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The ultra-luxury performance car brand is targeting outright victory at the 24 Hours of Le Mans for the first time since 1959
as it embarks upon a thrilling new chapter in its illustrious motorsport history with what will be the only production-derived Hypercar on the grid
emblazoned in a stunning green colour scheme synonymous with many of the great British glories in the race
Developed by Aston Martin Performance Technologies in conjunction with The Heart of Racing (THOR)
the race-tuned Valkyrie is consequently a unique proposition in FIA WEC
and is based upon a road car that was jointly conceived by Aston Martin Chief Creative Officer
“It would be almost unimaginable for Adrian
one of the greatest racing car designers in history
to design a car and not think about it going racing at some point,” commented Aston Martin’s Head of Endurance Motorsport
“The Aston Martin Valkyrie is a revolution in automotive engineering history
“The race car shares many strands of DNA with the road car
With an extraordinary fusion of F1 technology and road car mastery
the Valkyrie is truly built for racing and its participation at the highest level of global endurance racing will only further cement its technological achievement.”
On the driving strength, Harry Tincknell and Alex Riberas were announced back in November and will be partnered
by rising British star Tom Gamble and three-time FIA WEC class champion Marco Sørensen
with Ross Gunn and Roman De Angelis coming on-board for the longer events
Former European Le Mans Series (ELMS) title-holder Tincknell clinched LMGTE Pro honours at the 24 Hours of Le Mans in an Aston Martin Vantage in 2020
and spent last season contesting FIA WEC’s headlining Hypercar category in Proton Competition’s Porsche
Countryman Gamble is a fellow ELMS champion – at LMP3 level – and similarly boasts both LMP2 and GT experience
while Aston Martin Racing works driver Gunn is a multiple race-winner with the marque in IMSA competition
The trio will form an all-British partnership in the #007 entry at La Sarthe in mid-June
Riberas steps up to the discipline’s top-flight after triumphing in an Aston Martin Vantage in FIA WEC’s LMGT3 division at COTA last season
The Spaniard will be flanked by Danish ace Sørensen – the brand’s most successful active racing driver and a class-winner at Le Mans three years ago – and
“Harry was heavily involved in the development of the Valkyrie
so we wanted to incorporate him early on into the test programme,” explained Team Principal Ian James
whose Heart of Racing Team is masterminding the factory Hypercar effort
“He very quickly identified himself as a good team player
“I rate Tom very highly as a natural talent
and he deserves a chance in the spotlight at the highest level of sportscar racing
Ross has been with us for the past four years and has become
one of the best GT drivers in the world – he has a feel for a race car that not many drivers have
“Alex has been proving himself in GTD Pro in IMSA over the past couple of seasons
is an established race-winner and excelled in FIA WEC with us last year
He’s definitely part of the fabric of Heart of Racing Team and deserves his seat
“Marco is among the most experienced drivers ever to race for Aston Martin
and he’s waited a long time for his chance in the top class
Having worked with him and having seen his ability and how cool he is under pressure
I think he’s a perfect fit for this project
I first drove with him in 2018 and he’s gone from strength-to-strength
He’s won the AMR Academy and the IMSA GTD championship
and he’s become an out-and-out performer.”
the Valkyrie has embarked upon a comprehensive evaluation programme
completing more than 15,000km on circuits throughout Europe
With barely three weeks until the car makes its world competition debut in Qatar
“You can always be further up the road
but I couldn’t be happier in terms of how everything is integrated and with the reliability we’ve shown,” he mused
“For anybody that’s been involved in sportscar racing
to be running a car at the premier level with Aston Martin
and a car that is widely accepted as one of the most beautiful in the world – the only one that is the genuine progeny of a road car – is a real honour
To be entrusted with this programme is most definitely a career highlight.”
“This is a proud moment for Aston Martin,” echoed Adrian Hallmark
Chief Executive Officer of Aston Martin Lagonda
“To be returning to the fight for overall honours at the 24 Hours of Le Mans exists at the very core of our values and marks a key milestone in our motor racing heritage
The Valkyrie is an embodiment of our enduring sporting ethos
which has defined the brand for more than a century.”
they are also tempered by the reality of going up against more experienced rivals in a high-calibre Hypercar field
featuring no fewer than seven other major manufacturers all with at least one season in the championship under their belt
we are doing this because we want to win,” acknowledged Carter
we respect the challenge of the events and the competition
[The other brands] are already established and at a high level
and that’s why we want to compete against them
it is only worth winning if it’s against strong competition
“The ACO (Automobile Club de l’Ouest)
IMSA and the FIA have collectively created championships of growing popularity through working collaboratively
They have done a great job of establishing the format and promoting the series’ to make this a golden era
and it’s an opportunity to compete on the global stage in a fair and competitive environment
This is a great time to be joining the pinnacle of endurance racing.”
The eight-round 2025 campaign will get underway with the curtain-raising Qatar 1812km on 28 February
preceded by the traditional ‘Prologue’ group test at the same circuit on 21-22 February
This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report
CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979
This transnational coalition is comprised of state
and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests
Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader
Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial
and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions
Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction
while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence
Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives
which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East
Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy
We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting
We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports
Iranian armed forces-run Defa Press published a list of potential civilian and military targets in Israel on August 5
which likely aims to decrease Israel’s ability to effectively defend against an Iranian attack by causing Israel to disperse its air- and missile-defense assets and creating panic among civilians.[1] The list includes Israeli military bases and government sites like the Israeli Defense Ministry in Tel Aviv
Iran also named civil infrastructure sites like airports
and power plants throughout the country.[2] Iran may or may not try to attack any of these targets or others
Iran’s decision to explicitly name these targets
likely seeks to cause the Israel Defense Forces to disperse air- and missile-defense assets across a wide area
Iran may calculate that by causing Israel to spread out its defenses
this information effort will increase the likelihood that Iran can hit some of its targets
The US-Israeli coalition intercepted the majority of Iranian drones and missiles outside of Israel during the April 13
2024 attack on Israel.[3] Drones and missiles fired from Iraq
and Syria would be much harder to intercept than those launched from Iran given the shorter distances and flight times to Israel
The target list is not necessarily an indicator of what exact targets Iran will strike in response to Israel’s targeted killing of Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran
These targets are not all proportionate with Haniyeh's killing
and publishing some of the targets likely seeks to create informational and economic effects instead of identifying precise targets
Other targets would be significant escalations and seem likely to cause civilian causalities
which Iran would likely calculate is counter-productive to efforts to establish deterrence with Israel
Iran’s identification of targets in Israel does not independently verify CTP-ISW's assessment of a likely Iranian strike because it is more likely intended to achieve informational effects rather than to specify the precise targets to be struck
Iran’s messaging does align with CTP-ISW's assessment that Iran and its Axis of Resistance will most likely conduct a coordinated
large-scale drone and missile attack on Israel
however.[6] The operation could involve Lebanese Hezbollah
and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducting coordinated strikes on Israel at the same time as Iranian forces
the Houthis and Iraqi militias have all expressed an intent to attack Israel.[7] CTP-ISW has observed unconfirmed reports that additional groups
such as Iranian-backed militias in Syria and Palestinian fighters in the West Bank may participate in an Iranian-led attack.[8]
Israel’s security cabinet is discussing preemptive strikes in response to Iranian messaging detailing its planned attack
These details include the participation of Iranian-backed groups throughout the region
Hamas and Iran also reportedly directed Palestinian militias in Tulkarm to conduct an infiltration attack into Israel in the immediate future as part of a response to Israel’s killing of Haniyeh.[12] The IDF conducted preemptive strikes in Tulkarm on August 3
which killed nine Palestinian fighters and destroyed the militia cell responsible for planning the infiltration attack.[13]
Western sources and regional notices to airmen (NOTAM) suggest that an Iranian attack on Israel may occur in the next day
The Biden Administration reportedly told members of Congress on August 5 that an Iranian strike may occur as soon as August 5 or 6.[14] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken separately told counterparts at the G7 on August 4 that Iran might begin its attack in the next two to three days.[15] Iranian authorities issued a NOTAM for the center
warning of likely disruption to GPS and navigational signals.[16] Iran issued a similar warning on April 13 when it conducted its first direct large-scale missile and drone attack on Israel.[17] Jordanian authorities also issued a NOTAM
requesting all airlines in Jordan to carry 45 minutes of reserve fuel for "operational reasons."[18] Iran and the Axis of Resistance have a shrinking window of opportunity to attack Israel before the United States completes the transfer of additional military assets to the Middle East
The United States is reportedly sending a carrier strike group
and a squadron of fighter jets to the Middle East in preparation for an Iranian-led attack on Israel.[19] The arrival of these assets to the region would improve the ability of the United States to respond to an Iranian attack
which Iranian leaders almost certainly recognize
The troop deployment comes after Shin Bet received a warning that Hamas and Iran have directed Palestinian militias in Tulkarm planned to conduct an infiltration attack into Israel in the immediate term in response to a series of Israeli strikes that killed senior Axis of Resistance officials in recent days.[21] The military correspondent claimed that the Shin Bet assessed that there was an ”imminent threat” of an attack
prompting the IDF to conduct preemptive strikes in Tulkarm on August 3
which killed nine Palestinian fighters and destroyed the militia cell responsible for planning the infiltration attack.[22] The additional troops deployed across the border areas will act as a quick reaction force in the event of an attack into Israel from the West Bank.[23] Unspecified Israeli security officials claimed that Iran and Hamas are trying to draw Israel’s attention to the West Bank and prevent the Israelis from conducting an operation targeting Lebanese Hezbollah in Lebanon.[24]
Iran and Russia are continuing to promote increased cooperation ahead of the Iranian retaliatory strike against Israel
Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu met with various high-ranking Iranian officials in Tehran on August 5.[25] Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian invited Shoigu to visit Tehran in a phone call in May 2024.[26] Shoigu’s visit may have been prearranged prior to Haniyeh’s death
but senior Iranian and Russian officials would have still needed to deliberately decide to go forward with the visit in the context of the current heightened regional tension
It is notable in this context that Shoigu told Iranian officials that Russia is ready for ”all-around cooperation” with Iran in regional affairs.[27] Official Iranian readouts reported that Shoigu expressed a desire to increase political and economic relations in a meeting with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.[28] Pezeshkian condemned the killing of former Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh
Pezeshkian stated that Iran will ”receive answers” for this crime but that ”[Iran] is not seeking to expand the scope of this crisis in the region.” Shoigu separately met with Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri
Shoigu and Bagheri discussed increasing bilateral defense and military issues.[29] Shoigu condemned Haniyeh’s killing in Tehran and stated that whoever is responsible aimed to escalate regional tensions.[30]
Shoigu likely also sought to coordinate with Iranian officials ahead of the strike given the implications an Iranian strike launched in part from Lebanon and Syria could have for Russian forces in Syria.[31] Russia has military facilities at Khmeimim
in western Syria and maintains some military police forces in southwestern Syria.[32] Shoigu is expected to hold an additional meeting with Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian on August 5.[33]
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi in Tehran on August 4.[34] Pezeshkian stated that Israel made a ”big mistake” by killing Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31
Safadi stated that the killing of Haniyeh was an attempt by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to ”expand the scope” of regional conflicts
Pezeshkian expressed hope that Jordan and Iran could improve diplomatic relations
Jordan indicated that it may also shoot down projectiles that enter Jordanian airspace
should Iran and the Axis of Resistance launch another attack on Israel.[35] Safadi previously stated that Jordan will ”face” anyone who violates Jordanian airspace
Safadi also previously stated that Jordan ”will not become a battlefield.” CTP-ISW previously reported on August 4 that Safadi travelled to Tehran reportedly as part of a last-ditch effort to dissuade Iran from attacking Israel.[36] This marks the first visit of a senior Jordanian official to Iran in 20 years.[37]
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias likely conducted a rocket attack targeting US forces at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province
Iraq on August 5.[42] The rocket attack reportedly injured several US personnel
according to three US officials speaking to Reuters.[43] The militias reportedly fired two Iranian-made Arash 122mm rockets that impacted the interior of the base and hit a fuel tank.[44] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias previously targeted Ain al Asad Airbase with multiple rockets on July 26
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian announced three new appointments in his government on August 4.[46] Pezeshkian announced the appointments of the following positions:
The IDF Air Force struck and killed the commander of Hamas’ Sheikh Radwan Battalion in Sheikh Radwan
on August 4.[60] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Air Force struck two Hamas command and control sites in the Hassan Salameh and Nasr schools in Sheikh Radwan on August 4.[61] The IDF Arabic spokesperson confirmed on August 5 that the IDF killed Jaber Aziz
The IDF Air Force struck and killed Hamas’ Minister of Economy for the Gaza Strip Abdel Fattah al Zarii in the Gaza Strip on August 4.[67] The IDF said Zarii also worked at the weapons production headquarters of the al Qassem Brigades
The al Qassem Brigades’ production headquarters is tasked with improving Hamas’ weapons capabilities through coordination and “exchanging knowledge” with other “terrorist” groups in the Middle East
according to the IDF.[68] The IDF said that Zarii was responsible for distributing fuel
and funds for Hamas’ activities.[69] Zarii also reportedly managed Hamas-controlled markets and Hamas' takeover of humanitarian aid entry into the Gaza Strip.[70]
Hamas fighters detonated an anti-personnel mine targeting an IDF armored personnel carrier in Tal al Hawa
Palestinian militias conducted mortar attacks targeting Israeli forces along the Netzarim Corridor on August 5.[72] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades separately mortared IDF personnel and vehicles along the corridor.[73]
Hamas conducted three attacks targeting Israeli forces in the al Faraheen area
Hamas detonated an anti-personnel mine targeting Israeli forces positioned in a building in the al Faraheen area in Abasan al Kabira
east of Khan Younis.[78] Hamas also fired small arms and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) targeting Israeli personnel and armor in the area.[79] A Palestinian journalist reported on August 5 that IDF vehicles advanced into al Faraheen.[80] The IDF has not commented on its presence there as of this writing
due to the large scale of smuggling enabled by the tunnels.[85] The IDF has located 30 cross-border tunnels that enabled smuggling along the Philadelphi Corridor and over 100 kilometers of tunnels in Rafah in total.[86] The correspondent reported that the IDF has not found all underground smuggling routes it estimates exist beneath the Philadelphi Corridor and continues to excavate and destroy tunnels.[87] Rafah is home to the most extensive underground tunnel system in the Gaza Strip
according to the IDF.[88] The correspondent noted that Hamas’ Rafah Brigade specializes in tunnel excavation.[89] An unnamed high-ranking Egyptian source denied Israeli reports of active tunnels between the Gaza Strip and Egypt
Palestinian fighters continued to engage Israeli forces in Rafah on August 5.[91] Three Palestinian militias conducted separate mortar attacks targeting Israeli personnel and vehicles at the Rafah crossing.[92] Hamas fighters detonated three improvised explosive devices targeting Israeli forces in Zalata
Palestinian militias launched at least 15 rockets from the southern Gaza Strip targeting southern Israel on August 5.[94] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired rockets targeting Kibbutz Re’im and lightly injured a civilian.[95] The Mujahideen Brigades also fired rockets targeting Re’im.[96] The IDF reported that some rockets impacted in Re’im and Gama Junction.[97]
Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact
Israeli media reported that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu added a new ceasefire condition that would require all Palestinian fighters released from Israeli prisons to be deported to foreign countries rather than returning to the Gaza Strip or West Bank.[98] Channel 13 reported that the foreign countries would include Turkey and Qatar
citing “sources familiar with the details.”[99] Hamas has not commented upon this reported condition as of this writing
Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least ten locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on August 4.[105] Palestinian militias including the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades
and the Mujahideen Brigades engaged Israeli forces in at least eight locations across Jenin Governorate in the West Bank.[106] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) and fired small arms targeting an IDF vehicle in Jenin.[107] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades separately targeted Israeli forces in Tulkarm and Nablus
in the West Bank.[108] PIJ fired small arms and detonated IEDs targeting Israeli forces in at least six locations across Jenin.[109]
The IDF reported that unspecified individuals fired small arms in Beka’ot settlement in Jordan Valley
on August 5.[110] The IDF claimed that there were no casualties
The IDF launched a search operation in the area following the shooting.[111]
This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank
have conducted at least 10 attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on August 4.[112] Hezbollah launched a drone wave targeting the barracks of the IDF 91st division in Ayelet HaShahar on August 5.[113] The IDF attempted to intercept “suspicious aerial targets it identified,” but did not confirm if the interceptors successfully shot down the drones
moderately injuring an IDF soldier and officer.[114] The attack also started a small fire in the area.[115] Hezbollah claimed the attack
adding that the attack was in response to previous Israeli strikes.[116]
A separate Hezbollah drone attack targeting an unidentified site in Malkia
on August 5 crossed into Israel despite IDF detection and fell on Malkia
The attack caused no casualties.[117] The IDF detected two unclaimed drone attacks likely launched by Hezbollah on August 5
The IDF intercepted one drone over Western Galilee and another drone over Metula.[118]
Local Syrian media reported that an Israeli airstrike injured the head of Hezbollah’s drone unit at Dabaa military airport in Homs Province
Syria.[119] CTP-ISW previously reported that the IDF reportedly struck Dabaa military airport on August 2.[120] Syrian media reported on August 4 that Hussein Burji
was critically injured in a hangar at Dabaa airport.[121] Burji reportedly assumed his command of Hezbollah‘s drone unit after Israel killed the former Hezbollah Air Force commander and Burji’s brother
at a Radwan commander’s funeral in January 2024.[122] Dabaa Airport notably facilitates Iranian weapons shipments for Hezbollah.[123]
Iranian-backed Iraqi parliamentarians issued separate statements criticizing the US and the Iraqi Federal Government for failing to produce a timeline for the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq on August 4.[124] Ali Turki
a member of Asaib Ahl al Haq’s Sadiqoun Bloc in parliament
claimed that US officials have stalled withdrawal negotiations and have not agreed to an immediate or scheduled withdrawal.[125] Badr Organization member of parliament Mahdi Taqi separately demanded that the Iraqi federal government set a date for the expulsion of US and foreign forces.[126] Taqi noted that the Iraqi parliament passed a law to expel US forces
likely a reference to the 2020 non-binding resolution that requested the Iraqi federal government cancel the US-led international coalition’s anti-ISIS mission in Iraq.[127] The resolution is non-binding because US forces in Iraq are there under an executive agreement
meaning that only the prime minister can decide to expel them.[128]
US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken spoke with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani to discuss regional security developments and ongoing US-Iraq Higher Military Commission negotiations on August 4.[129] The Higher Military Commission
which is comprised of US and Iraqi military officials
began evaluating the status of the US-led international coalition in Iraq in late January 2024 and most recently met in Washington
on July 23.[130] The US Department of State emphasized the importance of protecting US forces in Iraq while the Higher Military Commission continued negotiations and determines how the US-led coalition will transition to bilateral US-Iraqi relations.[131]
and al Tanak oil fields.[133] The report did not specify which militias would conduct the attacks against US forces
Fatemiyoun commander Abdul Baqir Alawi reportedly also ordered the transfer of “heavy weapons” that are “believed to contain medium-range missiles and drones” to the Albu Kamal countryside.[134] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran and its Axis of Resistance may target US forces in Syria as part of a retaliatory strike for Israel killing several Axis of Resistance leaders.[135] CTP-ISW cannot verify this local reporting
Iranian Acting Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani continued to discuss regional tensions in phone calls with several other foreign ministers on August 4 and 5.[136] Bagheri Kani claimed that Israel violated international law
adding that Iran had a "right" to defend "its security
sovereignty and territorial integrity" in his call with Slovenian Foreign Minister Tanja Fajon on August 4.[137] Bagheri Kani also spoke to Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid al Zayani on August 5 and stressed that any silence surrounding "Israel's evils" is a detriment to peace in the region.[138] Zayani and Fajon reiterated their support for a ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war
[1] https://defapress dot ir/en/news/84861/the-list-of-possible-targets-of-the-axis-of-resistance-in-the-occupied-territories
dot ir/en/news/84861/the-list-of-possible-targets-of-the-axis-of-resistance-in-the-occupied-territories
[3] https://x.com/IDF/status/1779503384434819454
[4] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032924
[5] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-99-of-the-300-or-so-projectiles-fired-by-iran-at-israel-overnight-were-intercepted/ ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/01/26/3068021/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-31-2024
[7] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/682358 ; https://t.me/Akram_Alkaabi/148 ; https://x.com/kann_news/status/1820199318311067752 ; www dot almanar.com.lb/12296814
[8] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1820313823691108385 ; https://eyeofeuphrates dot com/ar/news/2024/08/03/11682 ; https://euphratespost dot net/%d9%81%d8%a7%d8%b7%d9%85%d9%8a%d9%88%d9%86-%d8%b1%d8%a3%d8%b3-%d8%ad%d8%b1%d8%a8%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d8%b1%d8%b3-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ab%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d9%88%d8%a7/
dot com/liveblog_entry/pm-security-chiefs-meet-ahead-of-anticipated-iran-hezbollah-attacks-said-considering-preventive-actions/
[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-4-2024
[11] https://eyeofeuphrates dot com/ar/news/2024/08/03/11682
[12] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1820313823691108385
[13] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1820313828803985775 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-3-2024
[14] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/08/05/israel-gaza-strike-hezbollah-iran/
[15] https://www.axios.com/2024/08/05/iran-hezbollah-attack-israel-monday-blinken ; https://www.israelhayom dot com/2024/08/05/iran-airspace-restrictions-reported-as-us-warns-of-imminent-strike-on-israel/
[16] https://www.notams.faa.gov/dinsQueryWeb/queryRetrievalMapAction.do?reportType=Raw&retrieveLocId=oiix&actionType=notamRetrievalbyICAOs
[17] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-warns-pilots-to-avoid-airspace-as-middle-east-awaits-attack-0682f78e
[18] https://x.com/IranIntl_En/status/1820485399627931787
[19] https://www.npr.org/2024/08/03/nx-s1-5062390/us-military-deployment-middle-east-israel-iran
[20] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1820313823691108385
[21] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1820313826232807704 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/12600
[22] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1820313828803985775 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-3-2024
[23] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1820313826232807704
[24] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1820313831261765732
[25] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/682844/ ; https://www.hamshahrionline dot ir /news/872146/
[26] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/03/08/3094434
[27] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/682824/
[28] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/682844/
[29] https://www.hamshahrionline dot ir /news/872146/
[30] https://www.hamshahrionline dot ir /news/872146/ ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/682824/
[31] https://mei.edu/publications/tiger-forces-16th-brigade-russias-evolving-syrian-proxies
[32] https://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/56351 ; https://mei.edu/publications/tiger-forces-16th-brigade-russias-evolving-syrian-proxies
[33] https://t.me/tass_agency/264447 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/21532667
[35] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-rebuffs-calls-for-restraint-in-its-response-to-killing-of-hamas-leader-309314e7?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2 ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/coalition-that-thwarted-irans-april-drone-and-missile-attack-again-taking-shape-report/
[36] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-4-2024
[37] https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/jordans-top-diplomat-make-rare-visit-iran-regional-112552023
[38] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1820491275998822666 ; https://www.axios.com/2024/08/05/iran-hezbollah-attack-israel-monday-blinken
[39] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1820491275998822666
[40] www dot timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/gallant-meets-us-centcom-chief-kurilla-to-discuss-defense-cooperation/
[41] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/cnn-hamas-more-intact-than-idf-says-action-in-central-gaza-limited-since-hostages-believed-held-there/
[42] https://x.com/RudawEnglish/status/1820532337710653625
[43] https://twitter.com/PHREUTERS/status/1820566940005380540
[44] https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1820540359371563339 ; https://x.com/timourazhari/status/1820531979475169284 ; https://x.com/OALD24/status/1820532618603155753 ; https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/1820532002296352860
[45]https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-26-2024
[47] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/05/14/3133600; https://president dot ir/fa/153337; https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/1940575
[48]https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/c3gw5ynq8w2o
[49]https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/c3gw5ynq8w2o
[50]https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/c3gw5ynq8w2o
[51]https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/c3gw5ynq8w2o
[52] https://president dot ir/fa/153333; https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/501977/Hamid-Pour-Mohammadi-appointed-as-new-PBO-head;
[53] https://www.iranintl.com/202408042969
[54] https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1820041964055646400; Iran International; https://president dot ir/fa/153339
[55] https://www.iranintl.com/202408042969
[56] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/05/14/3133543
[57] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/05/14/3134023
[58] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/05/14/3133595
[59] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/05/15/3134600
[60] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1820502591228325914; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/order-battle-hamas%E2%80%99-izz-al-din-al-qassem-brigades-part-2
[61] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-4-2024
[62] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1820502591228325914
[63] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1820502591228325914
[64] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1820502591228325914
[65] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1820502591228325914
[66] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1820502591228325914
[67] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1820366033552556123; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1820367365617463478; https://x.com/kann_news/status/1820367706492690742
[68] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1820366033552556123; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1820366036127871092
[69] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1820366038229274827
[70] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1820366038229274827
[72] https://t.me/sarayaps/18440; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6985
[73] https://t.me/sarayaps/18440; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6985
[74] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1820426898121392226
[75] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-4-2024
[76] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1820426898121392226
[77] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1820426898121392226
[79] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2853; https://t.me/qassambrigades/31530
[82] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-4-2024
https://alqaheranews dot net/news/90536/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%89-%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A3%D9%86%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9
مصدر رفيع المستوى ينفي ادعاءات إسرائيل بوجود أنفاق عاملة بين مصر وغزة | القاهرة الاخبارية
نفى مصدر رفيع المستوى، اليوم الاثنين، ما تتداوله وسائل إعلام إسرائيلية حول وجود أنفاق عاملة بين مصر وقطاع غزة
[91] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4378; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6980; https://t.me/sarayaps/18435; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6973 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2852 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2858
[92] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4378; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6980; https://t.me/sarayaps/18435
[94] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1820391956649746768 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1820392543080640711
[95] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6974; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1820392543080640711
[97] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1820391956649746768
[98] https://13tv.co dot il/item/news/politics/state-policy/dptfq-904184097/
[99] https://13tv.co dot il/item/news/politics/state-policy/dptfq-904184097/
[104] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/khaled-meshaal-who-survived-israeli-assassination-attempt-tipped-be-new-hamas-2024-07-31/
[105] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6970 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6971 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6972 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6976 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6977 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6979 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6982 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1401 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1404 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1404 ;
[106] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6976 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6977 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6979 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1397 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/18438 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6982 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1401 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6983 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1404 ; https://t.me/khalaya_almujahidin/14808 ; https://t.me/khalaya_almujahidin/14809
[108] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6970 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6971
[109] https://t.me/sarayajneen/1397 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/18438 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1401 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/18439 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1404 ;
[110] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1820338737303146800
[111] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1820338737303146800
[112] https://t.me/mmirleb/5872; https://t.me/mmirleb/5879; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1820329140572045506; https://t.me/mmirleb/5881; https://t.me/mmirleb/5883; https://t.me/mmirleb/5885; https://t.me/mmirleb/5887; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1820401858164224067; https://t.me/mmirleb/5889; https://t.me/mmirleb/5891
[114] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/two-idf-soldiers-moderately-wounded-in-hezbollah-drone-attack-on-north/
[115] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/two-idf-soldiers-moderately-wounded-in-hezbollah-drone-attack-on-north/
[117] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1820329140572045506
[118] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1820329140572045506; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1820401858164224067
[119] https://euphratespost dot net/مصادر-خاصة-تكشف-عن-اسم-القيادي-اللبنان
[120] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-3-2024
[121] https://euphratespost dot net/مصادر-خاصة-تكشف-عن-اسم-القيادي-اللبنان
[122] https://euphratespost dot net/مصادر-خاصة-تكشف-عن-اسم-القيادي-اللبنان ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-9-2024
[123] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-3-2023; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/new-lebanese-reports-say-alleged-israeli-strike-targeted-syrias-dabaa-airport-in-known-hezbollah-smuggling-area ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/12531
[124] https://alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=198743; https://alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=198748
[125] https://alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=198765 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-9-2024
[126] https://alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=198743
[127] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iraqs-parliament-votes-end-us-troop-presence-iraq
[128] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-5-2024
[129] https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-iraqi-prime-minister-sudani-2/
[130] https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3848346/readout-of-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iiis-meeting-with-iraqi-minister/
[131] https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-iraqi-prime-minister-sudani-2/
[132] https://euphratespost dot net/%d9%81%d8%a7%d8%b7%d9%85%d9%8a%d9%88%d9%86-%d8%b1%d8%a3%d8%b3-%d8%ad%d8%b1%d8%a8%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d8%b1%d8%b3-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ab%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d9%88%d8%a7/
[133] https://euphratespost dot net/%d9%81%d8%a7%d8%b7%d9%85%d9%8a%d9%88%d9%86-%d8%b1%d8%a3%d8%b3-%d8%ad%d8%b1%d8%a8%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d8%b1%d8%b3-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ab%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d9%88%d8%a7/
[134] https://euphratespost dot net/%d9%81%d8%a7%d8%b7%d9%85%d9%8a%d9%88%d9%86-%d8%b1%d8%a3%d8%b3-%d8%ad%d8%b1%d8%a8%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d8%b1%d8%b3-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ab%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d9%88%d8%a7/
[135] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-2-2024
[136] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/682635/
[137] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/682635/; www.mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/750953
The update will launch on September 10 and add Japanese voiceover
The major update that introduces a full Japanese voiceover is one equivalent to a full release
Not only can you enjoy the story of the Valkyries fully voiced in Japanese
Network Mode has been fully implemented and now includes 2v2 team matches
We are also planning to implement other features like Ultimate spells
so now’s a better time than ever to join in on the exciting online battles
Keep up fast and flashy combos by parrying and dodging enemy attacks in this game’s characteristic action gameplay
and learn new skills and combos to further flesh out your playstyle
We’re also planning several more updates in the future
Please look forward to the further evolution of Valkyrie of Phantasm
All of the characters in Valkyrie of Phantasm will be voiced by popular voice actresses
You can also check out the trailers on the official website that showcase each character’s voice
as well as messages from the voice actresses
avoiding incoming danmaku while shooting spells…
This is a brand new aerial combat action game project
Enjoy the Valkyries’ aerial battles and their extravagant danmaku
Watch a new trailer below. View a new set of screenshots at the gallery
Reproduction in whole or in part in any form or medium without acknowledgment of Gematsu is prohibited
Use of this site is governed by all applicable laws
Website by 44 Bytes
"If I said we were not under pressure
I would be lying," says anaesthesiologist
Prime Minister Robert Fico underwent a difficult five-hour surgery after the attempt on his life on May 15
many were surprised when he was discharged into home care a little over two weeks later
Fico's shooting in Handlová was an exceptional situation that brought significant pressure on the entire medical team.
"My life stopped functioning for two weeks," Valky said, describing how he and his colleagues tried to keep the department running as normally as possible.
The hospital continued with regular operations, including three liver transplants, despite increased security measures and the presence of guards.
Caring for severely injured patients is not an everyday occurrence, even in the best hospitals. "Everyone asked us if we had experience with similarly seriously injured patients. We don't have many, and almost no one does," Valky admitted.
However, thanks to excellent teams, including doctors with international experience from war zones, as well as modern trauma-centre equipment, they managed to stabilise and treat the prime minister.
Valky emphasised that the psychological pressure was enormous. "If we had failed, I can't imagine what would have happened in Slovakia," he said. The entire team approached the prime minister as an ordinary patient, which helped manage the situation professionally.
"We set clear rules to ensure our department and the entire hospital did not lose their composure," he explained.
During Fico's care, the hospital did not communicate directly with the media, which sparked speculation. Valky explained that this was intentional.
"We are doctors here to care for the patient," he said, adding that the political battle would continue regardless of who provided the information. "I personally asked the hospital management to cut us off from press conferences with journalists."
As he explained, the hospital management received detailed information about Fico's condition. This information was then passed on to Deputy PM and Defence Minister Robert Kaliňák of the Smer party.
"I read Kaliňák's statements, which he released to the media. They were a significant simplification of what we sent to the hospital management," the doctor said. "But there was never any falsehood in it. The minister stated what was true, and he did so very concisely."
Fico's physical condition before the assassination attempt and his attitude were crucial to his quick recovery, the doctor noted.
"The patient was in very good physical condition before. He recovered surprisingly quickly," Valky noted. The prime minister underwent multiple surgeries, highlighting the severity of his injuries but also the success of the medical care.
Valky, who has worked at the hospital for 34 years, expressed his pride in his colleagues and the entire team for handling the challenging situation effectively.
there’s still no getting round how blindingly fast it is
Photog Max EareyGQ is at the Bahrain GP circuit in Sakhir, scene of Fernando Alonso’s brilliant podium finish in his debut race for the Aston Martin F1 team
although our visit pre-dates that by a few weeks
and an Aston Martin representative confidently predicts I’ll top 300km/h (186mph) before applying the brakes for the very tight turn one
And because I don’t want to bury a limited series £2.5m hypercar into the wall in a million shards of carbon fibre
I’m on the brakes a earlier than I should be
Drew GibsonFull disclosure: the prospect of driving the Aston Martin Valkyrie had been making me distinctly nervous
A once-in-a-lifetime opportunity – one only a fool would turn down
But the Valkyrie is an order of magnitude more special than most cars
It isn’t just hugely powerful and monstrously fast
it also has the aerodynamic profile and downforce numbers of a very serious racing car
and past experience has taught me that cars of that ilk need to be driven according to their design
They need proper temperature worked into their tyres and brakes
and if you don’t get them into the window at which the downforce starts to work
Pussy-footing around is simply not an option
GQ was at Aston Martin’s Gaydon HQ in July 2016 when a full-size mock-up of the car was unveiled
where we spoke to one of the prime movers behind it: Red Bull Racing’s Chief Technical Officer
Aston Martin was a sponsor of the serial F1 champions
and was eager to partner with the team in order to create one of the most technically dazzling cars ever conceived
Newey’s F1 machines have won 194 F1 Grands Prix
and 11 constructors’ championships across three different teams
But he’s a restless soul and has always fancied the idea of designing a road car
of channelling his vast intellect and engineering ingenuity into a wholly different sort of challenge
it looked as though the Valkyrie might not actually make it
Perhaps these cars were simply a step too far
There are two Valkyrie coupes sitting in the desert sunshine currently flooding the Sakhir pit garage
along with a solitary AMR Pro track-only version
Newey’s original concept demanded outrageous aerodynamics and minimal weight
parlaying his notorious (in F1 circles) fixation with extreme packaging into a road car of extraordinary proportions
The Valkyrie is right at the limit of what’s possible in a road-legal car
This is one of those cars whose form is defined by what’s missing rather than what’s actually visible
inherited Newey’s sketches (a lunchtime doodle to begin with) and ordinarily would have fleshed them out
Except that the Valkryie is basically an exo-skeleton of a car
four cresting wings over each wheel the only concessions to a design that is almost entirely devoted to aero
The sides are hollowed-out channels of fastidious detail
hustling air around the under-body to suction the car to the ground
A wildly complex front spoiler – more complex
than the front wing on a 2023 F1 car – and huge rear diffuser locate this thing firmly in the motorsport realm
yet part of the Valkyrie’s remit is that it can be driven on the road
and you’ll be introducing the everyday world to a car of almost absurd visual drama
it does have a full body lift to negotiate speed bumps
although I’d give multi-storey car parks a miss
The real thing is borderline claustrophobic
as forbidding and intoxicating as the cockpit of an LMP1 endurance racing car
A minimalist button releases the ultra-lightweight door
and you slide into a space that looks barely big enough for one person
so thin they’re almost non-existent (they weigh just 8kg each
a fraction of a conventional car seat’s weight)
which sounds like an odd position from which to operate a car with this potential but feels natural almost immediately
A little instrument screen sits directly ahead
pulsing with all the usual information but pared down
It’s impossible to imagine doing anything other than concentrating like your life depended on it while strapped into a Valkyrie
The Valkyrie isn’t quite as light as Newey and co were targetting
but with fuel and fluids it weighs about 1,350kg
that means a power-to-weight ratio very close to 1:1
A few other bits of info: the pump that serves the car’s complex hydraulic system is the same one used by an Apache helicopter
the rear stop light is the smallest size it can possibly be
the windscreen wiper uses a torsion bar and is similar in design to the wipers used on the Space Shuttle
and the Aston Martin badge on the Valkyrie’s nose weighs less than a gram
There’s also a lot of aerospace-grade materials in the Valkryie
and so much titanium that Aston Martin actually pushed up the price of the stuff globally while developing this car
(Apparently the Ministry of Defence got in touch to find out what was going on.)
a little prod on a button spinning the e-motor first before the V12 erupts into life
It takes between two and five seconds to build up the necessary oil pressure
Even with a helmet on and ear buds wedged in
The carbon fibre chassis buzzes and thrums with vibrations
not least because the engine is a ‘structural member’
Hook first gear by pulling the right-hand paddle; the Valkyrie uses a seven-speed single clutch sequential gearbox supplied by specialist Ricardo
(A dual-shift ’box would be smoother but was deemed much too heavy.) The Valkyrie gets under way in e-mode only
before the V12 kicks back in and the world changes shape
Drew GibsonIn order to get a feel for the car
I follow endurance racing superstar Darren Turner for a few laps
He’s in a track-prepared version of an Aston Martin Vantage
I’ll be absolutely flat-out on the main straight and you’ll be cruising up right behind me.”
Amidst the gigantic sensory overload that ensues
there’s an unexpected realisation: the Valkyrie is actually pretty easy to drive
We’re in ‘track’ mode (there’s also ‘urban’ and ‘sport’)
but the clever active suspension finds the sweet spot between controlling the body’s movements and allowing some sense of movement
The aero and suspension set-up is designed to work together
The speed is overwhelming, of course, and you arrive everywhere faster than you think, but there’s no sense that the Valkyrie is hunting the edge of a driver’s ability and primed to make a fool of them. It’s amazingly accessible. It’s fitted with Michelin’s excellent Pilot Sport Cup 2 tyres
but really it’s all about that amazing engine and the aerodynamics
The V12 revs to an ear-splitting 11,000rpm
a kind of mechanically-infused banshee wail in second
if you have the space and nerve to extend it
There’s an ERS button for a 140bhp extra slug of electric boost but I’m too busy hanging on to bother with that
Flat-out on the main straight with the rear wing flat to reduce aerodynamic drag
the Valkyrie is generating 600kg of downforce
Specify the ‘Track Pack’ and those numbers are even higher
Aero is all about delivering stability and balance
encouraging the driver to lean on the car in a way that initally feels alien
but the car instils enough confidence to suggest that a day here would have the lap times tumbling
You can throw it into a corner and it just sticks – just don’t think about the money tied up in it
And a word on the Alcon-supplied brakes: the discs are made of carbon ceramic
perfectly modulated and confidence-inspiring
erasing huge speed seemingly in a heartbeat
Aston Martin will make a total of 150 Valkyries
A further 85 Spider versions are coming too
There are those who maintain that this car is a huge folly
that in striving to make it road legal it’s automatically less effective on a circuit
Maybe you’d be better off in a dedicated track car
Getting to this point has been anything but for Aston Martin
and the car I drove was one of two that were hammered around Sakhir for five days without missing a beat
The Valkyrie looks astonishing in the flesh
and has a bandwidth beyond almost anything ever attempted
Anger management with Brett Goldstein
Bella Ramsey on the traumatic The Last of Us episode 8 ending
James McAvoy’s lowkey watch is a people's champion
All the Fleetwood Mac drama that inspired Daisy Jones & the Six
Michael B Jordan on how he got in ring-ready shape for Creed III
And boy does Thompson sell that moment when her lover–a Valkyrie that looks strikingly like the blonde Nordic version from Marvel comics–jumps in front of Thompson’s warrior to save her from Hela’s blades
Another hint as to the depths of Valkyrie’s feelings for her fallen lover is her current state when the audience first meets Thompson in Thor: Ragnarok
Valkyrie is a classic example of a trope that’s as old as time: the former warrior who lost their spouse to violence turns to apathy and alcohol to drown their sorrows
It’s just that usually that character is a man
And it lays a foundation that can be built upon in future films
“There are gay characters in the Marvel Universe” but that Marvel just hasn’t outed them yet
We’re delighted you're perusing our site for all your nerdy news
We'd wholeheartedly appreciate you enabling ads to keep this content free
Watch this quick video and YOU be the judge
It's one thousand eight hundred thirty two cubic centimeters
The motor is anything but silly in a Gold Wing chassis
It's just smooth and pleasing; borderline invisible
But when you take a motor that was designed to politely lug around 900 pounds of airbags
and stereo equipment and shed around 150 pounds of weight things get more interesting
Honda also deserve credit for making the Valky sound the part
but produces an addictive howl when you twist the grip sharply
of torque and sounds like a European sports car doing it
It made me wonder if six cylinders is enough
The Valky is also more comfortable that you might expect
and it's got a muscular parking-lot presence
I can't tell you you'll feel the same way if you ride a Valkyrie
that what I thought was going to be a heavy
stupid answer to a question nobody asked turned out to be one of the biggest surprises of the year for me
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Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine
Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine
These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline
ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45 pm ET on December 10
ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova emphasized that Russia's maximalist objectives in Ukraine have not changed
repeating the Kremlin’s demand for full Ukrainian political capitulation and Kyiv’s acceptance of Russia’s military and territorial demands rather than suggesting any willingness to negotiate seriously
In a written interview with AFP on December 9
regime change.[3] “De-militarization” would obviously leave Ukraine permanently at Russia’s mercy
Zakharova's comments clearly highlight the fact that the initial goals of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine
as set out by Russian President Vladimir Putin on February 24
and that Putin does not intend to end the war unless his maximalist objectives have been accomplished.[4] ISW continues to assess that Russia does not intend to engage in serious negotiations with Ukraine in good faith and that negotiations on Russia's terms are tantamount to full Ukrainian and Western surrender.[5]
Zakharova's demand that Ukraine withdraw its troops from "Russian territory" as a necessary prerequisite for the resolution of the war suggests that Russia's maximalist objectives include controlling the entirety of the four oblasts it has illegally annexed parts of
Russian forces currently militarily control portions of Donetsk
but Russia formally (and illegally) annexed the entirety of these oblasts in September of 2022.[6] Zakharova's suggestion that Ukrainian forces must entirely withdraw from territory that Russia has claimed through its sham annexation suggests that the Russian demands include the surrender of additional Ukrainian territory that Russian forces do not currently control up to the administrative borders of the four occupied oblasts
Calls for Ukraine's capitulation under the current circumstances of Russian control of Ukrainian territory up to the current frontline are already unacceptable from the standpoint of vital Ukrainian and Western national security interests
as ISW has previously assessed.[7] The Russian demand for an even more expansive surrender of Ukrainian-held territory that Russian forces could likely conquer only at the cost of tremendous additional blood
indicates that Russia’s aims far transcend keeping the territory Russian forces have already seized
that Russian forces continue to conduct offensive operations in eastern Kharkiv Oblast
which Russia has not claimed to have annexed
suggesting that Russia’s territorial aims may be even more expansive than those Zakharova laid out
The Kremlin continues to express an increasingly anti-Israel position in the Israel–Hamas war despite feigning interest in being a neutral arbitrator in the conflict
NOTE: A version of this text appears in ISW-CTP's December 10 Iran Update
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a telephone conversation on December 10
Putin reportedly reiterated the Kremlin’s initial rhetorical position on the Israel–Hamas war by claiming that Russia is ready to alleviate civilian suffering and de-escalate the conflict.[10] Putin has increasingly shifted away from this more neutral rhetoric to a much more anti-Israel position in recent weeks
notably claiming that the war is leading to the “extermination of the civilian population in Palestine.”[11] Netanyahu reportedly expressed dissatisfaction with Russian positions towards Israel that Russian officials have articulated at the United Nations (UN) and other multilateral organizations.[12] Netanyahu also reportedly criticized Russia for its “dangerous cooperation” with Iran
notably following Putin’s meeting with Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi in Moscow on December 7.[13] Putin likely aimed to assuage Israeli concerns about Russian support for Hamas and the deepening Russian–Iranian security partnership
but Israeli and Russian rhetoric surrounding the conversation suggests that Putin likely failed to do so.[14] The Kremlin’s increasingly non-neutral framing of the Israel–Hamas war signals potential increasing support for Iranian interests in the region and increased willingness to antagonize Israel.[15]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky traveled to Latin America on December 10 likely in order to secure Latin American support for Ukraine
Zelensky met with Paraguayan President Santiago Peña Palacios
Russian military authorities in Armenia are likely attempting to maintain military power over Armenia amidst the continued deterioration of Armenian-Russian relations
The international human rights organization Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly’s Armenian branch in Vanadzor reported on December 8 that Russian military police at the 102nd Military Base in Gyumri
detained Russian citizen Dmitri Setrakov on December 6 or 7 for desertion.[20] The Russian 519th Military Investigation Department
on Armenian territory.[23] Sakunts called the arrest an “attack on the Armenian legal system and against Armenia as a sovereign state.”[24] Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly-Vanadzor called on the Armenian government
and other law enforcement agencies to protect Setrakov under Armenian law and initiate criminal proceedings against Russian military police in Armenia to prevent Setrakov's extradition.[25] Armenian government officials have not responded to Setrakov’s arrest or Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly-Vanadzor’s statement at the time of this publication
Russian forces conducted a small series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on December 9 and 10
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed a Kh-29 missile and Shahed-136 drone on December 9 and that Russian forces struck Velykyi Burluk
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting
We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas
We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued localized offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on December 10 but did not make any confirmed advances
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled at least seven Russian assaults in the Kupyansk direction near Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk)
Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk) and Novoselivske (16km northwest of Svatove) and at least five Russian assaults in the Lyman direction near Makiivka (23km northwest of Kreminna)
and the Serebryanske forest area (10km south of Kreminna).[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced 1.5 kilometers near Kreminna
although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[32] Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated that poor weather
including freezing rain and sub-zero temperatures
led to a decrease in Russian assaults in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions on December 9.[33] Another Russian milblogger claimed that in the past week Ukrainian forces stabilized the front line near Ivanivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk) and that Russian forces failed to break through Ukrainian defenses near Synkivka due to dense Ukrainian minefields.[34]
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on December 10 and recently made gains
A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces were somewhat successful in the Serebryanske forest area in the past week.[35] Russian sources
including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)
claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults near Synkivka
and the Serebryanske forest area on December 9 and 10.[36]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Bakhmut on December 10 but did not make any confirmed advances
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Vesele (18km northeast of Bakhmut).[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division captured 10 unspecified positions and advanced up to 3.5 kilometers in depth near Vesele.[38] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on December 9 that Russian forces advanced near Vesele and are attempting to encircle the settlement.[39]
Russian forces continued offensive actions west and south of Bakhmut on December 10 and recently made confirmed advances
Geolocated footage published on December 10 indicates that Russian forces advanced north of Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut).[40] Additional geolocated footage published on December 9 indicates that Russian forces advanced north and southeast of Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut).[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps
attempting to cut off Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Bakhmut.[44] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets claimed that Russian forces introduced additional manpower
including elements of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade and unspecified VDV units
into combat in the direction of Chasiv Yar.[45] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled at least 14 Russian attacks near Hryhorivka (9km northwest of Bakhmut)
and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[46] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Klishchiivka and Pivnichne (20km southwest of Bakhmut and just west of Horlivka).[47]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Avdiivka on December 10 and recently made a confirmed advance
Geolocated footage published on December 9 indicates that Russian forces advanced east of Stepove (3km northwest of Avdiivka).[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in Stepove
north of the Avdiivka Coke Plant (on the northwestern outskirts of Avdiivka)
and in the Avdiivka industrial zone southeast of the settlement and attacked in the direction of Novokalynove (13km northeast of Avdiivka).[49] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled at least 39 Russian attacks east of Novobakhmutivka (9km northwest of Avdiivka); near Stepove
Russian forces continued assaults west and southwest of Donetsk City on December 10 and recently made a confirmed advance
Geolocated footage published on December 10 shows Russian forces planting a flag on the southwestern outskirts of Marinka (just west of Donetsk City)
indicating that Russian forces marginally advanced further into Marinka.[54] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces control ”almost all” of Marinka and that Ukrainian forces have withdrawn to positions west of the settlement.[55] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled at least 14 Russian attacks near Marinka
Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City)
and southeast of Vuhledar (26km southwest of Donetsk City).[56] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Marinka and Pobieda.[57]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on December 10 but did not make any confirmed advances
One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces made marginal advances southwest of Staromayorske (10km south of Velyka Novosilka) in the past week
but another milblogger claimed that reports of Russian advances near Staromayorske are premature and that the frontline remains unchanged.[58] ISW has not observed any visual evidence of recent Russian advances in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 10 that Ukrainian forces repelled two Russian attacks near Staromayorske.[59] A Russian milblogger posted footage of the 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division
Eastern Military District) operating north of Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[60] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Novodonetske (15km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[61]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 10 and reportedly made unconfirmed gains
Russian sources claimed on December 9 that Russian forces advanced one kilometer and pushed Ukrainian forces from positions between Robotyne and Novoprokopivka (just south of Robotyne).[62] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces are advancing from Verbove (9km east of Robotyne) and Novofedorivka (15km northeast of Robotyne).[63] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on December 10 that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Verbove
however.[64] Russian milbloggers claimed that poor weather conditions and ice are impeding Russian and Ukrainian ground attacks and armored vehicle movement near Verbove.[65] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled three Russian attacks west of Robotyne and near Novopokrovka (12km northeast of Robotyne).[66]
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued unsuccessful offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 10
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack north of Novoprokopivka
and a prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Robotyne and Verbove .[67] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that the overall number of Ukrainian assaults in the area south of Orikhiv has recently decreased due to the recommitment of select Ukrainian troops to the Avdiivkadirection.[68] Russian sources additionally noted that the ground has mostly frozen around Verbove
and that fighting is ongoing in forest areas.[69] One milblogger stated that Ukrainian forces are still managing to operate combat helicopters along the Robotyne-Verbove line.[70]
Ukrainian forces continued ground operations on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on December 10
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the east bank of the Dnipro River and are striking Russian positions in the area.[71] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continues near Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City) and noted a sustained high tempo of Ukrainian operations in the area.[72] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces captured new positions on Velykyi Potemkin island (southwest of Kherson City)
although ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces already control all of the island.[73] A Russian milblogger amplified footage purporting to show elements of the Russian 28th Motorized Rifle Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division
18th Combined Arms Army) striking Ukrainian positions on islands in the Dnipro River.[74] The Russian MoD posted footage purporting to show unspecified Russian Airborne (VDV) elements conducting aerial reconnaissance of Ukrainian positions on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.[75]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian milbloggers continue to criticize the purported Russian military ban on the use of civilian vehicles for military purposes
A Russian milblogger claimed on December 10 that Russian Directorate of Military Representations officials attempted to seize all Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant (UAZ) off-road vehicles from an unspecified Russian naval infantry unit
ultimately demoralize military personnel.[79]
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are using drones to remotely mine areas along the frontline.[82] The milblogger claimed that Russian drones can carry both OZM
and POM anti-personnel mines and PTM-3 and PTM-4 anti-tank mines.[83]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are upgrading their digital communications kits in T-72B3
and T-90M tanks.[84] Russian news outlet Anna News reported that Sotniki-BL digital communications system first entered service with the 4th Motorized Rifle Battalion (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps) in August 2023
replacing outdated R-173 and R-123 radio communication systems.[85]
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural
Russian authorities continue long-term efforts to indoctrinate Ukrainian students in occupied Ukraine by directing funding to educational institutions in occupied Ukraine
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Lavrov likely also referenced these false historical analogies
which were followed by periods of increased Russian and Soviet geopolitical power
to claim that the war in Ukraine will conclude with a geopolitically empowered Russia that can more widely challenge the West
The analogies are farcical because the current war began with an unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine
whereas Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812 and Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in 1941
The Ukrainian Center for Combating Disinformation reported on December 10 that Russian actors sent false SMS messages to Ukrainian residents in Zaporizhzhia City alleging a planned mass evacuation from the city in December 2023.[90] Russian sources are increasingly promoting information operations aimed at generating Ukrainian social discontent
and Russian actors may want to promote alleged military threats to near rear population centers
even those far outside the realistic potential for Russian advance
in an effort to promote discontent towards Ukrainian leadership.[91]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko met with Equatorial Guinean President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo on December 9 and 10 and stated that Belarus will open an embassy in Malabo in the near future and that Equatorial Guinea will open an embassy in Minsk by the end of 2024.[92]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source
and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports
References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update
[1] https://telegra dot ph/Intervyu-oficialnogo-predstavitelya-MID-Rossii-MVZaharovoj-francuzskomu-informagentstvu-AFP-12-09
[2] https://t.me/MariaVladimirovnaZakharova/6737; https://telegra dot ph/Intervyu-oficialnogo-predstavitelya-MID-Rossii-MVZaharovoj-francuzskomu-informagentstvu-AFP-12-09; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/09/12/2023/657482d09a7947a7686f57aa?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=preview
[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122722; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120822
[4] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/67843; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2023; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031823; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010523
[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar053023; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052623; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122822; https://isw.pub/UkrWar12232022
[6] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignSept19; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignSept20
[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-19; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112723; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23
[8] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/72947 ; https://www.ynetnews dot com/category/3089#bykf8mx8p
[9] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/72947
[10] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/72947
[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2023
[12] https://www.gov dot il/en/departments/news/spoke-russia101223
[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar120723 ; https://www.gov dot il/en/departments/news/spoke-russia101223
[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar102623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120723
[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2023
[16] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/8877 ; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/prezident-ukrayini-proviv-zustrich-iz-prezidentom-ekvadoru-87637
[17] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/u-buenos-ajresi-prezident-ukrayini-proviv-zustrich-iz-prezid-87629 ; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/prezident-ukrayini-v-buenos-ajresi-zustrivsya-z-prezidentom-87633 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/8877 ; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/prezident-ukrayini-proviv-zustrich-iz-prezidentom-ekvadoru-87637
[18] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/prezident-ukrayini-v-buenos-ajresi-zustrivsya-z-prezidentom-87633 ; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/u-buenos-ajresi-prezident-ukrayini-proviv-zustrich-iz-prezid-87629
[19] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/8877
[20] https://hcav dot am/en/hcav-statement-08-12-2023/ ; https://www.azatutyun dot am/a/32723448.html ; https://www.severreal.org/a/v-armenii-politsiya-rossiyskoy-voennoy-bazy-zaderzhala-grazhdanina-rf/32724275.html?nocache=1
[21] https://www.severreal.org/a/v-armenii-politsiya-rossiyskoy-voennoy-bazy-zaderzhala-grazhdanina-rf/32724275.html?nocache=1
[22] https://www.severreal.org/a/v-armenii-politsiya-rossiyskoy-voennoy-bazy-zaderzhala-grazhdanina-rf/32724275.html?nocache=1
[23] https://www.azatutyun dot am/a/32723448.html
[24] https://www.azatutyun dot am/a/32723448.html
[25] https://hcav dot am/en/hcav-statement-08-12-2023/
[28] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Mt5cVHHd4ah8yrfgnQDgdRq6peBXtKCZe3TXVYZye8ZJmMf2m15XLNzh9UaHWZqDl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035Y8qi8voDo8U8sHeHm6dPGqGF1G2HRqoTNJSVTCJSvdDLbEED4eQnaRDWvAkWyAUl
[29] https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/1733783497850953887?s=20
[30] https://isw.pub/UkrWar120823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120523 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101223 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar093023 ;
[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Mt5cVHHd4ah8yrfgnQDgdRq6peBXtKCZe3TXVYZye8ZJmMf2m15XLNzh9UaHWZqDl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035Y8qi8voDo8U8sHeHm6dPGqGF1G2HRqoTNJSVTCJSvdDLbEED4eQnaRDWvAkWyAUl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gvjvzW55MkZU6q1tiz8iz4Ar3T6bSYXr12iDpzmkj7Q8DzovF1McVJmFFULoVyRtl
[33] https://suspilne dot media/636022-na-bahmutskomu-napramku-vijsko-rf-zastosovue-bilse-droniv-a-na-limano-kupanskomu-aviaciu/ ; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/15683
[36] https://t.me/btr80/12705 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57961 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/33395
[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gvjvzW55MkZU6q1tiz8iz4Ar3T6bSYXr12iDpzmkj7Q8DzovF1McVJmFFULoVyRtl
[39] https://t.me/rybar/54888 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/105983
[40] https://t.me/vdd98/1820 ; https://x.com/SzymekMajk37984/status/1733723070274179379?s=20 ; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1733736653863162053?s=20
[41] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/8340; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=718925713180048 ; https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1733846048366350656; https://t.me/bohunbrigade/2182; https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1733846051033923937
[43] https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/13015
[44] https://t.me/wargonzo/16922 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/16937 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/30523 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/5354 ; https://t.me/multi_XAM/1077
[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Mt5cVHHd4ah8yrfgnQDgdRq6peBXtKCZe3TXVYZye8ZJmMf2m15XLNzh9UaHWZqDl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035Y8qi8voDo8U8sHeHm6dPGqGF1G2HRqoTNJSVTCJSvdDLbEED4eQnaRDWvAkWyAUl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gvjvzW55MkZU6q1tiz8iz4Ar3T6bSYXr12iDpzmkj7Q8DzovF1McVJmFFULoVyRtl
[48] https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1733603224739844234; https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1733538242656452976
[49] https://t.me/rybar/54891 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/16922 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52634
[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gvjvzW55MkZU6q1tiz8iz4Ar3T6bSYXr12iDpzmkj7Q8DzovF1McVJmFFULoVyRtl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Mt5cVHHd4ah8yrfgnQDgdRq6peBXtKCZe3TXVYZye8ZJmMf2m15XLNzh9UaHWZqDl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035Y8qi8voDo8U8sHeHm6dPGqGF1G2HRqoTNJSVTCJSvdDLbEED4eQnaRDWvAkWyAUl
[51] https://suspilne dot media/636010-armia-rf-majze-cilodobovo-sturmue-pozicii-dovkola-avdiivki/
[54] https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1733883583238988006; https://t me/rt_russian/182898; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1733883659344597339 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/70601 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57982
[55] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52634 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/30562
[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gvjvzW55MkZU6q1tiz8iz4Ar3T6bSYXr12iDpzmkj7Q8DzovF1McVJmFFULoVyRtl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Mt5cVHHd4ah8yrfgnQDgdRq6peBXtKCZe3TXVYZye8ZJmMf2m15XLNzh9UaHWZqDl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035Y8qi8voDo8U8sHeHm6dPGqGF1G2HRqoTNJSVTCJSvdDLbEED4eQnaRDWvAkWyAUl
[58] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/105976; https://t.me/wargonzo/16937
[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Mt5cVHHd4ah8yrfgnQDgdRq6peBXtKCZe3TXVYZye8ZJmMf2m15XLNzh9UaHWZqDl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035Y8qi8voDo8U8sHeHm6dPGqGF1G2HRqoTNJSVTCJSvdDLbEED4eQnaRDWvAkWyAUl
[60] https://t.me/Vmsd127/158; https://t.me/dva_majors/30554
[62] https://t.me/genshtab24/41896 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/31475 ; https://t.me/rsotmdivision/12527 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/105986 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/16922 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/70583
[65] https://t.me/dva_majors/30564 ; https://t.me/frontbird/5009
[66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Mt5cVHHd4ah8yrfgnQDgdRq6peBXtKCZe3TXVYZye8ZJmMf2m15XLNzh9UaHWZqDl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035Y8qi8voDo8U8sHeHm6dPGqGF1G2HRqoTNJSVTCJSvdDLbEED4eQnaRDWvAkWyAUl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gvjvzW55MkZU6q1tiz8iz4Ar3T6bSYXr12iDpzmkj7Q8DzovF1McVJmFFULoVyRtl
[67] https://t.me/mod_russia/33396; https://t.me/rybar/54888
[68] https://t.me/dva_majors/30523; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/105986
[69] https://t.me/dva_majors/30564 ; https://t.me/frontbird/5009
[71] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Mt5cVHHd4ah8yrfgnQDgdRq6peBXtKCZe3TXVYZye8ZJmMf2m15XLNzh9UaHWZqDl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid035Y8qi8voDo8U8sHeHm6dPGqGF1G2HRqoTNJSVTCJSvdDLbEED4eQnaRDWvAkWyAUl
[72] https://t.me/rybar/54897 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/16937 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/16922
[76] https://t.me/romanov_92/43287; https://t.me/kaspiyskyberet/10392; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1733867540667838726 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/30565
[77] https://t.me/romanov_92/43287; https://t.me/kaspiyskyberet/10392; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1733867540667838726 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/30565
[79] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-8-2023
[80] https://suspilne dot media/635828-ekspertizi-vstanovili-so-virobnikom-shahed-iv-e-iranska-aviakompania-ofis-genprokurora-na-zapit-suspilnogo/
[81] https://suspilne dot media/635828-ekspertizi-vstanovili-so-virobnikom-shahed-iv-e-iranska-aviakompania-ofis-genprokurora-na-zapit-suspilnogo/
[85] https://anna-news dot info/rossijskie-tanki-poluchayut-novejshie-komplekty-tsifrovoj-svyazi-sotnik-bl/
[88] https://tass dot ru/politika/19501189
[89] https://tass dot ru/politika/19501189
[90] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/12/10/vorog-nadsylaye-ukrayinczyam-sms-pro-evakuacziyu-iz-zaporizhzhya/ ; https://www.facebook.com/protydiyadezinformatsiyi.cpd/posts/pfbid02jkLWzs2NDead1e1cXCK4cg8UxnV3X9wQAKq2R5D45AtbBLqN2smCZwKX9NLaFXA4l
[91] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-3-2023
[92] https://t.me/pul_1/10735 ; https://t.me/pul_1/10738 ; https://t.me/pul_1/10739 ; https://t.me/pul_1/10740 ; https://t.me/pul_1/10741 ; https://t.me/pul_1/10741 ; https://t.me/pul_1/10742 ; https://t.me/pul_1/10744 ; https://t.me/pul_1/10745 ; https://t.me/pul_1/10746 ; https://t.me/pul_1/10753 ; https://t.me/pul_1/10756 ; https://t.me/pul_1/10763 ; https://t.me/pul_1/10771
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) escalated claims of Russian territorial gains in Donetsk Oblast on November 13 and 14
likely to emphasize that Russian forces are intensifying operations in Donetsk Oblast following withdrawal from the right bank of Kherson Oblast
The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces completed the capture of Mayorsk (20km south of Bakhmut) on November 13 and of Pavlivka (45km southwest of Donetsk City) on November 14 after several weeks of not making claims of Russian territorial gains.[1] As ISW assessed on November 13
Russian forces will likely recommit troops to Donetsk Oblast after leaving the right bank of Kherson Oblast
which will likely lead to an intensification of operations around Bakhmut
and in western Donetsk Oblast.[2] Russian forces will likely make gains in these areas in the coming days and weeks
but these gains are unlikely to be operationally significant
The Russian MoD is likely making more concrete territorial claims in order to set information conditions to frame Russian successes in Donetsk Oblast and detract from discontent regarding losses in Kherson Oblast
Russian milbloggers seized on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s November 14 visit to Kherson City to criticize Russian military capacity more substantively than in previous days during the Russian withdrawal from the right bank of Kherson Oblast
as ISW has previously reported.[5] The clear shift in rhetoric from relatively exculpatory language generally backing the withdrawal as a militarily sound decision to ire directed at Russian military failures suggests that Russian military leadership will likely be pressured to secure more direct gains in Donetsk Oblast and other areas
Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin continues to establish himself as a highly independent
becoming a prominent figure within the nationalist pro-war community
Prigozhin commented on a Russian execution video of a reportedly exchanged Wagner prisoner of war
sarcastically supporting Nuzhin’s execution and denouncing him as a traitor to the Russian people.[6] Most sources noted that Wagner executed Nuzhin following a prisoner exchange on November 10
noting that the Wagner command is undertaking appropriate military measures to discipline its forces.[9] Some milbloggers even compared the execution to Joseph Stalin’s “heroic” execution of Russian Marxist revolutionary Leon Trotsky who had also fled Bolshevik Russia
further confirming Prigozhin’s appeal among the proponents of Stalin’s repressive legacy.[10] Prigozhin is taking actions that will resonate with a constituency interested in the ideology of Russia’s national superiority
and distasteful of the Kremlin’s corruption
which Russian President Vladimir Putin has used as a political force throughout his reign
Prigozhin is steadily using his participation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine to consolidate his influence in Russia
One milblogger voiced a concern that the integration of Wagner mercenaries into Russian society is “the destruction of even the illusion of legality and respect for rights in Putin’s Russian Federation.”[11] The milblogger added that Prigozhin is seizing the initiative to expand Wagner’s power in St
Petersburg while Russian security forces are “asleep.” Such opinions are not widespread among Russian nationalists but highlight some concerns with Prigozhin’s rapid expansion amid the Russian “special military operation” and its implications on the Putin regime
has requested that the FSB General Prosecutor’s office investigate St
Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov for high treason after St
Petersburg officials denied a construction permit for his Wagner Center in the city.[12] He had also publicly scoffed at the Russian bureaucracy when asked if his forces will train at Russian training grounds
likely to further assert the independence of his forces.[13] Prigozhin’s unhinged antics in the political sphere are unprecedented in Putin’s regime
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting
We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas
We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict
and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports
Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)
Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)
Ukrainian forces continued their counteroffensive operations on the Svatove-Kreminna line on November 13 and 14
Geolocated footage published on November 13 confirmed that Ukrainian forces liberated Makiivka
approximately 23km southwest of Svatove.[14] Commander of the Russian combat army reserve unit BARS-13
claimed that the situation on the Svatove frontline “escalated,” forcing Russian forces to retreat from the Makiivka area.[15] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported ongoing clashes in the direction of Novoselivske
and Stelmakhivka (all just northwest of Svatove) in the direction of the R66 highway.[16] Some Russian milbloggers noted that motorized rifle elements of the 1st Tank Army are holding defensive positions in the vicinity of Novoselivske.[17] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to attack Russian positions in the Chervonopopivka area
fewer than 10km northwest of Kreminna.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces stopped Russian assaults near Torske
about 16km due west of Kreminna.[19] Ukrainian forces also continued to target Russian logistics on the Svatove-Kreminna line
and geolocated footage showed the aftermath of a Ukrainian HIMARS strike on a Russian base on Miluvatka
Ukrainian and Russian forces engaged in clashes northwest of Lysychansk
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks on Bilohorivka
approximately 13km northwest of Lysychansk.[21] Russian sources for the second time since November 7 claimed that Wagner Group troops and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) units broke Ukrainian defenses in Bilohorivka and entered the settlement.[22]
Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to regain positions in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast on November 13
Ukrainian and Russian sources claimed that a Russian attack helicopter conducted a sortie against Ukrainian positions in Ternova (about 31km northeast of Kharkiv City)
and a Russian milblogger noted that Russian forces failed to get a foothold in the settlement on November 13.[23] Russian forces also launched missile strikes from S-300 air defense systems on an enterprise in Kharkiv City on November 14.[24]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces intensified offensive operations around Bakhmut on November 13 and 14
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Bakhmut
Bilohorivka (about 20km northeast of Bakhmut)
and Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[25] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Mayorsk (20km south of Bakhmut) on November 13
but Ukrainian Armed Forces spokesperson Serhiy Cherevatyi disputed these claims.[26] ISW is unable to independently confirm these reports
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also conducted ground assaults northeast of Bakhmut near Verkhnokamianske
and Bilohorivka.[27] Russian sources also claimed that Wagner forces advanced deep into the southeastern outskirts of Bakhmut
and that fierce fighting between Ukrainian and Wagner forces persists in the southeastern outskirts of Soledar (about 12km northeast of Bakhmut).[28] These sources claimed that Ukrainian forces are equipping their strongholds in the path of Russian forces
near Bakhmut and Soledar.[29] The Ukrainian government reported that Russian forces dropped prohibited chemical weapons
on Ukrainian strongholds on November 14.[30] The use of chemical weapons such as K-51 aerosol grenades is explicitly prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).[31] Both Russian and Ukrainian forces intensified shelling
and artillery strikes along the contact line in the Bakhmut area.[32]
Russian forces intensified offensive operations around Avdiivka–Donetsk City on November 13 and 14
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Krasnohorivka
on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City
and Marinka and Novomykhailivka on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City.[33] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces slowly advanced through Ukrainian fortified areas near Marinka
and Novomykhailivka.[34] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces slowly advanced through Ukrainian fortified areas near Pervomaiske
and Nevelske (19km northwest of Donetsk City).[35] Geolocated footage posted on November 12 showed that Russian forces advanced into northwestern outskirts of Opytne (about 12km northwest of Donetsk City)
and Russian sources claimed that Russian troops are attempting to push Ukrainian forces farther west of the settlement.[36] A Russian source reported that Ukrainian forces set up mine barriers in the Russian forces’ path to slow this Russian push west.[37] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces aim to capture Vodiane
which would allow them to bypass Avdiivka and ultimately take Tonenke (about 19km northwest of Donetsk City)
in an effort to cut off Ukrainian supply lines in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area.[38] Both Russian and Ukrainian forces intensified shelling
and artillery strikes along the contact line in the Avdiivka–Donetsk City area.[39]
Russian forces claimed to have made gains southwest of Donetsk City on November 13 and 14
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian news outlets claimed that Russian troops captured Pavlivka (45km southwest of Donetsk City) on November 14 after Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful counterattacks near Pavlivka and Nikolske on November 13.[40] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Pavlivka on November 13
while Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued to consolidate control over the northern outskirts of Pavlivka.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted assault operations from the direction of Pavlivka in an attempt to dislodge Ukrainian forces from behind the Kashlahach River.[42]Russian sources claimed that advancing units of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade of the Pacific Fleet
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Note: ISW will report on activities in Kherson Oblast as part of the Southern Axis in this and subsequent updates
Ukraine’s counteroffensive in right-bank Kherson Oblast has accomplished its stated objectives
so ISW will not present a Southern Ukraine counteroffensive section until Ukrainian forces resume counteroffensives in southern Ukraine
Russian forces continued defensive actions on the left bank of Kherson Oblast on November 13 and 14
Geolocated satellite imagery posted on November 13 shows newly created Russian defensive lines along the left bank of the Dnipro
east of Beryslav around Hornostaivka (28km northeast of Beryslav)
and Petropavlivka (25km southeast of Beryslav).[46] Additional satellite imagery shows the development of Russian defensive lines in Lukyanivka (16km southeast of Beryslav) between October 8 and November 10.[47] Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian troops are conducting defensive preparations on the left bank and striking Ukrainian positions and residential communities on the right bank.[48] The spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Forces
stated that Russian forces struck an abandoned equipment concentration in Chornobaivka (just northwest of Kherson City) on November 13
which the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed was a strike on a Ukrainian command post.[49] Ukrainian sources also stated that Russian forces conducted a mortar strike on November 14 on the private sector of Hornostaivka
a settlement on the left bank of the Dnipro River
because civilians refused to evacuate.[50]
Russian sources widely claimed that Ukrainian troops launched a limited raid and attempted to land on the Kinburn Spit on the night of November 13 and 14
Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian landing groups formed in Ochakiv
and attempted to land on the Kinburn Spit at Pokrovske
but that Russian forces destroyed the grouping during the ensuing battle.[51] Ukrainian sources did not comment on these claims
Russian milbloggers voiced concerns that this raid is indicative of Ukraine’s ability to land on the left bank of the Dnipro River.[52]
Russian forces continued routine artillery
and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts and on the right bank of Kherson Oblast on November 13 and 14.[53] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces launched anti-aircraft missiles at Ochakiv
which Russian sources reported was intended to disrupt Ukrainian fire control over the Kinburn Spit.[54] Ukrainian forces notably struck Russian concentration areas on the left bank of Kherson Oblast on November 13 and 14 and targeted personnel concentrations in Dnipryany
Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed additional decrees refining mobilization protocols and expanding military recruitment provisions
likely in an ongoing effort to reinforce Russian war efforts
Putin decreed that foreign citizens can serve in the Russian armed forces on November 14.[56] The decree also allows Russian officials to conscript Russian dual-nationals or foreigners with residence permits.[57] Such provisions will allow the Kremlin to recruit forces internationally and among immigrant populations in Russia
Recruitment of foreigners can also ignite further ethno-religious conflicts that have been plaguing Russian ad hoc forces
Putin is establishing enforcement measures for censorship of foreigners with acquired Russian citizenship
which would allow military recruitment officials to further carry out covert mobilization and respond to criticism of the failures of the Russian military campaign in Ukraine
Putin proposed an amendment that would deprive people of their acquired Russian citizenship if they spread “fakes about the Russian Armed Forces” or affiliate with “extremist organizations” that advocate against Russian territorial integrity
The Russian State Duma is also considering a law that would deprive residents of acquired Russian citizenship if they surrender or evade military service.[58] Both proposals excluded Russian-born citizens and are likely attempts to silence immigrant groups and ethnically based civil society in Russia
The amendment would task the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) with prosecuting individuals with such views
and Putin may be attempting to set up an internal repression apparatus
ISW previously assessed that Putin has never built an internal repression apparatus like the Soviets
instead relying on control over the information space.[59]
Putin may also be refining conditions for future force-generation efforts
Putin decreed that individuals with drug possession and consumption criminal charges will not be able to sign a contract with the Russian Armed Forces
likely in an effort to appear to address instances of substance abuse among new recruits and mobilized men.[60] It is unclear if Russian officials will actually follow Putin’s order prohibiting individuals with drug-related charges from serving
but the Wagner Group private military company (PMC) will likely continue to recruit these individuals regardless of Putin’s order regarding the conventional Russian military
Russian authorities continue their struggle to integrate combat forces lacking a coordinated central command structure
Putin eliminated one inconsistency in Russian and Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics’ (DNR and LNR) force-generation policy by decreeing the demobilization of students in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts on November 13.[61] The students were mobilized as part of DNR/LNR efforts rather than as part of the general Russian mobilization effort
The DNR and LNR will likely maintain their covert mobilization practices to ensure a supply of reinforcements
The Ukraine Resistance Center stated on November 14 that Russian forces continued to forcibly mobilize students in Donetsk and Luhansk from universities.[62] It is unclear whether DNR and LNR officials had any input into Putin’s decision
though DNR Head Denis Pushilin thanked Putin for giving DNR students the same opportunity as students in “other regions of Russia.”[63] A prominent Russian milblogger also noted that such issues will not resolve instantly due to divergences between DNR
and Russian laws.[64] Another Russian milblogger noted that Russian hospitals continue to deny treatment to DNR and LNR servicemen
and it is likely that Russian Armed Forces’ disparaging attitude towards non-Russian forces will persist throughout Russian efforts to consolidate the proxy republics’ and Russian Federation’s legal systems.[65] The resolution of discrepancies between Russia and forces the Kremlin is working to absorb has contributed to friction between the force groups
The aftermath of partial mobilization is continuing to have domestic social ramifications in Russia
Social media footage from November 13 shows a large group of mobilized servicemembers in Patriot Park
which makes it impossible for families to view information about service payments belonging to their deceased loved ones on the battlefield.[70]
Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural
Russian occupation officials continued to drive the “evacuation” and forced relocation of residents in occupied territories on November 14
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 14 that Russian officials are evicting Ukrainian citizens from their homes in some temporarily occupied settlements in Zaporizhia Oblast to house Russian servicemen.[71] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on November 14 that Russian forces plan to completely evacuate the civilian population from Rubizhne
all of which are in Russian-occupied Luhansk Oblast.[72]
Russian occupation officials continued efforts to relocate their administrative presence away from the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast on November 14
The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 14 that the Russian Duma Liberal Democratic deputies Leonid Slutsky
and Vladimir Sibyagin are supervising Kherson occupation officials as they attempt to launch operations of the administrative center after officially moving the Kherson Oblast temporary administrative capital to Henichesk on November 12.[73] The Ukrainian Resistance Center also reported that Russian occupiers are evacuating the families of Russian workers from Zaliznyi Port
Russian authorities are continuing to import Russian citizens to serve in occupation administrations
replacing possibly ineffective Ukrainian collaborators and personnel from Zaporizhia
The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 13 that Russian occupation officials have appointed new heads of prosecutors’ offices in occupied territories after chief prosecutors arrived in Zaporizhia
and Luhansk Oblasts on November 7.[75] A Russian source similarly claimed on November 14 that Russia is abolishing the LNR’s prosecution office to further integrate the territory into Russia.[76]
Russian occupation officials are continuing efforts to erode Ukrainian national identity among residents of occupied territories
Enerhodar Mayor Dmytro Orlov stated on November 14 that Russian occupation officials in Enerhodar
destroyed Ukrainian history textbooks and literature.[77] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 14 that the Commissioner for Children’s Rights under the Russian Presidential Administration
is personally responsible for the forced deportation and adoption of Ukrainian children into Russian families for the purpose of forces assimilation into Russia.[78]
[1] https://t.me/mod_russia/21716; https://t.me/mod_russia/21739
[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-13
[3] https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/17433; https://t.me/rybar/41143
[4] https://t.me/rybar/41143; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/19817
[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11
[7] https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/14399; https://t.me/NetGulagu/3788; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/14420; https://t.me/NetGulagu/3789
[9] https://vk dot com/concordgroup_official?w=wall-177427428_1435; https://t.me/rybar/41109; https://t.me/niviynii/769; https://t.me/niviynii/758; https://t.me/niviynii/760; https://t.me/grey_zone/15771; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/24; https://t.me/grey_zone/15767; https://t.me/grey_zone/15769; https://t.me/grey_zone/15770; https://t.me/grey_zone/15773; https://t.me/brussinf/5230; https://t.me/grey_zone/15774
[12] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/25; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10
[13] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/26
[14] https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/159173918170090291; https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1591765862389800963
[16] https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/34952; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/6847; https://t.me/mod_russia/21716; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/6847; https://t.me/mod_russia/21738; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/70262; https://t.me/razved_dozor/2862; https://t.me/wargonzo/9250; https://t.me/rybar/41133; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/34952
[17] https://t.me/razved_dozor/2839 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/70230
[18] https://t.me/mod_russia/21736; https://t.me/mod_russia/21716
[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YCSX87CsqK2udvjM2z98ry1BcCQHfDkcNhtd5fHqe2wTWo53uMBfwjmyZCBVFUyMl?__cft__[0]=AZUzNb-GE5QofG0DE4KNHZ3k5vbmabInMc0MP5h9c7I3pd_ZmrH1NqHuGGWgab2bWqFfaImEeQSwnhTYqQ4dPqxrjP93ydsoy3_VvmyyLbEh8ZjSS57caa2WsUwG2q6HjuF4WaaJ_GQfylsdd-_-imrdP5W04nPGkyC2E-H9Cznx7C_Jm2g5OmYiAhD1yAxvB6wkx1sW2AYRpCqljnDDjavZ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
[20] tps://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1591788457864892421; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1591354083252015104; https://t.me/marochkolive/33161; https://t.me/LPR_JCCC/7560; https://twitter.com/Bazinga00264477/status/1591560537233821696; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/42651
[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DK4f2arU8MDofYKaa24s8R89imXRZKYhU8UhHiN7zqrHnq4vzM3iksaRTiQvC31Tl
[22] https://t.me/rybar/41112; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7; https://t.me/wargonzo/9250; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/34952
[23] https://t.me/rybar/41120; https://www.facebook.com/easternforces/posts/pfbid0ik8MgUNj4jKXZyxjMsNNB5cezQbT4Pmd5N9mUizB6uz4xGo5dQYiySJhDPKdQ5YVl
[24] https://t.me/stranaua/75066l https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/547; https://t.me/synegubov/4752; https://t.me/mod_russia/21736; https://t.me/kommunist/13188
[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DK4f2arU8MDofYKaa24s8R89imXRZKYhU8UhHiN7zqrHnq4vzM3iksaRTiQvC31Tl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YCSX87CsqK2udvjM2z98ry1BcCQHfDkcNhtd5fHqe2wTWo53uMBfwjmyZCBVFUyMl?__cft__[0]=AZUzNb-GE5QofG0DE4KNHZ3k5vbmabInMc0MP5h9c7I3pd_ZmrH1NqHuGGWgab2bWqFfaImEeQSwnhTYqQ4dPqxrjP93ydsoy3_VvmyyLbEh8ZjSS57caa2WsUwG2q6HjuF4WaaJ_GQfylsdd-_-imrdP5W04nPGkyC2E-H9Cznx7C_Jm2g5OmYiAhD1yAxvB6wkx1sW2AYRpCqljnDDjavZ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
[26] https://t.me/mod_russia/21716; https://t.me/pushilindenis/2894; https://t.me/epoddubny/13640; https://suspilne.media/315754-cerevatij-sprostuvav-zaavu-okupantiv-pro-zahoplenna-majorska-na-doneccini/ ; https://t.me/rybar/41112; https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/5515
[27] https://t.me/wargonzo/9231; https://t.me/wargonzo/9250; https://t.me/rybar/41106
[28] https://t.me/rybar/41112; https://t.me/wargonzo/9250; https://t.me/rybar/41133
[29] https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/34952; https://t.me/rybar/41112
[30] https://www.facebook.com/DPSUkraine/posts/pfbid0Qo2aqg8JknMVSU8DgxxsDrfc7bpKufitQyebps6iwiDVEcCnbDy3mzXbb3aJznqfl; https://www.kmu.gov.ua/news/zagarbniki-zastosuvali-proti-ukrayinskih-prikordonnikiv-zaboroneni-aerozolni-granati
[31] https://zakon.rada.gov(dot)ua/laws/show/995_182#Text; https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention
[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DK4f2arU8MDofYKaa24s8R89imXRZKYhU8UhHiN7zqrHnq4vzM3iksaRTiQvC31Tl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YCSX87CsqK2udvjM2z98ry1BcCQHfDkcNhtd5fHqe2wTWo53uMBfwjmyZCBVFUyMl?__cft__[0]=AZUzNb-GE5QofG0DE4KNHZ3k5vbmabInMc0MP5h9c7I3pd_ZmrH1NqHuGGWgab2bWqFfaImEeQSwnhTYqQ4dPqxrjP93ydsoy3_VvmyyLbEh8ZjSS57caa2WsUwG2q6HjuF4WaaJ_GQfylsdd-_-imrdP5W04nPGkyC2E-H9Cznx7C_Jm2g5OmYiAhD1yAxvB6wkx1sW2AYRpCqljnDDjavZ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
[34] https://t.me/wargonzo/9231; https://t.me/wargonzo/9250; https://t.me/rybar/41134
[35] https://t.me/rybar/41106; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/19821;
[36] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1591520349354876928; https://t.me/izvestia/111583; https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1591521686163435522 ; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1591589815019253760; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/34952
[37] https://t.me/rybar/41133; https://t.me/rybar/41106;
[40] https://t.me/mod_russia/21716 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/21739 ; https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/12043 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/166052
[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YCSX87CsqK2udvjM2z98ry1BcCQHfDkcNhtd5fHqe2wTWo53uMBfwjmyZCBVFUyMl?__cft__[0]=AZUzNb-GE5QofG0DE4KNHZ3k5vbmabInMc0MP5h9c7I3pd_ZmrH1NqHuGGWgab2bWqFfaImEeQSwnhTYqQ4dPqxrjP93ydsoy3_VvmyyLbEh8ZjSS57caa2WsUwG2q6HjuF4WaaJ_GQfylsdd-_-imrdP5W04nPGkyC2E-H9Cznx7C_Jm2g5OmYiAhD1yAxvB6wkx1sW2AYRpCqljnDDjavZ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://t.me/rybar/41110 ; https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/5529
[43] https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/22576 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/70169 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/70108 ; https://t.me/kommunist/13190; https://t.me/kommunist/13194 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/70249; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/70246; https://t.me/wargonzo/9255 ; https://t.me/obtf_kaskad/588 ; https://t.me/ogneborets_spb/620; https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/17424 ; https://t.me/rybar/41133
[44] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/70259; https://t.me/SergeyKolyasnikov/44187
[46] https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1591788447379128320; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1591651146133012481; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1591644871559122946; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1591599396227252224; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1591595269489319936; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1591590694606753793
[47] https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1591590694606753793
[49] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2022/11/14/bojova-robota-na-pivdni-ukrayiny-ne-zupynylasya-nataliya-gumenyuk/; https://t.me/mod_russia/21736
[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DK4f2arU8MDofYKaa24s8R89imXRZKYhU8UhHiN7zqrHnq4vzM3iksaRTiQvC31Tl
[51] https://t.me/epoddubny/13643; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/34953; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/42696; https://t.me/smotri_z/8097; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/34952; https://t.me/milchronicles/1297
[54] https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/3412; https://t.me/stranaua/75092; https://t.me/smotri_z/8097; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/34952
[55] https://t.me/hueviyherson/29112 ; https://t.me/hueviyherson/29117;
https://t.me/stranaua/75154; https://www.facebook.com/sergey.khlan/posts/pfbid0f1tfjBzxtha6tZ5MWBJLhDEegc54UWQSWhbW4jVw8Xfn47uLQLF5Jg9EBa1hd8xMl; https://t.me/hueviyherson/29023
[56] https://t.me/stranaua/75155; http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202211140007
[57] https://centralasia dot media/news:1818719
[59] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2
[61] https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-nov-12-13; https://t.me/meduzalive/73273 ; https://t.me/meduzalive/73274; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/9661; https://t.me/dnronline/85294; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/9554; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/19804; https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/12011; https://t.me/epoddubny/13641
[62] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/11/14/na-shodi-ukrayiny-rosiyany-mobilizuvaly-studentiv-psevdouniversytetiv/
[65] https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1591493817156644866/photo/1
[66] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12
[67] https://t.me/operativnoZSU/55779; https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-nov-12-13; https://t.me/svobodnieslova/928; https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/12596; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1592045351938457601?s=20&t=guWaRo_qDK9sOQhJs8lF7A
[68] https://t.me/operativnoZSU/55779; https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-nov-12-13; https://t.me/svobodnieslova/928; https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/12596; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1592045351938457601?s=20&t=guWaRo_qDK9sOQhJs8lF7A
[69] https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-nov-12-13; https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/12575; https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-nov-12-13; https://t.me/msk_gde/2101; https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-nov-12-13; https://t.me/horizontal_russia/16939
[70] https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-nov-12-13; https://t.me/horizontal_russia/16939
[71] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DK4f2arU8MDofYKaa24s8R89imXRZKYhU8UhHiN7zqrHnq4vzM3iksaRTiQvC31Tl
[72] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02d9Z7xA3UMqSykA8kuAMvqYwrQ4VH42fogGLdJiZFJPWZ9cK3xXZeYR12bRYcJiWQl
[73] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/11/13/rosiyany-namagayutsya-nalagodyty-robotu-okupaczijnoyi-administracziyi-v-genichesku/; https://ria dot ru/20221112/genichesk-1830990519.html; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12; https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/11/14/rosiyany-vyvezly-svoyih-posipak-z-zaliznogo-portu-do-skadovska/
[74] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/11/14/rosiyany-vyvezly-svoyih-posipak-z-zaliznogo-portu-do-skadovska/
[75] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/11/13/okupanty-zavezly-svoyih-prokuroriv-na-tymchasovo-okupovani-terytoriyi/
[78] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/11/14/upovnovazhena-putina-osobysto-kontrolyuye-vykradennya-ukrayinskyh-ditej-do-rf/
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15pm ET on April 25
ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
Russian forces are stabilizing their small salient northwest of Avdiivka and may make further tactical gains that could cause Ukrainian forces to withdraw from other tactical positions along the frontline west of Avdiivka to a more defensible line
with Russian forces advancing at most roughly five kilometers in depth since April 18
Russian forces continue offensive operations throughout the frontline west of Avdiivka but have so far only achieved gradual marginal gains west and southwest of Avdiivka.[5]
The recent Russian advances in Novobakhmutivka and Solovyove widen the salient Russian forces are advancing along northwest of Avdiivka and afford Russian forces a more stable position from which to pursue a wider penetration
This salient is roughly two kilometers in width at its widest section
and would still be vulnerable to Ukrainian counterattacks should Ukrainian forces stabilize the tactical situation in the area
Ocheretyne notably sits on a junction between the Ukrainian defensive line that Russian forces have been attacking since their seizure of Avdiivka in mid-February 2024 and a subsequent defensive line further west
which Russian sources have identified as a more heavily fortified line.[6] Russian forces could further stabilize their salient northwest of Avdiivka and advance further west of Ocheretyne
making positions along the Berdychi-Semenivka-Umanske line increasingly difficult for Ukrainian forces to hold
The Ukrainian command could decide to withdraw Ukrainian forces further west if it deems Russian tactical gains in the area to be too threatening to current Ukrainian positions
Ukrainian forces withdrew from Avdiivka to relatively poorly prepared defensive positions immediately west of Avdiivka following the Russian seizure of Avdiivka in mid-February and proceeded to slow Russian advances.[7] Positions further west would likely afford Ukrainian forces similar or better opportunities to blunt Russian advances
and Russian forces would likely have to maintain a relatively high tempo of offensive operations to place these subsequent Ukrainian defensive positions under immediate pressure
Russian forces will likely have to replenish and reinforce attacking units northwest of Avdiivka and will likely not be able to maintain the tempo of offensive operations required to rapidly advance west of the Berdychi-Semenivka-Umanske line
Russian forces will likely continue to make tactical gains northwest of Avdiivka
but these gains are unlikely to develop into an operationally significant penetration
let alone cause the collapse of the Ukrainian defense west of Avdiivka
Russian offensive operations west of Avdiivka aim to exploit opportunities for tactical gains while the Russian offensive operation to seize Chasiv Yar offers Russian forces the most immediate prospects for operationally significant advances
Russian forces in the Avdiivka area remain roughly 30 kilometers from their reported operational objective of Pokrovsk and roughly 17 kilometers from relatively large villages east of Pokrovsk.[8] Even if Russian tactical gains do cause Ukrainian forces to withdraw to positions further west
the current Russian gains northwest of Avdiivka are unlikely to become operationally significant advances in the near term
Russian pressure on Chasiv Yar is more significant
although they may not be able to do so rapidly.[11] Russian forces are likely attempting to seize as much territory as possible before the arrival of US security assistance significantly improves Ukrainian defensive capabilities in the coming weeks
and the Russian military command may be intensifying offensive operations northwest of Avdiivka because the area provides greater opportunities for making more rapid tactical gains despite the relative operational insignificance of those gains
US officials are reportedly worried that the latest package of US military aid to Ukraine may not be enough for Ukraine to regain all of its territory
US military assistance is only part of what Ukraine currently needs
moreover; but Ukraine is itself working to address other war fighting requirements — primarily manpower challenges and the expansion of its defense industrial base (DIB)
Politico reported on April 25 that three US officials believe that the recent provision of US aid may not be enough for Ukraine to restore its territorial integrity due to changes in the situation on the battlefield in the past few months.[12] One US official reportedly stated that the “immediate goal” of the US aid package is to stop Ukrainian losses and help Ukraine “regain momentum” on the battlefield
after which the goal will be to help Ukraine regain its territory
US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated on April 24 that it is “certainly possible” that Russian forces could make further tactical advances in the coming weeks but that the US will be able to provide Ukraine “with what it needs through 2024.”[13] The commander of the Ukrainian 93rd Mechanized Brigade
that Ukraine’s manpower problems are “much more important than ammunition.”[14] Palisa stated that one Ukrainian soldier is currently having to perform the tasks of three to four soldiers and that Russian forces outnumber Ukrainian forces by about five to seven times in the Bakhmut direction
Palisa stated that Russian forces are taking advantage of this numerical superiority by conducting attacks that result in personnel and equipment losses
which Ukrainian forces cannot afford to do
ISW previously assessed that Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russian offensive operations and eventually challenge the theater-wide initiative heavily depends on both the US provision of military aid and on Ukraine’s efforts to restore and reconstitute existing units and create new ones.[15] US military assistance is currently en route to Ukraine
to translate these tactical advances into operationally significant gains before this window closes.[19] The timeline for Ukraine’s resolution of its manpower challenges is less clear
Ukraine has recently taken steps to increase significantly the pool of manpower conscripted into the army and will need time to induct and train new conscripts
The Ukrainian command has been taking steps to get more manpower to front line units already on a limited scale
as ISW has previously reported.[20] The arrival of new ammunition and equipment will likely help blunt ongoing Russian offensives
but the timeline for the incorporation of new manpower will likely play a larger role in determining the timeline for future Ukrainian counteroffensive operations
Russian forces are reportedly fielding drones adapted to be more resilient against Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities on critical sectors of the frontline
likely in an attempt to leverage new technological capabilities to exploit a limited window before US security assistance arrives in Ukraine
Ukrainska Pravda reported on April 15 that its sources in the Ukrainian General Staff stated that the number of Russian drones in “hot” sectors of the frontline has “at least doubled” in the past three months.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff sources reported that Russian forces are using modernized drones that operate on frequencies between 700 to 1,000 MHz
which are difficult for Ukrainian EW to jam because Ukrainian EW systems are chiefly designed to jam Russian drones operating on frequencies around 900 MHz
The sources stated that Ukraine is developing a unified system to collect information about Russian drone adaptations in order to quickly adapt Ukrainian electronic warfare systems to counter the Russian drones
The Russian military may have assessed that Ukrainian forces would eventually adapt their EW systems to jam drones at a larger frequency range and employed them now to support ongoing offensive operations as Ukrainian forces wait for US security assistance to arrive
The pattern of one side seizing on a fleeting technological advantage to support immediate ground operations while it lasts will likely become a characteristic of this kind of conflict
A prominent Kremlin-awarded Russian milblogger channel announced that it opened a “media school” in the Balkans
likely supporting Kremlin efforts to expand its reach in the international information space
The Rybar Telegram channel claimed on April 25 that it opened the “Rybar Media School” in the Balkans and that a Rybar team spent the past week in Serbia and the territory of Republika Srpska (the Serbian political entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina).[23] Rybar claimed that its team taught students
and academics how to create and run Telegram channels
and fight “misinformation.” Rybar claimed that founder Mikhail Zvinchuk gave lectures
adopted 10 “bright and promising” projects
and reached agreements to hold regular in-person masterclasses with authors of unspecified Russian Telegram channels
Rybar previously gave a masterclass on the importance of Telegram and other social media to press heads and communications personnel at Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec likely in an effort to normalize the war without involving the Kremlin.[24] Rybar’s public expansion to international media influence operations is notable
particularly as the Kremlin seeks to expand its influence over the Russian information space and coopt more Russian milbloggers like it has with Rybar.[25] Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev met with Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik in St
Petersburg on April 23 and discussed increasing interstate cooperation and the situation in the Balkans and Europe.[26]
Macron also supported increasing Europe’s cybersecurity and cyber defense capacities
and the creation of a European academy to train high-ranking military personnel
The Ukrainian Border Service reported on April 25 that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a Russian sabotage-and-reconnaissance group on the Sumy Oblast border.[30]
Positional fighting continued on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on April 25
but there were no changes to the frontline
Positional fighting continued northwest of Svatove near Berestove and Stelmakhivka; southwest of Svatove near Novovodyane
and Zarichne; and south of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area and Bilohorivka.[31] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division
Moscow Military District [MMD]) are fighting towards Berestove; elements of the 347th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 26th Tank Regiment (both of the 47th Tank Division
1st GTA) are deploying to the front in the Kupyansk direction; and elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps
Baltic Fleet) are operating in the Kyslivka direction (southeast of Kupyansk).[32] Mashovets also reported that elements of the 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division
MMD) are fighting near Makiivka; elements of the 283rd and 488th infantry regiments (both of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division
20th CAA) are fighting near Novosadove (northwest of Kreminna) and Terny
respectively; and elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division
Central Military District [CMD]) are fighting near Torske.[33]
Positional fighting continued in the Siversk direction (northeast of Bakhmut) on April 25
Geolocated footage published on April 25 indicates that Ukrainian forces have advanced further east of Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk) than previously assessed but likely did not make this advance recently.[34] Fighting continued east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske and southeast of Siversk near Spirne and Vyimka.[35]
Fighting continued near Chasiv Yar on April 25
but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area
Fighting continued on the eastern outskirts of Chasiv Yar
in the Novyi Microraion (southeastern Chasiv Yar)
and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske and Klishchiivka.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced near Klishchiivka
but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[37] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) and 11th VDV Brigade are operating near the Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar) and that elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division
Southern Military District [SMD]) and 11th VDV Brigade are operating near Ivanivske.[38] Mashovets stated that elements of the 331st VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are fighting near the Novyi Microraion and trying to advance west of the Siverskyi Donetsk-Donbas Canal
Mashovets stated that the Russian military command likely understands that it is risky for Russian forces to attempt further advances towards Chasiv Yar and Stupochky without making further advances on the southern flank near Ivanivske and Klishchiivka
Mashovets stated that Russian command is likely preparing elements of the 1307th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division
3rd Army Corps [AC]) for assaults near Klishchiivka from the east and elements of the Russian 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd AC) and 83rd VDV Brigade for assaults from the north and northwest
See topline text for updates on the Avdiivka area
Russian forces reportedly advanced west of Donetsk City amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on April 25
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault from two directions and advanced in southern and southeastern Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City)
although ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims.[39] Several Russian sources amplified footage purportedly showing personnel of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC) hoisting a flag over a building in the Krasnohorivka brick factory in central Krasnohorivka
SMD) and of the 242nd and 255th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division
SMD) continue to operate along the Heorhiivka-Pobeida-Novomykhailivka line.[43] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and 10th Tank Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division
8th CAA) are operating within Novomykhailivka
Russian forces recently advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area amid continued positional engagements in the area on April 25
Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 25
but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline
Positional engagements continued near Robotyne and northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne).[48] Elements of the Russian 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA]
Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue operating near Hulyaipole (northeast of Robotyne).[49]
Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast
on April 25.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently intensified drone operations and shelling near Krynky.[51]
and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted missile strikes against Ukrainian railway and logistics infrastructure on April 25
Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces struck a logistics and railway connection point in Smila
Cherkasy Oblast likely with an Iskander-K missile.[52] Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated that Russian forces struck a railway station in Balaklia
Kharkiv Oblast with an unspecified missile
wounding civilians in train cars.[53] Ukrainian military officials stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed an unspecified cruise missile over Kryvyi Rih Raion
Russian President Vladimir Putin justified Russia’s ongoing efforts to nationalize Russian enterprises
including defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises on April 25.[57] Putin stated at the Congress of Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs that Russian law enforcement agencies have opened an unspecified number of cases to nationalize companies when the actions of the owners of the nationalized enterprises caused direct damage to Russian interests
as well as several companies not related to military needs
such as a Rolf car dealership owned by former State Duma deputy Sergei Petrov
who criticized the Russian government.[60]
Russian defense industrial enterprises continue to struggle with labor shortages
Putin stated at the April 25 congress that Russia expects the labor shortage to continue in the near term and that migrant labor cannot solve these shortages
so Russia must find develop new methods to mitigate the shortages.[61] Sever Reallii reported on April 25 that a manager at the St
Petersburg Special Technology Center (STC)
which makes Orlan-10 reconnaissance drones
stated that several employees left after a Ukrainian drone struck a building in St
Petersburg recently.[62] The manager stated that STC authorities are considering creating an “electronic warfare (EW) dome” around the enterprise but have not resolved the issues this EW dome will cause to the enterprise’s own electronics
Sever Reallii reported that an employee at the Kingisepp Machine Building Plant in St
which produces armored vehicles and military boats
stated that many of the plant’s workers are from Uzbekistan and Russian authorities often conduct raids targeting the migrant workers – prompting many employees to leave
The Kingisepp Plant is reportedly offering monetary awards to employees who recruit additional workers or promote a bumper sticker with the enterprise’s logo on their cars
China continues to indirectly support Russia’s war effort in Ukraine by providing dual-use goods to Russian DIB enterprises
US Ambassador to NATO Julianne Smith told Politico on April 24 that the US is increasingly observing that China is supplying dual-use products
to Russia.[63] Smith noted that there is no evidence of China providing “lethal support” to Russia
The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) told the Telegraph on April 25 that satellite imagery indicates that the Russian Angara ship
which likely transported North Korean ammunition to Russia recently
has been moored in China’s Zhejiang province since February 2024.[64]
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US
ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today
ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today
Kremlin officials and mouthpieces continued information operations aimed at deterring further Western security assistance to Ukraine in reaction to reports that the US secretly provided Ukraine with long-range ATACMS in April 2024
The Russian MFA summoned Latvian Charge d’Affaires Dace Rutka and declared two Latvian diplomats persona non grata on April 25
The Russian MFA stated that these acts were retribution for the Latvian MFA declaring two Russian diplomats persona non grata on March 27
and the Russian MFA threatened “painful” steps if Latvia continues “hostile actions” towards Russia.[69] It is unclear why the Russian MFA only responded nearly a month after the Latvian persona non grata declaration
Kremlin officials and mouthpieces have consistently targeted Latvia and other Baltic states with information operations aimed at portraying these states as hostile to both the Russian state and Russian “compatriots” in their countries.[70] Zakharova criticized Latvia on April 25 for allegedly discriminating against Russian speakers by not teaching Russian as a second language in schools.[71]
Senior Belarusian officials made false claims about alleged Western threats to Belarus
Lithuanian military spokesperson Major Gintautas Ciunis called Tertel’s claims “nonsense.”[75]
[1] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/194; https://twitter.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1783434819667464560; https://twitter.com/Bielitzling/status/1783436308804698165 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5259?single; https://t.me/motopatriot/22048
[2] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/66802 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9912 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9941 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9952 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9963 ; https://t.me/rybar/59494 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/121050 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/22046; https://t.me/motopatriot/22047
[3] https://t.me/rybar/59485 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/22031 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/40821 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/66816 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121322 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/10459 ;
[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042224
[5] https://t.me/motopatriot/22034 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19563 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/66816 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37923 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028zcawumHY5ujSpB4kMxjTMoHN6VATBxYxcfJWRr43k2Vigi5McDH2Mq7SoRQdU9ul ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02iNui5DDRXaJEW8AVFY3tXTV33rCyNbSPQy2gjWDiyDG2tLfU8frokQhYoZybmDNdl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid032fEMA9aNuh5umQ9ZEaKwfMWdjKfxsCZG7Zz6WPsbBqou6dspipgRHwMkGkPm5Q3wl
[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031324%C2%A0;%C2%A0https://isw.pub/UkrWar022924%C2%A0;%C2%A0https://isw.pub/UkrWar022724%C2%A0; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021824 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2024
[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031324
[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041324
[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041324 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-14-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-4-2024
[12] https://www.politico.com/news/2024/04/24/biden-ukraine-russia-war-aid-00154143
[13] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2024/04/24/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-and-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-15/
[14] https://suspilne dot media/731395-comu-ludej-treba-zmusuvati-zahisati-krainu-komandir-93-i-brigadi-palisa-pro-front-nestacu-ludej-i-plani-rosian/
[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-11-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-16-2024
[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-11-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-16-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042424
[17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base
[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042324
[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-2-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2024
[21] https://www.pravda.com dot ua/rus/news/2024/04/25/7452892/index.amp
[23] https://twitter.com/rybar_force/status/1783400095083311252; https://t.me/rybar/59484; https://t.me/rybar/59486
[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20March%2010%2C%202024%20%28PDF%29.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/April%2016%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF.pdf
[26] https://tass dot ru/politika/20623169; https://ria dot ru/20240423/dodik-1941721880.html
[27] https://www.france24 dot com/en/europe/20240425-macron-to-outline-vision-for-independent-stronger-europe-in-keynote-speech ; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/macron-aims-cement-french-influence-eu-lift-party-fortunes-with-landmark-speech-2024-04-25/
[28] https://apnews.com/article/france-macron-europe-eu-paris-sorbonne-speech-a3f4de514a88ca324ed1c545fc3821c1
[29] https://www.france24 dot com/en/europe/20240425-macron-to-outline-vision-for-independent-stronger-europe-in-keynote-speech ; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/macron-aims-cement-french-influence-eu-lift-party-fortunes-with-landmark-speech-2024-04-25/
[30] https://dpsu.gov dot ua/ua/news/na-sumshchini-prikordonniki-dali-biy-rosiyskiy-drg/; https://www.facebook.com/DPSUkraine/posts/pfbid0UbGt5jasGyixs5D8gNxHSHUAJZMCs6a2iBQzdnPenCmE11BS7deJPspFXMJXqcdbl
[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028zcawumHY5ujSpB4kMxjTMoHN6VATBxYxcfJWRr43k2Vigi5McDH2Mq7SoRQdU9ul; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028zcawumHY5ujSpB4kMxjTMoHN6VATBxYxcfJWRr43k2Vigi5McDH2Mq7SoRQdU9ul; https://t.me/mod_russia/37919
[34] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5257?single; https://t.me/KotsBespredel/416
[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028zcawumHY5ujSpB4kMxjTMoHN6VATBxYxcfJWRr43k2Vigi5McDH2Mq7SoRQdU9ul ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02iNui5DDRXaJEW8AVFY3tXTV33rCyNbSPQy2gjWDiyDG2tLfU8frokQhYoZybmDNdl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid032fEMA9aNuh5umQ9ZEaKwfMWdjKfxsCZG7Zz6WPsbBqou6dspipgRHwMkGkPm5Q3wl
[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028zcawumHY5ujSpB4kMxjTMoHN6VATBxYxcfJWRr43k2Vigi5McDH2Mq7SoRQdU9ul ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02iNui5DDRXaJEW8AVFY3tXTV33rCyNbSPQy2gjWDiyDG2tLfU8frokQhYoZybmDNdl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid032fEMA9aNuh5umQ9ZEaKwfMWdjKfxsCZG7Zz6WPsbBqou6dspipgRHwMkGkPm5Q3wl ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37923 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19563
[37] https://t.me/wargonzo/19563 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/14270
[39] https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/10461; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/66823; https://t.me/z_arhiv/26599; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/10472; https://t.me/motopatriot/22042; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121312 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/66861
[40] https://t.me/rybar/59496 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/10337 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1783435813058916464 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121406 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/66823 ;
[44] https://t.me/osirskiy/663; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5255; https://x.com/CinC_AFU/status/1783362534466015366; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1783426831464497498
[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02iNui5DDRXaJEW8AVFY3tXTV33rCyNbSPQy2gjWDiyDG2tLfU8frokQhYoZybmDNdl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid032fEMA9aNuh5umQ9ZEaKwfMWdjKfxsCZG7Zz6WPsbBqou6dspipgRHwMkGkPm5Q3wl
[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028zcawumHY5ujSpB4kMxjTMoHN6VATBxYxcfJWRr43k2Vigi5McDH2Mq7SoRQdU9ul ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19563 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9910 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/40840
[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028zcawumHY5ujSpB4kMxjTMoHN6VATBxYxcfJWRr43k2Vigi5McDH2Mq7SoRQdU9ul ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02iNui5DDRXaJEW8AVFY3tXTV33rCyNbSPQy2gjWDiyDG2tLfU8frokQhYoZybmDNdl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid032fEMA9aNuh5umQ9ZEaKwfMWdjKfxsCZG7Zz6WPsbBqou6dspipgRHwMkGkPm5Q3wl ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9951
[52] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/25/rechnyk-povitryanyh-syl-rozpoviv-chym-vorog-czilyv-po-cherkashhyni/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/25/unochi-okupanty-atakuvaly-cherkashhynu-poshkodyly-krytychnyj-obyekt-infrastruktury/
[54] https://www.facebook.com/pvkshid/posts/pfbid06yDPuGKiyFgTGKQ5inkENAfQ5r9CuxJ9Z9YkdpVfVmAZGXE2in4ES8zS44xBRgiil ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/25/vorog-atakuvav-kryvyj-rig-raketoyu-z-vynyshhuvacha-su-57/ ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02oCqc9q9hjTX99qpaT9b6PS22V2xZngkefzxjbUQnHf5VWcER9qQj8f98sCftWFel
[55] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/25/vorog-atakuvav-kryvyj-rig-raketoyu-z-vynyshhuvacha-su-57/
[56] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042324
[57] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20February%2019%2C%202024%20PDF.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20February%2013%2C%202024%20%28PDF%29.pdf
[58] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/957772
[59] https://novayagazeta dot eu/articles/2024/03/12/war-and-fleece-en ; https://www.severreal dot org/a/putin-zayavil-o-vozmozhnosti-natsionalizatsii-kompaniy-v-interesah-natsionalnoy-oborony/32920657.html
[60] https://www.severreal dot org/a/putin-zayavil-o-vozmozhnosti-natsionalizatsii-kompaniy-v-interesah-natsionalnoy-oborony/32920657.html
[61] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/957783
[62] https://www.severreal dot org/a/zarplata-horoshaya-no-tselaya-golova-luchshe-voennym-zavodam-ne-hvataet-rabotnikov/32918790.html
[63] https://www.politico.eu/article/us-accuses-china-backing-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/
[64] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/04/25/china-harbours-ship-north-korean-munitions-russia/ ; https://www.rusi.org/news-and-comment/in-the-news/china-harbours-ship-transporting-north-korean-munitions-russia-satellite-images-show
[67] https://t.me/tass_agency/245594; https://t.me/tass_agency/245619
[68] https://suspilne dot media/731589-ssa-taemno-peredali-ukraini-dalekobijni-raketi-u-berezni-ap/; https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3856407-derzdep-oficijno-pidtverdiv-neglasni-postavki-v-ukrainu-raket-atacms-velikoi-dalnosti.html; https://twitter.com/USAmbKyiv/status/1783393551893545252 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/64178
[69] https://t.me/tass_agency/245728 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/245733; https://t.me/tass_agency/245738; https://t.me/tass_agency/245739
[72] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2024
[73] https://ria dot ru/20240425/belorussiya-1942255286.html
[74] https://sputnik dot by/20240425/tertel-radikaly-proizvodyat-v-litve-i-polshe-drony-dlya-udarov-po-belarusi-1085737044.html
[75] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/25/belarus-lithuania-drones-claim/037ca8a0-0302-11ef-8eac-39c6dcb59eb5_story.html ; https://apnews.com/article/belarus-lithuania-drones-claim-ab7b011914cea2344a76d05ccad321f1
The Russian Winter-Spring 2024 Offensive Operation on the Kharkiv-Luhansk Axis
Kagan with Nicole Wolkov and Christina Harward
Russian forces are conducting a cohesive multi-axis offensive operation in pursuit of an operationally significant objective for nearly the first time in over a year and a half of campaigning in Ukraine
The prospects of this offensive in the Kharkiv-Luhansk sector are far from clear
but its design and initial execution mark notable inflections in the Russian operational level approach
Russian efforts to seize relatively small cities and villages in eastern Ukraine since Spring 2022 have generally not secured operationally significant objectives
although these Russian operations led to large-scale fighting and significant Ukrainian and Russian losses.[1] Russian forces likely pursued more operationally significant objectives during their Winter-Spring 2023 offensive
but that effort was poorly designed and executed and its failure to make any substantial progress precludes drawing firm conclusions about its intended goals.[2] Russian offensives to this point have generally either concentrated large masses of troops against singular objectives (such as Bakhmut and Avdiivka) or else have consisted of multiple attacks along axes of advance that were too far away to be mutually supporting and/or divergent
The current Russian offensive in the Kharkiv-Luhansk sector
involves attacks along four parallel axes that are mutually supporting in pursuit of multiple objectives that
would likely generate operationally significant gains
The design of this offensive operation is worth careful consideration regardless of its outcome as a possible example of the Russian command’s ability to learn from and improve on its previous failures at the operational level
Russian tactical performance in this sector
does not appear to have improved materially on previous Russian tactical shortcomings
a factor that may well lead to the overall failure even of this better-designed undertaking
Russia’s Western Grouping of Forces has recently intensified operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and is focusing on four directions of advance
Russian forces are currently pursuing offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk
but the WMD appears to have taken over responsibility for the northern portion of the Lyman direction after the Russian command transferred significant elements of the CMD to support the offensive effort to seize Avdiivka in Donetsk Oblast in early October 2023.[4] The WMD‘s 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) and 1st Guards Tank Army (1st GTA) resumed a localized offensive effort northeast of Kupyansk on October 6
2023 and sporadically intensified operations elsewhere in the Kupyansk direction.[5] This localized Russian offensive effort to advance towards Kupyansk from the northeast had resulted in only marginal tactical gains by January 2024
Ukrainian officials increasingly began to report in January 2024 that Russian forces were setting conditions for a larger offensive effort in both the Kupyansk and Lyman directions.[6] WMD elements began to intensify operations in four directions of advance along the line in early January
and Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov announced by January 30 that the Russian 2024 winter-spring effort on the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis was underway.[7] The Russian offensive campaign is currently proceeding along four axes
from north to south: 1) around Kupyansk and Synkivka; 2) from Tabaivka toward Kruhlyakivka; 3) from Makiivka toward Raihorodka and/or Borova; and 4) from near Kreminna to Drobysheve and/or Lyman
Elements of the 6th CAA are currently conducting offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka in an ongoing effort to advance towards east bank Kupyansk
and Ukrainian military officials have identified the Synkivka area as providing the most rapid route for Russian forces to reach the two settlements on the east bank of the Oskil River.[10] Likely elements of the 6th CAA’s 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 128 Motorized Rifle Brigade conducted relatively large company-sized mechanized assaults in the Synkivka area in December 2023 that resulted in significant Russian armored vehicle losses and no notable tactical gains
and Russian forces have since heavily relied on infantry assaults with limited armored vehicle support in the area.[11] Elements of the Russian 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade are currently conducting assaults on Synkivka
and elements of the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade are reportedly operating in the Vilshana area.[12] Russian forces have reportedly made tactical gains in the Synkivka area in intensified assaults in late January
although ISW has not seen confirmation of any recent notable tactical gains near the settlement.[13] Ukrainian officials continue to assess that Russian assaults near Synkivka aim to facilitate Russian advances to Kupyansk and Kupyansk-Vuzlovy
where there are two bridges crossings over the Oskil River.[14]
Elements of the 1st GTA are reportedly still operating near Synkivka
although it is unclear if they are conducting assaults in the area.[15] Elements of the 1st GTA’s 2nd Motorized Rifle Division reportedly conducted attacks near Orlyanka (east of Kupyansk) in early January 2024
although it is unclear if some of these elements are still in the area.[16] Elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division participated in offensive efforts near Stepova Novoselivka (south of Orlyanka) in early February 2024 suggesting that they may have shifted their focus to the Russian effort further south.[17]
have intensified operations northwest of Svatove
have recently made tactical gains around Tabaivka
and appear to be pushing west toward the Oskil Reservoir in the direction of Kruhlyakivka and northwest along the P07 highway toward Kupyansk-Vuzlovy
Russian forces intensified operations northwest of Svatove in January 2024 more than anywhere else along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line
Elements of the 47th Tank Division began what Russian sources described as a “massive offensive” in the direction of Krokhmalne and Tabaivka on January 19.[18] Geolocated footage published on January 20 indicated that Russian forces had quickly captured Krokhmalne
and elements of the 47th Tank Division reportedly captured Tabaivka as early as January 27
although ISW has still not observed confirmation of Russian forces capturing the settlement as of February 20.[19] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also entered Ivanivka (north of Tabaivka) and advanced closer to Kyslivka (immediately north of Tabaivka) as of February 1.[20] Russian sources have claimed that Russian forces may have captured Kotlyarivka (immediately north of Tabaivka)
and elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st GTA) have reportedly advanced near Berestove (just south of Krokhmalne).[21] Russian forces have also resumed assaults near Stelmakhivka (south of Krokhmalne) and near Pishchane (immediately southwest of Tabaivka).[22]
Elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division's 1st Tank Regiment and 15th Motorized Rifle Regiment unsuccessfully attempted to encircle Ukrainian forces near Stepova Novoselivka (north of Kyslivka) in early February as elements of the 4th Tank Division (1st GTA) reportedly tried to push through Ukrainian defenses near Kyslivka.[23] Elements of the 47th Tank Division appear to be the main force committed to the effort northwest of Svatove
but the participation of elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade
and the 4th Tank Division in offensive operations in the area suggests that the wider 1st GTA is responsible for offensive operations this area of the line and is not actively committed to the effort northeast of Kupyansk
Russian operations around Tabaivka appear to be pushing along diverging axes to the northwest and west-southwest
and it is not yet clear which is the main effort
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are currently developing an offensive in the direction of Pishchane from Tabaivka in an effort to reach the Oskil River.[24] Pishchane and Berestove are located along a country road connecting the P07 highway to Kruhlyakivka
where one of the six bridges crossing the Oskil River is located
There is also a country road that begins west of Kyslivka and Kotlyarivka and connects the P07 highway to Kurylivka and southern Kupyansk-Vuzlovy
where a railway and roadway bridge across the Oskil River are located
The Russian tactical effort to seize settlements along the P07 highway likely aims to open routes of advance for Russian forces to reach Kurylivka
and Kruhlyakivka and threaten Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting the east and west banks of the Oskil River in the area
Elements of the 20th CAA’s 3rd Motorized Rifle Division are attacking southwest of Svatove
although they are currently conducting a lower tempo of operations in the area than Russian forces elsewhere along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line
Russian forces attacked southwest of Svatove
particularly near Makiivka on the Zherebets River
although at a slower tempo than other areas along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.[25] Geolocated footage published on January 27 indicates that Russian forces have recently advanced east of Makiivka
and elements of the 20th CAA’s 3rd Motorized Rifle Division have reportedly recently increased efforts to advance near the settlement.[26] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported positional engagements in the area throughout January 2024.[27] Russian and Ukrainian sources also stated that Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Makiivka throughout December 2023
but ISW did not observe visual confirmation of any Russian advances in the area during this time.[28]
Russian forces consisting mostly of elements of the 2nd CAA (CMD) previously conducted offensive operations southwest of Svatove along the Raihorodka-Karmazynivka-Novovodyane line further north of Makiivka in the summer and early fall of 2023
with Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stating in August 2023 that the Raihorodka area was one of the most intense sectors of the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.[29] ISW has not observed reports of the CMD’s 2nd CAA operating southwest of Svatove in 2024
suggesting that the transfer of elements of the CMD‘s 2nd CAA from the area and subsequent transfer of elements of the WMD’s 20th CAA may be part of an effort to cohere a large effort around WMD forces along the entire Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line
Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated the Russian forces intended to reach Borova before the start of winter 2023-2024 during localized Russian offensive operations in the area in early Fall 2023.[30] The CMD forces failed to achieve that goal
but there is no reason to assess that WMD elements in the area have shifted their goal away from Borova
Makiivka and Raihorodka are located on country roads that connect the P66 Svatove-Kreminna highway to Borova where there is a crossing over the Oskil River
is more direct than the route from Makiivka to Borova
suggesting that Russian forces may choose to resume offensive operations near Raihorodka aimed at advancing to Borova
country roads from Makiivka lead southeastward to Lyman
and current Russian activity near Makiivka could additionally be aimed at supporting offensive efforts to cross the Zherebets River west of Kreminna
Country roads from Makiivka also lead to several settlements south of Borova along the Oskil River and Oskil City
and Russian efforts near Makiivka may be ultimately aimed at securing the southern edge of the Oskil Reservoir (before it narrows at the Oskil Hydroelectric Power Plant)
Elements of the 20th CAA’s 144th Motorized Rifle Division have intensified an effort to push Ukrainian forces off the left bank of the Zherebets River west of Kreminna while non-WMD elements continue routine positional fighting elsewhere in the Lyman direction.[31] Russian and Ukrainian sources have stated that elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division were pursuing this effort as early as November 2023
although ISW did not observe a concerted offensive effort to push towards the Zherebets River until early January 2024.[32] Likely elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division notably intensified this effort around January 20 with reports of Russian forces using a significant number of tanks
and armored vehicles in a relatively large number of assaults in the area.[33] Geolocated footage published on January 21 showed at least 20 new Russian vehicle losses following unsuccessful assaults near Terny (west of Kreminna).[34] The most recent intensified Russian assaults have focused on Terny
and Torske — three settlements on the Zherebets River with nearby crossings — and Russian forces have made recent minor marginal tactical gains in the area.[35] Russian milbloggers have claimed that Russian forces have advanced close to the outskirts of Torske
although ISW has yet to observe confirmation of these claims.[36] Russian forces have advanced within two kilometers of the eastern outskirts of Terny as of February 12.[37]
Elements of the newly created 25th CAA (CMD) have also conducted localized offensive operations in the area since October 2023
Elements of the 90th Tank Regiment (41st CAA
CMD) were reportedly participating in positional engagements southwest of Kreminna in December 2023
although other elements may still remain in the Kreminna area.[42] It is unclear what elements of the CMD may still be deployed in rear areas of occupied Luhansk Oblast
although any remaining elements likely represent only a fraction of the combat power that the CMD had previously deployed in the area
Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) 2nd Army Corps (AC) elements and Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz forces are operating around Kreminna and have reportedly intensified operations south of Kreminna
but are likely not directly participating in the concerted Russian effort in the Lyman direction.[43] Russian milbloggers have claimed that Russian forces intensified offensive operations near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) in mid-January 2024 and have made tactical advances in the area
although ISW did not observe evidence of any Russian advances in the area until early February and has not observed a significant intensification of the tempo of Russian operations near Bilohorivka.[44] LNR 2nd AC and Akhmat Spetsnaz elements are likely engaged in tactical efforts that have little relevance to the wider operational effort in the Lyman direction
Reaching the Zherebets River and pushing Ukrainian forces across to the right bank of the river is only an immediate tactical objective
and Russian forces likely have more ambitious subsequent operational objectives in the area
Russian forces may have attempted to recapture Lyman
Donetsk Oblast during the failed Russian Winter-Spring 2023 offensive campaign in Luhansk Oblast
although the Russian failure to make any meaningful advances makes determining the ultimate objective of the offensive difficult.[45] Recapturing Lyman is the most likely operational objective for Russian forces in the area as the settlement opens routes of Russian advance both to the northwest towards Oskil City (southeast of Izyum) and to the southwest towards Slovyansk
Russian forces may alternatively intend to advance north of Lyman towards Drobysheve in an effort to support planned advances towards the Oskil River and set conditions for the later seizure of Lyman
Russian Operational Planning and Objectives
The apparent coordination of Russian offensive efforts along the four axes on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line is likely reflective of a wider operational objective and higher-level operational planning
Russian objectives in each direction of advance appear to add up to a wider cohesive operational objective to seize the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast
Russian operations on each axis share similarities in design and support one another in ways that suggest that the command of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces has planned a larger operation in pursuit of this cohesive operational objective
These four directions of Russian advance along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and the apparent Russian objectives in those directions suggest that the Russian Western Grouping of Forces is undertaking a larger months-long cohesive operational effort to seize the east bank of the Oskil River from Kupyansk to Oskil City
The fact that these directions of advance all fall under the operational responsibility of a cohesive Russian grouping of forces suggests that the Russian command has tasked the Western Grouping of Forces to pursue a coordinated operational objective on the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis
The clear delineation of those directions among elements of the 6th CAA
the 20th CAA’s 3rd Motorized Rifle Division
and the 20th CAA’s 144th Motorized Rifle Division suggests that the Western Grouping of Forces deployed relatively cohesive formations in distinct areas of operation well in advance of this effort
The intensification of Russian offensive operations along these axes of advance at the same time suggests that this activity is part of a wider operation and not four separate localized offensive efforts
The likely planned Russian objectives of advancing to and seizing east bank Kupyansk
and areas near or north of Lyman would all support a coordinated objective of pushing Ukrainian forces off the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast
Russian advances to and the seizure of these settlements would otherwise only have limited tactical significance
An operation to push Ukrainian forces off the east bank of the Oskil River offers the Russian military an attainable goal that would generate operationally significant effects
and areas near or north of Lyman as well as corresponding areas where there are river crossings would likely create conditions that would make continued Ukrainian operations on the east bank of the Oskil River untenable
This operation would also allow Russian forces to safely consolidate after the offensive’s planned culmination as there would be little risk of serious Ukrainian counterattacks back across the river
It would be surprising if the Russian command did not plan this operation with this relatively attainable objective and favorable conditions for consolidation but rather chose a less cohesive
and less attainable effort--but Russian commanders have made similarly poor choices repeatedly throughout the war.[46]
The Kremlin has often prioritized military efforts to achieve informational or political objectives over those with wider operational significance in Ukraine
but an operation to reach the Oskil River offers Russia opportunities for both kinds of gains.[47] Ukrainian military officials have noted that Russian forces may be intensifying offensive operations to take territory ahead of Russia’s March 2024 presidential elections
suggesting that Russian President Vladimir Putin intends to secure an informational victory in Ukraine to bolster his reputation as a capable war-time leader amid his certain re-election.[48] Operations northwest of Svatove
and near Kreminna offer the Russian military the opportunity to seize the remainder of unoccupied Luhansk Oblast
and the Kremlin has long pursued the seizure of all of Luhansk Oblast as one of its main objectives in eastern Ukraine.[49] The more operationally significant effort to reach the Oskil River would achieve this informational objective and more
But seizing the remainder of Luhansk Oblast could still be an attainable objective even if the wider operation fails since Ukrainian forces only control a small sliver of Luhansk Oblast south of Kreminna and west and southwest of Svatove
The seizure of all of Luhansk Oblast may be a subordinate objective
but three of the axes of the Russian offensive effort are focused on territory in Kharkiv and Donetsk oblasts
suggesting that the primary objective is reaching the Oskil River and possibly taking Kupyansk
The Kremlin could settle for this secondary objective for its informational benefits
but only if it appears unable to achieve its primary goals
The Western Grouping of Forces appears to be conducting the initial stages of an intensified cohesive offensive operation to reach the Oskil River on a broad front
but the Russian command could decide to pursue other objectives that diverge from this cohesive effort
Potential Russian advances towards Lyman would divert Russian forces along diverging axes of advance towards separate operational objectives that are not necessarily mutually supporting
The Russian command could decide to break the Lyman effort off from the overall operation to reach the Oskil River if the wider operation makes little progress or if the capture of Lyman and advances south of the settlement look more attractive than trying to advance all the way towards Oskil City
The terrain south of Lyman would likely be less favorable to Russian advances
Lyman also offers a less attractive position either to consolidate gains or to resume subsequent attacks because of the forest belts around it and the open flanks it would offer to Ukrainian counterattacks
Lyman’s position on a seam between groupings of forces would also pose greater command and control challenges to Russian efforts to consolidate and defend or exploit its seizure
Russian forces appear to be attacking along mutually supporting axes
something Russian forces have often failed to do in the past
which suggests possible improvements in Russian operational planning at least in this sector of the front.[50] The areas in which Russian forces are trying to advance are mutually supporting because they are roughly parallel with one another and close enough together to generate pressure on the same groupings of Ukrainian defenders
The flank of one direction of advance is close enough to the flank of the adjacent direction to create synergistic effects
a Russian tactical advance northwest of Svatove could also be seen as a tactical advance on the northern flank of the Russian effort west and southwest of Svatove or as an advance on the southern flank of the effort northeast and east of Kupyansk
A Russian advance in one of these directions places pressure not just on the Ukrainian forces defending in the immediate tactical area but also on Ukrainian forces that are defending against Russian offensive operations north or south of the direction in which Russian forces advanced
Mutually supporting operations also set conditions for the tactical envelopment or encirclement of Ukrainian forces in some areas if Russian forces can advance rapidly enough or if Ukrainian defenders make mistakes
Many of the settlements along the Oskil River that Russian forces are apparently trying to capture can be reached by forces advancing along adjacent axes
which could allow Russian forces to envelop or encircle a settlement instead of attacking it frontally
Russian forces can approach northern Kupyansk-Vuzlovy by advancing from Synkivka and can approach southern Kupyansk Vuzlovy from the direction of advance northwest of Svatove
the Russian advances towards Kruhlyakiva from settlements along the PO7 highway northwest of Svatove and advances southwest of Svatove from Makiivka can set conditions for Russian forces to envelop or encircle Ukrainian forces defending Borova
The four mutually supporting directions present Russian forces with opportunities to envelop or encircle east bank Kupyansk
and Borova depending on the rate and timing of Russian advances
The mutually supporting operations do not provide these opportunities for areas near or north of Lyman
as Lyman is on the flank of the overall operational effort along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line
The likely Russian offensive operation towards the Oskil River appears to be a much more sustainable effort than previous Russian offensive operations in Ukraine
The following observations are based on the current tempo of Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line
and it is unclear if many of them would hold in the event of a significant intensification of the Russian offensive effort
Ukrainian artillery shortages and delays in Western security assistance are creating uncertainty in Ukrainian operational planning and are likely prompting Ukrainian forces to husband materiel.[51] These constraints on Ukrainian operations are likely limiting Ukraine’s ability to degrade and pressure Russian forces and logistics along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line
and it is unclear if the Russian military would be able to conduct a relatively sustainable offensive operation in the absence of these Ukrainian constraints
Russian forces attacking along the Luhansk-Kharkiv axis appear to be attempting to use some of the principles of Soviet deep battle theory
particularly the principle of conducting multiple simultaneous attacks to pin the defender’s frontline forces and reserves.[52] Russian forces have shown a pattern of activity along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line that suggests that Russian forces are alternating intensified attacks along certain axes with regrouping and consolidation along others
This rotating intensification throughout the frontline likely aims to maintain pressure on Ukrainian defenders all along the east bank of the Oskil River even as some Russian groupings regroup and reconstitute
This approach likely also aims to prevent Ukrainian forces from concentrating on a single Russian axis of advance
This rotating intensification pressures the entire Ukrainian force grouping defending in the area and complicates Ukraine’s ability to transfer forces between different defensive directions
The current tempo of Russian offensives along the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis
and the Russian ability to conduct operational-level rotations will likely allow Russian forces to conduct offensive operations along each axis of advance without pulling manpower away from another
thereby making Russian offensive efforts at current levels of intensity sustainable.[58]
The losses Russian forces have taken in their effort to seize Avdiivka prompted the Russian command to transfer elements from other sectors of the front to support that effort
but the Russian elements attacking along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line are doing so in a way that has not thus far required the commitment of reserves from other sectors of the front.[59] The 6th CAA
and the 20th CAA’s 144th Motorized Rifle Division will likely be able to continue to replenish their losses and rotate degraded units at the current operational tempo without drawing on Russian reserves from other formations
The Russian military is replenishing losses with poorly trained and relatively combat ineffective personnel
losses over time will likely degrade the combat effectiveness of the attacking WMD elements and hinder their ability to sustain effective offensive operations.[60] The Russian offensive effort toward the Oskil River will thus likely culminate at or before the river line
and the Russians will likely have to conduct a fundamental reconstitution of the formations involved in this offensive before using them in subsequent major offensive operations
The apparent Russian ability to conduct routine regroupings and resume offensive operations on individual axes without drawing combat power from other axes is letting Russian forces sustain operations on each axis at their own pace
The degradation of Russian forces on one axis does not appear to influence the tempo of operations on other axes along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line
Russian forces on a given axis could even potentially culminate short of the river line without fully disrupting the overall operational scheme
The limited number of crossings and the vulnerability of those crossings to Russian fires also mitigates the risks caused by the premature culmination of a given axis—Ukrainian forces could be driven to withdraw from the entire east bank by the threat of being cut off even if they manage to stop one or more axes of Russian advance short of the river
if the Ukrainian forces managed to block one or more of the Russian advances in such a fashion that the Russian command had to divert effort from another axis to sustain its coherent drive
The apparent sustainability of the Russian offensive effort and the mutually reinforcing directions of Russian advance suggests that the Russian command may be learning from previous operational design failures
The Wagner offensive ultimately took Bakhmut
but did so in a way that left Russian forces unprepared to defend against Ukrainian counterattacks and required the deployment of significant Russian reserves drawn from elsewhere in the theater to hold most of the gains made.[63] The seizure of Bakhmut combined with the Wagner Group‘s abortive armed rebellion also led to the effective destruction of the Wagner Group as a fighting force
The apparent relatively sustainable operation to reach the Oskil River is notable in this context and suggests that the Western Grouping of Forces has intentionally designed operations to avoid a premature culmination of its ongoing effort
Russian forces have also routinely attacked along diverging axes throughout the Russian invasion of Ukraine
an approach that has regularly prevented Russian forces from capitalizing on tactical gains and translating them into operationally significant [64] The Western Grouping of Forces appears to be learning from this mistake as well
The Southern Military District’s [SMD] 58th CAA proved during its defensive effort in western Zaporizhia Oblast against the Ukrainian summer 2023 counteroffensive that at least some Russian formations can internalize lessons learned and successfully adapt campaign designs and tactical preparations to the battlefield realities in Ukraine.[65] ISW has yet to observe a Russian formation demonstrate this adaptation for operational planning at scale while conducting an offensive operational effort
and recent waves of mass mechanized assault around Avdiivka in October and November 2023 suggested that the Russian command has not disseminated tactical lessons learned from previous failed Russian offensive efforts.[66] The Western Grouping of Forces‘ current offensive operation may be the first instance of a large formation capturing and implementing at least campaign design lessons
Russian offensives along the Oskil River have not shown tactical improvements or innovations
Russian tactical engagements continue to display many of the same mistakes Russian offensive operations have repeatedly shown
causing high losses of men and materiel for limited gains
Russian learning and innovation thus appear to be partial and possibly confined thus far to operational level planning and force generation
Prospects of the Russian Offensive Operation on the Kharkiv-Luhansk Axis
Russian forces will likely struggle to translate minor tactical advances into operationally significant maneuver towards the Oskil River
and the effort will likely take months of campaigning regardless of its ultimate success or failure if Ukrainian forces retain the material capability to continue resisting as they have
Russian forces have not learned how to restore mechanized maneuver to the positional battlefield in Ukraine and have not conducted any offensive operation that has resulted in a rapid mechanized advance since spring 2022.[67] A successful Russian advance to the Oskil River would very likely result from months of accumulated marginal tactical Russian gains at very high cost
Russian forces are very unlikely to advance fast enough to encircle sizable pockets of Ukrainian forces
The likely gradual rate of Russian advance will allow Ukrainian forces to prepare positions
and logistics around settlements on the east bank of the Oskil River well ahead of any potential Russian advance towards these settlements
A threatened Russian encirclement of Ukrainian forces in these settlements rapid enough to prompt Ukrainian forces to withdraw to the west bank of the Oskil River is highly unlikely
The gradual rate of Russian advance will thus likely culminate in attritional frontal attacks against entrenched Ukrainian positions in and near settlements along the Oskil River before the final Ukrainian forces withdraw
Russian forces have previously struggled to conduct significant operational encirclements and likely will continue to do so even if they can gradually envelop settlements along the Oskil River
Russian forces failed to operationally encircle Bakhmut in March 2023 and proceeded to fight through the city for two months in highly attritional assaults.[68] Russian forces have also failed more recently to operationally encircle smaller settlements such as Marinka and Avdiivka
although the threat of a tactical Russian encirclement forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Avdiivka on February 16.[69] Russian forces can advance in areas north and south of settlements along the east bank of the Oskil River and may envelop Ukrainian forces but Russian forces are very unlikely to complete operational encirclements
The fact that these settlements are backed up against a water feature may give Russian forces a better chance to trap Ukrainian forces against the river (effectively an encirclement)
but only if the Russians can advance more rapidly than they have generally been able to do or if the Ukrainians either choose to defend a settlement to the last or make a mistake in timing their withdrawal
Russian forces will likely have to conduct assaults into and through east bank Kupyansk
and Borova if they wish to capture these settlements
Russian offensive operations to capture even relatively small settlements with entrenched Ukrainian positions have lasted months
and there is no reason to assess that fighting into and through these relatively small settlements will be much easier for Russian forces as long as Ukrainian forces have the materiel needed to continue defensive operations effectively
Russian interdiction efforts will likely have greater chances of isolating the battlespace on the east bank of the Oskil River than elsewhere in Ukraine where Russian forces are conducting offensive operations
Six bridges (both railway and roadway bridges) cross the Oskil River between Kupyansk and the Oskil Hydroelectric Power Plant
Satellite imagery from mid-January suggests that many of these bridges have sustained some damage and a few appear unlikely to be usable by heavy equipment.[70] Russian forces likely damaged these bridges during a coordinated strike campaign on crossings along the Oskil River in September and October 2023
although this effort did not isolate the Ukrainian defense northeast of Kupyansk
and Ukrainian forces have not yet shown any signs of suffering from serious difficulties in supplying positions on the east bank of the Oskil River.[71] Russian forces may resume this effort to degrade Ukrainian logistics and force Ukrainian forces to transfer heavy equipment across the river with more vulnerable crossing equipment
Russian forces may also hope that advances closer to the Oskil River will allow Russian fire to interdict the Ukrainian GLOCs running along the west bank of the Oskil River (especially the P-79 and P-78 highways)
Russian forces may envision conducting an interdiction effort that eliminates existing Ukrainian crossings to the east bank while also degrading logistics supporting areas on the west bank from where Ukrainian forces could deploy new crossings
The Russian command likely hopes that the isolation of the battlespace will allow Russian forces to conduct the operational encirclements and envelopments that they have previously failed to conduct
Elements of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces
began this operation less degraded and better rested than Russian forces elsewhere along the frontline
which may allow these elements to conduct more effective offensive operations than other Russian force groupings
These elements may not necessarily have the combat capabilities required to conduct successful maneuver to the Oskil River line
A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger questioned the Russian Western Grouping of Forces’ ability to conduct successful offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction after footage published in late December 2023 showed Ukrainian artillery
in which Ukrainian forces destroyed columns of Russian armored vehicles.[76]
The manpower fill and combat-effectiveness of the newly formed 25th CAA may affect the Russian military’s ability to conduct and support successful offensive operations west of Kreminna where the formation is operating
Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov stated in late August 2023 that Russian forces formed the 25th CAA as a “strategic reserve” and did not intend the formation to be combat ready before October or November 2023.[77] Budanov also stated that elements of the 25th CAA deployed to Luhansk Oblast in late August 2023 and were poorly trained and staffed with 80 percent of their planned manpower and only 50 percent of the necessary equipment
likely due to their rushed deployment.[78] The likely limited combat power of the 25th CAA may affect the Russian military‘s ability to hold positions near Kreminna as the 144th Motorized Rifle Division pursues advances toward the Zherebets River
Advances towards the Oskil River will likely require successful mechanized maneuver in many places
and Russian forces remain unlikely to be able to conduct such maneuver across the entire Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line
Many of the areas where Russian forces are currently attacking are heavily forested
Ukrainian military personnel have previously noted that Russian forces take advantage of this terrain to provide cover for infantry heavy assaults.[79] The land further west of the frontline in the direction of the Oskil River
Russian advances through this terrain will likely require at least some successful mechanized assaults while under Ukrainian fire with high visibility
Recent chaotic and costly Russian mechanized assaults throughout the theater
including along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line
suggest that WMD elements will struggle to advance in these areas and that assaults will likely produce significant armored vehicle losses that slow and disrupt the offensive operations.[80] Russian forces have proven more capable of making marginal tactical gains in urban or semi-urban environments
although at the expense of heavy personnel losses
as seen with the seizure of Bakhmut and Avdiivka.[81] Russian forces throughout much of the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line would have to advance roughly between eight and 35 kilometers through rural and open terrain to reach such semi-urban areas
The Kremlin may believe that delayed Western security assistance to Ukraine will give Russian forces opportunities to accelerate advances in the coming months
although it is unclear if this belief is accurate
Delays in Western security assistance are likely forcing Ukrainian forces to husband materiel
The longer the Russian military maintains the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine the more opportunity the Western Grouping of Forces has to achieve its operational objective of pushing Ukrainian forces off the east bank of the Oskil River
Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov assessed on January 30 that Russian forces will fail to reach the administrative borders of Luhansk Oblast or the Zherebets River and will likely be “completely exhausted” by the beginning of Spring 2024.[86] Russian forces around Synkivka conducted a localized offensive operation for four months without showing any signs that the effort was near culmination
although it is possible that further significant intensification of the Russian operation throughout the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line could result in an operational culmination by the time Budanov identified
The Russian ability to conduct routine regroupings
and rotations alongside the current operational tempo suggests that Russian forces may be able to continue operations along the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis for longer
Budanov may be suggesting that muddy ground conditions in early spring 2024 would force the Russian operation along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line to culminate since the ground will no longer be conducive to mechanized maneuver
Heavy spring rains can also interfere with drone operations
Russian forces notably launched localized offensive operations throughout eastern Ukraine in Fall 2023
Russian forces could alternatively conduct the operation to reach the Oskil River in several active phases interspersed with operational pauses aimed at resting
and preparing forces for resumed attacks in each direction of advance
The command of the Western Grouping of Forces has a wide range of options in determining both the tempo and the duration of its offensive effort precisely because the Russian military has the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine
Russian forces will be able to determine the location
and duration of fighting in Ukraine if Ukraine commits itself to defensive operations throughout 2024.[89] The Western Grouping of Forces may intend to conduct a much longer effort or resume it at a later date in case of its initial failure if it concludes that there is no credible threat of a Ukrainian counteroffensive in the area or elsewhere along the front
Operational Effects of a Successful Russian Operation to Reach the Oskil River
The Russian seizure of the left bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast would generate immediate operational benefits for Russian forces along the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis and throughout the theater while also setting favorable conditions for future Russian offensive efforts
Russian forces have not conducted offensive operations that have led to immediate operational-level benefits or set operational-level conditions for subsequent operations since Spring 2022.[90] Russian forces conducted nominally successful operations to seize Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in summer 2022 and Bakhmut in May 2023 and a nominally successful localized offensive effort to seize Avdiivka in February 2024
but those efforts have only generated limited tactical benefits for Russian forces.[91] A successful Russian operation to reach the Oskil River line would therefore be a significant inflection in over a year and a half of Russian campaigning in Ukraine
A successful Russian operation to push Ukrainian forces off the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast would deprive Ukraine of a potential area from which to launch a future counteroffensive operation into northwestern Luhansk Oblast
Ukrainian forces previously attempted to advance towards Svatove and Kreminna after liberating Lyman in October 2022
but would also likely ensure that Ukrainian forces were not able to reverse the Kremlin’s achievement anytime soon
Russian forces captured all of Luhansk Oblast in July 2022
a victory that the Kremlin soon had spoiled by the Fall 2022 Ukrainian counteroffensive’s advance into Luhansk Oblast.[94] The Kremlin likely hopes that positions along the Oskil River will prevent a scenario in which Russian forces have to routinely fight to retain or recapture Luhansk Oblast and allow the Kremlin to tout the occupation of all of Luhansk Oblast as a permanent victory
The Russian seizure of the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast would also likely secure several Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Luhansk Oblast from regular Ukrainian interdiction efforts
Russian positions along the P66 (Svatove-Kreminna) highway would be well out of range of Ukrainian tube artillery on the west bank of the Oskil River
and Ukrainian tube artillery would have to be deployed very close to the river to strike sections of the P07 (Svatove-Kupyansk) highway
Russian forces may also hope to be able to conduct counterbattery fire further into Kharkiv Oblast and push long-range Ukrainian artillery systems and HIMARS launchers out of range of Russian logistics facilities and GLOCs further in the rear
Moving Ukrainian fire further west would essentially allow Russian forces to turn a considerable section of Luhansk Oblast into near and deep rear areas and establish less vulnerable logistics to support operations further west and south of the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line
Ukrainian forces could still conduct long-range strikes against Russian targets in rear areas of Luhansk Oblast although Ukraine has limited numbers of long-range systems
A successful Russian effort to seize the east bank of the Oskil River from Kupyansk to Oskil City would also create a defensible frontline very difficult for Ukrainian forces to attack and thereby allow Russian forces to transfer materiel and manpower to other efforts in Ukraine
The Oskil River would act as a significant water obstacle along a sizable sector of the frontline from the international border with Belgorod Oblast all the way to the Donetsk-Kharkiv Oblast border area
The only other sector of the frontline along a notable water barrier in Ukraine is the front along the Dnipro River in east (left) bank Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts
The Western Grouping of Forces likely envisions a frontline along the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast resembling the frontline along the Dnipro River in some way
The Oskil River is nowhere near as wide or as deep as the Dnipro River (excluding in areas of the dried up Kakhovka Reservoir)
and some sections of the Oskil River are narrow enough to ford with limited river crossing equipment and possibly even with armored vehicles
The Oskil Reservoir from southern Kupyansk-Vuzlovy to west of Oskil City is the Oskil River’s widest section before it narrows at the Oskil Hydroelectric Power Plant
This wide section of the Oskil River would be an easily defensible front
and even narrower sections of the river are still challenging terrain for Ukrainian forces to conduct counterattacks across
Ukrainian forces could more easily conduct cross-river tactical activity along the Oskil River than along the Dnipro River
but such activity would likely have poor prospects for reestablishing positions on the east bank of the Oskil River absent a larger Ukrainian crossing effort
The relatively defensible frontline would likely require less Russian combat power to hold and allow the Russian command to transfer formations to other efforts in Ukraine or prepare for a subsequent offensive effort in northeastern Ukraine
The reduction in routine positional fighting along this frontline would allow the Russian command to transfer manpower and materiel currently operating in the northern sections of advance on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line relatively freely without endangering Russian positions in the area
Conditions Setting for Subsequent Operations
A successful Russian operation to advance towards the Oskil River would also set conditions for potential subsequent campaigns in northern Donetsk Oblast and/or eastern Kharkiv Oblast
and the Russian command may have designed the Winter-Spring 2024 offensive effort on the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis to prepare for successive campaigns in 2025 and beyond
The months-long effort to seize the east bank of the Oskil River will likely require the Western Grouping of Forces to consolidate its gains and rest and reconstitute over several months before committing to another large offensive operational effort
Russian forces would likely be unable to launch a subsequent campaign from the area until winter 2024-2025
and any Ukrainian counteroffensive operation would likely delay such a subsequent campaign well into 2025 or beyond
Russian forces previously attempted to seize the Ukrainian stronghold of Slovyansk in Spring 2022 as part of a wide campaign in eastern Ukraine that failed
and the seizure of the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast would set several conditions for Russian forces to revive that effort
The Russian military intended to encircle Ukrainian forces in Donetsk Oblast in spring 2022 and attempted to conduct three corresponding maneuvers west from Severodonetsk-Lysychansk
and north from Bakhmut to surround and seize Slovyansk.[98] The Russian command likely intended advances along the E40 highway (Izyum-Slovyansk-Bakhmut) highway and the capture of Slovyansk to facilitate the quick encirclement of Ukrainian forces in eastern Donetsk Oblast and open routes for further advances to the western borders of Donetsk Oblast.[99] Russian forces did not advance at the speed required to encircle Ukrainian forces
and by summer 2022 Russian forces prioritized the seizure of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk over the wider operational encirclement.[100] The Russian effort to drive on Slovyansk from Izyum culminated in mid-May 2022
and Russian forces likely intended to revive the effort from the Izyum-Lyman area at a later date.[101] Ukrainian forces liberated Izyum in early September 2022 and Lyman in early October 2022
effectively ending any Russian designs to resume a drive on Slovyansk.[102]
The Russian seizure of the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast secures what would otherwise be a wide operational flank for a Russian effort to drive on Slovyansk from the northeast
A Russian effort to drive on Slovyansk from the Lyman direction would effectively be an offensive effort from an unstable salient unless Russian forces north of Lyman seize the Oskil River line
A Ukrainian presence along the east bank of the Oskil River would allow Ukrainian forces to counterattack a Russian drive on Slovyansk from the north
The Russian seizure of the east bank of the Oskil River from Kupyansk to Oskil City would secure this operational flank
and allow Russian forces to attack along a wider front north of Slovyansk from positions backed by a secure Russian rear with the threat of Ukrainian counterattack confined to the south and west
Advances towards Oskil City can set conditions for Russian forces to interdict and possibly cut the E40 highway between Izyum and Slovyansk
Oskil City and positions to the southeast are securely within tube artillery range of the section of the E-40 highway connecting Izyum and Slovyansk
Russian indirect fire in the area could disrupt the major Ukrainian GLOC connecting Kharkiv Oblast to northern Donetsk Oblast and force Ukrainian forces to reorient GLOCs towards Slovyansk from the northwest and west along smaller country roads or longer routes
The Russian command may also envision a subsequent operation from positions near Oskil City to reach and cut the E-40 highway
Interdicting and possibly cutting the E40 would recreate some of the effects of the northern envelopment of Slovyansk that Russian forces had initially created from positions near Izyum in Spring 2022.[103]
The Russian command could alternatively attempt to conduct a sweeping envelopment of Ukrainian forces in eastern Donetsk Oblast as it had initially planned in spring 2022 by conducting simultaneous maneuvers from the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv and Donetsk oblasts and north from Bakhmut
The Russian command has previously shown an affinity for attempting wider operational maneuver across simultaneous axes in Ukraine
even if those efforts have been poorly planned and not parts of a cohesive operation with a coordinated objective.[104] The seizure of the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast would allow Russian forces to reattempt the operational encirclement of eastern Donetsk Oblast using two operational offensive maneuvers instead of three
Russian forces could revive the initial effort to drive up the E-40 from Bakhmut while also attacking north and northeast of Slovyansk in a narrower and theoretically more manageable operational encirclement of eastern Donetsk Oblast
The prospects of Russian success in such a massive undertaking remain highly questionable as long as Ukraine retains anything like its current defensive capabilities
The Russian command may also envision that the seizure of the east bank of the Oskil River could facilitate a subsequent drive further west into Kharkiv Oblast
although such an operation from these positions would likely be much more difficult than a drive on Slovyansk
The Kremlin has indicated that it aims to recapture territory in Kharkiv Oblast and occupy Kharkiv City.[105] The seizure of the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast offers little change to the Russian military's current prospects for trying to secure parts of Kharkiv Oblast
Russian forces would need to attack across the Oskil River first and likely would need to operationally encircle west bank Kupyansk or capture Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk) before being able to advance further west into Kharkiv Oblast
Neither of those undertakings would be easy
Russian forces would need to cross large areas of open rural terrain interspersed with a few small settlements before reaching relatively sizable settlements such as Chuhuiv or Velykyi Burluk
Russian forces have not conducted such a long drive since the initial phase of the full-scale invasion and would be highly unlikely to be able to pursue such an effort.[106] Russian forces could alternatively try to capture Izyum from the southeast
although such an advance would either likely turn into a vulnerable salient or require similar wide operations across the Oskil River
These prospects for Russian advances into Kharkiv Oblast from the east bank of the Oskil River are as challenging as the prospects of advance elsewhere along the international border with Belgorod Oblast if not more so
If Russian forces are currently pursuing an operation to reach the Oskil River as a months-long conditions setting effort for a subsequent larger campaign
that subsequent larger campaign likely does not aim to advance further west into Kharkiv Oblast
The Russian ability to conduct operationally significant offensive efforts is still largely dependent on the level of Western support for Ukraine
Well provisioned Ukrainian forces with superior capabilities have previously prevented Russian forces from making even marginal gains during large-scale Russian offensive efforts and have proven effective at causing lasting degradation to Russian logistics and combat capabilities.[107] Ukraine’s current capabilities are denying Russian forces the ability to restore the types of maneuvers required to conduct operationally significant advances
but many of those capabilities rely on key systems and materiel from the West and specifically the US.[108] The West has yet to provide Ukraine with certain capabilities that could allow Ukrainian forces to further constrain Russia’s ability to pursue operationally significant advances
particularly long-range strike capabilities that could degrade Russian logistics in depth and attack aircraft that could contest Russian aviation operations
Ukraine is attempting to rapidly expand its defense industrial base (DIB) to produce many of these capabilities itself
and Ukrainian forces are also developing technological innovations and adaptations that aim to offset Russian advantages in manpower and materiel.[109] These Ukrainian efforts will take time to produce results at scale
time that Russian forces will use to improve their own capabilities and to conduct potentially significant offensive operations such as their ongoing operation to reach the Oskil River line
Delays in Western security assistance have forced Ukrainian forces to husband materiel and have generated uncertainty in Ukrainian operational planning
vulnerabilities that Russian forces will increasingly exploit to facilitate gains on the battlefield.[110]
Ukraine’s ability to defend itself in the long-term relies on its ability not only to prevent Russian forces from seizing operationally significant ground but also to launch successful counteroffensive operations to liberate strategically vital areas.[111] The Ukrainian ability to seize and retain the theater-wide initiative and to liberate territory is an assured path to denying Russian forces opportunities to pursue strategically significant gains in Ukraine
Ukraine therefore needs security assistance that allows it to prevent ongoing Russian efforts to make operationally significant gains while also preparing for operations of its own that can liberate further Ukrainian territory
[1] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021424 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2023 ;
[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2023
[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2023
[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101623
[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-12-2023
[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010524 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-6-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2024
[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar013024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-19-2024;%C2%A0https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-5-2024
[8] https://vk dot com/wall-170770667_203231 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-12-2023
[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2024
[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-12-2024 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1483 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1491 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1519 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/3730?single
[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2024
[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2024
[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2024
[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-13-2024
[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2024
[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2024 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1608
[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-19-2024
[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2024
[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2024
[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-30-2024 ;
[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2024
[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2024
[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2024
[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2023
[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2024 ; https://suspilne dot media/665728-rosijski-vijska-vikoristovuut-novu-taktiku-na-limanskomu-napramku-recnik-21-ombr/
[34] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1749105243277652257?s=20 ; https://t.me/BALUhub/7890
[35] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2024 ;
[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2024
[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2024
[38] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2024
[39] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2024
[40] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1491 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1468 ;
[41] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101623 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-23-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2024 ;
[42] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2024
[44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-19-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-22-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-9-2024
[45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2023
[46] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-28 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-19
[47] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut
[48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2023
[49] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar03052023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033023
[50] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut
[54] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-1-2023 ;
[55] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2023
[57] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2024
[58] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2024
[59] https://isw.pub/UkrWar101623 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-18-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101623 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-23-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2024 ;
[60] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2024
[61] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut
[62] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023
[63] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023
[64] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut
[65] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120923
[68] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut
[69] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122623 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-25-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021524
[70] Commercially available satellite imagery via Planet Labs LLC
[72] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-5-2024
[73] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-5-2024
[74] https://t.me/rybar/55875 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/3730 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-12-2024
[76] https://t.me/rybar/55875 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-1-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-23
[77] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2023
[78] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2023
[79] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2024
[81] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2024
[82] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2023
[83] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2023
[84] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2024
[85] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-18-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2024
[86] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-30-2024
[87] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121223 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120923
[88] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121223 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120923
[90] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut
[91] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021424 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28
[92] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4 ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct1 ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignSept23 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033023
[93] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar03052023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033023
[94] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3
[95] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11
[97] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2023
[98] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11
[99] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11
[100] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Operations%20Assessments%20May%2013.pdf
[101] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12
[102] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1
[103] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12
[104] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut
[105] https://isw.pub/UkrWar013124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121523 ;
[106] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122623
[109] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021424 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base
[110] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-18-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2024
[111] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/lands-ukraine-must-liberate
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to discuss negotiations with Ukraine as a means of separating Ukraine from its Western supporters by portraying Kyiv as unwilling to compromise or even to engage in serious talks
During a news conference at the Eurasian Economic Union summit in Bishkek
Putin clarified his December 7 statements wherein he suggested that Russia was preparing for a “lengthy” war and stated that he meant the settlement process would be protracted.[1] Putin emphasized that the settlement process will be challenging and take time
and that all participants will need to agree with realities on the ground in Ukraine (by which he presumably means recognizing Russian control of any territories it has annexed)
Russia is open to negotiations.[2] Putin also criticized statements made by former German chancellor Angela Merkel that the 2014 Minsk Agreements were an attempt to “buy time for Ukraine” and accused Merkel and the West of propagating distrust in negotiating future settlements.[3] Putin remarked that based on this understanding of the Minsk Agreements
perhaps Russia should have begun military operations earlier.[4] Despite the constant employment of adversarial rhetoric regarding the settlement process
Putin continued to claim that Russia remains open to the possibility of negotiations.[5]
Putin has consistently weaponized invocations of the negotiation process to isolate Ukraine from partner support by framing Ukraine as refusing concessions and likely seeks to use any ceasefire and negotiation window to allow Russian troops time to reconstitute and relaunch operations
A ceasefire agreement that occurs soon enough to allow Russian forces to rest and refit this winter is extremely unlikely
Russia and Ukraine are extremely far apart on the terms of any such agreement
and it is almost impossible to imagine a ceasefire being agreed to
which would deprive Russia of the opportunity to pause Ukrainian winter counter-offensives and reset before spring
Putin may be overly optimistic about the prospects for a more immediate cessation of hostilities
but that is also unlikely given his rhetoric as well as statements by Ukrainian leaders and the West
It is more likely that Putin is fanning discussions of a ceasefire primarily as part of an information operation designed to expand cleavages between Ukraine and its backers by portraying Kyiv as unwilling to talk
Putin is likely secondarily setting conditions for actual negotiations sometime in 2023
presumably after Russian forces have secured more of the territory he claims to have annexed
Putin’s positioning in the Russian information space continues to oscillate between supporting the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and backing the nationalist and pro-war milblogger community
Putin stated that the Russian MoD “behaves transparently” and properly reflects the “stable” progress of the “special military operation” in its daily reports.[6] Putin
then proceeded to undermine the Russian MoD when responding to a question about persistent problems with supplying the army and mobilization
noting that the Russian MoD informed him that the Russian Armed Forces has solved most of its debilitating issues.[7] Putin also told journalists: “You cannot trust anyone
You can only trust me,” when responding to a question about whether Russians should trust Russian MoD or sources operating on the frontlines.[8] Putin’s statements seemingly indicate that he is distancing himself from the milblogger community
which largely reports or obtains information from the frontlines
Putin’s statement on the transparency of the Russian MoD briefs—which the Russian milblogger community heavily criticizes for its inaccuracies and censorship—may aim to blunt such critiques or could be an effort to deflect the blame for military failures in Ukraine onto the Russian MoD
Putin likely attempts to preserve the position he has tried to occupy throughout his reign
in which he is seemingly aware of all Russian problems while not being directly responsible for them
Putin has long established the Russian MoD as a scapegoat for his failures
but the quasi-official milblogger community may pose a threat to his pretense of ignorance of problems
Putin remains in a predicament in which he relies on the support of the nationalist community to rally support behind his war in Ukraine
but must also mitigate the risk of angering the nationalists by failing to deliver their unrealistic and unattainable visions for the Russian military campaign
needs to continue to play the part of the ultimate arbiter of the truth to manage the prominence of the quasi-official sources while simultaneously appealing to them in critiquing his very own security institutions
He remains unlikely to shut down the independent milblogger community but equally unlikely to commit fully to supporting it or pursuing its preferred extremist courses of action
An independent open-source investigation by BBC’s Russia service and independent Russia outlet Mediazona offered a series of observations on the nature of losses suffered by Russian troops in Ukraine
The BBC confirmed the deaths of 10,000 Russian soldiers in Ukraine based on open-source records and noted that over 400 of the deceased were soldiers called up by partial mobilization.[9] This number notably does not encapsulate the actual scale of Russian losses in Ukraine and reflects only those whose deaths are confirmable in the open source
The BBC investigation found that Russia’s Krasnodar Krai had the highest number of confirmed losses (428 dead)
and Buryatia (356 dead).[10] In comparison
BBC only found 54 confirmed deaths from Moscow
which by itself makes up 9% of the population of Russia.[11] BBC concluded that although citizens of national republics (such as Dagestan
and Bashkortostan) are sent to the front and die in combat at higher rates than citizens of ethnically Russian regions
ethnic Russians comprise the majority of Russian military deaths
and their proportion of the military dead is approximately equal to their proportion in the overall Russian population.[12] BBC concluded that this finding suggests that discrepancies in Russian force generation efforts therefore fall along regional and territorial lines as opposed to predominantly ethnic lines and noted that military service is seen as the only lifeline in regions on Russia‘s economic periphery where social mobility is greatly restrained.[13] As ISW has previously observed
the impacts of force generation have been firmly siloed on a regional basis
which further breaks down along overlapping ethnic and socioeconomic lines.[14] The BBC investigation partially contradicts ISW’s previous assessments that the Kremlin was attempting to shield the ethnic Russian population from the war by drawing disproportionately on minority regions
ISW has no basis for questioning this conclusion
The BBC investigation also found that both elite units and officers have suffered substantial losses in Ukraine
The BBC reported that the Special Forces of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (GRU Spetznaz) has suffered 250 confirmed losses
which in the case of some individual Spetsnaz units exceeds cumulative losses over 10 years of Russian operations in Chechnya.[15] The BBC additionally identified 1,509 confirmed officer deaths- or 15% of the 10,002 identified losses.[16] The losses accrued by elite units and the Russian officer cadre will have significant and generational ramifications for the Russian military
Russian officials continue efforts to place legislative controls on domestic dissent
Independent Russian outlet Meduza reported on December 9 that Russian State Duma deputies proposed a bill introducing new crimes and charges related to financing
or engaging in sabotage activities.[17] In all cases
the proposed law introduces a maximum sentence of life imprisonment
Life imprisonment is currently the maximum sentence only in the case of deaths resulting from sabotage actions.[18] As ISW has recently reported
Russian officials have been taking similar measures to expand legislative oversight of domestic affairs in an attempt to further stifle domestic dissent
expanded the list of “individual foreign agents” on November 27
and Russian media began reporting that the Russian government is taking steps to broaden the definition of foreign agents
as well as imposing additional restrictions on the activities and movements of those deemed to be foreign agents.[19] Such legislative efforts suggest that the Kremlin continues to fear domestic friction resulting from the effects of its conduct of the war in Ukraine
Senior US officials stated that Russia is providing an unprecedented level of military and technical support to Iran in exchange for Iranian-made weapons systems
NBC News reported on December 9 that senior US presidential administration officials stated that Russia may be providing Iran with advanced military equipment and components
including helicopters and air defense systems
likely to further discuss the sale of Iranian drones and missiles to Russia for use in Ukraine.[24] ISW has previously assessed that the Russian military is increasingly reliant on Iranian-made weapons systems due to the depletion of its arsenal of high-precision weapons systems.[25]
Russian forces continued defensive operations in the Svatove area on December 9
corroborating a December 8 report from the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (MoD) stating that elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army have likely deployed along the defensive line near Svatove.[30]
Russian forces continued to conduct counterattacks in the Kreminna area while Ukrainian forces reportedly continued counteroffensive operations in the area on December 9
Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on December 9
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Klishchiivka
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on December 9
Another Russian source claimed that Russian forces entered southern Vodiane and advanced slightly in Pervomaiske.[47] Multiple Russian sources claimed that Russian forces began attacking Ukrainian positions in the Novomykhailivka area (36km southwest of Avdiivka) and struck Ukrainian positions in Vesele (5km north of Avdiivka).[48] Russian forces continued routine shelling along the line of contact in this area.[49]
Russian forces continued defensive operations in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts on December 9
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are defending their positions in the Novopavlivka (western Donetsk Oblast) direction.[50] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian forces in the direction of Volodymyrivka and Pavlivka
Zaporizhia Oblast.[51] A social media user shared images from the Russian “Kaskad” Battalion purporting to show Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions near Mykilske (5km southeast of Vuhledar).[52] Russian forces continued routine indirect fire along the line of contact in Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.[53]
Russian forces may have established positions on an island west of Kherson City in the Dnipro River as of December 9
Some unofficial Russian and Ukrainian sources claimed on December 9 that Russian forces landed on Potemkin Island (10km southwest of Kherson City in the Dnipro River) and established firing positions there
suggesting that the network of islands in the Dnipro River near Kherson City may remain contested.[54] No official sources have supported such claims and ISW is currently unable to confirm their veracity
Russian forces continued to shell areas on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River
including Kherson City and its environs.[55]
Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian force concentrations in southern Ukraine
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that December 7 Ukrainian strikes against Russian forces near Berdyansk
Zaporizhia Oblast— all along strategic logistics lines – wounded 240 personnel and destroyed three ammunition depots and 20 pieces of military equipment.[56] A Ukrainian source reported that Ukrainian forces struck Hola Prystan (on the Kherson City-Armiansk highway) and Chaplynka (on the Nova Kakhovka-Armiansk highway)
both areas of reported Russian defensive fortifications.[57]
Ukrainian forces’ interdiction campaign against Russian military assets and logistics hubs in southern Ukraine has likely degraded Russian forces
A Russian milblogger claimed that he spoke to Russian soldiers who have served in Nova Kakhovka
who claim that Ukrainian HIMARS strikes completely destroyed military infrastructure in Nova Kakhovka
and inflicted significant manpower casualties—all of which the milblogger claimed significantly degraded Russian forces
adding that Russian forces have not been able to replenish their losses at an appropriate rate or quality.[58] The milblogger noted that Russian forces in “all major cities” suffered the same results from Ukrainian strikes and expressed anger that Russian military leadership failed to compensate for enough of its shortcomings to win the war.[59]
Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on December 9 that Russian authorities plan to reopen the road span of the Kerch Strait Bridge in March 2023 and the bridge’s rail lines in mid-summer 2023
significant delays from previously promised dates.[60] This announcement comes just four days after Putin drove across the Kerch Strait Bridge as part of a likely information operation to convince the Russian populace that the bridge is secure and to suppress panic over a possible future Ukrainian counteroffensive.[61]
Russian President Vladimir Putin doubled down on claims that Russia will not conduct a second wave of mobilization amidst persistent concerns within Russian society
Putin stated during the Eurasian Economic Union summit in Bishkek
that there are not any “factors” present now that would require the Kremlin to reinstate partial mobilization.[62] Putin reiterated that 150,000 mobilized men of the mobilized 300,000 are currently undergoing training in Russia
while another 77,000 have entered the combat zone as part of combat units
Putin added that the remaining 73,000 mobilized men are performing territorial defense duties on the second and third defensive lines
Putin had vaguely responded to a question regarding rotations of mobilized personnel
noting that such procedures depend on the situation on the front lines.[63] Putin added that rotated units will also receive veteran status
further committing the Kremlin to a long-term financial responsibility to mobilized personnel
The Kremlin continued to set legal conditions that would ease mobilization proceedings and maintained its crypto mobilization campaign despite Putin’s assurances in Bishkek
Russian state news wire TASS stated that the Russian Ministry of Education clarified that Russian men can only defer from mobilization once while being a student in a higher education institution
The ministry stated that Russian mobilization law allows Russian students to retain the deferment right from the start of their first higher education until their graduation
The ministry noted that students will not receive a second deferment from mobilization if they enroll in a higher education institution for a second time
Russian opposition outlets noted instances of Russian officials using this provision to mobilize three students
despite these students indicating that they qualify for deferment.[64] The Ukrainian General Staff also noted that Samara Oblast continues to deliver summonses to men of military age
while some Russian regions have maintained their mobilization efforts.[65]
Numerous Russian claims of desertion among mobilized personnel continue to challenge Putin’s December 7 claims regarding deserters
A Russian opposition source collected social media evidence composed of photos
and family accounts that indicate that Russian forces are continuing to detain deserters and are holding them in 12 detention centers in occupied Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.[66] Pskov Oblast officials have asked military prosecutors to investigate the appeals from families and their lawyers regarding the 265 mobilized men detained in basements in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[67]
Putin also claimed on December 7 and December 9 that Russian officials have resolved major issues with mobilization
but Russian families of mobilized personnel continued to report instances of poor treatment and conditions among the mobilized servicemen
Wives of mobilized men from Irkutsk appealed to the Irkutsk Oblast Governor Igor Kobzev that their husbands are sick “en masse” at Novosibirsk training ranges with pneumonia and bronchitis due to lack of adequate medical care
and low levels of professional training.[68] A mother of a mobilized serviceman who died at a training ground in Novosibirsk in October reported spotting signs of beating on his body
despite officials declaring his death as the result of ethanol poisoning.[69] The Kremlin
continues to target individual activists who advocate for the rights of mobilized personnel instead of actually resolving the fundamental issues with its force-generation measures
Samara Oblast officials detained the representative of the Council of Mothers and Wives
Russian mobilization will continue to have long-term societal and economic implications for Russia
The Moscow Times reported that about 30% of Russian companies reported paying attention to the recruits who are fit for military service
noting that they are reluctant to hire individuals of military build and age.[71] The Moscow Times added that every tenth company that participated in the survey rejects applicants with in-demand military occupations
while another 10% of responders reported reducing vacancies for potential conscripts
The publication noted that employers are increasingly turning to a female workforce
likely in an effort to preempt labor shortages amidst future force generation campaigns
The Russian State Duma tried—and failed—to clarify the purpose and operations of the territorial defense battalions in Belgorod Oblast on December 9
Russian State Duma Defense Committee Head Andrey Kartapolov stated that these battalions are not formally part of the Russian Armed Forces
denied Wagner’s involvement in training the Belgorod Oblast militia
noting only the presence of some Wagner former servicemen in the area.[75]
Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural
Russian officials continued efforts to deport Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of medical rehabilitation schemes and adoption programs on December 8 and 9
Russian occupation authorities are continuing to force Ukrainian civilians to apply for Russian passports
Russian independent outlet Meduza reported on December 9 that Ukrainian civilians in occupied areas are often denied humanitarian aid
and social assistance unless they hold a Russian passport.[80] Russian independent outlet Mediazona claimed on December 8 that Russian officials have issued passports to over 300,000 Ukrainian citizens from February 2022 through October 2022.[81] The report noted that Russian officials have simplified the process to obtain Russian passports in occupied Ukrainian territories
with Russian officials having issued over 40,000 passports within a month of Russian President Vladimir Putin formally annexing four Ukrainian regions on September 30.[82]
Russian occupation officials continued forced evacuation measures on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast on December 9
The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on December 9 that the largest evacuation drives occurred in Oleshky (7km southeast of Kherson City) and Nova Kakhovka.[83] The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that Russian officials are deporting evacuated Ukrainian civilians to the Caucasus in an effort to balance demographics in the area.[84]
Russian occupation officials continued efforts to integrate occupied Ukrainian territories into the Russian healthcare apparatus on December 9
Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) head Leonid Pasechnik and Chairman of Russia's Federal Compulsory Medical Insurance Fund Ilya Balanin signed an Agreement on Cooperation on December 9 to facilitate distributing medical insurance policies to residents of occupied territories in Luhansk Oblast
Pasechnik stated that a branch of the fund will open in LNR territory in the near future
allowing LNR residents to obtain compulsory medical insurance policies that guarantee medicine and treatment free of charge from Russia.[85]
Russian officials continued proposing new law enforcement measures in occupied territories on December 8
The Russian State Duma introduced a bill on December 8 that
would punish the organization of and participation in sabotage activities in occupied territories
Russian independent media outlet Meduza stated that the current Russian penal code allows for a life sentence if deaths result from acts of sabotage.[86]
[1] ttps://www do rbc dot ru/politics/09/12/2022/6393394d9a79471ae0a68d56; https://ria dot ru/20221209/putin-1837547068.html?chat_room_id=1837547068
[2] https://www do rbc dot ru/politics/09/12/2022/6393394d9a79471ae0a68d56; https://ria dot ru/20221209/putin-1837547068.html?chat_room_id=1837547068
[3] https://www do rbc dot ru/politics/09/12/2022/6393394d9a79471ae0a68d56; https://ria dot ru/20221209/putin-1837547068.html?chat_room_id=1837547068
[4] https://www do rbc dot ru/politics/09/12/2022/6393394d9a79471ae0a68d56; https://ria dot ru/20221209/putin-1837547068.html?chat_room_id=1837547068
[5] https://www do rbc dot ru/politics/09/12/2022/6393394d9a79471ae0a68d56; https://ria dot ru/20221209/putin-1837547068.html?chat_room_id=1837547068
[6] https://www do rbc dot ru/politics/09/12/2022/6393394d9a79471ae0a68d56
[7] https://ria dot ru/20221209/armiya-1837557939.html
[8] https://ria dot ru/20221209/armiya-1837557939.html
[9] https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-63917502
[10] https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-63917502
[11] https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-63917502
[12] https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-63917502; https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-63416259
[13] https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-63917502
[14] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct5; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-12; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5
[15] https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-63917502
[16] https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-63917502
[17] https://meduza.io/news/2022/12/08/v-gosdumu-vnesli-zakonoproekt-ob-uzhestochenii-nakazaniya-za-diversii-plot-do-pozhiznennogo-lisheniya-svobody
[18] https://meduza.io/news/2022/12/08/v-gosdumu-vnesli-zakonoproekt-ob-uzhestochenii-nakazaniya-za-diversii-plot-do-pozhiznennogo-lisheniya-svobody
[20]https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/russia-providing-unprecedented-military-support-iran-exchange-drones-o-rcna60921
[21] https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/russia-providing-unprecedented-military-support-iran-exchange-drones-o-rcna60921
[22] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/11/19/russia-iran-drones-secret-deal/
[26] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Zfe2WBeWWPgRatD6BS5vkSoiE2kcFckF4gXAEwfkTkpkPRPj4xhSrwLMWdiKSJLfl
[28] https://twitter.com/J_JHelin/status/1600651328740818945?s=20&t=AgleRavFq0qBa32viDQz4A
[30] https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1600996146595389441?s=20&t=fVFo9i7rK25hopVh31BgDw ; https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1600780158809563136
[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Zfe2WBeWWPgRatD6BS5vkSoiE2kcFckF4gXAEwfkTkpkPRPj4xhSrwLMWdiKSJLfl
[33] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/72398 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/10226
[35] https://t.me/kommunist/14056 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/72398 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/10226
[36] https://t.me/wargonzo/9680 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/9682
[37] https://t.me/kommunist/14046 ; https://t.me/millnr/9857
[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Zfe2WBeWWPgRatD6BS5vkSoiE2kcFckF4gXAEwfkTkpkPRPj4xhSrwLMWdiKSJLfl
[39] https://t.me/mod_russia/22518 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/9679
[40] https://t.me/smotri_z/8951; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/35218 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/9679 ; https://t.me/rybar/41866
[41] https://t.me/rybar/41869 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/9679
[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0RdkUN4VDMb4WU8WgfzGVhnoVLzZ1XNNruZPgXHHkYBYivXUzPKKmD6cWZgEVqnH3l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Zfe2WBeWWPgRatD6BS5vkSoiE2kcFckF4gXAEwfkTkpkPRPj4xhSrwLMWdiKSJLfl ; https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/5836 ; https://t.me/rybar/41866
[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Zfe2WBeWWPgRatD6BS5vkSoiE2kcFckF4gXAEwfkTkpkPRPj4xhSrwLMWdiKSJLfl
[45] https://t.me/smotri_z/8951; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/35218 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/9679 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/72399
[48] https://t.me/wargonzo/9679 ; https://t.me/rybar/41866 ; https://t.me/rybar/41866
[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0RdkUN4VDMb4WU8WgfzGVhnoVLzZ1XNNruZPgXHHkYBYivXUzPKKmD6cWZgEVqnH3l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Zfe2WBeWWPgRatD6BS5vkSoiE2kcFckF4gXAEwfkTkpkPRPj4xhSrwLMWdiKSJLfl ; https://t.me/rybar/41866
[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Zfe2WBeWWPgRatD6BS5vkSoiE2kcFckF4gXAEwfkTkpkPRPj4xhSrwLMWdiKSJLfl
[52] https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1601160924488163328
[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0RdkUN4VDMb4WU8WgfzGVhnoVLzZ1XNNruZPgXHHkYBYivXUzPKKmD6cWZgEVqnH3l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Zfe2WBeWWPgRatD6BS5vkSoiE2kcFckF4gXAEwfkTkpkPRPj4xhSrwLMWdiKSJLfl ; https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/5836 ; https://t.me/rybar/41866
[54] https://t.me/kommunist/14068; https://t.me/hueviyherson/30620
[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Zfe2WBeWWPgRatD6BS5vkSoiE2kcFckF4gXAEwfkTkpkPRPj4xhSrwLMWdiKSJLfl
[57] https://t.me/hueviyherson/30627; https://t.me/hueviyherson/30592; https://t.me/hueviyherson/30593; https://t.me/hueviyherson/30619; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1600798365859876864?s=20&t=jUhtHvFF1h-173ISv0C11g; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-27
[60] https://radiosputnik ria.ru/20221209/krymskiy-most-1837578081.html
[61] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6
[62] https://tass dot ru/politika/16553333
[63] https://radiosputnik dot ria dot ru/20221209/spetsoperatsiya-1837597359.html
[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0RdkUN4VDMb4WU8WgfzGVhnoVLzZ1XNNruZPgXHHkYBYivXUzPKKmD6cWZgEVqnH3l
[69] https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-dec-7-8 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/1911
[70] https://t.me/istories_media/1850 ; https://vk dot com/wall-214518425_5013
[71] https://www.moscowtimes dot ru/2022/12/08/rossiyanam-prizivnogo-vozrasta-nachali-otkazivat-v-rabote-iz-za-mobilizatsii-a27848
[72] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/09/12/2022/639087b29a79473c98ae594d
[73] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-19
[74] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-1; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11;
[75] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/85
[77] https://sprotyv dot mod dot gov.ua/2022/12/08/rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-vykradaty-ukrayinskyh-ditej-2/
[78] https://sprotyv dot mod dot gov.ua/2022/12/08/rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-vykradaty-ukrayinskyh-ditej-2/
[79] https://sprotyv dot mod dot gov.ua/2022/12/08/rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-vykradaty-ukrayinskyh-ditej-2/
[80] https://meduza dot io/news/2022/12/09/mediazona-za-pervye-vosem-mesyatsev-voyny-grazhdanstvo-rf-poluchili-300-tysyach-ukraintsev-mnogie-sdelali-eto-vynuzhdenno
[81] https://zona dot media/article/2022/12/08/papers
[82] https://zona dot media/article/2022/12/08/papers; (https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30
[83] https://sprotyv dot mod dot gov.ua/2022/12/09/okupanty-namagayutsya-prodovzhyty-deportacziyu-ukrayincziv-z-hersonshhyny/)
[84] https://sprotyv dot mod dot gov.ua/2022/12/09/okupanty-namagayutsya-prodovzhyty-deportacziyu-ukrayincziv-z-hersonshhyny/
[86] https://meduza dot io/news/2022/12/08/v-gosdumu-vnesli-zakonoproekt-ob-uzhestochenii-nakazaniya-za-diversii-plot-do-pozhiznennogo-lisheniya-svobody; http://duma dot gov.ru/news/55960/
Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12pm ET on May 14
ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
Important Note: ISW has reindexed its map layer for reported Ukrainian counteroffensives on May 12
We removed reported Ukrainian counteroffensive coded before May 1
in order to delineate more clearly new Ukrainian territorial gains from gains secured in previous Ukrainian counteroffensives
ISW retained a few reported Ukrainian counteroffensives polygons from before May 1
specifically on the Dnipro River Delta south of Kherson Oblast
to preserve context in that complex area of operations
is an arbitrary date and does not mark the beginning or end of any assessed Ukrainian or Russian effort
ISW has reindexed its map layers before and similarly removed old reported Ukrainian counteroffensives around Kyiv
and Sumy oblasts following the conclusion of the Battle of Kyiv in April 2022
Russian forces conducted another series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 13 to 14
Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of drones of varying models at Ukraine and that Ukrainian forces destroyed 25
including 18 Shahed 131/136s.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces launched 23 Shahed-136/131 drones in total.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of Kalibr missiles from the Black Sea as well as an unspecified number of Kh-101/555/55 cruise missiles
and that Ukrainian forces shot down three Kh-101/555/55 missiles.[3] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure in Ternopil and Mykolaiv cities as well as Kharkiv City and Zolochiv in Kharkiv Oblast with S-300 missiles.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian ammunition depot in Khmelnytskyi City and Ukrainian military facilities and deployment areas near Ternopil and Petropavlivka
Increasingly regular series of Russian drone and missile strikes are likely a part of a new Russian air campaign in Ukraine aimed at degrading Ukrainian abilities to conduct counteroffensive offensive operations in the near term
Russian forces have conducted at least 10 series of strikes throughout Ukraine
since April 19.[6] Russian forces have used significantly fewer high precision missiles in these latest series of strikes in comparison to their failed campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure from the fall of 2022 through the winter of 2023
ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely expended a significant proportion of their precision missiles in the previous air campaign
and the current Russian air campaign may be using far fewer of these missiles in an effort to conserve the limited remaining stocks.[7] Russian forces have instead relied heavily on launching large numbers of Iranian-made Shahed drones to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses
although Ukrainian forces have been more effective in shooting down Russian precision systems than during the previous Russian air campaign.[8] The new Russian air campaign appears to be focused on Kyiv and alleged Ukrainian military industrial and logistics facilities in deep rear areas
The more limited air campaign has so far been more regular than the previous wider Russian campaign against critical infrastructure
and ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces may be attempting to conduct almost daily series of strikes to portray themselves as successfully constraining potential upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[9] The alleged targets and limited nature of this campaign indicates that Russian forces are immediately concerned with current Ukrainian capabilities to launch counteroffensive operations
although the diminished effectiveness of these strikes are likely not significantly constraining Ukrainian capabilities writ large
Ukrainian forces continued counterattacking around Bakhmut on May 14
Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces captured over 10 Russian positions on the northern and southern outskirts of Bakhmut over the course of the day on May 14.[10] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian troops attacked towards Berkhivka
and Kurdiumivka and took up new unspecified positions near the settlements and additionally advanced towards Yahidne from the direction of Bohdanivka.[11] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that Ukrainian forces did not conduct any attacks on the night of May 13 to 14
however.[12] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of new Ukrainian positions around Bakhmut
Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty emphasized on May 14 that Ukraine’s main goal in Bakhmut is to destroy Russian concentration areas and encircle the city
not to conduct frontal assaults.[13] Cherevaty noted that Ukrainian forces have recently advanced up to 300m in some areas
and Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces are advancing in two directions in the suburbs of Bakhmut.[14]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is attempting to distract from recent Ukrainian successes near Bakhmut by praising Russian defensive efforts against the Ukrainian counterattacks
The Russian MoD praised the defensive efforts of the Russian 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps) south of Ivanivske
200th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps
and the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Division (20th Guards Combined Arms Army
and later posted footage of Russian military leadership presenting over 120 personnel with various awards
including “For Courage,” “For Military Distinction,” and “For Military Valor.”[17] The Russian MoD likely seeks to assuage information space criticism of the MoD’s failure to acknowledge Ukrainian battlefield successes in a timely manner without actually acknowledging the degree of these successes
which is consistent with recent Kremlin guidance to not downplay Ukrainian military successes.[18] The MoD also notably highlighted the efforts of its regular forces over those of irregular forces
including Wagner Group forces operating in Bakhmut
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin criticized reports on May 14 that Russian Airborne (VDV) forces are helping Wagner forces
instead claiming that VDV forces are failing to support Wagner’s offensive operations
or recapturing positions recently lost to Ukrainian forces.[19]
Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin’s newly formed “Club of Angry Patriots” is continuing efforts to expand its presence and influence public discourse
The Club of Angry Patriots announced on May 14 that it is forming regional branches and called on experienced politicians
and heads of Russian organizations to participate.[20] The Club of Angry Patriots also stated that it will hold a news conference in Moscow on an unspecified date in June
during which it will address how Russia can win the war in Ukraine.[21]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Kupyansk-Svatove line on May 14
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Masyutivka (12km northeast of Kupyansk)
and on the eastern outskirts of Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove).[22] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces continue “sluggish” fighting between Novoselivske and Kuzemivka (13km northwest of Svatove)
and that elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District) have established first lines of defense along the eastern side of the rail line near Novoselivske.[23] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces withdrew from Novoselivske on an unspecified date because the settlement is destroyed and not worth defending
and emphasized that Russian forces still control Kuzemivka
Russian and Ukrainian sources did not report any Russian ground attacks near Kreminna on May 14
citing a Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz commander
denied reports that Ukrainian forces broke through Russian defensive lines near Kreminna but acknowledged that Ukrainian forces may be conducting sabotage and reconnaissance in the area.[24] ISW has not observed claims or confirmation of significant Ukrainian offensive activity near Kreminna
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces have not made additional confirmed gains in or around Bakhmut as of May 14
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations within Bakhmut itself; within 9km northwest of Bakhmut near Hryhorivka
and Khromove; and within 14km southwest of Bakhmut near Bila Hora and Predtechyne.[25] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on May 13 that Wagner fighters advanced up to 500m in Bakhmut and that Ukrainian forces currently control 1.78 square kilometers of the city.[26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut).[27]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk front on May 14
Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on May 14.[31] The Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces (Eastern Military District) Spokesperson Alexander Gordeev claimed that Russian forces thwarted an attempted Ukrainian reconnaissance-in-force operation in an unspecified area of western Donetsk Oblast.[32]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued to fire on areas west of Hulyaipole in southern Ukraine on May 14.[33] Ukrainian Southern Forces Joint Press Center Head Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces are trying to use sea missile carriers
and reconnaissance drones to distract Ukrainian air defenses.[34] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces struck Kizomys and Stanislav
Kherson Oblast with four guided aerial bombs and targeted the Chornobaivka and Tokarivka areas with four loitering munitions.[35] The Southern Operational Command also reported that Russian shelling damaged critical infrastructure in Ochakiv Hromada.[36] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov posted footage on May 13 of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army
Eastern Military District) firing incendiary munitions at the Hulyaipole area.[37] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 14 that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian ammunition depot near Mykolaiv City.[38]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian forces continue efforts to replenish manpower losses using prisoners
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 14 that 200 prisoners arrived at a training camp in Rohove
occupied Luhansk Oblast for a four-week military training course and that an additional 50 recruits will likely arrive by the end of May.[39] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported that 800 prisoners are training in Mozhnyakivka
and that 400 convicts are training with the Wagner Group in Novopetrivka
Zaporizhia Oblast.[40] Ongoing prison recruitment efforts are part of a wider campaign of crypto mobilization that avoids the need to conduct general mobilization
Several Russian sources continue to claim that the Wagner Group is successfully continuing recruitment and maintaining a positive reputation despite its challenges in Bakhmut
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues measures to integrate the forces of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) into the Russian military
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on MAY 14 that the Russian MoD issued an order to an unspecified DNR brigade to replace its DNR military tickets with formal Russian tickets and to re-sign service contracts with the Russian armed forces for a two-year minimum.[46] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Russian MoD is threatening to send DNR forces who refuse to receive Russia military tickets or re-sign contracts with deployment to the most dangerous sectors of the front.[47]
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural
Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to prepare for regional elections in occupied territories
Chairman of the Russian Central Election Commission Ella Pamfilova met with Russian occupation authorities on May 14 to discuss preparations for the upcoming elections
including creating conditions for fair and safe voting for all residents of occupied territories.[48] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) head Denis Pushilin stated on May 14 that the Russian Central Election Commission has started preparing the electoral systems and that recruitment to form 615 precinct commissions is ongoing in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[49]
Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update
It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)
ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus
but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus
ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine
The Belarusian Ministry of Defense reported on May 14 that Belarusian forces are continuing combat readiness checks and combat training.[50]
[1] https://www.facebook.com/JointForcesCommandAFU/posts/pfbid0UrayivS8LqhUFdf16ggKP754fjgKhszNaFCh6NcyCaVRPZwUkYBrJr6rrUuwhPRxl; https://t.me/kpszsu/2515
[2] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0uoWcW4vAJqE1h6ZNGVDL8VdxenNicJzFMkvaS246JJLkdKL5N3DsCAdLidZVzunXl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06tm48EqygNAMAbMTYKm24SKyVKLZ8pwZ4vE2gLuwTfSEfEeFkTwm1qSDhpp88ezjl
[3] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0uoWcW4vAJqE1h6ZNGVDL8VdxenNicJzFMkvaS246JJLkdKL5N3DsCAdLidZVzunXl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06tm48EqygNAMAbMTYKm24SKyVKLZ8pwZ4vE2gLuwTfSEfEeFkTwm1qSDhpp88ezjl
[5] https://t.me/mod_russia/26560 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/26561;
[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050423 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042123 ;https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02yM9WCQsK5sDmFjR4GCs2yPfwr2xTWTY2c6EzfHGouEnTeJyvBWBrbomHcQbPhkLKl
[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032223
[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050423 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042123 ;https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02yM9WCQsK5sDmFjR4GCs2yPfwr2xTWTY2c6EzfHGouEnTeJyvBWBrbomHcQbPhkLKl
[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050923
[10] https://t.me/annamaliar/737
[11] https://t.me/wargonzo/12517; https://t.me/readovkanews/58836
[12] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/963
[13] https://suspilne dot media/475489-445-den-povnomasstabnogo-vtorgnenna-rosii-v-ukrainu-tekstovij-onlajn/
[14] https://t.me/annamaliar/732
[15] https://t.me/mod_russia/26560
[16] https://t.me/mod_russia/26560
[17] https://t.me/mod_russia/26565; https://t.me/mod_russia/26560
[18] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20May%202%2C%202023%20%28PDF%29.pdf
[19] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/963
[20] https://t.me/KRPRus/43; https://t.me/strelkovii/4832
[21] https://t.me/KRPRus/43; https://t.me/strelkovii/4832
[22] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ynGiLKQtMwJHCzeQhAuXSv8nG7U2KDiE9RKWvRUpAVD4ARfEQeJRNjQFTz7271Dvl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06tm48EqygNAMAbMTYKm24SKyVKLZ8pwZ4vE2gLuwTfSEfEeFkTwm1qSDhpp88ezjl
[23] https://t.me/rybar/47053; https://t.me/rybar/47054
[24] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3630
[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ynGiLKQtMwJHCzeQhAuXSv8nG7U2KDiE9RKWvRUpAVD4ARfEQeJRNjQFTz7271Dvl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06tm48EqygNAMAbMTYKm24SKyVKLZ8pwZ4vE2gLuwTfSEfEeFkTwm1qSDhpp88ezjl
[26] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/962
[27] https://t.me/wargonzo/12517
[28] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ynGiLKQtMwJHCzeQhAuXSv8nG7U2KDiE9RKWvRUpAVD4ARfEQeJRNjQFTz7271Dvl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06tm48EqygNAMAbMTYKm24SKyVKLZ8pwZ4vE2gLuwTfSEfEeFkTwm1qSDhpp88ezjl
[29] https://t.me/mod_russia/26558
[30] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47557
[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06tm48EqygNAMAbMTYKm24SKyVKLZ8pwZ4vE2gLuwTfSEfEeFkTwm1qSDhpp88ezjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ynGiLKQtMwJHCzeQhAuXSv8nG7U2KDiE9RKWvRUpAVD4ARfEQeJRNjQFTz7271Dvl
[32] https://t.me/mod_russia/26561
[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06tm48EqygNAMAbMTYKm24SKyVKLZ8pwZ4vE2gLuwTfSEfEeFkTwm1qSDhpp88ezjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ynGiLKQtMwJHCzeQhAuXSv8nG7U2KDiE9RKWvRUpAVD4ARfEQeJRNjQFTz7271Dvl
[34] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/05/14/okupanty-vykorystovuyut-taktyku-rozsiyuvannya-uvagy-nashoyi-protypovitryanoyi-oborony-nataliya-gumenyuk/
[35] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0zifB1EXiHEfhhWDZ7KYmh1ufWXzrBJDXwAPy7gyy9uKDpB2osyRBrZ3LzvRNRNygl
[36] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0zifB1EXiHEfhhWDZ7KYmh1ufWXzrBJDXwAPy7gyy9uKDpB2osyRBrZ3LzvRNRNygl
[37] https://t.me/vrogov/9456
[38] https://t.me/mod_russia/26561
[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06tm48EqygNAMAbMTYKm24SKyVKLZ8pwZ4vE2gLuwTfSEfEeFkTwm1qSDhpp88ezjl
[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06tm48EqygNAMAbMTYKm24SKyVKLZ8pwZ4vE2gLuwTfSEfEeFkTwm1qSDhpp88ezjl
[41] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051223; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isw.pub/UkrWar032623; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030623
[42] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/965
[43] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/85664
[44] https://t.me/idelrealii/27338
[45] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041723
[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ynGiLKQtMwJHCzeQhAuXSv8nG7U2KDiE9RKWvRUpAVD4ARfEQeJRNjQFTz7271Dvl
[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ynGiLKQtMwJHCzeQhAuXSv8nG7U2KDiE9RKWvRUpAVD4ARfEQeJRNjQFTz7271Dvl
[48] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3423; https://t.me/cikrossii/2723; https://t.me/cikrossii/2735; https://t.me/cikrossii/2733; https://t.me/cikrossii/2731; https://t.me/cikrossii/2725; https://t.me/cikrossii/2724
[49] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3423
[50] https://t.me/modmilby/27490
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on February 6
ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
Correction: This article was updated on February 7
to correct the statement regarding US monthly production numbers of 155mm artillery shells
We erroneously reported that US production would reach 60,000 shells per month in October 2024 only if the proposed congressional supplemental appropriations bill passes
whereas the US will reach 60,000 shells per month in October 2024 with or without additional funding and is on track to increase production to 80,000 shells per month using current funding
would be needed to reach the target production rate of 100,000 shells per month by October 2025
America’s European and Asian allies have significantly ramped up their efforts to support Ukraine
dozens of Marder infantry fighting vehicles
and an unspecified number of Skynex air defense systems to Ukraine in 2024.[3] South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) stated on February 6 that it plans to sign a contract with ammunition producer Poongsan in 2024 to mass produce 155mm shells that have an extended range of 60 kilometers.[4] South Korea reportedly began indirectly supplying artillery shells to Ukraine in early 2023
and these shells may go to European allies for indirect transfer to Ukraine.[5]
The EU and its member states have made available 138 billion euros (about $148.5 billion) - including its recently announced support package of 50 billion euros (about $54 billion) - to Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.[6] In comparison
the US has appropriated $113 billion to Ukraine since the full-scale invasion
of which over $75 billion was directly allocated to Ukraine for humanitarian
and military support.[7] The US government allocated the other $38 billion to security assistance-related funding
which the US government spent largely in the US and on US companies or personnel.[8]
As European partners continue to increase their support for Ukraine
US aid provision in the near to medium-term remains vital to help Ukraine build its defense industrial base (DIB)
ISW continues to assess that the US will not need to send large security assistance packages to Ukraine indefinitely if Ukraine successfully continues to actively pursue measures aimed at domestically producing its own weapons
building bilateral and international defense industrial partnerships
and creating industrial joint ventures with Western enterprises aimed at co-producing defense materials.[9] The US will need to continue supporting Ukraine for several years as Ukraine builds its own DIB
but Ukraine’s international security requirements will decrease in the long run as it builds out its own capabilities to become self-sufficient
The ultimate success of Ukraine's efforts to build its DIB
depends on Ukraine’s ability to liberate strategically vital areas currently occupied by Russian forces
US and partner military aid to Ukraine in the near term therefore continues to be crucial as the US remains the main source of sufficiently large quantities of essential military equipment
advanced air defense systems such as Patriots
and long-range strike systems - equipment which previous US aid packages prioritized.[10]
The US Army plans to significantly increase US domestic production of 155mm artillery shells and shell components for Ukraine in 2024 and 2025
and more so should the proposed congressional supplemental appropriations bill pass
US Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition
and Technology Doug Bush stated on February 5 that the US Army aims to double the US monthly production of 155mm artillery shells from 28,000 shells per month in October 2023 to about 60,000 shells per month in October 2024.[11] Bush stated that the US Army is on track to increase production capacity to 80,000 shells per month using current funding but that additional funding must be appropriated by Congress for it to reach the target production rate of 100,000 shells per month by October 2025
Bush stated that the construction of a new factory in Texas
which will “have an entirely new way” of using technology to make artillery shells
will contribute to the Army’s increased production goals
Bush noted that US shell production in part depends on US domestic production of explosive materials
Bush stated that the proposed supplemental bill includes $600 million for increasing the production of explosives at the Holsten Army Ammunition Plant in Tennessee from five million pounds of explosives a year to 13 million pounds.[12] The proposed bill would also include $93 million to reestablish the production of M6 propellant (used to fire artillery shells but no longer in production in the US) at the Radford Army Ammunition Plant in Virginia
and $650 million would go to constructing a facility (likely also at the Radford Army Ammunition Plant) to domestically produce TNT
Bush stated that the proposed bill also includes $14 million to construct and recommission a black powder explosive production line in Louisiana
Such investments in US manufacturing are necessary to help support US strategic readiness by rebuilding America’s atrophied defense industrial base
separate and apart from the need to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia
Russian authorities are reportedly paying Iran roughly $4.5 billion per year to import Iranian Shahed drones to use in Ukraine
A group of hackers from a hacking organization called the Prana Network claimed to have hacked into the servers of purported Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) front company Sahara Thunder on February 4 and published the costs per drone that Russia purchases from Iran.[13] The leaked documents suggest that Russia pays $193,000 per Shahed-136 drone in batches of 6,000 drones
which would total about $1.1 billion for all 6,000 Shahed-136 drones.[14] Russia reportedly pays $1.4 million per unit for one type of Shahed-238 drone and plans to purchase 677 of these upgraded Shahed drones per year
which would total about $947 million.[15] Another type of Shahed-238 reportedly cost about $900,000 per drone
and Russia reportedly plans to purchase 2,310 per year for just under $2.1 billion.[16] The documents claimed that the reconnaissance and attack Shahed-107 drones cost $460,000 each and that Russia plans to purchase 2,310
which would total about $1.5 billion.[17] A Russian milblogger justified the high cost due to the risk that Iran assumes by selling these drones to Russia and noted that the documents indicate that Russia plans to further localize production of Shaheds in Russia
which will reduce acquisition costs over time.[18] ISW is unable to confirm the authenticity of the purported leaked documents
but a milblogger’s claim that the documents refer to Iran as a ”friendly country” and refer to the Shahed drones in code as ”boats” is consistent with previously observed language about Iran and Iranian drone production in Russia.[19] Russian forces routinely use Shahed drones
which serve as both loitering munitions and as decoys to distract Ukrainian air defenses
and the massive expenditure on such systems is noteworthy
Russia is reportedly unfreezing North Korean assets and helping North Korea evade international sanctions in exchange for missiles and artillery ammunition for Russia to use in Ukraine
The New York Times (NYT) reported on February 6 that unnamed “US-allied” intelligence officials told the NYT that Russia unfroze $9 million of $30 million worth of North Korean assets in an unspecified Russian financial institution
which the intelligence officials assess North Korea will use to buy crude oil.[20] The intelligence official stated that a North Korean front company recently opened a new account at a Russian bank in Russian-occupied South Ossetia that North Korea may use to evade UN sanctions
An unnamed senior US government official told the NYT that Russia is likely unfreezing North Korean assets and helping North Korea evade international sanctions in exchange for North Korean weapons transfers to Russia
Russian President Vladimir Putin met with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un in Russia in September 2023 and met with North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui in January 2024.[21] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated that North Korea delivered one million rounds of artillery ammunition to Russia from September to November 2023
and US officials have stated that Russian forces have launched at least nine North Korean ballistic missiles against Ukraine.[22] ISW continues to assess that Russia may be open to financial
and defense cooperation with North Korea in return for the provision of artillery ammunition and ballistic missiles to use in Ukraine.[23] North Korea would also benefit from this cooperation by collecting technical data from its weapons’ performance in Ukraine to use in North Korean research and development among other things
Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev emphasized on February 6 that Russia needs to protect its strategic facilities as Russian authorities continue to voice concerns about external and internal threats to Russian infrastructure.[24] Patrushev held a meeting on Russian national security issues in the Ural Federal Okrug on February 6 and emphasized that Russia needs to increase efforts to prevent and respond to natural and man-made emergencies in the okrug
including strengthening counterterrorism protections of “critical and potentially dangerous facilities” and “hazardous production facilities,” both of which very likely include Russian defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises
Patrushev emphasized increasing onsite security
and Vysotsk in Leningrad Oblast due to the threat of Ukrainian drone strikes against port infrastructure.[28]
The Kremlin continues to set informational conditions for possible hybrid provocations against the Baltic states and Georgia
The Russian Foreign Ministry summoned the Latvian
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov similarly claimed on February 5 that Western governments have launched “Russophobic” influence campaigns aimed at Russian embassies
and similar assets abroad and warned that Western provocations abroad increase when polling stations open for Russians to vote in foreign countries.[30] Lavrov’s and Zakharova’s statements are likely aimed at setting informational conditions to frame essentially any action on the part of foreign authorities
regarding the Russian presidential election as a direct attack on Russian nationals living in Baltic states
The Kremlin frequently invokes the concept of “compatriots abroad” to claim special privileges for Russian nationals living outside of Russia and to set informational conditions for provocations in the countries where Russian “compatriots” live.[31] The weaponization of the Russian presidential election will allow the Kremlin to stage informational provocations against Baltic governments
which fits into the Kremlin’s wider hybrid influence playbook
Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili also stated on February 6 that Russia has launched a “new hybrid war against Georgia
for which it is using all forms and weapons,” referencing Russian naval basing projects in the port of Ochamchire
and other provocations in the Georgian territories that Russia has occupied since 2008.[32] Hybrid influence campaigns such as information operations surrounding Russian elections in the Baltics and provocations in occupied regions of Georgia destabilize Russia’s neighbors
Russian-Israeli relations are likely to continue to decline against the backdrop of Russia’s increasingly anti-Israel stance on the Israel-Hamas war
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) publicly criticized and summoned new Israeli Ambassador to Russia Simona Halperin over an interview she gave with Russian outlet Kommersant published on February 4.[33] Halperin stated that it took Russia “some time” to publicly condemn the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7
amid Russia’s increasingly anti-Israel position on the Israel-Hamas war.[36]
Positional engagements continued along the Kupyansk-Svatove line on February 6
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Synkivka
but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[37] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and southeast of Kupyansk near Tabaivka.[38]
Russian forces reportedly recently advanced near Kreminna
but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area on February 6
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Terny and Yampolivka.[39] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued west of Kreminna near Terny
and Yampolivka and south of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area
and Hryhorivka.[40] Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps) reportedly continue to operate near Bilohorivka
Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance north of Bakhmut
Geolocated footage published on February 3 confirms that Russian forces captured Vesele (northwest of Bakhmut).[42] Russian sources
claimed on January 18 that Russian forces captured Vesele
and this is the first time ISW has observed visual confirmation of these Russian claims.[43] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Vesele.[44]
Positional engagements continued near Bakhmut on February 6
A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces made small advances towards Bohdanivka (northwest of Bakhmut) and Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut)
although ISW has not observed visual evidence of Russian advances in either of these areas.[45] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued near Bohdanivka
and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka.[46] Elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps
Northern Fleet) and the “Sever-V” Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Bohdanivka; elements of the Russian 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps) are reportedly operating near Bakhmut; and elements of the Russian 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps) are reportedly operating near Klishchiivka.[47]
Russian and Ukrainian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka amid continued positional fighting in the area on February 6
Geolocated footage published on February 5 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently regained limited tactical positions in a residential area in southern Avdiivka.[48] Additional geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Avdiivka.[49] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in northwestern Avdiivka along Sapronov and Lesya Ukrainka streets
nearby where geolocated footage indicates a Russian advance in northern Avdiivka
and in the quarry area on the northern outskirts of Avdiivka.[50] Several Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced up to one kilometer towards Pervomaiske (southwest of Avdiivka)
and reached the southeastern outskirts of the settlement
although ISW has not yet observed visual evidence to confirm these claims.[51] Avdiivka Military Administration Head Vitaly Barabash noted that Ukrainian forces are clashing with small Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups within Avdiivka
so Russian forces near Avdiivka may be trying to apply lessons learned to improve Russian force protection.[55] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutikva; near Avdiivka itself; south of Avdiivka near Vesele; and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske
and Nevelske.[56] Elements of the Russian 21st Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army
Central Military District) reportedly continue to operate near Avdiivka.[57]
Geolocated footage further confirms that Russian forces advanced southwest of Donetsk City during an ultimately failed mechanized assault in the area in late January
and nearby Ukrainian artillery firing positions will complicate any Russian advances through the settlement towards Kurakhove (13km west of Marinka).[61]
Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on February 6
but there were no confirmed changes in this area of the frontline
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces made marginal advances near Pryyutne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka)
Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 6
Positional engagements continued near Robotyne and west of Verbove (east of Robotyne).[66] Elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate near Verbove.[67] Elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division
Southern Military District) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[68]
Positional engagements continued in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast near Krynky on February 6.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces operating in the Kherson direction are prioritizing locating and striking Ukrainian drone operators
which is consistent with routine Russian milblogger claims that Ukranian first-person view (FPV) drones pose a significant threat to Russian forces in east bank Kherson Oblast.[70]
Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SOF) reported on February 6 that Ukrainian SOF units successfully detonated explosives on a Black Sea gas or oil rig that Russian forces illegally seized and used to stage attacks with Iranian-provided Mohajer-6 reconnaissance drones and guide Shahed drone strikes.[71] Ukrainian SOF reported that Russian forces also deployed a ”Neva-B” object detection radar system on the rig
which allowed Russian forces to better surveil the northwestern part of the Black Sea
Ukrainian SOF reported that Russian forces also used the mining platform as a radar station to monitor surface vessels in the northwestern part of the Black Sea
The Kremlin continues expanding higher military education in Russia in support of medium-term force generation efforts
The Russian MoD announced on February 6 that it is building a new branch of the Suvorov Military School in Ulyanovsk and that the school will begin accepting students as soon as September 2024.[72] The Russian Higher School of Economics announced on February 2 that it is creating the Institute of Military Economics and Strategy and that retired Admiral Sergei Avakyants
who commanded the Pacific Fleet from 2010 to April 2023
will lead the institute.[73] The Kremlin demoted Avakyants in April 2023 amid a surprise readiness check
possibly due to the poor performance of Pacific Fleet naval infantry in Ukraine.[74]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a decree on February 6 ordering the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers and General Staff of the Armed Forces to develop a separate branch of unmanned systems forces within the Ukrainian military and submit relevant proposals to the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council.[75]
Reuters reported on February 6 that Turkey’s leading drone maker Baykar started building a drone factory near Kyiv that will manufacture Bayraktar-TB2 or TB3 model drones.[76] Baykar CEO Haluk Bayraktar told Reuters that the factory’s construction will take about 12 months after which Baykar will install internal machinery and equipment
Bayraktar stated that the factory would employ about 500 people and produce about 120 drones per year
Baykar announced that it would open a drone production facility and service center in Ukraine in September 2023.[77]
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) continues efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia and to seek international recognition of Russia’s illegal occupation of Ukraine
Russian Center Elections Committee (CEC) Chairperson Ella Pamfilova
Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin
Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik
and representatives from occupied Kherson Oblast
and Crimea met on February 6 to discuss the establishment of Russian MFA representative offices in occupied Ukraine.[78] The Russian MFA also emphasized its role in facilitating the work of international observers in occupied Ukraine during the March 2024 presidential election.[79] Russian authorities likely intend to frame the presence of international observers at polling stations in occupied Ukraine as international legitimization of Russia’s illegal occupation of Ukraine
A Russian official escalated claims of the alleged use of pro-Nazi rhetoric against Lithuania likely to further set information conditions for possible future campaigns against the Baltic states
Russian officials continue efforts to accuse the West of being escalatory and conflict-seeking in order to justify Russia’s continued war against Ukraine and deter further military assistance to Ukraine
Significant Activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)
Belarusian Ambassador to Russia Dmitry Krutoy stated on February 6 that Belarusian and Russian interior ministers have discussed the creation of a unified list of “extremists” and “extremist sources.”[84] Krutoy stated that he believes that Belarus and Russia will create a unified list in the near future
[1] https://www.consilium dot europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/02/06/ukraine-facility-council-and-parliament-agree-on-new-support-mechanism-for-ukraine/
[2] https://twitter.com/vonderleyen/status/1754759839031455791
[3] https://www.rheinmetall dot com/en/media/stories/2023/rheinmetall-a-powerful-partner-at-ukraine-side
[4] https://en.yna.co dot kr/view/AEN20240206002400315?section=news
[5] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/04/ukraine-counteroffensive-us-planning-russia-war/
[6] https://eu-solidarity-ukraine.ec.europa dot eu/eu-assistance-ukraine_en ; https://www.eeas.europa dot eu/delegations/united-states-america/eu-assistance-ukraine-us-dollars_en?s=253#:~:text=Collective%20EU%20and%20EU%20Member,Ukraine's%20success%20on%20the%20battlefield
[7] https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts ; https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/10/for-as-long-as-it-takes-putting-us-aid-to-ukraine-into-perspective/#:~:text=As%20of%20Zelensky%27s%20latest%20visit,went%20to%20various%20other%20expenses ; https://www.csis.org/analysis/past-present-and-future-us-assistance-ukraine-deep-dive-data
[8] https://www.csis.org/analysis/past-present-and-future-us-assistance-ukraine-deep-dive-data ; https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/10/for-as-long-as-it-takes-putting-us-aid-to-ukraine-into-perspective/#:~:text=As%20of%20Zelensky%27s%20latest%20visit,went%20to%20various%20other%20expenses
[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base
[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar092223 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101723 ; https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12040#:~:text=FY2022%20and%20FY2023%20security%20assistance,Drawdown%20Authority%20(PDA%3B%2022%20U.S.C
[11] https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2024/02/army-aims-double-155mm-shell-production-october/393943/?oref=d1-homepage-top-story
[12] https://www.defensenews.com/land/2024/02/06/us-army-hunts-for-explosives-to-meet-increased-munitions-output-goals/
[13] https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/stalo-vidomo-skilky-koshtuye-shahed-136-dlya-rosiyi/; https://defence-blog.com/hackers-uncover-foreign-suppliers-in-russias-arsenal/
[14] https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/stalo-vidomo-skilky-koshtuye-shahed-136-dlya-rosiyi/; https://defence-blog.com/hackers-uncover-foreign-suppliers-in-russias-arsenal/
[15] https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/stalo-vidomo-skilky-koshtuye-shahed-136-dlya-rosiyi/; https://defence-blog.com/hackers-uncover-foreign-suppliers-in-russias-arsenal/
[16] https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/stalo-vidomo-skilky-koshtuye-shahed-136-dlya-rosiyi/; https://defence-blog.com/hackers-uncover-foreign-suppliers-in-russias-arsenal/
[17] https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/stalo-vidomo-skilky-koshtuye-shahed-136-dlya-rosiyi/; https://defence-blog.com/hackers-uncover-foreign-suppliers-in-russias-arsenal/
[18] https://t.me/milinfolive/115816 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/115795 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/115811
[19] https://t.me/milinfolive/115802; https://t.me/vchkogpu/45583
[20] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/06/world/asia/north-korea-russia-missiles-bank.html
[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011624 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/us-russia-clash-un-over-north-korea-patriot-missiles-ukraine-2024-02-06/; https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2024-02-06/us-russia-clash-at-un-over-north-korea-patriot-missiles-in-ukraine
[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar091623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102323
[24] https://www.interfax-russia dot ru/ural/main/patrushev-prizval-usilit-zashchitu-vazhnyh-i-potencialno-opasnyh-obektov-na-urale; https://t.me/tass_agency/230520; https://t.me/tass_live/5124 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/230443
[25] https://www.interfax-russia dot ru/ural/main/patrushev-prizval-usilit-zashchitu-vazhnyh-i-potencialno-opasnyh-obektov-na-urale; https://t.me/tass_agency/230520; https://t.me/tass_live/5124 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/230443
[26] https://www.interfax-russia dot ru/ural/main/patrushev-prizval-usilit-zashchitu-vazhnyh-i-potencialno-opasnyh-obektov-na-urale; https://t.me/tass_agency/230520; https://t.me/tass_live/5124 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/230443
[27] https://www.interfax-russia dot ru/ural/main/patrushev-prizval-usilit-zashchitu-vazhnyh-i-potencialno-opasnyh-obektov-na-urale; https://t.me/tass_agency/230520; https://t.me/tass_live/5124 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/230443
[28] https://www.pasp dot ru/d/26909/d/rasporyazhenie_%E2%84%96_6_24-r_ot_02.02.2024_o_vvedenii_rezhima_povyshennoy_gotovnosti.pdf; https://suspilne dot media/677810-u-rosijskih-portah-rezim-pidvisenoi-gotovnosti-cerez-zagrozu-bpla/ ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/234743
[29] https://t.me/tass_agency/230568 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/34726
[32] https://suspilne dot media/678470-rosia-ne-zmogla-zlamati-ukrainu-ta-pocala-novu-gibridnu-vijnu-proti-gruzii-prezidentka-zurabisvili/; https://www.ekhokavkaza.com/a/32807324.html
[33] https://t.me/MID_Russia/34730 ; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6492853
[34] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6492853
[36] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122223 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121423 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2023
[37] https://t.me/multi_XAM/1295 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/111942 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7071
[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YMDG127XWhCBN4qtJ48ATtEsYEshwS3hiB9yJVc9REmjL6sfdKnmyyuQvrfbu1bol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027z2tWVqrQnafJdnTGC7wNZyBziFtMy4hnyhU5a6TupvNngVndG9wKogx39NoG9Esl ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/02/06/na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-zbilshyly-kilkist-shturmiv-oleg-synyegubov/ ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35390 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35391 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35388 ; https://t.me/multi_XAM/1295
[39] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61645 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/25945
[42] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4297; https://t.me/OGSHB_109/539
[43] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-18-2024
[45] https://t.me/rybar/56773; https://t.me/rybar/56776
[47] https://t.me/dva_majors/34073 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61605 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61637 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/7528
[48] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4295?single; https://t.me/mayorthunder/686; https://t.me/V_VP1952;
[49] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/7891; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1754761783812751739; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1754794230000619644
[50] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61600; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/111915; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7067
[51] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61608; https://t.me/wargonzo/18014; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/111910; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/111875; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/7521
[52] lii https://suspilne dot media/677778-zelenskij-doruciv-onoviti-bronuvanna-vid-mobilizacii-golova-minveteraniv-pisla-u-vidstavku-713-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1707229779&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[53] https://suspilne dot media/677778-zelenskij-doruciv-onoviti-bronuvanna-vid-mobilizacii-golova-minveteraniv-pisla-u-vidstavku-713-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1707229779&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://suspilne dot media/677778-zelenskij-doruciv-onoviti-bronuvanna-vid-mobilizacii-golova-minveteraniv-pisla-u-vidstavku-713-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1707220042&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[54] https://suspilne dot media/677778-zelenskij-doruciv-onoviti-bronuvanna-vid-mobilizacii-golova-minveteraniv-pisla-u-vidstavku-713-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1707220042&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[55] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020124
[58] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1754802062313816087?s=20; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1753767973423129039?s=20
[59] https://t.me/voin_dv/6909; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/111918 ; https://t.me/rybar/56791 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34045 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34043
[60] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09jvk8ouk1bAFPKqyoNPycrRaUEYPbx7C6k9CC3kX6XMTs51Tm7cg9SmgRaiHTA57l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YMDG127XWhCBN4qtJ48ATtEsYEshwS3hiB9yJVc9REmjL6sfdKnmyyuQvrfbu1bol; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027z2tWVqrQnafJdnTGC7wNZyBziFtMy4hnyhU5a6TupvNngVndG9wKogx39NoG9Esl ; https://t.me/rybar/56773 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18014
[62] https://t.me/vrogov/14181 ; https://t.me/rybar/56774
[63] https://t.me/mod_russia/35390 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35394 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35386 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/6912 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/6912 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18014
[68] https://t.me/dva_majors/34052 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34049 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34050
[70] https://t.me/dva_majors/34045 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2024
[73] https://meduza dot io/news/2024/02/06/v-vysshey-shkole-ekonomiki-sozdali-institut-voennoy-ekonomiki-i-strategii-ego-vozglavil-byvshiy-komanduyuschiy-tihookeanskim-flotom; https://www.mskagency dot ru/materials/3359529; https://www.hse dot ru/news/edu/893253360.html
[74] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2023
[75] https://www.president dot gov.ua/documents/512024-49625; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/02/06/u-skladi-zsu-stvoryat-syly-bezpilotnyh-system/; https://suspilne dot media/678492-zelenskij-pidpisav-ukaz-pro-stvorenna-sil-bezpilotnih-sistem-u-strukturi-zsu/
[76] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/turkeys-drone-maker-baykar-begins-build-plant-ukraine-2024-02-06/
[77] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base
[78] https://t.me/MID_Russia/34701 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/34699 ; https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/2104; https://t.me/pushilindenis/4264
[84] https://www.belta dot by/society/view/krutoj-belarus-i-rossija-vedut-rabotu-nad-objedineniem-spiskov-ekstremistov-i-ekstremistskih-resursov-613829-2024 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/02/06/rossiya-i-belarus-planiruyut-ob-edinit-svoi-spiski-ekstremistov-utverzhdaet-belorusskiy-posol
Hildr is unique among the Valkyries in that she has by far the single largest arena
which will give you plenty of room to engage her with
One thing to keep in mind however is the trap hallway: this will be random every time you enter the arena
and if it has sawblades (like in the picture below)
you need to be careful not to accidentally back yourself into them and get sliced up
A worse proposition are unguarded crushers: THESE WILL KILL KRATOS INSTANTLY
Looking for tips on how to beat a particular valkyrie
Defeat all 8 Valkyries, and you'll unlock one more, extra-challenging boss fight...
This image shows NASA’s Valkyrie (R5) robot
which is NASA's newest humanoid robot and was built to compete in the DARPA Robotics Challenge
NASA’s Valkyrie (R5) robot is NASA's newest humanoid robot and was built to compete in the DARPA Robotics Challenge and advance the state of the art of robotics within the agency
NASA's Valkyrie robot in the team's garage
Valkyrie was built by engineers at NASA's Johnson Space Center in Houston
NASA’s Valkyrie robot studying a doorknob during the Darpa Robotics Challenge in Miami in December 2013
is being developed by NASA Johnson Space Center to perform dynamic
dexterous and perception-intensive tasks in a variety of scenarios
Val is 6 foot 2 inches tall (1.9 meters) and sports a glowing NASA logo on its chest
NASA's new robot Valkyrie was designed for the DARPA Robotics Challenge taking place in December 2013
Join our Space Forums to keep talking space on the latest missions, night sky and more! And if you have a news tip, correction or comment, let us know at: community@space.com.
chronicling (and celebrating) humanity's ongoing expansion across the final frontier
the passion of writers and editors who are space fans and also trained journalists
Our current news team consists of Editor-in-Chief Tariq Malik; Editor Hanneke Weitering
Senior Space Writer Mike Wall; Senior Writer Meghan Bartels; Senior Writer Chelsea Gohd
Senior Writer Tereza Pultarova and Staff Writer Alexander Cox
Senior Producer Steve Spaleta oversees our space videos
with Diana Whitcroft as our Social Media Editor.
'Falcon' flies on Star Wars Day: SpaceX launches Starlink satellites from Florida (photos)
New US Space Force documentary 'Always Above' lands in planetariums
Control characters from the Touhou Project series in this shooting action game featuring high-speed aerial versus combat
Danmaku battles faster than you’ve ever seen will unfold in the skies of Gensokyo as you use your mobility to dodge countless bullets flying at you with a variety of spells
A meteorite suddenly crashes into Gensokyo
and small particles of light shine through the cracks
they reach the most powerful residents of Gensokyo
as it transforms into what looks like a suit of armor
she sighs and looks off in the direction which the light came from
leaving nothing but a red trail of light behind her
“My body feels so light…”
Reimu realizes that her armor—her Valkyrie Arms—are to thank for her newfound speed
Reimu hurries on her way… but it doesn’t take long before someone stands in her way
“Looks like I’m not the only one.”
and they both know what must be done…
Valkyrie of Phantasm is based on the Touhou series
but has a brand new original story with the creators’ own interpretations of the world and characters
This is a Touhou Project fan game developed by Areazero
*Multiplayer requires online play
the first Hollywood film to show a member of the German high command in a sympathetic light
a one-time liberal who survived the Third Reich
Es geschah am 20 Juli ("It Took Place on 20 July")
Writing of them in Films and the Second World War
said: "Some gap in time will have to elapse before they [the Nazi leaders] can be interpreted in terms at once acceptable both as art and psychology."
Well, we've had the definitive bunker movie, Oliver Hirschbiegel's Downfall, with Bruno Ganz as the Führer. Perhaps he should have followed it up with a July plot picture, because Bryan Singer's Valkyrie
co-scripted by his Usual Suspects collaborator Christopher McQuarrie
Valkyrie begins in North Africa in 1942 where Bavarian aristocrat Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg (Tom Cruise) makes a journal entry attacking Hitler's inept leadership and his persecution of the Jews
several fingers of his left hand gone and his left eye blown out
where Major General Henning von Tresckow (Kenneth Branagh) is planning to hide a bomb in a Cointreau bottle that will explode on Hitler's plane during his return flight to Berlin from Smolensk
in a scene both frightening and darkly comic
Von Tresckow recovers it and goes back to the drawing board
we see the disillusioned military men and their mostly rather older civilian supporters working on their plot
after drawing von Stauffenberg into their dangerous scheme as a key collaborator
continuously exciting story that sustains the tension up to its horrific end
when all the conspirators finish up shot or hanged with piano wire
but doesn't manage to convey much of what is going on behind Von Stauffenberg's black eyepatch
largely British cast that includes David Bamber as a muffled
There are hints from Von Stauffenberg's concealed crucifix that he is a practising Christian and we also gather that Wagner is the family's composer of choice and that his small children like nothing more than to dress up in Father's uniform
But while it's clear that some of the conspirators are crafty opportunists (Tom Wilkinson's convincing General Fromm
we do not learn much of what motivates the leading members of this strange coalition
At what stage did they become disillusioned with the Nazi leadership
What kind of future Germany do they have in mind
Do they really expect to succeed or are they making a grand gesture that will put them right with God and posterity
These questions go largely unasked and thus unanswered
The subject demands to be made as a documentary or in a form more imaginative than a linear narrative
This is the archive of The Observer up until 21/04/2025
The Observer is now owned and operated by Tortoise Media
“This analyzer is really a very important piece of medical equipment that every doctor needs daily
Now our family doctors have the opportunity to get a patient’s blood test in just a few minutes,” said Maryna Orlova
director of the Valky Primary Health Care Center
the cooperation between the Valky community and GIZ began during the process of reforming the primary health care system
family doctors were provided with the most necessary for their daily work
and the medical center was equipped to start the early intervention program
Valky Mayor Valerii Skrypnichenko notes that the first result of cooperation with Germany was the construction of a sports ground with an artificial surface
the Valky community cooperates with several international charitable organizations and foundations
Earlier, 48 generators were handed over to Kharkiv Oblast, 89 of which would be provided to medical institutions.
Subscribe to news from Kharkiv, UkraineMost important stories from the frontline region
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Ukraine’s Operations in Bakhmut Have Kept Russian Reserves Away from the South
Key Takeaway: Ukrainian forces are celebrating the liberation of two small towns south of Bakhmut
but Ukraine’s entire effort first to defend and now to conduct counter-offensive operations around Bakhmut has been the subject of much unwarranted criticism
Ukraine's defensive and counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area since summer 2022 are an operationally sound undertaking that has fixed a large amount of Russian combat power that would otherwise have been available to reinforce Russian defenses in southern Ukraine
Elements of two of Russia’s four Airborne (VDV) divisions and three of Russia’s four VDV separate brigades are currently defending the Bakhmut area
This significant Ukrainian achievement has helped prevent Russia from creating a large mobile VDV operational reserve that could have been used to stop the main Ukrainian counteroffensive effort in Zaporizhia Oblast
Continued large-scale Ukrainian counteroffensive efforts around Bakhmut are necessary to keep Russian forces fixed in that area
as the likely recent redeployment of a detachment of one VDV separate brigade from near Bakhmut to southern Ukraine shows how eager the Russians are to recoup the combat power that the Ukrainian counteroffensive around Bakhmut is fixing there
Ukraine’s defensive operations in Bakhmut drew elements of at least one Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) division and fixed them near Bakhmut in summer 2022
Elements of the 106th Airborne Division were reportedly operating in Bakhmut as early as June 2022
Former Russian officer Igor Girkin reported that the 137th Airborne Regiment of the 106th Airborne Division had been operating in Bakhmut alongside Wagner forces since the “beginning” of Wagner’s assault on Bakhmut
presumably in June 2022 when Wagner’s participation in major attacks to capture the town began.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that elements of the 137th Airborne Regiment were already operating near Bakhmut as of September 14
The Russian military committed elements of the 106th Airborne Division to augment the Wagner Group’s offensive in Bakhmut no later than December 2022
Combat footage posted in December 2022 and January 2023 shows likely elements of the 106th Airborne Division engaged in combat in Bakhmut.[3] A Russian milblogger reported that unspecified VDV forces conducted joint operations with the Wagner Group in the Bakhmut area on December 27
2022.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense confirmed Russian Airborne Forces’ participation in the battle of Bakhmut – very likely including elements of the 106th Airborne Division – in January 2023.[5]
The Russian military deployed additional VDV units to Bakhmut in early- and mid-May 2023 shortly before Wagner Group Financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s announcement that Wagner forces would withdraw from Bakhmut
The tempo of combat in Bakhmut decreased in April and early May 2023 as Russian forces completed their capture of the city
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin declared victory in Bakhmut on May 20 and announced his intent to withdraw Wagner forces from the town on May 25.[6] Prigozhin announced on May 25 that the Wagner Group began handing over its positions in Bakhmut to the Russian Ministry of Defense and claimed that Wagner would entirely withdraw from the town on June 1
Additional VDV forces deployed to Bakhmut before and during this transitional period
Senior Ukrainian defense officials reported that the Russian military deployed several unspecified VDV units to Bakhmut in mid-May 2023.[8] A Russian soldier’s obituary confirms that elements of the 31st Separate Air Assault Brigade deployed to Bakhmut – likely from the Svatove-Kreminna line - no later than May 14
2023.[9] Ukrainian sources reported that elements of Russia’s 98th Airborne Division deployed to Bakhmut in late March and mid-April.[10] Scattered small elements of the 98th Airborne Division were reportedly operating near Vuhledar
as of May 2023.[11] Combat footage and Russian reports confirmed that elements of Russia’s 98th Airborne Division redeployed to Bakhmut no later than June 2023.[12] Elements of the 11th and 83rd Separate Air Assault Brigades likely deployed to Bakhmut around this time
and their participation in combat in Bakhmut was confirmed in June and July 2023.[13]
Ukrainian forces began counteroffensive operations against Bakhmut almost immediately following Wagner’s withdrawal
causing the Russians to maintain VDV forces already there and to deploy additional VDV reinforcements to Bakhmut
Ukrainian forces conducted sustained tactical counterattacks in Bakhmut and around its flanks following Wagner’s capture of the city around May 20.[14] Ukraine launched a significant counteroffensive against Bakhmut on June 4
the same day it began its major counteroffensive in Zaporizhia
and conducted sustained and reinvigorated offensive actions near Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks throughout June
These sustained Ukrainian attacks near Bakhmut fixed considerable VDV forces in Bakhmut
The Russian military had committed elements of the 11th
and 83rd Separate Air Assault Brigades to the defense of the town by July 2023.[16] The only VDV separate brigade not committed to Bakhmut was the 45th Guards SPETSNAZ Brigade
which is a special forces unit directly controlled by the Russian General Staff.[17] The Russian military would not have deployed and retained this large quantity of VDV forces in Bakhmut had Ukrainian forces not launched large-scale and effective counteroffensive operations that threatened to retake the town that Russian forces had seized at enormous cost
Russian sources credited elements of the 98th Airborne Division - likely elements of the 217th Airborne Regiment - with defeating Ukrainian attacks on Bakhmut’s northern flank in July 2023.[18] Elements of the 106th Airborne Division's 137th Airborne Regiment remained in Bakhmut from September 2022 to September 2023 without any observed evidence of a rotation.[19]
Ukraine's continued counteroffensive actions in Bakhmut since June 2023 have fixed elements of two of Russia’s four VDV divisions and three of the VDV’s four separate brigades
dramatically reducing the VDV’s ability to redeploy more forces laterally to reinforce the southern front
The fact that the Russian command redeployed these VDV forces to hold Bakhmut shows that they would have been available to shift to Zaporizhia Oblast to defend against the main Ukrainian counteroffensive efforts there had Ukrainian operations not fixed them in the Bakhmut area
Ukraine’s sustained operations near Bakhmut have fixed the following VDV elements near Bakhmut:
The Russian military redeployed elements of two VDV units that the Russian command had not committed to Bakhmut to support Russian defenses in Zaporizhia Oblast
The only VDV forces not engaged in Bakhmut by June-July 2023 were elements of the 76th Air Assault Division operating near Kreminna
the 331st Airborne Regiment of the 98th Airborne Division also operating near Kreminna
the 7th Air Assault Division operating on left (east) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast
which had already been committed to defending southern Ukraine near Mala Tokmachka in early June 2023.[28] (The 45th Brigade’s last known location before appearing in Zaporizhia Oblast in June 2023 was in Kherson Oblast in October 2022).[29]
Russia redeployed the 7th Air Assault Division and elements of the 76th Air Assault Division to Robotyne in August.[30] The 7th Air Assault Division’s subordinate 56th
and 247th Air Assault Regiments remain active along the southern front as of early September 2023.[31] The 76th Air Assault Division’s subordinate 104th and 234th regiments were never committed to Bakhmut and had held positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line into July 2023.[32] The 76th Air Assault Division’s third regiment
was reportedly destroyed in Kherson Oblast in September 2022 and a likely reconstituted 237th Regiment deployed to the Luhansk line no later than January 2023.[33] The 104th and 234th Regiments redeployed to Zaporizhia Oblast in late August 2023 while the 237th Regiment reportedly continued to hold positions near Kreminna as of early July 2023.[34] ISW has not observed evidence of the 237th Regiment redeploying from Kreminna as of this publication
Russia’s most recent reported lateral redeployment to reinforce the southern front is reportedly being undertaken by the 41st Combined Arms Army - notably not a VDV formation
Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate Chief Kyrylo Budanov reported on August 31 that elements of the 41st Combined Arms Army began a “slow” redeployment from the Luhansk line to an unspecified area in southern Ukraine.[35] This lateral redeployment of regular motorized rifle units likely reflects the fact that Russian forces are running out of VDV units to move
All of Russia’s VDV regiments and brigades not already deployed to the south are committed to the Bakhmut area with the exception of the 331st Airborne Regiment of the 98th Airborne Division and the reconstituted 237th Air Assault Regiment of the 76th Air Assault Division
both of which are reportedly still operating on the Kreminna-Svatove line as of late August and July
respectively.[36] Reports of elements of the 83rd Separate Airborne Brigade operating near Nesteryanka
on the western shoulder of the Ukrainian drive to Robotyne in Zaporizhia Oblast
likely demonstrate how eager the Russians are to get additional VDV reinforcements to the Robotyne salient.[37]
Ukrainian forces’ sustained operations in Bakhmut since spring 2023 have successfully fixed a large portion of Russia’s VDV forces and have thus increased Ukraine’s chances of operational success on the southern frontline by preventing the creation of a VDV reserve there
Sustained Ukrainian combat operations near Bakhmut since December 2022 have fixed elements of two of Russia’s four VDV divisions and three of the VDV’s four independent brigades
The VDV is Russia’s principal expeditionary force and Russia’s highest mobility combat force
Ukrainian activity near Bakhmut has attritted these VDV elements
deprived them of opportunities to regroup and refit
and have prevented the Russian command from using them to form a high mobility operational reserve to defend the southern front
The concentration of any significant proportion of these VDV units in the Robotyne area would likely have made Ukrainian penetration of the lines there impossible
The Ukrainian defense of and counteroffensive around Bakhmut thus reflects sound campaign design principles
The Ukrainians took advantage of Russia’s fixation with the operationally insignificant town of Bakhmut to draw the highest-quality mobile Russian reserves there first to complete the Russian seizure of the town and then to hold it against Ukrainian counter-offensive operations that began almost as soon as Wagner forces pulled back
A Russian redeployment of all or most of these VDV elements to defend in southern Ukraine would likely have benefited Russia far more than the deployment of Ukrainian counter-offensive forces from Bakhmut to Zaporizhia
Russian forces in Zaporizhia lack the manpower necessary to defend the entirety of the field fortifications they have prepared
The redeployment of elements of multiple VDV divisions and separate brigades would have allowed them to man those defenses in depth
thus forcing Ukrainian troops attempting to penetrate the lines to confront fresh defenders repeatedly
Ukrainian forces would not have benefited as much by concentrating more of their own combat power on their breakthrough efforts
Lack of mine-clearing equipment and the challenges of conducting mine-clearing operations in the face of Russian fixed and rotary-wing attacks supporting extensive Russian artillery and anti-tank systems operating from heavily prepared field fortifications and tree lines were the main obstacles to a rapid Ukrainian penetration
Ukrainian difficulties in coordinating combined arms operations on which Ukrainian counter-offensive forces had been hastily trained compounded these obstacles
More Ukrainian forces wrestling with such difficulties would not have improved Ukraine’s chances materially
The Russian defensive positions around Bakhmut were not initially heavily mined
and therefore likely did not draw many of Ukraine’s limited mine-clearing capabilities to that area at least initially
More Ukrainian forces pushing south into Russia’s well-defended minebelts in Zaporizhia were thus very unlikely to make a decisive difference in the effectiveness of Ukrainian counteroffensives in the area whereas the unavailability of so much of Russia’s potential reserve forces has likely given Ukraine its chance to make significant gains in the south
This product’s purpose is not to offer a full evaluation of Ukraine’s campaign design or to comment on the effectiveness of Ukrainian tactics and operations on the Zaporizhia axis
It is meant simply to demonstrate that Ukrainian defensive and then counteroffensive operations around Bakhmut had the operationally sound effect of using the irrational Russian fixation on that town to draw a disproportionate amount of Russia’s limited mobile combat reserve there in a way that set much more favorable conditions for Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in the south than Ukraine could otherwise have expected to face
Ukrainian forces will likely have to continue to press hard around Bakhmut to keep Russian VDV forces pinned there
but that pressure will likely be worth the advantage of preventing those Russian forces from flowing quickly into southern Zaporizhia Oblast to refit and prepare to stop the decisive Ukrainian effort in that direction
[1] https://t.me/strelkovii/4989; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-13; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/338799278433157; https://t.me/rybar/33862;%C2%A0
[2] https://www.facebook.com/100069092624537/posts/pfbid02mU1aNjHijEYF5CSsvEXiLst1mED4pX2CiiUMo1jytQ873p3WErGgAgtTzK1kSrm2l/?d=n; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2022/09/15/sylamy-oborony-znyshheno-znachnu-kilkist-rosijskyh-desantnykiv-na-bahmutskomu-napryamku-genshtab-zsu/
[3] https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1607858010440728578; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2023; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1555425774968642
[4] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/20859; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28
[5] https://t.me/mod_russia/23347; https://t.me/mod_russia/23394
[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-20-2023; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1002;
[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-25-2023; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1040;
[8] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/05/18/za-mynulu-dobu-nashi-pidrozdily-poblyzu-bahmuta-prosunulys-upered-na-vidstan-vid-150-do-1700-metriv-sergij-cherevatyj/;https://t.me/annamaliar/738;
[9] https://vk dot com/wall-106160452_497886; https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1662338147655581697; https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1662337489334419458?s=20
https://t.me/vdd98/725;
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/50497;https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/26561; https://t.me/garmaev_alexander/4092;
[17] https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/security-insights/spetsnaz-operational-intelligence-political-warfare-and-battlefield-role-0#toc-scouts-and-saboteurs; https://vk dot com/club62201917; http://xn--80adjlackxh6aem6d dot xn--p1ai/chast/vch-71298/; https://voinskaya-chast dot ru/vozdushno-desantnye-vojska/voinskaya-chast-28337-45-gvardejskij-polk-specialnogo-naznacheniya.html
https://t.me/vdd98/725; https://cdsdailybrief.substack dot com/p/cds-daily-brief-14072023; https://m dot vk.com/wall-172715794_585354; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1687684244959789056
https://tvzvezda dot ru/news/2023719423-nqV6A.html; https://t.me/z_arhiv/24751
[20] https://t.me/kommunist/17807; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1682072567379640339?s=20; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1682073201474519040?s=20;
[21] https://twitter.com/GermanObserver1/status/1674837362449195008?s=20; https://t.me/k_2_54/134; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/51538; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1701396053587615977?s=20; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/52942
[22] https://x.com/KilledInUkraine/status/1695753644669284555?s=20; https://vk dot com/wall-165933456_676114; https://cdsdailybrief.substack dot com/p/russias-war-on-ukraine-30082023
[23] https://t.me/basurin_e/4953; https://t.me/rusich_army/10435; https://t.me/mod_russia/29426; https://t.me/rusich_army/10418; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1687682484874743808?s=20;
[24] https://t.me/multi_XAM/431; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1687684244959789056; https://t.me/vdd98/725; https://cdsdailybrief dot substack.com/p/cds-daily-brief-14072023
[26] https://t.me/voenacher/51383; https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1697927887993577716; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/52462
[27] https://t.me/ok_spn/26331; https://twitter.com/victoriaslog/status/1700564069952991411?s=20; https://twitter.com/Military_oO/status/1696442573991149585?s=20; https://t.me/voin_dv/4859
[28] t.me/sashakots/40222; https://t.me/ZA_FROHT/18224;
[29] https://t.me/wargonzo/8747
[36] https://cdsdailybrief.substack dot com/p/russias-war-on-ukraine-23082023; https://cdsdailybrief dot substack.com/p/cds-daily-brief-11072023
[37] https://t.me/batalyon15/2920; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-sept-16-2023
Honda's into full spinoff mode for 2014, whipping out what's now the third model hung from the Gold Wing's impressive and long-lived bones. Joining the touring machine and the custom bagger called the F6B is a reborn** Valkyrie**
12-valve opposed-six-cylinder engine trussed into an aluminum twin-spar frame
the styling isn't American Retro—it's more like Gold Wing meets Transformers
As though Honda didn't quite finish the job with the F6B
the new Valky strips the Gold Wing almost to the core
replacing the main fairing with a tidy headlight nacelle supporting LED bulbs and an all-electronic instrument display
Large flank-like fairings disguise the side-mounted radiators
Whatever the Valkyrie might look like in photos
it has serious presence in person; this is a large machine
closer in spec to the F6B's than the Gold Wing's
rides on 19-inch front and 17-inch rear tires
Modern four-piston calipers grace the front end
still with a five-speed transmission and shaft final drive
the whole Valkyrie is 92 pounds lighter than the F6B and a massive 154 pounds lighter than the trimmest Gold Wing
says power to weight is the name of the game here
suggesting the new Valky should be a hoot to ride
though company reps expect it to be around $17,000 for the base model
We're speculating that it'll be closer to $18,500 for the ABS version
How to take on God of War's toughest challenges - the Valkyries
God of War Valkyries are an optional challenge you can take on late in the game
Valkyries are eight bosses - and one final boss - that are amongst the game's most challenging fights
If you're interested in help with the main story, our God of War walkthrough and guide can help
Valkyries are optional bosses and among the toughest fights in the entire game
they all pack enough of a punch that you'll want to be readily prepared for them
we highly recommend coming back in the end game
when you have better armour (level 6 is recommended)
a strong array of abilities and a Resurrection Stone
Finding Valkyries requires you to start opening up Hidden Chambers. You'll encounter your first very early in the game - in the Wildwoods section, around the Daudi Kaupmaor boss fight - and are explicitly told you cannot open them yet
The ability to open them will come as part of the story
and it'll be obvious when the ability unlocks
you're welcome to backtrack and start opening Hidden Chambers
It's at this point you can start fighting Valkyries
as several of them are found behind these doors
you'll unlock the side-quest Prove Your Valour
Note not all Hidden Chambers have Valkyries
and not all Valkyries are behind Hidden Chambers - which is where our God of War Valkyries locations below will come in handy
which we also explain towards the end of this page
Not only does defeating all Valkyries unlock a Trophy
but each one will drop some of the game's best loot
Six Valkyries are found behind six Hidden Chambers - four in Midgard
The other two have more specific requirements
Valkyrie Gunnr location: Inside a Hidden Chamber within Thamur's Corpse
Valkyrie Kara location: Inside a Hidden Chamber between The River Pass and Foothills
Valkyrie Geirdriful location: Inside a Hidden Chamber at the Foothills
Valkyrie Eir location: Inside a Hidden Chamber near The Mountain
Valkyrie Rota location: Inside a Hidden Chamber within Helheim
Valkyrie Olrun location: Inside a Hidden Chamber within Alfheim
Valkyrie Gondul location: This is very final step once you have completed the series of trials within the optional realm of Muspelheim
Note that accessing Muspelheim requires finding all Muspelheim Ciphers within Midgard first
Valkyrie Hildr location: You'll find Hildr within the optional realm of Niflheim
but the following YouTube video gives you an idea of where Hildr will be
Note that accessing Niflheim requires finding all Niflheim Ciphers within Midgard first
With all eight Valkyrie locations found and their challenges vanquished
where you'll take the heads of the defeated Valkyries
and are given the chance to take on one final boss battle - the Queen of the Valkyries
this is not unlike previous Valkyrie encounters
so if you've made it this far you can probably take it down
you'll unlock the Chooser of the Slain Trophy
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Nathaniel is a history enthusiast and firearms hobbyist whose primary interest lies in military small arms technological developments beginning with the smokeless powder era
He can be reached via email at nathaniel.f@staff.thefirearmblog.com
More by Nathaniel F
Have a long range critter getter that needs a barrel.
ostiariusalpha please correct me if I'm wrong.
because I do that sort of thing even when people ask me not to
and it works great with 90gr bullets; a 1:6.5" twist is even more ideal
and won't keep a long bullet stable for very far without it keyholing on the target
a motorcycle with Honda’s GL1800 flat six at its heart can be ridden smoothly and quietly
or blasted up and down through the gears with snarling gusto
versatile gem of a powerplant—one reason that Honda has based a variety of models on it
the first six with a feature that gets as much attention as the engine—its polarizing styling
Honda is throwing all kinds of designs at the wall lately—retro
futuristic—a good thing for the market even if they don’t all stick
its look is obviously aimed at the non-traditional cruiser rider
one who is perhaps a bit younger and wants something really different with some genuine performance
It won’t be mistaken for any other cruiser
With the introduction of the 2001 Gold Wing
Honda’s iconic flat six grew from 1,520cc to 1,832cc
Though it’s no longer the most powerful six-pack in touring land
its overall output bests every other cruiser save the Star Vmax and humongous Triumph Rocket III Roadster
liquid-cooled SOHC mill with two valves per cylinder for the Valky is to the dual exhaust
more James Earl Jones note from its slash-cut tips
It and a slightly different airbox seem to help the bike make about five percent more power—on the Jett Tuning dyno the Valkyrie revved up 104.8 horsepower at 5,600 rpm and 112.4 lb-ft of torque at 4,000
with a monstrous plateau of more than 100 lb-ft of torque on tap from 2,200 to 5,400 rpm
This bike will lug down to idle and pull away smartly…in fifth gear
the GL1800’s larger displacement required more radiator capacity
Instead of going with less than optimum wheelbase and steering geometry dimensions on the Gold Wing in order to fit a single huge cooling unit in front
Honda split the rad in two and hid the halves under the fairing on each side
This and the Gold Wing’s stout twin-spar aluminum frame and single-sided swingarm helped give it surprisingly good
which quickly dissipated any controversy over the side-mounted rads
They did create a challenge for the latest Valkyrie’s designers
who also wanted to maintain the GL1800 platform’s great handling
but lacked a convenient hiding place for the radiators on the stripped-down machine
The “big shoulders” shrouds that resulted tie-in nicely with the fenders and the bike’s avant-garde muscle-cruiser styling
They also direct hot air away from the rider and provide some lower leg protection
Some tweaks to the GL’s running gear were necessary to adapt it to performance-cruiser duty
Wheel sizes front and rear were increased one inch for more cornering clearance
so the fork had to be a bit longer even though the bike runs slightly lower-profile 130/60-19 and 180/55-17 tires
The resulting changes to the steering geometry are minimal—wheelbase has grown 0.5 inch
rake less than 0.5 degree and trail 0.2 inch over the F6B/Gold Wing
The rear subframe was changed to accommodate the Valky’s unique seating arrangement
and seat height is right in the middle at 28.8 inches
The 6.0-gallon gas tank is the steel real deal
too—there’s no fuel hiding under the seat as on the other GL1800s
the bike still has the chassis formula that makes the Gold Wing and F6B rock-stable on the highway and so ridiculously capable in the corners
And get this—at 746 pounds fully fueled the Valkyrie weighs about 90 pounds less than the F6B
the Valky’s much improved power-to-weight ratio is the best way to experience it
Fire the big bike up with a roar from the more open exhaust and it pulls away strongly without hesitation
practically begging you to jump on the throttle
The bike’s lighter weight makes the big GL engine feel especially alive
and its broad spread of earth-moving torque and smoothness accelerate the bike like a rocket
It can be left in third gear and ridden briskly in the corners thanks to its good cornering clearance
and since all three GL1800s have the same gear ratios
top fifth gear on the highway delivers the same smooth flagship touring manners
with buckets of power in reserve for passing and such
but sounds and feels nothing like the traditional V-twin potato-potato-potato
The sheer size of the Valkyrie gives it generous seating proportions
with a wide 1-inch pullback handlebar that is slightly wider
and is rubber mounted—zero vibes get through to the rider in the bar
and footpegs are 1.3 inches forward and 0.6-inch higher for a sportier feel and more cornering clearance
radiator shrouds and cylinder heads provide some lower-body wind protection
but your upper body is in the wind and all of your weight is on the firm seat
with a reasonably sized pillion and ample grab rails
both of which can be removed for a solo look
Among the 15 accessories for the Valkyrie are Boulevard and Tall windscreens
so you can easily enhance its touring comfort and capacity
The Valkyrie’s suspension has the same good travel front and rear as the Gold Wing and F6B
with damping that Honda says is calibrated for the lighter machine
It is significantly firmer than either of those bikes
great for more aggressive riding but a bit jarring over bumps
though the rear Pro-Link shock offers remote spring preload adjustment similar to the F6B’s
This bike also gets more stopping power to suit its sportier intent
with dual opposed 4-piston calipers up front with floating 310mm rotors that are larger than the Wing’s/F6B’s 296mm discs
A 2-piston floating caliper grabs the 316mm disc in back
adds just six pounds and brings with it self-canceling turn signals
Both the standard and ABS-braked machines stop incredibly well
with great feel at the lever and pedal and just a slight clicking sensation in either when ABS is engaged
and a cool-looking multi-function digital LCD instrument display with a customizable start-up message
grab rails and engine covers are menacingly blacked-out; on the gorgeous Dark Red Metallic and Black Valkys those bits are chrome or silver
There’s a large locking storage compartment under the right side panel
and a thoughtful pair of guards to protect the engine in a tipover
Also does it have a gear position indicator
the F6B doesn’t even have cruise so i doubt it
if you want a power cruiser with cruise control just buy a 2014+ FJR1300
should fit right in at your local Sonic fast food location
Road tests used to include things like 1/4 mile times
etc…wonder why they didn’t include these things in this test
It is after all a performance cruiser…I’m curious how it would perform against the M109R…
We haven’t included that data for quite a while because the staff is made up of touring
travel and adventure guys of ample size who would just keep on going at the end of the quarter-mile or upon reaching 60 mph
I traded my M 109r with a power commander
K& N and also opened up the filtor box.on the honda
Have yet to use full throttle on the thing
Idle to 6000 RPM is instant in first gear
I have not figurd out how to not exceed it with even a instant twist of he throttle
Had the first original Valkyrie in Indiana
Took out that top lastic baffle and made many changes
this new bike would have had it for dinner
i realty like the F6B and the new Valkyrie
they both feel the same when they are stood up dry
the question is what happens when the are both full with gas
the F6B tank is under the seat and the Valkyrie tank is above the seat
i would like to buy the Valkyrie but waiting to see the accessories.I know some wonder why not just go with the F6B
to that i say 100 pound differance and a few long trips with the wife
the bike gorgeous in the flesh opposed to how it looks in pics
They just don’t do this bike justice
I’d like to see a compare as well….M109…Triumph Rocket…Ducatti Devil …Valk
having owned a rocket3 and diavel I think I can speak from personal experience
you cant compare the r3 or the valk to the diavel because the diavel weighs 100kgs less
the diavel is a monster on steroids but the diavel and Honda have much of of the same
side mounted radiators and feels similar to the valk when you sit on them but the valk is more like the r3 to ride
if it was a race the diavel would win every time so to me the r3 and valk are in a niche of there own
if I had to choose between these two I would choose the new Valkyrie any day
don’t get me wrong r3 owners but that flat 6 motor is the greatest
The 97 valkyrie is dearest to my heart for style and riding pleasure
the goldwing for me and the wife to take 1 or 2 week rides
the 2014 valkyrie its for me to go out and haul butt when the feeling arises
The new valk out handles and out powers the other 2 bikes and definitely has it’s own personality balance is great handling is unbelievable
Thinking about quitting work and riding all the time
commander changes I would say they ran very close to each other
My new Valkrie is still much faster then lboth
Killed engine several times stopping at a traffic light
its taking me some time to get use to this instant response
Would you please convey the make / model of the helmet and jacket you wore
Want to make a move soon on a Blue Valkyrie
I want to know about long trips… thoughts on this bike
I like the exhaust note of the stateline/fury etc.
but there is something about his bike that keeps drawing me in…
Do you think it would be appropriate for weekend trips
Anyone know where I can get a fairing for it
0-60 in under 4 seconds and Qtr mile under 12 seconds…
Rocket III and Vmax are the only ones faster
I started to ride my 2014 valk starting in 2 nd gear
It has so much torque that 1st gear isn’t necessary unless you are riding 2 up
I traded my ’02 Gold Wing for a naked Gold Wing
My wife never wanted to go riding so I ditched the bass boat seat in the rear of the Wing
The Valkyrie will cruise @ 100mph for as long as you can
My Harley friends are vibrating off the road @ 100mph
Honda is unsurpassed in the engineering of these big 6 cylinders
I love my Harley friends reaction to this bad boy
acting like everybody should ride a Harley or you “Can’t be COOL”
It doesn’t take long to understand that performance is more important than chained wallets & no helmet
I say they haven’t got anything to protect anyway if they aren’t wearing a helmet
and website in this browser for the next time I comment
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Players are also invited to arrive on December 25th for a “surprise event.”
Incidentally, MOP’s BDO columnist Carlo came into chat bubbling over today over the revamp of the monthly loyalty rewards
which this month include 20 days of premium sub time
The update has also made tweaks to Shining Medal of Honor reward tables
The Daily Grind: Do you think MMO subscriptions are greedy
WoW Factor: Down with raid nonsense addons
We’re finally getting our first glimpse of 12-year-old Camelot Unchained since last year in today’s dev stream
The Daily Grind: Do you feel bad about skipping new MMORPG launches
The Soapbox: Could an official WildStar revival succeed in 2025
The Daily Grind: How much does voice acting impact an MMORPG
had most of cringing in our seats with special cushions we'd brought into the auditorium to put over our faces at the dramatic moments
Cruise gives the Nazi salute - with his amputated stump
Director Bryan Singer has put together a fairly workable
but the convention of Brit thesps playing Germans has now become ridiculous
In among all these British character players
Tom looks like Steve McQueen with the limeys in The Great Escape
Every single British character actor in Spotlight has apparently got the call: Kenneth Branagh
David Bamber (as Hitler); the list goes on and on
(Singer probably also inquired after the availability of James Robertson Justice and Richard Wattis.) By my watch
it was fully 45 minutes before a bona fide German actor had any lines: Christian Berkel
playing the explosives expert Colonel Mertz
but Cruise's American accent is jarring and his jaw-muscle-clenching intensity is really only effective when he's playing the bad guy
Stauffenberg isn't really the part he should have played
Let Tom grow into the role - the role he was born for
"I hated that guy and all he stood for."
is not just the latest Tom Cruise action thriller
It is the fruition of a dream; a boyhood fantasy writ large; a Hollywood blockbuster that provides an opportunity that was denied him in life
Bryan Singer's picture casts Cruise as Claus von Stauffenberg
the Wehrmacht colonel who spearheaded the 20 July 1944 plot to save the fatherland
Wounded in battle and sporting a natty eye-patch
He wants to "show the world that not all Germans are like Hitler"
The obvious sticking point here is that (spoiler!) von Stauffenberg did not actually kill Hitler
The plot failed and the conspirators were executed
Except that Singer opts to frame Valkyrie as a high-concept wartime suspense thriller
inviting us to suspend our disbelief and go along for the ride
The 1944 plot was at least fiendishly planned and generally well executed
Valkyrie paints von Stauffenberg as the archetypal "good German"
his von Stauffenberg is essentially Top Gun with an eye-patch
The film's curious melange of dialects only underscores this quality
Von Stauffenberg's cohorts are played by British actors (Bill Nighy
Kenneth Branagh) who deliver their lines in English accents
The villainous Nazi is portrayed by German actor Thomas Kretschmann who speaks English in a German accent
And then - standing separate and apart - is Cruise himself
He might as well have been dropped in from an Allied plane; a gung-ho Hollywood hero sent in to clean up a very European mess
FAMILY VALUES: Honda’s Gold Wing has been stacking the deck for 40 years
Entire content is available under licence Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license, unless stipulated otherwise
brings to life a fever dream that raises the hypercar bar to its highest point
promised that the Valkyrie hypercar would be regarded as a pinnacle of the combustion era
it sounded like the sort of hyperbole common to those with limited-run hypercars to sell.
Yet the reality pretty much delivers on that far-off claim
made as long ago as 2016 when Aston and Red Bull Racing first announced they had started to collaborate on F1 designer Adrian Newey’s long-held ambition to make a road car
And Red Bull is now working on its own Adrian Newey project
which we’re promised will ultimately make the Valkyrie seem both fat and slow – improbable as that sounds
Yet while its parents are already divorced
and most of the 150 Valkyrie coupes have already been delivered to customers
I got to experience the Valkyrie exclusively on-track at the Bahrain International Circuit
just ahead of the Formula One season opener there
a bit stunned – the Valkyrie really does offer an experience well beyond even that of the most extreme hypercars to have gone before
Although the early claims that it would offer similar performance to an LMP1 race car have been shifted sideways – that comparison now reserved for the track-only AMR Pro version – the regular Valkyrie is undoubtedly the most extreme vehicle to ever legally wear registration plates
having been homologated for road use under Europe’s small series type approval
There is active suspension, including the ability to lower the car’s body in its Track mode to improve downforce, with active elements at both ends – plus in the diffuser tunnel – that allow it to make up to a peak 1100kg of aerodynamic assistance, but also to shed much of this to reduce drag on straights.
Turning Newey’s vision road-legal wasn’t easy. Talking to Aston’s chief designer, Miles Nurnberger, in Bahrain reveals that there were some fairly robust discussions over even tiny dimensional changes.
“We learned to quote millimetres to two decimal places so he didn’t think we were being slapdash,” Nurnberger admits.
At one meeting Newey conceded an 8mm expansion to the passenger compartment, something that won a round of applause from the engineering team. “Nobody could remember Adrian having given up more than 1mm before,” Nurnberger says.
Despite these small increases, passenger accommodation was still well down the list of the Valkyrie’s priorities. It’s definitely a tailored fit, with the teardrop-shaped cockpit forming only a small part of a much bigger silhouette which, up close, is filled with the channels and ducts that help direct airflow.
Access to the cockpit is through what are better thought of as gullwing windows than doors, and involves standing on the base of the seat and then sliding down, although a detachable steering wheel makes access slightly easier.
Once installed, elbow room is minimal and I’m very thankful not to be carrying a passenger; the cabin is barely one and a half occupants wide despite two seating positions. I also need to have the lower padding of the driver’s bucket taken out to give space for my helmeted head to fit under the roof. This at the dizzying height of 182cm. Anyone substantially taller simply won’t fit.
Yet once installed, the view is properly special. The Valkyrie’s heavily curved windscreen feels a little like looking through a visor; another engineering challenge was creating a wiper mechanism that would be able to angle the single blade to maintain contact as it sweeps the screen.
There are two small digital screens for the rear-view cameras, one on each side, plus a wider-angled ‘virtual mirror’ hung from the top of the windscreen. There is also a touchscreen on the right-hand side of the dashboard, this being the first ever fitted to an Aston, although you’ll be unsurprised to hear that I barely glanced at it once moving.
The most important stuff is conveyed by the small screen integrated into the steering wheel, with this dominated by a huge digital rev counter with numbers that go all the way to 12. The wheel also has switches for the ERS electric boost system and a controller to cycle through the various dynamic modes: Urban, Sport and Track. Selecting the last of these unlocks the additional function of a variable traction-control system.
It is brutally loud. The V12 is both directly mounted to the carbon-fibre tub and sits with the meshed gears that drive its valvetrain at the front – meaning that these are just centimetres behind the heads of occupants. Even at idle it sounds savage through the padding of a helmet, the cacophony growing from that point upwards and accompanied by a buzzing high-frequency vibration, much of which comes straight through the seat.
If not wearing a helmet, Aston recommends use of a noise-cancelling headset similar to the ones used in small planes or helicopters. Failing to use this would pose the serious risk of hearing loss. The Valkyrie sounds amazing from outside, but inside the cabin it is just painfully loud.
Getting rolling is easy. Despite its Rimac-produced 1.68kWh battery pack, the Valkyrie isn’t one of those hybrids that can operate in a full EV mode, the V12 needs to be running for it to move. But gentle starts are made under electric power, the engine then linked to the wheels by the clutch once moving.
(As with the McLaren Artura and Ferrari 296GTB/ SF90 Stradale, there is no mechanical reverse gear, the Valkyrie always backing up electrically.) There is also a launch-control system for more aggressive starts, this pretty much dumping the clutch to get the car off the line.
It takes several laps of the Bahrain circuit to build up to full commitment. Initially because Aston works driver Darren Turner is setting the pace in a fully liveried Vantage Formula 1 safety car, this feeling almost painfully slow even as he does his best Bernd Mayländer impression.
Performance is massive, the Valkyrie pulling a 300km/h terminal speed before a cautious braking point into Bahrain’s ultra-tight Turn One. But subjectively it feels even more ferocious than it is thanks to the noise and the scintillating, delay-free response of the throttle pedal and the savagery of the transmission’s upshifts. I once drove a Koenigsegg One:1 on a wet runway, and I can honestly say that on dry racetrack the Valkyrie is more viscerally exciting.
The ERS was an anti-climax – this bringing a KERS-like boost of harvested energy through the e-motor that Aston says it can do once a lap. To be honest, I struggled to feel much difference when deploying it.
The Valkyrie I drove had already done multiple stints on track by the time I got to it as well, which might be why it had a numb patch at the top of its brake pedal’s travel, with resistance also softening a few times during bigger stops. This didn’t seem to alter the rate at which the huge carbon-ceramic discs could shed speed; it knocked confidence and meant I was normally braking much too early.
But it’s not just about going incredibly quickly. The Valkyrie is also impressive driveable for something so potent, especially given the fundamental limitation that comes from wearing road-legal tyres. The Michelin Pilot Sport Cup 2 rubber produced plentiful grip, but not as much as in a car riding on slicks. Which is a relevant comparison when you consider the possibility of buying something like a Radical SR10 or even a factory-supplied GT3 race car for considerably less outlay.
Is it the pinnacle? Hell yes – to the extent it is hard to see how the bar could be raised any higher. Back to you, Adrian.
Our bloke in the UK has been writing about cars since the late ’nineties, and served time on the staff of CAR, Autocar and evo magazines. These days he combines his duties for Drive with being European Editor for Car and Driver in the ’States. He loves automotive adventures and old Mercs, sometimes experienced together.
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