On the morning of Monday, April 28, the Russian army launched several groups of Shahed-type attack drones across Ukraine. The attack targeted the city of Cherkasy and the region, according to the Ukrainian Air Force, the head of the Cherkasy Regional Military Administration, Ihor Taburets The Ukrainian Air Force reported the movement of Russian drones in the direction of Cherkasy at around 8:30 a.m the drones were also headed for Zolotonosha and Smila Russian drones were reported over Cherkasy Taburets warned locals about a significant threat from drones he announced the operation of air defense in the Cherkasy region and asked not to take photos and videos the city was attacked by at least 10 Russian Shaheds there were no reports of casualties or consequences of the Russian attack Ukrainian air defense forces destroyed 57 drones serious destruction was recorded: shops in Dnipro were damaged Russia launched several groups of attack drones across Ukraine the Cherkasy regional branch of the Ukrainian Red Cross helped set up the shelter The work was completed promptly and effectively in just 40 days “It is important for us to increase the number of safe spaces in schools and residential care facilities where people who need special care live We continue to work in this direction,” stated Ihor Taburets Head of the Cherkasy Regional Military Administration more than 160 people live at the Helmiaziv residential care facility 40 are internally displaced persons who have left regions where hostilities are ongoing Photos: Press Service of the Cherkasy Regional State Administration National CommitteeUkrainian Red Cross Society This article was published more than 6 months ago A local resident carries her son as she walks among the ruins of their home in Horlivka (Gorlovka) in the Donetsk region Svitlana Osypenko has been attending psychological group therapy on a regular basis With her husband serving in the army and her home city of Kharkiv under constant bombardment she began experiencing anxiety and depression I thought it was normal to feel bad because I was worrying about my husband and spending the first months of the war in the basement But when I just wanted to cry without a reason while I was walking with my dog and felt sad all the time The 36-year-old says that she feels constantly worried and – because of uncertainty about when the war will be over – she can’t totally recover most of the participants in the group therapy take antidepressants and a large percentage of them have one-on-one sessions with psychologists Before the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Ms Osypenko worked as a theatre choreographer and had her own dance studio for children Theatres are mostly closed because of the danger of being attacked with rockets and a lot of kids didn’t return to the city.” trying to support other women who are going through the same things She says that her social circle has significantly decreased and many of her friends have left Kharkiv but I can’t turn off the trigger – the war.” Family doctor Oleksandr Prokopchuk says that when patients with physical symptoms come to his hospital in Zolotonosha they often don’t understand that the problem is not in their internal organs at all an anxiety disorder or a psychosomatic illness “The patient thinks that the problem is with the heart or lungs or with something else adding that symptoms such as shortness of breath and chest pain very often hide mental disorders Analysis: Ukraine’s risky incursion into Russia marks a new and perilous phase of the war He said that he sees these symptoms in different age groups “We didn’t have such a large number of complaints before the full-scale invasion Prokopchuk added that for civilians it is also difficult to talk about their mental health because if they say they aren’t feeling well but do you know how hard it is for our boys at the front?” This “devalues individual feelings and adds to the increasing number of mental problems in society,” he said According to World Health Organization estimates just over one in five people living in a conflict zone have some form of a mental-health condition ranging from mild depression or anxiety to psychosis Roughly one in 10 are living with a moderate or severe mental-health condition “Applying these estimates to the population of Ukraine would mean that 9.6 million people may have a mental-health condition of whom 3.9 million may have conditions that are moderate or severe,” says Vera Schroepel People cover a roof with tarps after their house was hit by a Russian airstrike near the Russian-Ukrainian border in Sumy region illustrates the continuing influence and widespread psychological impact of the war in Ukraine on children’s health uncertainty and financial challenges due to unemployment and rising costs that come with the visible signs of stress and increased anxiety/anxiousness in their children,” Ms “Forty-three per cent of parents have noticed changes in the mental states of their children and reported high levels of anxiety sensitivity to loud noises and trouble sleeping among children.” Families of missing Ukrainian civilians fight for any news of where their loved ones went Anxiety and stress were also exacerbated for internally displaced people livelihoods and communities and have been forced to start again in new locations a psychologist and the head of Vilnyy Vybir – a non-governmental organization focused on psychological support and rehabilitation for veterans – says mobile apps are becoming an additional tool for people to help with mental-health challenges they don’t have the opportunity to make an appointment with a specialist or are not ready for one-on-one therapy The online tools help them understand what’s happening to them “When we are working with our clients on individual sessions mostly they come with post-trauma tiredness She says that experiencing traumatic situations and their continuation in the future prevent full rehabilitation because sufferers are continuing to deal with stress and troubling events says Ukrainians have adapted to living in conditions of uncertainty “At the beginning of a full-scale invasion and we don’t have any guarantees or predictability regarding when we will regain control over our own lives – it’s creating exhaustion.” but the level of it depends on their location and the degree of danger around them and the third year of threat to human life.” The Kharkiv Psychiatric Hospital has 15 to 20 new patients a day Two other psychiatric hospitals in the region are not operational any more – one of them has been totally destroyed “But not all the people who need help come to us or are delivered by ambulance,” he says “We still have a big number of people who stay at home.” A study using the WHO-5 psychological well-being index revealed alarming statistics: 35 per cent of Ukrainians surveyed indicated poor well-being and quality of life with scores suggesting potential psychological distress While 30 per cent described their quality of life as decent or fair only a small fraction – 10 per cent – reported the highest quality of life possible Report an editorial error Report a technical issue Editorial code of conduct Authors and topics you follow will be added to your personal news feed in Following Welcome to The Globe and Mail’s comment community. 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For more information on our commenting policies and how our community-based moderation works, please read our Community Guidelines and our Terms and Conditions During a Russian nighttime combined attack, 17 drones were shot down in the sky over the Cherkasy region. 2 people were injured in the attack, according to the head of the Cherkasy Regional Military Administration, Ihor Taburets. Russia attacked the Cherkasy region with drones and missiles Ukrainian Air Force destroyed 17 Russian drones people suffered as a result of the Russian attacks According to the Cherkasy Regional Military Administration Both are in moderate condition," noted Taburets The regional authorities are inspecting the area for property damage there have been no calls for help from residents an air alert was declared throughout the Cherkasy region Ukrainian Air Force warned of a Russian missile threat emergency power outages were introduced in Cherkasy region due to a massive missile attack an air raid alert was announced in Cherkasy and Zolotonosha districts the emergency blackouts were canceled only at 10:20 a.m Russian troops also attacked the Poltava region on the night of February 11 Naftogaz's production facilities were damaged Ukrenergo introduced emergency blackouts across Ukraine on the morning of February 11 That's according to the Main Directorate of the National Police in the Cherkasy region The pilot managed to eject during the fall We call on locals to pay special attention to suspicious people especially in tactical or military uniform with red elements on clothing The man may stay within the Zolotonosha district and try to stop passing vehicles in order to get to another city," the statement said Law enforcement officers continue to conduct investigative measures to establish the location of the pilot.  While citing and using any materials on the Internet links to the website ukrinform.net not lower than the first paragraph are mandatory citing the translated materials of foreign media outlets is possible only if there is a link to the website ukrinform.net and the website of a foreign media outlet Materials marked as "Advertisement" or with a disclaimer reading "The material has been posted in accordance with Part 3 of Article 9 of the Law of Ukraine "On Advertising" No 1996 and the Law of Ukraine "On the Media" No 2023 and on the basis of an agreement/invoice Online media entity; Media identifier - R40-01421 Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on November 1 ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP) highlighted ongoing social and ideological divides within Russian society while reiterating boilerplate justifications for the war in Ukraine during a speech on October 31 Kirill offered his assessment of the main external and internal threats to the Russian state during a meeting of the Bureau of the Presidium of the World Russian People's Council and Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine.[1] Kirill noted that while the war in Ukraine is the "most pressing threat" to the Russian state some people within Russian society "prefer to ignore" what is happening on the frontline in Ukraine and the struggles of people who live in Russian border areas closer to the combat zone Kirill criticized Russians who are unwilling to "give up their personal comforts" and who are relying on "frivolous entertainment" to distract them from the reality of the war Kirill's rebuke of Russians who are apathetic and disinterested in the war suggests that the Kremlin may be increasingly concerned about the sustainability of Russian society's support for the war Recent Russian opinion polls have suggested that support for local Russian government entities and some Kremlin policies although Russian citizens continue to widely support Russian President Vladimir Putin.[2] Additional polling has suggested that most Russians particularly Russians who have not personally lost family members in Ukraine are largely apathetic to the invasion and are able to avoid thinking about the invasion entirely as long as it does not personally affect them.[3] The Kremlin may be concerned about the growing cleavage between Russian citizens who have been immediately impacted by the invasion and Russians who have successfully insulated themselves and their families from the invasion The Kremlin may also be concerned about apathy towards the invasion in the context of the possible societal reaction to conducting a second wave of mobilization to which most Russians remain averse.[4] Kirill has previously acted as a key figure in injecting Kremlin narratives into the Russian information space and the Kremlin may be in the early stages of justifying and preparing Russian society to support a future wave of mobilization.[5] Kirill also highlighted the growing trend of brutality and cruelty in the Russian military and attempted to excuse this trend as the emergence of a “neo-pagan” cult.[6] Kirill stated on October 31 that neo-pagan preachers are trying to revive paganism and instill a "cult of brute force and cruelty” in Russia Kirill added that neo-pagans are introducing a false belief that Christianity discourages personal heroism and valor and that "holy" Russian servicemen disprove this belief with their conduct but he then noted that "neo-paganism" is present in the Russian army Kirill concluded the segment by criticizing Halloween celebrations in Russia and Kirill likely used the occasion to introduce a discussion about Russian servicemen committing brutal and cruel acts on the frontlines or upon their return to Russia from the frontlines ISW has observed numerous instances of Russian military personnel committing gruesome acts against fellow Russian servicemen on the frontlines and Russian citizens upon their return from the frontlines.[7] Russia is likely to see a significant rise of brutality and cruelty in its communities upon the arrival of more traumatized Russian servicemen home as long as it continues to brutalize its soldiers; refuses to provide the necessary psychological assistance to returning veterans; and militarizes its society Russian authorities also continue to identify conflict between ethnic Russians and minority groups as a critical issue Kirill identified "issues with migrants" and ethno-religious tensions as key internal threats to the Russian state during his October 31 speech and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev noted on October 31 that Russia needs to address its migration issues.[8] Medvedev suggested that Russia should introduce "digital migrant profile[s]," which would reportedly allow Russian authorities to stop foreigners at any time and identify foreigners via electronic immigration or travel documents ISW has reported at length on the balance that Putin is trying to strike between catering to his pro-war ultranationalist constituency which espouses extreme anti-migrant sentiments and his practical need to leverage migrant labor both economically and militarily.[9] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with his North Korean counterpart Choe Son-hui in Moscow on November 1 as the Russian Orthodox Church has used parallel language to rhetorically justify Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine as an existential and civilizational struggle—a struggle into which North Korea has now willingly entered.[13] Choe's visit to Moscow comes against the backdrop of reports that North Korean troops have already deployed to Kursk Oblast and will soon enter combat alongside Russian forces US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken held a joint press conference with South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul and South Korean Defense Minister Kim Yong Hyun on October 31 during which Austin assessed that 8,000 North Korean soldiers are in Kursk Oblast and will enter into combat against Ukrainian forces in "the coming days."[14] Austin stated that Russian forces have trained North Korean troops on how to use artillery systems and conduct basic tactical infantry maneuvers North Korean troops are unlikely to present Russia with a long-term solution to its manpower concerns despite Choe's comments about Pyongyang's indefinite commitment to Russia's war effort Austin reported that Russian forces are suffering over 1,200 casualties a day (or about 36,000 casualties a month) and recent US estimates placed Russian recruitment at between 25,000-30,000 new soldiers per month—meaning Russia is just shy of being able to replace its current rate of frontline losses at a 1:1 ratio.[15] The 8,000 North Korean soldiers reportedly preparing to enter combat in Kursk Oblast thus represent about one week's worth of casualties across the entire frontline North Korea has committed an estimated total of 12,000 troops to Russia.[16] It remains unclear exactly how Russia intends to leverage North Korean manpower but the commitment of North Korean troops into the type of highly attritional offensive operations that Russia has been pursuing is very likely to lead to high North Korean casualty rates ISW recently assessed that North Korea likely decided to engage in the war on Russia's behalf in order to gain valuable combat experience in a modern war but noted that the way that the Russian command uses North Korean troops in combat will impact the ability of North Korean forces to meaningfully internalize and disseminate combat experience.[17] If North Korean troops face the same casualty rates as Russian forces then the battlefield lessons Pyongyang hopes to learn will be undermined and Kim is unlikely to commit his forces to face such losses on the battlefield indefinitely The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a new tranche of military assistance valued at $425 million to Ukraine on November 1 includes Stryker armored personnel carriers (APCs); munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS); Stinger man-portable air-defense system (MANPADS) missiles; air-to-ground munitions; HIMARS ammunition; 105mm and 155mm artillery ammunition; Tube-launched Wire-guided (TOW) missiles; Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS) equipment and munitions; and Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems.[18] The package also includes small arms and ammunition could assist Ukrainian forces in kitting or resupplying new or existing Ukrainian brigades possibly alleviating some burdens that Ukrainian officials have previously identified in equipping new Ukrainian brigades.[19] Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor failed to enforce its plan to deanonymize Russian social media accounts by its stated November 1 deadline Roskomnadzor and the Russian Ministry of Digital Development published a draft resolution on October 4 requiring social media pages with an audience of over 10,000 subscribers to register their identity and contact information with the Russian government.[20] Russian officials specified that public discussion of the resolution would continue until October 31 meaning that the resolution should have come into force on November 1 A Russian milblogger claimed that he contacted Roskomnadzor on October 31 to verify if the resolution would go into effect on November 1 and that Roskomnadzor officials responded that the "law is still in development."[21] Roskomnadzor reportedly told the milblogger that it will publish additional information about the law on Roskomnadzor’s website soon Russian milbloggers commented on Roskomnadzor's response with one stating that Russia is passing "draconian laws" to leak milbloggers’ data but had failed to instruct the milbloggers on how to abide by the law before it was supposed to come into force.[22] We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced north of Sudzha amid continued assaults in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on November 1 Geolocated footage published on October 31 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of and into southwestern Russkoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha).[23] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Korenevo near Kremyanoye but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[24] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued assaults along the salient including southeast of Korenevo near Novoivanovka and south of Sudzha near Plekhovo.[25] Elements of the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade and the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF] Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[26] Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in Glushkovsky Raion (west of the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast) on November 1 Russian sources claimed on November 1 that Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russia on the night of October 31 to November 1 The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed 83 Ukrainian drones over Kursk and Belgorod oblasts and occupied Crimea.[27] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian drones struck a fuel and energy complex in Ufa and hit but did not damage an oil depot in Stavropol Krai though footage of the strike showed a fire at the Stavropol Krai oil depot.[28] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City) Ukrainian and Russian forces recently marginally advanced within central Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) amid continued limited Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 1 Geolocated footage published on November 1 shows that Ukrainian forces seized a Russian position on Zernova Street in central Vovchansk indicating that Russian forces had also advanced up to Zernova Street at a previous date.[29] Russian forces continued ground attacks near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) and near Vovchanski Khutory (immediately east of Vovchansk) on October 31 and November 1.[30] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Kupyansk and northwest of Kreminna amid continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 1 Geolocated footage published on November 1 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced within western Petropavlivka (northeast of Kupyansk) and withi northeastern Terny (northwest of Kreminna).[31] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on November 1 that Russian forces seized Kruhlyakivka (southeast of Kupyansk) and ISW assessed that Russian forces had seized the settlement as of October 31.[32] Russian forces also continued ground attacks southeast of Kupyansk near Kolisnynivka and Vyshneve; northwest of Kreminna near Druzhelyubivka and Terny; and south of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area on October 31 and November 1.[33] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas) Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Siversk direction on November 1 A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) are conducting daily airstrikes in the Siversk direction to support 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) ground operations in this direction.[34] Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Chasiv Yar on November 1 but did not advance The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported that Russian forces are conducting daily assaults in small groups and Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Anastasia Bobovnikova reported that Russian forces are attacking Ukrainian positions in groups of two to three personnel and hiding in foxholes or basements before rapidly trying to advance again.[35] Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov claimed that Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz forces recently advanced three kilometers past the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal and seized a part of the Chasiv Yar-Kostyantynivka (T0504) road likely in reference to recent Russian advances along the T0504 road across the canal just south of Chasiv Yar.[36] Fighting continued on the flanks of Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on November 1.[37] Elements of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) and 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile regiments (both of the 98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[38] Russian forces continued limited offensive operations near Toretsk on November 1 but did not make any confirmed advances The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces recently seized Oleksandropil (southwest of Toretsk) and Katerynivka (northwest of Toretsk) formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) reportedly continue operating in and near Toretsk.[42] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on November 1 but did not make any confirmed advances Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are continuing to advance beyond Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk) and Vyshneve (just west of Selydove) although ISW has not observed recent visual evidence of these claims.[43] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that fighting continued east of Pokrovsk near Sukha Balka and Myrolyubivka; and southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Vyshneve on October 31 and November 1.[44] Russian forces reportedly advanced in the Kurakhove direction amid continued offensive operations on November 1 Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced further west into Novoselydivka (north of Kurakhove) and north of Vovchenka (northeast of Kurakhove) and seized Stepanivka and Ilinka (just north of Kurakhove on the northeastern bank of the Kurakhivske Reservoir).[45] ISW has not yet observed confirmation of these claims The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating near Kurakhove noted that the situation in this area is difficult but that Ukrainian forces have prepared defensive lines and fortifications in Kurakhove that will inhibit Russian advances into the settlement itself.[46] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported continued fighting northwest of Kurakhove near Novodmytrivka; north of Kurakhove near Novoselydivka and Kreminna Balka; northeast of Kurakhove near Ostrivske and Vovchenka; and east of Kurakhove near Maksymilyanivka on October 31 and November 1.[47] Elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhivka-Vovchenka area.[48] Russian forces reportedly advanced in the Vuhledar direction amid continued offensive operations on November 1 Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and northeast of Novoukrainka (northwest of Vuhledar); north of Bohoyavlenka (northwest of Vuhledar); and into Trudove (north of Bohoyavlenka) although ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[49] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported fighting north of Vuhledar near Dalne; northeast of Vuhledar near Antonivka and Yelyzavetivka; and northwest of Vuhledar near Trudove and Novoukrainka on October 31 and November 1.[50] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov credited elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet Eastern Military District [EMD]) on November 1 with the recently claimed seizure of Shakhtarske and Novoukrainka.[51] Elements of the "Kaira" detachment (68th AC EMD) and 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating northeast of Vuhledar near Yelyzavetivka and Pobieda while elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) and 200th Artillery Brigade (29th CAA) are all operating northwest of Vuhledar near Shakhtarske Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes) Limited fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast including near Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne) on October 31 and November 1.[53] Elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA] Southern Military District [SMD]) and elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[54] Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on October 31 and November 1 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[55] Elements of the Russian BARS-33 (Russian Combat Army Reserve) Detachment and 80th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC] Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[56] A Russian source claimed on October 31 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a Russian Podlet radar station near Cape Tarkhankut and that Russian forces have not yet evacuated the station for repair as of October 31.[57] and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline) Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 31 to November 1 The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from the airspace over occupied Kherson Oblast and 48 drones including Shahed-type drones and other unidentified drone types from Oryol and Kursk oblasts.[58] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 31 drones over Kirovohrad and Poltava oblasts; that 14 Russian drones were "lost in location," presumably due to unspecified Ukrainian countermeasures; and that three drones flew into Belarusian airspace The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces also downed one Kh-59/69 missile and that the other two missiles did not strike their intended targets due to Ukrainian countermeasures The Ukrainian Air Force reported that falling Russian drone debris struck several civilian enterprises and residential buildings in Poltava Cherkasy Oblast Head Ihor Taburets stated that Russian drones damaged several apartment buildings and struck a state enterprise near Zolotonosha Cherkasy Oblast.[59] The Poltava Oblast Military Administration reported that Russian drones damaged residential buildings in the oblast and Ukrainian Emergency Services reported that a Russian missile strike damaged a fire station in Odesa City.[60] an independent Belarusian monitoring group reported on November 1 that Russian drones entered Belarusian airspace near Lyubech Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization) The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) introduced a new system on November 1 allowing Russian veterans and their families to confirm their veteran statuses digitally likely in response to persistent Russian servicemen and milblogger complaints regarding inefficient and overly bureaucratic veteran registration processes.[63] The Russian MoD announced that veterans and their families can use the Unified Portal of State and Municipal Services to obtain electronic veterans status certificates that entitle them to state benefits The Kremlin’s efforts to resolve long-standing problems with the compensation and recognition of veterans are likely a part of Russia’s efforts to continue the voluntary recruitment of Russian troops as opposed to declaring partial or general mobilization The success of this voluntary recruitment relies at least in part on the Kremlin’s ability to fulfill its promises to Russian veterans ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin’s efforts to avoid mobilization are committing Russia to long-term financial and societal responsibilities to support veterans and their families.[64] The Russian system for the electronic distribution of conscription summonses became fully operational on November 1 likely as part of the Kremlin’s effort to improve its mobilization system which proved to be inefficient during partial mobilization in September 2022 The Russian government passed a resolution on April 19 which specified that the unified registry for Russian citizens responsible for military service will become operational on November 1 2024.[65] The resolution stated that Russian men of conscription age will receive summonses electronically and summonses will be marked as "received" even if selected men do not open them.[66] The Russian government previously launched the trial period for the electronic summons distribution system in September 2024 and began widely using the system for the Fall 2024 conscription cycle.[67] ISW has observed that Russian regional and military officials routinely distribute false or misleading summonses that follow the structure of conscription summonses and it is possible that the Russian government will use this digital platform to coerce more Russians into enlisting in the Russian military under false pretenses.[68] Several Russian federal subjects significantly increased the one-time military enlistment bonuses to incentivize volunteer recruitment and meet the Russian MoD’s regional recruitment quotas Chuvashia Republic reportedly doubled its one-time military enlistment bonuses to one million rubles ($10,178) from 500,000 rubles ($5,089).[69] Orenburg Oblast similarly increased one-time military enlistment bonuses from 400,000 rubles ($4,079) to one million rubles and Perm Krai officials are reportedly offering 4.52 million rubles ($46,000) for the first year of military service - including a one-time enlistment bonus of 1.5 million rubles ($15,268).[70] Ufa City officials in the Bashkortostan Republic are reportedly offering 500,000-ruble discounts for the purchase of apartments to people who enlist to fight in Ukraine.[71] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov is reportedly preparing to deploy 84,000 troops from Chechnya to Ukraine due to the Kremlin’s ongoing problems with force generation.[72] Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine) A Russian insider source claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is searching for replacements for American microcircuits in the Russian market likely as a result of sanctions.[75] The insider source claimed that the Chelyabinsk "Polet" radio plant is a year late in supplying the Russian MoD with navigation and flight control systems and communications and lighting equipment stated that the "Polet" plant was unable to purchase components necessary to construct these systems due to US-imposed sanctions The "Polet" plant reportedly found two Russian microcircuits manufacturers to produce analogs to American components but the production of these components will take an estimated 390 days.[76] Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural ISW is not reporting on activities in Russian-occupied areas today Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus) Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko approved the draft of a Belarusian-Russian agreement on the procedure for the mutual enforcement of court decisions on October 31.[77] Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update [1] http://www.patriarchia dot ru/db/text/6170962.html [2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102924 [3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022524 [6] http://www.patriarchia dot ru/db/text/6170962.html ; https://www.moscowtimes dot ru/2024/10/31/glava-rpts-predlozhil-ogranichit-rossiyanam-razvlecheniya-a146557 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79860 [7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20October%2017%2C%202024%20%28PDF%29.pdf [8] http://www.patriarchia dot ru/db/text/6170962.html ; https://t.me/tass_agency/282867 ; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/society/news/2024/10/31/1072268-medvedev-prizval; https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/news/2024/10/31/24284269.shtml [9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar06272024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2024 [10] https://www.reuters.com/world/north-korean-foreign-minister-arrives-moscow-talks-2024-11-01/; https://t.me/tass_agency/282969; https://t.me/MID_Russia/47363; https://t.me/MID_Russia/47362; https://t.me/MID_Russia/47354 [12] https://www.yna.co dot kr/view/AKR20241101154251080?section=north-korea/all; https://t.me/tass_agency/282987 https://meduza dot io/news/2024/11/01/glava-mid-severnoy-korei-zayavila-chto-kndr-do-pobednogo-dnya-budet-tverdo-stoyat-s-rossiyskimi-tovarischami-v-ih-svyaschennoy-voynehttps://t.me/tass_agency/282981; https://t.me/tass_agency/282982 [13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-orthodox-church-declares-%E2%80%9Choly-war%E2%80%9D-against-ukraine-and-articulates-tenets [14] https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3953130/north-korean-soldiers-likely-to-enter-russian-war-on-ukraine/ [15] https://www.csis.org/analysis/north-korean-troops-deploy-russia-whats-military-effect [16] https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/24/europe/ukraine-north-korean-troops-spotted-kursk-intl-latam/index.html [17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/north-korea-joins-russias-war-against-ukraine-operational-and-strategic-implications [18] https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3954004/biden-administration-announces-additional-security-assistance-for-ukraine/ [19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-12-2024 [20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2024 [22] https://t.me/AlexCarrier/9126; https://t.me/rybar/64970; https://t.me/dva_majors/56500; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142942 [23] https://t.me/soiuzspaseniya/1662 ; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1852178017587728622 [25] https://t.me/mod_russia/45226 ; https://t.me/rybar/64961 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22905 [28] https://t.me/dva_majors/56499 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/282870 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/11/01/ukrainskiy-dron-atakoval-neftebazu-v-stavropolie; https://t.me/bazabazon/32591; https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/30910 [29] https://fb.watch/vAA30hSII0/; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1852301275456475606; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1852301583578452098 [30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0BPCabEScESChTvfp6zsrYPeSbRbNjBFJofcQtTqXRMgdXD5Jo9jBhEg8HMP25Hsyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04ibau2KXeKfCx7Hn5b3eDGiQM2cgtcFLdUKd1u3dLjDQ9iM17ZHvtLNKMCaduqC6l; https://t.me/otukharkiv/2378; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11729 [31] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1852266828157894660; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/21855; https://t.me/mb2omb30/72; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7337; https://t.me/omb_97/287; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7342 [32] https://t.me/mod_russia/45223; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-31-2024 [33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04ibau2KXeKfCx7Hn5b3eDGiQM2cgtcFLdUKd1u3dLjDQ9iM17ZHvtLNKMCaduqC6l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0BPCabEScESChTvfp6zsrYPeSbRbNjBFJofcQtTqXRMgdXD5Jo9jBhEg8HMP25Hsyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid05Ho9qQ7v2avqnDzXuA6qvpM71eZqRLtNFTHJBegcX3fBqXU6gxqAAyHYu4exterDl; https://t.me/rusich_army/18118; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11729 [35] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/01/vbombarduvaty-v-zemlyu-nichni-ataky-dronamy-efektyvno-strymuyut-voroga/; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/870869-kilkist-sturmiv-zmensilas-rosiani-nakopicuut-sili-otu-lugansk/ [37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid05Ho9qQ7v2avqnDzXuA6qvpM71eZqRLtNFTHJBegcX3fBqXU6gxqAAyHYu4exterDl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0BPCabEScESChTvfp6zsrYPeSbRbNjBFJofcQtTqXRMgdXD5Jo9jBhEg8HMP25Hsyl; https://t.me/wargonzo/22905 [40] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/01/my-yih-potyhenku-vsih-horonymo-czvyntar-okupantiv-u-toreczku-roste-v-geometrychnij-progresiyi/ [41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04ibau2KXeKfCx7Hn5b3eDGiQM2cgtcFLdUKd1u3dLjDQ9iM17ZHvtLNKMCaduqC6l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0BPCabEScESChTvfp6zsrYPeSbRbNjBFJofcQtTqXRMgdXD5Jo9jBhEg8HMP25Hsyl [42] https://t.me/wargonzo/22918; https://t.me/nm_dnr/12919 [43] https://t.me/rybar/64965; https://t.me/rusich_army/18118; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29082 [44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid05Ho9qQ7v2avqnDzXuA6qvpM71eZqRLtNFTHJBegcX3fBqXU6gxqAAyHYu4exterDl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04ibau2KXeKfCx7Hn5b3eDGiQM2cgtcFLdUKd1u3dLjDQ9iM17ZHvtLNKMCaduqC6l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0BPCabEScESChTvfp6zsrYPeSbRbNjBFJofcQtTqXRMgdXD5Jo9jBhEg8HMP25Hsyl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18379 [45] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142866; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/59903; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18395; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19296; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79833 [46] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/01/vony-goryat-palayut-yih-rozryvaye-na-shmattya-na-pidstupah-do-kurahovogo-tryvayut-vazhki-boyi/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDXWlQ2K0dM [49] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29072; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79833; [50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid05Ho9qQ7v2avqnDzXuA6qvpM71eZqRLtNFTHJBegcX3fBqXU6gxqAAyHYu4exterDl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0BPCabEScESChTvfp6zsrYPeSbRbNjBFJofcQtTqXRMgdXD5Jo9jBhEg8HMP25Hsyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04ibau2KXeKfCx7Hn5b3eDGiQM2cgtcFLdUKd1u3dLjDQ9iM17ZHvtLNKMCaduqC6l; https://t.me/rybar/64965; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/59891; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18394   [52]https://t.me/voin_dv/11584; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79808 (northeast of Vuhledar); https://t.me/rybar/64962 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/56479; https://t.me/voin_dv/11582; https://t.me/voin_dv/11589; https://t.me/voin_dv/11590 (northwest of Vuhledar) [53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04ibau2KXeKfCx7Hn5b3eDGiQM2cgtcFLdUKd1u3dLjDQ9iM17ZHvtLNKMCaduqC6l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0BPCabEScESChTvfp6zsrYPeSbRbNjBFJofcQtTqXRMgdXD5Jo9jBhEg8HMP25Hsyl [54] https://t.me/dva_majors/56560; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18356 [55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid05Ho9qQ7v2avqnDzXuA6qvpM71eZqRLtNFTHJBegcX3fBqXU6gxqAAyHYu4exterDl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0BPCabEScESChTvfp6zsrYPeSbRbNjBFJofcQtTqXRMgdXD5Jo9jBhEg8HMP25Hsyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0BPCabEScESChTvfp6zsrYPeSbRbNjBFJofcQtTqXRMgdXD5Jo9jBhEg8HMP25Hsyl; https://t.me/rusich_army/18126 [56] https://t.me/dva_majors/56515; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/41094 [59] https://suspilne dot media/cherkasy/870755-bahnuv-i-rozletilosa-vse-u-zolotonosi-na-cerkasini-likviduut-naslidki-vlucanna-droniv/ [60] https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/18810 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/34395; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/870639-rosiani-atakuvali-odesu-raketami-31-zovtna-so-vidomo-pro-stan-travmovanih-ratuvalnikiv/ [61] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/8197 ; https://t.me/Hajun_BY/8198 [62] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/8200; https://suspilne dot media/870841-belaruski-gaun-porahuvav-skilki-rosijskih-droniv-zaletili-v-bilorus-z-lipna/ [63] https://t.me/mod_russia/45213; https://t.me/rusvesnasu/30108 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79832 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18376; https://t.me/wargonzo/22910; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142903; [64] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-volunteer-units-and-battalions [65] http://publication dot pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202404270025 [66] https://www.severreal.org/a/v-rossii-zarabotal-reestr-s-elektronnymi-povestkami-v-armiyu/33183018.html [67] https://www.severreal.org/a/v-rossii-zarabotal-reestr-s-elektronnymi-povestkami-v-armiyu/33183018.html [68] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-18 [69] https://www.idelreal dot org/a/v-chuvashii-v-dva-raza-podnyali-razmer-regionalnyy-vyplaty-za-kontrakt-s-minoborony-na-voynu-s-ukrainoy/33183137.html; https://t.me/idelrealii/38289 [70] https://www.idelreal dot org/a/v-orenburgskoy-oblasti-razmer-regionalnoy-vyplaty-podnyali-v-1-5-raza/33182945.html; https://t.me/idelrealii/38287; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/20773 [71] https://ufa.rbc dot ru/ufa/31/10/2024/672380049a794775ec7b6428?from=from_main_6; https://www.idelreal dot org/a/v-ufe-obeschayut-skidku-v-polmilliona-rubley-na-kvartiru-tem-kto-poydet-na-voynu-s-ukrainoy/33182162.html; https://t.me/idelrealii/38283 [72] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/01/84-tysyachi-kadyrivcziv-najblyzhchym-chasom-planuyut-pomerty-v-ukrayini/; https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/84-tysyachi-kadyrivtsiv-najblyzhchym-chasom-planuyut-pomerty-v-ukrayini/ [73] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/22258431; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18366; https://t.me/uvznews/2756 [77] https://belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-odobril-proekt-belorussko-rossijskogo-soglashenija-o-porjadke-vzaimnogo-ispolnenija-672404-2024/ Ukrainian entrepreneurs have opened the gastronomic bar "Little Sins" in Berlin, as reported by the local media "Amal, Berlin".The bar is located in the Friedrichshain district often referred to as the "pleasure district." Little Sins is described as a small establishment with a dynamic format "for its own," where they aim to showcase Ukrainian service Oysters are brought in weekly from the Dutch farm Zeeland’s Roem Sometimes oysters are sold near the establishment The cider for the establishment is brought in from the city of Zolotonosha in the Cherkasy region sparkling wine and wine are served with dishes Wine tastings will also be held here in the future The owners of the gastronomic bar plan to open new branches in Berlin as well as in other cities and express their interest in franchise development The establishment has four co-owners in Berlin and a partnership with the large Ukrainian restaurant network Gastrofamily each person was responsible for a separate aspect: repairs The total investment amounted to €130,000 This website is using a security service to protect itself from online attacks The action you just performed triggered the security solution There are several actions that could trigger this block including submitting a certain word or phrase You can email the site owner to let them know you were blocked Please include what you were doing when this page came up and the Cloudflare Ray ID found at the bottom of this page the Emergency Management Center received a notification that 3 explosive objects were found during the earthworks They turned out to be 152-millimeter artillery pieces from the Second World War pyrotechnic calculation of the special purpose emergency and rescue unit more than a hundred explosive objects of various calibers were found the SNS sappers seized 200 artillery shells of the Second World War Work on the survey of the territory continues the pyrotechnic units of the State Emergency Service were involved 152 times pyrotechnic units worked: 23 thousand in the Kharkiv region Since the beginning of the large-scale military invasion of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine 441 thousand 950 explosive objects and 2 thousand 892 kg of explosives have been defused The area of more than 102 thousand 517 hectares was surveyed If you find a suspicious object or explosive We use cookies to provide you with better navigation on our website you automatically agree to the use of these technologies one of the largest-scale air attacks on Ukraine resulted in damage to critical infrastructure across the country The Ukrainian Red Cross responded promptly to the attacks and joined the relief efforts in many regions The fall of Shahed drone wreckage in a village in the Zolotonosha district caused damage to 17 households including smashed windows and damaged roofs in both commercial and residential properties The team of the Cherkasy regional branch of the Ukrainian Red Cross and the emergency response team together with the State Emergency Service of Ukraine worked at the site to address the aftermath of the morning attack on 26 August The volunteers provided materials to the villagers whose homes were damaged to temporarily cover their windows and roofs four missiles and a drone attacked critical infrastructure Volunteers of the Ukrainian Red Cross emergency response team in the Zhytomyr region promptly arrived at the scene and immediately provided first aid to a woman with bruises Given the ongoing threat of a repeated attack a tent was set up after the all-clear was given volunteers provided first aid and offered water and snacks to the emergency workers The Volyn emergency response team established a 24-hour aid station at the site where residents of the damaged houses could charge their devices and receive assistance during the emergency volunteers administered first aid to more than 20 people and snacks to local residents and first responders from the State Emergency Service of Ukraine and the National Police a warming centre was set up where up to 20 people could spend the night if necessary The Ukraine team will participate in the first-ever Women's Amputee Football World Cup a historic event that marks another important step in developing adaptive and women's football Ahead of their departure, Andriy Shevchenko, the president of the Ukrainian Association of Football, visited the team to personally congratulate the athletes and support them at this significant stage. The Blue and Yellow team, led by Dmytro Rzhondkovskyi, has been preparing for the competition in Zolotonosha, Cherkasy region. The inaugural women’s world championship will take place in Barranquilla, Colombia, from November 4 to 10. Ukraine has been drawn into Group C, where they will compete against Ecuador and USA. November 4, 2024: Ecuador vs. Ukraine (16:30) [email protected] Over a quarter of Cherkasy online media news is about the war the posts in the feeds are about volunteer and charity initiatives These are the results of an analysis conducted by the Institute of Mass Information with the purpose of investigating the number of war-related news and of creating a general outline of how Cherkasy online media cover the war The analysis included all news from the 18000, Procherk, Zmi.ck.ua, Provse, and Vycherpno news channels for the last week of July Online media published 180 news items that are directly or indirectly related to russia's war against Ukraine was about the full-scale invasion and its consequences Journalists of the 18000 and Vycherpo websites wrote about the war most often Their news feeds contained 35% and 28% of "military" news Vycherpno and 18000 contained the most such news items – 10 and 11 Posts about our military losses comprise almost as much Mostly these are news about the fallen soldiers or about bidding farewell to them The 18000 website published the most such news – 11 items 10 appeared in the Zmi.ck.ua and Vycherpno feeds each the occupiers in Kherson oblast have revived 'Berkut' and are torturing people" on Procherk The share of news about infrastructure damage in the region is only 2% of the total. All online media outlets whose feeds were analyzed, except for Zmi.ck.ua, posted the statistics provided by the head of the Cherkasy RMA Ihor Taburets at his meeting with journalists and Cherkasy districts have been damaged by rocket attacks on Cherkasy oblast during the full-scale war Note that the analyzed publications do meet the journalistic standards. An exception was the article "Uman Hasidim complain about refugees who left a mess in the hotel rooms" on the Provse website, which was also reposted by Procherk The headline and the text of the material contains hate speech targeting internally displaced persons the text contains a certain level of generalization and the source of the report's core narrative is the story of an aquaintance of the media outlet's spokesperson which should also have been a deterrent for journalists the material does not carry any other information except for the thesis presented in the headline leads to the conclusion that the purpose of the article was to create a negative image of immigrants regional representative of the Institute of Mass Information in Cherkasy oblast [email protected] (050) 447-70-63 Ідентифікатор медіа: R40-01250 Reprinting and disseminating our information is allowed but under strictly condition of reference to the source the socialist-Zionist theoretician and political leader long before his Zionist dreams became a reality 2012Get email notification for articles from David B the socialist-Zionist theoretician and political leader Ber Borochov died after having returned from New York to Russia in the lead-up to the revolution there.