosive device to a police station and blew herself up with it, she died.[image or embed] Russia has cleared out residents from the area in the Belgorod region where fighting has been going on Somber Governor of Russia’s Belgorod region Gladkov announced that nearly all residents of the border Krasnoyaruzhsky district have been evacuated due to a limited special operation by Ukraine’s defense forces, which began on March 18. This accounts for approximately 14,000 good Russians.[image or embed] Russian drone operators on human safari in Kherson attack workers repairing a building A video appeared on Russian "Z-blogs" that reportedly shows a drone hitting a roof in Kherson just as civilians were repairing it Russian bastards.[image or embed] 🔥Ukraine’s Air Force obliterated Russian positions in Toretsk. A strike wiped out Russian troops from the 1st Guards Motor Rifle Brigade & 103rd Regiment—taking down assault groups and drone operators.[image or embed] but I’d say having a huge hole in your howitzer is a bad thing Ukrainian fighters spotted a 122-mm D-30 howitzer of the Russian boys and destroyed its ammo with precise strikes. The howitzer survived, but it’s sporting some fresh holes now.[image or embed] He probably figured he was screwed so he might as well strike a pose ☀️🏖 What is he doing???👇👀[image or embed] KURSK 🚨 The command of the 810th brigade continues to send its personnel to slaughter “We spent 10 days in complete ass, birds are flying, if we get there, it will be awesome,” a marine who miraculously managed to survive shares his impressions.[image or embed] Speaking of being “in complete ass,” this lone survivor of a three-man assault team says his commanders treat soldiers as if they are “not even human.” Russian grunt from the 114th Brigade bitches about hellish days: "They chuck us into meat grinder assaults—I’m the last of three still kicking. We’re not even human to them. No meds, no leave, two hits—cough up dough or keep charging." Kurakhivka direction.[image or embed] Russian military publics rage over a "genius" business scheme in the RF army. Two workers of the 60th Brigade marry "SVO" fighters, a warrant officer kills them at the front, and they split the hefty death compensation payouts. They say this scam thrives among Russian women.[image or embed] These battle-hardened Russian combat vets survived the meat grinder of Ukraine only to come home and be defeated by … their wives.  1/ Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine have appealed to Vladimir Putin for help against a new and deadlier enemy – their wives, who they say have been corrupted by feminists and "Anglo-Saxons". The men say they have been kicked out "on the street, abandoned and impotent". ⬇️[image or embed] These poor soldiers have been rendered impotent by their evil spouses and their evil feminism 3/ "There have been more and more cases when soldiers who defended their homeland on the front lines are now betrayed on the home front with the support of professional psychologists and lawyers deprive veterans of the most precious things: children I hope Starmer told Trump he was a shitgibbon The British have way better insults than we do ⚡️ Starmer says he faced pressure from US to criticize Zelensky after Oval Office clash with Trump "We were under pressure to come out very critically with, you know, flowery adjectives to describe how others felt,” Starmer said.[image or embed] Maybe the EU has finally had enough of Viktor Orban’s crap European leaders no longer wait for Orbán’s approval on Ukraine The latest EU statement will be issued by 26 nations—Hungary isolated Diplomats say if Orbán wants to go it alone www.politico.eu/article/euro...[image or embed] ⚡️China considering joining Ukraine peacekeeping mission "The inclusion of China in a 'coalition of the willing' could potentially increase Russia's acceptance of peacekeeping forces in Ukraine," an unnamed EU diplomatic source reportedly told Die Welt.[image or embed] The movement to oust leaders in Hungary and Serbia has moved to Bratislava demanding PM Fico's resignation over his pro-Russian stance Protests, ongoing since December, intensified after Fico’s Moscow visit. Many fear Slovakia’s democratic course is under threat[image or embed] they take you to an upper floor with open windows ‼️ Russia: “Elevators rise to hell: in the Moscow region they want to assign a chatbot to monitor their condition” “The number of accidents involving lifts in apartment buildings in the Moscow region is off the charts” www.mk.ru/mosobl/2025/...[image or embed] Props to the Norwegian parliament for dropping this photo[image or embed] This is Nikol, a young girl killed today alongside her father, Oleksandr, in an attack by russia. Her mother is currently hospitalized.[image or embed] Bayraktar the turtle lived in the daycare that was badly damaged by the Russian attack on Zaporizhzhia yesterday Rescuers found him alive, got him from under the rubble and reunited Bayraktar with his owner. Look how happy she is to have him back![image or embed] After the hard night,his music sounds like a powerful resistance Kyiv stands.Plays. Lives.[image or embed] Not signed up for Daily Kos yet? Create a free account Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on September 27 ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment Ukrainian forces repelled a reinforced battalion-size Russian mechanized assault in the Kupyansk direction on September 26 — the first large Russian mechanized assault along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line since Winter 2024 A Ukrainian battalion operating near Pishchane (northwest of Svatove and southeast of Kupyansk) posted geolocated footage on September 26 showing Ukrainian forces repelling the reinforced battalion-size Russian mechanized assault in fields around Pishchane and reported that Russian forces attacked in the direction of Kolisnykivka and Kruhlyakivka (west of Pishchane and directly on the Oskil River).[1] The Ukrainian battalion reported that Russian forces used 50 armored vehicles in the assault and the Ukrainian Airborne Assault Forces Command reported that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian positions in two columns one with 37 armored vehicles and the other with 13.[2] The Ukrainian battalion reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed three tanks and 11 armored vehicles and damaged 10 tanks and 16 armored vehicles.[3] The Ukrainian Airborne Assault Forces Command posted footage showing damaged and destroyed Russian armored vehicles crowded close to one another suggesting that Russian armored vehicles attacked in tight columns and became jammed once Ukrainian fire elements started to strike the column— a common occurrence in failed Russian mechanized assaults.[4] Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian forces back to their starting positions near Pishchane and none of the geolocated footage that ISW has observed of the assault indicates that Russian forces advanced during the assault.[5] The Russian Western Grouping of Forces conducted several large mechanized assaults between January and February 2024 at the start of the Russian offensive operation along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line with the last observed battalion-size Russian mechanized assault occurring west of Kreminna in late January.[6] Russian forces have since conducted infantry assaults and occasional roughly platoon-size mechanized assaults along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and the tempo of the Russian offensive operation along this sector of the front has generally been much lower than Russian offensive operations elsewhere in Ukraine.[7] Russian forces may be intensifying their efforts to reach the Oskil River although Russian advances on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River will likely continue to be relatively gradual Russian forces have created a small tactical salient around Pishchane in recent weeks and have focused on advancing toward Kolisnykivka and Kruhlyakivka.[8] Russian forces advanced along a ravine running east of Pishchane and in fields south and north of the settlement but have struggled to advance in the fields immediately east of Kolisnykivka and Kruhlyakivka The command of the Western Grouping of Forces may have intended for the large mechanized assault to allow Russian forces to advance rapidly through these fields and consolidate positions within Kolisnykivka and Kruhlyakivka and enable Russian infantry to establish a more enduring foothold within the two settlements on the Oskil River Russian forces are likely focusing on establishing a foothold directly on the Oskil River because it would allow Russian forces to envelop Ukrainian positions on the east bank of the river both to the north and south - creating a narrower Ukrainian salient between Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi and Hlushkivka and a wider Ukrainian salient south of Kruhlyakivka since the Oskil River acts as a barrier The Western Grouping of Forces has conducted the offensive operation along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line in four mutually supporting axes of advance (northeast of Kupyansk Russian forces have not demonstrated the ability to quicken the pace of their advance along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line in recent months and Russian forces have also failed to make even marginal gains on other axes of advance notably spending weeks to enter small settlements like Nevske and Makiivka (both northwest of Kreminna) Russian sources claimed as of September 27 that Ukrainian forces are actively counterattacking near Nevske and Ukrainian forces have previously conducted tactically successful counterattacks in the Kreminna area — suggesting that Ukrainian forces have more flexibility to contest the tactical initiative in the area than elsewhere in eastern Ukraine.[10] The Russian military command has demonstrated that it will likely accept continued gradual gains along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line The Western Grouping of Forces established the Russian offensive operation towards the Oskil River as a much more sustainable effort than previous offensive operations and has repeatedly slowed offensive tempo along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line to allow participating Russian units to rest and rotate.[11] Russian forces began the effort to reach the Oskil River in Winter 2024 and have not abandoned the effort despite several brief operational culminations in the previous months.[12] Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military command are currently pursuing a theory of victory in Ukraine that posits that Russian forces can continue gradual creeping advances indefinitely as seen with the current Russian offensive operation around the operationally significant town of Chasiv Yar The Western Grouping of Forces likely has limited capacity to maintain an intensified offensive effort along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line or conduct effective combat operations that result in more rapid gains The Western Grouping of Forces initially was comprised of both Moscow and Leningrad Military District (MMD/LMD) elements when it launched the offensive operation along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line in Winter 2024 371st Motorized Rifle Regiment (mobilized unit) and several combined rifle battalions from the 1st GTA's 4th and 47th tank divisions to support the Russian offensive operation in the Kupyansk direction and this reserve will likely be unable to support prolonged intensified offensive operations.[18] The command of the Western Grouping of Forces has previously overseen costly and ineffective mechanized assaults Continued pronounced failures with mechanized assaults suggest that the Western Grouping of Forces is not learning tactical lessons that other Russian groupings of forces have learned.[19] Russian authorities appear to be expending a significant amount of effort to influence the Western debate about allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to conduct long-range strikes against military objects in Russia This Russian effort suggests a deep concern with the operational pressures that such strikes into Russia would generate on Russian offensive operations in Ukraine although US officials remain hesitant to permit Ukraine to conduct such strikes reported on September 26 that US intelligence assessments "play down" the effect that Ukrainian strikes into Russia with US- and other materiel out of the range of Western missiles which the officials noted would significantly complicate Russian supply lines in Ukraine.[21] Even a small number of successful Ukrainian long-range strikes could have asymmetric impacts and prompt Russian forces to move significant military and storage facilities outside the range of Western-provided weapons and further away from the frontline - complicating Russian logistics in the vicinity of Ukraine Ukrainian forces previously conducted a series of HIMARS strikes against Russian ammunition depots throughout occupied Ukraine in Summer 2022 Russian President Vladimir Putin reintroduced several of the Kremlin's previously most effective narratives back into the Western and Russian information spaces in recent weeks and tailored his typical boilerplate language to specifically target the ongoing Western debate about allowing Ukraine to conduct long-range strikes into Russia with Western-provided equipment although Putin may continue to employ such rhetoric if he assesses that these information operations will continue to have even minimal impacts on Western decision-makers.[26] The benefits of allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided long-range strike systems against Russia may outweigh the risk of Russian retaliation more than Western policymakers are currently considering Western media outlets have repeatedly reported that the US and other Western governments are hesitant to greenlight Ukraine to use Western-provided systems to strike targets in Russia due to previous assessments that the risk of Russian retaliation for such strikes outweighs the possible benefits that Ukraine could generate with such strikes.[27] NYT reported that the assessment notes that Russia is likely to retaliate with greater force against the US and its allies possibly with covert attacks on US and European strategic facilities and military bases in Europe in the event that the West allows Ukraine to use Western-provided systems to strike objects in Russia.[28] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers on September 27 likely as part of the ongoing Kremlin effort to coopt Russian milbloggers and downplay recent backlash in the ultranationalist information space over the death of two prominent drone operators formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) Junior Sergeant Dmitry Lysakovsky (alias Goodwin) and Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Gritsai (alias Ernest).[33] Some milbloggers accused this Kremlin-affiliated milblogger of working with the Russian MoD to gauge the public reaction to the claimed results of the investigation which allegedly found the commander of the 87th Separate Rifle Regiment not guilty of exceeding his powers by committing the drone platoon to combat operations which ultimately resulted in Lysakovsky and Gritsai’s deaths.[34] Belousov may have met with coopted Russian milbloggers to downplay the controversy generated by the deaths of Lysakovsky and Gritsai likely in an attempt to further the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) influence in the Russian information space The People's Republic of China (PRC) announced a new initiative to draw international support for its alternative peace plan for Ukraine amid increasing cooperation with Russia PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced on September 26 that the PRC and "other like-minded countries in the global south" will soon establish the "Friends of Peace" platform that allegedly aims to foster "inclusive dialogue" to find a solution to end the war in Ukraine.[35] The PRC routinely promoted its alternative peace plan allowing Russian officials to posture as willing to negotiate with Ukraine in good faith despite consistent Kremlin statements either insisting on its terms amounting to total Ukrainian capitulation or rejecting negotiations outright.[36] The Kremlin will likely promote this new Friends of Peace platform and use its support of multiple alternative peace efforts to falsely portray Ukraine as unwilling to negotiate Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continued to meet with US officials about the war in Ukraine during his visit to the US on September 26 and 27 Zelensky met with a bipartisan delegation from the US Senate and with US President Joe Biden on September 26 and with US Vice President Kamala Harris and former US President Donald Trump on September 27.[37] We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation Ukrainian forces continued ground assaults in Glushkovsky Raion Kursk Oblast on September 27 but did not make any confirmed gains including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults south of Glushkovo near Veseloye and Medvezhye on September 26 and 27.[38] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces also counterattacked near Novy Put.[39] Elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly defending against Ukrainian assaults in Glushkovsky Raion.[40] Ukrainian forces continued assaults in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on September 27 but did not make any confirmed advances claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked southeast of Korenevo near Lyubimovka and south of Sudzha near Plekhovo.[41] Russian forces conducted counterattacks in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on September 27 but did not make any confirmed gains A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Plekhovo but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[42] Russian milbloggers claimed on September 26 and 27 that fighting is ongoing in forest areas between Plekhovo and Borki (immediately east of Plekhovo) and that dense minefields in the area are slowing Russian progress.[43] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces conducted assaults southeast of Korenevo near Lyubimovka and Nikolayevo-Daryino and south of Sudzha near Plekhovo.[44] Elements of the Russian 83rd VDV Brigade are also reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[45] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City) Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Kharkiv City amid continued Russian assaults north and northeast of Kharkiv City on September 27 and Tykhe on September 26 and 27.[50] Elements of the Russian 380th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Lukyantsi (north of Kharkiv City).[51] Elements of the Russian "Enot" drone detachment of the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA] Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Vovchansk.[52] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) See topline text for details about the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas) Russian forces reportedly continued offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and southeast of Siversk near Spirne on September 26 and 27 but did not advance.[53] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on September 26 and 27 but did not make confirmed advances The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked north of Chasiv Yar near Hryhorivka and Minkivka and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Bila Hora.[54] Advisor to the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Igor Kimakovsky claimed that Russian forces seized an unspecified height near Chasiv Yar and are continuing offensive operations near Kalynivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar) and Hryhorivka although ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims.[55] A Russian milblogger affiliated with the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) claimed on September 27 that previously prepared defensive positions and the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal are slowing Russian advances near Chasiv Yar and impeding Russian assault groups trying to cross the canal.[56] The milblogger claimed that forests around Chasiv Yar allow Ukrainian forces to conceal military equipment that Ukrainian forces have an advantage in drone operations in the area and that Russian forces are struggling to secure positions in the ruins of Chasiv Yar’s private sector.[57] Russia forces recently made confirmed advances in Toretsk and southeast of Toretsk amid continued offensive operations on September 26 and 27 Geolocated footage published on September 21 and September 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Toretsk along Darvina and Pushkarenko streets respectively.[58] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern Toretsk along Heroiv Pratsi Street and in central Toretsk along Pyaboshapky Street.[59] Geolocated footage published on September 27 also indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Zalizne (southeast of Toretsk) indicating that Russian forces have seized the settlement.[60] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk; south of Toretsk; and southwest of Toretsk near Leonidivka and Shcherbynivka.[61] Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Pokrovsk amid continued offensive operations on September 26 and 27 Geolocated footage published on September 27 indicates that Russian forces advanced south of Sukhyi Yar and seized the Novohrodivska No 1/3 mine west of Novohrodivka (southeast of Sukhyi Yar).[62] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 27 that Russian forces seized Marynivka (southeast of Pokrovsk and south of Novohrodivka) during the week of September 21 and 27 and ISW assessed that Russian forces seized the settlement on September 10.[63] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Hirnyk (southeast of Pokrovsk).[64] Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Zelene Pole and Hrodivka; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske; and southeast of Pokrovsk near Novohrodivka and Zhelanne Druhe.[65] A Russian long-range reconnaissance company of a reconnaissance battalion belonging to the 35th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA] Central Military District [CMD]) is reportedly mining Ukrainian logistics routes near Mykolaivka.[66] Russian forces reportedly continued offensive operations west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka on September 26 and 27 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[67] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced in and near Vuhledar amid continued offensive operations southwest of Donetsk City on September 26 and 27 Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces with armored vehicle support advanced in eastern Vuhledar 3 mine northeast of Vuhledar.[68] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued offensive operations southwest of Donetsk City near Paraskoviivka Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC] Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a mobilized unit) advanced in eastern and central Vuhledar and that other Russian units are advancing near the western outskirts of Vuhledar.[71] Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating within Vuhledar.[72] Russian forces reportedly attacked southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novodarivka on September 27 but did not advance.[73] Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes) Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 26 and 27 near Novoandriivka and Mali Shcherbaky (both northwest of Robotyne) and near Robotyne but there were no confirmed changes to the front line.[74] Elements of the Russian "Valkyrie" Special Detachment (4th Military Base Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly correcting Russian artillery fire against Ukrainian positions near Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne).[75] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces fired on Tokmak with multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).[76] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn said on September 26 that a large contingent of Russian forces are using the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) as a training base for drone crews to shield these Russian forces from Ukrainian strikes.[77] ISW has reported at length about Russia's militarization of the ZNPP including visual evidence of Russian forces storing and operating weapons on the ZNPP's grounds.[78] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 27 that Russian forces attacked multiple times in the Dnipro (Kherson) direction[79] Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Leningrad Military District [LMD] formerly Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[80] The Ukrainian Crimean-based "Atesh" partisan group published photographs and reported on September 27 that Russian forces are building new defensive structures along the beach near occupied Andriivka-Uhlove (north of Sevastopol) and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline) Russian forces conducted a limited series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 26 to 27 The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched an Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missile from occupied Crimea two Kh-22 cruise missiles from airspace over the Black Sea and 32 Shahed-136/131 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk Krasnodar Krai.[82] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 24 Shahed drones over Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa oblasts and that one Shahed drone entered Romanian air space and another drone was "lost" due to unspecified Ukrainian drone countermeasures The Romanian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that a Russian drone briefly crossed into Romanian air space on the night of September 26 to 27 but did not confirm whether the drone crashed in Romanian territory.[83] Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported that Russian forces also struck residential areas in Izmail The Ukrainian Air Force reported on September 27 that Russian forces launched two unspecified missiles at Starokostyantniv but did not specify if the missiles struck their targets.[85] Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization) Russian authorities continue to threaten Russian frontline soldiers' ad-hoc communications networks Kremlin-affiliated business outlet Kommersant reported that Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor may block access to Discord a partially encrypted communications platform that allows users to communicate over text The Russian MoD continues efforts to deny financial and social benefits to Russian penal recruits who fought in Ukraine.[90] BBC Russian Service reported that Russian penal recruits whom the MoD recruited from February 24 to September 1 are suing the Russian MoD for promised payments and combat veteran status following their return to Russia and are frequently losing these cases BBC Russian Service noted that the MoD is categorizing these penal recruits as "special contingent volunteers" and had the penal recruits sign special agreements in which the prisoners "give consent" to fight for Russia in lieu of signing contracts like standard Russian contract recruits BBC Russian Service noted that Russian law forbids these penal recruits from serving in assault battalions but ISW has frequently observed reports of Storm-Z penal recruits conducting attritional infantry-led "meat" assaults and suffering high casualties as a result.[91] Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine) Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US ISW is suspending publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts until further notice Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural ISW is not publishing coverage of Russian-occupied areas today Russian Information Operations and Narratives Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus) The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on September 27 that a Belarusian peacekeeping contingent arrived at the Taldykorgan airfield in Almaty Kazakhstan for the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) "Indestructible Brotherhood-2024" military exercises.[92] Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update   [1] https://t.me/fedorenkoys/548; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1839609872947552735; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1839606930949497159; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1839605411831312819; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1839602670442590646; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1839598293573157195 [2] https://www.facebook.com/watch/uaairborne/?ref=embed_video ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/09/27/syly-oborony-vidbyly-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-shturm-kolony-z-50-odynycz-tehniky/ ; https://t.me/fedorenkoys/548 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/09/27/drony-storukogo-ahillesa-oboronczi-vidbyly-potuzhnyj-rosijskyj-broneshturm-na-kupʼyanskomu-napryamku/ [3] https://t.me/fedorenkoys/548 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/09/27/drony-storukogo-ahillesa-oboronczi-vidbyly-potuzhnyj-rosijskyj-broneshturm-na-kupʼyanskomu-napryamku/ [4] https://www.facebook.com/watch/uaairborne/?ref=embed_video ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/09/27/syly-oborony-vidbyly-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-shturm-kolony-z-50-odynycz-tehniky/ [5] https://www.facebook.com/watch/uaairborne/?ref=embed_video ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/09/27/syly-oborony-vidbyly-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-shturm-kolony-z-50-odynycz-tehniky/ ; https://t.me/fedorenkoys/548; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1839609872947552735; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1839606930949497159; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1839605411831312819; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1839602670442590646; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1839598293573157195 [6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis [7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv [8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar092624 [9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis [10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2024 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/17461 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/27987 [11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis [12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv ; 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[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JswoUvVwfDviQ5ZtkknwfKyAYcpQfmDcmCuBfHwJh4gt3JiFTMTJMsdXeNmhhLAKl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MWqhSePUy5PuL5cbKnSKL7WPwkzAQv2mFvVcVfjke8Zd78WP4FvKK3rxtJ21Xmz1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ULj87KJWJrxzQWPsWJ2nUVXssYDFBiXVA6aeianz3KBcPh8f9D8KGe9G1vvy8aX4l [62] https://t.me/Airborne1126/18275; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6953; [63] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11-2024; https://t.me/mod_russia/43865; https://t.me/sashakots/49222 [65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ULj87KJWJrxzQWPsWJ2nUVXssYDFBiXVA6aeianz3KBcPh8f9D8KGe9G1vvy8aX4l; ttps://t.me/smotri_z/34954 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/40022; https://t.me/tass_agency/275469; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/138827; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/59240; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28280; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/77718; https://t.me/sashakots/49218; https://t.me/rybar/63885 [67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JswoUvVwfDviQ5ZtkknwfKyAYcpQfmDcmCuBfHwJh4gt3JiFTMTJMsdXeNmhhLAKl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ULj87KJWJrxzQWPsWJ2nUVXssYDFBiXVA6aeianz3KBcPh8f9D8KGe9G1vvy8aX4l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MWqhSePUy5PuL5cbKnSKL7WPwkzAQv2mFvVcVfjke8Zd78WP4FvKK3rxtJ21Xmz1l [68] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/77675; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/77698; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28253; https://t.me/motopatriot/27984; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/138758; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/138760; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/138790 [69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ULj87KJWJrxzQWPsWJ2nUVXssYDFBiXVA6aeianz3KBcPh8f9D8KGe9G1vvy8aX4l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JswoUvVwfDviQ5ZtkknwfKyAYcpQfmDcmCuBfHwJh4gt3JiFTMTJMsdXeNmhhLAKl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MWqhSePUy5PuL5cbKnSKL7WPwkzAQv2mFvVcVfjke8Zd78WP4FvKK3rxtJ21Xmz1l [70] https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=845981814315474&id=100067109882285&rdid=9hVzV87MvvkV3oEW ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/09/27/u-nas-ne-zavedeno-unykaty-dvizhuhy-zamkombata-arkas-pro-sytuacziyu-zahidnishe-vugledara/ [71] https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02GHZdMrEHHz7beii6MGeuWCspQ4FtsvxQ8icxfHedvhtkQbmLSmJyc1WJEXYu5w3Dl [72] https://t.me/voin_dv/11024 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/11021 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/11028 [73] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ULj87KJWJrxzQWPsWJ2nUVXssYDFBiXVA6aeianz3KBcPh8f9D8KGe9G1vvy8aX4l [74]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ULj87KJWJrxzQWPsWJ2nUVXssYDFBiXVA6aeianz3KBcPh8f9D8KGe9G1vvy8aX4l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JswoUvVwfDviQ5ZtkknwfKyAYcpQfmDcmCuBfHwJh4gt3JiFTMTJMsdXeNmhhLAKl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MWqhSePUy5PuL5cbKnSKL7WPwkzAQv2mFvVcVfjke8Zd78WP4FvKK3rxtJ21Xmz1l [75] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/138749 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/11013 [76] https://t.me/vrogov/17550; https://t.me/motopatriot/27991; https://t.me/polk_1430/7154 [77] https://youtu.be/j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/09/26/yadernyj-shhyt-zagarbnykiv-shho-roblyat-rosiyany-na-terytoriyi-zaporizkoyi-aes/ [78] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-26-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25 [79]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ULj87KJWJrxzQWPsWJ2nUVXssYDFBiXVA6aeianz3KBcPh8f9D8KGe9G1vvy8aX4l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JswoUvVwfDviQ5ZtkknwfKyAYcpQfmDcmCuBfHwJh4gt3JiFTMTJMsdXeNmhhLAKl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MWqhSePUy5PuL5cbKnSKL7WPwkzAQv2mFvVcVfjke8Zd78WP4FvKK3rxtJ21Xmz1l [81] https://t.me/atesh_ua/5517 ; https://suspilne dot media/845431-zelenskij-zustrivsa-z-bajdenom-ta-garris-na-vijskovij-oblik-mozut-dozvoliti-stavati-onlajn-947-den-vijni-onlajn/ [83] https://www.mapn dot ro/cpresa/18593_comunicat-de-presa [85] https://t.me/kpszsu/20130 ; https://t.me/kpszsu/20132 [86] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7183348; https://t.me/tass_agency/275483 [87] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7183348; https://t.me/tass_agency/275483 [88] https://t.me/milinfolive/131447; https://t.me/milinfolive/126841 [89] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25-2024 [90] https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c8j7gm2lwr8o [91] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-22-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-30-2023 To stop the Ukrainian offensive on Svatove the Russian command threw thousands of untrained mobilized people to the front line Their relatives are telling what happened to them Illustration: SailorkyzIn the fall of 2022 the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) launched a counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast and liberated most of it in a short period of time It was largely the defeat at Kharkiv that forced Vladimir Putin to declare mobilization Further offensives of the AFU threatened strategically important towns in the neighboring Luhansk Oblast — Svatove and Kreminna the Russian army command rushed thousands of untrained mobilized soldiers to the front line the relatives of many of them have been trying to get any information about their close ones from the Russian authorities IStories has at its disposal a number of complaints from relatives of those mobilized to Vladimir Putin’s administration This archive was given by a source whose name we are not disclosing for security reasons IStories journalists Irina Dolinina and Rina Nikolaeva talked to some of the authors of the complaints and they confirmed the authenticity of the documents we had at our disposal We also managed to verify the identities of almost 300 mobilized men who went missing near Svatove We verified the personal data of 295 mobilized persons sent by the command near Svatove Over a third of the mobilized were born in the 1990s or early 2000s The oldest one at the time of mobilization was 58 years old All of them were distributed among different units. In some cases, new units were formed from the mobilized. For example, Troop No. 11097 from Voronezh, or the so-called Sobyanin’s Regiment was staffed by mobilized men from Moscow and the Moscow Oblast — Troop No Complaints to Putin are written by different people from different regions complaints about what happened to those mobilized near Svatove stand out in particular he and his colleagues were taken right from the workers’ hostel I can say his hands were twisted and he was dragged into this hell He didn’t want to,” — 51-year-old housewife Lyudmila Khovalkina recounts by phone she cries and sometimes interrupts to take pills Igor KhovalkinPhoto: social networksHer son graduated from college with a degree in fire safety I gave him as much education as I could,” — Lyudmila says Igor had a negative attitude towards the war: “He told me that things were very bad in our country ‘Why are they pushing the guys over there to this Ukraine?’ — that’s how he thought he called his mother and told her that many people did not want to go anywhere and there were even fights because of this “Guys absolutely did not want to go and resented: ‘We have families And we don’t need the war,’” Lyudmila recalls Khovalkin wrote his last message to his parents from somewhere near Svatove: he and other mobilized men were in a dugout in an ambush a 40-year-old father of three children from Orekhovo-Zuyevo near Moscow He worked at a local enterprise producing boiler equipment There he was handed a military summons.  checked students’ notebooks,” — recalls Alexey’s wife Many family photos of her together with her husband and their three school-age children hang on the walls: “My husband came and showed me the military summons We were watching what was happening in the world on TV and it seemed that it didn’t concern us and it would never happen to us I’m going together with other guys from the town Alexey Popkov and Svetlana PopkovaPhoto: social networksPopkov was sent to the Taman Division and then to Belarus Svetlana managed to get him dismissed as a father of three minor children Due to the fact that the command of the unit in Naro-Fominsk left early for the New Year holidays the official order of Alexey Popkov’s dismissal was signed only on January 12 But it was too late: by that time he had already been in Ukraine for five days “The last time I spoke to my husband was on January 13 I need to know when the commander will receive this information and you will be sent home.’ He told me that he went to the commander — and the connection was suddenly lost at this point He has never picked up the phone since then.” the wife of one of Alexey's fellow soldiers called Svetlana and told her that Alexey had gone missing near Svatove: “According to rumors among the soldiers and part [of the mobilized] together with my husband just left a large wedding photo hangs above the sofa Svetlana turns to her husband in tears: “Stop torturing us Since Igor Khovalkin and Alexey Popkov went missing near Svatove their relatives have been trying to get at least some information from the government They have written dozens of appeals to various authorities including the administration of Vladimir Putin But there were no results.    IStories found the complaints of Khovalkina and Popkova in the archive There we also found hundreds of other appeals from relatives of Russian military personnel who were sent to Svatove the first mobilized men arrived near Svatove as early as the first days of October just days after they received the military summonses and in the midst of fierce fighting in that area Relatives complained to Putin: “During the conscription they were told that they would stand on the second and third lines or somewhere in the liberated territories Why were they thrown into the slaughter?!” — the author of one of the appeals expressed Most relatives of the mobilized wrote to Putin that their close ones found themselves on the front lines without any training or supplies “I understand if an experienced person goes [to the war] at their own will [taking away] children who have just graduated from school On TV they show all the nonsense: the army and everything What happened to the mobilized at the front the authors of appeals to Putin most frequently describe with the word “hell.” Many complaints repeat the same story about how the command threw soldiers to the front line with only one light weapon and they died or went missing there they were taken out into the field without special military equipment and given a machine gun with two mags,” — a relative of a mobilized man writes “They had only two grenades and two mags of ammunition in the automatic rifles Then the real hell began,” — a relative of another military man complained to Putin “A few days after their arrival at the battlefront without proper training and combat coordination they [the mobilized] were sent into battle against superior enemy forces And the survivors were dispersed to other units,” — the father of a mobilized man wrote to Putin “And this is only one section of the front — Svatove Why were the mobilized people thrown there without providing everything they needed Where are our super-modern weapons and our strongest army in the world?!” — the mother of another soldier exclaimed after spending several days on the front line — without supplies and under constant shelling — tried to get out to a safer place But their commanders sent them back to the front line: “At the checkpoint our own staff refused to let them in because there was no one from the command They were told to crawl back where they came from,” — one complaint said “To those who refused to return to the front line the commander answered with a swear word: ‘I don’t give a shit new ones will be sent here,’” a relative of another mobilized man complained to Putin Those who still refused to return were put in pits and cellars by the command locked in garages and other special prisons under the military police control Illustration: SailorkyzMany complaints from relatives of the mobilized also mention the prison in the village of Zaitsevo in the Luhansk Oblast. It became known when Russians soldiers who were detained there told journalists about the conditions of detention and showed videos taken there Hundreds of people were held in the cellars of Zaitsevo concussed and wounded people who were not given medical care were among the detainees “Our cold-stricken husbands are kept in prison without water and food in order to break them down they might just die there!” — stated the relatives’ collective appeal to Putin “They do not refuse to defend their motherland but it is impossible to do it without training and equipment they are put in the cellar and threatened with torture until they agree to return to the front lines!” — a wife of one of the detained mobilized men resented “They are openly told that it is easier to get rid of them so that there is no fuss No people — and no problems,” — another one wrote The relatives of Russian soldiers asked Putin to investigate and bring to justice the commanders who threw their close ones to slaughter and into cellars the author even called the officers’ actions “fascism.” commander of a separate motor rifle regiment of an army brigade of the Baltic Fleet was mentioned especially often in the complaints: “Who is responsible for not taking care of the mobilized has no official record of them in his regiment and therefore has no losses Who will return the dead to us?” — the author of one of the complaints to Putin lamented In December 2022, Putin awarded Zavadsky with the Star of the Hero of Russia paperwork and logistics,” as the governor of the Vladimir region put it Many relatives of the mobilized also accused Lieutenant General Vladimir Lugovoy (deputy commander of the Western Military District) and Colonel Vladimir Rumyantsev of throwing soldiers into prisons and cellars on their orders. The media reported about the complaints of mobilized people about Rumyantsev exceeding his authority back in the fall of 2022 IStories has a list of 19 mobilized soldiers whose relatives reported that they were taken to prison in Zaitsevo on Rumyantsev’s orders IStories did not manage to contact the military officers mentioned in the complaints Along with the complaints, the source sent to IStories the recordings of two conversations between Russian military personnel stationed near Svatove. We checked the phone numbers and made sure that they belonged to real Russian citizens who were mobilized in 2022. You can listen to the recordings in our movie.  tells his relative that a lot of volunteers are coming to them: “This is how people are being fucked up They watch TV: every day they are told that ‘over the past 24 hours we have killed so many people and so many vehicles.’ They believe it a mobilized man confessed to his relative that there were “less than a hundred men left of the regiment [from 950 to 2,000 men] — somewhere around 70.” a mobilized man also told about heavy losses near Svatove: “There are no Kaliningrad men left Illustration: SailorkyzIt is impossible to confirm the reliability of these losses. However, according to open data only reports about the dead on social networks and in the media at least 250 mobilized people died in the Svativka-Kreminna line by September last year Earlier, Verstka and even Russian propagandist Anastasia Kashevarova reported on the heavy losses of the mobilized at Svatove: “I will tell you more about the story of the 27th Brigade and the mobilized sent untrained to Svatove <...> They were all thrown to the strongholds <...> Communication was practically non-existent during the fighting some units were moved and it was not known where they were And in such a situation the guys spent about five or six days under heavy artillery fire Lyudmila Khovalkina was a common housewife Now she spends her whole days just searching for her son looking through photos and videos of prisoners of war “My head used to be full of: how to cook pies a woman,” — Lyudmila says in a quiet and exhausted voice My husband has been a foreman in his work all his life the parents searched hospitals for anyone who could tell them anything about Igor’s fate The Khovalkins found his fellow soldiers who were with Igor in the trench One of them remembered that Khovalkin gave him first aid after being wounded by shrapnel: he gave him an injection and brought him water her son’s commander was another mobilized man named Vitaly He called us drunk at night when he came out of the hospital My husband sat next to me during the call and cried Lyudmila says that after Vitaliy came out of the hospital and since then she has not spoken to him: “These [commanders] dragged the children into that [slaughter] I think they wounded themselves just to get to this hospital — there is no other way to get out of this Ukraine I told him: ‘Be offended or not — you were just dragging children into the slaughter.’” The Khovalkin family searched for their son in Valuiki where mobilized people were brought after being served with military summonses; then they went to Luhansk Oblast the officials either ignored her requests or responded rudely The Khovalkin familyPhoto: social networks“A whole year has already passed We are just tired,” — Lyudmila Khovalkina complains Everywhere the same result — total silence Did I give birth to a child for this purpose I gave birth to a child for myself and raised him with my husband He understood… understands it perfectly well…” — Ludmila corrects herself — “‘Who is attacking us?’” — so he reflected All this time Svetlana Popkova is also trying to find some information about her husband “At first I was lost in life,” — she recalls assisted me in writing appeals on websites you look for these sites where you can appeal Then you start writing tearful letters for help Sometimes I forgot where I had already written my appeal what were the login and password… I did it all at night and then put the children to bed and started writing Svetlana was told in the Naro-Fominsk military unit that her husband Alexey is already considered a civilian because he was dismissed from service on January 12 And that they were not going to search for him “They said that perhaps he was holed up somewhere with friends Naro-Fominsk military unit commanders even denied the fact that Alexey Popkov was in Ukraine Svetlana Popkova sent details of her calls with her husband to officials to prove that he had fought in Ukraine and appealed to the military prosecutor’s office the military unit finally acknowledged that Popkov was in Ukraine this is your misfortune,” — Svetlana describes the attitude of officials — “Don’t touch us and deal with it yourself “When I found out that my husband was missing I subscribed to Telegram channels where people are looking for missing soldiers looking at photos — what if I see [Alexey] And there are a lot of them there… of guys lying dead,” — Svetlana says given this attitude of the authorities who are supposed to help us I would like to say that it is better to hide [the men],” Svetlana says Especially when I realized that I had a complete family Alexey Popkov was engaged in construction and dreamed of a house of his own you will see beautiful balconies bricked neatly — it's all his work Only now I realize that it will all rot someday and fall down if he does not come back because I can’t do it…’” — Svetlana says with tears “All relatives [of the mobilized] are worried Why do we need this hell?!” — Lyudmila Khovalkina exclaims Illustration: SailorkyzWhen asked whether her attitude towards the Russian authorities has changed in her opinion: “Even if not everyone has a child there maybe he or she has hidden [from mobilization] But everyone sympathizes [with the mobilized and their parents] What kind of person do you have to be not to sympathize?” Lyudmila Khovalkina has not stopped searching for her son Igor She even wrote to Ukrainian journalists who interviewed prisoners of war hoping that they might know something about him “I write to them apologizing for the whole country ‘Forgive us for unleashing such madness.’ I don't know why all this was necessary Although my son is suffering and I am suffering why does Ukraine deserve this hell?” — Lyudmila is sobbing — “God grant Ukraine to get out of this hell The Nemesis 412th Regiment has successfully targeted and destroyed russian tank belonging to the 4th Guards Tank Division near the town of Svatove in Luhansk region serves as a key staging ground for russian assaults toward Kupiansk Open-source intelligence confirms the presence of the 4th Division in the region Notorious for its actions during the start of the full-scale invasion the division played a role in russia’s failed attempt to seize Sumy region it gained infamy for war crimes and looting before being defeated by Ukraine’s 93rd Mechanized Brigade near Trostianets the division has since regrouped and returned to offensive operations Its arsenal is centered around T-80 tanks and their variants which have been redeployed from their permanent base in Naro-Fominsk only to be destroyed by Ukrainian bombers The strike underscores Ukraine’s ongoing efforts to disrupt russian offensive capabilities at operational depth even targeting so-called elite units of the russian military As Defense Express previously reported, the Nemesis 412th Regiment bomber drones have significantly altered the russian approach to overcoming natural water barriers The deliberate destruction of key bridges and crossings has forced the adversary to abandon traditional methods and explore other tactics russian forces have resorted to using boats and small craft to navigate the rivers that stand as formidable barriers to their advance citing geolocation footage from December 11 One of the main goals of the Russian full-scale war is to capture the remainder of occupied Luhansk and Donetsk Oblast; their operations on the Kupiansk-Svatove-Kreminna line are dedicated to that they also aim to push into Kharkiv Oblast and re-occupy Kupiansk and Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi Kopanka is a small village in Ukraine’s Kharkiv region situated about 12 miles from the frontline and roughly 31 miles from the city of Kharkiv Its strategic location near the frontline has made it a site of ongoing military operations On December 11, the official YouTube page of the Third Assault Brigade posted a video showing soldiers of their Second Mechanized Battalion “clearing” a settlement of Russian troops. During the operation, they captured a group of Russian fighters from the “Storm V” unit. “During the inspection of every building in the village, the Ukrainian army found a group of Russian soldiers from the 1st Tank Army in one of the basements. Most of them are criminals or under investigation,” the military said. The video concludes with a statement that Kopanka is currently under the control of the Ukrainian military.  Gwara Media could not confirm this information independently by the time of publishing this article.  Subscribe to news from Kharkiv, UkraineMost important stories from the frontline region Google Facebook Or Register from Google Register from Facebook Or Website materials are permitted only with an active link to “GWARA MEDIA,” not lower than the third paragraph The use of digital platform content is allowed with textual attribution Content for documentary films and integrated products is permitted The site was modernized with the support of the European Endowment for Democracy in 2023 ' + scriptOptions._localizedStrings.webview_notification_text + ' " + scriptOptions._localizedStrings.redirect_overlay_title + " " + scriptOptions._localizedStrings.redirect_overlay_text + " The Third Assault Brigade liberated the village of Nadiia in the Svatove district, Luhansk region, according to its statement “The Third Assault Brigade reports that the brigade has regained control of the settlement of Nadiia,” the statement said The total area liberated from the enemy is three square kilometers The Ukrainian military also detailed Russian losses in the battles for this settlement “The capture of Nadiia cost the enemy two months of effort and two wiped out mechanized regiments - the 752nd and 254th 20th army of the Russian Federation,” said Andrii Biletskyi Nadiia is a village belonging to the Svatove district of the Luhansk region The population according to the 2001 census was 25 people the village was captured by the Russian army during Russia's invasion of Ukraine in October 2022 it was returned to the control of the Armed Forces of Ukraine The Russians are constantly trying to reach the administrative border of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and capture the latter region completely 147 combat clashes took place at the frontline The Ukrainian Armed Forces hit drone control centers and an important Russian target The enemy attacked in the Lyman sector 21 times. Russia attempted to penetrate the Ukrainian defense in the areas of Nadiia and in the directions of Novyi and Novomykhailivka the enemy made three attempts to advance in the areas of Bilohorivka and Spirne Isabel van Brugen is a Newsweek Reporter based in Kuala Lumpur Her focus is reporting on the Russia-Ukraine war Isabel joined Newsweek in 2021 and had previously worked with news outlets including the Daily Express You can get in touch with Isabel by emailing i.vanbrugen@newsweek.com or by following her on X @isabelvanbrugen either observed and verified firsthand by the reporter or reported and verified from knowledgeable sources Translations may contain inaccuracies—please refer to the original content Russian forces have advanced along the front line in Ukraine as Ukraine warns that Moscow is preparing for a major offensive in the east Maps released by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) show that Russian forces have made progress in Ukraine's Luhansk and Donetsk regions The Kremlin has been pushing for the total capture of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions since Russia's initial invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014 Newsweek has contacted the Russian Defense Ministry by email for comment Russian forces advanced northwest of the city of Svatove and geolocated footage published on Sunday indicates that they recently advanced into the rural settlement of Ivanivka While the Russian Ministry of Defense has claimed that Russian forces seized Ivanivka the ISW said it hasn't observed confirmation of this Near the city of Bakhmut in Ukraine's Donetsk region the ISW observed that Russian forces had recently made small advances southwest of the captured fortress city of Avdiivka amid continued fighting in the area It said geolocated footage published Sunday indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within the western outskirts of the village of Netaylove Russian military bloggers claimed that Netaylove was seized by a Russian brigade Russian forces recently made some gains west of Donetsk city amid continued fighting in the area on Sunday "Geolocated footage published on May 25 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced during a roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault within central Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City)," the think tank said A Russian military blogger claimed that a Russian brigade advanced to 400 meters within Krasnohorivka city Russian troops continue to push in the Kharkiv region after kick-starting an offensive on May 10. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on May 16 that Moscow's forces had advanced some 6 miles into the Krasnohorivka region but that his forces were successfully stabilizing the situation Zelensky warned on Sunday that Russian forces are preparing for a new offensive close to the border with Ukraine This could be part of an attempt to draw Kyiv's troops to the area and "prepare for offensive operations that aim to expand the Russian foothold in the international border area in northeastern Ukraine," the ISW said Do you have a tip on a world news story that Newsweek should be covering Do you have a question about the Russia-Ukraine war Newsweek is committed to challenging conventional wisdom and finding connections in the search for common ground Newsweek is committed to journalism that's factual and fair Hold us accountable and submit your rating of this article on the meter. Newsletters in your inbox See all The Russian Winter-Spring 2024 Offensive Operation on the Kharkiv-Luhansk Axis Kagan with Nicole Wolkov and Christina Harward Russian forces are conducting a cohesive multi-axis offensive operation in pursuit of an operationally significant objective for nearly the first time in over a year and a half of campaigning in Ukraine The prospects of this offensive in the Kharkiv-Luhansk sector are far from clear but its design and initial execution mark notable inflections in the Russian operational level approach Russian efforts to seize relatively small cities and villages in eastern Ukraine since Spring 2022 have generally not secured operationally significant objectives although these Russian operations led to large-scale fighting and significant Ukrainian and Russian losses.[1] Russian forces likely pursued more operationally significant objectives during their Winter-Spring 2023 offensive but that effort was poorly designed and executed and its failure to make any substantial progress precludes drawing firm conclusions about its intended goals.[2] Russian offensives to this point have generally either concentrated large masses of troops against singular objectives (such as Bakhmut and Avdiivka) or else have consisted of multiple attacks along axes of advance that were too far away to be mutually supporting and/or divergent The current Russian offensive in the Kharkiv-Luhansk sector involves attacks along four parallel axes that are mutually supporting in pursuit of multiple objectives that would likely generate operationally significant gains The design of this offensive operation is worth careful consideration regardless of its outcome as a possible example of the Russian command’s ability to learn from and improve on its previous failures at the operational level Russian tactical performance in this sector does not appear to have improved materially on previous Russian tactical shortcomings a factor that may well lead to the overall failure even of this better-designed undertaking Russia’s Western Grouping of Forces has recently intensified operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and is focusing on four directions of advance Russian forces are currently pursuing offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk but the WMD appears to have taken over responsibility for the northern portion of the Lyman direction after the Russian command transferred significant elements of the CMD to support the offensive effort to seize Avdiivka in Donetsk Oblast in early October 2023.[4] The WMD‘s 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) and 1st Guards Tank Army (1st GTA) resumed a localized offensive effort northeast of Kupyansk on October 6 2023 and sporadically intensified operations elsewhere in the Kupyansk direction.[5] This localized Russian offensive effort to advance towards Kupyansk from the northeast had resulted in only marginal tactical gains by January 2024 Ukrainian officials increasingly began to report in January 2024 that Russian forces were setting conditions for a larger offensive effort in both the Kupyansk and Lyman directions.[6] WMD elements began to intensify operations in four directions of advance along the line in early January and Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov announced by January 30 that the Russian 2024 winter-spring effort on the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis was underway.[7] The Russian offensive campaign is currently proceeding along four axes from north to south: 1) around Kupyansk and Synkivka; 2) from Tabaivka toward Kruhlyakivka; 3) from Makiivka toward Raihorodka and/or Borova; and 4) from near Kreminna to Drobysheve and/or Lyman Elements of the 6th CAA are currently conducting offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka in an ongoing effort to advance towards east bank Kupyansk and Ukrainian military officials have identified the Synkivka area as providing the most rapid route for Russian forces to reach the two settlements on the east bank of the Oskil River.[10] Likely elements of the 6th CAA’s 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 128 Motorized Rifle Brigade conducted relatively large company-sized mechanized assaults in the Synkivka area in December 2023 that resulted in significant Russian armored vehicle losses and no notable tactical gains and Russian forces have since heavily relied on infantry assaults with limited armored vehicle support in the area.[11] Elements of the Russian 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade are currently conducting assaults on Synkivka and elements of the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade are reportedly operating in the Vilshana area.[12] Russian forces have reportedly made tactical gains in the Synkivka area in intensified assaults in late January although ISW has not seen confirmation of any recent notable tactical gains near the settlement.[13] Ukrainian officials continue to assess that Russian assaults near Synkivka aim to facilitate Russian advances to Kupyansk and Kupyansk-Vuzlovy where there are two bridges crossings over the Oskil River.[14] Elements of the 1st GTA are reportedly still operating near Synkivka although it is unclear if they are conducting assaults in the area.[15] Elements of the 1st GTA’s 2nd Motorized Rifle Division reportedly conducted attacks near Orlyanka (east of Kupyansk) in early January 2024 although it is unclear if some of these elements are still in the area.[16] Elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division participated in offensive efforts near Stepova Novoselivka (south of Orlyanka) in early February 2024 suggesting that they may have shifted their focus to the Russian effort further south.[17] have intensified operations northwest of Svatove have recently made tactical gains around Tabaivka and appear to be pushing west toward the Oskil Reservoir in the direction of Kruhlyakivka and northwest along the P07 highway toward Kupyansk-Vuzlovy Russian forces intensified operations northwest of Svatove in January 2024 more than anywhere else along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line Elements of the 47th Tank Division began what Russian sources described as a “massive offensive” in the direction of Krokhmalne and Tabaivka on January 19.[18] Geolocated footage published on January 20 indicated that Russian forces had quickly captured Krokhmalne and elements of the 47th Tank Division reportedly captured Tabaivka as early as January 27 although ISW has still not observed confirmation of Russian forces capturing the settlement as of February 20.[19] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also entered Ivanivka (north of Tabaivka) and advanced closer to Kyslivka (immediately north of Tabaivka) as of February 1.[20] Russian sources have claimed that Russian forces may have captured Kotlyarivka (immediately north of Tabaivka) and elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st GTA) have reportedly advanced near Berestove (just south of Krokhmalne).[21] Russian forces have also resumed assaults near Stelmakhivka (south of Krokhmalne) and near Pishchane (immediately southwest of Tabaivka).[22] Elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division's 1st Tank Regiment and 15th Motorized Rifle Regiment unsuccessfully attempted to encircle Ukrainian forces near Stepova Novoselivka (north of Kyslivka) in early February as elements of the 4th Tank Division (1st GTA) reportedly tried to push through Ukrainian defenses near Kyslivka.[23] Elements of the 47th Tank Division appear to be the main force committed to the effort northwest of Svatove but the participation of elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 4th Tank Division in offensive operations in the area suggests that the wider 1st GTA is responsible for offensive operations this area of the line and is not actively committed to the effort northeast of Kupyansk Russian operations around Tabaivka appear to be pushing along diverging axes to the northwest and west-southwest and it is not yet clear which is the main effort Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are currently developing an offensive in the direction of Pishchane from Tabaivka in an effort to reach the Oskil River.[24] Pishchane and Berestove are located along a country road connecting the P07 highway to Kruhlyakivka where one of the six bridges crossing the Oskil River is located There is also a country road that begins west of Kyslivka and Kotlyarivka and connects the P07 highway to Kurylivka and southern Kupyansk-Vuzlovy where a railway and roadway bridge across the Oskil River are located The Russian tactical effort to seize settlements along the P07 highway likely aims to open routes of advance for Russian forces to reach Kurylivka and Kruhlyakivka and threaten Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting the east and west banks of the Oskil River in the area Elements of the 20th CAA’s 3rd Motorized Rifle Division are attacking southwest of Svatove although they are currently conducting a lower tempo of operations in the area than Russian forces elsewhere along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line Russian forces attacked southwest of Svatove particularly near Makiivka on the Zherebets River although at a slower tempo than other areas along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.[25] Geolocated footage published on January 27 indicates that Russian forces have recently advanced east of Makiivka and elements of the 20th CAA’s 3rd Motorized Rifle Division have reportedly recently increased efforts to advance near the settlement.[26] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported positional engagements in the area throughout January 2024.[27] Russian and Ukrainian sources also stated that Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Makiivka throughout December 2023 but ISW did not observe visual confirmation of any Russian advances in the area during this time.[28] Russian forces consisting mostly of elements of the 2nd CAA (CMD) previously conducted offensive operations southwest of Svatove along the Raihorodka-Karmazynivka-Novovodyane line further north of Makiivka in the summer and early fall of 2023 with Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stating in August 2023 that the Raihorodka area was one of the most intense sectors of the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.[29] ISW has not observed reports of the CMD’s 2nd CAA operating southwest of Svatove in 2024 suggesting that the transfer of elements of the CMD‘s 2nd CAA from the area and subsequent transfer of elements of the WMD’s 20th CAA may be part of an effort to cohere a large effort around WMD forces along the entire Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated the Russian forces intended to reach Borova before the start of winter 2023-2024 during localized Russian offensive operations in the area in early Fall 2023.[30] The CMD forces failed to achieve that goal but there is no reason to assess that WMD elements in the area have shifted their goal away from Borova Makiivka and Raihorodka are located on country roads that connect the P66 Svatove-Kreminna highway to Borova where there is a crossing over the Oskil River is more direct than the route from Makiivka to Borova suggesting that Russian forces may choose to resume offensive operations near Raihorodka aimed at advancing to Borova country roads from Makiivka lead southeastward to Lyman and current Russian activity near Makiivka could additionally be aimed at supporting offensive efforts to cross the Zherebets River west of Kreminna Country roads from Makiivka also lead to several settlements south of Borova along the Oskil River and Oskil City and Russian efforts near Makiivka may be ultimately aimed at securing the southern edge of the Oskil Reservoir (before it narrows at the Oskil Hydroelectric Power Plant) Elements of the 20th CAA’s 144th Motorized Rifle Division have intensified an effort to push Ukrainian forces off the left bank of the Zherebets River west of Kreminna while non-WMD elements continue routine positional fighting elsewhere in the Lyman direction.[31] Russian and Ukrainian sources have stated that elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division were pursuing this effort as early as November 2023 although ISW did not observe a concerted offensive effort to push towards the Zherebets River until early January 2024.[32] Likely elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division notably intensified this effort around January 20 with reports of Russian forces using a significant number of tanks and armored vehicles in a relatively large number of assaults in the area.[33] Geolocated footage published on January 21 showed at least 20 new Russian vehicle losses following unsuccessful assaults near Terny (west of Kreminna).[34] The most recent intensified Russian assaults have focused on Terny and Torske — three settlements on the Zherebets River with nearby crossings — and Russian forces have made recent minor marginal tactical gains in the area.[35] Russian milbloggers have claimed that Russian forces have advanced close to the outskirts of Torske although ISW has yet to observe confirmation of these claims.[36] Russian forces have advanced within two kilometers of the eastern outskirts of Terny as of February 12.[37] Elements of the newly created 25th CAA (CMD) have also conducted localized offensive operations in the area since October 2023 Elements of the 90th Tank Regiment (41st CAA CMD) were reportedly participating in positional engagements southwest of Kreminna in December 2023 although other elements may still remain in the Kreminna area.[42] It is unclear what elements of the CMD may still be deployed in rear areas of occupied Luhansk Oblast although any remaining elements likely represent only a fraction of the combat power that the CMD had previously deployed in the area Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) 2nd Army Corps (AC) elements and Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz forces are operating around Kreminna and have reportedly intensified operations south of Kreminna but are likely not directly participating in the concerted Russian effort in the Lyman direction.[43] Russian milbloggers have claimed that Russian forces intensified offensive operations near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) in mid-January 2024 and have made tactical advances in the area although ISW did not observe evidence of any Russian advances in the area until early February and has not observed a significant intensification of the tempo of Russian operations near Bilohorivka.[44] LNR 2nd AC and Akhmat Spetsnaz elements are likely engaged in tactical efforts that have little relevance to the wider operational effort in the Lyman direction Reaching the Zherebets River and pushing Ukrainian forces across to the right bank of the river is only an immediate tactical objective and Russian forces likely have more ambitious subsequent operational objectives in the area Russian forces may have attempted to recapture Lyman Donetsk Oblast during the failed Russian Winter-Spring 2023 offensive campaign in Luhansk Oblast although the Russian failure to make any meaningful advances makes determining the ultimate objective of the offensive difficult.[45] Recapturing Lyman is the most likely operational objective for Russian forces in the area as the settlement opens routes of Russian advance both to the northwest towards Oskil City (southeast of Izyum) and to the southwest towards Slovyansk Russian forces may alternatively intend to advance north of Lyman towards Drobysheve in an effort to support planned advances towards the Oskil River and set conditions for the later seizure of Lyman Russian Operational Planning and Objectives The apparent coordination of Russian offensive efforts along the four axes on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line is likely reflective of a wider operational objective and higher-level operational planning Russian objectives in each direction of advance appear to add up to a wider cohesive operational objective to seize the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast Russian operations on each axis share similarities in design and support one another in ways that suggest that the command of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces has planned a larger operation in pursuit of this cohesive operational objective These four directions of Russian advance along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and the apparent Russian objectives in those directions suggest that the Russian Western Grouping of Forces is undertaking a larger months-long cohesive operational effort to seize the east bank of the Oskil River from Kupyansk to Oskil City The fact that these directions of advance all fall under the operational responsibility of a cohesive Russian grouping of forces suggests that the Russian command has tasked the Western Grouping of Forces to pursue a coordinated operational objective on the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis The clear delineation of those directions among elements of the 6th CAA the 20th CAA’s 3rd Motorized Rifle Division and the 20th CAA’s 144th Motorized Rifle Division suggests that the Western Grouping of Forces deployed relatively cohesive formations in distinct areas of operation well in advance of this effort The intensification of Russian offensive operations along these axes of advance at the same time suggests that this activity is part of a wider operation and not four separate localized offensive efforts The likely planned Russian objectives of advancing to and seizing east bank Kupyansk and areas near or north of Lyman would all support a coordinated objective of pushing Ukrainian forces off the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast Russian advances to and the seizure of these settlements would otherwise only have limited tactical significance An operation to push Ukrainian forces off the east bank of the Oskil River offers the Russian military an attainable goal that would generate operationally significant effects and areas near or north of Lyman as well as corresponding areas where there are river crossings would likely create conditions that would make continued Ukrainian operations on the east bank of the Oskil River untenable This operation would also allow Russian forces to safely consolidate after the offensive’s planned culmination as there would be little risk of serious Ukrainian counterattacks back across the river It would be surprising if the Russian command did not plan this operation with this relatively attainable objective and favorable conditions for consolidation but rather chose a less cohesive and less attainable effort--but Russian commanders have made similarly poor choices repeatedly throughout the war.[46] The Kremlin has often prioritized military efforts to achieve informational or political objectives over those with wider operational significance in Ukraine but an operation to reach the Oskil River offers Russia opportunities for both kinds of gains.[47] Ukrainian military officials have noted that Russian forces may be intensifying offensive operations to take territory ahead of Russia’s March 2024 presidential elections suggesting that Russian President Vladimir Putin intends to secure an informational victory in Ukraine to bolster his reputation as a capable war-time leader amid his certain re-election.[48] Operations northwest of Svatove and near Kreminna offer the Russian military the opportunity to seize the remainder of unoccupied Luhansk Oblast and the Kremlin has long pursued the seizure of all of Luhansk Oblast as one of its main objectives in eastern Ukraine.[49] The more operationally significant effort to reach the Oskil River would achieve this informational objective and more But seizing the remainder of Luhansk Oblast could still be an attainable objective even if the wider operation fails since Ukrainian forces only control a small sliver of Luhansk Oblast south of Kreminna and west and southwest of Svatove The seizure of all of Luhansk Oblast may be a subordinate objective but three of the axes of the Russian offensive effort are focused on territory in Kharkiv and Donetsk oblasts suggesting that the primary objective is reaching the Oskil River and possibly taking Kupyansk The Kremlin could settle for this secondary objective for its informational benefits but only if it appears unable to achieve its primary goals The Western Grouping of Forces appears to be conducting the initial stages of an intensified cohesive offensive operation to reach the Oskil River on a broad front but the Russian command could decide to pursue other objectives that diverge from this cohesive effort Potential Russian advances towards Lyman would divert Russian forces along diverging axes of advance towards separate operational objectives that are not necessarily mutually supporting The Russian command could decide to break the Lyman effort off from the overall operation to reach the Oskil River if the wider operation makes little progress or if the capture of Lyman and advances south of the settlement look more attractive than trying to advance all the way towards Oskil City The terrain south of Lyman would likely be less favorable to Russian advances Lyman also offers a less attractive position either to consolidate gains or to resume subsequent attacks because of the forest belts around it and the open flanks it would offer to Ukrainian counterattacks Lyman’s position on a seam between groupings of forces would also pose greater command and control challenges to Russian efforts to consolidate and defend or exploit its seizure Russian forces appear to be attacking along mutually supporting axes something Russian forces have often failed to do in the past which suggests possible improvements in Russian operational planning at least in this sector of the front.[50] The areas in which Russian forces are trying to advance are mutually supporting because they are roughly parallel with one another and close enough together to generate pressure on the same groupings of Ukrainian defenders The flank of one direction of advance is close enough to the flank of the adjacent direction to create synergistic effects a Russian tactical advance northwest of Svatove could also be seen as a tactical advance on the northern flank of the Russian effort west and southwest of Svatove or as an advance on the southern flank of the effort northeast and east of Kupyansk A Russian advance in one of these directions places pressure not just on the Ukrainian forces defending in the immediate tactical area but also on Ukrainian forces that are defending against Russian offensive operations north or south of the direction in which Russian forces advanced Mutually supporting operations also set conditions for the tactical envelopment or encirclement of Ukrainian forces in some areas if Russian forces can advance rapidly enough or if Ukrainian defenders make mistakes Many of the settlements along the Oskil River that Russian forces are apparently trying to capture can be reached by forces advancing along adjacent axes which could allow Russian forces to envelop or encircle a settlement instead of attacking it frontally Russian forces can approach northern Kupyansk-Vuzlovy by advancing from Synkivka and can approach southern Kupyansk Vuzlovy from the direction of advance northwest of Svatove the Russian advances towards Kruhlyakiva from settlements along the PO7 highway northwest of Svatove and advances southwest of Svatove from Makiivka can set conditions for Russian forces to envelop or encircle Ukrainian forces defending Borova The four mutually supporting directions present Russian forces with opportunities to envelop or encircle east bank Kupyansk and Borova depending on the rate and timing of Russian advances The mutually supporting operations do not provide these opportunities for areas near or north of Lyman as Lyman is on the flank of the overall operational effort along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line The likely Russian offensive operation towards the Oskil River appears to be a much more sustainable effort than previous Russian offensive operations in Ukraine The following observations are based on the current tempo of Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and it is unclear if many of them would hold in the event of a significant intensification of the Russian offensive effort Ukrainian artillery shortages and delays in Western security assistance are creating uncertainty in Ukrainian operational planning and are likely prompting Ukrainian forces to husband materiel.[51] These constraints on Ukrainian operations are likely limiting Ukraine’s ability to degrade and pressure Russian forces and logistics along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and it is unclear if the Russian military would be able to conduct a relatively sustainable offensive operation in the absence of these Ukrainian constraints Russian forces attacking along the Luhansk-Kharkiv axis appear to be attempting to use some of the principles of Soviet deep battle theory particularly the principle of conducting multiple simultaneous attacks to pin the defender’s frontline forces and reserves.[52] Russian forces have shown a pattern of activity along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line that suggests that Russian forces are alternating intensified attacks along certain axes with regrouping and consolidation along others This rotating intensification throughout the frontline likely aims to maintain pressure on Ukrainian defenders all along the east bank of the Oskil River even as some Russian groupings regroup and reconstitute This approach likely also aims to prevent Ukrainian forces from concentrating on a single Russian axis of advance This rotating intensification pressures the entire Ukrainian force grouping defending in the area and complicates Ukraine’s ability to transfer forces between different defensive directions The current tempo of Russian offensives along the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis and the Russian ability to conduct operational-level rotations will likely allow Russian forces to conduct offensive operations along each axis of advance without pulling manpower away from another thereby making Russian offensive efforts at current levels of intensity sustainable.[58] The losses Russian forces have taken in their effort to seize Avdiivka prompted the Russian command to transfer elements from other sectors of the front to support that effort but the Russian elements attacking along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line are doing so in a way that has not thus far required the commitment of reserves from other sectors of the front.[59] The 6th CAA and the 20th CAA’s 144th Motorized Rifle Division will likely be able to continue to replenish their losses and rotate degraded units at the current operational tempo without drawing on Russian reserves from other formations The Russian military is replenishing losses with poorly trained and relatively combat ineffective personnel losses over time will likely degrade the combat effectiveness of the attacking WMD elements and hinder their ability to sustain effective offensive operations.[60] The Russian offensive effort toward the Oskil River will thus likely culminate at or before the river line and the Russians will likely have to conduct a fundamental reconstitution of the formations involved in this offensive before using them in subsequent major offensive operations The apparent Russian ability to conduct routine regroupings and resume offensive operations on individual axes without drawing combat power from other axes is letting Russian forces sustain operations on each axis at their own pace The degradation of Russian forces on one axis does not appear to influence the tempo of operations on other axes along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line Russian forces on a given axis could even potentially culminate short of the river line without fully disrupting the overall operational scheme The limited number of crossings and the vulnerability of those crossings to Russian fires also mitigates the risks caused by the premature culmination of a given axis—Ukrainian forces could be driven to withdraw from the entire east bank by the threat of being cut off even if they manage to stop one or more axes of Russian advance short of the river if the Ukrainian forces managed to block one or more of the Russian advances in such a fashion that the Russian command had to divert effort from another axis to sustain its coherent drive The apparent sustainability of the Russian offensive effort and the mutually reinforcing directions of Russian advance suggests that the Russian command may be learning from previous operational design failures The Wagner offensive ultimately took Bakhmut but did so in a way that left Russian forces unprepared to defend against Ukrainian counterattacks and required the deployment of significant Russian reserves drawn from elsewhere in the theater to hold most of the gains made.[63] The seizure of Bakhmut combined with the Wagner Group‘s abortive armed rebellion also led to the effective destruction of the Wagner Group as a fighting force The apparent relatively sustainable operation to reach the Oskil River is notable in this context and suggests that the Western Grouping of Forces has intentionally designed operations to avoid a premature culmination of its ongoing effort Russian forces have also routinely attacked along diverging axes throughout the Russian invasion of Ukraine an approach that has regularly prevented Russian forces from capitalizing on tactical gains and translating them into operationally significant [64] The Western Grouping of Forces appears to be learning from this mistake as well The Southern Military District’s [SMD] 58th CAA proved during its defensive effort in western Zaporizhia Oblast against the Ukrainian summer 2023 counteroffensive that at least some Russian formations can internalize lessons learned and successfully adapt campaign designs and tactical preparations to the battlefield realities in Ukraine.[65] ISW has yet to observe a Russian formation demonstrate this adaptation for operational planning at scale while conducting an offensive operational effort and recent waves of mass mechanized assault around Avdiivka in October and November 2023 suggested that the Russian command has not disseminated tactical lessons learned from previous failed Russian offensive efforts.[66] The Western Grouping of Forces‘ current offensive operation may be the first instance of a large formation capturing and implementing at least campaign design lessons Russian offensives along the Oskil River have not shown tactical improvements or innovations Russian tactical engagements continue to display many of the same mistakes Russian offensive operations have repeatedly shown causing high losses of men and materiel for limited gains Russian learning and innovation thus appear to be partial and possibly confined thus far to operational level planning and force generation Prospects of the Russian Offensive Operation on the Kharkiv-Luhansk Axis Russian forces will likely struggle to translate minor tactical advances into operationally significant maneuver towards the Oskil River and the effort will likely take months of campaigning regardless of its ultimate success or failure if Ukrainian forces retain the material capability to continue resisting as they have Russian forces have not learned how to restore mechanized maneuver to the positional battlefield in Ukraine and have not conducted any offensive operation that has resulted in a rapid mechanized advance since spring 2022.[67] A successful Russian advance to the Oskil River would very likely result from months of accumulated marginal tactical Russian gains at very high cost Russian forces are very unlikely to advance fast enough to encircle sizable pockets of Ukrainian forces The likely gradual rate of Russian advance will allow Ukrainian forces to prepare positions and logistics around settlements on the east bank of the Oskil River well ahead of any potential Russian advance towards these settlements A threatened Russian encirclement of Ukrainian forces in these settlements rapid enough to prompt Ukrainian forces to withdraw to the west bank of the Oskil River is highly unlikely The gradual rate of Russian advance will thus likely culminate in attritional frontal attacks against entrenched Ukrainian positions in and near settlements along the Oskil River before the final Ukrainian forces withdraw Russian forces have previously struggled to conduct significant operational encirclements and likely will continue to do so even if they can gradually envelop settlements along the Oskil River Russian forces failed to operationally encircle Bakhmut in March 2023 and proceeded to fight through the city for two months in highly attritional assaults.[68] Russian forces have also failed more recently to operationally encircle smaller settlements such as Marinka and Avdiivka although the threat of a tactical Russian encirclement forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Avdiivka on February 16.[69] Russian forces can advance in areas north and south of settlements along the east bank of the Oskil River and may envelop Ukrainian forces but Russian forces are very unlikely to complete operational encirclements The fact that these settlements are backed up against a water feature may give Russian forces a better chance to trap Ukrainian forces against the river (effectively an encirclement) but only if the Russians can advance more rapidly than they have generally been able to do or if the Ukrainians either choose to defend a settlement to the last or make a mistake in timing their withdrawal Russian forces will likely have to conduct assaults into and through east bank Kupyansk and Borova if they wish to capture these settlements Russian offensive operations to capture even relatively small settlements with entrenched Ukrainian positions have lasted months and there is no reason to assess that fighting into and through these relatively small settlements will be much easier for Russian forces as long as Ukrainian forces have the materiel needed to continue defensive operations effectively Russian interdiction efforts will likely have greater chances of isolating the battlespace on the east bank of the Oskil River than elsewhere in Ukraine where Russian forces are conducting offensive operations Six bridges (both railway and roadway bridges) cross the Oskil River between Kupyansk and the Oskil Hydroelectric Power Plant Satellite imagery from mid-January suggests that many of these bridges have sustained some damage and a few appear unlikely to be usable by heavy equipment.[70] Russian forces likely damaged these bridges during a coordinated strike campaign on crossings along the Oskil River in September and October 2023 although this effort did not isolate the Ukrainian defense northeast of Kupyansk and Ukrainian forces have not yet shown any signs of suffering from serious difficulties in supplying positions on the east bank of the Oskil River.[71] Russian forces may resume this effort to degrade Ukrainian logistics and force Ukrainian forces to transfer heavy equipment across the river with more vulnerable crossing equipment Russian forces may also hope that advances closer to the Oskil River will allow Russian fire to interdict the Ukrainian GLOCs running along the west bank of the Oskil River (especially the P-79 and P-78 highways) Russian forces may envision conducting an interdiction effort that eliminates existing Ukrainian crossings to the east bank while also degrading logistics supporting areas on the west bank from where Ukrainian forces could deploy new crossings The Russian command likely hopes that the isolation of the battlespace will allow Russian forces to conduct the operational encirclements and envelopments that they have previously failed to conduct Elements of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces began this operation less degraded and better rested than Russian forces elsewhere along the frontline which may allow these elements to conduct more effective offensive operations than other Russian force groupings These elements may not necessarily have the combat capabilities required to conduct successful maneuver to the Oskil River line A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger questioned the Russian Western Grouping of Forces’ ability to conduct successful offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction after footage published in late December 2023 showed Ukrainian artillery in which Ukrainian forces destroyed columns of Russian armored vehicles.[76] The manpower fill and combat-effectiveness of the newly formed 25th CAA may affect the Russian military’s ability to conduct and support successful offensive operations west of Kreminna where the formation is operating Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov stated in late August 2023 that Russian forces formed the 25th CAA as a “strategic reserve” and did not intend the formation to be combat ready before October or November 2023.[77] Budanov also stated that elements of the 25th CAA deployed to Luhansk Oblast in late August 2023 and were poorly trained and staffed with 80 percent of their planned manpower and only 50 percent of the necessary equipment likely due to their rushed deployment.[78] The likely limited combat power of the 25th CAA may affect the Russian military‘s ability to hold positions near Kreminna as the 144th Motorized Rifle Division pursues advances toward the Zherebets River Advances towards the Oskil River will likely require successful mechanized maneuver in many places and Russian forces remain unlikely to be able to conduct such maneuver across the entire Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line Many of the areas where Russian forces are currently attacking are heavily forested Ukrainian military personnel have previously noted that Russian forces take advantage of this terrain to provide cover for infantry heavy assaults.[79] The land further west of the frontline in the direction of the Oskil River Russian advances through this terrain will likely require at least some successful mechanized assaults while under Ukrainian fire with high visibility Recent chaotic and costly Russian mechanized assaults throughout the theater including along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line suggest that WMD elements will struggle to advance in these areas and that assaults will likely produce significant armored vehicle losses that slow and disrupt the offensive operations.[80] Russian forces have proven more capable of making marginal tactical gains in urban or semi-urban environments although at the expense of heavy personnel losses as seen with the seizure of Bakhmut and Avdiivka.[81] Russian forces throughout much of the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line would have to advance roughly between eight and 35 kilometers through rural and open terrain to reach such semi-urban areas The Kremlin may believe that delayed Western security assistance to Ukraine will give Russian forces opportunities to accelerate advances in the coming months although it is unclear if this belief is accurate Delays in Western security assistance are likely forcing Ukrainian forces to husband materiel The longer the Russian military maintains the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine the more opportunity the Western Grouping of Forces has to achieve its operational objective of pushing Ukrainian forces off the east bank of the Oskil River Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov assessed on January 30 that Russian forces will fail to reach the administrative borders of Luhansk Oblast or the Zherebets River and will likely be “completely exhausted” by the beginning of Spring 2024.[86] Russian forces around Synkivka conducted a localized offensive operation for four months without showing any signs that the effort was near culmination although it is possible that further significant intensification of the Russian operation throughout the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line could result in an operational culmination by the time Budanov identified The Russian ability to conduct routine regroupings and rotations alongside the current operational tempo suggests that Russian forces may be able to continue operations along the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis for longer Budanov may be suggesting that muddy ground conditions in early spring 2024 would force the Russian operation along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line to culminate since the ground will no longer be conducive to mechanized maneuver Heavy spring rains can also interfere with drone operations Russian forces notably launched localized offensive operations throughout eastern Ukraine in Fall 2023 Russian forces could alternatively conduct the operation to reach the Oskil River in several active phases interspersed with operational pauses aimed at resting and preparing forces for resumed attacks in each direction of advance The command of the Western Grouping of Forces has a wide range of options in determining both the tempo and the duration of its offensive effort precisely because the Russian military has the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine Russian forces will be able to determine the location and duration of fighting in Ukraine if Ukraine commits itself to defensive operations throughout 2024.[89] The Western Grouping of Forces may intend to conduct a much longer effort or resume it at a later date in case of its initial failure if it concludes that there is no credible threat of a Ukrainian counteroffensive in the area or elsewhere along the front Operational Effects of a Successful Russian Operation to Reach the Oskil River The Russian seizure of the left bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast would generate immediate operational benefits for Russian forces along the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis and throughout the theater while also setting favorable conditions for future Russian offensive efforts Russian forces have not conducted offensive operations that have led to immediate operational-level benefits or set operational-level conditions for subsequent operations since Spring 2022.[90] Russian forces conducted nominally successful operations to seize Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in summer 2022 and Bakhmut in May 2023 and a nominally successful localized offensive effort to seize Avdiivka in February 2024 but those efforts have only generated limited tactical benefits for Russian forces.[91] A successful Russian operation to reach the Oskil River line would therefore be a significant inflection in over a year and a half of Russian campaigning in Ukraine A successful Russian operation to push Ukrainian forces off the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast would deprive Ukraine of a potential area from which to launch a future counteroffensive operation into northwestern Luhansk Oblast Ukrainian forces previously attempted to advance towards Svatove and Kreminna after liberating Lyman in October 2022 but would also likely ensure that Ukrainian forces were not able to reverse the Kremlin’s achievement anytime soon Russian forces captured all of Luhansk Oblast in July 2022 a victory that the Kremlin soon had spoiled by the Fall 2022 Ukrainian counteroffensive’s advance into Luhansk Oblast.[94] The Kremlin likely hopes that positions along the Oskil River will prevent a scenario in which Russian forces have to routinely fight to retain or recapture Luhansk Oblast and allow the Kremlin to tout the occupation of all of Luhansk Oblast as a permanent victory The Russian seizure of the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast would also likely secure several Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Luhansk Oblast from regular Ukrainian interdiction efforts Russian positions along the P66 (Svatove-Kreminna) highway would be well out of range of Ukrainian tube artillery on the west bank of the Oskil River and Ukrainian tube artillery would have to be deployed very close to the river to strike sections of the P07 (Svatove-Kupyansk) highway Russian forces may also hope to be able to conduct counterbattery fire further into Kharkiv Oblast and push long-range Ukrainian artillery systems and HIMARS launchers out of range of Russian logistics facilities and GLOCs further in the rear Moving Ukrainian fire further west would essentially allow Russian forces to turn a considerable section of Luhansk Oblast into near and deep rear areas and establish less vulnerable logistics to support operations further west and south of the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line Ukrainian forces could still conduct long-range strikes against Russian targets in rear areas of Luhansk Oblast although Ukraine has limited numbers of long-range systems A successful Russian effort to seize the east bank of the Oskil River from Kupyansk to Oskil City would also create a defensible frontline very difficult for Ukrainian forces to attack and thereby allow Russian forces to transfer materiel and manpower to other efforts in Ukraine The Oskil River would act as a significant water obstacle along a sizable sector of the frontline from the international border with Belgorod Oblast all the way to the Donetsk-Kharkiv Oblast border area The only other sector of the frontline along a notable water barrier in Ukraine is the front along the Dnipro River in east (left) bank Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts The Western Grouping of Forces likely envisions a frontline along the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast resembling the frontline along the Dnipro River in some way The Oskil River is nowhere near as wide or as deep as the Dnipro River (excluding in areas of the dried up Kakhovka Reservoir) and some sections of the Oskil River are narrow enough to ford with limited river crossing equipment and possibly even with armored vehicles The Oskil Reservoir from southern Kupyansk-Vuzlovy to west of Oskil City is the Oskil River’s widest section before it narrows at the Oskil Hydroelectric Power Plant This wide section of the Oskil River would be an easily defensible front and even narrower sections of the river are still challenging terrain for Ukrainian forces to conduct counterattacks across Ukrainian forces could more easily conduct cross-river tactical activity along the Oskil River than along the Dnipro River but such activity would likely have poor prospects for reestablishing positions on the east bank of the Oskil River absent a larger Ukrainian crossing effort The relatively defensible frontline would likely require less Russian combat power to hold and allow the Russian command to transfer formations to other efforts in Ukraine or prepare for a subsequent offensive effort in northeastern Ukraine The reduction in routine positional fighting along this frontline would allow the Russian command to transfer manpower and materiel currently operating in the northern sections of advance on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line relatively freely without endangering Russian positions in the area Conditions Setting for Subsequent Operations A successful Russian operation to advance towards the Oskil River would also set conditions for potential subsequent campaigns in northern Donetsk Oblast and/or eastern Kharkiv Oblast and the Russian command may have designed the Winter-Spring 2024 offensive effort on the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis to prepare for successive campaigns in 2025 and beyond The months-long effort to seize the east bank of the Oskil River will likely require the Western Grouping of Forces to consolidate its gains and rest and reconstitute over several months before committing to another large offensive operational effort Russian forces would likely be unable to launch a subsequent campaign from the area until winter 2024-2025 and any Ukrainian counteroffensive operation would likely delay such a subsequent campaign well into 2025 or beyond Russian forces previously attempted to seize the Ukrainian stronghold of Slovyansk in Spring 2022 as part of a wide campaign in eastern Ukraine that failed and the seizure of the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast would set several conditions for Russian forces to revive that effort The Russian military intended to encircle Ukrainian forces in Donetsk Oblast in spring 2022 and attempted to conduct three corresponding maneuvers west from Severodonetsk-Lysychansk and north from Bakhmut to surround and seize Slovyansk.[98] The Russian command likely intended advances along the E40 highway (Izyum-Slovyansk-Bakhmut) highway and the capture of Slovyansk to facilitate the quick encirclement of Ukrainian forces in eastern Donetsk Oblast and open routes for further advances to the western borders of Donetsk Oblast.[99] Russian forces did not advance at the speed required to encircle Ukrainian forces and by summer 2022 Russian forces prioritized the seizure of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk over the wider operational encirclement.[100] The Russian effort to drive on Slovyansk from Izyum culminated in mid-May 2022 and Russian forces likely intended to revive the effort from the Izyum-Lyman area at a later date.[101] Ukrainian forces liberated Izyum in early September 2022 and Lyman in early October 2022 effectively ending any Russian designs to resume a drive on Slovyansk.[102] The Russian seizure of the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast secures what would otherwise be a wide operational flank for a Russian effort to drive on Slovyansk from the northeast A Russian effort to drive on Slovyansk from the Lyman direction would effectively be an offensive effort from an unstable salient unless Russian forces north of Lyman seize the Oskil River line A Ukrainian presence along the east bank of the Oskil River would allow Ukrainian forces to counterattack a Russian drive on Slovyansk from the north The Russian seizure of the east bank of the Oskil River from Kupyansk to Oskil City would secure this operational flank and allow Russian forces to attack along a wider front north of Slovyansk from positions backed by a secure Russian rear with the threat of Ukrainian counterattack confined to the south and west Advances towards Oskil City can set conditions for Russian forces to interdict and possibly cut the E40 highway between Izyum and Slovyansk Oskil City and positions to the southeast are securely within tube artillery range of the section of the E-40 highway connecting Izyum and Slovyansk Russian indirect fire in the area could disrupt the major Ukrainian GLOC connecting Kharkiv Oblast to northern Donetsk Oblast and force Ukrainian forces to reorient GLOCs towards Slovyansk from the northwest and west along smaller country roads or longer routes The Russian command may also envision a subsequent operation from positions near Oskil City to reach and cut the E-40 highway Interdicting and possibly cutting the E40 would recreate some of the effects of the northern envelopment of Slovyansk that Russian forces had initially created from positions near Izyum in Spring 2022.[103] The Russian command could alternatively attempt to conduct a sweeping envelopment of Ukrainian forces in eastern Donetsk Oblast as it had initially planned in spring 2022 by conducting simultaneous maneuvers from the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv and Donetsk oblasts and north from Bakhmut The Russian command has previously shown an affinity for attempting wider operational maneuver across simultaneous axes in Ukraine even if those efforts have been poorly planned and not parts of a cohesive operation with a coordinated objective.[104] The seizure of the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast would allow Russian forces to reattempt the operational encirclement of eastern Donetsk Oblast using two operational offensive maneuvers instead of three Russian forces could revive the initial effort to drive up the E-40 from Bakhmut while also attacking north and northeast of Slovyansk in a narrower and theoretically more manageable operational encirclement of eastern Donetsk Oblast The prospects of Russian success in such a massive undertaking remain highly questionable as long as Ukraine retains anything like its current defensive capabilities The Russian command may also envision that the seizure of the east bank of the Oskil River could facilitate a subsequent drive further west into Kharkiv Oblast although such an operation from these positions would likely be much more difficult than a drive on Slovyansk The Kremlin has indicated that it aims to recapture territory in Kharkiv Oblast and occupy Kharkiv City.[105] The seizure of the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast offers little change to the Russian military's current prospects for trying to secure parts of Kharkiv Oblast Russian forces would need to attack across the Oskil River first and likely would need to operationally encircle west bank Kupyansk or capture Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk) before being able to advance further west into Kharkiv Oblast Neither of those undertakings would be easy Russian forces would need to cross large areas of open rural terrain interspersed with a few small settlements before reaching relatively sizable settlements such as Chuhuiv or Velykyi Burluk Russian forces have not conducted such a long drive since the initial phase of the full-scale invasion and would be highly unlikely to be able to pursue such an effort.[106] Russian forces could alternatively try to capture Izyum from the southeast although such an advance would either likely turn into a vulnerable salient or require similar wide operations across the Oskil River These prospects for Russian advances into Kharkiv Oblast from the east bank of the Oskil River are as challenging as the prospects of advance elsewhere along the international border with Belgorod Oblast if not more so If Russian forces are currently pursuing an operation to reach the Oskil River as a months-long conditions setting effort for a subsequent larger campaign that subsequent larger campaign likely does not aim to advance further west into Kharkiv Oblast The Russian ability to conduct operationally significant offensive efforts is still largely dependent on the level of Western support for Ukraine Well provisioned Ukrainian forces with superior capabilities have previously prevented Russian forces from making even marginal gains during large-scale Russian offensive efforts and have proven effective at causing lasting degradation to Russian logistics and combat capabilities.[107] Ukraine’s current capabilities are denying Russian forces the ability to restore the types of maneuvers required to conduct operationally significant advances but many of those capabilities rely on key systems and materiel from the West and specifically the US.[108] The West has yet to provide Ukraine with certain capabilities that could allow Ukrainian forces to further constrain Russia’s ability to pursue operationally significant advances particularly long-range strike capabilities that could degrade Russian logistics in depth and attack aircraft that could contest Russian aviation operations Ukraine is attempting to rapidly expand its defense industrial base (DIB) to produce many of these capabilities itself and Ukrainian forces are also developing technological innovations and adaptations that aim to offset Russian advantages in manpower and materiel.[109] These Ukrainian efforts will take time to produce results at scale time that Russian forces will use to improve their own capabilities and to conduct potentially significant offensive operations such as their ongoing operation to reach the Oskil River line Delays in Western security assistance have forced Ukrainian forces to husband materiel and have generated uncertainty in Ukrainian operational planning vulnerabilities that Russian forces will increasingly exploit to facilitate gains on the battlefield.[110] Ukraine’s ability to defend itself in the long-term relies on its ability not only to prevent Russian forces from seizing operationally significant ground but also to launch successful counteroffensive operations to liberate strategically vital areas.[111] The Ukrainian ability to seize and retain the theater-wide initiative and to liberate territory is an assured path to denying Russian forces opportunities to pursue strategically significant gains in Ukraine Ukraine therefore needs security assistance that allows it to prevent ongoing Russian efforts to make operationally significant gains while also preparing for operations of its own that can liberate further Ukrainian territory [1] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021424 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2023 ; [2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2023 [3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2023 [4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101623 [5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-12-2023 [6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010524 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-6-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2024 [7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar013024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-19-2024;%C2%A0https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-5-2024 [8] https://vk dot com/wall-170770667_203231 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-12-2023 [10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2024 [11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-12-2024 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1483 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1491 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1519 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/3730?single [12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2024 [13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2024 [14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2024 [15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-13-2024 [16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2024 [17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2024 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1608 [18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-19-2024 [19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2024 [20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2024 [21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-30-2024 ; [22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2024 [24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2024 [26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2024 [30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2023 [33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2024 ; https://suspilne dot media/665728-rosijski-vijska-vikoristovuut-novu-taktiku-na-limanskomu-napramku-recnik-21-ombr/ [34] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1749105243277652257?s=20 ; https://t.me/BALUhub/7890 [35] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2024 ; [36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2024 [37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2024 [38] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2024 [39] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2024 [40] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1491 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1468 ; [41] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101623 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-23-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2024 ; [42] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2024 [44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-19-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-22-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-9-2024 [45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2023 [46] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-28 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-19 [47] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut [48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2023 [49] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar03052023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033023 [50] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut [54] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-1-2023 ; [55] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2023 [57] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2024 [58] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2024 [59] https://isw.pub/UkrWar101623 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-18-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101623 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-23-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2024 ; [60] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2024 [61] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut [62] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023 [63] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023 [64] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut [65] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120923 [68] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut [69] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122623 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-25-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021524 [70] Commercially available satellite imagery via Planet Labs LLC [72] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-5-2024 [73] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-5-2024 [74] https://t.me/rybar/55875 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/3730 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-12-2024 [76] https://t.me/rybar/55875 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-1-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-23 [77] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2023 [78] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2023 [79] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2024 [81] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2024 [82] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2023 [83] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2023 [84] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2024 [85] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-18-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2024 [86] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-30-2024 [87] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121223 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120923 [88] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121223 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120923 [90] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut [91] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021424 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28 [92] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4 ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct1 ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignSept23 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033023 [93] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar03052023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033023 [94] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3 [95] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11 [97] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2023 [98] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11 [99] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11 [100] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Operations%20Assessments%20May%2013.pdf [101] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12 [102] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1 [103] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12 [104] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut [105] https://isw.pub/UkrWar013124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121523 ; [106] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122623 [109] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021424 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base [110] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-18-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2024 [111] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/lands-ukraine-must-liberate Stories of those missing in action and survivors’ accounts AI-generated illustrationVladimir Putin threw thousands of mobilized men outside Svatove to stop the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in fall 2022 Commanders were sending Russians to the frontline without outfits Newly fledged soldiers immediately got under fire from the Ukrainian side and then from their own forces as well These all resulted in catastrophic losses for the Russian army The authorities are trying to conceal the details of this tragedy by all means got hold of unique documents—hundreds of complaints to Putin from families of the mobilized thrown for slaughter in the Luhansk region and reconstructed the full picture of the Svatove slaughter For more details, read the text version of the investigation here The relevant statement was made by Luhansk Regional Military Administration Head Serhii Haidai on Telegram “ ‘Bavovna’ [an ironical euphemism for explosions – Ed.] in Svatove Haidai mentioned Svatove as another restless place for Russian invaders in Ukraine but did not disclose any details Ukraine’s Air Force has struck 13 enemy personnel and military equipment clusters and three air defense missile system positions the Ukrainian anti-aircraft defense units shot down five Russian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and one Ka-52 helicopter Ukraine’s missile and artillery units inflicted fire damage on more than 200 enemy objects While citing and using any materials on the Internet links to the website ukrinform.net not lower than the first paragraph are mandatory citing the translated materials of foreign media outlets is possible only if there is a link to the website ukrinform.net and the website of a foreign media outlet Materials marked as "Advertisement" or with a disclaimer reading "The material has been posted in accordance with Part 3 of Article 9 of the Law of Ukraine "On Advertising" No 1996 and the Law of Ukraine "On the Media" No 2023 and on the basis of an agreement/invoice Online media entity; Media identifier - R40-01421 Please enable JS and disable any ad blocker Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine Russian forces have regained the initiative in Ukraine and have begun their next major offensive in Luhansk Oblast The pace of Russian operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line in western Luhansk Oblast has increased markedly over the past week and Russian sources are widely reporting that conventional Russian troops are attacking Ukrainian defensive lines and making marginal advances along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border particularly northwest of Svatove near Kupyansk and west of Kreminna.[1] Geolocated combat footage has confirmed Russian gains in the Dvorichne area northwest of Svatove.[2] Russian military command additionally appears to have fully committed elements of several conventional divisions to decisive offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line as ISW previously reported.[3] Elements of several regiments of the 144th and 3rd Motor Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army Western Military District) and a regiment of the 90th Tank Division (Central Military District) supported by elements of the 76th Airborne Division and unspecified Southern Military District elements are conducting offensive operations along the entire Svatove-Kreminna line and are reportedly advancing against Ukrainian defenses.[4] The commitment of significant elements of at least three major Russian divisions to offensive operations in this sector indicates the Russian offensive has begun even if Ukrainian forces are so far preventing Russian forces from securing significant gains The Russian offensive likely has not yet reached its full tempo; Russian command has not yet committed elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st Guards Tank Army which deployed to Luhansk Oblast in January after deploying to Belarus.[5] Russian forces are gradually beginning an offensive but its success is not inherent or predetermined While Russian forces in Luhansk Oblast now have the initiative (in that Russian forces are setting the terms of battle ending the period of Ukrainian initiative from August 2022) the full commitment of these forces could lead to their eventual culmination along the Svatove-Kreminna line without achieving their objectives of capturing all of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts That culmination would likely provide a window of opportunity for Ukrainian forces to exploit with their own counteroffensive.[6] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia command reportedly assumed control over a Russian artillery battalion likely in support of an effort to strengthen degraded DNR forces ahead of an imminent Russian offensive A Russian source published a video appeal from mobilized personnel of the 640th howitzer battalion from Saratov Oblast on February 8 in which they stated that Russian military officials sent them to join DNR units and that DNR commanders are now trying to transfer them to infantry assault units.[7] ISW has not previously observed Russian personnel subordinated to a DNR formation and this claim would suggest that Russian forces may be reinforcing degraded DNR formations with mobilized personnel from Russia itself because DNR formations are unable to replenish losses themselves The reported subordination of Russian military personnel to DNR formations may portend a Russian effort to prepare DNR formations for an expanded role in their zone of responsibility along the western outskirts of Donetsk City and the transfer of remaining conventional Russian forces from this area to the Bakhmut area and Luhansk Oblast where Russian forces are conducting an increased pace of offensive operations The reported subordination of Russian mobilized personnel to DNR formations could also suggest that Russian military command may be continuing efforts to integrate ad hoc DNR and Luhansk People‘s Republic (LNR) formations into the Russian Armed Forces but will likely face significant difficulties The Russian Southern Military District formally controls the armed forces of the DNR and LNR through the 1st and 2nd Army Corps many DNR and LNR formations remain ad hoc units and are not fully integrated into Russian MoD structures ISW previously assessed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears to be rushing to integrate irregular conventional forces into a more traditional structure and may be creating new formations from DNR/LNR units in support of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s proposals to create new maneuver divisions.[8] Russian forces would likely need to temporarily remove these irregular forces from frontline positions to integrate them into new Russian formations a prospect that would not be operationally sound ahead of increased Russan offensive operations in Ukraine Russian officials therefore may be attempting to gradually integrate these irregular formations through subordinating mobilized personnel under them without disrupting the command structures and existing personnel operating at front line positions The mobilized personnel of the 640th howitzer battalion claimed that DNR command is retraining assault units for artillery purposes yet still committing their artillery battalion to infantry roles indicating a breakdown in command and the proper utilization of personnel among DNR formations.[9] The Russian MoD will likely struggle to correct the poor effectiveness of DNR/LNR forces through the rapid integration of Russian personnel Russian officials continue to propose measures to prepare Russia’s military industry for a protracted war in Ukraine while also likely setting further conditions for sanctions evasion Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin stated on February 8 that the Russian government will subsidize investment projects for the modernization of enterprises operating in the interests of the Russian military and will allocate significant funds for manufacturing new military equipment.[10] Mishustin also stated that the Russian government would extend benefits to Russian entrepreneurs who support the Russian military including extended payment periods on rented federal property.[11] The Kremlin likely intends these measures to augment its overarching effort to gradually prepare Russia’s military industry for a protracted war in Ukraine while avoiding a wider economic mobilization that would create further domestic economic disruptions and corresponding discontent.[12] Russian officials also likely proposed these measures in coordination with a recent decree excluding Russian officials from requirements to list income declarations and proposals to repeal federal procurement procedures The Kremlin may be creating a system of subsidies and benefits designed to have little oversight or accounting This lack of oversight and accounting would likely allow Russian firms to better evade international sanctions regimes targeting Russia’s military industry.[13] The United Kingdom announced a new list of sanctioned entities on February 8 focused on Russia’s military industry.[14] ISW previously reported that 82% of Iranian-made drones downed in Ukraine had chips and other components from the United States suggesting that Russia and Iran are likely exploiting loopholes to transfer Western-produced arms components to Russia via proxy actors.[15] The Kremlin’s effort to prepare the Russian military industry for a protracted war in Ukraine in part relies on the ability of Russian military industry to have consistent access to multiple secure supply chains of key foreign components that it otherwise cannot produce   We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1- Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and  northern Donetsk Oblast) ISW continues to assess the current Russian most likely course of action (MLCOA) is an imminent offensive effort in Luhansk Oblast and is therefore adjusting the structure of the daily campaign assessments We will no longer include the Eastern Kharkiv and Western Luhansk Oblast area as part of Ukrainian counteroffensives and will assess this area as a subordinate part of the Russian main effort in Eastern Ukraine The assessment of Luhansk Oblast as part of the Russian main effort does not preclude the possibility of continued Ukrainian counteroffensive actions here or anywhere else in theater in the future ISW will report out on Ukrainian counteroffensive efforts as they occur Russian forces continued offensive actions northwest of Svatove on February 8 Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synehubov reported on February 8 that Russian forces are increasing their presence northwest of Svatove in the Kupyansk and Dvorichna areas.[16] A former Luhansk People‘s Republic (LNR) deputy claimed that fierce fighting is ongoing 7km from the Kupyansk area which Russian sources claimed Russian forces captured on February 6.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack near Novoselivske about 15km northwest of Svatove.[18]  Former Russian militant commander and nationalist milblogger Igor Girkin denied that Russian forces have made any significant territorial gains in Kharkiv Oblast Russian forces also reportedly intensified offensive operations in the Kreminna area roughly parallel to the Svatove-Kreminna line) and captured Ukrainian positions in an unspecified location around February 6.[22] Russian sources also reported that elements of the 3rd Motor Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army Western Military District) are approaching the Zherebets River and are threatening Ukrainian positions in the area.[23] A prominent Russian milblogger posted footage of the 59th Tank Regiment of the 144th Motor Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army Western Military District) attacking towards Torske (13km west of Kreminna) and claimed the unit pushed Ukrainian forces back to secondary lines of defense.[24] Russian forces continued offensive operations south of Kreminna on February 8 The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian troops attacked near Shepilove (7km south of Kreminna) and Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[25] Chechen Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that elements of the Chechen ”Akhmat” special forces and 2nd Brigade of the Luhansk People’s Republic 2nd Army Corps captured Ukrainian positions near Berestove 30km south of Kreminna.[26] Russian forces appear to be pushing northeast of the Bakhmut area towards Siversk (17km southwest of Kreminna) to provide a supporting line of advance to the likely main Russian push directly westward toward Kreminna   Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)  Russian forces conducted ground attacks around Bakhmut and continued making tactical advances on February 8 Geolocated footage posted between February 4 and 8 confirms that Russian forces have made marginal advances north of Bakhmut near Krasna Hora and Zaliznyanske (10km north of Bakhmut) and southwest of Bakhmut near Ivanivske.[27] Russian forces are visually confirmed to be within 2.5 km of the E40 Bakhmut-Slovyansk highway.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself; northeast of Bakhmut near Verkhnokamyanske (30km northeast) the report of a Russian attack on Chasiv Yar indicates that Russian forces have likely advanced closer to the T0504 Kostyantynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut highway southwest of Bakhmut  Russian sources claimed that Wagner Group fighters took control of Krasna Hora and are fighting northeast of Bakhmut.[30] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Wagner Group forces established fire control over a section of the T0504 highway between Stupochky and Ivanivske.[31]  Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on February 8 The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Avdiivka and along the western outskirts of Donetsk City near Vodyane SMD) attacking Marinka and claimed that Russian forces had cleared all Ukrainian fortifications there.[37] The deployment of valuable Russian conventional military units (as opposed to DNR proxy forces) in the area is notable claimed that the situation in Marinka has not changed and continues at a sluggish pace.[38] Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack in western Donetsk Oblast on February 8 The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bohoyavlenka (25km southwest of Donetsk City).[39] Russian sources made conflicting claims about the status of operations in this area One milblogger claimed that fierce fighting is ongoing near Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City) while other milbloggers stated that there is no active fighting in the area.[40] Girkin claimed that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Vuhledar and inflicted heavy losses.[41] Odesa Military Administration Spokesman Serhiy Bratchuk shared a video on February 8 of Ukrainian forces attacking and halting a disorganized Russian mechanized column near Vuhledar.[42] Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes) Russian and Ukrainian forces reportedly continued small scale skirmishes and reconnaissance activity in the Dnipro River delta and on the Kinburn Spit on February 8 The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported that Russian forces are using small boats to try to maintain a presence on islands in the Dnipro River delta south of Kherson City and that Ukrainian forces have deployed long-range artillery to strike several Russian outposts on the islands.[43] The UK MoD reported that Russian and Ukrainian forces have likely deployed small groups on the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast aiming to control the Dnipro Gulf.[44] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Natalia Humenyuk previously stated that Russian forces are increasing the number of reconnaissance and sabotage attempts in the area of the Dnipro River delta as part of an information operation to create a perceived threat against Kherson City.[45] Russian forces continue to construct defensive fortifications in Zaporizhia Oblast Satellite imagery collected between January 26 and February 7 shows Russian forces expanding trench and field fortifications near Tarasivka Zaporizhia Oblast.[46] Russian forces likely constructed these fortifications to further strengthen Russian positions along the T0401 highway between Polohy and Tokmak  Russian forces are likely establishing long defensive lines along critical grounds lines of communication (GLOCs) in Zaporizhia Oblast in preparation to defend against possible future Ukrainian counteroffensive operations along the Zaporizhia frontline ISW has not observed Russian forces constructing defenses intended to halt a cross-country Ukrainian attack on a large front and defensive positions remain limited to main roads Russian forces continued routine fire west of Hulyaipole and in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv Oblasts on February 8.[47] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck Kherson City and in the vicinity of Ochakiv Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)  Russian officials continued attempts to extend social benefits held by regular Russian servicemembers to volunteer formations serving in Ukraine Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin stated on February 8 that the Russian government has prepared new measures to support volunteers including increasing pensions and social assistance payments related to injuries and disabilities.[49] The Russian State Duma is reportedly drafting a bill to include provisions against discrediting volunteer detachments assisting the Russian military in Ukraine as Wagner Group Financier Yevgeny Prigozhin previously demanded.[50] The Kremlin is likely pursuing efforts to more formally recognize volunteer formations in order to mitigate continued criticism of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) over the unclear status of volunteer formations.[51] The Wagner Group is reportedly resorting to more coercive tactics in its campaign to recruit prisoners possibly in response to declining numbers of recruits since autumn 2022 Independent Russian outlet Agentstvo reported on February 8 that Russian lawyers and human rights activists stated that Wagner Group representatives and Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and Federal Security Service (FSB) officials are threatening prisoners in Samara and Rostov oblasts and the North Caucasus with new criminal cases if they refuse to volunteer with the Wagner Group in Ukraine.[52] One of the lawyers reportedly stated that fewer convicts have agreed to volunteer with the Wagner Group in an unspecified recent period because of information about its high casualties supporting ISW’s previous assessment that Russian convicts’ resistance may have caused a decline in the Wagner Group’s prison recruitment campaign.[53] The Wagner Group will likely continue these more coercive practices as it seeks to replenish its forces in Ukraine with more convict recruits following months of highly attritional human wave attacks in eastern Ukraine Russian officials continue to promote incremental efforts to fix longstanding personnel issues associated with mobilization Russian Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council (and head of the mobilization working group) Andrey Turchak claimed that the mobilization working group has received appeals from 22,000 Russian servicemembers and their family members since holding its first meeting on December 29 addressing issues like the incorrect accrual of payments and the wrongful mobilization of fathers with many children who should be exempt.[54] Turchak stated that the working group has heavily focused on solving poor recordkeeping issues through efforts to digitize military registration information from military recruitment offices.[55] Turchak claimed that the working group sent a report to Russian President Vladimir Putin with recommendations to establish comprehensive rehabilitation centers a minimum set of measures to support family members a reduced term for recognizing a Russian soldier as missing and a guarantee for receiving pensions.[56] These proposals and efforts are likely meant primarily to placate ultranationalist figures that criticized the numerous issues associated with mobilization and hedge against further domestic discontent ahead of a likely second wave of mobilization Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural Russian occupation authorities are continuing efforts to increase connectivity between Russia and southern Ukraine Kherson Occupation Head Vladimir Saldo claimed on February 8 that Russian occupation authorities have approved design and research works on a new highway that will run from Crimea Russia.[57] Saldo also claimed that the construction of a new town in the Arabat Spit in northeast Crimea has begun.[58] ISW has previously assessed that Russian occupation authorities likely seek to increase the population in the deep rear of occupied territories to strengthen production capabilities and support logistics related to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[59] Russian occupation authorities continue to lean on patronage-like partnerships with Russian federal subjects to restore infrastructure in occupied territories Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed on February 8 that he held a meeting with Sakhalin Oblast Governor Valery Limarenko in which they discussed Sakhalin Oblast’s plans to help repair kindergartens Donetsk Oblast.[60] Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik held a meeting with Voronezh Oblast Governor Aleksandr Gusev on February 8 during which Gusev claimed that Voronezh Oblast hopes to develop occupied Luhansk Oblast to not only extract raw materials but also to develop a processing industry.[61] Gusev claimed that Voronezh Oblast will double the amount of aid it previously provided occupied Luhansk Oblast in 2022 to bring living standards in occupied Luhansk Oblast to those of Russia’s “national” level.[62] Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.) Belarusian airborne forces may be conducting tactical force-on-force exercises with Russian airborne elements in Belarus The Belarusian Ministry of Defense announced on February 8 that unspecified airborne infantry companies — likely of the Belarusian 38th Air Assault Brigade — conducted a force-on-force company tactical exercise at the Brest Training Ground emphasizing using unmanned aerial vehicles and tactical medicine.[63] It is unclear if Russian airborne forces participated in this exercise The Belarusian 38th Air Assault Brigade has historically conducted joint exercises with elements of the Russian 76th Air Assault Division and the 31st Air Assault Brigade - all units that have taken casualties in Ukraine and require regeneration.[64] Belarusian maneuver elements continue conducting exercises in Belarus Unspecified elements of the Belarusian 19th Separate Guards Mechanized Brigade conducted tactical readiness exercises at the Lepelsky Training Ground in Vitebsk Oblast [1] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020623; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020423; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020223 [3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-25-2023 [5]https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Operations%20Assessments%20January%2027%202023.pdf [6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2023 [8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020423 [10] https://podolyaka dot ru/2023/02/08/zayavleniya-premer-ministra-rf-mihaila-mishustina-o-podderzhke-uchastnikov-svo-i-voennoy-promyshlennosti/; https://stolica-s dot su/archives/366231; https://t.me/rybar/43402 [11] https://podolyaka dot ru/2023/02/08/zayavleniya-premer-ministra-rf-mihaila-mishustina-o-podderzhke-uchastnikov-svo-i-voennoy-promyshlennosti/; https://stolica-s dot su/archives/366231; https://t.me/rybar/43402 [12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010723 ; [13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020123 [14] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-sanctions-target-putins-war-machine-and-financial-networks-as-uk-accelerates-economic-pressure-on-russia   [15] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-war-russia-iranian-drones-us-made-technology-chips/ ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020623 [16] https://suspilne dot media/amp/378863-de-okupanti-posiluut-prisutnist-na-harkivsini-dani-sinegubova/ [17] https://t.me/kommunist/15598; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-6-2023 [18]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FuH223o7wLNSiJSNdCXigpCmwEnYbhGorMX4DoRP98heCwqkGax2jw7LAfJod8mgl [21]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FuH223o7wLNSiJSNdCXigpCmwEnYbhGorMX4DoRP98heCwqkGax2jw7LAfJod8mgl [22] https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/35783; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/37711 [23] https://t.me/rybar/43387; https://t.me/notes_veterans/7845 [25]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FuH223o7wLNSiJSNdCXigpCmwEnYbhGorMX4DoRP98heCwqkGax2jw7LAfJod8mgl [28] https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1623071883988987905; https://twitter.com/EerikMatero/status/1623076900548517892; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1623206937134497792; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1623207358888558593 [29]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FuH223o7wLNSiJSNdCXigpCmwEnYbhGorMX4DoRP98heCwqkGax2jw7LAfJod8mgl [30] https://t.me/wargonzo/10773; https://t.me/strelkovii/3896 [31] https://t.me/DonbassYasinovatayanaliniiOgnia/36445; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/22062; https://t.me/wargonzo/10773; https://t.me/strelkovii/3896 [32]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FuH223o7wLNSiJSNdCXigpCmwEnYbhGorMX4DoRP98heCwqkGax2jw7LAfJod8mgl [36] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/77568; https://t.me/sashakots/38439   [39]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FuH223o7wLNSiJSNdCXigpCmwEnYbhGorMX4DoRP98heCwqkGax2jw7LAfJod8mgl [40] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/77574; https://t.me/wargonzo/10773 [43] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1623199796352745475/photo/1   [44] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1623199796352745475/photo/1   [45] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/02/01/zbilshennya-kilkosti-rozviduvalnyh-grup-voroga-v-gyrli-dnipra-mozhe-buty-oznakoyu-nagnitannya-sytuacziyi-gumenyuk/ [46] https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1623082928283746304?s=20&t=ETx-WeYabYcAhBWPxEz2BA     [48] https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/4236 ;  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FuH223o7wLNSiJSNdCXigpCmwEnYbhGorMX4DoRP98heCwqkGax2jw7LAfJod8mgl ;  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kL8XZwXNsSUphpcF5SAsVUR92f3mJJevFsSWvEZnRJsXKEr7LQzhWmWxXFubauUml ; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/3607 [49] https://podolyaka dot ru/2023/02/08/zayavleniya-premer-ministra-rf-mihaila-mishustina-o-podderzhke-uchastnikov-svo-i-voennoy-promyshlennosti/; https://stolica-s dot su/archives/366231; https://t.me/rybar/43402 [50] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020723; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/425; https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/2612 [51] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2023 [53] https://t.me/agentstvonews/2482 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020123 [54] https://t.me/turchak_andrey/1032 ;  https://isw.pub/UkrWar122922   [57] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/363; https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/365 [58] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/363; https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/365 [59] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-5-2023 [61] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/745; https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/748 [62] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/745; https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/748 [63] https://t.me/modmilby/22455; https://t.me/modmilby/22419 [64] https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/OSW-Report_Russia%E2%80%99s-Belarusian-army_net.pdf Gerrard joined Newsweek in 2021 and had previously worked at Express Online You can get in touch with Gerrard by emailing g.kaonga@newsweek.com Ukraine has claimed that Russia has lost 44 tanks and 27 armored personnel carriers in a single day as Kyiv presses forward with counteroffensives on two fronts The General Staff of the armed forces of Ukraine Facebook page produced its latest estimates on Tuesday morning Russia has rarely released updates on how many losses it has endured and the figures it has released have been much lower than Ukrainian estimates The post estimated that since the beginning of the war Russia has lost around 60,800 personnel with an additional 370 losses on October 3 It also claimed that 2,424 tanks have been lost since the war started on February 24 and an additional 44 tanks were destroyed on Monday Ukrainian forces have destroyed 5,018 armored personnel vehicles and another 27 were destroyed on Monday Russia has not confirmed these numbers are accurate and Newsweek has contacted its Ministry of Foreign Affairs for comment two UAVs and 12 vehicles and fuel tanks were destroyed on Monday "The enemy suffered the greatest losses [in total] in the Kramatorsk and Bakhmut directions," the post added, according to a Google translation "Russian enemy suffered the greatest losses of the past day at the Kramatorsk and Kryvyi Rih directions Kramatorsk and Bakhmut are in the eastern Donetsk region where Ukraine has taken ground with one counteroffensive where Ukraine's forces have launched another counteroffensive Ukraine has also admitted to significant losses of its own Nearly 9,000 Ukrainian military personnel have been killed in the war with Russia the head of Ukraine's armed forces said in August The latest reported losses come after Russia has admitted it was forced to retreat from the city of Lyman due to the Ukrainian counteroffensive The Institute for the Study of War told Newsweek that over the weekend the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lyman to what it called "more advantageous positions" to avoid the 'threat of encirclement' in the settlement The think tank explained the details of Ukraine's victories in the region and what this could mean for the war "Ukrainian forces continued to liberate settlements east and northeast of Lyman on October 2 and have liberated Torske in Donetsk Oblast Russian sources claimed that Russian forces withdrew from their positions northeast of Lyman likely to positions around Kreminna and along the R66 Svatove-Kreminna highway," the think tank said The think tank continued: "Russian sources are voicing concern that Ukrainian forces are targeting and preparing to cut the critical Svatove-Lyman ground line of communication that was supplying the Russian grouping in Lyman "Russian sources are concerned that the collapse of the Lyman pocket and control over the Svatove-Lyman Road will allow Ukrainian forces to essentially wedge into Luhansk Oblast and threaten RU positions along the Kharkiv-Luhansk border especially near the critical settlements of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk Aila Slisco is a Newsweek night reporter based in New York Her focus is on reporting national politics where she has covered the 2020 and 2022 elections the impeachments of Donald Trump and multiple State of the Union addresses Other topics she has reported on for Newsweek include crime public health and the emergence of COVID-19 Aila was a freelance writer before joining Newsweek in 2019 You can get in touch with Aila by emailing a.slisco@newsweek.com Russia has "regained the initiative" by launching a new offensive in the Ukraine war despite being blocked from making "significant gains," according to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) An ISW assessment published on Wednesday says that Moscow has started its "next major offensive" in Luhansk a region of Ukraine that is already largely controlled by Russian forces The report notes that "operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line" in western Luhansk have accelerated over the past week leading to "marginal advances along the Kharkiv-Luhansk" border "The commitment of significant elements of at least three major Russian divisions to offensive operations in this sector indicates the Russian offensive has begun," the report says "Even if Ukrainian forces are so far preventing Russian forces from securing significant gains." The U.S.-based think tank said that "Russian forces are setting the terms of battle" in the war for the first time since Ukraine took the initiative in August, while cautioning that a Russian victory "is not inherent or predetermined" and could lead to a new Ukrainian counteroffensive "The full commitment of these forces could lead to their eventual culmination along the Svatove-Kreminna line without achieving their objectives of capturing all of Luhansk and Donetsk," says the report "That culmination would likely provide a window of opportunity for Ukrainian forces to exploit with their own counteroffensive." Russia reportedly also made some "marginal advances" in Ukraine's Donetsk region including a series of "tactical advances" that were made in a ground assault near Bakhmut Last week, ISW reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin had set a March deadline for troops to capture all of Luhansk and Donetsk two of the four Ukrainian regions that he claimed to have annexed for Russia last year the think tank said at the time that there was no evidence Russia had "sufficient combat power" to achieve Putin's goals by the deadline while suggesting that Ukraine would exploit any failure with "their own late spring or summer 2023 counteroffensive after incorporating Western tank deliveries." While the new Russian offensive does represent a potential turning point in the war ISW said on Wednesday that Moscow officials were also continuing "to prepare Russia's military industry for a protracted war in Ukraine." Meanwhile, Russian mercenary organization the Wagner Group was reportedly being aided by Kremlin intelligence officials in efforts to use "coercive tactics" to revive a failing campaign to recruit prisoners for the Ukraine war effort ISW cited Russian media reports claiming that "representatives and Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and Federal Security Service" were threatening prisoners inside Russia with "new criminal cases if they refuse to volunteer with the Wagner Group." "The Wagner Group will likely continue these more coercive practices as it seeks to replenish its forces in Ukraine with more convict recruits following months of highly attritional human wave attacks in eastern Ukraine," says the report Newsweek has reached out to the Russian and Ukrainian ministries of defense This is the standard modus operandi of the Ukrainian military thus far Ukrainian commanders pick an important urban center and launch a two-prong attack from the north and the south with the aim of encircling it and trapping any Russian forces in there or forcing them to retreat so they are not cut off “Russia’s use of Iranian-made drones is not generating asymmetric effects the way the Ukrainian use of US-provided HIMARS systems has done and is unlikely to affect the course of the war significantly,” the Institute for the Study of War assessed in its latest estimate of the war 1945’s Defense and National Security Columnist Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist with specialized expertise in special operations a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ) His work has been featured in Business Insider Today's print edition Home Delivery Temperatures in eastern Ukraine have been well below freezing in recent days hardening the ground and opening a window for potential winter offensives by both sides either now or during a more sustained cold spell.googletag.cmd.push(function() { googletag.display('div-gpt-ad-1499653692894-0'); }); Military analysts within and outside Ukraine say that while the shift from muddy to frozen terrain is important in enabling the use of wheeled combat and support vehicles it’s just one of many factors commanders would consider before risking a major new assault In a time of both misinformation and too much information quality journalism is more crucial than ever.By subscribing Your subscription plan doesn't allow commenting. To learn more see our FAQ Sponsored contents planned and edited by JT Media Enterprise Division ShareSaveCommentBusinessAerospace & DefenseBETAThis is a BETA experience. opt-out hereThe Russian Army Is Crowding Its Best Tanks In One Sector Of Eastern UkraineByDavid Axe ShareSaveComment@font-face{font-family: "Schnyder"; src: url("https://i.forbesimg.com/assets/fonts/schnyders/schnyders-bold-webfont.woff2") format("woff2") url("https://i.forbesimg.com/assets/fonts/schnyders/schnyders/schnyders-bold-webfont.woff") format("woff"); font-weight: 700; font-style: normal;} @font-face{font-family: "Merriweather"; src: url("https://i.forbesimg.com/assets/fonts/merriweather/merriweather-bold-webfont.woff2") format("woff2") url("https://i.forbesimg.com/assets/fonts/merriweather/merriweather-bold-webfont.woff") format("woff"); font-weight: 700; font-style: normal;} @font-face{font-family: "Euclid"; src: url("https://i.forbesimg.com/assets/fonts/euclidcircularb/euclidcircularb-bold-webfont.woff2") format("woff2") url("https://i.forbesimg.com/assets/fonts/euclidcircularb/euclidcircularb-bold-webfont.woff") format("woff"); font-weight: 700; font-style: normal;} @font-face{font-family: "Schnyder"; src: url("https://i.forbesimg.com/assets/fonts/schnyders/schnyders-light-webfont.woff2") format("woff2") url("https://i.forbesimg.com/assets/fonts/schnyders/schnyders-light-webfont.woff") format("woff"); font-weight: 400; font-style: normal;} @font-face{font-family: "Merriweather"; src: url("https://i.forbesimg.com/assets/fonts/merriweather/merriweather-regular-webfont.woff2") format("woff2") url("https://i.forbesimg.com/assets/fonts/merriweather/merriweather-regular-webfont.woff") format("woff"); font-weight: 400; font-style: normal;} @font-face{font-family: "Euclid"; src: url("https://i.forbesimg.com/assets/fonts/euclidcircularb/euclidcircularb-regular-webfont.woff2") format("woff2") #article-stream-0 .quote-embed .color-accent{color: #FFFFFF;} #article-stream-0 .quote-embed.bg-accent #article-stream-0 .quote-embed .bg-accent{background-color: #FFFFFF;} #article-stream-0 .quote-embed.color-base #article-stream-0 .quote-embed .color-base{color: #000000;} #article-stream-0 .quote-embed.bg-base #article-stream-0 .quote-embed .bg-base{background-color: #000000;} #article-stream-0 .quote-embed.font-accent #article-stream-0 .quote-embed .font-accent{font-family: Schnyder,"Noto Sans","Droid Sans","Helvetica Neue",Corbel,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;} #article-stream-0 .quote-embed.font-size p #article-stream-0 .quote-embed .font-size p{font-size: 36px;} #article-stream-0 .subhead3-embed.color-body #article-stream-0 .subhead3-embed .color-body{color: #333333;} #article-stream-0 .subhead3-embed.color-body-border{border-top-color: rgba(51,51,51 #article-stream-0 .subhead3-embed .color-body-border{border-top-color: rgba(51,51,51 0.8);} .bg-body{background-color: #333333;} #article-stream-0 .subhead3-embed.font-accent #article-stream-0 .subhead3-embed .font-accent{font-family: Euclid,"Noto Sans","Droid Sans","Helvetica Neue",Corbel,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;} #article-stream-0 .subhead-embed.color-accent #article-stream-0 .subhead-embed .color-accent{color: #333333;} #article-stream-0 .subhead-embed.bg-accent #article-stream-0 .subhead-embed .bg-accent{background-color: #333333;} #article-stream-0 .subhead-embed.font-accent #article-stream-0 .subhead-embed .font-accent{font-family: Euclid,"Noto Sans","Droid Sans","Helvetica Neue",Corbel,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;} #article-stream-0 .subhead-embed.font-size #article-stream-0 .subhead-embed .font-size{font-size: 26px;} #article-stream-0 .headline-embed.color-accent #article-stream-0 .headline-embed .color-accent{color: #000000;} #article-stream-0 .headline-embed.bg-accent #article-stream-0 .headline-embed .bg-accent{background-color: #000000;} #article-stream-0 .headline-embed.color-base #article-stream-0 .headline-embed .color-base{color: #FFFFFF;} #article-stream-0 .headline-embed.bg-base #article-stream-0 .headline-embed .bg-base{background-color: #FFFFFF;} #article-stream-0 .headline-embed.font-base #article-stream-0 .headline-embed .font-base{font-family: Schnyder,"Noto Sans","Droid Sans","Helvetica Neue",Corbel,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;} #article-stream-0 .headline-embed.font-size #article-stream-0 .headline-embed .font-size{font-size: 54px;}T-90 Russian arms firm Uralvagonzavod has manufactured around 600 T-90 tanks for the Russian army The 45-ton, three-person T-90 with its 125-millimter gun and steel-composite armor is Russia’s best tank. And it seems no fewer than 50 of them are packed into one small sector of the Ukrainian front around Svatove in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region That the Russian army has concentrated its most modern tanks in Svatove speaks to the Kremlin’s priorities as Russia’s wider war on Ukraine grinds into its 10th month which itself threads through the forest and fields to Severodonetsk The Ukrainians held Severodonetsk until a combined Russian-separatist force captured the city in July Liberating Severodonetsk is a top priority in Kyiv Keeping Severodonetsk is a top priority in Moscow Approaching the city from the north—where good Ukrainian brigades are thick on the ground—means going past Svatove It’s not for no reason the Ukrainian eastern command has assigned the elite 92nd Mechanized Brigade to the effort The 92nd Mechanized Brigade is a volunteer unit with well-maintained T-64 tanks and BTR fighting vehicles Since the start of the current war in February a series of battles in and around Kharkiv Oblast just north of Svatove It’s an impressive feat for the Russian army to mass two battalions of T-90s the Russians on paper had more than 600 T-90s modern tanks with their delicate optics and electronics tend to degrade fast while not in routine use but which lack high-tech optics and electronics and therefore don’t degrade as fast as 1990s-vintage T-90s might That brings the total T-90 inventory down to around 360 of which at least 50 now are around Svatove Tanks are highly vulnerable to small teams of infantry packing precision-guided anti-tank missiles A tank’s best defense against enemy infantry is .. But the Russian army never had enough trained infantry to screen its tanks It has even fewer now that it’s lost 100,000 of its best troops killed or wounded in Ukraine the Kremlin has drafted—or lured into service with huge cash bonuses—hundreds of thousands of unhappy and largely unfit men these draftees die fast and easy in battle with hardened Ukrainian troops Yes, the Ukrainian 92nd Mechanized Brigade as it drives toward Severodonetsk might run into a lot of modern Russian tanks. But it might not run into a lot of well-trained, well-equipped and well-led Russian infantry. And that lack of infantry could make all the difference. The situation in the vicinity of Bakhmut remains difficult but the area is still under the control of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) which are being confronted by PMC Wagner mercenaries and Russian army units Ukrainian forces continue to advance near Svatove, but muddy terrain and the additional reinforcement of Russian positions have slowed their advance, reported the WarMonitor media project pro-Russian war correspondent Alexander Kots attempted to convince draftees that the situation near Svatove isn’t that bad – Kots points out that one can even wash his clothes but “there are problems with drying”: Russian forces have captured half of the strategically important town of Marinka Marinka is a town in the south of the Donetsk region opening the way to the Vuhledar bulge and the road to Donbas A video depicting the situation in the city was circulated on social media: A video that a Russian serviceman recorded for his girlfriend was shared on Telegram channels the man talks about his unit going on the offensive on the 31st of November as we're going to march through a field without equipment or support It's a complete f*cking mess – both the commanders and the situation If I'd known what was going to happen here Russia has struck the Ukrainian energy grid yet again All Kyiv-controlled operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) were affected as a result of the November 23 shelling Power units of the South Ukrainian and Khmelnytskyi NPPs were shut down and the Rivne nuclear power plant was put in emergency mode Enerhoatom said that the radiation background at the shutdown nuclear power plants has not changed Emergency blackouts were introduced in almost all regions of Ukraine Kiev is almost completely plunged into darkness Power outages also occurred in the Chernihiv region Electric transport stopped running in Kharkiv The head of Kirovohrad region reported explosions at a critical infrastructure facility Ukrenerho reported that there will be no light across various locations throughout the country for about a day half of the territory of Moldova was also left without electricity which led to a transport collapse in the country’s capital The following images illustrate the structure of Ukraine's electricity grid and a close-up of the connections through Moldova: On November 18, Ukrainian Prime Minister Denis Shmyhal stated that Russia’s massive missile strikes had disabled nearly half of the country's power grid Kyiv Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko warned that the city authorities were preparing for the worst-case winter scenario: a complete absence of electricity emergency blackouts were imposed in Ukraine due to massive shelling of the country’s energy infrastructure 51 of which were shot down by Ukrainian air defenses a missile strike in the city of Vilniansk in the Zaporizhzhia region destroyed a hospital maternity ward The city of Kupyansk in the Kharkiv region was shelled at around 07:40 a.m Russian missiles damaged a nine-story residential building Two people died: a 55-year-old woman and a 68-year-old man multiple explosions were heard in more than 16 Ukrainian cities as a result of Russian missile strikes: 36 Ukrainians have returned home from Russian captivity Among those freed were soldiers defending Mariupol and members of Ukraine’s National Guard captured at Chernobyl during the first days of the invasion The UK will for the first time supply Ukraine with three Sea King helicopters as part of a military aid package Ukrainian crews have received training in Britain – including for search and rescue operations A new $400 million aid package to Ukraine was also announced by the United States Vladimir Putin and Uralchem founder Dmitry Mazepin discussed the unblocking of the ammonia pipeline from Togliatti to Odessa on November 23 Mazepin asked Putin to facilitate the unblocking as part of the grain deal to temporarily open and ensure the discharge and transportation of ammonia in Odesa “The parameters and the figures are known The benefits for all participants in this process are also clear,” Putin said In September, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called the return of Ukrainian prisoners of war a condition for resuming the transit of Russian fertilizers through the Togliatti-Odesa ammonia pipeline “I am against ammonia supplies from the Russian Federation through our territory I would only do it in exchange for our prisoners of war That is what I suggested to the UN,” he said The Kremlin reacted negatively to the proposal at the time “Are people and ammonia the same thing?” – Dmitry Peskov said in an interview with Russian state-owned agency TASS Ammonia is the main ingredient in the production of nitrate fertilizers and increasing its supply to the world market could lower its prices and ease the risks of a food crisis in several countries whose terminus is the Odesa Portside Plant Prior to the Russian invasion on February 24 the pipeline was used to export ammonia produced by Russian firm Togliattiazot (owned by Russian oligarch Dmitry Mazepin) and JSC Minudobreniya (owned by Russian oligarch and Putin confidante Arkady Rotenberg) ammonia shipments via the pipeline stopped amid Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent threats to terminate the “grain deal,” which unblocked the export of Ukrainian grain the UN wants to resume exports of Russian ammonia We really need your help! Subscribe to donations! Сделано в Charmer устарел и не позволяет корректно отображать сайт According to Ukrinform, the UK Ministry of Defense said this in its latest intelligence update published on Twitter. "Russia likely sees maintaining control of this zone as important because it is transited by one of the few main resupply routes Russia still controls from the Belgorod region of Russia. In addition, this line sits along the border of Luhansk Oblast, part of the Donbas, which Russia aims to 'liberate' as one of its immediate war aims. Any substantial loss of territory in Luhansk will unambiguously undermine Russia's strategy," the report said. It added Russia would likely attempt to conduct a stubborn defense of this area, but it is unclear whether Russia's front line forces have sufficient reserves or adequate morale to withstand another concerted Ukrainian assault. Online media entity; Media identifier - R40-01421. © 2015-2025 Ukrinform. All rights reserved. The shelling of the Kherson region on the right bank of the Dnipro river – and Kherson itself – continues. Russia struck civilian infrastructure in Kherson on the morning of November 21, according to a report issued by Kherson Regional Council First Deputy Chairman Yuri Sobolevsky on his Telegram channel “There are missile strikes in Kherson medical care is being provided,” Sobolevsky wrote According to the head of the Office of the President Kyrylo Tymoshenko as a result of the shelling of Kherson by the Russian military four people were taken to the regional hospital with injuries Dmytro Lubinets, the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) Commissioner for Human Rights, reported that Kherson region residents were subjected to more brutal torture methods than residents of those regions that were subjected to temporary occupation earlier: Kharkiv Lubinets named three differences from torture in other regions: that men and women were held together that there were video cameras in each cell for surveillance and that there was a separate cell for teenagers in the torture rooms Images of the looted Kherson Art Museum have also appeared online. The Insider had earlier reported that the Russian military leaving the right bank of the Dnipro had looted close to 15 thousand exhibits from the city’s cultural institutions – four trucks carrying the stolen exhibits have arrived in Simferopol The museum’s permanent exhibition included icon paintings from the 17th to the early 20th centuries Ukrainian art from the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries Russian forces shelled Vuhledar with incendiary ammunition, according to a report by independent investigative outlet Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) It is clear from the published video that incendiary ammunition was used specifically in the city limits which is prohibited by international humanitarian law Experts have highlighted that the area is important for Russia as part of the railroads leading from Donetsk to the southwest are within striking range of Ukrainian barrel artillery It is these railroads that are used to supply Russian troops in the southern directions “The particularity of Vuhledar is the village of Volnovakha and from there comes the only railroad that connects Russia with Melitopol and the Zaporizhzhia group,” military expert Roman Svitan explained to The Insider they need that railroad going through Volnovakha – there’s only a few dozen kilometers from there to Vuhledar One break through Volnovakha – and the entire Russian Zaporizhzhia group will be left without supplies.” A picture of the bodies of Russian servicemen has also appeared online. There have been claims that the dead men in the image were marines of the 155th Brigade killed in the direction of Vuhledar but there has been no independent confirmation of that information Fighting has intensified in the Bakhmut direction The video the analyst is referring to can be found here The main attention of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) seems to be concentrated in the north and south around the settlements of Novoselivske and Ploshchanka progress is currently slow – with the arrival of reinforcements on both sides it is likely that the situation will not change for a long period of time The shelling of Belohorivka in the Luhansk region has also continued this is how the Russian military is diverting AFU forces away from Kreminna There is also a lot of evidence of high activity of Russian troops in the Verkhnokamyanka area near the Lysychansk oil refinery Def Mon notes that Verkhnokamyanka provides the Russians with shelter and observation points with an open descent to the west The AFU continue to shell Russian positions in occupied Makiivka which is in the so-called “DPR” According to the “DPR People's Militia” a HIMARS launcher hit the railroad track in the Chervonohvardiiskyi district The so-called “DPR Emergencies Ministry” also published a video of a burning oil depot in the Chervonohvardiiskyi district The “ministry” reported that the fire destroyed three stationary tanks with a volume of 60 cubic meters with the oil spill affecting an area of 300 sq Shrapnel damaged two tanks on the railroad bed with a total volume of 70 cubic meters resulting in a fuel spill covering an area of 350 sq According to the “DPR Emergencies Ministry,” an “explosive object” also hit a gas pipeline on Pushkin Street in the city of Yasynuvata in the near future Russian forces will accumulate the potential to attack in the directions of Huliaipole Now the attacks in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia directions were not reported the expert believes that the Russians are waiting for dry weather The Ukrainian Armed Forces have continued shelling Russia’s Belgorod region, particularly the town of Shebekino, which is close to multiple military facilities. Belgorod regional governor Vyacheslav Gladkov wrote about the recent shelling of Shebekino on his Telegram channel shells hit an apartment building and an industrial enterprise Power lines were damaged and a woman was wounded The AFU also shelled the town of Maslova Pristan in the Belgorod region with MLRS shells, reported Telegram channel Moscow Calling The inscription on one shell read “For Chernihiv the projectile in question was an AGM-88 HARM anti-radar missile AFU continue to find bodies of fellow servicemen abandoned by RussiansThe abandoned bodies of Russian servicemen have been found near Izium in the village of Dovhenke (Kharkiv region). According to Radio Donbass.Realii correspondent Sergei Gorbatenko volunteers from the military history heritage research association “Platsdarm” are working at the battle site At least 20 bodies have already been found The head of the search team Alexei Yukov commented that Russia has barred volunteers from returning the bodies of fallen Ukrainian soldiers from the temporarily occupied territories which means the remains of the Russians will be exchanged for the bodies of AFU soldiers after expert examinations К сожалению, браузер, которым вы пользуйтесь, устарел и не позволяет корректно отображать сайт. Пожалуйста, установите любой из современных браузеров, например: the Armed Forces of Ukraine completed the envelopment of the Russian grouping in Lyman units of the “People’s Militia of the LPR and DPR” they have retaken Stavky and are fighting in Zarichny; the road connecting Lyman and Torske is under heavy enemy fire The battle of Lyman is important because its encirclement opens the road to the “LPR” Retaking Lyman will also grant the AFU access to Svatove The exact location of the new frontline remains unclear Ukrainian troops have spent several weeks cutting off Lyman from two sides There was only one road connecting the Russian troops in Lyman through Torske to Svatove where they had munitions and reinforcements and so has Drobysheve on the other side of the road Unless the Russian military command takes decisive action within the next 24 hours Should the Russian troops in the city be eliminated Russia will lose its entire defense potential on this segment of the frontline Kharkiv Oblast / Photo: Denys Glushko for Gwara MediaSince the beginning of the full-scale invasion the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has been studying the hostilities on the frontlines in Ukraine The latest reports document the offensive of the aggressor country’s army on the border of Kharkiv and Luhansk regions Russia’s main efforts are still aimed at capturing the rest of Luhansk region and advancing to the eastern part of Kharkiv and northern part of Donetsk regions The General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensives in the area of Synkivka (9 km northeast of Kupiansk) and Novoyehorivka (16 km southwest of Svatove) spokesman for Ukraine’s Eastern Military Group said that Russian troops continue to concentrate their efforts in the area of Novoyehorivka and use convicts and unknown private military companies (PMCs) for assaults Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine Hanna Malyar stated that the operational situation in the Kupyansk and Lyman sectors is escalating ISW cites a report from a Russian news aggregator that Russian troops continued to advance in the area of Sinkivka and Petropavlivka (7 km east of Kupiansk) the Institute for the Study of War has not seen any visual evidence of this statement Constant missile attacks and empty streets: how Kupyansk lives on the front line. This city in Kharkiv Oblast is 10-15 km/ 6–9 miles from the front line and 40 km/ 25 miles from the border with Russia The city was severely damaged at the beginning of the full-scale invasion and during the battle for its liberation in September 2022 it is constantly under fire from Russian aviation Russian army shelled Petropavlivka in Kupiansk district – Kharkiv Governor Shelling of the village wounded a man of 68; he was hospitalized the Russian army also shelled Kucherivka of the Kupiansk district The shelling damaged a residential building Ukraine managed to bring home 9 Ukrainian children who were in the temporarily occupied territory. About 700,000 Ukrainian children have been taken to Russia. All rights reserved. ©2016-2024. GWARA MEDIA. Website materials are permitted only with an active link to “GWARA MEDIA,” not lower than the third paragraph. The use of digital platform content is allowed with textual attribution. Content for documentary films and integrated products is permitted, subject to editorial approval. The site was modernized with the support of the European Endowment for Democracy in 2023. Дякуємо за повідомлення. Ми відреагуємо це! there were no major changes on the front on November 3rd The Russian offensive on Vuhledar has bogged down and there is fighting in the Pavlivka area of the Donetsk region Boris Rozhin, a military expert at the Russian propagandist “Center for political-military journalism,” claims that there are no significant changes in the Kherson direction as the AFU continues to mount attacks and scouting operations An anonymous analyst with the nickname Def Mon on Twitter has studied satellite images west of Kherson and concluded that Russia is building fortifications in the area as there are defensive positions in almost every forest belt Pervomaiske and Opytne in the Avdiivka direction Russia is trying to attack the AFU in the direction of Makiivka soldiers of the Russian Armed Forces “were held hostage” by weather conditions as dirt roads became impassable due to rainfall Video of Ukrainian Excalibur artillery strikes against Russian armored vehicles in the south have been published online It is claimed that the 2016 model T-72B3 and BMP-2 were destroyed Meanwhile, Russia’s Civic Council, made up of public figures from nine Russian regions, has begun recruiting volunteers into the ranks of the AFU The organization has announced the creation of the Technical Mobilization Center for Russians who want to volunteer for the Ukrainian army When asked by The Insider as to who made up the organization replied that it was currently impossible to name all the council’s participants – among them were prominent figures “who hadn’t yet guaranteed their own safety.” The Institute for the Study of War (ISW), a US-based think tank, had assessed that the AFU was going on the offensive in the direction of Svatove and Kreminna in the Luhansk region The institute’s experts also wrote that Russia's mobilization efforts are having a long-term devastating effect on the Russian economy Positional fighting on the line continued on March 1 The Institute cited Russian and Ukrainian sources as confirming that fighting continued northeast of Kupiansk near Synkivka and Petropavlivka west of Kreminna near Terny and Yampolivka ISW cites Russian mil bloggers who posted footage of alleged Russian troops striking a Ukrainian pontoon bridge over the Oskil River near Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi (southeast of Kupiansk) with guided aerial bombs and claims that Russian forces have allegedly destroyed all fixed bridges across the Oskil River researchers add that Russian forces likely did indeed damage fixed bridges across the Oskil River during the September-October 2023 strike campaign Although these efforts were unsuccessful in isolating Ukrainians near Kupiansk then Ukrainian defense forces were not facing supply difficulties on the eastern bank of the Oskil River The ISW adds that units of the Chechen Akhmat special forces “Aida” and the Russian “GORB” detachment have begun operating near Bilohorivka the head of the Kharkiv Regional Military Administration Russian troops continue to storm the positions of Ukrainian defenders in the Kupiansk sector trying to take advantage of favorable heights and hold Kupiansk as an essential logistics hub despite the concentration of Russian forces Ukrainians are holding back the onslaught and are not giving up their positions He adds that Russia uses all types of weapons to shell the border areas – aircraft and civilians are being called to evacuate a town in eastern Kharkiv Oblast with a pre-war population of about 30,000 people was occupied from late February till September 2022 The city is a railway and road hub in Eastern Ukraine between Kharkiv and Luhansk regions Constant missile attacks and deserted streets: how Kupiansk lives on the front line. It is 10-15 km / 6–9 miles from the front line and 40 km / 25 miles from the border with Russia. The city was severely damaged at the beginning of the full-scale invasion and during the battle for its liberation in September 2022.  A section of the R-66 highway from Kreminna to Siverodonetsk in the Luhansk region is now within full range of the Ukrainian army’s artillery, reported Alexander Kovalenko a military and political observer from the Information Resistance group the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) have significantly complicated the logistics in the area for the Russian military Russia is suffering heavy losses among its mobilized soldiers at the Svatove-Kreminna line where the Russian command has been trying to contain the actions of the AFU for more than two months Military analyst Def Mon stressed that Svatove is now within the Ukrainian army’s twenty-five-kilometer artillery range which allows for the use of long-range shells Russian artillery has stepped up its efforts in the Zaporizhzhia direction. According to Russian propagandist outlet WarGonzo Chervone and Malynivka are all under attack Russian artillery is also shelling Vuhledar battles are taking place near Novomikhailovka and in the city limits of Marinka Russian forces have attempted to advance in the direction of Pervomaiske and Vodyane on Krasnohorivka from the direction of Opytne and near Kamianka Russian troops rained fire on the Kherson region and Kherson itself using artillery and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) “Russian occupants shelled the territory of Kherson region 33 times. The region’s peaceful settlements suffered from artillery shells, as well as fire from MLRS, mortars and tanks,” – Yaroslav Yanushevych, head of the Kherson administration, wrote of the strikes on December 25 Yanushevich noted that Kherson was attacked 7 times – warehouses standalone homes and apartment buildings were all hit Authorities urged Kherson region residents to evacuate The day before, on December 24, Russia shelled the city of Kherson over 40 times and dropped over 70 shells on the Kherson region. Eleven people were killed. Yanushevich reported that a total of 64 local residents were wounded with 18 people still in critical condition the shelling damaged a market and shopping center in the city Yanushevich stressed that people are transported daily by free buses from Kherson to Odesa via Mykolaiv as well as several times a week from Kherson to other destinations across Ukraine: Kriviy Rih A video of the use of incendiary ammunition on Kherson – a war crime – appeared on multiple Telegram channels The recording was made from a private home was liberated by the Ukrainian army in early November a Ukrainian drone attacked the Engels-2 airfield in the Saratov region According to claims made by the Russian Defense Ministry and three servicemen died as a result of falling wreckage Independent media outlet Baza reported four casualties as a result of the incident Telegram channels published apparent videos of the explosion but they do not give a clear indication of what happened in Engels The Russian army evacuated four to six Tu-95 strategic bombers from the Engels-2 airfield, reported Ukraine’s Channel 24 The planes were transferred to the Ukrainka airfield in the Amur region in Russia’s Far East Russia’s Federal Security Service, the FSB, claimed that it had “eliminated” a group of four Ukrainian saboteurs attempting to enter the Bryansk region from Ukraine The agency released a video with blood-covered bodies There are a lot of inconsistencies in the FSB video – one of the killed “saboteurs,» who had to walk sizable distances over rough terrain The FSB report claimed that “the dead were armed with German SIG Sauer submachine guns and four 40 kg TNT equivalent bombs” and were allegedly preparing a “terrorist attack.” Experts interviewed by The Insider pointed out that the weapons were not fit for their stated purpose Shortly after the publication of the FSB video, the Telegram channel Grey Zone, which is considered to be associated with the Wagner Group, released uncensored photos of the “saboteur” murder scene. Experts, to whom The Insider showed these photos, suggested that the people in the images were killed as a result of a vehicle hitting a land mine The land mine theory could also indirectly explain the clean soles seen on one of the dead soldiers Bellingcat investigative journalist Christo Grozev tweeted a video appeal from Wagner Group mercenaries to Valery Gerasimov the Russian Defense Ministry’s Chief of General Staff the mercenaries call Gerasimov a “f***ot” and “f*cking *sshole” and complain about the lack of artillery shells There is currently no confirmation that the soldiers in the video actually belong to the Wagner Private Military Company (PMC) “To the Chief of the General Staff: you're a f***ot and a f*cking *sshole and we're sitting here not f*cking helping We're fighting against the entire Ukrainian army here at Bakhmut There's nothing else to f*cking call you where are you all?” – say the men in the video The press service of Concord, a company owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin, founder of the Wagner PMC, commented that Prigozhin was currently “unavailable” and could not comment on the video Ukraine’s president reports nearly 400 artillery strikes by Russian forces in a single day in the east News | World President Zelensky has claimed Ukrainian forces are “destroying the potential of the occupiers” in the south of the country as battles rage in the Donbas Some of the Kremlin’s troops which fled the southern city of Kherson in recent weeks have been moved to reinforce Russia positions in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions Ukraine’s leader reported the “fiercest battles” were taking place in Donetsk Speaking in his latest nightly video address Mr Zelensky said: “Although there were fewer attacks today due to worsening weather the amount of Russian shelling unfortunately remains extremely high we are slowly moving forward while fighting there have been almost 400 artillery attacks in the east since the start of the day” Mr Zelensky said troops in the south were “consistently and very calculatedly destroying the potential of the occupiers” UK defence chiefs on Monday reported intense fire between Russian and Ukrainian forces around the city of Svatove in the north-eastern Luhansk region over the past week Russian forces continue to prioritise constructing defensive positions almost certainly partially manned by poorly trained mobilised reservists,” the Ministry of Defence said in its latest intellogence update The Svatove area is now a “more vulnerable operational flank of the Russian force,” and its leaders will likely see retaining control of it as a “political priority” commanders are likely struggling with the military realities of maintaining a credible defence while also attempting to resource offensive operations further south in Donetsk “Both Russian defensive and offensive capability continues to be hampered by severe shortages of munitions and skilled personnel.” It comes as the UN nuclear watchdog warned that forces responsible for firing artillery at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant at the weekend was “playing with fire” Support for Ukraine has created ‘capability gaps’ for UK forces Ukraine renews missile appeal after US and UK fail to reach deal in Washington Make education a priority with help from these acclaimed resources The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said more than a dozen blasts shook the Russian-occupied nuclear plant late on Saturday and yesterday IAEA head Rafael Grossi said the attacks were extremely disturbing Russia and Ukraine blamed each other for the shelling of the facility as they have done repeatedly in recent months UN inspectors were planning to visit the plant today to check for damage Mr Zelensky’s latest address came a day after Rishi Sunak conducted his first visit to the war-torn country Britain’s prime minister anounced a £50 million package of defence aid comprising 125 anti-aircraft guns and technology to help Ukraine counter Iranian-supplied drones including radars and anti-drone technology Prince Louis steals the show at VE Day parade as he keeps dad William looking sharp and mimics brother George Prince Louis steals show with sweet antics at VE parade VE Day 2025 fashion: best looks from the day VE Day 2025 fashion: Princess of Wales to Lady Victoria Starmer Ukraine 'launches stunning Kursk offensive' in major blow for Putin ahead of Victory Day celebrations Ukraine 'launches stunning Kursk offensive' in blow for Putin New visa crackdown as Home Office plans to restrict applications from nationalities most likely to overstay New visa crackdown as Home Office plans to restrict applications Man charged after London student nurse stabbed to death in Texas 'in row over cat' Man charged after London student nurse stabbed to death in Texas His focus is on covering news and politics in Texas as well as other general news across the United States James joined Newsweek in July 2022 from LBC and previously worked for the Daily Express You can get in touch with James by emailing j.bickerton@newsweek.com A Russian commander was seriously injured in Ukraine this week Major General Oleg Tsokov, Commander of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division, was reportedly wounded in a Ukrainian "fire attack" at his HQ near Svatove Russia has lost a number of generals in Ukrainian attacks since Putin's invasion began on February 24 with Western officials saying they are forced to the frontline by poor moral and discipline among Russian troops Ukrainian forces were already claiming to have killed at least 12 Russian generals by early May The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine wrote on Facebook that Major General Tsokov had been injured as part of their latest "operation update" on the war The post read: "The enemy continues to suffer losses the commander of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division of the 20th Combined Arms Army was wounded as a result of a fire attack in the area of ​​the settlement of Svatove It was evacuated on September 20 of this year." The Ukrainian military typically describes a "fire attack" as one carried out either by artillery or rocket launchers, such as the HIMARS system that has devastated Russian ammunition depots Russia shelled at least 45 Ukrainian settlements primarily in the eastern region of the Donbas according to the operational update on Facebook the Russians said 27 airstrikes and 75 multiple launch rocket system strikes were conducted targeting both "military and civilian objects." The update said Russia is continuing to suffer heavy losses and has been forcing men in occupied Ukrainian territory to join its military or allied militias The post read: "From September 19 to 20 this year 105 bodies of dead Russian servicemen were delivered to the military hospital in Rostov-on-Don preparations are underway to receive another 200 bodies in the near future the enemy continues forced mobilization in temporarily occupied territories representatives of the 1st Army Corps detained and took ten men to military service has been supplying Ukraine with intelligence to help with these strikes according to senior American officials speaking to The New York Times On Wednesday, President Putin announced a partial mobilization, which will see 300,000 Russian reservists conscripted back into the military Referendums will be held in the Russian-controlled parts of Donetsk Kherson and Zaporizhzhia on formally joining the Russian Federation though these have been rejected as shams by Western officials According to Novaya Gazeta Europe, an independent Russian newspaper, a hidden clause in Putin's mobilization decree will allow the military to draft 1 million people rather than the 300,000 claimed by Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu Newsweek has contacted the Russian Foreign Ministry for comment Ukraine’s General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks near Synkivka (9 km northeast of Kupyansk) Novoyehorivka (16 km southwest of Svatove) and in Serebryanske forestry (10 km south of Kreminna) The institute cited a pro-Kremlin military blogger who said on November 7 that Russians were advancing west of Pershotravneve (20 km east of Kupyansk) US researchers found no visual evidence to support this claim It was also claimed that the movement of Russian troops was strenuous due to dense minefields in the area The spokesperson for the Land Forces Command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Lyman and Bakhmut directions lost 1,826 personnel and 200 pieces of military equipment including 22 tanks and 54 armored combat vehicles units of the Western Group of Russian troops repelled two Ukrainian attacks southeast of Kupyansk near the village of Tymkivka (20 km southeast of Kupyansk) Constant missile attacks and empty streets: how Kupyansk lives on the front line. This city in Kharkiv Oblast is 10-15 km/ 6–9 miles from the front line and 40 km/ 25 miles from the border with Russia Evacuation in Kharkiv Oblast: almost 3,000 residents left frontline Kupiansk District Kharkiv Oblast to prepare forced evacuation of families with children from 10 settlements — governor. The region’s authorities are preparing a decision on the forced evacuation of frontline localities, the head of the regional military administration, Oleh Syniehubov, said on October 25. reveals the Russian army has moved to positions west of Serhiivka This video supports Russian assertions that they have taken control of Serhiivka A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces advanced near Lyman Pershyi (12km northeast of Kupyansk) and Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna) on November 11 Russian forces conducted unsuccessful assaults near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk) and the Serebryanske forest area (11km south of Kreminna) on November 12 Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction but are regrouping because Russian forces have not achieved strategic successes in the past month of fighting The institute quotes a Russian milblogger claiming that 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Guimet in Paris Ukrainian troops are outnumbered and outgunned as they try to contain a Russian offensive A few hours after leaving the front line of his brigade's positions in the middle of the Serebryansʹkyy forest looked exhausted and pounced on a bottle of water and a piece of meat in the bunker that served as his command center he described arriving with his men on the afternoon of Thursday and his surprise at being caught in a massive artillery barrage signaling the imminent launch of a new Russian assault against Ukrainian positions He promptly decided to withdraw to the rear at the risk of being hit by the mortar shells falling heavily around him he remembered a huge explosion and the other men's astonishment Only later would he be informed that a Russian BTR-MD Rakushka had just been blown up on a Ukrainian mine during an attempt to breach their defenses in the headquarters of the brigade recently deployed at one of the most violent points of the front line in northeastern Ukraine the commander proudly indicated on a map the location of the previous day's explosion around a hundred meters from where he was positioned It's hard to think that his soldiers from his brigade had laid the mine that blew up the BTR-MD only the day before the attack The colonel seemed to have regained his composure after narrowly escaping death we have to be better," he explained to his soldiers justifying his ventures into extremely risky positions "I am here to support my men in battle," he said soberly You have 83.41% of this article left to read Lecture du Monde en cours sur un autre appareil Vous pouvez lire Le Monde sur un seul appareil à la fois Ce message s’affichera sur l’autre appareil Parce qu’une autre personne (ou vous) est en train de lire Le Monde avec ce compte sur un autre appareil Vous ne pouvez lire Le Monde que sur un seul appareil à la fois (ordinateur En cliquant sur « Continuer à lire ici » et en vous assurant que vous êtes la seule personne à consulter Le 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