The reported attack comes just days before Russia's Victory Day parade and three-day "truce." MPs will be able to ask questions and learn more about the details of the agreement in meetings with Economy Minister Yulia Svyrydenko May 6-7 MP Serhii Sobolev told the news outlet Suspilne The ratification vote is scheduled for May 8 Attacks against the border villages of Bilopillia and Vorozhba damaged civilian infrastructure and triggered emergency evacuations the regional military administration reported "I look forward to working with President Erdogan on getting the ridiculous war between Russia and Ukraine ended — now!" U.S Putin's Victory Day truce "doesn't sound like much if you know where we started from," Trump told reporters at the White House on May 5 Far-right Euroskeptic candidate George Simion head of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) Bucharest Mayor Nicusor Dan placed second with 20.99% of the vote and the candidate from the ruling coalition "It requires the continuation of contacts between Moscow and Washington which have been launched and are now ongoing," Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said set to operate within the Council of Europe will focus on Russia's political and military leaders up to 20 Russian soldiers were killed and their equipment destroyed The move represents an apparent violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions passed in the wake of North Korea's intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests "We are ready to deepen our contribution to the training of the Ukrainian military," Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala said on May 5  (Updated:  January 27, 2025 3:03 pm) • 2 min readby Martin Fornusek, The Kyiv Independent news deskUkrainian soldiers preparing a mortar in the direction of Velyka Novosilka in Donetsk Oblast on Feb (Diego Herrera Carcedo/Anadolu via Getty Images)Editor’s note: The article was expanded with a statement from the Khortytsia group of forces and its spokesperson 26 that its forces had captured Velyka Novosilka a strategically significant settlement in the western part of Donetsk Oblast Ukraine’s 110th Mechanized Brigade, which is deployed in the area, acknowledged a withdrawal from parts of the village to avoid encirclement but claimed that fighting is ongoing elsewhere in Velyka Novosilka "Fights in Velyka Novosilka are ongoing. Russian forces shelled our positions 30 times," the Khortytsia group of forces said on Jan "The Defense Forces continue inflicting casualties to Russia in manpower and equipment during tense battles." clarified later during the day that Ukrainian forces withdrew from the southern part of the village but continue to hold positions in the outskirts The Kyiv Independent could not verify the claims The village with a pre-war population of 5,000 lies only around 15 kilometers from the administrative border with Zaporizhzhia Oblast and 20 kilometers from Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, a region so far untouched by Russian occupation The estimated Russian advance at Velyka Novosilka, Donetsk Oblast, as of Jan. 26, 2025, according to DeepState. (DeepState/OpenStreetMaps)If confirmed, this would represent the most significant gain of Russian forces in Donetsk Oblast since overrunning Kurakhove earlier in January The 110th Brigade said that both Russia and Ukraine had parity in equipment but Moscow had significant advantage in manpower Russian forces will struggle to advance their offensive onward The Mokri Yaly River creates an obstacle for Russia’s advance and Russian troops are in a vulnerable "fire pocket," said the brigade Please enable JS and disable any ad blocker Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15 am ET on January 26 ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment Russian forces recently made further advances within Velyka Novosilka amid official Russian claims that Russian forces seized the entire settlement on January 26 Geolocated footage published on January 26 indicates that Russian forces advanced northward along Tsentralana Street in northern Velyka Novosilka.[1] Some Russian sources including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 26 that Russian forces completely seized Velyka Novosilka whereas other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces had seized most of the settlement.[2] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are still clearing Ukrainian forces from the settlement and that Ukrainian forces are still counterattacking in the area.[3] ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces occupy 89 percent of the settlement Russian forces continued offensive operations within and near Velyka Novosilka itself northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozdolne and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on January 25 and 26.[7] The Russian MoD notably is paying an abnormally high amount of fanfare to the claimed Russian seizure of Velyka Novosilka very likely as part of informational efforts to shape Western perceptions of the battlefield situation in Ukraine and degrade international support for Ukraine The Russian MoD posted footage during the day of January 26 purportedly showing Russian forces conducting thermobaric artillery strikes against Ukrainian forces in Velyka Novosilka and claimed that Russian assault groups were clearing Ukrainian positions.[8] The Russian MoD later claimed that elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA] Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet and Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov congratulated the command and personnel of the two brigades for the seizure.[9] The Russian MoD subsequently posted footage purportedly showing Russian flags in multiple areas of the settlement.[10] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA) also participated in the claimed seizure of Velyka Novosilka and it is unclear why the Russian MoD did not credit the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade in their announcements.[11] The Russian MoD has not recently been announcing the claimed seizures of settlements with so much fanfare and as quickly as they did on January 26 Russia is likely trying to leverage the claimed seizure of Velyka Novosilka in order to influence Western perceptions of the situation on the battlefield in Donetsk Oblast to advance narratives that Russian battlefield gains are inevitable and that Ukrainian positions are rapidly deteriorating Russian gains in western Donetsk Oblast continue to be gradual and far below the pace that is normal for modern mechanized warfare it remains unclear whether Russian forces will be able to rapidly advance beyond Velyka Novosilka as it is unclear how much combat power elements of the EMD still retain after several months of continuous offensive operations Velyka Novosilka is located next to several rivers which will likely complicate and hamper further Russian tactical advances in the area.[12] Russian forces have historically struggled with river crossings and tactical terrain features will likely complicate Russian forces' ability to leverage the seizure of Velyka Novosilka to make operationally significant advances in western Donetsk Oblast The seizure and clearing of Velyka Novosilka will likely present opportunities and a decision point to the Russian military command on whether to redeploy elements of the Russian Eastern Military District [EMD] from the Velyka Novosilka area to other priority operational areas Any redeployment of EMD elements from the Velyka Novosilka area over the coming weeks will indicate the Russian military command’s priority operational areas for offensive operations in Spring and Summer 2025 Elements of the Russian EMD have been the primary fighting force in the Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka directions since at least early 2023 defended against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Summer 2023 Velyka Novosilka is protected from Ukrainian counterattack due to the settlement’s disposition near the Mokri Yaly River The Russian military command may opt to retain elements of the EMD in the western Donetsk Oblast area and continue advancing towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary which runs north and west of Velyka Novosilka This decision would indicate that the Russian military is prioritizing advances to the administrative boundary as quickly as possible over other axes of advance in Donetsk Oblast or other frontline areas It remains unclear how much combat power the EMD elements still retain after having engaged in intense operations for over six months The Russian military command could also retain some EMD elements in the Velyka Novosilka area to continue limited attacks and pin Ukrainian forces in the area but redeploy the bulk of the EMD to another frontline area Russian forces are currently intensifying offensive operations in the Kupyansk and Pokrovsk directions and are still working to eliminate the remainder of the Ukrainian salients in the Kurakhove direction and Kursk Oblast Ukrainian officials have also recently warned that Russian forces may also renew offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast in 2025.[15] The Russian military command could redeploy EMD elements to any of these directions and the redeployment of elements of the EMD will be an indicator of the Russian military command's priority areas for Spring and Summer 2025 Russian forces are poised to seize Toretsk in the coming days and a redeployment of elements of the EMD to reinforce the Russian force grouping in the Toretsk direction would indicate a new Russian priority effort to resume attacks in the direction of Kostyantynivka ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely intend to exploit the seizure of Toretsk to push further west and along the T-05-16 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway towards the southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Kostyantynivka.[16] Russian advances in the Toretsk direction have historically been slow as Russian forces fought through built-up urban areas but Russian forces may begin to advance relatively more quickly once they break out of Toretsk into the more open fields west of the settlement Russian forces may also attempt to leverage tactical gains within and near Toretsk and east of Pokrovsk to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk and select Russian milbloggers have recently speculated that Russian forces may be intensifying offensive operations southwest of Toretsk for this purpose.[17] Russian forces may want to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk in order to firm up their southern flank ahead of a push on Kostyantynivka The Russian military command may redeploy elements of the EMD to reinforce offensive operations in the Toretsk direction if it intends to prioritize pressuring the Ukrainian fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast in the Spring and Summer 2025 Seizing Pokrovsk has been the Russian military command’s main operational objective in Donetsk Oblast since February 2024.[18] A Russian redeployment of EMD elements to the Toretsk or Chasiv Yar directions - as opposed to retaining the EMD elements in western Donetsk Oblast redeploying them to the Zaporizhia direction or redeploying them to the Pokrovsk direction - would therefore indicate an inflection in Russian operational priorities Ukrainian forces conducted a second strike on the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan Oblast on the night of January 25 to 26 and ships.[23] Ukrainian forces last struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery on the night of January 23 to 24.[24] We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting in the Ukrainian salient on January 26 Geolocated footage published on January 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in central Pogrebki (north of Sudzha) and in the forested area northwest of Kositsa (northeast of Sudzha).[25] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted counterattacks near Pogrebki.[26] Elements of the Russian 106th and 76th airborne (VDV) divisions including the 76th VDV Division's 234th VDV Regiment are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast; elements of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA] Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Pogrebki; and elements of the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during 2022 partial reserve call up) are reportedly operating near Kositsa (north of Sudzha).[27] Russian sources claimed on January 26 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to cross the Russian-Ukrainian international border towards Tetkino (west of the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast) and some milbloggers characterized the Ukrainian activity as a reconnaissance-in-force mission.[28] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City) Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on January 26 but did not advance.[29] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on January 26 that Ukrainian forces destroyed four Russian infantry fighting vehicles in the Vovchansk direction.[30] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 26 but did not make any confirmed advances so groups of five to eight people cross the river in small boats during the night or foggy weather after which they wait at a concentration point in forested areas for reinforcements to arrive Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Petropavlivka and south of Kupyansk near Hlushkivka on January 25 and 26.[33] Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on January 26 Geolocated footage published on January 26 shows Russian soldiers raising a Russian flag in eastern Tverdokhlibove (southeast of Borova) indicating that Russian forces recently advanced to the eastern part of the settlement and seized Novoyehorivka (just east of Tverdokhlibove).[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in the fields northwest of Novoyehorivka in the fields northwest and west of Makiivka (southeast of Borova) and 400 meters from Makiivka towards Hrekivka (just west of Makiivka).[35] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Borova near Kolisnykivka and Kopanky and in the direction of Shyikivka; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Novoyehorivka on January 25 and 26.[36] The commander for a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kupyansk and Borova directions stated on January 26 that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian advances near Kolisnykivka and toward Zahryzove and that Ukrainian forces destroyed almost all of the equipment that Russian forces used in four mechanized assaults in the area between January 23 to 26.[37] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on January 26 but did not make any confirmed advances A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the outskirts of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman) after repelling Ukrainian counterattacks.[38] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are unsuccessfully trying to enter Kolodyazi in small groups.[39] Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi after which well-trained servicemembers begin attacking Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Zarichne (east of Lyman).[43] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas) or damaged armored vehicles from the front Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on January 26 but did not make any confirmed advances A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to Tsentralna Street in western Chasiv Yar and on the southern outskirts of the settlement but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[46] Russian forces continued ground attacks near Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and towards Novomarkove; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces are hiding and moving around in pipes near the Siverskyi Donets Donbas Canal Elements of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[49] Ukrainian forces recently regained limited positions in Toretsk amid ongoing Russian assaults in the settlement on January 26 Geolocated footage published on January 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently regained limited positions in northwestern Toretsk.[50] A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Toretsk direction reported that Ukrainian forces maintain positions within the administrative boundaries of Toretsk.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing in Krymske (north of Toretsk) and Petrivka (west of Toretsk) but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[52] Russian forces continued assaults near and within Toretsk including near the Toretska Mine in northern Toretsk on January 25 and 26.[53] Elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA] formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) reportedly continue to operate in Toretsk.[54] Russian forces recently marginally advanced west of Pokrovsk amid ongoing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on January 26 and ISW assessed that Russian forces seized the settlement as of January 21.[57] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further west of Kotlyne and seized a nearby mineshaft advanced in the fields south of Udachne (west of Pokrovsk) south of Novoyelyzavetivka (southwest of Pokrovsk) and gained a foothold in eastern and southern Nadiivka (southwest of Pokrovsk) but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[58] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces are attempting to bypass and envelop Yelyzavetivka (east of Pokrovsk).[59] Russian forces continued assault near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Vozdvyzhenka and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Zelene and Zvirove; west of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Kotlyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Novovasylivka and Bohdanivka on January 25 and 26.[60] Elements of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA Central Military District [CMD]) and drone operators of the Russian Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and the "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[61] Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 26 Geolocated footage published on January 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to the eastern outskirts of Dachne (west of Kurakhove).[62] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and south of Sribne (northwest of Kurakhove); into Andriivka (west of Kurakhove); to northern Dachne; and north and northeast of Sukhi Yaly (southwest of Kurakhove).[63] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces attacked after artillery preparation north and south of Ulakly (west of Kurakhove) and advanced as part of efforts to close the Ukrainian pocket in the area.[64] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Kurakhove near Sribne and Shevchenko; west of Kurakhove near Andriivka Kostyantynopil and Dachne; and southwest of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopolske and Ulakly on January 25 and 26.[65] Elements of the Russian 68th Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Dachne; elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) and 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA SMD) are reportedly operating near Andriivka; and elements of the 200th Artillery Brigade (29th CAA Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC EMD) are reportedly operating near the Sukhi Yaly River (southwest of Kurakhove).[66] See topline text for updates on the Velyka Novosilka area Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes) Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported Russian offensive operations in the Zaporizhia direction on January 26 A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Zaporizhia direction stated that Russian forces are using fiber optic drones more frequently.[67] Russian forces continued assaults in the Kherson direction including on Zabych and Kozatskyi islands (southwest and east of Kherson City on January 25 and 26 but did not advance.[68] and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline) Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 25 to 26 The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 72 Shahed and decoy drones from Oryol Krasnodar Krai.[69] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 50 drones over Kyiv and Khmelnytskyi oblasts; that nine decoy drones were “lost” in location likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that one drone was still in the air as of 0900 local time Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones damaged civilian infrastructure in Sumy City overnight and damaged residential buildings and vehicles in Shevchenkivskyi and Osnovyanskyi raions of Kharkiv City overnight and on January 26.[70] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on January 26 that Russian forces launched 1,250 glide bombs and over 220 missiles against Ukraine from January 20 to 26.[71] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed two guided aircraft missiles and 59 other drones over Ukraine from January 20 to 26.[72] Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization) Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian government on January 25 for not prioritizing the recruitment and training of Russia's next generation of military officers One Russian milblogger claimed that current Russian youth are more patriotic than previous generations A third milblogger noted that the Russian military does not pay cadets a livable wage and accused the Russian military command of being careless towards the future of the Russian officer corps.[74] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger noted that the Russian government needs to adjust its youth policies and propaganda.[75] Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine) Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks) citing the heightened risk of severe repercussions.[78] Lukashenko's regime has attempted to minimize the risk of wide-spread protests in recent years including by rescheduling the presidential election from their usual timing in the summer to the winter restricting internet access during the voting period and introducing increasingly repressive policies to disincentivize opposition parties since 2020.[79] The Russian government continues to erode Belarusian sovereignty by increasing its permanent military presence and deploying missile systems in Belarus Lukashenko claimed on January 26 that Russian Oreshnik ballistic missiles would arrive in Belarus “any day now.”[80] Lukashenko claimed that Russia may deploy the Oreshniks to a Belarusian city such as Orsha close to Smolensk City in western Russia.[81] Lukashenko asserted that Russia's deployment of Oreshnik missiles to Belarus is a direct response to US missile deployments in Europe and claimed that the Oreshnik missiles will protect Belarus.[82] Lukashenko likely hopes to assert some form of control over Russia's use of the Oreshnik missiles deployed to Belarus to buttress Belarus’ waning sovereignty but Moscow will likely retain operational control over the missiles and their use ISW continues to assess that the deployment of Oreshnik medium-range ballistic missiles to Belarusian territory does not fundamentally alter Russian military capabilities vis-à-vis Europe and Ukraine as Russia has long maintained weapons systems with similar payloads and longer ranges in Kaliningrad and elsewhere in mainland Russia.[83] Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update [1] https://t.me/ombr_110/428; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8225; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/25056 [2] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61673; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22967; https://t.me/mod_russia/48249 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/63154; https://t.me/rybar/67485 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85150; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31587; https://t.me/yurasumy/20774; https://t.me/milinfolive/140590; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20451; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152575 [3] https://t.me/rybar/67485; https://t.me/milinfolive/140590; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20451 [4] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/933659-ci-okupuvali-rosijski-vijska-veliku-novosilku-na-doneccini/ [7] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20265; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nG3CVrZjCv4Khhww5wZvgvikfy3kuC7b8akFdsqcgbsbBMu1qoAFxQbhceZ9HNAYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EkjXwbSWHv3n66yBGKfpBhkG3vkUSgBU1ivsgkKXWvjdqR8hUvqq3tNQR586GYTel; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4501 [9] https://t.me/mod_russia/48249; https://t.me/mod_russia/48251 [11] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85113; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85127; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85150 [12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-18-2025 [13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2023 [14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar100124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111124 [16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-7-2025 [17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-7-2025 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20779 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22909 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152367 [18] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine [19]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08fzAxCYd6LhXpXHCQx2iWhVRJ44GnmQFd6jDifAM2mm6ieFWMwReR9cY5XNjfoUXl [20] https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1883296910771167659; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/25036; https://x.com/cyber_boroshno/status/1883306551571861671; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/10978 [22] https://t.me/pavelmalkov_official/3809 [23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025 ; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8669 ; [24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025 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ua/2025/01/25/zgorily-pid-kupyanskom-vorozhyj-shturm-zakinchyvsya-znyshhennyam-4-btriv/; https://t.me/ngu_3027/3612 [32] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/26/okupanty-na-chovnah-v-tumani-nashi-vijskovi-poyasnyly-chomu-okupanty-namagayutsya-forsuvaty-oskil-unochi/ [33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20265; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nG3CVrZjCv4Khhww5wZvgvikfy3kuC7b8akFdsqcgbsbBMu1qoAFxQbhceZ9HNAYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EkjXwbSWHv3n66yBGKfpBhkG3vkUSgBU1ivsgkKXWvjdqR8hUvqq3tNQR586GYTel; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4501 [34] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8226; https://t.me/svarkapogruzka/4904 [35] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31589; https://t.me/rybar/67469; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22957   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media/donbas/930803-na-napramku-zavilis-kolisni-vagnerivci-rf-sodenno-sturmue-casiv-ar/ [50] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1883553874805747888; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2585472334976132 [51] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/25/vykonuyut-funkcziyu-prymanky-v-toreczku-kydayut-v-ataky-solyanky-iz-pryrechenyh-na-smert/ [52] https://t.me/dva_majors/63154 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152546 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22955 [53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20265 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nG3CVrZjCv4Khhww5wZvgvikfy3kuC7b8akFdsqcgbsbBMu1qoAFxQbhceZ9HNAYl  ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EkjXwbSWHv3n66yBGKfpBhkG3vkUSgBU1ivsgkKXWvjdqR8hUvqq3tNQR586GYTel ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4501 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22955 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20780 [54] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85122 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13302 [55] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8222; https://t.me/skarlatop/4420 [56] https://youtu.be/iIjUshqoYXE ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/25/pidviz-na-toj-svit-pid-pokrovskom-rosiyany-vezut-svoyu-pihotu-vprytul-do-nashyh-pozyczij/ [57] https://t.me/mod_russia/48246 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2025 [58] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61677 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61671 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31597 ; https://t.me/Sever_Z/9442 [60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20265 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nG3CVrZjCv4Khhww5wZvgvikfy3kuC7b8akFdsqcgbsbBMu1qoAFxQbhceZ9HNAYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EkjXwbSWHv3n66yBGKfpBhkG3vkUSgBU1ivsgkKXWvjdqR8hUvqq3tNQR586GYTel ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4501 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61677 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61671 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61666 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/63154 [61] https://t.me/tass_agency/297676; https://t.me/mod_russia/48243 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/48236; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85129 ; https://t.me/sashakots/51513 [62] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8228; https://t.me/ssternenko/39246 [63] https://t,me/RVvoenkor/85118; https://t.me/rybar/67477; https://t.me/yurasumy/20776; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152546; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30722 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20772 [65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20265 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nG3CVrZjCv4Khhww5wZvgvikfy3kuC7b8akFdsqcgbsbBMu1qoAFxQbhceZ9HNAYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EkjXwbSWHv3n66yBGKfpBhkG3vkUSgBU1ivsgkKXWvjdqR8hUvqq3tNQR586GYTel ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4501; https://t.me/yurasumy/20775; https://t.me/yurasumy/20776; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152481 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[82] https://t.me/tass_agency/297714 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/297704 ; https://t.me/modmilby/44635 [83] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2024 though the outcome was obvious long before that Things became critical early in the new year when Russian troops took over villages immediately to its north-east and west pinching the Ukrainian defenders on three sides By January 23rd the narrow corridor to what had become a nearly-isolated pocket had become impassable The order to retreat came as soon as a mist descended It was a nightmarish task that had to be completed on foot The evidence of triumphant Russian propaganda channels suggests that many failed to make it This article appeared in the Europe section of the print edition under the headline “Danger in Donbas” Discover stories from this section and more in the list of contents George Simion will face Nicusor Dan, a mainstream candidate, in a run-off There are five luxuries it can no longer feasibly afford Friedrich Merz’s career is one of unforced errors and puzzling missteps. But he is serious about Europe Both Donald Trump and Ukraine’s diplomats will consider it a success A Ukrainian serviceman of Azov brigade stands atop of a self-propelled howitzer Dita after firing towards Russian positions at frontline in Donetsk region A Ukrainian self-propelled howitzer Dita of Azov brigade rides to firing position to open fire towards Russian positions at frontline in Donetsk region A Ukrainian serviceman of Azov brigade carries artillery 155mm shell into a self-propelled howitzer Dita before firing towards Russian positions at frontline in Donetsk region A Ukrainian serviceman of Azov brigade loads artillery 155mm shell into a self-propelled howitzer Dita before firing towards Russian positions at frontline in Donetsk region The Russian soldiers were still fighting Ukrainian defenders left in Velyka Novosilka which had around 5,000 residents before the war It was not possible to independently confirm the claim Ukrainian officials made no immediate comment though they recently reported that Russia had increased its troop numbers in the area Velyka Novosilka would be the first significant town to capitulate in 2025 under Russia’s onslaught in Donetsk against Ukraine’s weary and short-handed army The war is set to reach its three-year milestone in February Spokesperson for the Khortytsia Operational-Strategic Group of Troops "Fighting is ongoing on the outskirts of Velyka Novosilka we regularly report on it – both regarding the damage to the enemy there directly and about the enemy trying to advance from there in other directions," Trehubov stated The Spokesperson also commented on the situation in the village of Kotlyne in the Pokrovsk sector "Fighting has been ongoing there for some days," he noted a total of 99 combat engagements between the Ukrainian Defense Forces and the Russian invaders were recorded on the front line The Ukrainian forces repelled 33 enemy assaults on the Pokrovsk axis While citing and using any materials on the Internet links to the website ukrinform.net not lower than the first paragraph are mandatory citing the translated materials of foreign media outlets is possible only if there is a link to the website ukrinform.net and the website of a foreign media outlet Materials marked as "Advertisement" or with a disclaimer reading "The material has been posted in accordance with Part 3 of Article 9 of the Law of Ukraine "On Advertising" No 1996 and the Law of Ukraine "On the Media" No 2023 and on the basis of an agreement/invoice Online media entity; Media identifier - R40-01421 Warehouse strike in Russia ‘destroys 200 Shahed drones’; Ryazan oil refinery hit again Russia on Sunday claimed its troops had captured Velyka Novosilka a strategically important town in the Donetsk region The statement could not be independently verified and Ukraine’s 110th Separate Mechanized Brigade said its troops had only strategically withdrawn from certain parts of Velyka Novosilka to avoid encirclement “This does not mean that we have completely left the city the fighting in Velyka Novosilka continues All actions are aimed at minimising our own losses and maximum damage to the enemy.” The brigade said the withdrawal would make it topographically difficult for Russians to advance by making the river an obstacle any movement is cut off by shells and drones.” Russia also claimed it troops had taken control of the settlement of Zelene in Donetsk region Zelene lies south of Pokrovsk where Russia has incurred mass casualties in a grinding campaign against Ukrainian defenders In its latest Russia-Ukraine war assessment the Institute for the Study of War said: “Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk Ukraine’s military said it destroyed 200 Shahed drones in an attack on warehouses in the Oryol region of Russia There is information about a strong secondary detonation.” Ukraine on Sunday claimed a further successful drone strike on the Ryazan oil refinery south-east of Moscow It was the second attack on the same site in less that two weeks Kyiv said the refinery is one of the four largest in Russia and is used by Moscow’s air force “Explosions and a fire were recorded in the targeted area,” it said The Russian regional governor in Ryazan – Pavel Malkov – said Russian air defence had “destroyed” drones over the region and that authorities were assessing the damage Russian officials routinely falsely claim that all attacking drones were destroyed and any damage was only caused by falling debris An undersea fibre optic cable between Latvia and Sweden was damaged on Sunday, likely as a result of external influence, Latvia said, prompting Nato to deploy patrol ships to the area and triggering a sabotage investigation by Swedish authorities Nato was coordinating military ships and aircraft under its recently deployed mission The effort follows a string of incidents in which power cables telecom links and gas pipelines have been damaged in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 either observed and verified firsthand by the reporter or reported and verified from knowledgeable sources Translations may contain inaccuracies—please refer to the original content Russia is quickly advancing towards the eastern town of Velyka Novosilka as Moscow said its forces had captured two villages in eastern Ukraine on Sunday Moscow has made "rapid advances towards the eastern flank of Velyka Novosilka," the British Defense Ministry said in an intelligence assessment posted to social media on Sunday The town sits in Ukraine's bitterly contested Donetsk region not far from the eastern border of the southern Zaporizhzhia region although this is not internationally recognized and Moscow does not control all of the territory in the regions Ukrainian forces regained territory around Velyka Novosilka during Kyiv's counteroffensive in 2023 likely hoping to then push down towards the southern and Russia has been making consistent gains in the east throughout 2024 including the seizure of the former Ukrainian stronghold of Avdiivka in February Even Ukraine's cross-border push into southern Russia from early August designed to pull resources away from the east and largely deemed quite successfully has failed to fend off consistent Russian advances in Donetsk Russia has advanced at several points in Donetsk as well as west of Avdiivka towards the vital defensive hub of Pokrovsk But it has also pushed in Donetsk close to the Zaporizhzhia border seizing the bastion village of Vuhledar in early October Velyka Novosilka is "now vulnerable to Russian attacks" after Ukraine retreated from Vuhledar roughly 30 kilometers [18 miles] east of Velyka Novosilka The capture of Vuhledar allowed Russia to advance more easily into "less-well-defended areas in western Donetsk," the ministry said Velyka Novosilka is a "linchpin of Ukraine's front line," but Russian forces "are attacking behind established Ukrainian defenses and threatening the primary logistics routes to the town," London said The U.S.-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW) which tracks daily changes to the front line in Ukraine said on Tuesday that Russian forces were "coming closer to enveloping the town of Velyka Novosilka" and were putting Ukraine's supply lines into its Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions in jeopardy In an updated assessment published on Saturday the ISW said Russia had continued attacks near Velyka Novosilka Russia's Defense Ministry said on Sunday that its troops had captured two settlements in Donetsk in the previous 24 hours its forces had seized control of a village in Ukraine's northeastern Kharkiv region has recorded several villages in Donetsk falling under Russian control in recent days and Moscow's advances along several chunks of the front line Ukrainian officials have been warning of a Russian breakthrough in the southern parts of Donetsk for many weeks a spokesperson for the Ukrainian military's forces in the south said in late November that a push from Moscow would likely concentrate around Velyka Novosilka according to comments cited by Ukrainian media Newsweek is committed to challenging conventional wisdom and finding connections in the search for common ground Newsletters in your inbox See all Ukrainian soldiers and Western experts are raising concerns about the cost of last-ditch withdrawals Ukrainian soldiers of the 110th Separate Mechanized Brigade operate a 155mm American Paladin self-propelled howitzer in the direction of Velyka Novosilka in Donetsk Oblast on Jan (Wolfgang Schwan/Anadolu via Getty Images) by Asami TerajimaThrusting forward with their vast manpower advantage Russian troops are gradually penetrating Ukrainian defenses on the western edge of Donetsk Oblast and are close to capturing Velyka Novosilka Located about 15 kilometers east of the neighboring Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, the vital road-junction village was once home to around 5,000 people. It is now facing a similar fate to other Donbas strongholds, where Ukraine's delayed withdrawals resulted in avoidable casualties Russian troops appear to have cut into the center of Velyka Novosilka, likely dividing the town into two and trapping Ukrainian troops in the south according to Pasi Paroinen at the Finland-based open-source intelligence organization Black Bird Group 25 that the southern pocket appears to have just fallen with Ukrainians likely holding onto Velyka Novosilka’s northwestern areas and Russia expected to complete the capture in “days.” The Russian Defense Ministry claimed on Jan 24 that its troops had planted a Russian flag in the center of Velyka Novosilka and that they had split the town in two It is unclear how many Ukrainian troops were trapped inside the southern pocket in Velyka Novosilka but it could be around two or three battalions given the dire manpower situation in Ukraine with only a few hundred troops remaining in total “The question is if it's closer to a thousand or closer to a few hundred and considering how bad the manpower situation is it's probably going to be closer to several hundred,” Paroinen told the Kyiv Independent adding that it is “purely a rough estimate” due to the lack of official information Ukrainian soldiers of the 110th Separate Mechanized Brigade operate a 155mm American Paladin self-propelled howitzer in the direction of Velyka Novosilka in Donetsk Oblast on Jan. 21, 2025. (Wolfgang Schwan/Anadolu via Getty Images)Ukrainian military spokesman Viktor Trehubov said on Jan 23 that the risk of encirclement persists for Ukrainian troops in the Velyka Novosilka area as Russia is attempting to cut off routes into the town with heavy fire He claimed that Ukraine’s military has the situation under control and is working to prevent encirclement "Velyka Novosilka is currently in a difficult situation," Trehubov said on television acknowledging that the town's topography As Ukraine tries to hold onto the Donetsk Oblast strongholds no matter how close Russian troops are to capturing them more Ukrainian soldiers and Western experts are raising concerns about the cost of such decisions Similarly to the situation unfolding in Velyka Novosilka exhausted Ukrainian troops defending the town of Avdiivka — located just outside Russian-occupied Donetsk — were left behind in and around the town multiple surviving soldiers told the Kyiv Independent in February 2024 Two soldiers from the 110th Separate Mechanized Brigade, which is currently defending Velyka Novosilka and facing a similar fate, have recounted how they had to leave behind dozens of their wounded comrades in order to increase their own chances of survival it will be its first notable victory in 2025 Doctors provide medical aid to a wounded serviceman at a front-line stabilization point of the 5th Assault Brigade in the Kramatorsk direction in Donetsk Oblast on Jan (Roman Chop/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images)Russian troops have been on the offensive for more than a year capturing long-time Ukrainian strongholds in Donetsk Oblast Russian troops are gradually pushing Ukrainian forces out of the salient that they control in Russia’s Kursk Oblast the city of Kupiansk in Kharkiv Oblast is facing another Russian offensive Russia’s imminent seizure of Velyka Novosilka comes about a year and a half after Ukraine began a counteroffensive in the summer of 2023 when it tried to liberate villages along the Mokri Yaly River The furthest they advanced was to the village of Urozhaine about 10 kilometers south of Velyka Novosilka with Russia reclaiming all the villages and threatening to advance further Velyka Novosilka’s fall could impact the situation in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts as only open fields lie beyond the village a retired Ukrainian colonel and military analyst But he stressed that it took a long time for Russia to finally come close to capturing Velyka Novosilka and that holding onto the village makes sense because it is exhausting Moscow's resources that could be used elsewhere “(Russian troops) are attacking only on one relatively narrow front line this is the price of holding on,” Hrabskyi told the Kyiv Independent gradually cutting off supply routes for Ukrainian troops He stressed that the sharp contrast in manpower leverage has allowed Moscow to gradually advance despite the cost Russian tactics remain unchanged relying on the continuous deployment of small groups of five to seven assault soldiers until enough troops are gathered to properly advance on a nearby Ukrainian position and it can last for weeks — then this group moves forward," he told the Kyiv Independent "Imagine being two people in a trench with 50 Russian soldiers storming toward you." Ukrainian troops should withdraw earlier to prevent encirclements He called the situation in Velyka Novosilka “a completely self-inflicted situation” caused by Ukrainian mismanagement Either Ukraine's top military leadership is unable to comprehend the brutal reality on the ground or it is “way too slow at making these difficult decisions “This situation could have been foreseen for months,” Paroinen argued stressing that the Russian advance had slowed down for the past two months possibly due to winter weather conditions or potential resource exhaustion “The situation has already been such for a week or so ever since the Russians got into Vremivka,” he added in reference to the potential encirclement Asami Terajima is a reporter at the Kyiv Independent covering Ukrainian military issues She is the co-author of the weekly War Notes newsletter She previously worked as a business reporter for the Kyiv Post focusing on international trade Terajima moved to Ukraine during childhood and completed her bachelor’s degree in Business Administration in the U.S She is the winner of the Thomson Reuters Foundation's Kurt Schork Award in International Journalism 2023 (Local Reporter category) and the George Weidenfeld Prize awarded as part of Germany's Axel Springer Prize 2023 She was also featured in the Media Development Foundation’s “25 under 25: Young and Bold” 2023 list of emerging media makers in Ukraine Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00pm ET on November 25 ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment Russian forces continue to make significant tactical advances in western Donetsk Oblast and are coming closer to enveloping Velyka Novosilka and advancing towards important Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) supplying the rest of western Donetsk Oblast and running into eastern Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts Geolocated footage published on November 24 shows elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA Eastern Military District [EMD]) advancing to the eastern outskirts of Velyka Novosilka (just east of the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area).[1] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also made additional advances northeast and southeast of Velyka Novosilka.[2] Russian EMD elements including of the 2nd Battalion of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA EMD) are reportedly advancing on the outskirts of Velyka Novosilka.[3] Russian forces are also continuing efforts to eliminate the small pocket east of the O0510 Kurakhove-Velyka Novosilka road (southeast of Kurakhove and northeast of Vuhledar) Geolocated footage published on November 25 indicates that elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA] formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) have advanced up to Pobiedy Street in central Kurakhove.[4] Several Russian milbloggers claimed on November 25 that Russian forces seized Romanivka (northeast of Vuhledar) and made additional gains in fields surrounding the settlement.[5] While ISW has not yet observed confirmation of Russian forces operating within Romanivka geolocated footage published on November 24 shows two separate Russian platoon-sized mechanized assaults just east of Romanivka near Illinka and Antonivka indicating that Russian forces advanced towards Romanivka during these assaults.[6] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly conducted the mechanized assault near Antonivka.[7] Russian milbloggers noted that Russian forces in this area are focusing on forcing Ukrainian troops to withdraw westward towards Kostyantynopolske (northwest of Vuhledar).[8] ISW previously assessed on November 24 that the Russian military command has several potential courses of action (COAs) in this sector of the front and Russian gains on November 24 and 25 lend themselves to two of the outlined COAs — the Russian effort to push west along the H15 to the Andriivka-Kostyantynopil line from Kurakhove and the Russian effort to bypass Velyka Novosilka and threaten Ukrainian GLOCs into eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.[9] Russian forces have already seized positions along the H15 road in eastern Kurakhove and will likely use new positions along Pobiedy Street (which runs southward perpendicular to the H15 road) to further interdict and advance westward through Kurakhove and along the H15 towards Dachne and Andriivka (both west of Kurakhove) Recent Russian advances to Pobiedy Street in central Kurakhove place Russian forces about 15km east of Andriivka Such a maneuver could enable Russian forces to seize tactical positions in the area and level the frontline from Sontsivka (northwest of Kurakhove) to Kostyantynopolske placing Russian forces about 23km east of the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border at its closest point Recent Russian advances near Velyka Novosilka are consistent with ISW's November 24 forecast that Russian forces could attempt to envelop Velyka Novosilka via its eastern and northeastern flanks.[11] ISW has not yet observed confirmation that Russian forces have crossed the Kashlahach River directly east of Velyka Novosilka which they would have to do in order to begin fighting within the urban areas of the settlement Russian forces are more likely to advance north of Velyka Novosilka by pushing southwest from Rozdolne towards Novyi Komar and supplement these attacks with advances northward to the west of Velyka Novosilka via Rivnopil Ukraine's loss of Velyka Novosilka would be significant and potentially detrimental to Ukraine's ability to sustain the defense of the nexus between Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts — Ukrainian Volunteer Army Spokesperson Serhiy Bratchuk noted on November 24 that Velyka Novosilka is an important logistics point for Ukrainian troops the seizure of which would allow Russian forces to more actively threaten Hulyaipole and Orikhiv (both in Zaporizhia Oblast southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[12] The seizure of Velyka Novosilka would also afford Russian forces a stronger position from which to attack into southeasternmost Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[13] Russian advances in western Donetsk Oblast may become operationally significant if the Russian command properly exploits these recent tactical successes Russian advances in western Donetsk Oblast do not automatically portend the collapse of the Ukrainian frontline Recent Russian mechanized assaults with elements of the SMD northeast of Vuhledar appear to cohere with EMD mechanized assaults near Velyka Novosilka further supporting ISW's assessment that elements of the EMD and SMD are currently conducting mutually supportive offensive operations in this sector of western Donetsk Oblast.[14] Russian forces' ability to further advance towards the Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblast borders will in large part be contingent on whether Russian EMD and SMD command elements continue to successfully coordinate combat operations on their respective sectors of the front even if Russian forces are able to achieve all the operational COAs outlined above Russian forces would need to seize over 8,000 square kilometers of territory to achieve Moscow’s self-defined objective of seizing the entirety of Donetsk Oblast.[15] Potential Russian advances into southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast given historical data about Russian offensive performance are unlikely to be immediately rapid or threaten major Ukrainian military objects or large cities in the winter 2024-2025 campaign season The Ukrainian theater is large and Russian tactical gains in western Donetsk Oblast should not cause undue panic in the short-term Russian gains remain tactical and Russian forces have not restored operational maneuver to the battlefield yet The current Russian advances may fall short of their operational objectives as did initial Russian frontal assaults against Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk earlier in 2024 Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil depot in Kaluga Oblast and an airbase in Kursk Oblast on the night of November 24 to 25 The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 25 that units of Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and the Ukrainian Armed Forces struck several important Russian assets in Bryansk and Kaluga oblasts on the night of November 24 to 25 and Russian milbloggers acknowledged the strike but claimed that Ukrainian forces did not significantly damage the airfield.[20] A Russian insider source posted a photo claiming to show that a Ukrainian ATACMS strike recently destroyed the radar system of a Russian S-400 air defense system near Bolshoe Zhirovo (northwest of Kursk City) Kursk Oblast following Ukrainian reporting about the S-400 strike on November 24.[21] Ukrainian military officials continue to warn of potential Russian ground operations against Zaporizhzhia City though the timeline and scale of this offensive operation remain unclear due to the operational constraints imposed by ongoing Russian operations in Kursk and Donetsk oblasts reported on November 24 that Russian forces are preparing for a future offensive operation with up to 130,000 personnel on Zaporizhzhia City which is 30 kilometers from the current frontline although the date of this forecasted operation is unknown.[22] A Ukrainian brigade commander stated that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast halted initial Russian plans for an assault on Zaporizhzhia City and that the Russian military command redeployed nearly half of the 20,000-30,000 Russian troops initially slated for the offensive in Zaporizhia Oblast to Kursk Oblast The battalion commander noted that continued Russian effort in Kursk may delay an offensive on Zaporizhzhia City but that Russian forces may also conduct the attack with a smaller force grouping than originally intended and are preparing to conduct intensified assaults in these areas.[27] ISW also observed intensifications of Russian activity near Kamyanske in early October 2024.[28] Ukrainian Volunteer Army Spokesperson Serhiy Bratchuk downplayed reports on November 24 of a possible Russian ground offensive on Zaporizhzhia City noting instead the persistent threat of Russian airstrikes along the southern frontline is aimed at spreading fear among Ukrainian civilians.[29] Bratchuk addressed concerns of Russian preparations in this area by disclosing that Ukrainian forces have observed Russian units being transferred away from the Zaporizhzhia direction to the Kurakhove-Pokrovsk line in Donetsk Oblast for ongoing offensive operations ISW is unable to independently confirm the large-scale redeployment of Russian troops at this time North Korea is reportedly expanding a key weapons facility likely used to supply Russia with ballistic missiles citing satellite imagery findings from a US-based think tank reported on November 25 that North Korea is expanding its only weapons facility that assembles KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles which Russia uses in Ukraine.[30] CNN reported on November 23 that about 60 of the total 194 ballistic missiles that Russia launched against Ukraine so far in 2024 were North Korean-supplied KN-23s.[31] ISW continues to observe increased North Korean support for Russia's war effort through the deployment of North Korean troops to the theater of war and the provision of ammunition and weapons.[32] The Kremlin signaled that it would remove the Taliban from its list of prohibited organizations amid intensified Russia-Taliban rapprochement Afghan and Russian news outlets reported on November 25 that Russian Security Council Secretary General Sergei Shoigu stated that the Kremlin will soon remove the Taliban from its list of "terrorist organizations" during a meeting with the Deputy Prime Minister of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and a Taliban delegation.[33] ISW previously observed that the Kremlin has maintained direct contact with the Taliban since the Taliban took power in Afghanistan in 2021 although more explicit Russian recognition of the Taliban as the legitimate Afghan government will likely enhance Russia-Taliban cooperation.[34] Russia has recently intensified outreach to the Taliban in large part to leverage the Taliban's control of the Afghan government to degrade the Taliban's regional adversary the Afghanistan-based Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP).[35] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced within the Kursk Oblast salient on November 25 but ISW has not observed confirmation of any claimed Russian advances in the area Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating southeast of Korenevo are continuing to clear Ukrainian forces from Darino and are advancing near Tolsty Lug and in the direction of Nizhny Klin.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced near Cherkasskoye Porechnoye (northeast of Sudzha) and Plekhovo (southeast of Sudzha).[37] ISW has not yet observed concrete evidence of Russian advances in any of these areas Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked from Leonidovo towards Novoivanovka (both southeast of Korenevo) and near Novaya Sorochina and west of Pogrebki (both northwest of Sudzha).[38] Elements of the 2nd Battalion of the 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly advancing near Darino while elements of the 155th and 810th naval infantry brigades (Pacific Fleet and Black Sea Fleet respectively) are operating throughout Kursk Oblast.[39] Ukrainian military sources posted footage on November 22 of a Ukrainian strike on a temporarily repaired Russian crossing over the Seym River near Karizh (in Glushkovsky Raion west of the main Kursk Oblast salient).[40] Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces used an American-provided GDU-39 Small Diameter Bomb to conduct the strike which also hit a Russian military vehicle as it was crossing the bridge Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City) Russian forces slightly intensified cross-border assaults northwest of Kharkiv City amid continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City on November 24 and 25 but did not make any confirmed advances The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted offensive operations near the international border northwest of Kharkiv City near Kozacha Lopan and Kudiivka and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Tykhe on November 24 and 25.[41] Russian cross-border raids likely aim to fix Ukrainian forces along the international border in northern Kharkiv Oblast and force Ukraine to redeploy forces from Kursk Oblast where Russian forces are currently conducting intensified offensive operations to regain lost positions Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) Russian forces reportedly crossed the Oskil River north of Kupyansk amid continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on November 24 and 25 but ISW has not yet observed confirmation of these claimed Russian advances Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces crossed to the west (right) bank of the Oskil River in boats and captured a foothold on the right bank south of Novomlynsk (north of Kupyansk).[42] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Senkove (south of Kupyansk on the west bank of the Oskil River) suggesting that Russian forces may have intensified efforts to cross the Oskil River south of Kupyansk near the Kruhlyakivka-Kolisnykivka salient.[43] ISW has not observed any confirmed Russian advances across the Oksil River either south of Novomlynsk or near Senkove A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attacking near the feed mill Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kupyansk near Novomlynsk and Holubivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Kruhlyakivka; and south of Kupyansk near Senkove.[46] Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line on November 24 and 25 but did not make any confirmed advances A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into the fields east of Terny and Yampolivka (both west of Kreminna).[47] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim The milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian artillery and drones are preventing Russian mechanized assaults in the Lyman (west of Kreminna) direction and inhibiting Russian forces from advancing further towards Yampolivka Russian forces continued ground attacks west of Svatove near Pershotravneve Vyshneve and Zelenyi Hai; southwest of Svatove near Novoyehorivka and Hrekivka; west of Kreminna near Yampolivka and Torske; and south of Kreminna near Serebryanka.[48] Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA) (Moscow Military District [MMD]) continue to operate near Kopanky (west of Svatove).[49] Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA] MMD) are reportedly operating near the southeastern outskirts of Terny.[50] Drone operators of the Russian "Okhotnik" (Hunter) drone detachment (164th Motorized Rifle Brigade Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kreminna forest area.[51] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Siversk direction on November 24 and 25 Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on November 24 and 25 but did not make confirmed advances Russian sources claimed that elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Brigade are fighting in Chasiv Yar’s industrial area but that it is unclear if they secured some unspecified positions at the factory.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near a stadium in Chasiv Yar are occasionally entering the industrial area and seized a quarry near Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[53] ISW has not observed visual evidence confirming these maximalist claims such as the RBU-6000 Smerch anti-submarine rocket launcher.[56] Drone operators of the "Okhotnik" (Hunter) Spetsnaz Detachment (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA] formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic's [DNR] 1st Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[57] Russian forces recently advanced in southwestern Toretsk amid ongoing Russian offensive operations on November 24 and 25 Russian sources claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced south and southeast of Pokrovsk amid continued Russian offensive operations in this area on November 25 Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced east and northeast of Pushkine (south of Pokrovsk) east of and in central Zhovte (northeast of Pushkine) and west of Pustynka (northeast of Pushkine).[62] ISW cannot independently verify these claims Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn reported that Ukrainian minefields have destroyed 30 percent of Russian military equipment during recent assaults in the Pokrovsk direction.[65] Russian forces reportedly conducted offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and south of Pokrovsk near Hryhorivka See topline text for reporting on Russian activity in the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions and the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes) Russian forces continued assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Novoandriivka (northwest of Robotyne) on November 25 but did not make confirmed advances.[67] Russian milbloggers reiterated claims that Russian forces advanced towards Orikhiv (north of Robotyne) and into Bilohirya (northeast of Robotyne) but ISW has still not observed confirmation of these claims.[68] Elements of the Russian 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[69] Russian forces continued assaults in the Dnipro direction in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on November 24 and 25 Bratchuk noted that Russian forces are struggling to advance across the Dnipro River in part because the Russian military command has redeployed units and reserves from the Kherson direction to the Kurakhove and Pokrovsk directions in Donetsk Oblast Ukraine’s Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated that the Russian military command is concentrating elements of Russia’s Northern Fleet near the Tendrivska Spit in Kherson Oblast and the Kinburn Spits in Mykolaiv Oblast to defend against Ukrainian raids and attacks in the area.[72] Both spits jut into the northwestern corner of the Black Sea and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline) Russian forces conducted a large series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 24 to 25 The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 145 Shahed drones and other unspecified drones Krasnodar Krai after 1830 local time on the night of November 24 and that Ukrainian forces downed 71 drones over Kyiv and Kherson oblasts as of 1100 local time on November 25.[73] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that 71 Russian drones became "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference and that another drone flew into Belarusian air space Ukrainian officials reported that Russian missiles and drones struck Kharkiv damaging residential areas and injuring civilians.[74] The Ukrainian Air Force warned on November 25 that Russian forces increasingly using Shahed drones during the day after previously mainly relying on these drones at night.[75] Russian milbloggers claimed that a Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile destroyed an F-16 fighter jet at an airfield in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast but ISW has not observed independent confirmation of this claim.[76] Independent Belarusian monitoring group Hajun Project reported on November 25 that 38 Russian Shahed drones entered Belarusian airspace on November 24 and 25 - a record number of Russian drones violating Belarusian airspace.[77] The Hajun Project reported that at least one Russian drone flew to Mozyr several briefly crossed into Belarusian airspace on their way to Ukraine and at least three drones flew into Gomel Oblast The Hajun Project reported that Belarusian forces downed at least one drone and sortied aircraft four times in response to the airspace violation acknowledged on November 24 and 25 that Russia’s November 21 Oreshnik ballistic missile strike did not significantly damage the Pivdenmash factory in Dnipro City Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[78] The Kremlin has attempted to oversell the impact of the Oreshnik missile on Russia’s strike capabilities in recent days.[79] Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization) Russian authorities continue to incentivize service in Ukraine through one-time payment offers in a likely effort to avoid conducting another partial involuntary reserve callup in Russia Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree extending one-time payments amounting to 400,00 rubles (about $3,846) to Rosgvardia personnel if they sign service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to serve in Ukraine.[80] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 25 that Russian command posts are relying on Chinese-made radios for internal communications as Russia cannot domestically produce enough quality radios for the Russian military.[81] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces heavily relied on cellular and internet communications at the onset of the war in Ukraine and failed to develop a unified and secure communication system The milblogger highlighted that many Russian personnel either lacked domestically produced "Azart" radios or did not know how to use them The milblogger claimed that frontline communications have relied almost entirely on Chinese radios for an unspecified time and their Russian analogs although Ukrainian forces frequently intercept and monitor these devices The milblogger noted that Russian domestic radios are less common and underproduced partly due to sanctions and quality control issues Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine) Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus) Belarusian military sources emphasized Belarus' modernization efforts Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin stated on November 25 that the Belarusian military accepted over 60 new models of weapons and equipment into service so far in 2024.[82] Khrenin also reported that the Belarusian military is focusing on developing tactical techniques based on modern wars The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that the Belarusian Armed Forces are currently developing updated command and control (C2) systems [1] https://x.com/vosintt/status/1861053758857208132; https://x.com/vosintt/status/1861053762338513242; https://x.com/vosintt/status/1861053765677203840; 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https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029edXUsuEe3L1ZD2FAQ9VBh2HYpFB8a4ehnQDXAiKETrM9n2spaiTk7tXwkuZpgefl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02khFQEw2bTBUtaKdTG5bnL1fd91kptkXiY1MwBWxPnhRshAiCGMmxp5ivaNW6LgJPl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TC2ogw1fL8SAZBZ4mtf5VQqtz9oW5F9J4fhuq2xi6EPVcs3KDWD9fzf24prBc3HUl [48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029edXUsuEe3L1ZD2FAQ9VBh2HYpFB8a4ehnQDXAiKETrM9n2spaiTk7tXwkuZpgefl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TC2ogw1fL8SAZBZ4mtf5VQqtz9oW5F9J4fhuq2xi6EPVcs3KDWD9fzf24prBc3HUl; https://t.me/dva_majors/58532; https://t.me/rybar/65672; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02khFQEw2bTBUtaKdTG5bnL1fd91kptkXiY1MwBWxPnhRshAiCGMmxp5ivaNW6LgJPl [49] https://t.me/ab3army/4919 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/15296; https://t.me/ab3army/4919 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1861001168140337619; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2024 [52] https://t.me/motopatriot/29810; https://t.me/motopatriot/29819; https://t.me/tass_agency/287158; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19874; https://t.me/wargonzo/23331 [54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029edXUsuEe3L1ZD2FAQ9VBh2HYpFB8a4ehnQDXAiKETrM9n2spaiTk7tXwkuZpgefl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TC2ogw1fL8SAZBZ4mtf5VQqtz9oW5F9J4fhuq2xi6EPVcs3KDWD9fzf24prBc3HUl; [55] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDXWlQ2K0dM; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/887643-situacia-v-casovomu-aru-zagrozliva-recnica-otu-lugansk/; [56] https://t.me/fifthbrUA/612; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/25/morskyj-bombomet-u-stepah-ukrayiny-na-donechchyni-znyshhyly-ridkisnu-vorozhu-ustanovku-zalpovogo-vognyu/ [58] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1861005597623165390; https://www.tiktok.com/@oleksander1313/video/7441108217674911008 [59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TC2ogw1fL8SAZBZ4mtf5VQqtz9oW5F9J4fhuq2xi6EPVcs3KDWD9fzf24prBc3HUl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02khFQEw2bTBUtaKdTG5bnL1fd91kptkXiY1MwBWxPnhRshAiCGMmxp5ivaNW6LgJPl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029edXUsuEe3L1ZD2FAQ9VBh2HYpFB8a4ehnQDXAiKETrM9n2spaiTk7tXwkuZpgefl [60] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/887643-situacia-v-casovomu-aru-zagrozliva-recnica-otu-lugansk/ [62] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29781; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29781; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81302; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29781; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29781; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81302; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81319; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81319 [63] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/24/try-termobary-na-blindazh-mercziv-nashi-shturmovyky-pokazala-staru-shkolu/ ; https://t.me/skalabatalion/449 [65] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/25/30-vorozhoyi-tehniky-znyshhuyetsya-pid-chas-shturmiv-minamy-tehnoczyd-vorozhyh-koles-na-donbasi-prodovzhuyetsya/ [66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029edXUsuEe3L1ZD2FAQ9VBh2HYpFB8a4ehnQDXAiKETrM9n2spaiTk7tXwkuZpgefl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02khFQEw2bTBUtaKdTG5bnL1fd91kptkXiY1MwBWxPnhRshAiCGMmxp5ivaNW6LgJPl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TC2ogw1fL8SAZBZ4mtf5VQqtz9oW5F9J4fhuq2xi6EPVcs3KDWD9fzf24prBc3HUl; https://t.me/rybar/65674; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81302 [67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029edXUsuEe3L1ZD2FAQ9VBh2HYpFB8a4ehnQDXAiKETrM9n2spaiTk7tXwkuZpgefl [68] https://t.me/dva_majors/58532 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/23331 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-24-2024 [70] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029edXUsuEe3L1ZD2FAQ9VBh2HYpFB8a4ehnQDXAiKETrM9n2spaiTk7tXwkuZpgefl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TC2ogw1fL8SAZBZ4mtf5VQqtz9oW5F9J4fhuq2xi6EPVcs3KDWD9fzf24prBc3HUl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02khFQEw2bTBUtaKdTG5bnL1fd91kptkXiY1MwBWxPnhRshAiCGMmxp5ivaNW6LgJPl [71] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/24/u-sylah-oborony-ukrayiny-rozpovily-pro-blakytni-mriyi-rosiyan-na-prydniprovskomu-napryamku/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1SQtlWVy2AM [72] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/24/rosiyany-boyatsya-shho-zsu-forsuvatymut-dnipro-vystavyly-svij-syevyernyj-flot/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JYRsTCB1Pq4 [73] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02e9k6zfKmNHHcWnSnq3ti9xu6r2kPv7DfwAcnoPriKNQHpo2gaNduoKykm6C7mjcDl [74] https://t.me/synegubov/12218 ; https://t.me/synegubov/12233 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/11/25/rossiyskie-voyska-nanesli-udar-po-harkovu-postradali-10-chelovek ; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/9659 ; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/35720; https://t.me/odeskaODA/7682 ; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/35726 [75] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02e9k6zfKmNHHcWnSnq3ti9xu6r2kPv7DfwAcnoPriKNQHpo2gaNduoKykm6C7mjcDl [76] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19847 ; https://podolyaka dot ru/udar-po-dnepropetrovskomu-aeroportu-pervyy-zadokumentirovannyy-sluchay-unichtozheniya-f-16/ [77] https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/38-rosijskyh-droniv-shahed-zajshly-do-bilorusi-v-period-z-24-do-25-lystopada/; https://t.me/Hajun_BY/8239 [78] https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/195830 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/58514 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/145447 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/20670 [79] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112224 [80] https://t.me/tass_agency/287255 https://t.me/sotaproject/90364 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81340 [81] https://t.me/zhivoff/18139; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60297 Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30am ET on November 24 ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment Russian forces’ recent confirmed battlefield gains near Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka demonstrate that the war in Ukraine is not stalemated The frontline in Donetsk Oblast is becoming increasingly fluid as Russian forces recently have been advancing at a significantly quicker rate than they did in the entirety of 2023 Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on November 24 that Russian forces have seized Katerynivka and likely Romanivka (all northeast of Vuhledar along the C051104 highway) and geolocated footage published on November 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to the eastern outskirts of Yelizavetivka.[1] Additional geolocated footage published on November 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to central Trudove (north of Vuhledar).[2] Russian forces also made recent confirmed advances in the Velyka Novosilka area as geolocated footage published on November 23 and 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka Novosilka) and to western Novodarivka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[3] Russian forces have significantly increased the tempo of their advances in the Pokrovsk and Velyka Novosilka directions since September 1 having gained at least 1,103 square kilometers in these areas since September 1 only gained 387 square kilometers in all of 2023 due to Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive Russian forces’ advances in southeastern Ukraine are largely the result of the discovery and tactical exploitation of vulnerabilities in Ukraine’s lines tactical advances in southeastern Ukraine since Fall 2024 Russian forces notably have not been able to restore operational maneuver seen during the initial months of Russia's full-scale invasion although quicker now than in the months of positional warfare that characterized most of 2023 and early 2024 are still far below the Russian rate of advance in March 2022.[4] Russian forces have succeeded in taking advantage of the seizure of Vuhledar for further offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast contrary to an incorrect previous ISW assessment that forecasted otherwise.[5] ISW presents the following courses of action (COAs) that the Russian command may be considering given Russian forces’ recent advances and Velyka Novosilka directions present the Russian military command with several courses of action (COAs) that the Russian command may attempt in the coming weeks and months The Russian military command appears to be simultaneously attempting to encircle Velyka Novosilka while closing pockets with Ukrainian forces north and south of Kurakhove Russian forces are also pursuing supporting COAs to improve Russia’s battlefield geometry in southern Donetsk Oblast and reduce threats to Russian flanks ISW presents the following COAs in no particular order and none of these COAs are mutually exclusive It remains unclear which of the COAs the Russian command will pursue None of the COAs in this analysis were part of the Russian command’s initial objectives for its Fall 2024/Winter 2024-2025 campaign in Donetsk Oblast The COAs have only emerged as possibilities following the Russian seizure of Vuhledar in October 2024 and tactical advances south of Pokrovsk and near Velyka Novosilka The Russian command’s self-identified priority in Donetsk Oblast in late 2024 was the seizure of Pokrovsk – an objective the Russian command temporarily abandoned following stiff Ukrainian resistance on Pokrovsk’s outskirts.[13] It is unclear how much advance preparation the Russian command has undertaken to exploit opportunities in this area of operations or what kind of resistance Ukrainian forces will provide as Russian forces advance Ukraine notably blunted Russian offensive operations near Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk in 2024 The Russian military command is likely planning on how to advance into the southeasternmost part of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in support of Russia's longstanding objective to seize all of Donetsk Oblast The Kremlin’s stated objective of seizing all of Donetsk Oblast very likely presupposes ground operations in southern and eastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop these Ukrainian positions Russian forces are geographically close to Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and may advance north into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to envelop Ukrainian forces in southwestern Donetsk Oblast (The Russian Forward Line of Own Troops near Novodarivka is eight kilometers from the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary as of November 24 could eventually force Ukrainian forces from the areas southwest of Pokrovsk and west and northeast of Velyka Novosilka The Russian military would likely first have to successfully envelop or bypass Velyka Novosilka in order to interdict the T0518 Bahatyr-Velyka Novosilka highway – a significant undertaking that Russian forces may not be able to achieve Russian forces may attempt to leverage water features as natural barriers to advance north along the Vorona River (just west of Velyka Novosilka) toward Velykomykhailivka Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (just east of the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border) from the Rivnopil area (just east of the Vorona River) Russian forces may also try to advance along the Mokri Yaly River which runs through and north of Velyka Novosilka Dnipropetrovsk Oblast following a potential future Russian envelopment of Velyka Novosilka Russian forces could leverage these advances into the southeasternmost parts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to support operations to seize territory in southwestern Donetsk Oblast Such a development would likely not be part of a direct drive against the interior of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in the short-to-medium term though the Kremlin likely seeks to eventually seize significant territory in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast as well Russian milbloggers have recently reignited calls for Russian forces to advance toward southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast from the Velyka Novosilka area in order to pressure the Pokrovsk-Kurakhove area from the west.[14] Potential Russian efforts to secure the Kremlin's objective of seizing the entirety of Donetsk Oblast by occupying at least part of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast are consistent with Russia's commitment to pursuing Ukraine's total capitulation and destroying Ukraine's independence and territorial sovereignty reported on November 20 that Interfax Ukraine viewed a Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) document outlining Russia's objectives of partitioning Ukraine into three different parts: one acknowledging the full Russian annexation of occupied Luhansk and Kherson oblasts and occupied Crimea; another establishing a pro-Russian puppet state centered in Kyiv under Russian military occupation; and a third part designating Ukraine's western regions as "disputed territories" to be divided among Ukraine's westernmost neighboring countries.[15] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is notably not one of the four Ukrainian oblasts that the Kremlin has illegally annexed – for now The Russian military may leverage limited advances into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to set conditions for future operations to militarily occupy Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and other regions of eastern and central Ukraine in the long-term mutually supportive offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast and have recently made relatively rapid tactical advances The Russian military command may be learning from some battlefield mistakes after three years of war but the extent of this learning is currently unclear and northeast of Velyka Novosilka.[16] This array of Russian forces to mutually supportive offensive operations represents an inflection in how Russian forces have conducted offensive efforts so far in this war often hindering advances during dedicated offensive efforts.[19] The Russian military command appears to be planning more complex operations but Russian forces have yet to be able to restore operational maneuver to the battlefield and are instead still relying on their ability to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in the Ukrainian defensive lines to make gradual and Velyka Novosilka directions in recent weeks have prioritized efforts to exploit Ukrainian vulnerabilities to envelop or encircle Ukrainian forces from the flanks over direct frontal assaults against Ukrainian positions Russian forces along the Pokrovsk-Kurakhove-Velyka Novosilka line have not restored operational maneuver to the battlefield and are making these relatively rapid gains in highly attritional offensive operations-- resulting in personnel and equipment casualties that Russian forces cannot sustain in the medium- or long-term.[20] United Kingdom (UK) Defense Secretary John Healey stated on November 9 that Russian casualty rates in October 2024 reached about 1,345 personnel per day and Russian forces may have suffered roughly 80,110 casualties alone in September and October 2024.[21] Data compiled by Oryx founder Jakub Janovsky indicates that Russian forces also lost 197 tanks and 65 artillery systems larger than 100mm throughout the frontline in September and October 2024 and Russian forces are likely to run out of armored vehicles from Soviet-era stockpiles in mid-2025 or 2026.[22] Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-400 air defense system radar in an unspecified area in Kursk Oblast on the night of November 23 to 24 The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck positions of the Russian 1490th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA] Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and a S-400 radar in Kursk Oblast.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that elements of the 1490th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment conduct ground-to-ground strikes against stationary Ukrainian targets Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov claimed that Russian forces downed 24 Ukrainian drones and two missiles over Kursk Oblast on the night of November 23 to 24.[24] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces used US-provided ATACMS missiles in the strike but ISW cannot independently confirm these claims and has not observed official confirmation of these Russian claims.[25] Russia's S-400 air defense systems comprise part of Russia's air defense umbrella which facilitates Russian long-range air- and ground-based strikes against Ukraine Weakening Russia's air defense umbrella is key to Ukraine's defense and efforts to eliminate Russia's ability to use sanctuary space within Russia to launch strikes Further degradation of Russia's air defense umbrella will enable more effective combined Ukrainian strike packages against Russian military objects and enable Ukrainian fixed-wing aircraft to more freely operate Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on November 24 that Ukrainian drones crashed near Belorechensk roughly 13 kilometers from the Russian military's Khanskaya Air Base in Adygea Republic.[26] Astra also reported on November 24 that sources in Kaluga Oblast's emergency services stated that a Ukrainian drone struck a Rosneft oil depot in Kaluga Oblast on November 22 and damaged several empty oil tanks.[27] Russia reportedly recruited hundreds of Yemeni nationals to fight in the Russian military amid growing cooperation between Russia NOTE: A version of this text appears in the September 24 ISW-CTP Iran Update Financial Times (FT) reported on November 24 that Houthi-affiliated intermediaries recruited "hundreds" of Yemeni men beginning as early as July 2024 to travel to Russia after promising them lucrative jobs in the "security" and "engineering" fields and eventual Russian citizenship.[28] Russian authorities reportedly instead forcibly conscripted the largely inexperienced recruits into the Russian army and sent them to fight in the war upon their arrival in Russia FT also highlighted growing ties between the Kremlin and the Houthis citing US Special Envoy for Yemen Tim Lenderking who confirmed that Russia is actively engaging with the Houthis and discussing weapons transfers ISW has assessed that the Kremlin has in part sought to offset heavy battlefield losses and personnel shortages by enlisting migrants and foreign nationals while avoiding another partial involuntary reserve callup in Russia.[29] ISW also observed growing engagement between Kremlin officials and Houthis amid enhanced Russia-Iran cooperation and Iranian support for the Russian war effort in Ukraine.[30] Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting in the area on November 24 Geolocated footage published on November 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha).[31] Additional geolocated footage published on November 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Zeleny Shlyakh (southeast of Korenevo).[32] Russian sources continued to claim that elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) seized Darino (southeast of Korenevo) although one Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have not completely cleared the settlement and that Ukrainian forces are still operating in the area.[33] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued southeast of Korenevo near Nikolayevo-Darino; north of Sudzha near Plekhovo; near Sudzha itself; and southeast of Sudzha near Plekhovo and Pogrebki.[34] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in Kursk Oblast.[35] Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City on November 23 and 24 near Vovchansk and Tykhe (east of Vovchansk) but did not make any confirmed advances.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked with armored vehicles toward Zhuravlevka Belgorod Oblast (just across the border from Vysoka Yaruha) but ISW has not observed any other sources making this claim.[37] Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk amid continued offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 24 Geolocated footage published on November 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in fields south of Lozova (southeast of Kupyansk).[38] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces occupy half of Kopanky and Pershotravneve (both southeast of Kupyansk) and advanced within eastern Kupyansk 2.5 kilometers towards Borova (south of Kupyansk) and one kilometer towards central Terny (northwest of Kreminna).[39] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Novomlynsk; south of Kupyansk near Novoplatonivka and towards Senkove; southeast of Kupyansk near Lozova Kruhlyakivka; west of Svatove near Kopanky and Zeleny Hai; northwest of Kreminna near Druzhelyubivka and Tverdokhlibove; west of Kreminna near Torske; and southwest of Kreminna near Serebryanka on November 23 and 24.[40] Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk) on November 23 and 24 but did not make any confirmed advances.[41] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on November 24 but did not advance Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on November 23 and 24.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are trying to bypass the refractory plant in central Chasiv Yar from the south.[43] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division including of its 215th Reconnaissance Battalion; the 78th "Sever-Akhmat" Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division Southern Military District [SMD]); and the 4th Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd CAA formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[44] Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk on November 24 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on November 23 and 24.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces occupy the eastern one-third of the Zabalka Microraion (southern Toretsk) but that the rest remains a contested "semi-gray zone."[46] Elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly operating in Toretsk.[47] Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on November 24 Geolocated footage published on November 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to Zhovte and west of Yurivka (both south of Pokrovsk) but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[49] Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Myrnohrad and southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on November 24 Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Kurakhove near Novodmytrivka and Zorya; near Kurakhove; north of Kurakhove near Beretsky; and south of Kuarkhove near Dalne on November 23 and 24.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces almost completely occupy Zorya and Berestky but that Ukrainian forces maintain positions to the north and south of Zorya and in the dachas near Beretsky.[52] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are still in northern Berestky.[53] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Kurakhove.[54] See topline text for analysis of recent confirmed Russian advances near Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Vuhledar near Romanivka and Antonivka; north of Vuhledar near Trudove and Kostyantynopolske; and northwest of Vuhledar near Sukhi Yaly on November 23 and 24.[55] Elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA SMD) are reportedly operating near Illinka (northwest of Vuhledar) and elements of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Military Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) and 200th Artillery Brigade (29th CAA Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Sukhi Yaly.[56] Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozdolne; near Velyka Novosilka itself; south of Velyka Novosilka near Makarivka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novodarivka and Rivnopil on November 23 and 24.[57] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that reports that battles have started for Velyka Novosilka are unconfirmed.[58] Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet EMD) are reportedly operating near Rozdolne; elements of the 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA EMD) are reportedly operating in Makarivka (south of Velyka Novosilka); and elements of the 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA EMD) are reportedly operating near Velyka Novosilka.[59] Russian and Ukrainian sources did not report any ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on November 24 Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA] Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Polohy (Hulyaipole) direction and drone operators of the Russian 63rd Separate Spetsnaz Company (35th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Ternuvate (northwest of Hulyaipole).[60] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced roughly two kilometers near Mala Tokmachka and are advancing within Bilohirya (both northeast of Robotyne) but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[61] Ukrainian Southern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reiterated recent warnings that Russian forces are preparing assault groups for intensified localized operations in the Orikhiv and Hulyaipole directions.[62] Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on November 23 and 24.[63] The Ukrainian Crimea-based "Atesh" partisan group reported on November 24 that Russian forces deployed an unspecified number of S-300 air defense batteries near the military base in occupied Fiolent (south of Sevastopol) where the Russian 25th Coastal Missile Battalion (11th Separate Coastal Missile Brigade Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) and 26th Naval Radiotechnical Battalion are located.[64] Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on November 23 to 24 The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 73 Shahed drones and other unspecified strike drones (likely referring to decoy drones) from Oryol and Bryansk oblasts on the night of November 23 to 24.[65] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defense downed 50 drones over Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast Administration Head Ruslan Kravchenko stated that drone debris damaged an unspecified industrial enterprise in Kyiv Oblast.[68] CNN reported on November 23 that about 60 of the total 194 ballistic missiles that Russia launched against Ukraine so far in 2024 were North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles.[69] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on November 24 that Russian forces used more than 800 glided guide bombs and more than 20 missiles of various types to strike Ukraine in the past week (November 18 to 24).[70] See topline text for updates on Russian mobilization and force generation efforts Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus) [1] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7615; https://t.me/opforukraine/60; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2368 [2] https://t.me/immitis71/735; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7611 [3] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7617; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/11798; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1860712512208977936 ; https://t.me/morpex_V/3565; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7608 [4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29-2024 [5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11-2024 [6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11-2024; https://t.me/morpex_V/3565; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7608 [7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-23-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2024 [8] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7550; https://t.me/voin_dv/11908; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-13-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-19-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2024; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7617; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/11798; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1860712512208977936 [9] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2369; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29-2024 [10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine [11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-30-2024 [12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine [13] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine [14] https://t.me/epoddubny/21502 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80484 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80670 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60231 [15] https://interfax.com dot ua/news/general/1028868.html ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2024 [16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2368; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2369 [17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-13-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2023 [18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis [19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis [20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024; [21] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/11/08/defence-secretary-john-healey-russia-army/; https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/1843198787097124968/photo/1 ; https://lordslibrary.parliament dot uk/war-in-ukraine-update-october-2024/ [23] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0rRU2mSC59Mjcg6jwTKeUagsCR7CUYQRa3k1craMem57hXzoPAmmHqFYYBhKg1Xeml [25] https://t.me/dva_majors/58465 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19755 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/145379 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/52696 [28] https://www.ft.com/content/da966006-88e5-4c25-9075-7c07c4702e06; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/11/24/financial-times-rossiya-zaverbovala-sotni-yementsev-dlya-voyny-v-ukraine-ih-zastavlyayut-podpisyvat-kontrakty [29] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2024 [30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/why-you-cant-be-iran-hawk-and-russia-dove; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-10-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-12-2024 [31] https://t.me/HAN_AKHMAT/104; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7612 [32] https://x.com/small10space/status/1860595030290829796; https://x.com/strategicbakery/status/1860610172013482096 [33] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29756; https://t.me/SolovievLive/297673 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81276 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/18735 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/145424 [34] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19788 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/58487 [36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FokKFbtGQiBJdXEtFtwsMzfKQifWsqFnpJxJTURmKY68EfVZj4ZFPBZwqJZwiXtsl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07h41Q6Egj334z2WKxxM3L7hUNUo8mdFfi8ncwC6ANL5b4EbM7hYefytWn3RVQrKnl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EwQHpADE2GkbGNdiPSSora22mSqorNaxp7pH3ePwGUCmexU44j4DFYDvXoMXUFTZl ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/2748 [38] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7616; https://t.me/ngu_war_for_peace/22373 [39] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11878; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19780; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19772; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19775 [40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FokKFbtGQiBJdXEtFtwsMzfKQifWsqFnpJxJTURmKY68EfVZj4ZFPBZwqJZwiXtsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07h41Q6Egj334z2WKxxM3L7hUNUo8mdFfi8ncwC6ANL5b4EbM7hYefytWn3RVQrKnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07h41Q6Egj334z2WKxxM3L7hUNUo8mdFfi8ncwC6ANL5b4EbM7hYefytWn3RVQrKnl [41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07h41Q6Egj334z2WKxxM3L7hUNUo8mdFfi8ncwC6ANL5b4EbM7hYefytWn3RVQrKnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EwQHpADE2GkbGNdiPSSora22mSqorNaxp7pH3ePwGUCmexU44j4DFYDvXoMXUFTZl   [42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FokKFbtGQiBJdXEtFtwsMzfKQifWsqFnpJxJTURmKY68EfVZj4ZFPBZwqJZwiXtsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07h41Q6Egj334z2WKxxM3L7hUNUo8mdFfi8ncwC6ANL5b4EbM7hYefytWn3RVQrKnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EwQHpADE2GkbGNdiPSSora22mSqorNaxp7pH3ePwGUCmexU44j4DFYDvXoMXUFTZl  ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81290 [44] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19771; https://t.me/motopatriot/29792; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5251 [45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FokKFbtGQiBJdXEtFtwsMzfKQifWsqFnpJxJTURmKY68EfVZj4ZFPBZwqJZwiXtsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07h41Q6Egj334z2WKxxM3L7hUNUo8mdFfi8ncwC6ANL5b4EbM7hYefytWn3RVQrKnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EwQHpADE2GkbGNdiPSSora22mSqorNaxp7pH3ePwGUCmexU44j4DFYDvXoMXUFTZl [46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19786; https://t.me/motopatriot/29778 [48] https://t.me/moment_war/142; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7610 [49] https://t,.me/motopatriot/29789; https://t.me/motopatriot/29775; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29747 [50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FokKFbtGQiBJdXEtFtwsMzfKQifWsqFnpJxJTURmKY68EfVZj4ZFPBZwqJZwiXtsl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07h41Q6Egj334z2WKxxM3L7hUNUo8mdFfi8ncwC6ANL5b4EbM7hYefytWn3RVQrKnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EwQHpADE2GkbGNdiPSSora22mSqorNaxp7pH3ePwGUCmexU44j4DFYDvXoMXUFTZl   [51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FokKFbtGQiBJdXEtFtwsMzfKQifWsqFnpJxJTURmKY68EfVZj4ZFPBZwqJZwiXtsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07h41Q6Egj334z2WKxxM3L7hUNUo8mdFfi8ncwC6ANL5b4EbM7hYefytWn3RVQrKnl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EwQHpADE2GkbGNdiPSSora22mSqorNaxp7pH3ePwGUCmexU44j4DFYDvXoMXUFTZl ; https://t.me/rybar/65651 [55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FokKFbtGQiBJdXEtFtwsMzfKQifWsqFnpJxJTURmKY68EfVZj4ZFPBZwqJZwiXtsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07h41Q6Egj334z2WKxxM3L7hUNUo8mdFfi8ncwC6ANL5b4EbM7hYefytWn3RVQrKnl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EwQHpADE2GkbGNdiPSSora22mSqorNaxp7pH3ePwGUCmexU44j4DFYDvXoMXUFTZl   [57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FokKFbtGQiBJdXEtFtwsMzfKQifWsqFnpJxJTURmKY68EfVZj4ZFPBZwqJZwiXtsl;  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07h41Q6Egj334z2WKxxM3L7hUNUo8mdFfi8ncwC6ANL5b4EbM7hYefytWn3RVQrKnl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EwQHpADE2GkbGNdiPSSora22mSqorNaxp7pH3ePwGUCmexU44j4DFYDvXoMXUFTZl   [59] https://t.me/rybar/65648; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/145391 [60] https://t.me/voin_dv/11971; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/145416 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/11967 [61] https://t.me/tass_agency/287032; https://t.me/dva_majors/58489; https://t.me/vrogov/18084 [62] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/24/rosiyany-gotuyutsya-proryvatysya-na-pivden-donechchyny/ [63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07h41Q6Egj334z2WKxxM3L7hUNUo8mdFfi8ncwC6ANL5b4EbM7hYefytWn3RVQrKnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FokKFbtGQiBJdXEtFtwsMzfKQifWsqFnpJxJTURmKY68EfVZj4ZFPBZwqJZwiXtsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EwQHpADE2GkbGNdiPSSora22mSqorNaxp7pH3ePwGUCmexU44j4DFYDvXoMXUFTZl [64] https://suspilne dot media/886867-strilanina-u-kiivskomu-goteli-povernenna-dvoh-ditej-z-mariupola-1005-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1732445824&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/atesh_ua/5821 [68] https://suspilne dot media/886867-strilanina-u-kiivskomu-goteli-povernenna-dvoh-ditej-z-mariupola-1005-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1732437393&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://interfax dot com.ua/news/general/1029739.html; https://www.facebook.com/RuslanKravchenkoKyiv/posts/pfbid02jSWorijbKWq9EE4fUr6Se9eVwz9E69T3mr8cNE1s7DHyD2oV37FJsEMzfCQ9Fp5Hl [69] https://edition.cnn.com/2024/11/23/europe/ukraine-north-korean-missile-attacks-western-components-intl?cid=ios_app&fbclid=IwY2xjawGvMf9leHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHZQpwdt_ivFbBjztICLOurGoyfHy8RcDGKuMqlfjYw9-oo8opuTJSEWhuA_aem_yOzQjlpO3q_gbNoL_BYQ1w [70] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/12579; https://suspilne dot media/886911-rf-za-tizden-vipustila-po-ukraini-ponad-800-kabiv-i-blizko-460-droniv-kamikadze-zelenskij/  Kagan with Nate Trotter and William Runkel Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15pm ET on February 21 ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment Russian state media and Kremlin officials appear to be leveraging select statements from US officials alongside long-standing Russian narratives to create tension between the United States and Ukraine and undermine faith in America's commitment to Ukraine Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on February 21 that the Kremlin has ordered Russian state media personalities and other prominent voices in the Russian information space to intensify narratives aimed at creating discord in Ukrainian society and discrediting Ukraine among Western allies.[1] The GUR stated that Russian actors intend to amplify narratives falsely alleging that the West has "betrayed" Ukraine the United States is not concerned about Europe's and Ukraine's opinions the Ukrainian military is losing on the frontline and "corrupt people" are stealing billions of dollars of US aid from Ukraine The GUR reported that the Kremlin is also preparing to declare "victory" over Ukraine and possibly over NATO on the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion – February 24 and will offer to pay protestors if they attend rallies in Ukraine.[4] The SBU asked Ukrainian citizens to be cautious of Russian efforts to manipulate Ukraine's information space ahead of the third anniversary of the war US officials continue to reiterate their support for Ukraine and a lasting and just resolution of the war US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on February 20 that the United States used the recent bilateral meeting with Russian officials in Saudi Arabia to gauge Russia's interest in good faith peace negotiations and to open a communication channel between the two countries.[5] Rubio emphasized on February 18 that a war can only end when "everyone involved" in the war — which Rubio explicitly defined as including Ukraine and US partners in Europe — is "okay with" and accepts the end agreement.[6] Rubio reiterated on February 16 that Trump wants to see the war end in a way that "protects Ukraine's sovereignty," and US Special Presidential Envoy for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg stated on February 15 that Russia must make territorial concessions during negotiations.[7] Russian forces recently eliminated the Ukrainian pocket west of Kurakhove amid continued reports that the Russian military is redeploying elements of the Russian Southern Military District's (SMD) 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk direction Geolocated footage published on February 21 indicates that Russian forces – reportedly elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC] Eastern Military District [EMD]) – seized Ulakly (west of Kurakhove) and likely closed the Ukrainian pocket west of Kurakhove.[8] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within central Kostyantynopil (west of Kurakhove) from the south.[9] Russian forces continued attacking west of Kurakhove near Andriivka ISW recently observed reports that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th CAA SMD) to the Toretsk and eastern Pokrovsk directions and Russian servicemen in the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA SMD) operating near Toretsk claimed on February 18 that elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 163rd Tank Regiment (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division 8th CAA) recently redeployed to the area.[12] The Russian military command likely began redeploying elements of the 8th CAA as Russian forces began closing the Kurakhove pocket and aligning the frontline between the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions in Winter 2024-2025 by pushing west from the Yasenove-Andriivka (northwest and west of Kurakhove) line and north from Zelenivka (southwest of Kurakhove) Russian forces have likely freed up some forces of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division from the Kurakhove direction to redeploy to the Toretsk direction by evening out the frontline west of Kurakhove and are likely prioritizing pressuring Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk) - the southernmost point of Ukraine's "fortress belt" in Donetsk Oblast ISW has observed elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA Central Military District [CMD]) attacking toward Andriivka from the west and northwest since at least the beginning of January 2025.[13] The Russian military will likely continue attacking in the Kurakhove direction from the east with elements of the 41st CAA (CMD) and from the southeast with elements of the EMD thereby allowing 8th CAA (SMD) elements to redeploy to other areas of the frontline Russian forces are attempting to leverage the seizure of Velyka Novosilka to advance further north of the settlement toward the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border Russian forces recently reintensified offensive operations northeast and west of Velyka Novosilka after temporarily pausing attacks in these areas for several weeks after Russian forces seized Velyka Novosilka in late January 2025.[14] Geolocated footage published on February 20 indicates that Russian forces seized Novoocheretuvate (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) after recently crossing the Mokri Yaly River.[15] The Russian Ministry of Defense [MoD] claimed on February 21 that elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA] Eastern Military District [EMD]) played a crucial role in crossing the Mokri Yaly River and seizing the settlement.[16] Russian forces may have exploited a dry patch of the Mokri Yaly River near Novoocheretuvate to advance into the settlement as ISW previously assessed that the Mokri Yaly River could pose a significant challenge for Russian forces.[17] ISW previously assessed that the Russian military command could either redeploy most of the EMD to another sector of the frontline or opt to retain elements of the EMD in the Velyka Novosilka direction and continue advancing toward the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary.[18] Russian forces have also intensified offensive operations on Velyka Novosilka's northeastern and western flanks A Russian miblogger published footage on February 21 purportedly showing elements of the Russian 57th Mechanized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA EMD) conducting a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault near Novosilka (west of Velyka Novosilka) and Russian forces recently conducted a battalion-sized mechanized assault near Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove and northeast of Velyka Novosilka).[19] Another Russian milblogger claimed on February 20 that elements of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA EMD) recently penetrated Ukrainian defenses north of Vremivka (west of Velyka Novosilka) and seized several strongholds in the area.[20] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently advanced west of Velyka Novosilka and east and south of Novosilka but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[21] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are using armored vehicles and electronic warfare (EW) systems to support Russian infantry attacking near Novosilka Ukrainian officials continue to highlight the growth of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) through significant expansion in the domestic production of key military equipment Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced on February 21 that Ukrainian forces have tripled domestic artillery production increased armored personnel carrier production fivefold and doubled the output of anti-tank weapons.[24] Shmyhal noted that Ukraine's ammunition production has grown 2.5 times and drone manufacturing has surged tenfold between January 2024 and January 2025 Shmyhal stated that Ukraine currently produces about one-third of its weapons domestically and is actively working to increase this share and that Ukraine is allocating an additional 7.9 billion hryvnia (about $189 million) to boost drone production in 2025 Ukrainian Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov also stated on February 21 that 19 Ukrainian companies joined the Ukrainian defense innovation platform Brave1 to support the production of short and medium-range missiles as well as ballistic missiles.[25] Fedorov added that the Brave1 platform will also create a separate grant program to support the development and production of explosives and gunpowder for Ukrainian forces.[26] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced on February 20 the launch of the new State Rear Operator (DOT)-Chain System model of efficiently delivering drones to Ukrainian forces on the frontline.[27] The DOT-Chain System expedites drone delivery through forecasting orders and better informs Ukrainian DIB companies of upcoming drone requirements ISW assesses that such enhancement of Ukraine's DIB – in part through continued Western support – is part of a continued plan to create a sustainable basis for Ukraine to be able to defend itself over the long term with dramatically reduced foreign military assistance.[28] Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Commander Sergei Pinchuk to the rank of Admiral and Eastern Group of Forces Commander Andrei Ivanayev to the rank of Colonel General on February 21.[29] Pinchuk's promotion may be reflective of recent Russian efforts to restructure Russia's peacetime military administrative control over military services Putin signed a decree on February 5 revoking Russian military districts' "interservice status" and removing naval and Aerospace Forces (VKS) units from subordination to Russian military districts.[30] Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast Russian forces continued attacking northwest of Sudzha near Pogrebki and Sverdlikovo and south of Sudzha near Guyevo on February 21.[31] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Sverdlikovo and Guyevo.[32] Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 21 indicates that Russian forces advanced in southern Sverdlikovo.[33] Ukrainian Northern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vadym Mysnyk reported on February 21 that small Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups continue operating on the international border near Kursk Oblast but that Ukrainian forces repel these groups.[37] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on February 21 that Russian civilians have sent 29 percent more requests in January 2025 presumably than in December 2024 to find relatives operating in Kursk Oblast to the Ukrainian "I Want to Find" initiative which identifies killed or captured Russian soldiers.[38] The GUR reported that most requests are about the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) 155th and 40th naval infantry brigades (both Pacific Fleet); 488th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division Moscow Military District [MMD]); 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division Leningrad Military District [LMD]); 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division LMD); 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division); 234th VDV Regiment (76th VDV Division); and 11th and 83rd VDV brigades.[39] Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division and elements of the 22nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue to operate in Kursk Oblast.[40] Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an electrical substation and oil pumping station near Novovelichkovskaya Krasnodar Krai overnight on February 20 to 21 Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Kharkiv direction on February 21 but did not advance Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on February 20 and 21.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed on February 21 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vovchansk.[45] Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Yevhen Romanov stated on February 21 that snowy and freezing weather conditions are impairing Russian drone operations.[46] Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Kupyansk direction on February 21 but did not make confirmed advances Russian forces continued attacking north of Kupyansk near Zapadne and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka.[47] Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on February 21 that Russian forces have seized most of Topoli (north of Kupyansk near the international border) and advanced southwest of Orlyanske (southeast of Kupyansk) and west of Zapadne.[48] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 21 but did not advance Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and east of Borova near Kopanky on February 20 and 21.[49] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces published footage on February 21 of Ukrainian forces repelling at least a reinforced platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault towards Lozova (northeast of Borova) and stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed four infantry fighting vehicles.[50] Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA] Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Lozova and elements of the 12th Tank Regiment (4th Tank Division MMD) are reportedly operating near Zelenyi Hai (east of Borova).[51] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 21 but did not make confirmed advances Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Lyman near Terny Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on February 21 but did not advance Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka on February 20 and 21.[53] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on February 21 but did not advance Russian forces continued attacking near and within Chasiv Yar and northeast of Chasiv Yar near Vasyukivka on February 20 and 21.[54] Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[55] Elements of the Russian "Nevsky" Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar).[56] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on February 21 but did not advance Russian forces continued attacking near Toretsk and north of Toretsk near Dyliivka on February 20 and 21.[57] Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk Russian forces continued attacks near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Pishchane; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udache and Sribne on February 20 and 21.[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zaporizhzhia and Preobrazhenka (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[59] Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[60] Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 21 that Russian forces seized Nadiivka and a Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 6th and 239th tank regiments (both of the 90th Tank Division Central Military District [CMD]) are advancing near Nadiivka.[61] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Kotlyne and north of Zaporizhzhia (all southwest of Pokrovsk).[62] See topline text for updates in the Kurakhove and Velyka Novosilka directions Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 21 but did not make any confirmed advances Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Robotyne near Shcherbaky and Pyatykhatky on February 20 and 21.[65] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pyatykhatky and Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne).[66] Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger reiterated claims that Russian forces seized half of Pyatykhatky.[67] Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA] Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking targets in the Orikhiv direction; drone operators of the Russian 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division SMD) are reportedly striking targets near Robotyne; drone operators of the Russian 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment’s (reportedly of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division SMD) “Shaman” detachment are reportedly striking targets near Novoandriivka; and elements of the Russian 19th Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA SMD) are reportedly operating near Pyatykhatky.[68] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on February 21 that Ukrainian forces recently destroyed a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system in southern Ukraine.[69] Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on February 21 Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 3rd Company “Night Witches” (BARS-Sarmat Detachment Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly striking targets on the right bank of the Dnipro River.[70] Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 20 to 21 The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M/Kn-23 ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea towards Odesa Oblast and launched 160 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Oryol Smolensk Oblast.[71] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 87 drones over Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts; that 70 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that Russian strikes damaged Odesa Ukrainian sources reported that Russian drones and glide bombs damaged civilian infrastructure and an industrial facility in Kyiv The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly falsely designating former penal recruits as having abandoned their units without authorization (SOCH) to avoid paying them amid continued indicators that Russian authorities are concerned about the war's strain on the Russian economy.[73] Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on February 20 that Russia designated at least 32 penal recruits of military unit 95378 the 1437th Motorized Rifle Regiment (15th Motorized Rifle Brigade Central Military District [CMD]) as SOCH since October 2024 including personnel pulled from the frontline beaten in punishment "pits," transported to unknown locations and killed in action.[74] (ISW has observed reports that elements of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade have been fighting in the Pokrovsk direction since intensified offensive operations in Fall 2024).[75] Verstka reported that the families of the missing soldiers wrote an appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin for assistance in removing the false SOCH designations Verstka reported that some relatives have filed complaints against the 1437th Motorized Rifle Regiment's Acting Chief of Staff Captain Sergei Betonov who reportedly admitted to relatives that former prisoners were assigned the SOCH status due to an "internal directive" from the MoD Betonov reportedly told the relatives that his unit designates all penal recruits as SOCH when they perform combat missions and does not remove the designation until the soldiers return from combat Verstka noted that the relatives believe the Russian MoD does not want to pay them as relatives can petition Russian courts to redesignate "missing" or "lost" soldiers as "dead" to receive social benefits afforded to relatives of dead soldiers ISW has frequently observed reports indicating that Russian penal units sustain especially high casualties in attritional and the Russian military likely aims to reduce the high monetary costs associated with these high casualty rates.[76] A Russian milblogger claimed on February 20 that a Russian penal recruit currently in detention in occupied Donetsk Oblast claimed that only 30 personnel of his 240-person unit remained after a month of combat operations due to high casualties.[77] The milblogger claimed that "Storm" penal recruit units regularly are completely restaffed within one or two months Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to highlight Russian military units fighting in Kursk Oblast to obscure the role of North Korean forces as well as to highlight units accused of committing war crimes Putin awarded the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade with the honorific name "Kursk" on February 21.[78] Putin previously lauded the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade in November 2024 as part of continued efforts to gloss over North Korean forces' participation in combat operations in Kursk Oblast.[79] The 155th Naval Infantry Brigade is implicated in at least two instances of beheadings and summary executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Kursk Oblast in October 2024.[80] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Russia service Radio Svoboda reported on February 21 that it gained access to data from the Russian MoD's Main Military Medical Directorate and determined that Russian forces have suffered at least 166,000 wounded who were treated in military hospitals from January 2022 to mid-June 2024 Radio Svoboda reported that the Russian military units that have suffered the most wounded personnel between February 2022 and June 2024 include the 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division 70th and 71st motorized rifle regiments (both 42nd Motorized Rifle Division and 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA Radio Svoboda reported that the 76th Airborne (VDV) Division had the most wounded of the VDV and 237th VDV regiments suffered a combined 2,400 wounded from February 2022 to June 2024 while the 98th VDV Division sustained the second most wounded with over 1,300 including 800 just from its 331st VDV Regiment including 60 officers Radio Svoboda reported that the Russian General Staff Main Directorate (GRU) units that suffered the most losses in this period were the 10th and 22nd Spetsnaz brigades Radio Svoboda noted that this data only includes Russian soldiers transported to rear military hospitals also includes those treated in hospitals for injuries and illnesses unrelated to the war and does not include instances when a Russian soldier was treated several times Radio Svoboda noted that Russian officers sustained higher casualty rates until roughly July 2022 as the Russian military had formed effective communications and moved command posts farther from the frontline following Ukraine's introduction of HIMARS to the battlefield in June 2022 Russia's ruling United Russia party announced on February 21 that Russia's Center for Unmanned Systems Technologies has developed its first drone detection system based on artificial intelligence (AI) and will test it in late February 2025.[81] United Russia claimed that the Titan has a laser with a three-kilometer range and a 24-barrel and 12-gauge turret The Titan reportedly will first attempt to disable drones with electronic warfare (EW) before downing drones kinetically Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks) [2] https://tass dot ru/politika/23133119 ; https://military.pravda dot ru/2180008-pochemu-zelenskomu-pridetsja/ ; https://aif dot ru/politics/world/-konflikt-zavershitsya-pobedoy-rossii-nikolay-patrushev-o-raskole-zapada ; https://iz dot ru/1842568/2025-02-21/eks-analitik-tcru-soobshchil-o-rassledovanii-v-ssha-korruptcii-na-ukraine ; https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/67a095199a7947ce62d502e0 [4] https://ssu.gov dot ua/novyny/sbu-poperedzhaie-pro-novi-sproby-spetssluzhb-rf-rozkhytaty-suspilnopolitychnu-sytuatsiiu-v-ukraini-cherez-aktyvizatsiiu-informatsiinykh-dyversii [5] https://www.state.gov/secretary-marco-rubio-with-catherine-herridge/ [6] https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-national-security-advisor-mike-waltz-and-special-envoy-to-the-middle-east-steve-witkoff-with-jennifer-hansler-of-cnn-and-matthew-lee-of-the-associated-press/ [8] https://t.me/verumreactor/17609; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8451 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/13529 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/13530 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/13528 [10] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02D6Rd6qWi1vatPcjrm2eC4BMvs6Dvo3WVTqaBY4qDgQz1oNAcLoRH9GTBwkzEczktl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21220 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24219 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/155289 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86653 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62310 [11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-7-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120724 [12] https://t.me/ne_zhdi_novosti/1979 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/17606 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-16-2025 [13] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-3-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2025 [14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012625 [15] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1892670724759810376; https://x.com/creamy_caprice/status/1892632956239216687; https://t.me/voin_dv/13515; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8446; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32506 ; https://t.me/rybar/68202; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30928 [16] https://t.me/mod_russia/49155 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/49182 [17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-18-2025 [18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2025 ; [19] https://t.me/epoddubny/22541 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-17-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2025 [21] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32506; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30928 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/155316 ; https://t.me/rybar/68202 [22] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30928 ; https://t.me/rybar/68202 [24] https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/9578 ; https://suspilne dot media/953963-smigal-rozpoviv-pro-dosagnenna-ukrainskogo-opk-a-takoz-ogolosiv-pro-vidilenna-79-mlrd-griven-na-droni/ ; https://mil dot in.ua/uk/news/uryad-ukrayiny-vydilyv-majzhe-8-mldr-grn-na-zakupivlyu-droniv/ [25] https://mil dot in.ua/uk/news/granty-brave1-na-rozrobku-raketnogo-ozbroyennya-otrymaly-19-kompanij/ [26] https://mil dot in.ua/uk/news/u-brave1-z-yavytsya-okrema-grantova-programa-dlya-vyrobnykiv-vybuhovyh-rechovyn-ta-porohiv/ [27] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/20/rustem-umyerov-predstavyv-novu-model-zabezpechennya-bezpilotnykiv-dlya-ukrayinskoyi-armiyi/ ; https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/posts/pfbid0bRDmfeukMfiPa3JLhmcEqx63npczJtmGUhSP9e42aYHDyJxso2qxE5k124KztK4Ql?rdid=swi07k2BNx94OjXY ; https://mil dot in.ua/uk/news/u-minoborony-zapustyly-novu-model-zabezpechennya-zsu-dronamy/ [28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base [29] 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ua/2025/02/21/vbyvaty-shturmovykiv-na-pidhodi-najefektyvnishyj-reczept-vidbyttya-shturmiv-vid-brygady-rubizh/ [54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02D6Rd6qWi1vatPcjrm2eC4BMvs6Dvo3WVTqaBY4qDgQz1oNAcLoRH9GTBwkzEczktl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21220 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid05bsxPeKdU2ZfmDodkDaKHeNxxVZkrcSdRLKCJJRfZ4aMxHzEtCQjEH5UVtuCdJepl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24901 [56] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/43907 [57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02D6Rd6qWi1vatPcjrm2eC4BMvs6Dvo3WVTqaBY4qDgQz1oNAcLoRH9GTBwkzEczktl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21220 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid05bsxPeKdU2ZfmDodkDaKHeNxxVZkrcSdRLKCJJRfZ4aMxHzEtCQjEH5UVtuCdJepl [58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02D6Rd6qWi1vatPcjrm2eC4BMvs6Dvo3WVTqaBY4qDgQz1oNAcLoRH9GTBwkzEczktl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21220 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid05bsxPeKdU2ZfmDodkDaKHeNxxVZkrcSdRLKCJJRfZ4aMxHzEtCQjEH5UVtuCdJepl ; https://t.me/rybar/68181 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21310 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/155289 [60] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1892906610504188110; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8450; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1892897513000063027 [61] https://t.me/tass_agency/301889 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32544 [62] https://t.me/rybar/68181 ; https://t.me/genshtab24/81650 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/155316 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24227 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21315; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32532 [63] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/21/okupanty-vidchajdushno-zabuksuvaly-pid-pokrovskom-protyvnyk-maye-neuspihy/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JFvyCBahZ_k ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/954073-plan-okupantiv-pid-pokrovskom-zabuksuvav-casiv-ar-trimae-oboronu-majze-rik-tregubov/ [64] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/953813-verhu-takticnoi-dumki-mi-ne-sposterigaemo-ak-voue-armia-rf-na-pivdni-pokrovskogo-frontu/ [65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02D6Rd6qWi1vatPcjrm2eC4BMvs6Dvo3WVTqaBY4qDgQz1oNAcLoRH9GTBwkzEczktl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21220; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid05bsxPeKdU2ZfmDodkDaKHeNxxVZkrcSdRLKCJJRfZ4aMxHzEtCQjEH5UVtuCdJepl; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62316; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24201; https://t.me/dva_majors/65089; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86657 [66] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62316; https://t.me/dva_majors/65012; https://t.me/rybar/68191 [68] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24197; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32545; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/155284; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86657 [69] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02zw9PUnY1B1uD3bMtLrfj5smSEMqqAgTW2jCfMGEeDS199R9HNCwe6zowLez2vo1Cl [72]https://t.me/dsns_telegram/38573 ; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1892927001436061899 ; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1892902080576172445 ; https://t.me/kievreal1/81272 ; https://pl.dsns.gov dot ua/news/nadzvicaini-podiyi/poltavshhina-riatuvalniki-likviduvali-pozezu-spricinenu-vorozim-udarom [73] https://verstka dot media/propavshih-na-fronte-eks-zaklyuchennyh-massovo-priznayut-samovolno-ostavivshimi-chast-chtoby-lishit-vyplat; https://t.me/svobodnieslova/6370 [74] https://www.change.org/p/%D0%BE%D0%B1%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%89%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5-%D0%BA-%D0%B2%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%80%D1%83-%D0%BF%D1%83%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%83-%D0%BE-%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%82%D1%83%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B8-%D1%81-%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BB%D1%83%D0%B6%D0%B0%D1%89%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B8-%D0%B2-%D1%87-95378-1437-%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%BA%D0%B0 [75] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-18-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2024 [76] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-6-2025 [77] https://t.me/pgubarev/1210; https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1892922843303678125 [79] http://www.en.kremlin dot ru/acts/news/74679 [81] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/23210817 by The Kyiv Independent news deskAerial view of war-torn Velyka Novosilka (110th Separate Mechanised Brigade / Telegram)Ukrainian troops avoided encirclement as Russian forces are poised to capture Velyka Novosilka said the 110th Separate Mechanised Brigade Ukrainian troops successfully withdrew from some areas to avoid being encircled but fighting is ongoing around the village, which lies around 15 kilometers east of the neighboring Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Equipment on both sides wears thin but Russian infantry vastly outnumbers the Ukrainian side While Russian troops will likely capture the village soon they will struggle to advance their offensive onward The Mokri Yaly River creates an obstacle for Russia’s advance and Russian troops are in a vulnerable “fire pocket,” said the brigade “Any movement is suppressed by shells and drones," said the brigade The river also hindered supply routes to the Ukrainians. On Jan 23, Military spokesperson Viktor Trehubov warned that Ukrainian troops were at risk of encirclement Russian forces are attempting to take control of access routes to the village through heavy fire The Russian Defense Ministry claimed on Jan Experts told the Kyiv Independent that Ukrainian troops were likely holding onto the village's northwestern areas and Russia expected to complete the capture in “days.” it will be Russia’s first notable win this year The number of soldiers is probably around several hundred We are the news team of the Kyiv Independent We are here to make sure our readers get quick essential updates about the events in Ukraine Feel free to contact us via email with feedback and news alerts Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45 am ET on January 25 ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment Ukraine and Moldova continue to offer solutions to Transnistria's energy crisis as Moldovan President Maia Sandu met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on January 25 Zelensky stated at a press conference with Sandu that Ukraine can supply Transnistria with coal at low prices or even free of charge if Transnistria would supply Ukraine with electricity in return.[1] Zelensky also stated that Ukraine is ready to send a team of specialists to help increase the Transnistrian power plant's electricity output such that it would far exceed Transnistria's domestic needs allowing Transnistria to provide electricity to all of Moldova and Ukraine Zelensky noted that Transnistria's cooperation with Moldova and Ukraine would help reduce electricity prices throughout all of Moldova by 30 percent Transnistrian authorities have previously refused Moldovan and Ukrainian offers of help to posture Russia as the breakaway republic's savior and benefactor and to leverage Chisinau's turn to higher priced European electricity as part of Moscow's anti-EU narratives The Kremlin is continuing to leverage the prominent Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram channel to cultivate increased Russian influence in Iraq The Rybar channel claimed on January 25 that members of the Rybar team – including its founder Mikhail Zvinchuk – visited Iraq over the last week and met with Iraqi officials including Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia Al Sudani.[4] The channel claimed that Iraqi officials noted their openness to increasing trade and foreign investments with Russian partners and their interest in further developing Russian–Iraqi relations and investors to begin exploring opportunities in Iraq Member of the Rybar team visited Iraq in August 2024 and ISW noted at the time that this was the first observed report of a Russian milblogger meeting with a senior foreign official.[5] ISW-CTP previously assessed that Russia may be setting conditions to supplant the US as a security partner in Iraq in anticipation of the US possibly reducing its military presence there.[6] The recent fall of the Bashar Al-Assad regime in Syria may be prompting the Kremlin to reconsider the contours of its relations with Iraq   Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 25 but did not make any confirmed advances Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Nikolayevo-Darino (southeast of Korenevo) north of Cherkasskoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha) and south of Sudzha.[7] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims Russian forces continued attacks near Kurilovka (south of Sudzha) and Sverdlikovo (northwest of Sudzha).[8] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked with armored vehicle support near Pogrebki (north of Sudzha).[9] Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast and elements of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA] Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Pogrebki.[10]   Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue operating in the Kharkiv direction.[14] Ukrainian sources speculated on Russian offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction amid ongoing Russian assaults in this direction on January 25 The commander of a Ukrainian anti-tank battalion operating in the Kupyansk and Borova directions stated that Russian forces are attempting to envelop Kupyansk and Kupyansk-Vuzhlovyi (just south of Kupyansk) from the north and south.[15] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA] and other elements mainly of the 6th CAA are currently operating near Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk) and are attempting to expand their bridgehead on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River near the settlement.[16] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 12th Tank Regiment (4th Tank Division Moscow Military District [MMD]) and 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division 1st GTA) are unsuccessfully attacking east of Kupyansk near Kotlyarivka.[17] Mashovets suggested that the Russian military command may redeploy elements of the 6th CAA including the 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 69th Motorized Rifle Division from the Vovchansk area (northeast of Kharkiv City) to Dvorichna if Russian forces begin to make substantial advances north of Kupyansk The Russian military command may intend to use these forces to expand the Russian salient north of Kupyansk as part of Russian efforts to envelop Kupyansk to avoid a frontal assault on the settlement Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Zapadne (north of Kupyansk and south of Dvorichna) but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[18] Russian forces continued assaults north of Kupyansk near Dvorichna and Hlushkivka and east of Kupyansk near Pishchane on January 24 and 25.[19] Drone operators of the Russian Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[20]   Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 25 but did not advance Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 400 meters near Zahryzove (north of Borova) but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[21] The commander of the Ukrainian anti-tank battalion operating in the Kupyansk and Borova directions stated that Russian forces are attempting to seize Kopanky (east of Borova) and are attacking with a large number of infantry.[22] The commander estimated that the Russian military command has staffed the 1st GTA and 20th CAA (MMD) - both of which are attacking in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions - to 80 percent of their doctrinal end strength Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA) are attacking towards Borova from the north and northeast near Lozova and Pershotravneve.[23] Russian forces continued assaults north of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove; northeast of Borova near Lozova and Zelenyi Hai; east of Borova near Kopanky and Pershotravneve; and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka and Makiivka and towards Shiykivka and Druzhelyubivka on January 24 and 25.[24] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zahryzove and Zelenyi Hai.[25]   Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Novolyubivka and Torske and in the direction of Zelena Dolyna on January 24 and 25 but did not advance.[26] Russian forces continued offensive operations southwest of Siversk near Vasyukivka on January 25 but did not advance.[27] Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Chasiv Yar direction on January 25 but did not make any confirmed advances and Bila Hora on January 24 and 25.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in southern Chasiv Yar.[33] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division including its 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[34] Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on January 25 Geolocated footage published on January 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Mykhaila Hrushevskoho and Pyrohova streets in northern Toretsk.[35] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Krymske (north of Toretsk) and half of the Toretska mine in northern Toretsk and advanced one and a half kilometers west of Niu York (south of Toretsk) and near Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[36] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims Russian forces continued ground attacks within Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Krymske and Dyliivka; and west of Toretsk near Leonidivka and Shcherbynivka on January 24 and 25.[37] Drone operators of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA] formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) are reportedly operating in Toretsk.[38]   Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued fighting in the area on January 25 Geolocated footage published on January 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Sukhyi Yar (southeast of Pokrovsk).[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Novoandriivka and about half of Nadiivka (both southwest of Pokrovsk) and advanced to Novooleksandrivka (southwest of Pokrovsk); near Uspenivka Novoyelyzavetivka (all southwest of Pokrovsk) and Baranivka (both east of Pokrovsk); and on the outskirts of Kotlyne (west of Pokrovsk) Zelene Pole and Yelyzavetivka (both east of Pokrovsk).[40] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe; east of Pokrovsk near Baranivka and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko and Novoukrainka; west of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Kotlyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove and Bohdanivka on January 24 and 25.[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have become more active near Kalynove (east of Pokrovsk) and will increase pressure on Oleksandropil (northwest of Kalynove) after Russian forces seize Toretsk.[42] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Kotlyne and that Ukrainian forces still hold positions in Kotlyne The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are moving forward in teams of one to two people under the cover of fog while using drones to divert Ukrainian forces' attention.[47]   Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction on January 25 amid continued offensive operations in the area Geolocated footage published on January 25 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced east and south of Slovyanka and up to the northeastern outskirts of Andriivka (northwest of Kurakhove).[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces entered northeastern Dachne (west of Kurakhove) and advanced north and northeast of Sukhi Yaly (southwest of Kurakhove).[49] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Kurakhove near Shevchenko and Andriivka; southwest of Kurakhove near Yantarne and Kostyantynopolske; and west of Kurakhove near Dachne and Ulakly on January 24 and 25.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 25 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking west of Kurakhove along the Zelenivka-Ulakly line.[51] Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction; drone operators of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Ulakly; and drone operators of the Russian ”Vizantiya” detachment and the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in Dachne.[52] Russian forces recently advanced within Velyka Novosilka amid continued fighting in the area on January 25 Geolocated footage published on January 25 shows elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet EMD) raising a flag in eastern Velyka Novosilka A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced southwest of Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka Novosilka) but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[55] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence stated on January 24 that Russian forces are publishing manipulated footage to create the false impression that Russian forces have seized all of Velyka Novosilka.[56] The Ukrainian source stated that Russian forces are advancing on the eastern outskirts of the settlement and seized a small part of the center of the settlement Russian forces continued ground attacks near Velyka Novosilka itself southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novodarivka and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on January 24 and 25.[57] Snipers and drone operators of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA EMD) reportedly continue operating and clearing Ukrainian positions in the southern part of Velyka Novosilka.[58]   Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes) Russian forces continued ground assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast including northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka and north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka on January 24 and 25 but did not make any confirmed advances.[59] Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division the "Sharman" Detachment of the 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division and the "Batyr" Detachment of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[60]   on January 24 and 25 but did not advance.[61]   Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 24 to 25 The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from the airspace over the Black Sea and 61 Shahed and decoy drones from Oryol and Kursk oblasts; Millerovo Krasnodar Krai.[62] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed two Kh-59/69 missiles and 46 drones over Odesa and Kirovohrad oblasts; that 15 decoy drones were "lost" in location likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that debris from Russian drones damaged buildings in Kyiv Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones also damaged energy infrastructure in Cherkasy Oblast and buildings in Kharkiv Oblast.[63] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on January 24 that Russian forces used domestically produced Shahed drones during the drone strike against Ukraine on the night of January 23 to 24.[64] Russian milbloggers continue to complain about Russia's insufficient quantities of drones and inefficient use of drone strikes A Russian milblogger claimed on January 20 that Russian forces need "fighter drones" to destroy Ukrainian strike and reconnaissance drones.[67] Another Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor responded on January 25 that Russian forces have an insufficient quantity of material resources and trained personnel to counter Ukraine's quantitatively superior drones The milblogger complained that the Russian military leadership is not making efforts to fix these issues The milblogger called for Russian forces to focus on striking priority targets such as Ukrainian reconnaissance drones that guide drone and artillery strikes Russian defense manufacturer Kalashnikov Concern announced on January 21 that it will unveil its new "Kub-2-E" reconnaissance and strike drone equipped with guided munitions at the IDEX-2025 exhibition in Abu Dhabi in late February 2025.[68] Russian forces will reportedly use launchers attached to armored vehicles to launch the "Kub-2-E" drones and Kalashnikov reportedly designed the drones to destroy lightly armored military equipment helicopter basing sites and additional military equipment Belarusian officials are likely restricting internet access in Belarus as early voting for the January 26 Belarusian presidential election is currently underway reported on January 25 that Belarusian authorities will restrict access to Belarusian sites from abroad from January 25 to 27 due to “threats to information infrastructure facilities and the information that the facilities process.”[69] Russian and Belarusian opposition outlets reported that Belarusian users reported issues using VPN services.[70]   [1] https://suspilne dot media/933245-prezidentka-moldovi-sandu-pribula-do-kieva/; https://www.rbc dot ua/ukr/news/ukrayina-gotova-nadati-moldovi-vugillya-i-1737809779.html [2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar012225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010225 [5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2024 [6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-20-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-21-2024 [7]https://t.me/dva_majors/63117 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22907 [8]https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22887 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/63117 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/20370 [9] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152381; https://t.me/wargonzo/24440 [10] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/25/bukovynski-desantnyky-znyshhyly-rosijskyh-morpihiv-zi-155-brygady-na-kurshhyni/; https://www.facebook.com/dshv82odshbr?ref=embed_video ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85070 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85096 [11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0t6b9ktbyJxN3yW2hnEzDkYtFEws9GG4W6g1AzQb5xnKyyQL72HFFbbnnCuCBGa1Sl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20218; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4446; https://t.me/otukharkiv/3848     [12] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4446; https://t.me/otukharkiv/3848 [13] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/25/riznobarvnyh-gartuyut-poblyzu-vovchanska-tryvayut-zhorstki-artylerijski-dueli/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc [15] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/25/sto-mercziv-na-desyat-kilometriv-jduchy-na-shturm-rosijski-shturmovyky-rahuyut-poperednykiv/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg [16] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2512 ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02QR6CF1hv5WNchoPiJoGunAc9FcJRDroS2sk2TRiWxkzcywHS674ABhsF8nAZXrcdl ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2513 [18] https://t.me/dva_majors/63117 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22888 [19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0t6b9ktbyJxN3yW2hnEzDkYtFEws9GG4W6g1AzQb5xnKyyQL72HFFbbnnCuCBGa1Sl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20218 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid033uMXwAN4pyBPLsjAYx4XjJZsoyV3tCqw3LLF4CL6ZHcXjjhQFeLWupFbn26ViGkWl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4446 [22] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/25/sto-mercziv-na-desyat-kilometriv-jduchy-na-shturm-rosijski-shturmovyky-rahuyut-poperednykiv/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg [24] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0t6b9ktbyJxN3yW2hnEzDkYtFEws9GG4W6g1AzQb5xnKyyQL72HFFbbnnCuCBGa1Sl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20218 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid033uMXwAN4pyBPLsjAYx4XjJZsoyV3tCqw3LLF4CL6ZHcXjjhQFeLWupFbn26ViGkWl ; https://t.me/tass_agency/297575 [25] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22888 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/297575 [28] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22904 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24440 [29] https://t.me/official24ombr/867 ; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/v-chasovomu-yaru-znyshhyly-4-rosijskyh-bmd-4/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/24/nakopychyly-bronyu-i-dochekalysya-tumaniv-vorog-sprobuvav-atakuvaty-chasiv-yar/ [30] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/24/nakopychyly-bronyu-i-dochekalysya-tumaniv-vorog-sprobuvav-atakuvaty-chasiv-yar/ [32]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid033uMXwAN4pyBPLsjAYx4XjJZsoyV3tCqw3LLF4CL6ZHcXjjhQFeLWupFbn26ViGkWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0t6b9ktbyJxN3yW2hnEzDkYtFEws9GG4W6g1AzQb5xnKyyQL72HFFbbnnCuCBGa1Sl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20218 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4446 [34] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22892 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152394 [35] https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/583; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8216; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1883098935239290978; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1883099198138273795 [36]https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22909 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152367 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152434 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20769 [37]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid033uMXwAN4pyBPLsjAYx4XjJZsoyV3tCqw3LLF4CL6ZHcXjjhQFeLWupFbn26ViGkWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0t6b9ktbyJxN3yW2hnEzDkYtFEws9GG4W6g1AzQb5xnKyyQL72HFFbbnnCuCBGa1Sl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20218 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4446 ; https://t.me/rybar/67467 [39] https://t.me/moment_war/301; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8219 [40] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61653; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61656; https://t.me/rybar/67464; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152367; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152434; https://t.me/yurasumy/20762 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61654 [41] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4446; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20218; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0t6b9ktbyJxN3yW2hnEzDkYtFEws9GG4W6g1AzQb5xnKyyQL72HFFbbnnCuCBGa1Sl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid033uMXwAN4pyBPLsjAYx4XjJZsoyV3tCqw3LLF4CL6ZHcXjjhQFeLWupFbn26ViGkWl; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61653; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61656; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85092; https://t.me/dva_majors/63117 [42] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152367; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152434 [43] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85092; https://t.me/rybar/67464 [45] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/24/ustylayut-polya-pihotoyu-tilky-na-odnij-dilyanczi-pid-pokrovskom-rosiyany-vtratyly-blyzko-90-soldativ-za-den/; https://youtu.be/mswYHhGXhW4 [46] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/25/v-pavutynni-optovolokna-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-fiksuyut-masovi-ataky-bpla-na-drotah/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg [47] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/25/pryrecheni-yizhaky-u-tumani-rosiyany-odyn-za-odnym-vmyrayut-v-imli-poblyzu-pokrovska/ [48] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8220; https://t.me/osirskiy/1046; https://t.me/raid_413/96; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8221 [49] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61662; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152434   [52] https://t.me/dva_majors/63105; https://t.me/voin_dv/12989; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22884 [53] https://t.me/voin_dv/12986; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8214 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85099; https://t.me/dva_majors/63117 [54] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152430; https://t.me/voin_dv/12994 [57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid033uMXwAN4pyBPLsjAYx4XjJZsoyV3tCqw3LLF4CL6ZHcXjjhQFeLWupFbn26ViGkWl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4446 [58] https://t.me/dva_majors/63103; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152403; https://t.me/voin_dv/12994; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18653   [59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0t6b9ktbyJxN3yW2hnEzDkYtFEws9GG4W6g1AzQb5xnKyyQL72HFFbbnnCuCBGa1Sl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20218 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24440 [60]  https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22888 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85085 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85104 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22892 [61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0t6b9ktbyJxN3yW2hnEzDkYtFEws9GG4W6g1AzQb5xnKyyQL72HFFbbnnCuCBGa1Sl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20218 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/11989 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid07HArEzQJFsrzsQaufYS3upZBL943KgniYe4Dj4iKjaSCxWqJG3rFZ3WtEtRRAjeJl [63] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/37428 ; https://suspilne dot media/933135-umerov-zvilniv-kerivnicu-agencii-oboronnih-zakupivel-usaid-prizupinae-dopomogu-ukraini1067-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1737814579&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/cherkaskaODA/12148; https://t.me/astrapress/73173 ; https://t.me/police_kh_region/35400 [64] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13072 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/24/kozhen-shahed-yak-i-kozhna-rosijska-raketa-robytsya-na-osnovi-inozemnyh-komponentiv-prezydent/ [68] https://военное dot рф/2025/Калашников5/ ; https://kalashnikovgroup dot ru/news/kalashnikov-vpervye_predstavit_noveyshie_udarnye-kuby-_v_abu-dabi [69] https://t.me/astrapress/73212; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/01/25/v-belarusi-pered-vyborami-nachalis-sboi-v-rabote-vpn-chast-belorusskih-saytov-stala-nedostupna-dlya-polzovateley-iz-za-granitsy; https://news.zerkalo [70] https://meduza dot io/news/2025/01/25/v-belarusi-pered-vyborami-nachalis-sboi-v-rabote-vpn-chast-belorusskih-saytov-stala-nedostupna-dlya-polzovateley-iz-za-granitsy; https://news.zerkalo dot io/life/89461.html; https://t.me/astrapress/73212 In this photo taken from video distributed by Russian Defense Ministry Press Service on Sunday Russian servicemen prepare a “Orlan-10" drone in an undisclosed location in Ukraine (Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP) a Russian serviceman prepares a “Orlan-10" drone in an undisclosed location in Ukraine A Russian army helicopter MI-35 launches rockets toward Ukrainian position in an undisclosed location Ukraine (AP) — Russia on Sunday claimed its troops had captured a strategically important town in eastern Ukraine as part of a grinding campaign to weaken Kyiv’s grip on the country’s industrial heartland while uncertainty over the continued flow of U.S funding has reportedly halted the work of some Ukrainian NGOs Russia’s Defense Ministry announced the fall of Velyka Novosilka Its statement could not be independently verified and Ukraine claimed its troops had only strategically withdrawn from certain areas it would make Velyka Novosilka the first significant town to capitulate in 2025 under Moscow’s onslaught in the eastern Donetsk region against Ukraine’s weary and short-handed army Ukrainian forces withdrew from certain parts of Velyka Novosilka to avoid encirclement the 110th Separate Mechanized Brigade said in a statement on its official Telegram channel Sunday The brigade is active in that patch of the frontline Analysts have long predicted that it’s only a matter of time until Russian forces capture the settlement which lies only 15 kilometers (9 miles) from the neighboring Dnipropetrovsk region The brigade said though they have approximate parity with Russian forces in terms of artillery and drones the Russians have a huge advantage in manpower skillfully withdrew from areas where there was a threat of encirclement This does not mean that we have completely left the city the fighting in Velyka Novosilka continues All actions are aimed at minimizing our own losses and maximum damage to the enemy,” the statement said The brigade said the withdrawal will make it topographically difficult for Russians to advance by making the river an obstacle for further advance any movement is cut off by shells and drones,” the statement said Ukrainian NGOs catering to the needs of war veterans and their families have claimed a suspension of U.S funding is forcing them to halt their work Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced he would pause foreign aid grants for 90 days Ukrainian NGOs receiving funding from Washington this weekend began receiving “stop work” orders requiring them to pause all projects and related travel an NGO that provides legal and psychological support to war veterans and their families was forced to halt operations of two of its three largest service units as a result the organization said in its official Facebook page It said the suspension has lead it to ask for public donations for the first time we have refrained from public fundraising because we believe that donations are primarily needed for the military we are forced to publicly ask for support for the first time,” the organization said With the Trump administration questioning the future of U.S stressing the need to quickly broker a peace deal both Moscow and Kyiv are seeking battlefield successes to strengthen their negotiating positions ahead of any prospective talks Russian forces have been waging an intense campaign to punch holes in Ukraine’s defenses in the eastern Donetsk region The sustained and costly offensive has compelled Kyiv to give up a series of towns This was reported by the Khortytsia operational and strategic group of troops in Telegram The video shows that while moving between houses, two invaders take a civilian woman and a dog with them to protect themselves from drone strikes Video: The official channel of the Khortytsia Operational and Strategic Group of Troops (OSGT) “The occupiers know that we will not shoot,” the OSGT noted As Ukrinform reported earlier, the Russian army attacked six times in the Novopavlivka sector near Lysivka, Kostiantynopil and Rozdolne. About 302,000 civilians remain in the Donetsk region Brendan Cole is a Newsweek Senior News Reporter based in London He also covers other areas of geopolitics including China Brendan joined Newsweek in 2018 from the International Business Times and well as English You can get in touch with Brendan by emailing b.cole@newsweek.com or follow on him on his X account @brendanmarkcole John Feng is Newsweek's contributing editor for Asia based in Taichung He has covered foreign policy and defense matters especially in relation to U.S.-China ties and cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan John joined Newsweek in 2020 after reporting in Central Europe and the United Kingdom He is a graduate of National Chengchi University in Taipei and SOAS You can get in touch with John by emailing j.feng@newsweek.com Russia has said it had captured a strategically significant settlement in the west of Ukraine's Donetsk oblast amid reports that its troops are closing in on the key regional city of Toretsk as maps show the state of play along the front line Russia's Defense Ministry said it had captured Velyka Novosilka although Ukraine's military only acknowledged there had been a partial withdrawal and that fighting was ongoing elsewhere in the settlement Ukraine's Defense Ministry referred Newsweek to an earlier media statement that its forces were holding on to positions on the outskirts of Velyka Novoselka and had avoided encirclement by Russian forces Russia's Defense Ministry said on Sunday its forces had captured Velyka Novosilka although Ukraine's 110th Mechanized Brigade said on Monday it had withdrawn from parts of the settlement to avoid encirclement but that fighting was ongoing elsewhere in the area The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) said on Sunday that geolocated evidence showed Russian forces occupied 89 percent of the settlement but there was no sign that it had been encircled citing the Khortytsia group of forces spokesman Ukraine's Defense Ministry told Newsweek its troops had escaped encirclement and had withdrawn from the southern part of Velyka Novoselka Ukraine held important positions on the outskirts of the village which stopped Russian troops from advancing further think tank said that Russia had been unusually vocal about the claimed seizure; likely to shape Western perceptions of the battlefield and degrade international support for Ukraine The think tank also said that Russian forces are poised to seize Toretsk with its map showing Moscow's advances near the district of Krymske in the north of the town Ukraine's military said on Monday that Russian forces had made unsuccessful pushes in the Kharkiv and Kupiansk directions Ministry of Defence said on Monday that Russian forces had expanded a bridgehead on the west bank of the Oskil River and was applying pressure to the logistics hub of Kupiansk Russian forces control supply lines east and south of Kupiansk and are probably focusing on getting hold of the northern supply routes into the city The Institute for the Study of War said: [Moscow] is paying an abnormally high amount of fanfare to the claimed Russian seizure of Velyka Novosilka very likely (...) to shape Western perceptions of the battlefield situation in Ukraine and degrade international support for Ukraine." The capture and clearing of Velyka Novosilka would mean Russian command would decide on whether to redeploy troops to other front-line areas which could signal Moscow's priorities for spring and summer slow Russian advances are likely to continue in Donetsk at a high cost in personnel ET: This article has been updated with a response from Ukraine's Defense Ministry Posted: 5 February 2025| Region: Europe, Caucasus, and Central Asia | Category: Ukraine Update Authors: Olha Polishchuk; Cristian Vlas Explore the ACLED Conflict Exposure tool to assess the numbers of people affected by armed violence and Central Asia Research Manager at ACLED and has been with the organization since September 2018 originally hired as the Ukraine Researcher she manages a team of researchers covering countries across Eastern Europe and Central Asia and oversees the dataset and analysis work for the region Olha holds an LLM in Law of the Sea from the Arctic University of Norway an LLM in Human Rights Law with International Law from the University of Kent and a bachelor's degree from the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv She has experience working in the private law sector Cristian Vlas is the Assistant Research Manager at the Eastern Europe desk His previous focus was political violence in Belarus His work experience includes four years of reporting on Moldova and the Transnistrian conflict settlement for Moldova.org monitoring of the use of small arms and light weapons in Moldova at SEESAC's Armed Violence Monitoring Platform He also worked on reporting and advocacy with the Romanian National Council of Refugees (CNRR) Cristian has a Master’s degree in International Relations from the Corvinus University of Budapest and earned his Bachelor’s degree in International Relations and European Integration from the University of Pécs Regions: Europe, Caucasus, and Central Asia your new go-to podcast to spice up your weekday mornings with relevant news and behind-the-scenes from Brussels and beyond From the economy to the climate and the EU's role in world affairs this talk show sheds light on European affairs and the issues that impact on our daily lives as Europeans Tune in to understand the ins and outs of European politics Dare to imagine the future with business and tech visionaries Deep dive conversations with business leaders Euronews Tech Talks goes beyond discussions to explore the impact of new technologies on our lives the podcast provides valuable insights into the intersection of technology and society Europe's water is under increasing pressure floods are taking their toll on our drinking water Join us on a journey around Europe to see why protecting ecosystems matters and to discover some of the best water solutions an animated explainer series and live debate - find out why Water Matters We give you the latest climate facts from the world’s leading source analyse the trends and explain how our planet is changing We meet the experts on the front line of climate change who explore new strategies to mitigate and adapt The Russian Ministry of Defence claimed on Sunday that its forces had taken control of Velyka Novosilka a town in the east Ukrainian Donetsk region The town is a key defensive hub on the frontlines for the Ukrainian army it being occupied by Russian forces would mean a significant gain for Moscow Analysts have long predicted that it was only a matter of time until Russian forces entered the settlement which lies just 15 kilometres from the neighbouring Dnipropetrovsk region the 110th Separate Mechanised Brigade said on its official Telegram channel Sunday The brigade said that though their forces are roughly equal in terms of artillery and drones the Russians have a significant advantage in manpower skilfully withdrew from areas where there was a threat of encirclement All actions are aimed at minimising our own losses and maximum damage to the enemy,” the statement said The brigade said the withdrawal would make it difficult for Russian troops to advance as a river in the area would act as an obstacle for further advance Heavy fighting in the Donetsk has put Ukrainian troops in a "quite difficult" situation adding that more weapons are urgently needed to fend off Russian aggression and territorial advances EU foreign ministers agreed to roll over sanctions against Russia EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said in a post on X "This will continue to deprive Moscow of revenues to finance its war Russia needs to pay for the damage they are causing." Speaking to reporters ahead of the meeting with EU foreign ministers Kallas praised US President Donald Trump for putting pressure on Russia to end the war in Ukraine The EU renews its sanctions every six months and the deadline for the latest extension expires on Friday Sanctions include bans on trade with Russia in energy as well as measures that freeze Russia's central bank assets Renewing the sanctions is usually a formality, but recent anti-sanction rhetoric from Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has cast doubt on their renewal The rollover requires unanimity from all 27 member states to be approved With the Trump administration questioning the future of US aid to Ukraine and stressing the need to quickly broker a peace deal Russian forces have been waging an intense campaign to punch holes in Ukraine’s defences in the eastern Donetsk region The 110th Mechanized Brigade of the Ukrainian Ground Forces reported this on Facebook sharing video footage of the battle's aftermath attempting to take advantage of poor weather conditions Ukrainian reconnaissance detected the enemy early "A few enemy armored vehicles managed to retreat but the rest were left to rust on the battlefield Infantry was bombarded with shells," the brigade reported “To avoid encirclement of the Ukrainian forces in the southern part of the settlement (Velyka Novosilka) The Ukrainian forces continue to hold some positions within the settlement Any other actions could have led to encirclement and unnecessary losses among the Ukrainian defenders the Russian forces have entered a significant portion of the settlement while Ukrainians are maintaining specific defensive lines to prevent them from advancing further,” Trehubov stated intense fighting continues in the area of responsibility of the Khortytsia OSGT The enemy unsuccessfully attempted to assault positions in Vovchansk and tried to break through the defenses in the Kramatorsk and Toretsk sectors "There is no complete encirclement there There is a risk of operational encirclement but efforts are being made to prevent it and to prevent the Russians from blocking the approaches to the village although they are trying to take them under fire control," Trehubov said the geographical location of Velyka Novosilka creates special difficulties namely: the river that crosses the village and limits maneuvers Action plans are also being developed to eliminate these difficulties "They are constantly rotating in one way or another replenishing the forces that they already have there especially noticeably in the Pokrovsk sector but this does not mean that they are currently in difficulty in this regard This means that they are not currently "bathing" in excess resources," the spokesperson said the Russian troops are resorting to the tactic of total destruction of the town which complicates defense and indicates that they do not need the town Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 pm ET on January 22 ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment The Kremlin has launched an information operation that seeks to create the false impression that the Russian economy is performing well despite numerous continued indicators of macroeconomic distress Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed during a meeting on economic issues on January 22 that 2024 was a "strong year" for the Russian economy.[1] Putin claimed that Russia has a manageable budget deficit of 1.7 percent and achieved a 26 percent increase in non-oil-and-gas revenue to 25.6 trillion rubles (approximately $257.9 billion) in 2024 and announced a retroactive 9.5 percent increase in insurance and military pensions to address rising Russian inflation Bloomberg reported on January 21 that the Russian Finance Ministry released a report projecting economic strength and suggesting that Russian budget revenue in December 2024 reached a record high of over 4 trillion rubles (about $40 billion) — a 28 percent increase compared to December 2023 and the highest level recorded since 2011.[2] The data fails to account for Russia's unsustainable levels of defense spending a growing deficit and the erosion of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund however.[3] ISW continues to observe macroeconomic data that directly contradict the Kremlin's claims that the Russian economy is performing well The Kremlin has recently adopted policies aimed at increasing defense spending all while Russian society faces labor shortages and increasing reliance on bailouts as the Russian economy faces rising interest rates and deteriorating production capacity.[4] These economic realities suggest that the Kremlin's efforts to posture economic strength are largely an information operation aimed at reassuring domestic audiences and posturing Russian strength abroad while masking the true challenges Russia's economy is facing particularly heightened due to its war against Ukraine Russia continues long-term efforts to build out its manpower reserve with All-Russian Cossack Society organizations and create a willing and well-trained prioritized pool designed to buffer the Kremlin from potential blowback in the event of a possible future partial call up of Russian reservists Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's northwestern Russia service Sever Realii reported on January 22 that Russian organizations have allocated a total of 11.4 million rubles (roughly $114,880) for territorial defense training for 100 officers within the "Great Don Army" branch of the All-Russian Cossack Society including 5.6 million rubles (approximately $56,400) from the Russian Presidential Grant Fund and 5.7 million rubles (approximately $57,400) from the "Great Don Army" organization.[5] The training will include drone piloting training and tactical A separate portion of the training will be devoted to organizing defense and interacting with political authorities in "wartime conditions." The Kremlin's efforts to expand the All-Russian Cossack societies following the March 2024 law enrolling members of the All-Russian Cossack Society into the Russian military's mobilization reserve are likely an effort to expand the number of well-trained troops in Russia's active reserve pools that the Kremlin can call up to fight in Ukraine or elsewhere during a possible future partial call up of Russian reservists.[6] North Korea will reportedly deploy new military personnel to Russia by mid-March 2025 likely to maintain the current pace and intensity of attritional The New York Times (NYT) reported on January 22 that a US senior defense official stated that additional North Korean forces will arrive in Russia "within the next two months," (roughly mid-March 2025).[7] The NYT did not specify the number of troops or whether North Korea is rotating forces or increasing the size of its total force grouping in Russia The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff reported on December 23 that North Korea may be preparing to deploy an unspecified number of additional forces to Ukraine and military equipment to Russia either as a rotation or additional deployment of forces.[8] Western officials told the BBC on January 22 that North Korean forces have suffered roughly 1,000 killed in action and 3,000 missing or wounded in action as of mid-January 2025 roughly 33 to 40 percent of the 11,000 to 12,000 total North Korean personnel already in Russia.[9] ISW recently assessed that the entirety of the North Korean contingent in Russia may be killed or wounded in action by about mid-April 2025 at their current casualty rate assuming the reported next batch of North Korean troops will train for the same duration as their predecessors and deploy to Russia imminently in late January or early February 2025 These fresh North Korean forces are unlikely to decisively improve Russian operations and will likely face the same high casualty rates and complications operating with Russian forces as the current North Korean contingent provided the Russian command continues to use North Korean forces the same way as it has thus far US officials and Ukrainian soldiers told the NYT that North Korean and Russian forces continue to struggle with communications and cohesion and that Russian and North Korean forces have "clashed" at least twice due to troop identification errors.[12] A Ukrainian commander told the NYT that North Korean assault groups now include a translator who speaks Russian but that these groups are still not very effective Ukrainian soldiers reported that North Korean forces continue conducting mass infantry assaults and that North Korean soldiers do not retreat even if injured Russian milbloggers complained and expressed concern over recent claims that the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government in Syria suspended Russian investment and financial involvement in the port of Tartus as Russia's long-term military presence in Syria remains unclear A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on January 22 that the Russian government via a Russian military official based in Turkey recently reached an unspecified agreement with HTS that appears to have included permission for Russian vessels to dock in the port of Tartus.[16] Marine Traffic shows that the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships are docked in the port of Tartus as of January 22 and these ships are likely supporting the Russian military's evacuation of military equipment from the port A Russian state media outlet reported that Russia may resume direct gas deliveries to Transnistria despite recent discussions about sourcing non-Russian gas to the region reported on January 22 that Russia may resume gas supplies to Transnistria via the TurkStream pipeline using the Cyprus-based company Obzor Enterprises as an intermediary.[20] Kommersant citing data from the European Union (EU)'s Regional Booking Platform (RBP) for natural gas transmission reported that Obzor Enterprises booked the TurkStream pipeline on January 20 to transit 3.1 million cubic meters of gas per day to the Strandzha-2 entry point from February 1 to March 1 volumes which Kommersant assessed align with Transnistria's estimated humanitarian needs Kommersant reported that authorities are discussing extending these supplies through mid-April and that Russia would pay roughly $160 million to purchase the gas Kommersant's sources noted that Russia is prioritizing efforts to transfer the gas to Transnistria through the Trans-Balkan pipeline which runs through Bulgaria and Romania before reaching Transnistria Russian and Transnistrian authorities have recently been exploring the possibility of sourcing Russian-funded European gas to Transnistria through the European spot market but Moldovan President Maia Sandu has stated that only Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz has the authority to deliver gas to Transnistria and that Moldovagaz can only work with companies that do not violate Moldovan law or international sanctions.[21] Ukrainian and Moldovan officials have noted how Russia is trying to leverage the manufactured gas crisis to affect Moldovan public opinion before the Summer 2025 Moldovan parliamentary elections.[22]   Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 22 but did not make confirmed advances A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached the outskirts of Guyevo (south of Sudzha)   Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on January 22 that GUR first person view (FPV) strike drones struck a piece of Russian satellite equipment near Tetkino Kursk Oblast on January 17.[28] The GUR reported that the equipment supported Russia's use of the Yamal-401 and Yamal-300K communications satellites in the area Russian forces continued limited ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on January 21 and 22 but did not advance.[29] Elements of the Chechen “Zapad-Akhmat” Battalion and Rosgvardia’s 116th Special Purpose “Stalhaya" Brigade are reportedly operating in Kharkiv Oblast.[30] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 22 but did not make confirmed advances The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 22 that Russian forces seized Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[31] Russian milbloggers claimed on January 22 that Russian forces advanced both north and south of Zapadne and south of and in central Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk).[32] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims Trehubov also stated that Russian forces conduct assaults on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River have accumulated an unspecified amount of personnel and have not established logistics across the Oskil River as the water has not frozen   Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 22 but did not make confirmed advances A Russian milblogger claimed on January 22 that Russian forces advanced southwest of Lozova (northeast of Borova) and west of Nadiya (east of Borova).[39] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Borova near Lozova and Zahryzove; east of Borova near Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka and Novoserhiivka on January 21 and 22.[40]   Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on January 22 but did not make confirmed advances A Russian milblogger claimed on January 22 that Russian forces advanced southwest of Terny (northeast of Lyman) northwest and west of Ivanivka (northeast of Lyman) and north and east of Kolodyazi.[41] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Lyman near Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Kuzmyne and Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near the Serebryanske forest area on January 21 and 22.[42] Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA] Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue operating in the Lyman direction.[43] Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on January 21 and 22 but did not advance.[44]   Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 22 Geolocated footage published on January 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Zaliznychna Street in northwestern Chasiv Yar and recently marginally advanced north and northwest of the Chasiv Yar Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further along Tsentralna Street in central Chasiv Yar but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[46] Russian forces continued ground attacks near Chasiv Yar itself and north of Chasiv Yar in the direction of Fedorivka on January 21 and 22.[47] Snipers of the Russian 299th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Chasiv Yar itself and elements of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Chasiv Yar itself.[48]   Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 22 Geolocated footage published on January 22 shows drone operators of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA] formerly the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) striking Ukrainian forces in western Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk) but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[52] Russian forces continued ground attacks within Toretsk itself on January 21 and 22.[53]   Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Pokrovsk amid ongoing offensive operations near Pokrovsk on January 22 Geolocated footage published on January 22 indicate that Russian forces recently advanced in the fields northeast of Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk) and within the northeastern part of the settlement.[54] Russian milbloggers reiterated claims that Russian forces advanced near Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk) seized Baranivka (northeast of Pokrovsk and north of Vozdvyzhenka) and Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk) advanced 3.6 kilometers in depth west of Vovkove (southwest of Pokrovsk) and within Nadiivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian military command recently introduced reserve forces into combat east of Pokrovsk and that these forces participated in the supposed seizure of Baranivka.[56] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces recently introduced elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA Central Military District [CMD]) to offensive operations south of Pokrovsk indicating that Russian forces continue to prioritize the envelopment of Pokrovsk from the southwest.[57] Mashovets assessed that Russian advances south and east of Pokrovsk have slowed in recent weeks A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[58] Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novyi Trud and Petropavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Novoserhiivka and Sribne and in the direction of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) on January 21 and 22.[59]   Russian forces recently advanced west of Kurakhove amid continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on January 22 Mashovets stated on January 22 that elements of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) have struggled to advance towards Andriivka (west of Kurakhove) from the south since their last advance as of January 12 despite being reinforced with elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA).[62] Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Kurakhove near Slovyanka and Shevchenko; west of Kurakhove near Dachne and Kostyantynopil; and southwest of Kurakhove near Ulakly and Yantarne on January 21 and 22.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka and Zelenivka (southwest of Kurakhove).[64]   Russian forces recently advanced near and within Velyka Novosilka amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 22 Geolocated footage published on January 21 and 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along a road west of Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka Novosilka) and along Horizhnia Street in northeastern Velyka Novosilka.[65] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Vremivka (west of Velyka Novosilka) and further within eastern Velyka Novosilka and reiterated claims that Russian forces have partially enveloped Ukrainian forces in Velyka Novosilka from the north and south.[66] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA) are attacking in southeastern Velyka Novosilka and that elements of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA EMD) are attacking in the southwestern part of the settlement.[67] Mashovets noted that elements of the Russian 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are advancing near the northern outskirts of Velyka Novosilka.[68] Russian forces continued ground assaults near Velyka Novosilka and just west of Velyka Novosilka near Vremivka on January 21 and 22.[69] Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet EMD) are reportedly operating within Velyka Novosilka.[70]   Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes) Russian forces continued limited ground attacks northwest of Robotyne near Kamyanske on January 21 and 22 but did not advance.[71] Drone operators of the Russian "Smuglyanka" Detachment are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[72] A Ukrainian drone group operating in the Zaporizhia direction posted footage on January 22 showing a Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drone strike against a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system likely in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[73]   Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dnipro direction on January 21 and 22 but did not advance.[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have intensified drone and HIMARS strikes against the Russian rear in occupied Kherson Oblast.[75] Drone operators of the Russian 10th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Main Military Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[76]   Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 21 to 22 The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 99 Shahed and other strike and decoy drones from Millerovo and Oryol oblasts; and occupied Cape Chauda Crimea.[77] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 65 drones over Poltava and Odesa oblasts; that 30 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that drone strikes damaged institutions Ukrainian official sources reported that Russian drone strikes hit a residential home and an administrative building in Mykolaiv Oblast and a residential home in Sumy Oblast.[78] Russia and Uzbekistan are deepening military cooperation Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with Uzbek Defense Minister Shukhrat Halmukhamedov in Tashkent on January 22 and signed a joint Russian-Uzbekistan military cooperation plan for 2025 and a strategic military partnership plan for 2026-2030.[79] Belousov stated that the delegation also discussed bilateral military-technical cooperation and regional security issues and claimed that Russian-Uzbek cooperation has a significant impact on regional security in Central Asia Belousov also met with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev on January 22.[80] Russia continues efforts to improve state monitoring processes and streamline force generation mechanisms Moscow City Military Recruitment Head Maxim Loktev announced on January 21 that regional officials will send text messages to boys turning 17 years old in 2025 regarding automatic registration for military service.[81] The Kremlin adopted a law in 2023 which authorized authorities to dispatch automatic summons via electronic methods thereby boosting the state's visibility among recruitment pools and automating recruitment notices and Loktev's announcement appears to be part of this effort.[82] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to grapple with unprofessionalism and abuse among Russian commanders A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on January 22 that Luhansk Oblast occupation authorities arrested the commander of a Russian assault company of the 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA] Central Military District [CMD]) for crimes ranging from embezzlement to creating a private prison to punish his subordinates.[83] The milblogger claimed that this is the second scandal in two days for the unit and that occupation officials recently arrested a military police officer for beating a contract soldier The milblogger noted that such beatings are common and have a negative impact on Russian society and force generation efforts The milblogger called on Russian military officials to make an example of such individuals   [1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76145 [2] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-01-21/russia-s-budget-revenue-surges-to-record-in-december-despite-sanctions [3] https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-national-wealth-fund-38-billion-deficit/32229281.html; https://www.aa dot com dot tr/en/economy/russias-national-wealth-fund-reserves-down-117b/3452503 [5] https://vsko dot ru/ ; https://t.me/severrealii/29287 [6] 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https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2025; https://newsmaker dot md/ro/recean-si-serebrian-califica-drept-schema-contractul-asumat-de-vicol-doar-moldovagaz-poate-livra-gaz-in-stanga-nistrului/; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/22921917; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011425 [24] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22731; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22771; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61595 [25] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61595; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22771; [27] https://t.me/mod_russia/48135; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84939 [28] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/rozvidnyky-znyshchyly-vorozhe-suputnykove-obladnannia.html [29]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l ; https://t.me/synegubov/12756 [32] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84927; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30650; https://t.me/notes_veterans/21526 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22774 [33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l [35] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/22/okupanty-na-gumovyh-chovnah-pereplyvayut-oskil-ale-yih-zustrichayut-nashi-dronari/ [36] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/21/stymulyuvannya-rozstrilamy-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-vorog-pidtrymuye-rytm-shturmiv-stratamy/ [39] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30647 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30647 [40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4309 [41] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30644; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30644 [42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l [44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4309 [45] https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/1882013082530238489; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24878; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1882092705913930238; https://t.me/Rarog_24OMBr/392 [46] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30656 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30659 [47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l; https://t.me/dva_majors/62896; https://t.me/wargonzo/24387 [49] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1882076801478078537; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13287 [50] https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/582; https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/573; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8189; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1882067413816275303; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8188 [51] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/22/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-sytuacziyu-u-toreczku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg [52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22724; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152093 [54] https://t.me/ssternenko/39091; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8193 [55] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30640 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61599 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61585 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84923 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/3158 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22762 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22769 ; https://t.me/vrogov/18848 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152093 [59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61599; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20709 [60] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8185; https://t.me/AFUStratCom/27774 [61] https://t.me/dva_majors/62896; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22731 [63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l; https://t.me/dva_majors/62896; https://t.me/yurasumy/20706 [65] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24867; https://t.me/ombr_110/420; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8192 [66] https://t.me/yurasumy/20705 ; https://t.me/sashakots/51449 ; https://t.me/smotri_z/39304 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22233 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84900 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62937 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152093 [69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l [70] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84900 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/12929 [71]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l [73] https://t.me/Ronins44_65/431; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/22/zrubaly-chergovyj-buk-nashi-dronari-vidznachylysya-na-pivdni/ [74]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tLM6nGF1VnxuPsczjrjFzviWsJJXKjfoCmGop2bXASNtTPrq896cgi5GFr5WxcgYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0exJS3KzfvzJBx8FkTCZRkGixZqJqsVz41mh1mayoBnUVYC9QuYh13URZ8NNSCM8Yl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kK7SbfRzoWBhC6aruhihe7t5u9oAza2JwLtaBoPctaQE4s12KQkBtjg4yMPxTSp5l [78] https://t.me/senkevichonline/11293; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/12895; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/924153-zagroza-bezpilotnikiv-u-mikolaevi-prolunali-vibuhi/ ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/01/22/rossiyskiy-dron-popal-v-shestietazhnyy-dom-v-nikolaeve-chastichno-razrushen-verhniy-etazh; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/37268 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/37268 [81] https://www.rbc dot ru/society/21/01/2025/678f6f419a794753e2dea007 [82] https://www.rbc dot ru/society/14/04/2023/64399bbf9a79473c8e25e2ec ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2024 As reported by Ukrinform, this was stated on Telegram by the Khortytsia Operational-Strategic Group of Troops (OSGT) "In the Novopavlivka sector of the front conducted offensive actions in Velyka Novosilka Nearly 80 shelling attacks were carried out on our positions in this settlement The enemy's losses are excessively high," the Khortytsia OSGT emphasized and the remnants of the attacking group retreated to their original positions the Russian forces carried out offensive actions near Dvorichna the enemy also failed to breach defensive positions near Kopanky and Yampolivka the invaders tried to break through the Ukrainian defenses near Ivano-Darivka Fire strikes destroyed two Russian infantry fighting vehicles and two buggies the Russian forces assaulted positions in Chasiv Yar and Toretsk which were destroyed before reaching the frontline and the tactical situation remained stable the Russian troops attempted to leverage their numerical advantage to breach defensive lines in the areas of Vodiane Druhe Intense battles continue in the settlements of Lysivka The Ukrainian defenders continue to neutralize the superior enemy forces the total combat losses of the Russian forces in Ukraine from February 24 The news from the battle around Velyka Novozilka is still somewhat hazy and unsettled.  The Russians claim to have taken the previously peaceful home of about 5,000 souls mostly farmers in far Southwestern Donetsk oblast Ukraine.  Videos of Russian forces waving various battle flags in the center of the town famed for their stalwart 2 year long stand at Avdiivka Russian forces have a significant advantage in infantry numbers “But we’ve made them bleed and continue to do so From areas where encirclement was a threat our units skillfully withdrew using weather conditions to their advantage,” the brigade said The report added that fighting in Velyka Novosilka continues with Ukrainian forces focusing on minimizing their own losses while inflicting maximum damage on the enemy the brigade emphasized that Russia would not be able to continue advancing from Velyka Novosilka(emphasis mine) Soldiers noted that this is a typical situation for Russian forces: prioritizing symbolic gains over strategy and outcomes www.msn.com/... It is probably safe to say that by the looks of things is under Russian control as I write but that the much hoped for Russian dream of an encirclement has not happened.  It may be hard for those of us who have Ukraine’s cause at heart to see them withdraw from another town Once again seemingly performing with relative ease one of the most difficult tactical field maneuvers … a fighting retrograde The Ukrainian army is re-writing the book on how to do this thing Something that is likely to become course material for future warriors in military academies the world over Somehow as hard as they try the Russian Wile E Coyote just never quite seems to be able to spring the trap on that pesky Ukrainian Road Runner Be that as it may the above excerpted quotes from the Ukrainian 110th Brigade also serves to illuminate the kernel of Ukraine’s ongoing strategy … attrit attrit and attrit some more …  “focusing on minimizing their own losses while inflicting maximum damage on the enemy.” Until the Russian Leviathan is eventually rendered prostrate and pusillanimous … unable to go any further But at Velyka Novosilka there is an interesting twist As stated above it is highly likely that Russian forces may not be able to continue advancing from Velyka Novosilka.:   the fighters with the 110th Brigade continue to strike at Russian forces which have trapped themselves by entering Velyka Novosilka The 110th Brigade with the Ukrainian Armed Forces assures that Russian troops will not be able to move forward from there "Continuing the offensive from Velyka Novosilka will no longer be possible for Russian troops It's a typical situation for the Russians – 'the main task is to plant the flag.' The cost and prospects don't matter which created problems for our supply units has now become an obstacle to the Russian advance the Russians have fallen into a fire trap where they will find no peace; any movement is suppressed by shells and drones," the brigade explained there are no intact buildings left in the settlement," the 110th Brigade concluded It all seems like “déja vu all over again” to quote the old chestnut attributed to a fellow St the late Baseball Hall of Fame NY Yankees catcher Some might recall that the eastern wing of the Ukrainian 2023 counteroffensive aiming for Mariupol started off from Velyka Novosilka down the Mokri Yaly river valley. And the rural settlements Makarivka, Urozhaine(bloodiest battle in that series) are the same ones that Ukraine battled so hard to take back from the Russians in 2023.  Taking advantage of the mostly riverine topography of the area the Russians mounted a strong defense(part of the famed Surovikin line) at Zavitne Bazhannya.  The Ukrainian drive faltered here and did not make it to the linchpin Russian fortress at  Staromilnivka… roughly half way to Mariupol by road and the sea of Azov from Velyka Novosilka Now the tables appear to have turned. The Russians may have taken Velyka Novosilka but it would appear that once again the Ukrainians plan to give the Russians a taste of what they dished out to Ukraine after the Ukrainians retook Urozhaine in 2023 .. here and no farther in the Mokri Yaly river valley The Ukrainians will take full advantage of what Russia did to them in 2023 by blowing up the Novodarivka dam to slow the Ukrainian counteroffensive The river is much wider than it was before Russia destroyed the dam forests and high river banks which obscure movement of the defenders and do not leave too many places where the attacking force can attempt a river crossing And we all know how challenging river crossings have been for the Russians in this war… the disaster at Bilohorivka the Dnipro and the Sehm(Kursk) to name just a few River crossings by their very nature are extremely challenging to pull off successfully especially if the defenders are aware and have made their defensive dispositions accordingly … eyes everywhere 24/7 mine fields and various forms of killer drones by the thousands.  And now all river crossing bridges have long disappeared If the Russian southern pincer to encircle Pokrovsk is predicated on moving northward along the Mokri Yaly through Velyka Novosilka the Ukrainians are bound and determined to not let that happen.  The Russians will have to take Pokrovsk head on(something they have been reluctant to do but now seem doomed to) or take the long route through Zaporizhizhia oblast for their dream encirclement.  That will take a long time … a long slog that will bog down the Russian behemoth and cause it to eventually run out of gas running on fumes as they currently are already. And the Ukrainians will be waiting.  It isn’t sexy but it works.  Ukraine may not have millions of disposable mobiks to throw into “meat assaults” but contrary to what Josef Stalin said about quantity having a quality of its own which Ukraine now has and continues to develop in abundance Putin and the Russians ought to remember their own war history Not signed up for Daily Kos yet? Create a free account by Tim ZadorozhnyyUkrainian infantrymen of the Carpathian Sich 49th Infantry Battalion named after Oleg Kutsyn exercise in an unspecified location not far from front line in Donetsk Oblast (Anatolii Stepanov / AFP via Getty Images)Russian troops may encircle Ukrainian forces near Velyka Novosilka located 74 kilometers from the regional center of Donetsk the monitoring group DeepState reported on Dec DeepState, an independent mapping project known for its close ties to Ukraine's Defense Ministry and widely trusted for accurate territorial updates, highlighted that Russian operations in the area aim to sever logistics and occupy the village Ukrainian troops in Makarivka south of Velyka Novosilka have been almost surrounded Analysts warn that the situation around Makarivka is becoming more critical as Russian troops continue their advances A recent Russian raid on Novyi Komar, just 4 kilometers north of Velyka Novosilka, achieved partial success, with Russian forces reportedly entering the village The DeepState monitoring group map, as of December 17. (DeepState/OpenStreetMaps)Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi previously described the ongoing Russian offensive as "one of the most powerful" since the start of Moscow's full-scale invasion in February 2022 Over the autumn, Russian forces have achieved operational gains in southern Donetsk Oblast, particularly near Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, and Kupiansk, while also advancing on Russian soil in Kursk Oblast Tim Zadorozhnyy is a news editor at The Kyiv Independent he is pursuing studies in International Relations Tim began his career at a local television channel in Odesa he joined the Belarusian opposition media outlet NEXTA starting as a news anchor and later advancing to the position of managing editor This was reported on X by the British Defense Ministry Russian forces have applied increasing pressure on the town of Velyka Novosilka Russian forces have advanced north to seize the villages of Neskuchne and Vremivka – the latter situated to the immediate west of the town," the report says It is noted that Velyka Novosilka has been on the front line since the full-scale invasion Russia failed in its attempts to capture the settlement back in the summer of 2022 while Ukraine eventually pushed Russian troops south in 2023 Russia advanced in this area after capturing other settlements to the east including Vuhledar in October 2024 and Kurakhove in January 2025 referring to the Khortytsia Grouping of Troops taking advantage of challenging weather conditions went for an offensive to “block” the settlement of Velyka Novosilka According to Ukrinform, the Khortytsia operational and strategic grouping of troops reported this in Telegram and posted a video “In the Novopavlivsk direction, pilots of attack drones of the unmanned systems battalion destroyed dozens of Russian invaders near the village of Velyka Novosilka,” the statement said It is noted that our defenders used FPV strike drones to eliminate the occupiers “UAV operators are actively knocking out enemy assault groups and assured that the enemy has no potential for further advancement here,” the Khortytsia unit added As Ukrinform reported earlier, the total combat losses of Russian troops in Ukraine from February 24, 2022 to February 7, 2025 amounted to about 846,650 people Photo: 110th Separate Mechanized Brigade named after Major General Mark Bezruchko the spokesman for the Khortytsia operational and strategic group of forces said this on Ukrainian television when asked if Russian troops had completely occupied Velyka Novosilka  “Our information is that fighting continues there Ukrainian troops are holding their positions within the settlement I would not comment on the loss of Velyka Novosilka Because we have the right not to comment on what did not happen our enemies would like to hear from us sometimes,” Trehubov said When asked how the occupation of Vremiivka and other small villages near Velyka Novosilka would affect the further defense operation the spokesman explained that it would be necessary to continue to hold back the Russians “We will have to restrain the Russians in the positions [they have now] and either return (the positions - ed.) or restrain the Russians in the next positions There is nothing new here and nothing difficult to understand any general military battle is complex in itself I'm saying that there is nothing difficult to understand about further actions,” he said Trehubov said that the units of the Defense Forces had been withdrawn from the southern part of Velyka Novosilka in the Donetsk region in order to avoid the encirclement of Ukrainian forces According to Ukrinform, the Khortytsia operational and strategic group of troops reported this in a Telegram message conducted offensive actions in the areas of Novyi Komar Fighting continues in Velyka Novosilka. Russian troops fired almost 30 artillery shells at the positions of the Defense Forces in this locality The Ukrainian Defense Forces continue to inflict losses in manpower and equipment on the Russians in the course of intense defensive battles the invaders tried to storm Ukrainian positions in Vovchansk the enemy also unsuccessfully conducted offensive actions in the areas of Kolisnykivka the Russian army attacked the positions of the Defense Forces near Kopanky Russian troops tried to break through the defenses near Stupochky High-intensity fighting continued in the urban areas of Chasiv Yar and Toretsk The enemy fired 150 artillery shells at Chasiv Yar and 91 at Toretsk as well as one attack with a guided aerial bomb Russians actively used various types of UAVs As a result of the assault and fire of the Russians some positions of the Defense Forces were destroyed Measures are being taken to prevent the tactical situation from deteriorating The invaders also attacked the positions of Ukrainian troops near Vodiane Druha As Ukrinform reported earlier, President Volodymyr Zelensky has appointed Major General Mykhailo Drapaty to lead the Khortytsia military unit Drapaty will retain the powers of the Commander of the Land Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15pm ET on November 11 ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment Russian forces are successfully leveraging their recent seizure of Vuhledar to make tactically significant gains south of Kurakhove in support of ongoing Russian offensive operations that aim to level the frontline and eliminate the Ukrainian salient in western Donetsk Oblast but ISW is yet to observe confirmation of Russian advances into Yelizavetivka and further west along the C051104 highway.[3] Russian forces are currently several kilometers south of the Romanivka-Uspenivka-Sukhyi Yar line — a string to settlements north of Vuhledar that could pose a notable challenge to Russian forces should Ukrainian forces be able to establish defenses in these settlements Russian forces appear to be attempting to bypass this line of settlements as geolocated footage published on November 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Dalne (south of Kurakhove and northwest of Yelizavetivka) and likely hold positions in the fields east and southeast of Dalne.[4] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced into Dalne itself but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these maximalist claims.[5] Further Russian advances into Dalne and west of Dalne could force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from positions in the pocket north and northeast of Vuhledar and allow Russian forces to advance along the C051104 highway relatively uncontested Such advances would allow Russian forces to further pressure Ukrainian positions in Kurakhove from the south ISW is revising its previous assessment that Russian forces would not likely be able to take advantage of the seizure of Vuhledar for further offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast Russian forces also continued to advance in other areas of the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions on November 10 and 11 Additional geolocated footage published on November 11 indicates that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA] Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Kurakhove near Novodmytrivka and Sontsivka; north of Kurakhove near Voznesenka and Novoselydivka; south of Kurakhove near Dalne; northeast of Vuhledar near Maksymilyanivka and Katerynivka; and northwest of Vuhledar near Trudove Russian forces reportedly continue to advance in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and Russian advances northwest of Vuhledar and south of Velyka Novosilka may begin to pressure Ukrainian positions in Velyka Novosilka ISW assessed on November 4 that Russian forces seized Shakhtarske (northeast of Velyka Novosilka and northwest of Vuhledar) and Russian sources have claimed further Russian advances north and west of Shakhtarske since.[12] Russian forces notably resumed tactical ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area in mid-October 2024.[13] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 11 that Russian forces advanced in southern Makarivka (south of Velyka Novosilka and west of Vuhledar) with some milbloggers claiming that elements of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA in order to reach the southern and southwestern outskirts of Velyka Novosilka and advances through these settlements could prove costly and time-consuming should Ukrainian forces choose to defend here Russian forces will likely also leverage positions within Shakhtarske and in the fields south of the settlement to pressure Ukrainian positions in the area and attempt to force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from defensive positions south of Velyka Novosilka Russian forces have advanced in western Donetsk Oblast at a moderate tempo but Russian forces remain highly unlikely to be able to conduct rapid mechanized maneuver that could successfully encircle Ukrainian forces Russian forces have advanced just over 10 kilometers from the Vuhledar-Prechystivka line over the past five weeks and the current rate of Russian advance in western Donetsk Oblast — should it continue - would allow Ukrainian units ample time to withdraw from frontline positions without risk of encirclement The possible future elimination of the Ukrainian salient around Kurakhove does not portend the collapse of the frontline in Donetsk Oblast as settlements further west could provide suitably defensible positions for Ukrainian forces in the future Grinding Russian assaults in western Donetsk Oblast and throughout the frontline will likely continue in the coming weeks and months as the Russian military continues efforts to retain the theater-wide initiative that are degrading Russian manpower and materiel It remains unclear if Russian forces will be able to exploit further advances in western Donetsk Oblast should Russian forces successfully close this pocket and the future culmination of Russian offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast will provide Ukrainian forces with an opportunity to contest and possibly seize the battlefield initiative Ukrainian and Russian sources stated on November 11 that damage to a dam of the Kurakhivske Reservoir is causing limited flooding in nearby settlements Ukrainian Kurakhove City Military Administration Head Roman Padun reported on the morning of November 11 that water is flowing near the Ternivska Dam but that Ukrainian authorities cannot inspect the dam to confirm the damage due to constant Russian shelling.[17] Padun stated that there was flooding in Velykonovosilkivska Hromada (west and southwest of the dam) Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin reported on the evening of November 11 that the water level in Velykonovosilkivska Hromada had risen by 1.2 meters but no houses had flooded as of 1600 local time.[18] Filashkin stated that flooding may affect settlements along the Vovcha River in Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts A Ukrainian Telegram channel reported that sources in Ukrainian emergency services stated that unspecified actors shelled Kurakhove in the morning of November 11 destroying the Ternivska Dam.[19] The channel reported that there was no flooding in Bahatyr and Kostyantynopil (all west of the dam along the Vovcha River) Another Ukrainian Telegram channel stated that roads near the dam are usable but that the movement of armored vehicles on dirt roads is limited.[20] Russian milbloggers and opposition outlets noted that photos circulating on the internet purporting to show damage to the Ternivska Dam actually show the Kozarovytska Dam which Ukrainian forces destroyed in February 2022 to prevent Russian advances near Kyiv at the start of the full-scale invasion.[21] Ukrainian and Russian sources disagreed about who was responsible for damaging the dam but Russian forces reportedly struck the dam in September 2024 Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin reported on the evening of November 11 that Russian forces struck the dam.[22] Russian milbloggers claimed Ukrainian forces struck the dam to prevent further Russian advances Russian forces may have struck the dam in order to cause significant long-lasting flooding west of Kurakhivske Reservoir that could facilitate Russian efforts to envelop Ukrainian forces north and south of Kurakhove Russian forces are currently conducting offensive operations north and southwest of Kurakhove as part of wider efforts to eliminate the Ukrainian salient in the Kurakhove direction Russian offensive operations northwest and north of Kurakhove along the Sontsivka-Voznesenka-Novoselydivka line aim to advance southwestward and southward to envelop the Ukrainian pocket north of the Kurakhivske Reservoir Russian forces are also attacking along a wide front along the Shakhtarske-Trudove-Antonivka line in order to envelop the Ukrainian salient south of Kurakhove The Kurakhivske Reservoir is a significant water barrier separating the Ukrainian force groupings north and south of Kurakhove and Russian forces may have struck the Ternivska Dam in order to flood settlements along the Vovcha River west of the reservoir extending the water barrier separating these Ukrainian groupings Russian forces may have also intended for flooding along the river to prevent Ukrainian forces from using the H-15 (Donetsk City-Zaporizhzhia City) highway a significant Ukrainian GLOC that runs through Kurakhove and just south of the Vovcha River The potential advantages that Russian forces could gain from the damage to the dam are currently unclear as the extent and duration of the flooding remain unknown at this time Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denied on November 11 reports of a recent phone conversation between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President-elect Donald Trump.[26] Peskov dismissed reports of Putin and Trump's phone call claiming that Russian officials have no plans to organize a call between Putin and Trump The Washington Post reported on November 10 that Trump spoke with Putin on November 7 and advised Putin to refrain from further escalation in Ukraine.[27] Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced within the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast amid continued Ukrainian offensive operations in the area on November 11 Geolocated footage published on November 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in eastern Novoivanovka (southeast of Korenevo).[28] Russian sources claimed on November 11 that Ukrainian forces attacked east of Korenevo near Olgovka and southeast of Korenevo near Novoivanovka Russian forces recently advanced within the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on November 11 Geolocated footage published on November 7 and 10 indicates that elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF] Southern Military District [SMD]) recently recaptured positions during a roughly reduced company-sized mechanized assault northwest of Pogrebki (north of Sudzha).[30] Additional geolocated footage published on November 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Darino.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Darino although ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[32] Russian forces continued attacking southeast of Korenevo near Leonidove Kruglenkoye and Novoivanovka; and north of Sudzha near Malaya Loknya.[33] Ukraine's Pivnich (Northern) Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Vadym Mysnyk reported on November 11 that Russian forces are conducting a high tempo of ground attacks in Kursk Oblast and that Russian forces conduct assaults in intervals of 10 to 15 minutes.[34] Mysnyk stated that Russian forces are conducting air and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) strikes against Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[35] Mysnyk noted that many Russian munitions fall onto Kursk Oblast and that the intensity of Russian strikes in Kursk Oblast is two to three times higher than in Ukraine Mysnyk stated that elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating in Kursk Oblast.[36] Elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Darino.[37] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on November 11 that Russian forces have concentrated almost 50,000 personnel in Kursk Oblast.[38] Mysnyk also noted that the Russian military is frequently transferring new reserves to Kursk Oblast due to high personnel and equipment losses.[39] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City) Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Starytsya on November 10 and 11 but did not advance.[40] an milbloggers claimed that Russian forces made tactical gains and improved their positions in central Vovchansk but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[41] Elements of Rosgvardia's 116th Spetsnaz Brigade reportedly continue to operate near Vovchansk.[42] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) Russian forces reportedly advanced near Kupyansk amid continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line on November 10 The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 153rd Tank Regiment and 347th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 47th Tank Division Moscow Military District [MMD]) seized Kolisnykivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[43] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk) and near Berestove (southeast of Kupyansk) towards Lozova (southeast of Berestove).[44] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims and personnel from unspecified private military companies (PMCs) with varying levels of combat experience and training.[48] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synehubov announced mandatory evacuations on November 11 for 10 settlements in Borivska Hromada Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna amid continued offensive operations in the area on November 10 Geolocated footage published on November 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Terny (west of Kreminna).[50] Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Kreminna near Terny and Torske and south of Kreminna near Serebryanka on November 10 and 11.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drone and artillery strikes are slowing Russian advances near Terny.[52] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 31st and 37th motorized rifle regiments; 19th Tank Regiment; 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (all of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division Central Military District [CMD]); 169th Motorized Rifle Brigade; and 11th Tank Brigade (both of the 25th CAA) are operating in the Lyman direction.[53] Mashovets stated that the Russian force grouping in the Lyman direction consists of 34,000-35,000 personnel and 112-114 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).[54] Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Brigade (20th CAA MMD) are reportedly operating near Terny.[55] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast Russian forces continued assaults east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on November 10 and 11 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[56] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division and the 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly the 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) and 123rd motorized rifle brigades and most of the 85th and 88th motorized rifle brigades reinforced by a tank battalion of the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade are operating near Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[61] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on November 11 but did not make any confirmed advances Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv yar near Stupochky on November 10 and 11.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered Stupochky but ISW assesses that Russian forces are still roughly 2.5 kilometers from of the settlement.[63] Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division and the "Okhotnik" ("Hunter") Spetsnaz Detachment (51st CAA formerly the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar and elements of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps [AC) are reportedly operating south of Chasiv Yar.[64] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on November 11 but did not make any confirmed advances Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Nelipivka on November 10 and 11.[65] Elements of the Russian 56th Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA) and the ”Rodnya” Battalion are reportedly operating near Niu York (south of Toretsk) and elements of the "Sparta" Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in Toretsk.[66] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on November 11 but did not make any confirmed advances A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Pokrovsk near Selydove and Hryhorivka and south of Pokrovsk near Novooleksiivka although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[67] Russian forces continued attacking east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Myrolyubivka and southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka Hryhorivka and Petrivka on November 10 and 11.[68] See topline text for updates on the Kurakhove and Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border areas Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes) Russian forces continued assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne) and near Novoandriivka (northwest of Robotyne) on November 10 and 11 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[69] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported that Russian forces may intensify assaults with armored vehicles and motorcycles in Zaporizhia Oblast in the near future after increasing reconnaissance operations and the number of air strikes in the area by 30 to 40 percent in the past several weeks.[70] Drone operators of the Russian ”Nemtsa” Group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Robotyne and elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Novooleksandriivka (southwest of Robotyne in the Russian rear).[71] Positional fighting continued in the Dnipro direction in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on November 10 and 11 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[72] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov visited a Russian "Dnepr" Grouping of Forces command post on November 11 and met with Russian "Dnepr" Grouping of Forces and VDV Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky to discuss the situation in the Kherson and Zaporizhia directions.[73] Teplinsky also claimed that Russian forces are effectively implementing Russian-made drones in their reconnaissance-strike complex (RSC) and reconnaissance-fire complex (RFC) in the area.[74] Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 10 to 11 The Ukrainian Air Force reported on November 11 that Russian forces launched two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from airspace over occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and 74 Shahed drones and strike drones of an unknown type from Kursk and Bryansk oblasts and Primorsko-Akhtarsk The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles and 39 drones over Kyiv and Mykolaiv oblasts; that 30 drones were ”locally lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that three drones flew towards Belarusian airspace and occupied Ukrainian territories Ukrainian officials reported on November 11 that Russian forces struck an apartment building in Kryvyi Rih Dnipropetrovsk Oblast with an unspecified ballistic missile injuring civilians.[75] Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast police reported on November 11 that Russian forces struck a residential complex in Kramatorsk Donetsk Oblast with three UMPB D-30SN guided glide bombs.[76] Ukrainian officials reported on November 11 that Russian drone strikes killed civilians and damaged residential areas in Mykolaiv City.[77] Ukrainian officials also reported that Russian forces conducted airstrikes on Zaporizhzhia City and Prymorsk City damaging civilian infrastructure and injuring civilians.[78] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 11 that Russian forces used over 2,000 drones against Ukraine in October 2024 - roughly half of which were decoys or false targets that aim to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses.[79] The GUR stated that these decoy drones do not contain explosives are much smaller and cheaper to produce than Shahed drones The GUR noted that two such decoy drones fell in Moldova on November 10 Russian regional governments continue to commit large portions of their social budgets towards payments to Russian veterans likely as part of ongoing efforts to incentivize Russian military service The Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced on November 11 that Belarus officially obtained BRICS partner country status enabling it to permanently participate in special sessions of the bloc's summits and foreign ministers' meeting.[81] [2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2024 [3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6-2024 [4] https://x.com/SibirPrizrak/status/1855723386133217420; https://t [dot] me/mechanized33/527; https://t [dot] me/creamy_caprice/7458; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1855712532784460030 [6] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7469; https://t.me/mo114rf/73 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1855976507073495162 [7] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29363 ; https://t.me/rybar/65288 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18979 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80480 [8] https://t.me/dva_majors/57373 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19001 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/23099 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80480 [11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eK8TZ5cjXatEHb2Lc8RvqHRJFeiau1gbX9JFPPZNxyrk1JY1hqgFbeMwVaCPxbTHl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029YHit8FbXFk4g9dRfWdtcFfheF2wYT4yaicVZfNTaqKvP9nhHNhaxByBjrD3Ptgml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YDqNBT3pFZEUKWTpm3FaBAdJrDsZ8Ahk6xYuKaDKyEHKd33iaa4BrdcQyeGHaPeyl [12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-4-2024 [14] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29337 ; https://t.me/vrogov/17961 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/284552 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18958 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80433 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/29470 [15] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eK8TZ5cjXatEHb2Lc8RvqHRJFeiau1gbX9JFPPZNxyrk1JY1hqgFbeMwVaCPxbTHl [17] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/877339-jde-voda-po-selah-so-vidomo-pro-poskodzenna-ternivskoi-dambi-kurahivskogo-vodoshovisa/ [18] https://www.facebook.com/vadym.filashkin/posts/pfbid0S6uHW1oNtiKawgvyjEiVnaPFWzFwxzHA3ZHr6XJVA2DxzyUvS6XbZGKcHf1CeQ1Wl [21] https://t.me/milinfolive/134841; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/11/11/ukrainskie-i-rossiyskie-pabliki-soobschili-chto-vzorvana-damba-kurahovskogo-vodohranilischa-po-dannym-vlastey-idet-voda-po-selam; https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/27/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-flood-infrastructure.html [22] https://www.facebook.com/vadym.filashkin/posts/pfbid0S6uHW1oNtiKawgvyjEiVnaPFWzFwxzHA3ZHr6XJVA2DxzyUvS6XbZGKcHf1CeQ1Wl [23] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18980; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18981 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80450 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60050 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/15439; https://t.me/wargonzo/23105; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/143932 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/134820; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80469 [25] https://t.me/don_partizan/5297; https://t.me/don_partizan/5302 ; https://t.me/don_partizan/5319 [26] https://t.me/tass_agency/284603 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/284604 ; https://t.me/interfaxonline/50397; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/11/11/ne-bylo-razgovora-peskov-otritsaet-chto-tramp-i-putin-sozvanivalis-i-obsuzhdali-voynu-v-ukraine ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/72775 [27] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/11/10/trump-putin-phone-call-ukraine/ [28] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/22150; https://t.me/brygada47/1050 [29] https://t.me/mod_russia/45566 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18985 [30] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1855627357681283128; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1855009682462851574; https://t.me/BaluHub777/15559 [31] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7463; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/4049 [32] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/143930 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60051 [33] https://t.me/mod_russia/45566 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18949 [34] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/11/u-konveyernyj-sposib-na-kurshhyni-intervaly-mizh-vorozhymy-shturmamy-stanovlyat-10-15-hvylyn/ [35] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/11/z-glybyny-vorozhoyi-terytoriyi-po-pivnochi-ukrayiny-okupanty-byut-dalekobijnoyu-zbroyeyu/ [36] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/11/riznogo-gatunku-ta-komplektacziyi-yaka-chyselnist-sklad-ta-yakist-rosijskogo-ugrupova [38] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/12389 [39] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/11/riznogo-gatunku-ta-komplektacziyi-yaka-chyselnist-sklad-ta-yakist-rosijskogo-ugrupova [40] https://t.me/otukharkiv/2573; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029YHit8FbXFk4g9dRfWdtcFfheF2wYT4yaicVZfNTaqKvP9nhHNhaxByBjrD3Ptgml; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/10/gynut-sered-ruyin-u-vovchansku-okupanty-vtrachayut-zhyvu-sylu-bez-zhodnogo-prosuvannya/ [41] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/143867; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18949 [43] https://t.me/mod_russia/45559; https://t.me/mod_russia/45561; https://t.me/tass_agency/284691 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/45577 [44] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29356; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/143931 [45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YDqNBT3pFZEUKWTpm3FaBAdJrDsZ8Ahk6xYuKaDKyEHKd33iaa4BrdcQyeGHaPeyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eK8TZ5cjXatEHb2Lc8RvqHRJFeiau1gbX9JFPPZNxyrk1JY1hqgFbeMwVaCPxbTHl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029YHit8FbXFk4g9dRfWdtcFfheF2wYT4yaicVZfNTaqKvP9nhHNhaxByBjrD3Ptgml [47] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/11/na-tylovyh-pidstupah-na-kupyanshhyni-vorogu-ne-dozvolyayut-spokijno-dijty-do-peredovoyi-navit-vnochi/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDXWlQ2K0dM [48] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/11/mobiky-kontrachi-sapogi-kym-voyuyut-okupanty-na-kupyanshhyni/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDXWlQ2K0dM [50] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7459; https://t.me/OMIBr_60/606 [51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YDqNBT3pFZEUKWTpm3FaBAdJrDsZ8Ahk6xYuKaDKyEHKd33iaa4BrdcQyeGHaPeyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eK8TZ5cjXatEHb2Lc8RvqHRJFeiau1gbX9JFPPZNxyrk1JY1hqgFbeMwVaCPxbTHl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029YHit8FbXFk4g9dRfWdtcFfheF2wYT4yaicVZfNTaqKvP9nhHNhaxByBjrD3Ptgml [56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YDqNBT3pFZEUKWTpm3FaBAdJrDsZ8Ahk6xYuKaDKyEHKd33iaa4BrdcQyeGHaPeyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eK8TZ5cjXatEHb2Lc8RvqHRJFeiau1gbX9JFPPZNxyrk1JY1hqgFbeMwVaCPxbTHl [62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eK8TZ5cjXatEHb2Lc8RvqHRJFeiau1gbX9JFPPZNxyrk1JY1hqgFbeMwVaCPxbTHl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029YHit8FbXFk4g9dRfWdtcFfheF2wYT4yaicVZfNTaqKvP9nhHNhaxByBjrD3Ptgml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YDqNBT3pFZEUKWTpm3FaBAdJrDsZ8Ahk6xYuKaDKyEHKd33iaa4BrdcQyeGHaPeyl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/23099 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60053 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/57373 [64] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18956; https://t.me/dva_majors/57431; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/143915 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/12955 [65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YDqNBT3pFZEUKWTpm3FaBAdJrDsZ8Ahk6xYuKaDKyEHKd33iaa4BrdcQyeGHaPeyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029YHit8FbXFk4g9dRfWdtcFfheF2wYT4yaicVZfNTaqKvP9nhHNhaxByBjrD3Ptgml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eK8TZ5cjXatEHb2Lc8RvqHRJFeiau1gbX9JFPPZNxyrk1JY1hqgFbeMwVaCPxbTHl ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18949; https://t.me/wargonzo/23099 [66] https://t.me/wargonzo/23097 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/23096 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/12956 [68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eK8TZ5cjXatEHb2Lc8RvqHRJFeiau1gbX9JFPPZNxyrk1JY1hqgFbeMwVaCPxbTHl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029YHit8FbXFk4g9dRfWdtcFfheF2wYT4yaicVZfNTaqKvP9nhHNhaxByBjrD3Ptgml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YDqNBT3pFZEUKWTpm3FaBAdJrDsZ8Ahk6xYuKaDKyEHKd33iaa4BrdcQyeGHaPeyl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/57373 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18949 [69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eK8TZ5cjXatEHb2Lc8RvqHRJFeiau1gbX9JFPPZNxyrk1JY1hqgFbeMwVaCPxbTHl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029YHit8FbXFk4g9dRfWdtcFfheF2wYT4yaicVZfNTaqKvP9nhHNhaxByBjrD3Ptgml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YDqNBT3pFZEUKWTpm3FaBAdJrDsZ8Ahk6xYuKaDKyEHKd33iaa4BrdcQyeGHaPeyl [70] https://t.me/bbcrussian/72788 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-troops-trying-advance-kursk-region-ukraine-says-2024-11-11/ [71] 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media/876991-tramp-pogovoriv-z-putinim-rosia-gotuetsa-do-kontrnastupu-v-kurskij-oblasti-992-den-vijni-onlajn/?; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/17319 [76] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/11/vorog-vdaryv-po-kramatorsku-bombamy-umpb-d-30sn-poshkodzheno-desyatky-budynkiv/ [77] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/34831 ; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/12042; https://suspilne dot media/876991-tramp-pogovoriv-z-putinim-rosia-gotuetsa-do-kontrnastupu-v-kurskij-oblasti-992-den-vijni-onlajn/; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/12038; https://t.me/senkevichonline/10447 [78] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/34827; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/13229 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/13259l [80] https://t.me/severrealii/28248 ; https://t.me/istories_media/8100 ; https://storage.googleapis dot com/istories/stories/2024/11/11/sotszashchita-voennogo-vremeni/index.html [81] https://t.me/tass_agency/284614; https://www.mfa dot gov.by/press/news_mfa/e76e1922bbd6ca01.html plans to withdraw 20,000 American soldiers from Europe and at the same time threatened to take measures against Russian exports if an agreement is not reached soon in Ukraine The US president continued with his statements about everything and the opposite of everything: “We must never forget that Russia helped us win the Second World War at the cost of almost 60 million lives.” “I have no intention of hurting Russia I love the Russian people and I have always had a good relationship with President Putin.” Trump said he offers Russia two ways to end the Ukrainian conflict: easy and difficult Moscow will have to accept Washington’s conditions as shown by the head of the American administration’s publication on the social network Truth Social Trump also appointed Andrew Puzder as US Ambassador to the European Union He previously served as CEO of fast food chains Carl’s Jr Former NATO Secretary Jens Stoltenberg said from the stage in Davos: “I understand that there is not much enthusiasm for Ukraine joining NATO so we need to arm it to the teeth.” “If we did something wrong in 2012 it was not arming Ukraine from 2014 to 2022 Let me remind you that in 2017-2018 there was a big discussion in NATO and most of the allies said ‘No’ to providing lethal weapons to Ukraine because that could provoke Russia.” And “It was President Trump who approved the decision to bring lethal weapons to Ukraine,” Stoltenberg said again during a roundtable at the World Economic Forum in Davos he added that the best security guarantee for Ukraine could be Article 5 of the NATO Treaty NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte at the Davos Economic Forum: “The NATO alliance has entered a “crisis situation” due to the need to increase the rate of spending of member countries on national defense “Europe will finance the purchase of American weapons for Ukraine.” “If the new Trump administration is ready to continue to help Ukraine with its defense industrial base we must be ready to do so,” Mark Rutte said The European Commission has promised to provide Ukraine with 35 billion euros in financial assistance in 2025 there is some confusion about the possible Peace Agreement According to the Advisor to the Head of the Presidential Office Mykhailo Podoljak: “Russia would collapse within eight months if we significantly increase attacks on its territory and increase international pressure on it.” “Now if there were a significant destruction of the economy in Russia and a significant increase in panic in social sentiment 6-8 months of zeroing out the economy (Russian – ed.) with 3-4 months of increasing attacks deep into Russia And then this year we may see everything completely differently,” he said Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov promptly responded to Trump’s words “Russia will not forget American help during the Great Patriotic War (World War II) and hopes that US President Donald Trump will share with the Russian Federation the joy of celebrating the 80th anniversary of the Victory,” the spokesman said “Trump’s data that the USSR lost almost 60 million lives during World War II do not correspond to reality,” Peskov said And again: “The USSR paid the highest price for the victory over fascism but for them it was business,” Peskov added Dmitry Peskov then added: “We expect an international telephone conversation with the president <…> I will say right away that this is not that conversation but it is no less important for us,” the Kremlin representative said The Kremlin does not see anything new in US President Donald Trump’s threats to impose sanctions if an agreement on Ukraine is not reached Dmitry Peskov stressed: “We do not see anything particularly new was the American president who most often resorted to sanctioning methods or at least he liked them during his first presidency.” In Russia the country’s economic and financial data were released: “The budget deficit in 2024 amounted to 1,7% of GDP” and this is an acceptable level noted the President of the Russian Federation the inflation rate in Russia from 14 to 20 January 2025 was 0.25% instructed to additionally index military pensions to actual inflation social payments and benefits will be indexed by 9.5% “I propose to index insurance pensions already in January based on the real situation 9.5% <…> I consider it correct and fair that military pensioners also do additional indexation <…> I ask the government to “take the necessary actions as soon as possible to implement these and other decisions on indexation of social payments and benefits,” Putin said Belgorod authorities have decided to resettle residents of the village of Terezovka Shebekinsky district – Governor Gladkov And now a look at the front line as of 17:00 on January 23 Russian forces attacked Ukrainian targets in the city of Zaporizhia Explosions also occurred in Kramators’k and Pavlohrad From the Kursk region they report that in the area of ​​Kruglenkoe/Viktorovka during the offensive actions of Russian troops assault troops entered Viktorovka and are trying to gain a foothold Attack operations are underway in the direction of the village of Nikolskyi The Northern Group of Troops reports that the Ukrainian Armed Forces continue to strengthen their grouping in the Sudzhansky border region transferring elite reserve units of special forces Several special forces units have arrived in Sumy from where they will be transferred to the Kursk region in a few days Missile strikes have been carried out on Ukrainian concentrations Russian marines are fighting in Kurilovka and the surrounding forest belts units of the Western Group of Troops have liberated the village of Zapadne in the Kharkiv region The penetration into enemy defenses was 4.5 km deep from the Oskil River to the west In the Pokrovs’k direction there are battles in the area of ​​the settlement Russian attack aircraft have occupied the mine ventilation shaft west of Kotlyne Ukrainians admit that the garrison of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is being squeezed from several sides by assault units of the Russian Armed Forces The distance between the attacking units is from 2.2 to 3.7 km the “pocket” is completely crossed by Russian troops the Russian Armed Forces control almost all of Toretsk One post reads: “The entire residential sector is under the control of Russian troops fighting is underway,” the channel’s source said “The Russian Armed Forces are currently clearing the territory of the Toretskaya mine from the enemy.” The complete transition of the city to the control of the Russian military is a matter of the near future Russian troops have taken control of Solenoye in the DPR Ukrainian armed forces again attacked the satellite city of the Zaporizhia Energodar nuclear power plant with four drones in order to damage the city’s civilian infrastructure The impacts were recorded in the water utility area on the city embankment and near the Groshik store "The situation near Velyka Novosilka is indeed difficult The Russians aim to encircle the village," Trehubov said the Ukrainian Defense Forces’ goal is to prevent the encirclement "and there are specific plans in place regarding this." He added: "To keep the situation under control the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Certain options for resolving this situation were considered." He further noted that "the situation remains a focal point of attention." earlier Trehubov stated that there is a risk of operational encirclement of the Ukrainian Defense Forces' units near Velyka Novosilka on the Novopavlivka front The Russians have captured Velyka Novosilka the last significant point of Ukrainian resistance on where Donetsk Oblast borders Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts It is likely that some of the defenders failed to break out of encirclement although this has been denied by the Ukrainian command North of Velyka Novosilka and south of Pokrovsk Ukrainian forces are now only holding out only on the outskirts of Donetsk Oblast and the Russians are 3 km away from its borders at the narrowest point The exception is the salient west of Kurakhove where Ukrainian positions stretch 40 km into the oblast’s territory After Russian troops began storming the junction settlement Andriivka the threat of their encirclement increased Fighting continues on the outskirts of Toretsk and in the centre of Chasiv Yar Shifts in Russia’s favour have also occurred between the Toretsk agglomeration and Myrnohrad and Pokrovsk nevertheless Russia has still not managed to control the road junction on the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka route The declining importance of Pokrovsk as the main logistical hub of Ukrainian forces in the Donbas means that this role is increasingly being taken over by Kostiantynivka from where supplies are directed to the groupings in the Chasiv Yar and Toretsk areas (Pokrovsk has become a de facto independent defence region) it is increasingly directed from the Kharkiv region The Russians are likely to have captured the nodal Dvoritsa on the right bank of the Oskil River enabling them to continue their advance south toward Kupiansk or westward deep into the Kharkiv region They have also made further field advances on the border of Luhansk Donetsk and Kharkiv oblasts (towards Lyman and Borova) and in Kursk Oblast (pushing towards Sudzha from the northwest) The return of General Mykhailo Drapatyi to the front should be considered a direct consequence of the inability of Ukrainian forces to stabilise their defences in the Donbas President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed him commander of the Khortytsia operational-strategic group of troops which is responsible for (among other things) the defence of Pokrovsk Drapatyi is also likely to remain commander of the entire Ukrainian Land Forces a position to which he was appointed last November 29 he commanded the Luhansk operational-tactical group of troops (subordinate to the Khortytsia higher command) They were combined by the current Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine The Russians are continuing their massive attacks on Ukrainian military infrastructure and facilities The most serious one in terms of impact took place on January 23 in Zaporizhzhia 20,000 consumers were temporarily cut off from electricity supplies Damage to critical or industrial infrastructure was reported on January 25 and 28 from Cherkasy and Cherkasy Oblast on January 27 from Sumy and also Dnipropetrovsk and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts Damage to civilian facilities was reported in Mykolaiv (January 21) Dnipro (January 27) and Odesa (January 28) as well as Kyiv (January 22–25 and 28) and Lviv (January 24) oblasts The effectiveness of Russian drone strikes is increasing as indicated by both reports from the field and communications from the Ukrainian Air Force Command The latter has seen an increase in the number of drones that have been declared neither shot down nor locally lost “without negative consequences.” From the evening of January 21 to the morning of January 28 the invaders are thought to have used a total of 586 drones and 13 missiles Ukraine declared 365 drones and two missiles shot down This would mean that 46 of them may have hit targets directly the Ukrainian side had repeatedly declared 100% effectiveness against drones with the damage mainly coming from falling debris The declining effectiveness of anti-drone defences should be considered a direct result of the increasing dispatch of soldiers from mobile drone combat teams operating in the country’s rear to the front Ukrainian drones struck a refinery in Ryazan the company halted operations after the second attack Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council reported that the Kremniy El plant in Bryansk one of Russia’s major microelectronics manufacturers Ukraine’s attack carried out that day was the largest since the beginning of this year a total of 121 enemy drones were shot down over 13 regions of the Russian Federation apart from damaging facilities in Ryazan and Bryansk the target of the attack was also thought have been a fuel base in Tver Oblast Ukraine will receive its first Mirage 2000-5F fighter jets by the end of the first quarter of this year French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot announced on January 28 he responded to doubts raised by reports earlier this month that the first three aircraft would be delivered to Kyiv by January 20 French experts stress that the Ukrainian air force is still not sufficiently prepared to receive them It is expected to receive a total of ten of these aircraft German conglomerate KNDS Deutschland has officially opened a joint venture with a Ukrainian company Ukraine’s Minister for Strategic Industries Herman Smetanin announced on January 21 It will handle the servicing and overhaul of armaments donated to Kyiv by KNDS A company carrying out similar tasks was launched in Ukraine last year by Germany’s Rheinmetall and Poland’s PGZ and WB Group were forerunners in this regard On January 21, Ukraine and Albania concluded a ten-year agreement on security cooperation and long-term support The document included a declaration of cooperation on security and defence issues political cooperation and humanitarian assistance The Albanian side said it will make a financial contribution to the European fighter coalition which will provide English-language training for Ukrainian pilots and technicians Ukraine has concluded 28 security cooperation agreements Ukraine’s military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov indicated that North Korea will transfer at least 150 KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles and artillery shells and systems to Russia this year He added that over the past three months Pyongyang has delivered  around 120 M-1989 Koksan 170 mm caliber self-propelled artillery systems and 120 M-1991 240 mm caliber rocket systems to Russia there is no confirmation that the artillery from North Korea which has been observed several times in recent months on Russian territory has been transferred to and used by units of the Russian army It is also unknown whether the North Korean contingent has used it in the Kursk region British intelligence estimated North Korea’s losses in the Kursk region at about 4,000 soldiers killed or wounded it stressed that Russian and North Korean forces are facing interoperability difficulties due to the language barrier Estonian intelligence did not rule out that North Korea will send more troops to Russia before the summer the State Bureau of Investigation arrested General Yuri Halushkin the former operational-tactical commander of the Kharkiv army grouping He faces charges that in May 2024 he misjudged the potential of the enemy and by his actions contributed to the abandonment of the battlefield by soldiers of the 125th Infantry Brigade He was also alleged to have ignored available intelligence and underestimated the risk of a Russian attack in the Kharkiv region Similar charges were also brought against former 125th Brigade commander Artur Horbenko while the former commander of Kyiv’s 155th Anna Kyiv Mechanised Brigade was taken into custody (he was accused of failing to supervise the state of discipline in the unit and accepting violations of soldiers’ rights The publicity about the initiation of criminal cases against senior commanders is intended to show that officers commanding units are responsible for failures at the front rather than the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine or the commanders of military branches This was indirectly confirmed by Oleksandr Syrskyi who asserted that the situation in the 155th Brigade had improved due to his personal contacts with the command staff Biuletyn Informacji Publicznej by Tim ZadorozhnyyUkrainian troops fire at Russian positions near the occupied Ukrainian city of Bakhmut on August 14 (Photo by Roman Chop/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images)Ukrainian troops positioned near the village of Velyka Novosilka in Donetsk Oblast are at risk of encirclement by Russian forces military spokesperson Viktor Trehubov said on Jan Russian forces are attempting to take control of access routes to the village through heavy fire a spokesperson for Ukraine's Khortytsia group of forces "Velyka Novosilka is currently in a rather difficult situation. Ukrainian soldiers are doing everything to prevent further advances of the enemy," Trehubov said including a river that cuts through the village A screenshot of the map by the DeepState monitoring group as of Jan showing the front-line village of Velyka Novosilka (DeepState/OpenStreetMaps)According to Trehubov Russia's numerical advantage in manpower in the area poses significant challenges "They are constantly conducting rotations They still have this resource," Trehubov added He said that preventing encirclement and maintaining access to Velyka Novosilka remains a priority for Ukrainian troops Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi previously described the ongoing Russian offensive in the east as "one of the most powerful" since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 Throughout the fall of 2024, Russian forces made operational gains in southern Donetsk Oblast, including areas near Toretsk and Chasiv Yar, while advancing near Kupiansk and on Russian soil in Kursk Oblast Russia claims full occupation of Velyka Novosilka in the Donetsk region The Khortytsia operational and tactical group of troops refutes this stating that Ukrainian forces still control certain positions closer to the outskirts of the village and the Russian objectives were outlined in the material by RBC-Ukraine below Velyka Novosilka is one of the most important frontline areas in Donetsk region which holds strategic significance for both sides due to its location at the intersection of the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions The village has been on the front lines since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine Efforts by the enemy to seize the settlement in the summer of 2022 failed and Ukraine managed to push back the Russian forces during a counteroffensive in 2023 Russian advances on this axis resumed after they took control of the towns of Vuhledar and Kurakhove Velyka Novosilka remained an important defensive hub for the Ukrainian army the situation worsened around the village in the fall of 2024 Russian forces increased pressure in an attempt to cut off Ukrainian logistics and encircle the settlement the Russian Ministry of Defense reported the capture of Velyka Novosilka Videos began circulating showing the Russian army hanging the Russian flags in various parts of the village The Ukrainian project DeepState reported that Russian forces had taken control of the village of Vremivka and nearly fully occupied the neighboring Velyka Novosilka Ukrainian officials have not confirmed this information the Khortytsia operational and tactical group of troops Map: DeepState shows the village as almost fully occupied (deepstatemap) there are still Ukrainian troops and positions there They are destroying Russians and Russian equipment spokesman for the Khortytsia operational and tactical group of troops soldiers of the 110th Separate Mechanized Brigade stated that they had retreated from areas where there was a risk of encirclement They said that when the enemy entered the settlement skillfully withdrew from areas where encirclement was a threat This does not mean that we have completely left the town the fighting continues in Velyka Novosilka All actions are aimed at minimizing our own losses and maximizing enemy casualties," the brigade emphasized They also added that the Russians have a significant advantage in infantry numbers while the number of artillery and FPV drones is approximately the same the soldiers stress that the enemy will not be able to continue advancing from Velyka Novosilka as they have encountered a significant obstacle - the Mokri Yaly River the Khortytsia operational and tactical group of troops stated that Ukrainian troops they continue to hold some positions within the settlement "Any other actions could have led to their encirclement and unnecessary losses among Ukrainian defenders. Therefore, as of now, the Russians have entered a significant part of the settlement while the Ukrainians hold certain positions to prevent their further movement," Trehubov said According to the American Institute for the Study of War (ISW) Russian forces have managed to occupy 89% of Velyka Novosilka Analysts assess that after the full occupation of the settlement which could reveal its plans for a spring-summer offensive here are a few potential directions for Russian actions after capturing Velyka Novosilka: Option 1: The Russian command could leave units in the western part of the Donetsk region and continue advancing toward the administrative border between Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk regions This would indicate that Russia prioritizes advancing to the administrative border as quickly as possible compared to other directions in Donetsk or other near-front areas Option 2: The Russian army might decide to keep some units in the Velyka Novosilka area to continue limited attacks and block Ukrainian forces there while redeploying the main part of their units to another section of the front Option 3: The Russian army could resume intensive combat operations in Zaporizhzhia region in 2025 Map: ISW analysts report that the Russian forces control 89% of the territory of the village (understandingwar.org) As the former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Lieutenant General Ihor Romanenko emphasized in a comment to the RBC-Ukraine YouTube channel Ukrainian forces currently hold a small northwestern portion of Velyka Novosilka is about establishing defensive lines outside of Velyka Novosilka and preventing rapid advancement Map: Possible direction where Russian forces could go in case of occupation of Velyka Novosilka (deepstatemap) in the case of full occupation of the settlement the Russian forces consider both options: moving towards the Ukrainian defense line of Komar - Bahatyr - Kostiantynopil or heading west to the administrative border of Dnipropetrovsk region it is "very tempting" for the Russian forces to advance even just 100 meters into the Dnipropetrovsk region This would allow them to once again flaunt their flags and demonstrate that they are already fighting there Before the full-scale war, Velyka Novosilka had a population of around 6,000 people having adapted to life in basements due to daily Russian shelling The settlement has no functioning shops or pharmacies and buildings in Velyka Novosilka have been destroyed by constant Russian shelling Sources: the statements of Viktor Trehubov DeepState and the American Institute for the Study of War (ISW) analyst as well as an exclusive commentary by Ihor Romanenko former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Russia's military said Monday that its forces had captured the village of Storozheve in eastern Ukraine as part of apparent efforts to encircle the nearby town of Velyka Novosilka "As a result of decisive action by troops.. the settlement of Storozhevoye has been liberated," the Defense Ministry said in a statement Russian forces have steadily advanced in the Donetsk region against outgunned and outmanned Ukrainian forces Storozheve and Velyka Novosilka are close to the southern front line which has remained largely static but where Ukraine says Russia is planning a fresh offensive Military analysts believe Moscow hopes to secure as much territory as possible before U.S President-elect Donald Trump comes to power in January Trump has promised to bring a swift end to the nearly three-year conflict but he has yet to propose specific terms for a ceasefire or peace deal Russia's Defense Ministry claims to have seized more than 190 Ukrainian settlements this year Russia's Prosecutor General's Office has designated The Moscow Times as an "undesirable" organization criminalizing our work and putting our staff at risk of prosecution This follows our earlier unjust labeling as a "foreign agent." These actions are direct attempts to silence independent journalism in Russia The authorities claim our work "discredits the decisions of the Russian leadership." We see things differently: we strive to provide accurate We, the journalists of The Moscow Times, refuse to be silenced. But to continue our work, we need your help please support us monthly starting from just $2 and every contribution makes a significant impact independent journalism in the face of repression Russian troops are making significant advances in the west of the Donetsk region, where they are heading towards a key logistics hub, according to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) whose map shows the state of the play on the frontline think tank said that Russian troops "are coming closer to enveloping the town of Velyka Novosilka," where they can threaten Ukrainian supply lines leading to the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts These advances chime with an assessment the previous day that Moscow's forces "could attempt to envelop Velyka Novosilka via its eastern and northeastern flanks." The town is an important supply line for Ukraine's troops and its loss would be "significant and potentially detrimental" to Kyiv's ability to defend the nexus between the Zaporizhzhia The think tank said the town's capture would allow Russian forces to more actively threaten the towns of Hulyaipole and Orikhiv and also be a stepping stone for an attack into the southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast The ISW's latest map marks how geolocated footage showed Russian advances on Sunday on the outskirts of the town It also illustrates the reported capture on the same day by Moscow's troops of Zoria and Sontsivka—as well as three settlements further south Pro-Russian military bloggers have said that Moscow's troops made gains northeast and southeast of Velyka Novosilka where elements of Russia's 5th tank brigade and 37th motorized rifle brigade are engaged in fighting Ukraine's forces The ISW's latest map and update also outlined efforts by Russian forces southeast of Kurakhove and Russian platoon-sized mechanized assaults east of Romanivka towards which Moscow managed to advance These Russian advances in western Donetsk do not automatically signal the collapse of Ukraine's front line although they may be "operationally significant" if the Russian command "properly exploits these recent tactical successes which is not a given," according to the think tank Newsweek contacted the Russian and Ukrainian defense ministries for comment by email It comes as Ukrainian monitoring group DeepState said on Monday that Russian forces had captured 90 square miles over the previous week—the biggest advance so far this year Russian gains in November are already higher than for the whole of October which itself saw the most gains since the start of the war The change in momentum on the frontline in Donetsk comes amid concerns about what an incoming Trump administration will mean for future military aid for Ukraine, and after the White House confirmed that it had given Kyiv permission to use ATACMS long-range missile systems to strike inside Russian territory