The regulatory tracker was last updated on May 2 As the Trump administration returns to office for a second term with renewed deregulatory ambitions the executive branch and its agencies are implementing significant policy changes The Brookings Center on Regulation and Markets Regulatory Tracker (“Reg Tracker”) provides background information and status updates on a curated selection of significant regulatory and deregulatory changes made by the Trump administration This tracker allows you to monitor a curated selection of new and important court battles across key policy areas such as environmental The Reg Tracker focuses on major regulatory changes implemented under the current Trump administration Entries we tracked during the Biden administration and during President Trump’s first term can be accessed through the “Biden” or “Trump Term 1” archive checkboxes For a more thorough explanation of the Reg Tracker, including an explanation of how entries are selected, an overview of the rulemaking process, and guidance on how to use the Reg Tracker’s interactive features, click here For regular updates from the Reg Tracker and new research from the Center on Regulation and Markets Subscribe to the Reg Tracker newsletter Source: Hutchins Center calculations and projections using data fromBureau of Economic Analysis (historical) and the Congressional Budget Office (projections) The Hutchins Center Fiscal Impact Measure shows how much local and federal tax and spending policy adds to or subtracts from overall economic growth and provides a near-term forecast of fiscal policies’ effects on economic activity STATE AND LOCAL FISCAL POLICY AND THE ECONOMY GDP growth by 0.6 percentage point in the first quarter of 2025 the Hutchins Center Fiscal Impact Measure (FIM) shows The FIM translates changes in taxes and spending at federal and local levels into changes in aggregate demand illustrating the effect of fiscal policy on real GDP growth GDP decreased at an annual rate of 0.3% in the first quarter of 2025 according to the government’s latest estimate The 0.6 percentage point decrease in the first quarter was largely the result of a decline in federal purchases reflecting a step down in defense spending after two strong quarters as well as the effects of recent actions taken to reduce the federal workforce (Workers who were placed on administrative leave or who accepted offers under the deferred resignation program continued to receive pay but were not working which boosted the federal deflator and lowered real purchases.) Net transfers increased the FIM by less than 0.1 percentage point We expect the FIM to remain negative in the next quarter and through the end of our forecast period (the first quarter of 2027) The sharp decline in our forecast of the FIM over the next four quarters reflects the effects of tariffs and heightened uncertainty surrounding tariffs and other federal policies including those related to federal grants to universities and other non-profits Although these effects are difficult to quantify we have marked down the FIM by one percentage point for each of the next four quarters as a rough approximation of their magnitude This projection also assumes that the provisions of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) that are set to expire at the end of 2025 are extended This projection does not reflect any other future legislation including any additional tax cuts beyond those in the TCJA and any potential cuts to Medicaid and other spending For more on the FIM, see our methodology ». You can also read our Guide to the FIM » MITCHELL — Parker Mandel proved to be a force at the plate for the Mitchell High School baseball team on Sunday Mandel collected five total hits and drove in five runs on the day to power the Kernels to a doubleheader sweep of Brookings at Cadwell Park Mandel’s three-hit game in the opener helped Mitchell win 10-7 before his go-ahead two-run double in the second game was the difference in a 6-5 victory Game 1 saw the Kernels push across runs in every inning beginning with a three-run opening frame after the Bobcats pushed across two runs in the top of the inning Jaxson Hartman plated home Gavin Jones on a single before scoring on Mandel’s base hit Brennan Penne also drove in a run in the first Brookings rallied in the top of the seventh taking advantage of a Kernels miscue in the field to score three times Following Cooper Schneider’s RBI double and Tre Christopherson working a walk to bring the tying run to the plate getting Tyson Antonen to pop out to collect the save Mitchell tallied 11 hits in Game 1 while drawing three walks Hudson Borgan and Landon Soulek each finished with a hit and an RBI Mason Herman collected the win after working six innings allowing four runs (three earned) with four strikeouts Talon Hyde recorded three of the Bobcats’ 10 hits in the contest Tane Friedrich collected two hits and Nolan Wagner was handed the pitching loss after allowing seven runs (four earned) to come across in four innings Game 2 saw Brookings (9-13) use small-ball tactics to jump out to a 4-3 lead after four innings Mitchell came through at the plate with two outs as Mandel laced a two-run double to left field He later scored on Herman’s base hit to complete the three-run frame The Bobcats again threatened in the top of the seventh inning moving runners into scoring position on a pair of singles and a groundout leading to Christopherson scoring on a passed ball lined out to Mitchell’s Jacob Ebert to finish the sweep Mandel and Hartman each recorded two hits in the game Hartman also recorded an RBI along with Herman to back Tyler Christensen who worked around five walks to log six innings and the win giving up four runs (three earned) and fanning seven Bobcats batters Christopherson finished 1-of-3 with two RBIs and scored once but was handed the pitching loss after being tagged with five earned runs in a six-inning complete game Mitchell (12-7) stays home for another twin bill against Sioux Falls Washington This audio recording is part of the World Bank/IMF Spring Meetings 2025 Special Episode of the Foresight Africa podcast I have been the IMF executive director representing 17 countries on the continent And my constituency comprises diverse countries ranging from low-income countries SIGNÉ: What are your key takeaways from the 2025 Spring Meetings N’SONDE: So regarding my key takeaways for the 2025 Spring Meetings I would say first that it’s a bit early to draw lessons from the 2025 Spring Meetings for the simple reasons that major events is yet to take place which is the International Monetary and Financial Community Meeting So this is basically the the organ where governors and ministers from around the world discusses the global challenges facing the economy and the policy priorities that policymakers should tackle But we have initial insight on what the takeaway might be the global economy outlook is clouded by major uncertainty stemming from the global trade policy shifts you are aware of So it creates uncertainty for policymakers in terms of how they will calibrate or recalibrate monetary policy because the policy shifts I just mentioned will have consequences in terms of the ongoing process of disinflation There could be additional inflationary pressures coming up There will be an impact on fiscal and external positions of countries And even countries that are not directly affected by the the policy shifts could be adversely affected indirectly through spillovers who will go through their trading partners a significant sense of uncertainty among policymakers Thank you so much for sharing your wonderful insights How might the 2025 Spring Meetings shape policy decisions and deliver tangible results across Africa moving forward I believe that despite the unilateral initiatives taken by some major countries we still believe that the multilateralism should be the way to address common challenges facing the world economy you know the continent remains vulnerable to external shocks ranging from climate change but now also from the global policy uncertainties So our continent needs to make sure that we we put our affairs in order which means that we should continue to put our public finances in order and accumulate sufficient buffers to be ready for the next series of shocks Now the world economy has been affected by multiple shocks ranging … you remember the started with the COVID-19 pandemic and since then we have seen a succession of shocks and we need to be prepared for the next shock we need to make sure that our economies remain resilient So this means not only building up buffers but also moving on with structural reforms to strengthen our resilience which includes diversifying our economies and also advancing the regional integration through notably the African Continental Free Trade Agreement SIGNÉ: Thank you so much for joining us today The Foresight Africa podcast is brought to you by the Brookings Podcast Network Send your feedback and questions to podcasts at Brookings dot edu My special thanks to the production team including Fred Dews senior communications coordinator in Brookings Global  The show’s art was designed by  Shavanthi  Mendis Additional promotional support for this podcast comes from my colleagues in Brookings Global and the Office of Communications at Brookings TechTank a biweekly podcast from the Center for Technology Innovation at Brookings explores today’s most consequential technology issues Moderators Nicol Turner Lee and Darrell West speak with experts and policymakers to share data and policy solutions that address the challenges of our digital world co-host Darrell West speaks with Eric Lipton an investigative reporter at the New York Times about the implications of these partnerships and what it means for space policy CO-HOST NICOL TURNER LEE [00:00:00] You’re listening to Tech Tank a bi-weekly podcast from the Brookings Institution exploring the most consequential technology issues of our time From racial bias and algorithms to the future of work Tech Tank takes big ideas and makes them accessible CO-HOST DARRELL WEST [00:00:28] Thanks for joining our Brookings Tech Tank podcast a senior fellow in the Center for Technology Innovation at the Brookings Institution It is an exciting time in the history of space exploration There have been advances in scientific knowledge through space-based telescopes and there are ambitious plans to return humans to the Moon in the next several years there are unresolved issues concerning the role of private firms in space exploration NASA used to have a near monopoly on space launches but now relies on commercial companies to send things into space Firms such as SpaceX are getting billions of dollars in federal money from NASA And leaders from the private sector are gaining new influence by taking positions at NASA and the Federal Aviation Administration All these things raise interesting questions concerning the role of private firms in space policy we are pleased to be joined by Eric Lipton of the New York Times He is a distinguished investigative reporter who covers several areas He joined the Times in 1999 and is a three-time winner of the Pulitzer Prize welcome to our Brookings Tech Tank podcast So I know that you cover a number of different sectors but in recent times you’ve several articles on the space area What interests you about the space sector and the role of private companies there GUEST ERIC LIPTON [00:02:04] I started about two years ago now looking at the subject matter of the acquisitions around technology and commercial services and the Defense Department the Pentagon is one of the biggest buyers in the world It’s got a budget of almost a trillion dollars a year And its purchases have just such enormous consequence to not only the effect of defense of the United States interest globally looking at how venture capital backed startups were transforming the world of defense contractors the beltway bandits were becoming VC backed startups one of the sectors within the defense procurement world that was going through this radical transformation moving from a kind of a Lockheed-Boeing-dominated built for DoD bespoke rockets under contract to a SpaceX model where the Pentagon is buying a service and it just grabs a ride on a sailboat that’s headed to space CO-HOST DARRELL WEST [00:03:20] So I think that is an interesting new trend And I know that you recently had an article entitled SpaceX position to secure billions in new federal grants under Trump What did you find in your reporting and what concerns you about SpaceX and Elon Musk GUEST ERIC LIPTON [00:03:37] So one of the kind of subsets of what I’ve been examining as part of that area of reporting is SpaceX because it is such a phenomenal story It went you know from you know founded in 2002 first launch of a Falcon 1 rocket in 2006 it gets its first money from NASA in 2008 I’m sorry in 2006 I got a small amount the first sizeable amount in 2008 And then it worked its way it eventually became a part of the National Security Launch Program But what happened along the way is that while SpaceX entered the scene saying Lockheed and Boeing have a monopoly and you have to help us break up this monopoly And it got $3.8 billion worth of federal contracts and it’s NASA’s largest private contractor And it’s DOD’s currently until a couple of days ago when the United Launch Alliance which is a consortium of Boeing and Lockheed got certification of its new rocket It was the only way that DOD had to get to space for its most important launches but what had happened is that SpaceX is now so dominant but it now looked like it was even going to see a bigger haul because a bunch of policy shifts have already taken place in four or five different parts of the federal government The department of commerce has decided it’s going to open up a broadband internet to satellite based Internet providers like SpaceX instead of relying on Fiverr for a $42 billion program that’s distributing broadband internet to rural America The Federal Aviation Administration is considering using Starlink the SpaceX communication systems to build out its air traffic control and weather data system being in the white house and he’s the CEO of SpaceX it looks as if it’s positioned to get an even bigger chunk of money from the federal government and to potentially dominate even more CO-HOST DARRELL WEST [00:06:48] And so Musk might say so that’s the reason we’re doing so well there’s no question SpaceX has transformed the commercial space industry both the satellite deployments at Starlink I mean it completely dominates the number of satellites in Orbit It is it is the prep puts like something nearly eighty or more than eighty percent of all A mass in orbit in 2024 was delivered by SpaceX Its reusable rocket has transformed the cost point of getting into orbit and it has opened up the commercial space industry It has allowed new businesses to emerge and flourish The problem is that it’s also vertically integrated So they’re both manufacturing the satellite busses They’re manufacturing the Starlink systems that or data communications and they’re also providing for themselves and also for commercial launch And they’re so large that it’s hard for any other players to get into the space two other commercial space companies were certified were added by the Department of Defense to one of the National Security Launch Programs the United Launch Alliance also got its Vulcan rocket certified it continues to be a commercial sector that is completely dominated by SpaceX and Trump appears to be taking steps that are going to make that even greater CO-HOST DARRELL WEST [00:08:45] And of course what a lot of people worry about is real or potential conflicts of interest here because as you point out Musk has extraordinary access to President Trump He’s attended several cabinet meetings through the Department of Government Efficiency His team is reviewing a bunch of the federal his team is revealing a bunch of the Federal agencies that now either are supporting him or maybe supporting him in the future So how should we think about those potential conflicts of interest there are real issues that demand constant examination there’s extremely little transparency and accountability in this current administration And so the only way that we’re able to really get any visibility is through efforts of reporters for the most part because the inspector generals have been fired the head of the office of government ethics has been fired The head of the Office of Special Counsel has been fire the Department of Justice is effectively neutered NASA is about to be taken over once he’s confirmed by Jared Isaacman tens of millions of dollars off of that investment And he recently sold it off because he’s been nominated to take over NASA spent hundreds of millions of dollars to buy two flights to orbit um client and a business partner with SpaceX and he’s now taking over NASA uh the head of sales for human flights for SpaceX who spent 15 years there So he’s now helping make decisions about astronaut systems for NASA having just less SpaceX he gave a no-bid contract to SpaceX worth more than a billion dollars to build a new low Earth orbit spy network for the National Reconnaissance Office And then Musk recommended him to become the new Air Force Secretary to Trump He just had his confirmation hearing as the new air force secretary And this is the same agency that’s going to largely be overseeing the construction of the Golden Dome hundreds of billions of dollars missile defense system And Troy Minks was asked just at his confirmation hearing about whether or not it looks as if the Space Force might be moving contracts that were already awarded to other companies to SpaceX and he said at his confirmation hearing that he would look into it they’ve appointed several people who actually are employees at SpaceX to work on evaluating the FAA’s air traffic control system and they were given ethics waivers that allow them to take positions that financially benefit SpaceX even though they’re still SpaceX employees and their own special assignments to the FAA They went in there and recommended that the Starlink satellite system be installed on FAA’s data collection system in certain areas of United States it is a concern about conflicts of interest And the problem is that the only way that we’re finding out about these things are the efforts of reporters and some of your articles have been extraordinary So definitely encourage people to go to the New York Times website and check out these articles one of the angles that you wrote about last year was this whole competition policy area And you know SpaceX does have a dominant market position already in the new administration that may even grow you wrote that some competitors have complained that the firm is using its dominant market position to either squeeze out other companies or somehow undercut them What did you find when you looked into that particular issue Elon Musk did not hesitate to accuse the Air Force of being helping a monopoly in the form of Boeing and Lockheed and he sued the Air Force claiming that they were being that Boeing and Lockheeds had this monopoly and that they were not letting SpaceX get into the fight and that it was good for the nation to have diversity And so that was how SpaceX effectively was born was that lawsuit that was filed in April 2014 and when I spoke with the CEOs of several of the kind of emerging commercial space companies that are effectively mini SpaceX’s from a decade ago these are companies that are just starting up to the venture capital market to raise money to help build out their business plans suddenly executives and SpaceX were talking to VCs and saying Don’t give money to this emerging space company and a CEO of another company told me that he was trying to find satellite companies that would launch on his new rocket that he was building SpaceX is demanding that we exclusively that we give them write a first refusal before we switch to another vendor you’re trying to box them in to prevent them from leaving even though SpaceX had such incredible market share was trying to keep its satellite companies from picking other launch providers And I even heard that late in the Biden administration About potentially looking at anti-competitive practices investigation relative to SpaceX that never materialized But there was some discussion about it and obviously it’s not gonna happen now CO-HOST DARRELL WEST [00:15:06] So in 2024 in a Times article you noted that government agencies had encountered environmental and worker safety issues with the firm and imposed various fines and penalties What were the problems that you found there And then now that Musk is so closely integrated with the new administration how are the dealing with these past complaints another topic that I spent a lot of time on last year was the look at how SpaceX approached its project in South Texas near the Mexican border in an area close to Brownsville It’s a little village called Boca Chica that I spend a lot a time in last year And they built a truly extraordinary complex there in Boca chica and it was a tiny little village was they had tanks that provided the water supply They’re not even on the water system There’s nothing in this area and really close to the Mexican border at the Southern point of Texas In the middle of a national wildlife refuge and state parks because they could just buy that tiny piece of land and then have all of this other federally protected property nearby and then launch their rockets and repeatedly blow up their rockets and send debris from those explosions into the state parklands and the federal parklands Um cause you know damage to wildlife and just keep going um because that’s the way that elon musk builds his rockets as he he innovates he blows them up and then he revises them and then blows them up again and then revises and blows them again um just more recently as everyone has seen they blew up twice over the caribbean and sent tons of debris falling down and forcing the uh relocation of air traffic in the region because of the debris and it’s one of the reasons he’s innovated so quickly is that he’s willing to blow rockets up instead of testing them endlessly on the ground or in laboratories but what I found was that Musk likes to do it his own way and that means that he doesn’t necessarily honor the environmental regulations or even the agreements that He’s me To limit the environmental impact of this massive operation that he’s built in the middle of a national wildlife refuge he was causing repeated harm to the wildlife refuge areas and it was causing distress among Fish and Wildlife Agency at the Department of Interior and the emails that we got through open records requests showed their distress over the damage that was occurring to the refuge that they’re supposed to protect And this disregard that was coming from SpaceX they just bulldozed their way through whatever they need to in order to get what they want And that’s the approach that Musk has taken And it’s part of the reason he’s been so successful but the environmental consequences did not seem that important And the issue then is that this resulted in the EPA finding SpaceX for discharging wastewater without a permit or fish and wildlife looking at damage that was occurring to nesting birds and the eggs when the rockets lift off and destroying these threatened species of birds and other consequences to the area And so the issue now is that with Musk is effectively one of the most powerful bureaucrats in the United States federal government how many employees and what the spending can be of federal agencies across the enterprise he has huge clout over the agencies that are supposedly investigating him And another story that we did was examining how many of those investigations are now being stalled or rolled back or is reconsidering a fine that it proposed against SpaceX for ignoring safety regulations in Florida on two launches So it’s a very unusual situation to have an individual who’s one of the biggest federal contractors on the one hand and also one of the most powerful bureaucrats in the federal government and to be simultaneously doing both of those things it creates unavoidable conflicts of interest that are having that are very evidence and that we are examining in a series of stories that we’re doing that is a troubling set of interests that are converging there so I’m glad you’re paying attention to this I have been undertaking research on space policy more generally And one of the things I’ve discovered is space law is actually rather sparse some of the international agreements on space date back 50 years and don’t really specify the rules for things that… Now either we’re on the cusp of doing or actually are doing space mining and space tourism private companies sending people to the moon and perhaps beyond I personally think we need to clarify the rights and the responsibilities of private firms as they launch new initiatives but we don’t seem to have much clarity right now When there seem to be relatively few guardrails in place in terms of what they can do I think that I mean one thing that I need to make entirely clear is that I mean SpaceX and Elon Musk have done incredible things that are benefiting and it is transformational what he has done and through the kind of the brute force and determination to persist And it has been so transformational that the United States is now such a dominant player in the space space defense and commercial space that it is far outpaced the bureaucratic capacity of the federal government to manage this incredible transformation And billions and billions of dollars of venture capital are now pouring into this space because it is now so much cheaper to get to orbit that all of a sudden… It’s opened up all of these business opportunities that just were not even conceivable because the cost points were so outrageous for so the net result is you’re right that the the infrastructure around it is way immature you have at the Federal Communications Commission they’re rapidly moving to try they’ve created a new office that that focuses on because they they control the bandwidth of But it also is supposed to be promoting the commercial space industry So there’s a tension there where it’s both promoting and regulating something And the FAA is working on modernizing its commercial space regulations and The Commerce Department and NOAA also has a role because in terms of coordinating satellites in orbit because there’s all these weather satellites and other NOAA satellites So the entire federal infrastructure is working to try to modernize and rapidly but it’s because this transformation in the industry has happened so much faster than anyone thought was ever possible And the federal government moves relatively slowly when it comes to writing new rules And the old rules just aren’t really relevant We had just a few players that were largely working in a geosynchronous orbit which was so far out that they were a great distance from each other SpaceX already has more than 6,000 satellites and Amazon’s Kuiper is about to start launching its own huge constellation in low earth orbit it’s getting pretty busy up there and complicated and there’s all kinds of fights going on over spectrum and bandwidth on the spectrum and you have terrestrial cell phone companies that are fighting with SpaceX and over who should get the bandwidth in the radio frequencies for communications purposes and so it’s a very complicated world and And the government has to figure it out fast because these companies are going faster than the regulatory system that manages them CO-HOST DARRELL WEST [00:24:17] It is impressive how fast the innovation has taken place and the transformation that you’ve been describing has unfolded And one of my favorite examples about the relative lack of policy and legal guardrails in this sector is there’s some businesses now that sell a service by which people can send the ashes of loved ones into space And when outsiders complained about this service on grounds that we should not be treating space as a cemetery A NASA program officer was quoted responding by saying his agency had no control over commercial payloads and noted that firms don’t have to clear those payloads with us These are truly commercial missions and it’s up to them to sell what they can sell I’m personally appalled by that NASA attitude that it is financing many of the the firms what to do or impose any conditions government agencies often attach conditions to the public funding and say do private firms need greater guidance now on their rights and responsibilities in space So the question is whether or not does that launch of these ashes create a safety risk to people on Earth perhaps because it’s put in some type of an urn that could come back in and land and hurt somebody I mean it’s the F.A.A.’s responsibility to focus on safety the F.A.A had to consult with Fish and Wildlife relative to the consequences on the National Wildlife Refuge But its primary mandate was to evaluate whether or not the launch of SpaceX rocket was to be a safety threat to people in the area on the ground nearby Or to people that would be under the rocket as it was on its way to orbit And that is its primary mission was to prevent that launch from hurting people even though it has sole jurisdiction over that launch to make sure that it does not damage the environment in consequential ways Because the F.A.A is not an environmental agency it does have to consult with other environmental agencies when it approves them and get their input The whole process is just not built for the industry as it has matured because it is now you have SpaceX building effectively one of the world’s largest private space launch facilities in South Texas and Bezos has his own launch facility I mean normally launches are done out of Cape Canaveral and our Kennedy Space Center And these are federal facilities that have thousands or even tens of thousands of acres around them billionaires setting up their own rocket launch facilities in the United States And all they effectively need to do is to go to the FAA and say are we going to kill people or hurt people or damage property I would say that’s not the right system in the sense there’s just too many gaps like we’ve developed a much more robust oversight system just to make sure companies are engaging the kind of behaviors that we want and when the FAA was trying to challenge what he was doing in Brownsville around the Starship that’s when he called for the resignation and the firing of the F.A.A administrator when he first started to move to get involved in politics He was so angry at what he considered to be delays in his launch licenses for Starship that he kept saying on social media that humans are never going to get to Mars and there’s a single thing that drives Elon Musk it is just this fundamental fixation on getting to Mars And when the FAA was kind of in some way slowing down progress of Starship it was that that and when the FAA then moved to and the Fish and Wildlife was asking questions about potential environmental consequences the day that Trump was nearly assassinated And that came only after incredible anger on his part about regulatory slowdowns for his Starship project and him saying And so when Elon Musk decides he wants to change something And he spent $300 million to get Trump elected And then he got himself appointed as the head of this government efficiency project And now he’s basically walking through agencies and ripping apart their regulatory systems which I know you have been drawing attention I want to thank you very much for sharing your thoughts on this important topic People can read his articles at the New York Times website He’s done extraordinary reporting on this as well as other issues we write regularly about space exploration and digital technology And you can find more information on our Brookings Tech Tank blog located at Brooking.edu CO-HOST NICOL TURNER LEE [00:30:30] Thank you for listening to Tech Tank a series of roundtable discussions and interviews with technology experts and policymakers subscribe to the podcast and sign up to receive the Tech Tank newsletter for more research and analysis from the Center for Technology Innovation at Brookings Ever since Western nations began to levy sanctions on Russia in response to its illegal invasion of Ukraine a race has emerged between Russia’s efforts to amass a shadow fleet of oil tankers and efforts by the European Union and United States to sanction an ever-larger number of ships Russia’s attempts to purchase hundreds of aging tankers—often approaching the end of their useful life—has been aided by willingness of Western shipowners to sell vessels into the Russian fleet with an outsized contribution by EU shippers in general and Greek shippers in particular have been counteracted by an aggressive sanctions campaign by Western nations collectively initiated sweeping new sanctions on Russian ships sharply raising both the number of sanctioned ships and the share of shadow fleet ships subject to sanctions we document these trends in detail and suggest several additional sanctions measures Sanctions on Russia’s shadow fleet are an especially important topic currently because the U.S.—in an effort to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine—is offering to lift sanctions on Russia It is therefore critically important to understand how impactful Western sanctions are and what role they play in constraining Russia A forthcoming blog will complement this piece by documenting how EU sanctions constrain shipping activity among Russia’s shadow fleet oil tankers Following the imposition of a price cap on Russian oil by the G7 and Australia in December 2022 Russia began rapidly amassing a “shadow fleet” of tankers that could be used to circumvent Western sanctions in hopes of trading at market prices While Western sanctions apply to a host of oil trade services that extend beyond shipping the presence of the shadow fleet—coupled with the emergence of the Russian insurance sector—has enabled Russian producers to more frequently trade around Western sanctions we can document both the growth rate and origin of Russia’s entire shadow fleet that the true scope of the shadow fleet is likely far larger than our measure our data likely overstate the proportion of sanctioned ships in the shadow fleet this shadow fleet has steadily grown from less than 100 vessels in February 2022 to 343 vessels today—with Russia adding approximately seven vessels per month over the past three years (a minority of the shadow fleet predates the invasion of Ukraine because Russia has always required at least some capacity to covertly move its oil) the growth of the shadow fleet is being driven by sales from shipowners in Greece and other EU countries Greece was the single largest source of shadow fleet tankers since early 2022 more than double the contribution from the rest of Europe Russia itself has also been a substantial source of shadow fleet ships as many former Sovcomflot ships have transitioned to the shadow fleet to help Russian exporters skirt Western sanctions We combine these data with information on the imposition of Western sanctions a wave of which hit shadow fleet ships earlier this year to compare the aggregate size of the fleet to the population of sanctioned vessels of the 343 tankers in Russia’s shadow fleet 264 have been sanctioned by some combination of the EU the aggressive sanctions activity in the first two months of 2025 dramatically raised the share of shadow fleet ships sanctioned by the EU or U.S.—rising up to 77% by March of this year as the total number of tankers sanctioned by at least one entity has grown so too has the number of tankers sanctioned by multiple Western entities approximately half (49%) of sanctioned shadow fleet ships were sanctioned by multiple sanctioning authorities of the 264 tankers in our database that are currently sanctioned 130 are sanctioned by multiple countries (38 are sanctioned by the U.S and 34 are sanctioned by all three) while 134 tankers are only sanctioned by a single entity (85 are sanctioned by the U.S. there are still 79 that are currently unsanctioned by the EU the data presented here suggest that tankers supplied by EU shipping companies were instrumental in aiding Russia’s quest to acquire a massive shadow fleet aggressive actions in early 2025 by the EU successfully captured a large share of the shadow fleet we propose several additional measures to be taken: (i) Sanctioning bodies should prohibit the sale of Western tankers to buyers who might be acting as middlemen for Russia’s shadow fleet; (ii) overlap of sanctions should be maximized and EU sanction vessels jointly in all cases; and (iii) the 79 ships in our database that are currently unsanctioned should be sanctioned We will publish a complete list of opportunities for further sanctions in a future post an undergraduate student at Southern Methodist University and acting to deport faculty and students—have been unprecedented What does the American public see as driving these actions by the Trump administration To find out, the University of Maryland’s Critical Issues Poll, which I direct, fielded some questions with SSRS on its Opinion Panel Omnibus platform. The survey was conducted from April 3 to April 7 The margin of error for total respondents is +/-3.7 percentage points at the 95% confidence level Here are some key findings and analysis that places them in a broader context: Americans see confronting Trump administration critics and critics of Israel as even stronger driving forces than confronting antisemitism we asked: “You may have heard of the Trump administration’s actions toward a number of American universities particularly regarding protests of the war in Gaza How would you evaluate the degree to which the following reasons were behind the administration’s actions?” We provided respondents with three basic choices: “confronting antisemitism,” “confronting critics of Israel,” and “confronting critics of the Trump administration.” Keep in mind that these possible responses are by no means comprehensive only common interpretations; the aim is to probe how much of a role respondents think each played said confronting critics of the Trump administration and confronting critics of Israel mattered “a lot” or “somewhat,” while 44% said the same about confronting antisemitism 32% said confronting antisemitism was “not much” of a factor or “not at all,” compared to 24% each who said the same about confronting administration critics and critics of Israel there were partisan differences with 60% of Republicans saying antisemitism is a factor in Trump’s actions toward universities But it is also notable that nearly the same percentage of Republicans saw confronting critics of Israel as a factor and 50% saw confronting critics of the Trump administration as a factor Although we have not asked specifically about universities in the past we have asked questions about labeling people antisemitic in the political discourse both before the Hamas October 2023 attack on Israel and after The results indicated that Americans view labeling people antisemitic as more often used to delegitimize political opponents and critics of Israel than to describe people who are genuinely antisemitic those who said the labeling was used to delegitimize critics of Israel went from 49% in 2023 (22% “frequently” and 27% “sometimes”) to 64% in 2024 (34% “frequently” and 30% “sometimes”) those who said the labeling described people who are genuinely antisemitic went from 48% in 2023 (19% “frequently” and 29% “sometimes”) to 61% in 2024 (25% “frequently” and 36% “sometimes”) One notable change is that the number of those who said they didn’t know declined from 35% or more in 2023 to 23% or less in 2024 as public attention was more focused on these issues after October 7 the changes in the responses were somewhat proportional to each other suggesting robustness months before the October 7 The largest increases from 2023 to 2024 among those answering “frequently” came from describing de-legitimation of political opponents (13 points) followed by de-legitimation of critics of Israel (12 points) and genuine antisemitism (6 points) Keep in mind that attitudes may have also shifted since last summer on this issue and our poll will be further probing possible change later this spring while 37% of Americans say they don’t know when asked to describe the Trump administration policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian issue 30%—including about half of Democrats (48%) and a plurality of independents (38%)—say Trump’s policy “leans toward Israel more than I do,” compared to 5% who say it leans toward the Palestinians more than they do 28%—including a majority of Republicans (55%)—say the policy coincides with their position It is notable that the latest Pew poll on this issue included a question very similar to the one we fielded “Do you think Donald Trump is…” with the response options: “Favoring the Israelis too much,” “Favoring the Palestinians too much,” “Striking about the right balance,” or “Not sure.” The poll found that 31% said Trump is favoring the Israelis too much 3% said he is favoring the Palestinians too much The poll also found that 36% of Jewish Americans said that Trump was favoring Israelis too much compared to only 2% who said he was favoring the Palestinians too much while 43% said he was striking the right balance and much of our public discourse have highlighted the issue of antisemitism as a driving force Public opinion polls show that the public sees antisemitism as one of the driving issues for Trump campus policies and as a factor in labeling people antisemitic But the public sees targeting political opponents and critics of Israel as even greater factors in driving policies toward universities and the labeling of people as antisemitic—even more so after the October 7 attack on Israel and Israel’s subsequent war in Gaza with many seeing them as acts of genocide or “akin to genocide.” These findings are supported by new major polling from Pew and Gallup The Pew poll found that a majority of respondents—53%—have an unfavorable view of Israel an increase of 11 percentage points from 42% in 2022 adults who voice very unfavorable views of Israel has roughly doubled over this period.” Notably all segments of the public examined have shown increasingly unfavorable views of Israel—including Democrats who rose from 53% unfavorable in 2022 to 69% in 2025; Republicans who rose from 27% to 37%; and Democrats age 50 and older whose unfavorable views increased the most increasingly aligning with younger Democrats The trend among Democrats was also reflected in the latest Gallup poll which found that attitudes have shifted nearly 180 degrees since 2001 Democratic sympathy for the Palestinians has risen from 16% in 2001 to 59% in 2025 while sympathy for the Israelis has dropped from 51% to 21% over the same period less than half of all Americans are now sympathetic toward Israel One is hard-pressed to find these pervasive American public attitudes proportionately reflected in the statements of American elected officials have taken root despite differing official and media discourse This paper examines the evolution and effectiveness of the safety net over the past half-century It finds that while some programs have contracted the safety net has overall grown substantially stronger through expansions that have significantly reduced poverty The paper also addresses criticisms of the safety net from both the left and the right and concludes with recommendations for future policy Among those who have benefited most from the safety net expansions of the past half-century are lower-income working families with children including millions of families modestly above the poverty line that struggle to get by on low wages the safety net has stagnated or contracted for some other individuals and households especially deeply poor individuals who have little or no earnings and Unemployment Insurance (UI)—was relatively spartan in scope and impact The Food Stamp Program (now called the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program [SNAP]) was not available in all parts of the country in 1970 and households had to use their own cash to purchase their food stamps which prevented many eligible households from enrolling the purchase requirement has been eliminated SNAP has also served as an automatic stabilizer expanding during economic downturns as more people become eligible and receding as the economy recovers Medicaid’s reach was severely limited as well The program primarily served those who received cash welfare assistance while excluding most of the working poor and large numbers of low-income children The Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) did not yet exist Nor did the Affordable Care Act (ACA) subsidies to help people afford private health insurance And Medicare lacked prescription drug coverage Various other major social programs also were created after 1970 including the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) policymakers also cut some programs markedly the expansions substantially outweighed the cuts real spending for cash welfare assistance through Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and its successor Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) fell by a stunning 78 percent—reducing support for some of the lowest-income families with children Many states cut their General Assistance (GA) programs which target very poor individuals who aren’t elderly Poverty rates have fallen over the past 50 years and the data demonstrate that the primary reason is that social programs overall have grown considerably stronger The safety net now cuts poverty nearly in half a dramatic improvement over its anti-poverty impact half a century ago The poverty rate before counting government benefits and taxes stood at 23.6 percent in 2019 and 23.4 percent in 2023 But the poverty rate after counting government benefits and taxes was 13.5 percent in 2019 and 12.9 percent in 2023 (the most recent year for which we have poverty data) The data for child poverty also are striking Government benefits and taxes increased the child poverty rate in 1970 because income and payroll taxes pushed more children’s families into poverty than the safety net raised out of poverty government benefits and taxes reduced the child poverty rate by more than a third The number and share of Americans who lack health insurance fell sharply as well especially after implementation of the ACA Nearly 15 percent of Americans were uninsured in 1970 And the share of children without insurance has fallen from about 25 percent several decades ago to about 5 percent today The federal minimum wage has eroded over recent decades and the share of workers in labor unions has plunged leading some on the left to call for focusing almost entirely on predistributive measures such as minimum wage increases and labor law reforms while largely eschewing further improvements in redistributive social programs arguing for the critical role safety net programs play in reducing poverty and improving children’s well-being both now and over the long term The paper also cites evidence that predistributive and redistributive measures work most effectively in tandem and calls for improvements in both areas The paper also explains that predistributive measures cannot pass the U.S Senate unless they secure a supermajority of 60 votes which makes them much harder to enact than redistributive measures which need only 51 votes if they are included in a budget reconciliation bill The paper also addresses two leading critiques of the safety net from the right: that targeted safety net programs are the primary driver of increased deficits and debt and that they lack sufficiently tough work requirements The paper highlights evidence showing that tax cuts account for considerably more of the fiscal imbalance that has emerged since the turn of the century than policymakers’ actions to strengthen targeted social programs to reduce poverty The paper also reviews recent research on work requirements which does not support calls to make such requirements more widespread and severe The research finds that work requirements in Medicaid and SNAP have proven largely ineffective in inducing more work while resulting in a substantial loss of benefits including among people who are already working or qualify for an exemption but have difficulty with the paperwork needed to prove compliance and people who are unable to work or to find employment that provides sufficient hours of work on a regular basis The paper concludes with recommendations—first that policymakers “do no harm.” Major cuts to various social programs would almost certainly increase poverty and leave many more Americans without health insurance Nor are cuts like these necessary to bolster the nation’s fiscal health The paper also recommends that policymakers prioritize addressing a number of major safety net gaps the CTC’s limited availability to the lowest-income children the shortage of affordable housing and child care and the threadbare safety net for individuals living in poverty who aren’t raising children at home and aren’t classified as elderly or disabled Read the full paper African countries can harness digital technologies to foster intelligent economies that are sustainable and transformative Digital technologies have significant potential to address many of Africa’s pressing challenges but their adoption and impact face several obstacles that need to be overcome to ensure that nobody is left behind African countries must address several key challenges related to digital inclusion for an intelligent economy to emerge Estimates suggest $400 billion is needed for electricity transmission and distribution improvements by 2050. Without this investment most countries in the region will not have the necessary baseload electricity to benefit from digital technologies the continent will need to make significant investments in high-performance supercomputers that can power deep learning models train and run complex AI models efficiently all of which are essential for extracting meaningful insights from large datasets the continent needs multiple supercomputing centers strategically located in different regions to serve various countries Africa’s path to developing an intelligent economy must focus on ensuring digital inclusion by addressing these challenges related to digital access Africa has the potential to drive significant socioeconomic change and emerge as a key player in the global digital landscape This blog analyzes data from “Tracking President Trump’s second-term Cabinet and appointees,” by scholar Kathryn Dunn Tenpas. View the tracker here The president’s first 100 days, a benchmark popularized by President Franklin D provides an opportunity to take stock and evaluate the early direction of a new administration In the aftermath of a presidential inauguration the nomination and confirmation of cabinet officials is the highest priority Placing senior appointees at the helm across the federal government allows the president to steer the ship of state in his direction it is not surprising that the data show a marked drop compared to the Biden administration record that approached parity with 47% women at the 100-day mark The data below demonstrate a decline in ethnic diversity during the first 100 days of President Trump’s second term This is a nine 10-point drop from his first term in office when 26% of Senate-confirmed appointees were non-white President Trump’s Senate-confirmed nominees are less ethnically diverse than their predecessors in the four prior administrations Clearly the 100-day mark is a brief period yielding a small sample size of confirmed nominees the trends apparent at this early stage may be enduring particularly if GOP control of the Senate continues after the 2026 elections In addition, and in stark contrast to President Biden’s push for diversity, President Trump’s ending of DEI programs across the government and the private sector is similarly reflected in the composition of his first set of confirmed nominees President Trump has appointed fewer women and fewer non-white individuals demonstrating the consistency of his commitment to eliminate DEI programs across the government This piece is part of the Taiwan-U.S. Quarterly Analysis series which features the original writings of experts with the goal of providing a range of perspectives on developments relating to Taiwan while its authoritarian neighbor to the north continues to expand its military capabilities and exacerbate tensions on the Korean Peninsula face changing relationships with the United States under the new Trump administration defined by relative uncertainty and unpredictability Both Taiwan and South Korea rely on the United States diplomatically and economically in order to maintain their relative peace and stability Understanding how these two places see the United States under Trump’s leadership has never been a more pressing question we conducted a survey of 1,500 voters in Taiwan and South Korea asking a series of questions about the United States and whether they see the United States as a trustworthy partner we redid the survey with 2,000 participants in Taiwan and South Korea asking the same questions Our findings paint a bleak picture of America’s future relations with South Korea and Taiwan the United States is seen as a less reliable partner Taiwan and South Korea both feel less confident that the United States will assist them in the event of a conflict with their respective authoritarian neighbor and both see Trump as bad for democracy around the world If perceptions that the United States will not help Taiwan increase it will have major ramifications for how civil society will respond in the event of a military conflict over Taiwan South Koreans also exhibit a similar declining perception of the likelihood of U.S. assistance in the event of a war with North Korea. Although Trump has not recently mentioned whether the U.S. troop presence in South Korea will change during his tenure, he has previously threatened to withdraw U.S. troops from the country particularly during his 2024 presidential campaign troops from South Korea would have knock-on effects on perceptions of American reliability in the region a comparison of the two suggests that South Koreans still have more trust in the United States than Taiwanese This may be because each country’s security relationship with the United States differs in nature: South Korea is a treaty ally whereas Taiwan is not defense commitments is lower in both countries in part due to the Trump factor overall levels of confidence may still be higher in South Korea due to the presence of formal security guarantees Beyond perceptions of partnership and military support overall attitudes toward the United States have also decreased Positive perceptions of the United States as a country and of U.S.-Taiwan and U.S.-South Korean relations are down significantly relative to July 2024 the proportion of respondents who viewed the United States either very positively or positively decreased by 20.8% in Taiwan and 14.4% in South Korea as of April 2025 We also asked respondents how much they agreed with two questions about Trump: “I feel my country is safer than before with Trump as president,” and “I feel democracy around the world is stronger than before with Trump as the U.S president.” In both Taiwan and South Korea agreement with these statements is incredibly low Why does it matter that these two places have low opinions of Trump Beyond the broader reputational cost to the United States that has come with his new administration this signals a deeper sense of global insecurity people in Taiwan and South Korea may feel less secure and may no longer see the United States as a reliable defender of peace and democracy This lower perception of the United States has serious implications for whether and how Taiwanese and South Koreans may act in the event of a conflict with China or North Korea It may also affect how voters in these places support their governments’ foreign policies toward the United States in the future Those who follow Taiwanese and South Korean politics will undoubtedly know that there is severe polarization in both places It is worth asking how partisans feel about all three sets of questions discussed above there is a clear partisan divide over the question of whether America is a trustworthy ally We find that Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) supporters are significantly more likely to view the United States as a trustworthy partner than Kuomintang (KMT) About 50% of DPP supporters view the United States as a trustworthy or a very trustworthy partner and 14% of independents share the same sentiment we still see a 14% decline over the span of eight months Our data show that President Lai Ching-te’s DPP remains the most optimistic about the United States but the overall trend of declining faith in the United States among Taiwanese signals a growing partisan disconnect between the current ruling party and the rest of Taiwanese voters all major parties in Taiwan express their deep support for U.S.-Taiwan relations there is a disconnect between how DPP versus non-DPP Taiwanese voters see Taiwan’s most critical geopolitical partner There is also a significant difference in South Koreans’ support for the United States based on party affiliation Conservatives are much more likely to view the United States positively and more likely to trust and show favorability toward the U.S.-South Korea alliance 69.2% of conservative respondents viewed the United States as either very trustworthy or trustworthy while only 36.4% of progressive respondents felt the same revealing a stark contrast by party affiliation only 6% of progressive respondents believe South Korea is safer under Trump relative to 20% of conservative respondents Only 5.5% of progressive respondents believe that democracy has strengthened under Trump relative to 21.2% of conservative respondents The Trump administration’s policy choices are impacting public opinion in Taiwan and South Korea attitudes toward the United States in both Taiwan and South Korea have become more negative the United States continues to be the most important partner for Taiwan and South Korea and Seoul manage these shifts will inform the direction of America’s relations with Taiwan and South Korea moving forward This tracker will be updated after the first 200 days and 300 days of the second Trump administration The trendline shows that the process has grown slower with each new president suggesting that the first 300 days of President Trump’s second term may see an even lower yield Monitoring this “shared” constitutional power—presidents nominating and the Senate confirming—offers insight into the separation of powers The data below and inferences drawn from them continue a long-standing effort to monitor presidents’ ability to staff the executive branch by identifying nominees and persuading the Senate to confirm them This tracker helps us understand the functional capabilities of these two branches to fulfill a key responsibility at the start of a new administration View the Notes section at the end of this page to learn more details about the data The data below show the pace of confirmations and the total number of confirmations during the first 100 days of a new president’s term Set out below are the individuals whom the Senate has confirmed during the first 100 days of President Trump’s second term in office Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security Director of the National Institutes of Health Note: The data include confirmed nominees from the 15 major departments in the line of presidential succession In cases where individuals have more than one race/ethnicity such that the total number shown above may exceed the number of nominees This data abides by the categorization of the 2020 census Back to top Congressional Republicans are expected to consider a Medicaid work requirement as part of upcoming reconciliation legislation (e.g. Proposals vary in who they apply to and what they direct enrollees to do but they generally require adult enrollees to be employed (or engaged in another approved activity like schooling) for some number of hours per month to remain eligible for Medicaid this paper examines one of the few precedents for such a policy: a work requirement implemented by the state of Arkansas under a waiver granted by the first Trump administration Arkansas applied its policy for nine months The Arkansas policy closely resembles the federal work requirement passed by the House of Representatives as part of the Limit a potential starting point for upcoming reconciliation legislation Prior research has shown that Arkansas’ policy reduced Medicaid enrollment and increased uninsurance among low-income adults in Arkansas (Sommers et al 2019; 2020; Gangopadhyaya and Karpman 2025) This research also finds that the number of enrollees that the state deemed non-compliant with the requirement far exceeded the number of enrollees who neither qualified for an exemption nor were engaged in the required activities indicating that most enrollees lost coverage due to challenges in reporting information to the state this research finds no evidence that the Arkansas requirement increased employment among the population subject to the policy Because the Arkansas policy was in effect for a short time—and was still phasing in when it was stopped in court—it is not straightforward to use the Arkansas experience to assess how this policy would have affected Medicaid enrollment over the long run this paper develops a dynamic structural model suitable for using the Arkansas experience to forecast the long-run enrollment effects of the Arkansas policy and similar policies Read the full report here and Gideon Lukens for helpful comments on a draft of this analysis He thanks several members of the staff of the Brookings Institution for their outstanding contributions to this project: Ben Graham and Paris Rich Bingham (research assistance) Rasa Siniakovas (editorial and web posting assistance) it’s important to examine where in the U.S the technology might boost or harm workers Last fall, Brookings published a report looking at possible patterns of AI involvement in the labor market focusing on how generative AI appears set to intersect with particular occupations we found that more than 30% of all workers could see at least 50% of their occupational tasks affected by ChatGPT-4 while 85% of workers could see at least 10% of their tasks affected Most notably, our analysis—based on occupation-specific “exposure” data supplied by ChatGPT creator OpenAI over a year ago—forecasted that for the most part the greater the education level or pay for an occupation the greater its likely “exposure” (positive or negative) to generative AI tools will be (albeit with a dip at the very top) That’s because generative AI is especially well suited to the cognitive tasks of white collar knowledge work—think coders And while generative AI puts at risk the “routine” tasks of customer service and clerical work (often handled by female-staffed call centers it is currently not equipped to handle the manual work of manufacturing In sum, the workforce impacts of generative AI look at least for now to differ significantly from those of previous forms of automation, which earlier findings showed tended to disrupt the work of primarily less-educated Does it differ from the impact pattern of earlier automation To explore the possible distribution of generative AI impacts across place we build here on our earlier labor market analysis to leverage AI exposure statistics for occupations as they impact U.S we use data on each occupation’s share of local employment to calculate county- and metro-level exposure statistics Such statistics reflect the share of AI-exposed jobs relative to all local jobs in the geographic area that “exposure” does not speak only to the displacement of workers; it also may involve their “augmentation” through rapidly improving AI tools such as ChatGPT which can enhance worker productivity and capability.)  generative AI is not your grandparents’—or even your parents’—automation the possible impact patterns of generative AI look quite different from those of previous forms of automation As noted, Brookings has shown that earlier digital or automation technologies—with their facility for replacing rote manual or physical work—tend to impinge most on lower-skill with corresponding impacts on patterns of regional labor market exposure our mapping of earlier automation impacts tended to suggest that workers in small-town in the South and industrial Midwest—encountered much more disruption than workers in larger This reflects the small-town and more rural locations of much “routine” physical and cognitive work susceptible to earlier forms of automation For AI—and specifically, generative AI—the exposure pattern looks very different. AI “upend[s] this paradigm,” as we note in the earlier report we mean that AI excels at supporting or carrying out the highly cognitive better-paid office workers do—tasks such as conducting research the more involved workers are in upscale office or information-based work with AI exposure rising with wages for the most part as generative AI’s broad pattern of impacts on occupation groups drives its own pattern of local labor market exposure white collar metro areas previously considered to be at relatively low risk of automation look to be the places that will be the most exposed to generative AI—meaning that they will both gain the most from the potential it unlocks as well as shoulder the greatest burdens of any worker displacement and disruption it causes the urban geography of generative AI starkly contrasts with the geography of previous automation technologies such as digital enterprise systems and robotics As those technologies spread over the last decade they tended to impact workers in lower-paid less educated metro areas much more than those in higher-tech office-oriented metro areas (who tended to benefit from them) the higher-end workers and regions only mildly exposed to earlier forms of automation look to be most involved (for better or worse) with generative AI and its facility for cognitive workers in high-skill metro areas such as San Jose appear likely to experience heavy involvement with generative AI while those in less office-oriented metro areas such as Las Vegas; Toledo while 43% of workers in San Jose could see generative AI shift half or more of their work tasks that share is only 31% of workers in Las Vegas from elevated exposure rates of around 40% or more in high-paying tech and finance locales such as Santa Clara County to rates in the 30% range and even the 20% range in small and rural heartland counties Generative AI exposure varies dramatically even within the same state shaped by the industry makeup of individual counties California shows high intra-state variation due to the presence of both urban tech counties and less educated exurban or rural ones Labor market exposure to generative AI in the state ranges from as much as 42.8% in Santa Clara County to as little as 26.7% in Mono County other lower-exposure states without large information-oriented metro areas—such as North Dakota and Mississippi—exhibit much narrower ranges of exposure reflecting more uniform lower exposure across their largely agriculture- and manufacturing-dependent counties Looking across the entirety of the nation’s counties Reflecting the fact that many metro areas aren’t particularly tech- or information-saturated the average local AI exposure level varies modestly from 35% in the nation’s 821 highly urban counties to 30% in its 1,053 rural counties the metropolitan exposure rate is 35% and the nonmetro rate is 30% the new landscape of AI—reshaped by generative AI—reflects a dynamic in which the people and places who were initially the least exposed to automation technology may now be the most involved generative AI looks likely to impact a different set of workers compared to previous technologies It is now big-city information workers who will gain the most from generative AI—and bear its most challenging displacements the communities that past waves of automation hit hardest look like they will be the ones most insulated from the risks of AI such regions also look likely to be left out of the biggest gains Given that, what the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) calls a “changing landscape” of automation suggests the need for policy adaptations to address different and emerging groups of workers and places Policymakers need to better track the emergence of new and different exposure patterns They will also need to do much more to identify AI-relevant skills competencies and leverage that to develop new and more proactive upskilling and re-skilling efforts for workers in danger of displacement strong efforts will be needed to mitigate economic and social disparities that may arise as some people and places pull ahead thanks to the likely productivity benefits of AI technologies the geography of AI exposure looks like it will be exactly opposite of what it was for previous automation bouts ensuring it will present new and different riddles This website is using a security service to protect itself from online attacks The action you just performed triggered the security solution There are several actions that could trigger this block including submitting a certain word or phrase You can email the site owner to let them know you were blocked Please include what you were doing when this page came up and the Cloudflare Ray ID found at the bottom of this page please perform a WhoIs lookup on kobi5.com and contact the registered owner Thank you for inviting me to speak at this Volatility and Risk Institute conference I will discuss the efforts in recent years to strengthen Treasury market resilience and what’s still to come Resilience has always been a high priority I will make the case that it is ever more important now as Treasury debt is projected to grow rapidly and chaotically and uncertain policies will make shocks large We all recognize that the Treasury market is a critical market government at the lowest cost to the taxpayer It is an important channel for the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy It provides the benchmark risk-free yield curve And it is a safe asset and is used by many financial firms A few examples for nonbanks include stablecoins that hold Treasuries as a reserve asset to help maintain par; hedge funds that use Treasuries as collateral for good lending terms; open-end bond funds that use Treasuries to manage the mismatch between the liquidity of bonds and shareholder redemptions; and insurers and pension funds that use Treasuries to meet margin calls on derivative positions The Treasury market serves these critical functions because it is the deepest and most liquid market in the world It has achieved this distinction because it is supported by a strong economy and rigorous institutional policy frameworks It also relies on an efficient and stability-enhancing regulatory and market structure to help ensure that market liquidity is elastic and resilient—that is investors can transact when needed at low cost without materially moving the price under normal economic conditions but also during periods of uncertainty and stress we’ve seen a few cracks in market liquidity and then significant dysfunction in the “dash for cash” in March 2020 at the onset of the COVID pandemic In response to these events as well as ongoing changes in technology and trading practices the IAWG undertook a comprehensive effort to strengthen the Treasury market I will mainly focus today on Treasury market liquidity I’d like to give a shout out to the inter-agency working group (IAWG) who have worked hard and pushed forward this agenda for the past few years I’d also like to give a special thanks to Treasury’s debt management and fiscal teams who track government receipts and expenditures to determine how much Treasury debt to issue what kinds of securities to issue each quarter and to keep financing regular and predictable so as to finance the government at least cost over time They manage hundreds of auctions each year also had to navigate two very perilous debt ceilings Policy uncertainty has become massive in recent weeks and financial market volatility has shot up The tariffs that President Trump announced on April 2 were bigger and broader than expected and set off a volatile period for financial markets There have been detailed accounts of price moves as policy swung between temporary pauses in tariffs for some countries and escalation for others and even threats to monetary policy independence the net effect is higher rates beyond the short-end of the yield curve yields on 10-year and 30-year Treasury securities are up around 40 to 50 basis points from their recent lows in early April consistent with Treasury securities having cheapened relative to other safe haven assets The correlation between interest rate and the dollar is not the only one to break down. The correlation between bonds and equities also did. Using this correlation, Acharya and Laarits (2025) show a reduction in the safe-asset hedging properties of longer-term Treasury securities and rates have fallen as investors price the higher odds of a recession in the near term Investors also began questioning whether markets would become dysfunctional The 3-year auction on April 8 didn’t go well and there were concerns that funding pressures would escalate because highly-leveraged hedge funds might have to unwind positions in swaps and cash-futures basis positions But the worst fears about market functioning were not realized though market participants believe conditions would have worsened materially if the tariffs had not been paused or the 10-year auction went badly Actual measures of market liquidity available to the public are limited I show one here on market depth—the sum of three bids and offers by queue position in the mornings for 2-year and 30-year Treasury securities—courtesy of J.P This measure of market depth fell sharply on the recent news but not to levels as low as in March 2020 or March 2023 I plotted this measure of market depth against the MOVE index there is a strong correlation—as interest rate volatility increases not unexpectedly as market participants pull back from risk-taking as volatility and uncertainty increase the most extreme observations are for March 2020 shown by the dark blue dots in the lower left where market depth is well below what might be expected given the volatility Those blue dots illustrate the conditions when the Fed announced that it would purchase securities “in amounts necessary to ensure market functioning.”  The gold dots represent March 2023 when banks with large interest rate risk exposures came under pressure and two failed dramatically interest rate volatility was exceptionally high and market depth unusually low but market participants at the time reported that markets were functioning albeit not as smoothly as in normal times The current episode is shown by the red dots Interest rate volatility is at the high end it is well within—maybe even at the upper end of—the cloud of dots market depth is just one measure on market liquidity and we would also like to be able to see measures of price impact But this graph captures what many market participants have said and also is consistent with the very high daily trading volumes in April What these metrics illustrate is that the markets continued to function in recent weeks but not because market participants cannot transact is that market dysfunction is hard to predict Some of the blue dots for the week of March 8 when COVID risk were becoming apparent and volatility was high and that was just two weeks before the Fed began purchasing Treasury securities I testified to Congress recently on Treasury market resilience work and had emphasized the importance of the work following March 2020 The Fed intervened by purchasing Treasury securities after first trying repo operations to restore market functioning the Fed’s objectives for market functioning were aligned with its monetary policy objectives for price stability and full employment But we should anticipate a time when policy objectives aren’t aligned—that is when markets aren’t functioning but inflation is above desired targets This scenario makes it all the more important to strengthen Treasury market resilience The starting point for this work acknowledged significant changes in past decades and principal trading firms now represent most of the trading in electronic inter-dealer markets Traditional securities dealers have pulled back from market-making after capital standards and risk management practices were strengthened after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) Treasury debt has continued to grow rapidly And the investor base is becoming more price sensitive There have been some significant accomplishments I will not go through each of the five workstreams but will highlight a few that might be of particular interest to this audience A first priority is to improve data quality and transparency Much more data on Treasury securities transactions now are being disclosed to the public Trading volumes on a daily basis started to be provided to the public since February 2023 daily trading volumes surged to almost twice normal volumes price and quantity data for on-the-run securities transactions now are being made available These transactions represent about one-half of overall daily trading and about 75% of the daily activity in nominal coupon securities Treasury’s Office of Financial Research (OFR) started a new data collection for non-centrally cleared bilateral repo which closes a large important data gap in the repo market provide authorities data to monitor a segment of the market that has been opaque since before the GFC and is where significant risks materialized in March 2020 The collection started formally in December 2024 and represents a multi-year effort built on data pilot exercises in 2013 and 2022 the SEC began collecting more information from Form PF including separate reporting of Treasury cash and derivatives OFR created an interactive monitor with aggregated data on hedge funds from Form PF and other sources You can use this new Hedge Fund Monitor to monitor aggregate trends both repo (mostly Treasury) and prime brokerage borrowing have risen significantly in the past two years leverage of the 10 largest HFs did not rise on net over this period A second priority is to improve the resilience of market intermediation The SEC’s rule for central clearing of Treasury securities is potentially the most significant and transformational to the Treasury market Central clearing is used for other assets—including equities and exchange-traded derivatives It can reduce risk by standardizing risk management requirements and it can increase intermediation capacity of bank-affiliated dealers because bank capital and leverage requirements recognize the risk-reducing effects of multilateral netting of centrally cleared trades The centralization of transactions also provides greater visibility into market conditions The new mandate will lead to a significant increase in the volume of transactions to be centrally cleared. Treasury clearing activity is expected to increase by more than $4 trillion each day, and at least 7,000 new relationships between direct and indirect participants are expected to be needed in advance of the deadlines. A key issue related to the additional significant volume is that currently there is only one CCP for U.S But CME and ICE are also preparing to enter Entry could lead to greater competition and innovation and bring with it different clearing offerings and pricing there are gains to operational resilience from multiple CPPs These are significant benefits even as there are some open questions about a loss in netting benefits and fragmentation of liquidity pools when there is more than one CCP and accounting issues to resolve in moving to central clearing and some concerns about potentially higher transactions costs from higher risk management practices But there is general recognition by the industry groups of the benefits and they have been engaged actively and are committed to the next steps it will be important to stay focused on achieving the goals of expanded intermediation capacity and managing leverage and pro-cyclicality in the system These objectives are also affected by bank capital regulations Changes should be considered to the supplementary leverage ratio (SLR) put in place following the GFC The SLR requires banking firms to hold the same amount of capital for riskless reserves at the central bank as they would for risky assets To the extent this ratio is binding and not functioning as a backstop One change could be to exclude central bank reserves and perhaps Treasury securities in the trading book That is because Treasury securities have interest rate risk as we saw in the bank stresses in March 2023 There are some concerns that the simple adjustment to exclude reserves could reduce rather than expand intermediation capacity in stress because putting Treasuries on the balance sheet would make the SLR more binding So that leads to some more complicated options to consider: The Fed and OCC have discussed calibrating the SLR to half the GSIB surcharge Another option would be to make the enhanced-SLR buffer countercyclical where the buffer could be released in periods of market-wide stress based on triggers that are defined ex ante so that banks could plan for a release the buffer would need to be rebuilt after stresses had eased so that it would be available to be released were market-wide stresses to escalate again any changes to the SLR should avoid reducing total bank capital A next step for the resilience work is to better understand the potential interactions of the various reforms on intermediation capacity and on leverage in Treasury markets expanded central clearing and SLR reform are complementary and interconnected and more work on the interactions is needed as “how” central clearing will be implemented is progressing there are two changes by the official sector that impact intermediation capacity The Fed put in place a standing facility to finance Treasury repo with pre-authorized dealers and banks which could encourage dealers to invest in market-making capacity and support liquidity in times of market stress Treasury initiated a limited buyback program to allow dealers to sell off-the-run securities on a predictable basis to help free up their balance sheets but not because of lack of market liquidity Recent moves reflect breakdowns in traditional correlations between Treasury securities and the U.S consistent with investors reassessing Treasury securities as a global safe-haven asset Resilience in market liquidity is ever more important now the Federal Reserve may have less ability to respond to market dysfunction by purchasing Treasury securities when inflation is above its target if chaos and uncertainty are the dominant investment themes and shocks likely to remain large With Treasury debt projected to continue to grow and interest rates higher (without also higher growth) the risks to fiscal sustainability are increasing because it raises the risk of a self-reinforcing cycle of higher rates and higher debt while the SLR should be adjusted to function as a backstop now is not a good time to reduce the total amount of bank capital The series includes research and commentary on actionable steps democracy actors can take to strengthen democratic institutions and protect freedoms in the U.S and we therefore separate the two here to highlight both complementary challenges we examine the 232 races for state legislature and supreme court in 2025 post-May 1 that have yet to take place across 15 states we specifically focus on the subset of those races that we have identified as higher risk for election subversion; in section 2 we look at the races that have the highest propensity for voter suppression Pennsylvania and Virginia elections fall under both categories and so increased attention should be paid to races in those states 189 elections across four states could change the balance of power in those states with all 80 seats of the General Assembly in New Jersey and all 100 seats of the House of Delegates in Virginia up for election this year The General Assembly in New Jersey and the House of Delegates in Virginia each represent one of the two legislative bodies in their respective states meaning their make-up following the elections could keep or break a unified state legislature Outcome-determinative races often garner more attention and thus are often more prone to election subversion where the gubernatorial and legislative branches are currently under Democratic control a change in party control could make or break a trifecta States that fall both within the election subversion category and which have also been identified as having a higher propensity for voter suppression (see subsequent section) are highlighted below in orange State assembly elections have not previously faced the same level of malfeasance they merit attention to ensure that remains the case in 2025 Losing candidates should concede their races and quash any claims of cheating from supporters. In addition, those involved in the ministerial and mandatory duty to certify election results should continue to do so show the highest potential for voter suppression states that have a higher propensity for both election subversion and voter suppression are highlighted in orange In South Carolina, S108 was signed into law in 2022 and made absentee voting more difficult by narrowing the qualification criteria for an absentee ballot increasing the information required on the application and banning the use of drop boxes in the state While two recent laws in Mississippi—S.B. 2576 and H.B. 1406—increased access to the polls by expanding voter ID options, removing affidavit requirements, and establishing a notice-and-cure process for mail-in ballots, the state remains one of the most restrictive (Elections in Mississippi have yet to be scheduled but are currently anticipated for November 2025.) Though it is often difficult to quickly determine the exact causal impact of a new piece of restrictive legislation on voter turnout these races and states present opportunities for increased vigilance and areas for future study Elections, including at the state level, are a fundamental component of American democracy, but they have come under threat in various ways. As Jacob Grumbach analyzed in his State Democracy Index 2.0 (SDI 2.0) electoral democracy in the states was strong in the 2000s but began to decline in the 2010s Recent data shows an uptick in electoral democracy scores in 2023 compared to 2018 but levels still remain well below those in the 2000s (data for 2024 and 2025 are not yet available in the SDI 2.0 analysis) Given the decline since the 2000s and the possibility of state electoral recovery in 2023 it is crucial to continue analyzing the health of state down-ballot elections The races identified in this piece should be monitored to ensure they remain or become safe pro-democracy actors must ensure that this standard is upheld The authors would like to thank Peter Beck and Gigi Liman for research support; Julianna Melendez and Eric Urby for fact-checking and copyediting assistance; and Jordan Muchnick and Eric Urby for editorial assistance As Russian tanks roll through Red Square for Victory Day on May 9 Chinese President Xi Jinping will stand alongside Russian President Vladimir Putin—a jarring image for a country that claims to be a force for global stability The image of Xi in Moscow underscores the growing tension at the heart of China’s foreign policy: its strategic partnership with Russia increasingly collides with its broader ambitions to be seen as a responsible global leader as a steadying alternative to what it depicts as American volatility and Western decline Although the China-Russia relationship remains solid, Xi faces challenges. Over the past year, Moscow has expanded its diplomatic outreach, negotiating directly with Washington and signing a mutual defense pact with Pyongyang Xi’s visit offers him an opportunity to reaffirm the strength of the Beijing-Moscow partnership—even as Putin’s diplomatic options grow Some observers argue that China could turn U.S diplomatic disarray under the second Trump administration into a strategic advantage Beijing has long believed that periods of American distraction or disruption offer an opportunity for China to expand its influence Chinese leaders have been actively courting Europe positioning Beijing as a more reliable economic and diplomatic partner—especially as Trump’s erratic tariffs open musings about annexing foreign territories and disregard for allies and international norms have alienated much of the world where Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi pressed for deeper trade and investment ties and a revival of negotiations on a long-stalled trilateral free trade agreement Yet Xi’s appearance in Moscow muddies China’s campaign—and exposes the limits of its strategy By visibly aligning with Putin while Russia wages a war of aggression against Ukraine Beijing reinforces suspicions that it is willing to side with revisionist powers over defending international norms the diplomatic costs of this alignment are uneven Many governments in the Global South view Beijing’s partnership with Moscow as unproblematic or at least secondary to their broader interests with China where skepticism of Beijing already runs high Xi’s overtures are unlikely to offer reassurance As competition with the United States intensifies Chinese officials dismiss the prospect of a “reverse Nixon”—the scenario in which Washington and Moscow reconcile relations The consensus view in Beijing is that Putin is unlikely to give Trump the Ukraine peace deal he wants; the distrust between Moscow and Washington remains too profound for any full reset What has Chinese officials nervous is not a potential Trump-Putin rapprochement but the tightening of ties between Putin and Kim Jong-un The recently signed Russia-North Korea defense pact has only deepened these anxieties Chinese analysts are increasingly uneasy about Russia’s expanding and opaque military ties with Pyongyang and their potential to create instability right on its doorstep Beijing is particularly wary that Putin could position himself as a broker between Trump and Kim attention away from faltering negotiations on Ukraine long accustomed to playing a central role in Korean Peninsula diplomacy ceding its position to Moscow would be seen as a serious blow Xi isn’t inclined to make new concessions to Putin and its diplomatic leverage with the West remains limited China continues to dominate the economic relationship and that imbalance isn’t likely to change soon—though it’s increasingly a source of the Kremlin’s resentment Russia is both a strategic asset and a potential liability—an ally in confronting Western dominance A weakened Russia can’t fully serve Beijing’s strategic goals independent Russia could one day reemerge as a rival It wasn’t so long ago that China and the Soviet Union were bitter adversaries facing off across a heavily militarized 4,000-kilometer frontier Beijing’s ideal outcome is a Russia strong enough to push back against the West but weak enough to remain securely in China’s orbit is becoming more difficult—and carries global consequences Xi’s visit to Moscow exposes the contradictions at the heart of China’s foreign policy The belief that Beijing could capitalize on American dysfunction while maintaining credibility with Europe and Asia is proving naïve Xi’s embrace of autocrats abroad is not strengthening China’s global hand—it is narrowing it While Africa has been historically underrepresented in the cultural and creative industries (CCIs) on the global stage these industries are now undergoing a renaissance on the continent and attracting global attention Improving technological infrastructure is allowing more African and global consumers to access CCI products via new channels This comes at a time when Africa’s rapidly growing middle class population represents an expanding market for firms while international consumers are becoming increasingly aware of African creative goods Digital payment platforms also are diversifying the ways African consumers can pay for CCI goods These developments have opened opportunities for new sectors of the CCIs as consumers shift from purchasing physical to digital goods Advertising revenues have also become an important driver of growth in the entertainment and media (E&M) sector of the CCIs on the continent Growing the CCIs offers unique advantages to emerging markets There are fewer barriers to entry in the CCIs and the sector tends to employ a younger and more diverse workforce providing the potential to create jobs and promote social equity the CCIs can promote the growth of other sectors wherein technology and the arts can provide new nontraditional ways of learning and training many African governments have recognized the benefits of the CCIs and established cultural ministries and national strategies to promote the growth of these industries International media companies are turning their attention to Africa as a lucrative opportunity for growth Vivendi is already a big player (Goodfellow 2024) and streaming companies like Netflix are making inroads (Kazeem 2020) domestic media companies like South Africa’s Naspers already have a powerful foothold in the market and can be key partners for international firms looking to better understand the African consumer (Naspers Technology investors are also helping to enhance the infrastructure that supports the CCIs this advanced infrastructure can promote the animation While there is growth in the CCIs throughout the continent South Africa and Nigeria are two markets that have outsized potential in the near term and television and film industries are all areas of potential growth Nigeria’s fashion and film industries also have incredible potential with the rising prominence of Nollywood bringing international attention and acclaim(PwC The African CCI sector faces challenges like piracy (WT Research 2020) continental and global shocks such as epidemics and pandemics these risks can be mitigated through investments in digital distribution channels business-friendly policies like stronger IP protections and greater financial support for the CCIs incentivizing and growing the CCIs in Africa provides an opportunity for businesses and private citizens alike to promote socioeconomic development and reap high returns Download the full report here. Registration is required to attend this event Same-day or walk-in registration will not be available The event will take place in person at USP located at 12601 Twinbrook Parkway See the spring 2025 BPEA event page to watch paper presentations and read summaries of all the papers from this edition. Submit a proposal to present at a future BPEA conference here Thinly capitalized hedge funds’ growing role in the enormous and rapidly expanding market for U.S Treasury securities poses a clear and present danger to financial stability that warrants a new approach from the Federal Reserve during times of extreme market stress suggests a paper discussed at the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (BPEA) conference on March 28 “Treasury Market Dysfunction and the Role of the Central Bank,” the authors examine changes in the Treasury market since March 2020 when the Federal Reserve purchased more than $4 trillion of Treasuries and government-backed mortgage securities to calm turmoil in those markets triggered by the COVID pandemic “These problems threatened to spill over into other markets as well potentially interrupting the smooth flow of credit and impairing the implementation of monetary policy,” write the authors Anil K Kashyap of the University of Chicago “It is natural to wonder whether such episodes of fragility will become more frequent and/or more severe as the Treasury market continues to grow.” Treasury debt held by the public reached $28.3 trillion (96% of gross domestic product) by the third quarter of 2024 and continues to climb rapidly They developed a model to examine the incentives and constraints facing three types of institutions in the Treasury market: asset managers such as bond mutual funds pension funds and insurance companies; broker-dealers; and hedge funds And they offer recommendations for how the Federal Reserve can best address future episodes of turmoil asset managers invest directly in Treasury bonds and indirectly through derivatives such as futures and swaps Both their direct holdings and derivative positions are “long,” meaning they are exposed to losses if interest rates rise and the value of their holdings and positions falls hedge funds in essence lend their balance sheets to the asset managers They directly hold the Treasury securities that the asset managers prefer to hold synthetically through derivatives The hedge funds and broker-dealers hedge their direct holdings by taking a “short” position in derivatives (the opposite of the asset managers) If interest rates rise and the value of their direct holdings declines then the value of their derivatives positions increases to offset the direct holdings’ decline The dealers and hedge funds are compensated for this service through the spread known as a “cash-futures basis,” between the returns on Treasuries and Treasury derivatives The vulnerability arises because the hedge funds which are more lightly regulated than broker-dealers finance their Treasury holdings almost entirely by borrowing against them any number of shocks can lead the hedge funds to quickly exit the trade The authors recommend that the Federal Reserve be prepared to take over the hedge funds’ positions the Fed could stand ready to purchase Treasury securities but it would also take offsetting short positions in derivatives The primary advantage of that approach for the Fed is that the purchases would be self-liquidating because the reversal of the securities purchases would be embedded in the short positions in derivatives worry about how to reduce its holdings once market stress subsides the Fed would not have to take a loss on those holdings if it has to raise interest rates to quell inflation as it did in the aftermath of the pandemic this new approach would be strictly focused on market functioning preserving the distinction with monetary policy actions to support economic growth and employment they would not—as the Fed’s COVID-era purchases did—put upward pressure on growth and inflation by pushing down long-term interest rates Download the conference draft “Treasury Market Dysfunction and the Role of the Central Bank.” BPEA Conference Draft David Skidmore authored the summary language for this paper Chris Miller assisted with data visualization Kashyap receives compensation for occasional speaking engagements with financial services firms Younger contributed to this paper while he was a senior policy advisor at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and a lecturer in law at Columbia University he is employed at Tudor Investment Corporation a Brookings donor (Tudor’s longstanding financial support to Brookings is not in any way related to this article or Younger’s authorship) The authors did not receive financial support from any firm or person for this paper The views expressed in the paper are the authors’ own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Tudor Investment Corporation Activities supported by its donors reflect this commitment and the analysis and recommendations are solely determined by the scholar(s) Almost one in five Americans over age 65 are unable to manage basic activities of daily life—bathing Friends and family members can and do help out about half of people reaching the age of 65-years of age will use paid long-term services and supports (LTSS) at some point Most Americans do not have enough income or savings to cover these costs The private long-term care insurance industry has never worked well despite many creative efforts to fix it and to encourage enrollment The Federal Medicare program provides limited home health care services that does not offer long-term care for lasting functional impairments Medicaid offers a critical long-term care safety net for people who get their healthcare primarily through Medicaid—but it isn’t a good solution for most Medicare beneficiaries as it doesn’t align with the system that manages their care and pays their providers eligibility for Medicaid is restricted to those with very low incomes and few assets It is well past time to add a universal home care program to Medicare itself Prior efforts to move in this direction have been stymied Some proponents have called for a universal Critics have argued that any universal home care benefit would be a budget buster These tensions are ubiquitous in social program design An additional tension in designing a program that serves people towards the end of their lives is that public funds should be focused on expanding access to necessary care rather than protecting the ability of people to leave large bequests to their children universal benefit that does all that is a challenging task—but we believe it is not an impossible one we describe some design options for a Medicare home care benefit that could be dialed up or down depending on the priority assigned to program generosity or fiscal feasibility Several features make designing a universal home care benefit challenging None of these challenges can be ignored—but none of them are damning either policymakers will need to make tradeoffs across these challenges to design a program that provides the maximum benefits consistent with their budget appetite The good news is that the current landscape of home care financial protections is so limited that even a modest program that made conservative choices across these parameters with costs we estimate at around $40 billion annually would make many people who currently lack services much better off cost more—and it would extend more benefits to more frail and vulnerable Medicare beneficiaries What might such a very-conservatively designed universal program look like Eligibility for the program would be restricted to people who independent clinical reviewers determined were unable to perform two activities of daily living (e.g. That’s the standard that many State Medicaid programs already use and it could be assessed annually during the initial implementation period to further develop and monitor the uniformity of functional assessments over time the program would include cost-sharing that varied according to people’s means Medicare beneficiaries with high income and assets would receive modest assistance from the program to defray a portion of the costs of home care; those with fewer assets and less income would pay much less beneficiary contributions to the costs of their care would depend on both their current income and their accumulated assets but through cost-sharing rather than a strict cutoff we could allow all qualifying Medicare beneficiaries to fully retain income up to 150% of the poverty line ($22,600 in 2024) and assets up to $30,000; beyond that limit individuals would still qualify but would pay cost-sharing out of their resources to defray taxpayer costs only care provided by formal caregivers associated with home care agencies would be covered but provider agencies would be subject to a population-based hours of service budget The combination of resource-based copayments with population-level budgeting will ensure that the costs of this program will not explode Federal Medicaid savings from shifting home care benefits from Medicaid to Medicare would be used to defray the costs of the program The program we’ve outlined tightly focuses benefits on the most vulnerable people who currently have little eligibility for care But many others could also benefit from a new home care program People who have impaired functioning that does not meet the two activities of daily living standard may also need assistance Lower cost-sharing for middle-class people would leave them more resources to make the most of their lives The tradeoff is simple: at a higher cost to the federal budget We can’t define where the lines should be drawn—that’s Congress’s job—but our analysis suggests that there are programmatically tractable fiscally feasible ways to add a home care benefit to the Medicare program Hartford Foundation and the Commonwealth Fund for their financial support The authors also thank Paul Ginsburg for helpful comments on an earlier draft The Brookings Institution is financed through the support of a diverse array of foundations, corporations, governments, individuals, as well as an endowment. A list of donors can be found in our annual reports published online here and conclusions in this report are solely those of its author(s) and are not influenced by any donation This is part of the “Why we have and need a US Department of Education” series which seeks to examine the role of the U.S Department of Education at a time when the president of the United States has called for the Department’s demise It considers what the Department does to shape education policy and practice in the United States It also addresses misconceptions about the Department’s role and the president’s authority to dismantle it Brown Center scholars reproduce the full text of the EO and provide commentary with context and analysis “By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America and communities to best ensure student success Our Nation’s bright future relies on empowered families and excellent educational opportunities for every child the experiment of controlling American education through Federal programs and dollars — and the unaccountable bureaucracy those programs and dollars support — has plainly failed our children “Taxpayers spent around $200 billion at the Federal level on schools during the COVID-19 pandemic on top of the more than $60 billion they spend annually on Federal school funding This money is largely distributed by one of the newest Cabinet agencies which has existed for less than one fifth of our Nation’s history.” President Andrew Johnson created a cabinet-level Department of Education in 1867 It was quickly “demoted to an Office of Education in 1868” and existed continuously for more than a century under various cabinet-level departments before its 1979 restructuring as the current form of ED the federal government has administered funding and other educational programs in some capacity for over 150 years “The Congress created the Department of Education in 1979 at the urging of President Jimmy Carter who received a first-ever Presidential endorsement from the country’s largest teachers’ union shortly after pledging to the union his support for a separate Department of Education the Department of Education has entrenched the education bureaucracy and sought to convince America that Federal control over education is beneficial While the Department of Education does not educate anyone it maintains a public relations office that includes over 80 staffers at a cost of more than $10 million per year.” though this influence is primarily focused at state and local levels It is unclear how dismantling ED would affect union influence “Closing the Department of Education would provide children and their families the opportunity to escape a system that is failing them American reading and math scores are near historical lows This year’s National Assessment of Educational Progress showed that 70 percent of 8th graders were below proficient in reading and 72 percent were below proficient in math The Federal education bureaucracy is not working.” it would be extremely difficult to identify the effects of the U.S We don’t know of any rigorous studies that claim to do so it’s worth emphasizing that most of the Department’s spending goes to higher education (e.g. with federal funding accounting for only about 10% of K-12 school spending “Closure of the Department of Education would drastically improve program implementation in higher education The Department of Education currently manages a student loan debt portfolio of more than $1.6 trillion This means the Federal student aid program is roughly the size of one of the Nation’s largest banks But although Wells Fargo has more than 200,000 employees the Department of Education has fewer than 1,500 in its Office of Federal Student Aid and it must return bank functions to an entity equipped to serve America’s students.” which has served as a watchdog for unscrupulous student loan practices What the administration can do is continue to kneecap FSA resulting in worse customer service and threatening students’ ability to access financial aid and successfully repay their loans the Department of Education’s main functions can Closing the Department of Education and Returning Authority to the States to the maximum extent appropriate and permitted by law take all necessary steps to facilitate the closure of the Department of Education and return authority over education to the States and local communities while ensuring the effective and uninterrupted delivery of services and benefits on which Americans rely.” It would confront similar obstacles if it sought to make structural changes to widely supported federal laws or programs such as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act that will affect ED’s ability to fulfill its core responsibilities “(b) Consistent with the Department of Education’s authorities the Secretary of Education shall ensure that the allocation of any Federal Department of Education funds is subject to rigorous compliance with Federal law and Administration policy including the requirement that any program or activity receiving Federal assistance terminate illegal discrimination obscured under the label “diversity and inclusion” or similar terms and programs promoting gender ideology.” This section of the executive order indicates the administration’s intention to continue down that path including DEI programs; and b) promoted an interpretation of Title IX’s prohibitions on sex-based discrimination that frames any accommodations for transgender students as discrimination against girls and women for example—seemingly undeterred by the illegality of preemptive termination of funding or the possibility that its actions will punish students or faculty who had nothing to do with the supposed violation (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect: (i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency (ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary (b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States if the Trump administration takes a more aggressive approach than what the law seems to allow its actions almost certainly will be challenged in court (if not walked back by the Trump administration before it reaches that point) most Americans believe that generative AI will have a major impact on jobs—mainly negative—in the next two decades there is little consensus on the nature and scale of generative AI’s potential impacts and how—or even whether—to respond Fundamental questions remain unanswered: How do we ensure workers can proactively shape generative AI’s design and deployment What will it take to make sure workers benefit meaningfully from its gains And what guardrails are needed for workers to avoid harms as much as possible These animating questions are the heart of this report and a new multiyear effort we have launched at Brookings with a wide range of external collaborators and shape our societal response toward a future where workers benefit meaningfully from AI’s gains and In this report, we frame generative AI’s stakes for work and workers and outline our concerns about the ways we are, collectively, underprepared to meet this moment. Next, we provide insights on the technology and its potential impact on jobs, drawing on our analysis of detailed data from OpenAI (described here) that explores task-level exposure for over a thousand occupations in the labor market we discuss three priority areas for a proactive response—employer practices and public policy levers—and highlight immediate opportunities as well as gaps that need to be addressed we draw on insights from a recent Brookings workshop we convened with more than 30 experts from different disciplines—policy and philanthropy—to grapple with those fundamental questions about AI The scope of this report is more limited than the full suite of concerns about AI’s impact on workers Conscious that our effort builds on an already robust body of academic work and policy momentum on key aspects of job quality and harms from AI (including privacy our primary focus is addressing some of generative AI’s emerging risks for which society’s response is far less developed we are not prepared for the potential risks and opportunities that generative AI is poised to bring and business practices needed for workers to benefit from AI and avoid its harms most of the discussion around ChatGPT and similar technologies has stayed away from work and workers Other serious concerns are dominating the debates and deception (epitomized by “deep fakes” as an instrument of financial and political fraud) What is not receiving nearly enough attention are the workers and the content and terms of their work which are so crucial for delivering the value of AI for society Attention to AI’s impacts on the world of work and livelihoods has been secondary at best It is impossible to predict the future trajectory of technological advancements the range of possible AI futures is exceedingly broad from a near-term plateau in useful capabilities to exponential improvements resulting in capabilities at the level of long-hypothesized artificial general intelligence (AGI) with sweeping economic and social consequences Though confident prediction is not possible what is clear is that the design and deployment of generative AI technologies are moving far faster than our collective response to understand and shape them We are underprepared to meet this complex and growing challenge. Take public policy: While today, there are few partisan battlelines in policy responses to AI’s threats to work, there is also relatively little urgency, momentum, or concrete examples of legislation and regulations at the state or federal level that address automation risks or generative AI’s workplace threats—or that directly encourage responsible engagement of workers in making the most of AI’s capabilities we find that there is a stark mismatch between the industries and occupations most exposed to generative AI and the sectors where workers have substantial union strength or other access to worker organizations Third, there’s a widely reported “gold rush” mentality and hype driving AI deployment, with many companies rushing to adopt the technology despite fresh questions about cost and expected profitability and Microsoft are making big investments in developing AI most other organizations—whether in business or the nonprofit sector—will focus on using these AI tools rather than developing them These “deployers” of AI technology are employers as well with employees expected to adapt in some way to growing AI deployment We refer to such organizations in this report as “employer-deployers”—a key decisionmaking group that will influence how AI technologies are adopted and managed there are few guidelines or codes of conduct for how companies should ethically implement AI with respect to their workforce especially those publicly traded or aiming to go public feel intense pressure from competitors and investors to adopt AI to save on labor costs and increase efficiency Bumpy product deployment and broader uncertainty notwithstanding the stakes for workers are unquestionably high without any dramatic acceleration of capability gains generative AI technology is poised to impact a broad range of workers in fields as diverse as law the first waves of that disruption are only months away Interacting with an AI-powered customer service agent or bot—something that is already commonplace—is just the tip of this iceberg even as generative AI has the potential to boost incomes What are generative AI’s likely impacts on work and workers we briefly summarize several defining features of this new technology and glean insights from the data provided by OpenAI We include summary findings of new Brookings research analyzing OpenAI data which looks at task exposure to existing ChatGPT-4 technology across more than 1,000 occupations The data is best interpreted as directionally useful in identifying the types of occupations that might see more (or less) disruption from current generative AI technology But the analysis does not and cannot offer definitive predictions or precise accounting of specific impacts For more information on our methodology and some of its limitations Popularized by ChatGPT-3.5’s release at the end of 2022 “generative” AI is a compelling technological breakthrough with traits and sophisticated capabilities fundamentally different from past forms of computerization and automation The tool’s particular combination of traits makes it different: its capacity to generate new content it is a mostly “disembodied” technology rather than a physical tool for work like an industrial robot (though that could change soon with advances in machine vision and other AI technologies) novel among information technologies because of their ability to create entirely new content from the data the AI models were trained on That’s what makes them “generative.” As a type of machine learning generative AI works as an algorithm that can produce a wide range of new content The technology is enabled by large language models (LLMs) that train on vast data sets detecting statistical patterns and structures that the model then uses to generate new content Especially critical is generative AI’s ability to predict and generate new “natural language” content useful to a user’s momentary intent and need not unlike an auto-prompt feature on a smartphone—whether it be to write correspondence or scrape the internet and then generate ideas for action Advanced generative AI models such as Dall-E 3 and Stable Diffusion can create high-quality visual content from text input while programs such as Sora have made striking advances in text-to-video content systems are coming that can combine different data types such as text and video for both input prompts and generated outputs ChatGPT became the fastest-spreading tech platform in history by reaching 1 billion monthly visits just four months after its 2022 launch Generative AI is also distinct for its relative ease of diffusion mostly through existing web browsers and apps on computer devices of all kinds the rails to carry generative AI are mostly already in place workplace adoption of generative AI is still modest today as employers experiment with early use cases and face lingering concerns around privacy regardless of their employer’s rules.) And while more widespread diffusion may only happen over a longer time horizon workplace adoption of AI may face lower barriers than previous forms of technology given: 1) its accessible and user-friendly interface that does not require machine learning expertise; and 2) its modest infrastructure requirements unlike physical robots assembling goods in a factory or vacuuming your floor AI tools remain oriented toward information-based tasks as LLMs are designed to communicate with material objects and their sensors Generative AI’s capabilities represent a departure from previous workplace technologies. For decades, as a large body of research shows, technology has been “skill-biased”: It substituted for routine skills common in middle- and some low-wage jobs (such as manual accounting while it complemented non-routine skills typical of higher-paid jobs (such as managerial decisionmaking Technologies such as ChatGPT upend this paradigm. In fact, generative AI is not likely to disrupt physical, routine, blue collar work much at all, barring technological breakthroughs in robotics. Instead, generative AI excels at mimicking the kinds of non-routine skills and interactive traits that just a few years ago experts considered impossible for computers to perform Most of the industries that face the greatest exposure to generative AI today are those that just a few years ago were ranked at the bottom of automation risk generative AI technologies are capable of performing a wide range of tasks Some of the capabilities that the technology can perform autonomously without human oversight include those in the box below:  Source: OpenAI and University of Pennsylvania working paper  Given this extraordinary set of capabilities (which human workers can tweak and complement to enhance AI’s perceived responsiveness and traits such as empathy) and the huge interest in AI deployment it’s time to get a handle on which workers in which industries are most likely to be affected—and also how equipped and likely they are to be able to shape the deployment of AI in their fields The exposure data from OpenAI suggests that generative AI technology may impact broad swaths of the nation’s workers We find that more than 30% of all workers could see at least 50% of their occupation’s tasks disrupted by generative AI while some 85% of workers could see at least 10% of their work tasks impacted The sectors that face the greatest exposure are dominated by higher-paying fields with advanced degree requirements “middle-skill” office and administrative support occupations blue collar sectors face the least exposure while lower-paid service sector jobs will also likely see more modest effects and community and social services have medium exposure according to our analysis elementary school teachers and registered nurses could see substantial time savings in about one-third of tasks A teacher might save time on tasks such as grading many manually intensive tasks that require in-person administration—such as performing a physical exam or administering an IV—will see minimal impact but generative AI could save time on other tasks such as evaluating diagnostic tests and performing administrative and managerial functions Figure 1 shows how this looks across sectors with exposure levels plotted for occupational groups as bars depicting major groups’ exposure levels the bars’ lengths reflect the share of the major occupational group’s tasks that LLMs can reduce the time to complete by 50% or more the figure helps us spot that some fields—such as computer work and engineering—stand out as having relatively high levels of exposure Looking at generative AI exposure impacts more closely it’s possible to see how LLM exposure varies by occupations’ pay levels higher-paying occupational groups such as computer work and business-financial roles stand out for being forecasted to encounter high exposure to ChatGPT-4 and other LLMs the bubbles representing various occupational groups are sized according to the current number of workers in those jobs That means that several very large occupational groups—such as business and health care work—stand to undergo significant exposure to generative AI This alone forecasts the technology’s broad implications for the labor market it is important to recall that these exposure rates in themselves do not predict—let alone determine—the nature of effects on workers they reflect generative AI’s potential involvement with jobs or occupational groups without distinguishing between labor-augmenting or labor-displacing effects it is obviously important to probe the specific potential for LLM-driven automation (or work replacement) given the technology’s widely feared potential to disrupt human work To assess the technical feasibility of LLMs automating specific tasks within occupations we analyzed data from OpenAI estimating the likelihood of generative AI completing tasks with no human oversight per the autonomous capabilities list in Box 1 Tasks with a high exposure and high likelihood of being completed without human oversight were categorized as “more likely to automate.” Five sectors emerge as having relatively high exposure and high automation potential as detailed in the chart below alongside illustrative occupations Office and administrative support occupations stand out for the sector’s high exposure women comprise the overwhelming majority of the nearly 19 million Americans employed in the sector which has provided the lion’s share of decent-paying stable jobs with upward mobility potential for women without a college degree in jobs such as bookkeepers technology has contributed to the hollowing out of these jobs; generative AI could accelerate these trends The stakes are especially high for this racially and ethnically diverse group of lower-middle-class women many of whom may risk falling into more precarious much more analysis is needed of the likely distribution of AI’s employment effects by race some of the most exposed and possibly vulnerable jobs are currently disproportionately held by white workers while others—the ranks of bank tellers and HR assistants say—roughly mirror the racial makeup of the labor force as a whole not all workers in a given occupation will necessary be affected equally The plight of clerical workers illustrates a broader trend: It is women who face both the highest exposure to generative AI and the highest automation risk due to their overrepresentation in white collar work that requires a college degree and in administrative support roles 36% of female workers are in occupations in which generative AI could save 50% of the time on tasks according to Brookings’ analysis of OpenAI’s GPT-4 ratings of task susceptibility This reality runs counter to popular conceptions of technology and work: The dominant stereotype of a worker at high risk of automation is often that of a blue collar Yet generative AI is likely to have only a minimal impact on male-dominated blue collar industries barring further advances in robotics technologies generative AI is not just the latest update of the various digital and automation technologies that have been reshaping wide-ranging segments of the labor market for decades While the data here suggests some contours of how generative AI could impact a range of workers and types of work what we know about the likely impacts and how best to shape them remains radically incomplete The technology is still in its early stages and insights into its workings and potential impacts remain sketchy beyond an appreciation of great potential and necessary caution we don’t know a lot yet about how “exposure” to generative AI will translate into real-world impacts on workers Several key questions loom large and suggest how we might at least locate the unknowns and generate more tangible experience and learning:  How much and how rapidly will generative AI augment—as opposed to automate—human labor We don’t know the extent to which generative AI will affect overall demand for human labor (types and numbers of jobs) or how much AI will in fact augment (enhance capabilities and/or improve efficiency and performance) versus automate jobs—and how soon these changes will unfold there are multiple ways AI might augment the role of a computer programmer: enhancing productivity AI might also automate some or even much of the work taking on routine tasks and even generating code We need to learn when and how AI can complement or displace workers and whether what looks initially like “augmentation” might ultimately lead to displacement we need to clarify which exposed workers are vulnerable to displacement and who will not be very vulnerable and instead will “roll with the changes.” As we analyze and track these effects and potential others and other differences—not only where workers of different backgrounds are concentrated in terms of industries and occupations but also how well positioned and supported they are to respond But it is possible that the opposite may also be true: Some jobs may be “de-skilled.” For example generative AI might “upskill” the ability of a novice grant writer to prepare higher-quality grant applications potentially even rivaling one written by a seasoned and high-performing grant writer But another possibility is that the job of grant writer may be de-skilled rarer) skill substituted by copying and pasting from generative AI It is also possible that as the technology improves more senior employees will experience productivity boosts while demand for lower-level employees erodes All of these scenarios imply a massive need for workers to adapt and a wide spectrum of forms that could materialize The case of Hollywood writers is instructive here because their landmark agreement with major studios aimed to build in AI adaptation along with guardrails The Writers Guild opted to support the use of AI technology in principle and assume its ongoing evolution while also establishing a role in co-determining the technology’s use (e.g. stipulating what AI cannot replace) and safeguarding intellectual property Tied to the question of how gains and losses will appear is the question of how both will impact inequality across multiple dimensions: income How could AI-triggered changes affect inequality, and how can that best be shaped? While a few signals have been coming in we don’t yet know the likely overall impact of generative AI on inequality Nor do we know what efforts to mitigate even greater inequality might prove helpful or what steps might be delivered at scale to ensure LLMs deliver on “leveling up” or other gap-reducing changes Can generative AI really level up lower performers, narrow gaps between them and “star” workers, and thereby lower inequality and boost the middle class? To what extent will workers benefit from AI-supported worker productivity gains and via what mechanisms (stock ownership or other equity What will happen to the value of a college degree How difficult will it be for displaced workers to transition to new roles especially if their education and training are highly specialized Who will be positioned to benefit from the new jobs that will be created Who—and in what places—will reap the biggest financial gains Beyond affecting the demand and rewards for human labor, how could generative AI add to harms for workers and their workplaces? A growing body of evidence documents multiple ways that employers’ use of AI can harm workers beyond livelihood risks, including by undermining their power monitoring and surveilling with little or no consent and exacerbating scheduling and other pressures through algorithmic management and decisionmaking we know too little about how generative AI specifically might contribute to or exacerbate those harms we outline three priority challenges that we explored at the Brookings workshop earlier this summer but it does encompass a range of leverage points for positive change our aim is to focus on emerging concerns—especially involving risks to livelihoods—that have received much less attention to date than well-documented harms such as bias and surveillance The first key priority is establishing what good responsible business and organizational practice looks like for employers and deployers of generative AI Generative AI has been all the corporate buzz over the past year and a half with investor interest peaking and companies racing to demonstrate their embrace of the innovation and new ways to create value—or at least not be left too far behind In a highly unequal economic system—one centered on maximizing shareholder value and short-term returns while persistently concentrating huge market power in a small number of leading companies—a predominant focus of industry discussions has been on the potential labor cost savings and efficiency gains from deploying AI There has been little public discussion or focus on worker impacts or worker engagement in shaping AI’s use at work there is a long-established set of norms and gold-standard examples for what it looks like to be a “high-road” employer in terms of worker pay and benefits dimensions of job quality such as creativity and purpose and investments in upskilling and job security “co-investments” is more accurate: Employers newer standards labeled “sustainability” address—and also rate and rank—companies’ data privacy and other corporate leaders can and do respond to those But here’s the urgent challenge: There is not yet any standard for acting as a high-road employer-deployer in the context of generative AI These standards might include actions such as assessing risks and opportunities; setting goals that put the fortunes and capabilities of workers in the center and not the margins; engaging workers in designing and implementing AI deployment and its rewards (and in the process redefining work and sharing gains from higher productivity); and responsibly supporting transitions for workers who need them (e.g. as demand for certain human skills and tasks declines) Chief Executives for Corporate Purpose and JUST Capital are likewise exploring what “good” can mean—and how to realize it in corporate practice Leading companies and worker-led organizations are starting to launch promising collaborations. For example, in 2023, Microsoft and the AFL-CIO announced a first-of-its-kind tech-labor partnership on AI and the future of the workforce in addition to stronger leadership by employers more research on the ground—especially in the workplace—is required to answer key questions How is AI being deployed in different settings and industries are affected workers engaged as co-designers and/or user-deployers The second key priority is adapting and scaling models for amplifying worker voice in the generative AI moment This requires that we recognize and tackle a “great mismatch.”  As we documented in a recent multimedia case study last year’s Hollywood writers’ strike illustrated the power of organized workers using their collective voice to protect their livelihoods It even showed the potential of “sectoral bargaining”—rare for a U.S The contract the Writers Guild secured with all the major studios includes far-reaching guardrails on generative AI—the first of their kind for any collective bargaining agreement the writers pushed back on unchecked risks and succeeded in setting their own terms for the use of AI—not a ban on the technology but instead regulation of its use in ways that could benefit writers and studios alike while reducing clear harms the writers emphasized both the income at stake as well as the creative purpose and meaning at stake in their technology-affected work lives and changing career paths A great mismatch: The industries most exposed to generative AI have some of the lowest union representation in the economy But the replicability of the writers’ success is limited by a great mismatch: The industries most exposed to generative AI have some of the lowest union representation in the economy the entry-level analyst jobs that have traditionally offered the foundation for moving up Education stands out as the lone exception: a medium-exposure sector with substantially higher union representation Beyond formal power and bargaining rights through unions workers in heavily exposed industries also lack voice and visibility in other forms of countervailing power from worker justice organizations to sustained campaigns there is no equivalent to “Fight for 15,” the landmark campaign that shifted the goal posts and momentum on the minimum wage there is no pro-worker alliance—equivalent to the National Domestic Workers Alliance or United for Respect—for bookkeepers or sales reps ubiquitous occupations seem to be marketing targets for those offering AI training and tips starting with popular and professionally oriented social media platforms such as LinkedIn and YouTube Compounding these twin challenges of low union density and limited countervailing worker power are the political obstacles to enacting broader labor law reforms, as well as the limitations to federal regulatory power stemming from recent Supreme Court decisions On the positive side, as workshop participants pointed out, there is a unique group of potential influencers: Sought-after technologists—including senior coders and other employees of Google, OpenAI, and other leading AI developers—are speaking out as whistleblowers and voting with their feet by seeking out new employers and expressing serious concerns about unregulated development and deployment of generative AI generative AI’s disruption of new industries—including higher-paying higher-status jobs that previously were not perceived at risk of technological change—may bring fresh opportunities to organize new and broader classes of workers There is no “Fight for 15”-equivalent campaign for legal secretaries and HR assistants and no pro-worker alliance for bookkeepers or sales reps To adapt models of worker voice to the challenges arising from generative AI more experimentation is needed to enable positive AI use cases and models to be documented Other opportunities include exploring opportunities to require or support worker voice such as through procurement standards and conditions attached to government grants or other public money The growing number of occupations and industries perceived to be at risk from the technology may present fresh opportunities to organize concerned workers Pressure from well-organized campaigns helps motivate leadership—both insisting on accountability and recognizing when employers do the right thing and serve as role models for peers and/or competitors Labor history shows many ways to connect worker and work-centered campaigns to consumer power and “conscious consumerism” as well both to discourage harmful practices and reward positive ones The third priority is developing public policy responses and using the public sector to pilot and model how to help workers succeed in an AI-affected economy The Biden administration’s Executive Order on the safe development and use of AI was a promising catalyst for proactive policy responses to AI with a clear focus on worker voice and power included alongside other risks and opportunities Yet it mostly calls for more data and knowledge-building—both critical to be sure—and does not offer broader solutions for shaping a positive future of work it is not yet clear what those solutions should be But the potential mechanisms are many: from worker-protecting standards built into government procurement to investment in worker-centered innovation and creativity as part of value-creating AI use a government response should include use of AI by the public sector itself potentially to enhance a near-endless range of service delivery Helpfully, there are not yet entrenched partisan positions on policy responses—but neither are there models of state or federal legislation and regulation ready to scale, at least not well-understood models or those ready to be championed. Like the larger debate about AI risks, most of the promising examples of state-level policies focus on reducing harms from AI bias with far less policy attention to automation risk or potential fallout such as rapid job dislocation and income loss Yet some new ideas are emerging; for example as well as the right to not be forced to train AI to replace one’s own job These broader concerns defy easy regulatory or “silver bullet” legislative fixes as it is challenging to parse out “good” versus “bad” automation the scope of issues that require proactive policy and regulatory responses range from copyright and fair use (particularly in the creative arts) to core labor rights the current policy inaction—and impasse—over the rapid rise of social media offers a cautionary tale: Lawmakers and other policymakers must act if they are to have any hope of shaping the impact of this transformative technology on workers States are moving faster than the federal government on enacting AI policies Given the pace of technological development and deployment the next two years appear to be especially important for establishing worker rights and employer responsibilities in policy Some experts at our workshop argued strongly that the focus should be broader than generative AI per se and instead looking at technology systems and the full suite of technology into which generative AI embeds and through which it distributes (e.g. established enterprise software already in wide use) Building out the model for public sector deployment would benefit from more policy experimentation as well as coordination across states and between the state and federal levels multiyear effort focused on understanding and shaping a positive future of work in an AI-affected world this report has outlined some of the major stakes and questions that should guide and accelerate much-needed attention toward the issue In collaboration with leaders across a range of sectors and many parts of the country we will be tackling each of the major challenges—and conversely from helping workers and employers tell their stories to supporting policymakers as they experiment with different approaches and respond to a range of stakes and stakeholders Generative AI is poised to rewire how many of us work and earn a living the future of work will not be determined by technological capacity alone Whether generative AI lives up to its potential to unlock new possibilities for workers and spread shared prosperity or realizes fears of exacerbating inequality and harm depends on the choices that employers To assess the “exposure” of work to generative AI in the form of specific occupations we utilized estimates shared by OpenAI relating the predicted ChatGPT-4 exposure level of thousands of the tasks that make up the hundreds of occupations defined by the Department of Labor’s O*NET database OpenAI employed a combination of human annotators and GPT-4 itself to assess the overall exposure of tasks to GPTs following in the tradition of earlier work quantifying work’s exposure to machine learning the implied impacts of the thousands of task impacts were aggregated onto 1,016 occupations following OpenAI’s use of a midrange “exposure” rating statistic that assumes a middling amount of future innovation in complementary applications that use GPT-4 technology to assess the technical feasibility of current or near-term generative AI automating away specific tasks and occupations we analyzed data from OpenAI estimating the likelihood of ChatGPT-4 completing tasks with no human oversight as per the autonomous capabilities list in Box 1 Tasks with a high exposure and high likelihood of being completed without human oversight were categorized as “more likely to automate.”   task assessments developed using O*NET were aggregated up and considered at the occupational level to create job-level automation estimates and statistics employed here yield a plausible way of generating a rough-draft speculation on how generative AI might impact work in coming years we note here a few caveats about the data and its limitations this data does not attempt to project future capability enhancements from next-generation AI models likely to be released (e.g. these exposure analyses—based on technical feasibility exercises to gauge the performance requirements of specific tasks—often overstate the potential for job impacts by not accounting for the many practical constraints to real-world adoption of technology in workplaces from legal and business risks to ethical and privacy concerns and consumer preferences task-based analysis in some cases understates the potential impact by missing major technological disruptions that are not easily captured in a task-based approach a fashion model appears to have a low exposure to generative AI when considering the job’s key tasks such as “apply makeup,” “wear costumes,” and “pose as directed.” But that approach misses the potential for major disruptions to the fashion industry and job risks from retailers using their own AI fashion models this exercise tells only part of the story: It neither captures the impact of generative AI on important aspects of job quality (as opposed to the quantity of human labor required) nor is it able to capture the emergence of new tasks and occupations that could result from generative AI—undeniably an important impact of earlier waves of automation (e.g. mass-produced motor vehicles creating the need for lots of mechanics) there is significant value in the basic exposure statistics presented and discussed here and utilized in the narrative—precisely because our understanding of the risk to livelihoods is so limited and our national conversation about solutions lags behind the technology The data suggests the overall distribution of potential impacts on a wide range of occupations and workers not just the handful discussed in popular news coverage or social media to date: coders and writers Such broad estimates can and should inform how society understands and responds to the deployment of increasingly powerful AI Brookings Metro would like to thank the following partners for their generous support of this analysis and our research on AI and work more broadly: Omidyar Network The authors would like to thank the following colleagues inside and outside of Brookings for important insights and helpful feedback: Bharat Ramamurti Pamela Mishkin of OpenAI provided data and valuable advice at several stages of our research We are grateful to the participants in our June convening who provided tremendously useful perspectives and insights and to Omidyar Network for providing support for the convening Special thanks to Glencora Haskins for research support and to Mayu Takeuchi for fact checking and Edward Paisley for their editorial and communications expertise Thanks to Carie Muscatello for layout and graphic design Latino or Hispanic business owners capitalized on economic opportunity between 2017 and 2022 creating thousands of firms that benefited the communities they serve Latino or Hispanic individuals owned 7.9% of all employer businesses (those that employ at least one person)—a total of 465,202 firms But Latino or Hispanic individuals are still underrepresented as employer business owners compared to their share of the U.S. population. As mentioned above, Latino or Hispanic-identifying individuals owned 7.9% of employer businesses in 2022, despite comprising 19.1% of the population. In contrast, and as we’ve identified in previous reports representing 81.1% of all employer business owners yet only 74% of the U.S As this report demonstrates, growth in Latino or Hispanic-owned businesses hasn’t come at the expense of other race or ethnic groups; it has been additional, and there’s still room to grow. If the share of Latino or Hispanic-owned employer businesses equaled the share of Americans who identify as Latino or Hispanic there would be 812,440 more businesses generating a combined $1.1 trillion in revenue and $250 billion in payroll and influence the picture of opportunity at the regional and metro area level Latino or Hispanic-owned businesses represent large segments of relatively small economies Latino or Hispanic-owned employer businesses represent 50% or more of total employers Latino or Hispanic employers are also large components of dense, racially and ethnically diverse economies. This includes Washington, D.C., Chicago, New York, Houston, and Los Angeles. Miami—a historic hub of Cuban cultural heritage—had close to 60,000 Latino or Hispanic-owned businesses in 2022 exceeding totals for New York and Los Angeles Yet even in midsized and large Latino or Hispanic-majority cities where Latino or Hispanic-owned businesses represent a large component of total businesses these business owners are still underrepresented where 55% of employer businesses are Latino or Hispanic-owned there are close to 1.6 times more Latino or Hispanic-identifying residents (83% population share) 66% of the population identifies as Latino or Hispanic but only 28% of employer business owners do cities with higher shares of Latino or Hispanic residents tend to have higher shares of Latino or Hispanic-owned employer businesses Ill.—the share of Latino or Hispanic business owners is greater than the proportion of Latino or Hispanic-identifying residents these cities are exceptions rather than the rule and have relatively small Latino or Hispanic populations Despite disparities with population shares Latino or Hispanic business ownership is on the rise the number of Latino or Hispanic employers increased by 44.4% (see Figure 2) the number of Latino or Hispanic employers increased by 14.6% to a total of 465,202 employer businesses nationally This growth eclipses overall employer business creation which grew by just 0.46% annually and 2.3% overall during this period Latino or Hispanic employers’ growth rate was the third-largest compared to other major racial and ethnic groups Figure 3 shows that the number of non-Latino or Hispanic Native American-owned businesses increased by 93.9% and non-Latino or Hispanic Black-owned businesses increased by 56.9% The number of Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander employers increased by 39.5% and the number of Asian American employers increased by 17.1% Employer businesses owned by white Americans declined slightly Despite being underrepresented nationally, recent research shows that Latino or Hispanic-owned businesses were a substantial component of post-pandemic business creation These businesses likely buffered the economy against a more severe downturn in 2020 and have helped foster strong economic growth since Latino or Hispanic-owned businesses represented 58% of the increase in total employers would have had 619,655 fewer jobs—a loss of $34 billion in workers’ wages and $190 billion in total revenue Arguably more important than business formation are indicators of businesses success and how much those employees are paid (measured here by annual payroll) Figure 4 shows that these indicators were variable for Latino or Hispanic-owned businesses the number of employees at Latino or Hispanic-owned businesses decreased by over 42,000 Yet strong growth between 2020 and 2022 reversed this decline making up for the previous loss 15 times over while total wages decreased in 2019 alongside the decline in employees this also rebounded from $105.6 billion in 2020 to $143.3 billion in 2022 In terms of industry composition, Figure 5 shows that Latino or Hispanic employer businesses were clustered in construction, accommodation and food services, and professional and technical services, which comprised 18.8%, 12.3%, and 10.9%, respectively, of Latino or Hispanic-owned businesses by sector. In contrast the top three industries for all employer businesses were professional and technical services (19.2%) these industries grew substantially for Latino or Hispanic employers Figure 6 shows that the number of Latino or Hispanic-owned businesses in construction increased by over 37,500 (a 75% increase) While almost all industries have seen some increase in Latino or Hispanic employers (aside from agriculture the other top-growing industries were in the arts Across the 251 metro areas that were surveyed at least twice between 2017 and 2022 Map 2 shows that in 204 (89.9%) Latino or Hispanic-owned businesses have grown This growth has been particularly pronounced across the Midwest and parts of Southern Appalachia Smaller metro areas in those regions—including Lawton This partially reflects the fact that these areas started with smaller numbers of Latino or Hispanic-owned businesses in 2017 In terms of the number of Latino or Hispanic-owned businesses (also shown on Map 2 by hovering over a metro area) the largest growth occurred in metro areas with large Latino or Hispanic communities This includes Miami (13,693 new businesses; 29.9% gain) Los Angeles (10,999 new businesses; 39% gain) and New York (8,727 new businesses; 29.3% gain) Cities that have experienced tremendous population growth—including Phoenix and Dallas—also saw substantial increases in the number and percentage of Latino or Hispanic-owned businesses Latino or Hispanic-owned businesses contributed substantially to overall business growth Figure 7 displays the change in Latino or Hispanic-owned businesses compared to non-Latino or Hispanic businesses It shows that Latino or Hispanic businesses represented over 93% of total growth in Miami; 47% of total growth in Los Angeles; and 65% of total growth in Orlando where total businesses declined over the period Latino or Hispanic-owned businesses increased by 8,727 To better understand if the growth in Latino or Hispanic-owned businesses is a result of a more opportunity-rich business environment for underrepresented groups this report analyzes macroeconomic trends alongside business growth Figure 8 shows the growth in Latino or Hispanic-owned and total businesses compared to gross domestic product (GDP) and income per capita (indexed to 2017 values) these variables indicate the “health” of local and regional economies Because business creation typically follows patterns of economic growth and decline by examining these indicators alongside Latino or Hispanic-owned business growth we can start to assess whether policy changes aimed at improving access for Latino or Hispanic and other groups have also had a positive impact on growth Figure 8 shows that while regional trends varied from 2017 to 2022 Latino or Hispanic business growth generally followed GDP and per capita income GDP and per capita income surged in 2021 and 2022 demonstrating that Latino or Hispanic-owned businesses benefited from a strong post-pandemic economy in a way that businesses overall did not in metro areas in the Midwest and Northeast Latino or Hispanic business growth more tightly mimics metro-level economic health than overall business growth does This likely means that Latino or Hispanic business growth in these places is more sensitive to local economic shifts and a greater dependence on the local economy Latino or Hispanic business growth is less sensitive to local economic conditions in the South economic conditions only explain an average of 34.5% of the growth in Latino or Hispanic-owned businesses and 21.9% of the growth in total businesses This suggests a greater influence of factors not measured here such as business and capital concentration in a smaller number of industries While macroeconomic conditions explain most of the growth in Latino or Hispanic-owned businesses a substantial portion of growth is still unexplained This indicates that policy changes aimed at creating opportunities for underrepresented communities could have helped facilitate the sharp increase in Latino or Hispanic-owned businesses visible in the data this analysis is likely to overstate the role of economic conditions on business growth As Latino or Hispanic-owned businesses are overrepresented in sectors highly sensitive to macroeconomic trends their growth may appear more correlated with economic conditions than is really the case While this analysis provides insights into the relationship between metro area economic health and business growth it is worth noting that factors that could be driving Latino or Hispanic business growth are not accounted for due to a lack of disaggregated data (especially by industry) This limitation highlights the need for more granular data on Latino or Hispanic-owned businesses by sector Future qualitative research could also assess Latino or Hispanic business growth in thriving metro areas across the U.S to gain better insights into how local business dynamics and capital markets influence economic opportunity The data in this report demonstrate the potential for economic growth and job creation that could stem from supporting Latino or Hispanic business owners Latino or Hispanic-owned business show a significantly stronger correlation with local GDP and so are more vulnerable to economic downturns This indicates that Latino or Hispanic business owners in these regions would benefit from policies that can support their growth whether economic conditions are strong or poor place-based business incentives in Latino or Hispanic-dense areas could help accelerate job creation and hiring Latino or Hispanic individuals constitute almost one in five Americans and represent one of the fastest-growing demographics in the country They are making tremendous contributions to this nation’s economy Supporting Latino or Hispanic entrepreneurs in policies and programs increases the potential for all regions and communities to benefit This report was made possible by support from the Ares Charitable Foundation The views expressed in this report are those of its authors and do not represent the views of the donor This tool will update daily shortly after 4 p.m for daily data from the Daily Treasury Statements Weekend and holiday transactions accumulate to the next business day Weekly data (totaled from the daily data) will update once the previous full week’s data are complete shortly after the Monthly Treasury Statements are released on the eighth business day The vertical dashed line indicates President Trump’s 2025 inauguration The Trump administration’s conduct and statements with regard to spending freezes and impoundment including the Department of Government Efficiency’s (DOGE) activities have created uncertainty as to whether or not funding is flowing through Treasury’s Bureau of the Fiscal Service to particular programs and departments in accordance with the law This data tool allows users to track the flow of federal funds in real time and annual processed outlays to key programs and departments This tool only reports outlays of federal funds meaning the actual transmission of funds from the federal government to another entity This tool makes few to no adjustments to the data and expected variation in patterns of outlays over time remain one cannot discern directly whether there is a gap between obligated funds and their outlay if federal agencies have changed the rate at which they are newly obligating funds (e.g. those changes would only gradually be reflected in outlays These data are downloadable and can be used for secondary analysis you can select one outlay recipient at a time to observe how year-to-date outlays (either as a 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up to nine recipients (which can include programs like the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program [SNAP] agencies like the National Institutes of Health [NIH] To use the “Outlays over time (monthly data)” tool select up the nine recipients by searching for an outlay recipient or by using the drop-down menu The monthly outlay recipients are labeled with numerical prefixes to retain the nested structure of the Monthly Treasury Statement the Legislative Branch or the Department of Commerce) are designated with a single number (1–32) and each nested subcategory is designated with a decimal one top level category is “10 Department of Housing and Urban Development.” The first nested categories under housing programs include “10.1 Public and Indian Housing Programs,” “10.2 Community Planning and Development,” and several others under “10.1 Public and Indian Housing Programs,” you can find “10.1.1 Tenant Based Rental Assistance,” “10.1.2 Housing Certificate Fund,” and several others Totals for each category are calculated from each of its subcategories Note that we have taken these numbers and names directly from the Monthly Treasury Statement data certain numerical labels for outlay recipients change over time; this happens when new outlay recipients are added “Federal Direct Student Loans” is line item 6.7.3 in some months and 6.7.4 in others We are working to make these labels consistent over time and will add a glossary for the monthly data in the coming weeks leaving fewer avenues for academic researchers to study the social media landscape and to share large-scale empirical research with policymakers we discuss three potential data access pathways researchers could use to study TikTok in the U.S.—the company’s Researcher API individual users’ data “takeouts,” and online scraping—highlighting the challenges of each approach this analysis aims to emphasize current challenges for researchers studying social platforms how a lack of research can lead to under-informed policy debates open data access for researchers to answer pressing questions about platforms like TikTok and for policymakers pursuing new legislation the options for researchers to study the topic are a function of the data to which they have access The first and most direct pathway to access TikTok data is from the platform itself. At present, TikTok has established a TikTok Researcher API (Application Programming Interface) program where academic researchers can apply for access to datasets with a sample of anonymized profiles In trying to investigate phenomena like foreign influence across the entire digital ecosystem researchers must contend with the current limitations of the API: whether it provides a large enough sample of data (in most cases it does not); the fact that it doesn’t differentiate between all content on the platform and the most popular content on the platform; and the reality that the access structure to analyze this data is misaligned with the typical academic research process further highlighting the importance of transparency and multiple pathways for accessing data where anonymized data should be permanently retained and accessible for replication purposes Ultimately, while the TikTok Researcher API has proven valuable in describing specific events or trends, such as content about the war in Gaza it does not enable large-scale research on long-term phenomena or news ecosystems as a whole For these types of broad research questions like “How much foreign influence content is on TikTok?” The Researcher API in its current form falls short While the takeout file from TikTok appears to be rich with data including a full history of a user’s watched videos and engagement we have encountered two issues: the completeness of the data and the ability to securely get a large number of these takeouts into the hands of researchers our research teams and collaborators have found that data sometimes appears to be missing from the data takeout without clarity on when or why this may be occurring collecting any amount of takeouts at scale poses significant logistical challenges TikTok’s current data-takeout process requires users to tap through five screens in their settings before being able to request their data file users must wait a few days for the file to be prepared and delivered to their app which occurs without a push notification to the user’s device to remind them of the file users then have four days to download the file or share it with our team before it expires While no evidence suggests whether incomplete data is intentional on TikTok’s end it is clear that the takeout system has not been designed to be inclusive of research needs or transparency a research team could conceivably start to answer some of these ecosystem-wide questions such as what proportion of content might be created by or promoting the agendas of foreign actors But even more generally, the public interest can be best served when independent researchers can design and implement studies that allow policymakers to understand both what is happening on the platforms and its impact The concerns around the threats to public interest research on Twitter or Reddit are also mirrored in the lack of open access in Project Texas therefore data access pathways must take shape in various ways Article 40 includes a provision granting access to the data of very large online platforms (VLOPs) and search engines (VLOSEs) to vetted researchers contributing to the “detection and understanding of systemic risks” in the European Union which is a governance structure where actions are mostly taken by various stakeholder groups under the oversight of a government body policymakers can avoid potential First Amendment concerns around government overreach into how social media companies control speech by engaging academia and industry when publishing guidelines for data access and increasing inclusivity and transparency in the policymaking process Taking a public-private approach will also help U.S and audits that are informed by a diverse set of expertise social media data could be presented in a format that achieves higher accessibility among non-technical and technical researchers alike the bill—or others like it—should continue to be top-of-mind in policy conversations Developing effective mechanisms to share data with researchers allows the public to better understand the risks and harms associated with social media including national security concerns over TikTok’s algorithm concerning potential Chinese influence and questions related to child safety particularly around newer platforms like TikTok will also allow researchers to conduct rigorous scientific analysis to inform the public and policymakers about the reality of what occurs online—and help policymakers make effective evidence-based decisions on future technology regulation Sarah Graham and Lama Mohammed wrote the first draft of this article; all of the authors contributed to planning This report provides a comprehensive analysis of evidence from over two decades of research on interventions designed to increase college access and completion Drawing on rigorous evaluations of diverse programs and approaches we examine what is effective to help students successfully navigate the path to and through college We identified several unanswered questions and directions for further experimentation and research An extensive experimental literature provides useful guidance on how post-secondary institutions and policymakers can best use their limited resources to support students significantly increasing the number of students who find their way to and through college—and reducing disparities by race and ethnicity and gender—will require a substantial investment Given the high returns to education for individuals Read the full report Appendix The Brookings Institution is financed through the support of a diverse array of foundations A list of donors can be found in our annual reports Cutting-edge insights and actionable strategies for Africa’s inclusive and sustainable development in the run-up to 2030 2025 will be a critical juncture for Africa’s trajectory New political leadership in both the African Union and the United States coincides with the urgent need to meet the looming 2030 deadline for the Sustainable Development Goals to accelerate implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area and to modernize and renew the African Growth and Opportunity Act—a cornerstone of the U.S Africa trade relationship—currently set to expire in September 2025 Paired with an escalating climate crisis and the reverberations of conflict and global economic instability these dynamics will require bold and coordinated policy action to address Africa’s unique challenges while leveraging its vast potential This special edition of Foresight Africa—the flagship annual report of the Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings—extends its focus from one year to five and offers cutting-edge insights and actionable strategies from heads of government as well as leading Brookings scholars and other high-profile policymakers the report’s six chapters offer a comprehensive vision for Africa’s next chapter—a future driven by African leadership The world is at a crossroads as economic shifts and societal inequalities reshape the way people and regions interact in the pursuit of inclusive and sustainable prosperity Africa plays a role often overlooked in global conversations: The continent is home to some of the world’s fastest-growing economies some of the biggest reserves of natural resources and critical minerals and rising partnerships and competitions between traditional and emerging powers The Africa Growth Initiative (AGI) at Brookings recognizes the significance of Africa in a complex and interconnected world fosters dialogue and actionable solutions on the region’s challenges while spotlighting its unique opportunities for the world and advancing U.S.-Africa relations in a competitive geopolitical and geoeconomic environment AGI brings together a network of scholars and African think tanks to provide high-quality and nonpartisan policy research on pressing issues This initiative showcases the very best that Brookings has to offer in terms of open-minded inquiry At the heart of AGI’s success over the last 15 years has been the initiative’s flagship annual report which uses the occasion of the New Year to draw the world’s focus to critical issues and opportunities shaping the African continent through research and analysis as well as to engage high-level policymakers the Foresight Africa report has grown to be one of the most-read and most-downloaded Brookings publications demonstrating the report’s significant reach and impact while highlighting the critical importance of Africa With the 2030 deadline for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) fast approaching this year’s Foresight Africa report is a special edition (2025-2030) and forward-thinking assessment of the important priorities poised to shape Africa’s trajectory over the next five years We approach this year’s Foresight Africa report with a great sense of responsibility recognizing the continent’s growing role in shaping inclusive global prosperity Africa will be home to nearly 40% of the world’s population This demographic shift makes the continent’s sustainable development a priority not just for Africans since Africa’s sustainable development has direct implications for global stability and prosperity Foresight Africa: Top priorities for Africa 2025-2030 explores these opportunities and challenges in depth offering valuable recommendations and strategies for policymakers and stakeholders to harness Africa’s potential and drive meaningful We at Brookings pride ourselves in tackling some of the most challenging issues of our generation head-on with the intention of being a call to action and guiding light to policymakers and global stakeholders who are committed to a better future it is a privilege to contribute to this flagship publication Africa’s development is not only a regional priority but a global imperative The United States has much to gain from a strong just as Africa benefits from the engagement of global partners Our interconnected futures demand shared solutions to challenges such as climate change Writing this foreword is both a reflection of Brookings’ commitment to Africa and my personal belief in the power of knowledge to drive positive change This year’s special edition exemplifies the fulfillment of this mission and it is my sincere hope that you will engage deeply with it and consider how its insights might inform your own work or the work of others committed to Africa’s dynamic future now is a critical time to assess the progress and road ahead in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and other top policy and development priorities for Africa and the continent’s broader global partnerships Foresight Africa—the flagship annual report of Brookings’ Africa Growth Initiative—is celebrating its 15th anniversary with a special issue focusing on the next five years (2025-2030) rather than just one As one of the Brookings Institution’s most-read and downloaded publications and as one of the world’s most influential publications on Africa we are dedicated to our role in feeding policy conversations and contributing to successful policy implementation—in Washington D.C. This special edition shares cutting-edge insights into the major trends and actionable strategies for Africa to achieve inclusive and sustainable development priorities Contributors include heads of state and government Foresight Africa 2025-2030 comes at a pivotal time in history for Africa, the U.S., and the world. including with the implementation of the AfCFTA the second Donald Trump administration will bring its own approach to engagement with the continent one that offers both challenges and opportunities The next four years hold opportunities to turbocharge private sector engagement and leverage global economic and mineral competition to achieve mutually beneficial goals Despite the United States’ waning influence on the continent thanks to accelerated engagement by countries such as China it still maintains a competitive advantage in areas key to African development and democracy the Trump administration will go about creating a comprehensive strategy and leveraging these advantages (including reauthorization and modernization of AGOA) has yet to be determined making this year’s Foresight Africa even more relevant to U.S policymakers by providing analysis and actionable policy options and expanding influence in multilateral arenas mean the continent will be central to developing and deploying innovative solutions to global challenges and global backdrop that this year’s Foresight Africa seeks to elevate African voices and move beyond policy and development rhetoric toward concrete strategies and actions As we celebrate 15 years of the publication of Foresight Africa this year’s edition has the potential to shape the direction of Africa’s future especially as new leadership in the AU and the U.S provide a plethora of new policy opportunities and challenges Given the urgency of bridging the gap between policy intention and policy outcomes this year’s collection of essays and viewpoints focuses on a diverse range of cutting-edge issue areas and is packed with creative and actionable policy options that can boost both African and global prosperity Achieving this promise requires bold, strategic choices rooted in African agency, innovative policies, and strong global partnerships. This year’s report explores six critical themes shedding light on the opportunities and obstacles that will define Africa’s future and underlie the policies needed to propel its progress over the period between 2025 to 2030 and beyond Africa’s economic future depends on its ability to chart its own course Chapter 1 examines the urgent need for African nations to harness their internal strengths and reduce reliance on external forces to drive sustainable growth from within The chapter’s contributors challenge conventional development paradigms and highlight how self-determination and innovation can drive transformative growth With a keen eye to the future and a combination of perspectives from African leaders at the continental this chapter highlights how Africa’s diversity of strengths—from rising intra-African trade to rich deposits of critical minerals and continental financial institutions—can drive its push to meet the SDGs and the Agenda 2063 goals Chapter 2 assesses the continent’s progress over the past decade providing a nuanced analysis of where Africa stands in order to explore viable strategies for accelerating progress and what must change to meet the SDG targets on time This chapter does not shy away from the complexity of the challenges ahead but instead proposes creative pathways for the future to ensure that Africa is on track to achieve development goals As both a reflection on the past decade and a roadmap for the next five years its contributors make a call to action for bold results-driven policies to ensure that no one is left behind in Africa’s development journey The key to African prosperity lies with its people—especially its youth and women who have been a driving force for entrepreneurship and innovation over the past decades Chapter 3 explores how to transform Africa’s demographic advantage into greater economic and social prosperity by investing more in women and youth through education and entrepreneurship and by dismantling structural biases and barriers that limit their participation in leadership and decisionmaking roles This chapter argues that empowering African youth and women is both a moral and economic imperative Through analyses of the challenges and opportunities that these communities face this chapter highlights the links between economic A brighter future for Africa means ensuring that its youth and women are at the center of its development story Turning policy into action and real-world impact through successful implementation is key to meeting citizens’ aspirations which has long been recognized as a cornerstone of sustainable development Chapter 4 dives into the state of governance across Africa African governments are meeting the priorities and needs of African citizens the chapter highlights the crucial links between accountability underscoring the importance of citizen engagement in building institutions that deliver for the people they serve It offers unique perspectives on bridging the gap between policy intention and policy outcome to accelerate the successful implementation of African goals and dives into key interconnected topics such as the rule of law offering a profoundly future-oriented outlook on African governance artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies are reshaping the world playing a leading global role in their development and deployment now and into the future Chapter 5 examines how emerging technologies can address some of the continent’s most pressing challenges and calls for strategic investments in digital infrastructure and skills development The message is clear: Emerging technologies can be a game changer for Africa’s development making it possible to achieve desired outcomes and improve livelihoods Africa’s role on the global stage is transforming as the continent increases its voice in key international forums Chapter 6 explores how African leaders can leverage their growing presence on the global stage including the African Union’s new membership in the G20 and relationships with partners such as the United States and multilateral institutions to drive the continent’s priorities Contributors discuss strategies for achieving the African development agenda related to trade deals recognizing the potential challenges ahead The chapter emphasizes that successful global partnerships must be built on mutual respect and a commitment to empowering African countries to shape their own economic futures these six chapters tackle key pieces of the puzzle and offer a comprehensive vision for Africa’s next chapter—a future driven by African leadership The unparalleled insight offered by this year’s contributors will shape policy discourse across Africa and among its partners and forging partnerships that focus on African priorities the continent can achieve the prosperity it so deeply deserves Download the full report Can Africa achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030 Chapter 2 assesses Africa’s progress over the past decade providing a nuanced analysis of where the region stands in order to explore viable strategies for accelerating progress The key to African prosperity lies with its people—especially its youth and women who have been a driving force for entrepreneurship and innovation and entrepreneurship and by dismantling structural biases and barriers that limit their participation in leadership and decisionmaking Turning policy into action and real-world impact is key to meeting citizens’ aspirations Artificial intelligence (AI) and other emerging technologies are reshaping the world and be a game changer for Africa’s development Chapter 6 explores how African leaders can leverage their growing presence on the global stage to drive the continent’s priorities A newsletter highlighting economic policy and development issues in Africa from the Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply 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Manage your subscriptions The Foresight Africa podcast provides unique insights and innovative solutions to Africa’s most complex development challenges while highlighting the continent’s opportunities in order to advance impactful engagements between Africa senior fellow in the Global Economy and Development Program and the Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings 2024 2023 2022 2021 See more New York Superintendent of Financial Services Adrienne A Harris discussed her vision for financial services regulation at Brookings Superintendent Harris addressed her department’s latest regulations and policy on digital assets and crypto The conversation was moderated by Brookings Senior Fellow Aaron Klein It might seem that we have seen this movie before New tech companies seek to build their product on the backs of existing copyright owners taking their work without permission or compensation After a blizzard of lawsuits and perhaps some legislative reform a new equilibrium emerges accommodating the new technology and protecting copyright owners But—as with so much involving artificial intelligence (AI)—this time is different Generative AI has the potential to significantly increase the productivity and quality of creative human labor AI-powered machines that will enable creators to generate high-quality content at dramatically lower costs are within reach The creative workplace will never be the same In the face of this unprecedented challenge copyright law cannot evolve to create a balanced outcome Generative AI technology is not a means of mass reproduction and distribution of already-created content rather content companies and the creators who work with or for them will use it to create genuinely new content the deeper and longer-term conflict involving generative AI does not pit technology companies against content owners; it pits the content owners against their own workers and suppliers The contested terrain in this labor-management dispute lies outside the reach of copyright law Copyright law has an important role to play in the coming transition but a balanced solution must come from elsewhere that case will at least proceed to trial and judgment it seems reasonably clear that the AI companies have the better case Tech companies do make intermediate copies of works for the purpose of creating a new product that can be used to generate output of the same general kind as the works that were used as input except in the rare case of output that is substantially similar to one of the input works the outputs of these models do not compete with the specific works copied by putting in circulation exact duplicates of them As I know from the Atlantic’s useful tool that searches through material used to train Meta’s AI, my book, “Regulating Digital Industries,” was uploaded to a pirate website and subsequently ingested in its entirety to help construct Meta’s Llama 3 model Some people might steal my book from the pirate website and that is clearly infringement but no one is going to Llama 3 to obtain my book rather than buying it online the market for my work has not been harmed by Meta’s development of this new tool and the world now has a useful new piece of technology Meta might be vulnerable to a challenge that the company had not lawfully obtained the training data as it was downloaded from a pirate website but when an AI company lawfully does obtain data freely available on the open internet AI companies seem to be engaged in fair use in ingesting lawfully obtained copyrighted works to train their models since the use is transformative and does not create copies of works that compete with the copyrighted works in the training data But it seems to be highly unlikely that courts will go there. Copyright is aimed at preventing the mass reproduction and distribution of existing content to allow authors an economic reward from creating this content It seems a stretch to say that copyright law extends to protecting existing books from competition with other books on the same topic or to preserve the market for future unwritten works One implication of the unresolved nature of the fair use defense for using copyrighted material in training AI models is that the various transparency measures under consideration at the federal and state level are premature would have required AI model developers to disclose all their copyrighted works used to train an AI model to content companies Both bills are likely to be reintroduced this year A bill introduced in the California legislature in February and as amended by the Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection in March 2025 would require developers of AI models to create an “approximate content fingerprint” for each work used in training to let the content community know how to create fingerprints using the same technology and then to respond to identification requests using this technology The problem with these measures is that they presuppose that the fair use defense has failed If training on copyrighted works without permission is fair use then there is no purpose to these required disclosures There would be no infringement and therefore no need for required disclosures to allow owners to pursue their copyright infringement claims AI companies and copyright owners would have wasted substantial time and resources creating useless transparency systems It is possible to imagine other purposes for requiring transparency of training data or assessing the likelihood that the output data will be factually accurate But then the transparency requirement should be part of a larger requirement focusing on ensuring AI fairness But even if the fair use defense fails and copyright owners want to assert their rights against AI companies transparency measures might not be necessary AI companies typically ingest everything they can get their hands on to train their models so it would be reasonable for courts to adopt a rebuttable presumption that they copied specific works if these works were accessible online Congress could adopt this rebuttable presumption of copying for AI training if a work appeared on the internet somewhere An elaborate and expensive identification system might prove to be unnecessary for copyright owners to assert their rights It is widely recognized that AI output that is substantially similar to existing copyrighted works would be infringing AI companies take pains to screen their output to ensure it does not duplicate existing works that gives living content producers rights to control and be compensated for AI outputs that copy their recognizable style the animation company headed by Japanese artist Hayao Miyazaki It is as if OpenAI were willing to block requests for art in the style of Peter Paul Rubens but allow requests for art in the style of the workshop Rubens ran in Antwerp This is a loophole legislation might have to consider closing Closely related to this issue is the need to constrain AI output that resembles the voice or appearance of an individual. Copyright does not currently give people control over this output, as the Copyright Office noted in its 2023 report on digital replicas. But S. 4875 the “NO FAKES Act” introduced last year by Sen Chris Coons (D-Del.) and co-sponsored by a bipartisan group of senators would create a new property right in a “computer-generated highly realistic electronic representation that is readily identifiable as the voice or visual likeness of an individual.” Armed with this new digital right individuals may license or refuse to license their voice or likeness to other content creators that human authors cannot claim copyright protection for content they produce using AI models If neither AI models nor human users of AI models can be authors of works for purposes of copyright The implications of this are extraordinary Companies would lose a significant incentive to use AI to generate news reports If they used more than a “de minimis” amount of AI to generate this output then anyone could copy the material and redistribute it for free Copyright’s incentive to the production of content would not apply to AI-generated works and there would be fewer such works produced content companies might continue to register their works with the Copyright Office but disclaim whatever content is generated by AI Movie companies can copyright a film that contains AI-generated special effects but not the AI portion of the film this posture will inevitably limit the amount of AI-generated content that can be included in creative works If content companies are forced to disclaim anything more than “de minimis” AI content in their work, they will be left, at best, with nothing more than “thin” copyrights. For instance, they might try to show that the “selection, coordination, and arrangement” of non-copyrightable, AI-generated material is original enough to trigger copyrightability. This is what those seeking copyrights in compilations must show But this would be to expose themselves to individualized and subjective assessment of copyrightability at the Copyright Office and the courts It would be a weak and uncertain defense against mass copying and distribution far less protective than a simple copyright in the AI material itself Copyright owners like music companies and book publishers might think that the lack of copyright protection for AI works will protect them against emerging commercial rivals who would use AI to create competitive songs and books. The problem of AI-generated knockoffs on Amazon and other book outlets would only get worse if they had copyright protection these upstart rivals have much less incentive to use AI to generate competitive works because they themselves would reap only limited benefits from their work Any popular AI output they generate would be immediately copied and distributed for nothing established content companies will want to use this technology themselves to generate high-quality content at a fraction of the current cost They will need copyright protection for these works generated by creative authors using AI It is true that AI models do not need copyright protection as an incentive to produce content because they are inert machines incapable of doing anything absent prompts from people seeking to create attractive content copyright should not treat AI models as the authors of works; rather it should recognize the humans who use sequences of prompts to generate original content as the true authors The Copyright Office thinks no sequence of prompts is enough to allow copyright protection for AI-generated works since the prompts themselves do not “determine” or “control” the output But this seems to reflect a lack of comfort with the “black box” and probabilistic nature of generative AI systems assimilating them to chance-driven machines like roulette wheels Others have come to terms with the reality of generative AI models. For instance, courses and workshops have been developed to teach skills in prompt engineering, and AI prompt marketplaces exist where it is possible to buy someone else’s prompt sequence and use it to generate the purchaser’s own works If prompt sequences do not determine valuable AI output these developments would not have taken place Why bother to learn prompt engineering skills if these skills do not control AI output Why spend money on prompt sequences if they do not determine AI output The public interest is on the side of the vast potential for increasing human productivity in the arts and creative industries brought about by the advent of generative AI technology Recognizing copyright when human authors use AI models to help them generate content is not a betrayal but a fulfillment of copyright’s fundamental purpose to promote progress in science and the useful arts The current legal view that works generated with the help of AI lack copyright protection is not a stable position or Congress will allow companies to protect AI-generated works from unauthorized copying My view is that copyright should be based on a work’s originality, not the method of its creation. However, a court in China has taken a different stance. It ruled that the user owns a copyright in an AI system’s output of an image when his use of the system through myriad prompts is sufficiently creative allowing copyright in AI-generated works when the prompt sequence shows sufficient human creativity One unintended effect of denying copyright protection to AI works might be that content companies will have to maintain current levels of employment and compensation for today’s creative workers If they cannot protect AI– generated works from mass copying then these companies will not be able to use AI to generate the content they need They will have to continue to employ large numbers of experienced creative workers at good salaries to generate their content But full employment and high salaries for content creators are not the purpose of copyright The solution to the employment challenges of using AI in content industries must be found elsewhere AI-generated content is nowhere near as good today as the output of skilled journalists Content producers will soon be able to use AI systems to generate at least some content that used to be generated without any AI assistance Prompt engineers will work together with traditional content creators to guide new systems of content production The promise of the new technology is that this output will be satisfactory and maybe even superior for a wide variety of purposes at a fraction of the cost The Italian newspaper Il Foglio recently published a series of newspapers with content largely generated by AI and human writers had to check it for fabrications but it showed that the handwriting is on the wall journalists will be expected to use AI to help produce their stories The model for these future arrangements might be the contract negotiated in 2023 between the Writers Guild of America and the Hollywood studios. As last year’s Brookings study documented the writers obtain substantial control over the conditions and compensation for their work an AI model would never be considered the writer of a script and writers would receive full pay and credit for reworking a first draft of a script generated by another worker using AI As the Brookings report also indicated, however, the bad news for workers seeking to imitate this success in other industries is that only 9.9% of the U.S. labor force is unionized and the percentage is even less in the creative industries where AI content generation is likely to have its largest effect AI models might eventually get good enough that they could be used to produce his columns—or tech policy commentary like this all of this might be just overblown AI hype We have encountered previous predictions of transformative AI only to see these systems turn out to be either vaporware or then the experiment of having people use AI to generate content will fall of its own weight Companies’ efforts to have their workers use AI will prove expensive ultimately leading to failure and abandonment If current expectations of transformative AI prove accurate the challenges to the future of work and the place of human creativity in a radically altered workplace will be genuinely hard to manage designed to oversee such a large-scale transition in the nature of creative work Copyright will not help policymakers here to any significant degree It is time to start the search for alternative public and private mechanisms that would help to ease the inevitable pain such a transition would bring and to allow this transformative technology to be used in a way that ultimately would benefit us all unrestricted donors to the Brookings Institution and conclusions posted in this piece are solely those of the authors and are not influenced by any donations Most of the discussion around President Donald Trump’s volley of tariff threats this week has centered on their potential impact on consumer prices and inflation another impact involves the fact that regional economies (and the local jobs there) are frequently caught in the middle of trade disputes given the last-minute suspension of Trump’s proposed tariffs on goods imported from Canada and Mexico with Trump standing by his threat to impose 10% tariffs on imports from China and China sticking with its threat of counter-tariffs commencing on Monday the nation may well be heading toward a new reminder of the unfortunate ways local communities can suffer collateral damage from international faceoffs While the China clash will play out globally and strategically its potential impacts will be localized and varied since different regions have different local industry mixes and structures Which is why it’s worth looking at the local geography of the pending trade war as an example of how national policy can hurt communities and their economies To explore how this works, this analysis builds on previous Brookings Metro work from 2018 by assessing which places have the most jobs in industries targeted by China’s proposed retaliatory tariffs While this piece focuses specifically on Chinese retaliation it also provides a template for assessing the place-specific economic side effects associated with any future trade tensions such as if Mexico and Canada reimplement their retaliatory tariffs All told, these industries account for between 400,000 and 700,000 jobs in the United States. The tariff list contrasts with the much broader tariffs China levied in 2018 which affected 40 industries that supported over 2 million U.S this round of tariffs is significantly more straightforward in nature creating a shorter product list and more concentrated economic impacts While it’s not entirely clear why China is not retaliating with the same level of intensity as it did in 2018 it’s possible that seven years of escalating bilateral tariffs and substantial U.S export restrictions have simply left the Chinese government with fewer levers to pull when it comes to new trade barriers Looking at how this may play out across the map of U.S counties with the largest shares of jobs in industries China’s tariffs target reveals which places are most significantly exposed to potential supply chain disruptions county has just 0.05% of its jobs in potentially affected industries (and over 80% of all counties have less than 1% of their jobs in affected industries) the industrial heartland is again bearing a disproportionate impact from Chinese retaliation Some of the most intensely affected counties are energy and manufacturing communities in North Dakota has the highest potential exposure of any county due to its large manufacturing presence with 59% of its employment in industries potentially affected by the tariffs Other counties that may be highly affected include Gibson County Oklahoma (both of which are manufacturing hubs) which relies heavily on oil and natural gas each with more than 30% of their employment in industries potentially affected by the proposed Chinese tariffs Turning to total employment in affected industries across particular regions there are significant concentrations of these jobs in major energy-producing places such as Harris County as well as manufacturing hubs such as Wayne County exposure to Chinese tariffs reiterate that while trade skirmishes are frequently discussed in terms of geopolitics and consumer prices they also entail very tangible local impacts on regional industry clusters Given how closely this new round of tariffs is associated with Trump’s policies it also bears discussing how Chinese retaliation may affect communities where a majority of voters supported him compared to communities that supported former Vice President Kamala Harris in the 2024 election The four largest counties with industries that Chinese tariffs could impact all voted for Harris which is centered on Houston and its substantial oil and gas industry Harris-voting counties stand to be affected on balance nearly two-thirds of all jobs in affected industries reside in Trump-voting counties This again stands in contrast to China’s 2018 tariffs when employment in affected industries was more evenly divided between Trump-voting counties and counties that voted for Hillary Clinton in 2016 While it’s impossible to fully say how much political motivation played a role in this new set of retaliatory tariffs it’s clear that Trump-voting counties will feel a bigger burden than Harris-voting counties this time around Many of the most tariff-exposed counties are found in the industrial heartland and Southeast regions which formed Trump’s electoral base in 2024 including Elkhart and Gibson counties in Indiana; Macomb County And because the vast majority of counties overall voted for Trump a significantly larger number of Trump-voting counties have employment in tariff-affected industries than those that voted for Harris Of the 2,010 counties with employment in tariff-affected industries 1,722 of them voted for Trump compared to just 288 for Harris while Democratic representatives in Illinois may have constituents affected by the manufacturing tariffs the burden of Chinese retaliation as a whole is more likely to land on places that voted for Trump and his Republican allies in Congress Notably, all 71 counties with 10% or more of their jobs in industries exposed to tariffs voted for Trump in 2024. Combined with previous Brookings Metro work showing that Trump-voting counties account for a smaller share of gross domestic product due to their rural nature this draws attention to smaller communities that are dependent on key tariff-affected industries and their special sensitivity to disruptions in global trade flows it bears noting that the proposed tariffs are the latest in a long string of protectionist actions across the Trump and Biden administrations that have forced supply chains to shift and relocate And while previous rounds of tariffs and U.S export controls may have left China with fewer options to retaliate than it had seven years ago these latest trade actions might nonetheless still cause disruptions for U.S as well as foreign retaliation—have real effects on employment in places across the nation and a continued expansion of protectionism and retaliation is likely to cause substantially more disruption for more American workers and Canada is the most important set of trade relations for all three countries Canada and Mexico are the United States’ first and second largest export markets with goods exports of $680 billion in 2023 is the largest export market for Canada and Mexico The difference in the negative economic impact from the current 10% tariff on energy imports versus a 25% tariff is relatively small And given that Canada and Mexico look almost certain to retaliate the following assesses the impact of across-the-board 25% tariffs The impact of these tariffs on trade across North America will be particularly impactful not only because of the large volume of trade that is involved but also because of the importance of supply chains which comprise around 50% of intraregional trade in the production of a Chevy Silverado or Dodge Challenger components cross borders multiple times before being assembled into a final product imposing a 25% tariff every time a product crosses borders adds up quickly The following presents the results of simulations based on the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model under two scenarios The first scenario assesses the economic impacts on the U.S. imposing across-the-board 25% tariffs on imports from Mexico and Canada with no retaliation from Canada or Mexico The second scenario assesses the impact of Canada and Mexico retaliating with 25% tariffs on U.S All economic impacts are estimated to occur over the medium term (i.e. tariffs on imports from Mexico and Canada under USMCA are in most cases close to zero now a 25% tariff will have significant negative economic shocks for the U.S. the economic impact is more severe for Mexico and Canada because a much larger share of their trade is with the U.S.—83% of Mexico’s exports and 78% of Canada’s exports go to the U.S. exports are destined for Canada and Mexico with some sectors in particular standing to contract significantly These tariffs will also harm the Trump administration’s goal of developing more secure supply chains and competing with China Continuing to make progress here will require greater trade and investment across North America to strengthen and diversify existing supply chains and reduce reliance on China-centered supply chains The tariffs are directly at odds with deeper economic integration across North America China will benefit from a trade war across North America as it undercuts efforts to reshore supply chains away from China because these tariffs are most likely inconsistent with USMCA they signal to the world that any international agreement with the U.S allies and trading partners about the value of trade agreements with the U.S One result is that countries will start to hedge—creating new options for trade and investment to insure against an unreliable U.S. which will include being more open to expanding trade and investment relations with China Figure 1 shows that tariffs would reduce U.S GDP growth by around 0.25 percentage points GDP growth falls over 0.3 percentage points GDP in 2024 of approximately $23.5 trillion economic output over the medium term of around $45 billion from the 25% on imports from Canada and Mexico and this rises to about $75 billion in lost economic output should Canada and Mexico retaliate losses to economic growth for Canada and Mexico are around 1.15 percentage points from the 25% U.S and this increases to over 3 percentage points should they both impose 25% tariffs on U.S The tariffs will take a toll on employment in all three countries Figure 2 shows the job losses from tariffs employment will decline by 0.11% from the 25% tariffs on imports and rise to a 0.25% loss of jobs with retaliation this is equivalent to over 177,000 job losses from the 25% tariff rising to over 400,000 job losses in the event Canada and Mexico retaliate Job losses in Canada and Mexico would be around 1.3% and 2.3% this would amount to 278,000 Canadian jobs and 1.4 million Mexican jobs job loses would increase to almost 2.5% and 3.6% of total employment in Canada and Mexico equivalent to over 510,000 Canadian jobs and 2.2 million Mexican jobs Tariffs will also lead to lower wages across the three countries wages would fall by over 2.6% and in Mexico by over 4.5% in the scenario of no retaliation and by 4.9% and over 7% in Canada and Mexico following retaliation by both countries Worth noting here is that the contraction in demand for labor and decline in wages would be distributed evenly across skilled and unskilled labor but with a slightly higher impact on unskilled labor The impact from tariffs on exports shown in Figure 3 would also be large exports to Canada and Mexico would decline by around 6% from a 25% U.S and Mexico would contract by 9% with a U.S Mexico’s exports would contract by close to 14% and over 25% with retaliatory tariffs tariffs would also have an impact on inflation The tariffs would cause inflation to rise in the U.S would be less at around 0.8 percentage points reflecting the impact on the price of imports from the U.S there is also significant decline in inflation of 9% following U.S reflecting the impact of lower economic growth and this decline is reduced to around 6 percentage points should Mexico put a 25% tariff on U.S The results presented earlier show the impact on the aggregate economies The negative impact on exports is widely dispersed across sectors the bottom line being that all three countries experience significant sector-wide contractions in exports The following presents some of the sector-specific trade results Given that there are no tariffs proposed between Canada and Mexico and as the vast majority of their exports are to the U.S. the following analysis focuses on the impacts on U.S and the impacts on Canadian and Mexican exports to the U.S the trinational integration of many of the sectors through supply chains means that many of the sectors affected by these tariffs are common across the three countries many of the sectors affected produce manufacturing and other business inputs Raising the costs of these exports will therefore increase costs for businesses in all countries and lead many businesses to instead source inputs from other countries and metals would all suffer large contractions in exports mining exports to Canada suffer an almost 60% decline in exports mining exports are almost completely wiped out motor vehicle exports to Canada that increases to 55% with retaliation and products in “other transport” fall by 18% following U.S the 12% decline in exports from the electrical sector will turn into a 30% plus decline with retaliation exports to Mexico also fall across manufacturing but almost every sector experiences a large contraction in exports exports of nonferrous metals such as copper tariffs and then by 78% with retaliation by Mexico exports of manufactured products—computers and electronics there is a 31% decline in exports of computers and electronics Exports of motor vehicles also decline by 23% with tariffs and then by 65% following retaliation Table 3 shows some of the key sectors where Canada’s exports to the U.S exports of electronic equipment and electronics decline by over 70% following U.S tariffs and by close to 80% with retaliatory tariffs Exports of “other transport” decline by 70% with tariffs and 74% with retaliation and motor vehicle exports from Canada decline by 53% with the U.S tariffs and by 68% with retaliatory tariffs The decline in exports from Mexico are across mining Mexico’s mining sector exports suffer contractions of over 90% The pharmaceutical sector also contracts over 60% with tariffs and over 70% following retaliation Mexico’s exports of motor vehicle and electronic equipment sectors also contract significantly a common outcome for all three countries given the supply chains in these sectors exports of these products fall by 50% and 62% tariff of 25% on imports from Canada and Mexico is going to reduce U.S and retaliation by Canada and Mexico will multiply the economic harms across the three countries President Trump has said that these tariffs are in response to flows of fentanyl and illegal immigrants from Mexico and Canada The problem with these tariffs is that they impose immediate costs on U.S and businesses without a clear link between these tariffs and how they will reduce flows of immigrants or fentanyl these tariffs will harm the Trump administration’s goal of developing more secure supply chains and competing with China countries will start to hedge—creating new options for trade and investment to insure against an unreliable U.S. Unless the Trump administration resolves its issues with Canada and Mexico and unwinds these tariffs quickly and strategic harms from the tariffs will be substantial it must contend with America’s competition with China How will Congress set priorities for bolstering America’s competitiveness Where will China fit on Congress’ hierarchy of priorities How will success be defined in long-term strategic competition with China How will Congress and the White House work together or separately to navigate one of America’s most critical bilateral relationships Thornton China Center at Brookings hosted a fireside chat with Chairman John Moolenaar (R-Mich.) and Ranking Member Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-Ill.) of the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party Brookings scholars Ryan Hass and Patricia Kim moderated the analytical discussion on how Congress will approach the China challenge Audience Q&A followed the fireside chat Viewers submitted questions via email to [email protected] and via X (Twitter) to @BrookingsFP using #GlobalChina This event is a part of the Brookings Global China project an initiative which focuses on advancing recommendations for how the United States should respond to China’s actions that implicate key American interests and values The Brookings Institution is committed to championing issues of diversity and inclusion across all aspects of our work We recognize that to produce high-quality research that informs innovative we must strive for a workplace that represents diversity of experience This means ensuring that everyone is heard and empowered to fully participate in Brookings’ mission to conduct in-depth nonpartisan research that improves policy and governance we have published annually our workplace and Board of Trustee demographics real progress on diversity and inclusion can be achieved over the long term These annual reports represent one component of our work towards that end Brookings achieved a 2024 DEI priority through its Pay Transparency Initiative a multiyear effort designed to promote pay equity and transparency across the Institution This initiative builds on the 2021 Job Framework initiative which outlines clearer pathways to achievement for the various roles at Brookings Brookings conducted all-staff educational sessions to explain its compensation philosophy and pay practices and updated salary ranges based on the findings we announced the next phase of the initiative: employees can now access the salary range for their position and prospective applicants can now view projected hiring ranges on all advertised job listings Brookings plans to share a comprehensive compensation guide with employees and continue hosting educational sessions to enhance understanding of Brookings pay practices and policies announced the ratification of a landmark three-year collective bargaining agreement which reflects Brookings’ commitment to fairness Brookings and the union remain dedicated to creating a workplace that continues to attract and support a talented and thriving workforce The Brookings DEI Committee sponsors programming for nine Heritage Months and four employee-led Affinity Groups—bringing people together around shared interests and topics and engages staff of all backgrounds in experiential learning and community-building programming Examples of recent programming include the following: Aligned with the 2024 national Black History Month theme of “African Americans and the Arts,” Brookings hosted the Richard Wright Public Charter School for a student panel on voting issues that impact young people During National Native American Heritage Month Brookings invited Matriarch Julie Tayac Yates of the Piscataway Tribe for a conversation on local modern efforts to preserve Native land and culture Brookings continues to host an internal Racial Equity in Research seminar series The series features Brookings scholars and external experts and aims to center and advance racial equity in our research with a focus on the language we use Topics discussed range from the consequences of racial disparities in COVID-19 on perspectives towards mitigation policies to the role of race in the study of international relations Brookings has held 19 seminars and continues to explore new topics Brookings offers a range of learning opportunities through the DEI Committee often in collaboration with employee-led Affinity Groups and Networks Sessions focus on timely topics that promote inclusivity and provide resources for ongoing reference topics included equitable meetings practices Researchers across Brookings explore and analyze issues of race One highlight from 2024 was the June launch of the Center for Community Uplift (CCU) CCU’s research explores how diversity and inclusion can yield better outcomes for all—using research innovation CCU co-hosted the “Paths to Progress” event with HUMANLEVEL an initiative founded by artist and activist John Legend This event featured panels on business and homeownership; measuring the value of diversity; and health Percentage data may not sum to 100% in some categories due to rounding some numbers may appear as 0% when there is The source of this data is based on a questionnaire completed by all Brookings employees upon hire. The categories for race and gender are determined by the federal government for workforce reporting. The categories used for generation identification come from earlier work by Pew Research Center Disclaimer: Brookings is subject to mandatory annual workforce data collection by the U.S Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Brookings invites employees to voluntarily self-identify their race/ethnicity and gender based on the above categories employment records or observer identification is used This data set does not include our nonresident scholars This is an abridged version of the full paper “Fixing Social Security: Blueprint for a Bipartisan Solution,” which outlines a roadmap for strengthening and restoring solvency to the Social Security program Writing and condensing of this summary was done by Amy Goldstein a Visiting Fellow at Brookings’ Center on Health Policy and Center for Economic Security and Opportunity She was a staff writer for The Washington Post for 36 years often focusing on health care and other domestic policy issues Social Security is the United States’ most important social insurance program It provides at least half of income for about four in 10 beneficiaries and more than 90% of income for one in seven beneficiaries Social Security also is the nation’s oldest and largest anti-poverty program keeping about 20 million older Americans and one million children out of poverty Why is it critical to revise this vital program According to the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) Office of the Chief Actuary and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) the Old-Age and Survivor Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund—the source of the program’s retirement benefits—is forecast to exhaust its funds in 2033 the available revenues to the OASI fund will be able to finance about 83% of scheduled benefits the resulting gap means Social Security checks for these beneficiaries will shrink by about 17% Avoiding that insolvency will require substantial policy changes The size of the deficit over 75 years—3.5% of taxable payroll according to the 2024 Social Security Trustee’s Report—is about 1.7 times as large as the deficit the program was facing nearly four decades ago when Congress in 1983 adopted the most recent amendments to the Great Depression-era Social Security Act Relying on different assumptions about fertility CBO predicts an even larger deficit over 75 years—4.3% of taxable payroll or more than twice as large as in 1983 Both forecasts make the fundamental point that the Social Security system will not have enough money The blueprint proposed here would virtually achieve solvency for the Old-Age and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program’s actuarial balance over the 75-year period And it would achieve this financial stability in ways that adhere to the program’s 90-year tradition This blueprint includes both ways to increase the program’s revenue and to improve certain benefits It also includes several ways to stabilize the system’s finances The major proposals to stabilize its finances would increase the taxable maximum earnings to cover 90% of wages and close a loophole through which some business owners now are escaping the payroll tax The plan would change benefits by increasing the retirement age for high earners and expanding the number of working years used to compute wages Other aspects of the plan would raise legal immigration levels to increase the pool of tax-paying workers and ease workforce shortages And more proceeds from taxes on Social Security benefits would be devoted to the OASDI trust funds the blueprint would strengthen child benefits and protections for Americans with disabilities and the survivors of workers who die It would achieve universal coverage shortly after the program’s 125th anniversary and would make the system more progressive revenue increases match the benefit reductions minus the benefit improvements A word on the causes of the system’s financial problems: it boils down to demographic trends with people living longer despite COVID-era setbacks overall life expectancy will have increased fertility has declined below replacement levels and is predicted by Social Security’s actuary and the CBO to remain that way for several decades these broad forces have led to a striking change in what is known as the old-age dependency ratio The number of working-aged people ages 18 to 64 per older adult 65 and older has declined from 5.7 in 1970 to 3.7 in 2020 putting intensifying pressure on Social Security’s finances as fewer workers contribute to its trust fund while more older people qualify for benefits The need to stave off the trust fund’s depletion comes as the Democrat and Republican political parties have sharply divergent views about how to fix the problem Members of both parties in Congress have recently introduced Social Security solvency plans The Democratic plans call for restoring solvency entirely by increasing revenue The major Republican plans would restore solvency entirely by reducing benefits Both parties have been reluctant to move Social Security legislation because doing so would come with political pain: raising taxes or cutting benefits there are several powerful reasons for Congress to tackle Social Security solvency in 2025 restoring solvency would put the country on a more secure fiscal path at a time when recent federal budgets have had huge deficits public debt is on a risky and troubling path recent polling has found that most Americans say Congress should act now to shore up the program’s funding are relying on lawmakers to ensure that their Social Security benefits are protected Waiting would make the policy changes needed to restore solvency greater including the likelihood of a larger reduction in benefits neither political party’s position will prevail The only way to resolve these differences is through compromise and a more centrist approach This plan is guided by a set of goals or principles Restoring solvency and avoiding the trust fund’s depletion is by far the most important goal Americans want confidence that the benefits they have been promised will be there for them Solvency depends on long-range economic and demographic projections so how long the system can be expected to stay financially sturdy can change over time The goal is to achieve 75 years of solvency under SSA actuary assumptions No Americans receiving Social Security benefits before the blueprint becomes law would have those benefits lowered Social Security has been financed entirely through payroll taxes interest on balances in the system’s trust funds and taxes that recipients pay on their benefits This link between wages and benefits has been a central principle of the program and a foundation of its political support such as from the federal budget’s general fund which would worsen future federal deficits The blueprint is intended to preserve the bipartisan nature of every major Social Security action before now there has been a practical reason for bipartisanship as well as an ideological one the program may not be altered through a reconciliation bill and no party is likely to control that many votes in the foreseeable future The plan strives to make the Social Security system more progressive primarily by raising taxes and reducing benefits for higher earners This blueprint is designed to bolster the program’s help with three types of risk against which it already provides some economic protection: death The proposed benefit improvements address these risks plus the financial burden on grandparents raising grandchildren and county employees in certain places—remain outside the federal retirement system This can be for their entire career or a portion of it Because of the way Social Security calculates benefits retirees who had these mixed work lives can end up getting larger benefits than those in the system all along The blueprint’s goal is to eventually bring all workers into Social Security Table 1 outlines the major elements of this blueprint and two ways of thinking about their effects—on the Social Security system’s finances and the federal budget. For further details, please see the full paper The table’s first column shows each element’s anticipated impact on the program’s solvency over the coming 75 years That column is expressed as a percent of the earnings subject to the Social Security payroll tax Based on estimates from the Social Security Chief Actuary the column shows the impact of each element on taxable payroll—that is how much it would help or hurt the deficit of 3.5% of taxable payroll that is forecast over the next 7 ½ decades The table’s second column shows the total amount of money each element is predicted by an Urban Institute analysis to cost or save from this year through 2035 the table’s columns demonstrate that the blueprint’s mix of revenue increases and benefit improvements would cause the 75-year Social Security deficit to virtually disappear and have a positive effect on the federal budget over the next decade Increase the taxable maximum ceilingThis proposal would increase the maximum wages subject to Social Security taxes so it eventually covers 90% of total wages This would return the percentage to what it was in 1983—just slightly less than at the program’s beginning—before the increase in wages beyond that taxable limit and the growing number of high earners caused the percentage to drop to just above 80% by 2024 And stopping short of 100% still leaves room for other important budget priorities of both political parties increase this taxable-minimum ceiling six percentage points faster than the current law Change rules for pass-through payroll taxThe plan would change current rules under which the definition of taxable self-employment income varies for different types of businesses: investments which are not subject to Social Security taxes Because the types are not always easy to tell apart these rules enable limited partners and owners of S-corporations to escape payroll taxes on a significant share of their income pass-through businesses that meet the material participation standard The cap would be their individual taxable maximum in a given year Increase payroll taxThe OASDI payroll tax would increase from its current 12.4% on wages split evenly between employers and employees That increase of 0.2 percentage points would also be split evenly It is the smallest amount needed to produce an equal amount of revenue (that is the reduction minus the improvements)—the core idea of this centrist plan—and make the program virtually solvent for the next 75 years Increase retirement age for high earnersThe program’s normal retirement age the point when a beneficiary becomes eligible for an unreduced benefit would increase for people in the top two-fifths of the nation’s wage distribution with the age set at 65 for those born in 1937 or earlier and increasing gradually for each year up to 67 for people born in 1960 and later The proposal would treat what would be renamed the “benefit age” somewhat differently for people who earned the top one-fifth of lifetime wages and those in the fifth just below that the policy would start increasing the retirement age in 2037 and keep raising it by two months annually until reaching a retirement age of 70 in 2054 with the ultimate retirement age depending on exactly where within that fifth a person’s wages are Calculations would be separate for men and women These changes would affect retirement benefits—not disability or survivor benefits Treating high earners’ retirement age differently is fair because of trends in life expectancy with men and women with high incomes living longer than everyone else while those with the lowest incomes tending to live shorter lives than their counterparts in the past Women aged 62 can be expected to live 26 more years if their earnings are in the highest quintile compared with just under 20 more years in the lowest quintile the gap is even greater—25.6 years for the highest quintile compared with slightly more than 15 years for the lowest Increase the number of working years used to calculate Social Security’s average indexed monthly earnings.The average indexed monthly earnings it would rely on the highest 40 years of earnings It also would help balance the proposal’s benefit reductions and tax increases While extending eventually to 40 years would have the most negative effect on low-income workers who tend to have longer periods of unemployment that disadvantage would be counterbalanced by other policy changes in the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program that will be part of a separate forthcoming Brookings proposal on reducing poverty among older and disabled adults with low wages Tax all Social Security benefits of high earnersTo make the system more progressive the proposal would tax all Social Security benefits received by single people with adjusted gross income above $100,000 and couples with income above $125,000 That would set them apart from people with less earnings who are taxed on half or 85% of their Social Security benefits End the dependent retiree spouse benefitThe proposal would gradually eliminate a policy for new retirement beneficiaries that currently provides up to half a partner’s benefits for spouses who are at least 62 or care for a child under 16 The benefit would be lowered by five percentage points a year starting in 2027 so that it disappeared by 2037—sooner for spouses whose partners have income in the top 25% of earnings It would not apply to disabled spouses or widow(er)s but this change reflects that the gap has shrunken between the labor force participation of women and men Eliminate Child Retiree BenefitsSocial Security benefits would end for children of a parent who begins retirement benefits starting in 2027 and a partner who cares for them This would eliminate a policy in which such children are entitled to up to half of their parent’s benefits (three-fourths if the parent has died) but it would not alter the program’s help for children who are disabled This would end a policy that currently encourages early retirement and subsidizes decisions to have children later in life Increase survivor benefitsBenefits would be increased for the surviving spouse of a worker who has died the survivor could choose to get the larger of the benefits that they or their deceased spouse had been receiving choose to receive 75% of their combined benefits—a closer match to the estimated typical drop in household expenses once one member of a couple has died Create a disability benefit for older workers with disabling conditions that make them unable to do their jobsThe proposal would establish a new Early Retirement Disability benefit for people at least age 58 who are not healthy enough to work—but do not qualify under the stringent complex rules for Social Security Disability Insurance or Supplemental Security Income This new benefit is intended to stave off financial hardship among people in poor health many of whom retire earlier than planned and take early Social Security benefits at a considerable reduction people would need to prove that they are unable physically or mentally to carry out their most recent job Restore and expand student benefit for children whose parents are disabled or deadThe plan would broaden eligibility for Social Security payments to children and young adults whose parents are disabled or no longer alive—a benefit currently available through high school or age 20 The change would improve upon an even earlier policy from the mid-1960s that had allowed these benefits for unmarried students attending certain types of higher education full-time provide the benefit to students whose parents are disabled or dead through age 25 regardless of their marital status or the type of higher education they are pursuing The payments also would be available to grandchildren receiving benefits based upon their grandparents’ earnings record Provide a child benefit to grandparents or certain other relatives caring for childrenEligibility would be loosened for benefits on behalf of children who are in the custody of a grandparent or other eligible relative of the same generation benefits would be available if the child has been in the custody of a grandparent or other eligible relative for at least six months—rather than the current full year—and receives at least half their financial assistance from that caretaker without regular caretaking by a biological parent For children receiving a survivor benefit or a benefit for the child of a disabled parent The caretaking grandparent or other eligible relative would not need to be receiving retirement benefits Improve benefits for disabled adult childrenThe proposal would make it easier for a “disabled adult child,” with a qualifying physical or mental impairment they no longer would need to be unmarried or to have developed their disability before reaching adulthood And they no longer would be restricted in how much they could earn after reaching age 22 Devote all proceeds from taxes on Social Security benefits to OASDI trust fundsThe proposal would end a policy adopted about three decades ago that has devoted proceeds from some taxes on Social Security benefits to the Medicare Hospital Insurance Trust Fund which was running short of money at the time All proceeds from taxes on Social Security benefits would gradually be devoted to the OASDI trust funds In a forthcoming set of Medicare policy proposals we will lay out ways to protect the hospital trust fund Expand the labor force by changing policies on legal immigrationThe population of working-age adults who contribute to the U.S economy and the Social Security system would be expanded in several ways: increase the cap on permanent employment-based migration (EB-1 through EB-5) Allow other major permanent migration caps to slowly increase by 1.5% annually (F-1 through F-4 family preference visas Make status adjustment available for certain undocumented immigrants The plan also would increase administrative funding to handle backlogs in the immigration system and the increase in legal immigration Achieve universal coverage in Social SecurityThe proposal would fold into the program the 6% of U.S workers currently outside the Social Security system These 6.6 million people are primarily state and local government employees who are insured by alternate public pension plans and thus do not pay into Social Security during whatever part of their working lives they are in such “uncovered” jobs all newly hired employees of state and local governments outside Social Security would be covered by the program To help the outside pensions stay solvent as they manage the transition The switch would help the workers involved because Social Security provides automatic cost-of-living adjustments and better protections for spouses of living and dead workers and dependents and it does not disadvantage workers who change jobs This blueprint meets its chief goal of making the Social Security system virtually solvent while improving several important forms of help to certain groups of beneficiaries It averts the possibility of benefits being cut across the board when the Social Security Trust Fund becomes exhausted this proposal restores solvency under SSA assumptions for 75 years and adheres strictly to the program’s fundamental principles over its 90-year history The blueprint makes the system more progressive and does not rely on general fund borrowing or financing it has better prospects of securing Democratic and Republican support and maintaining what always has been the bipartisan nature of the program Read the full blueprint here The authors thank Gopi Goda and Amy Goldstein for careful review and comments on earlier drafts of the summary and full blueprint and Ben Graham for excellent work with the DYNASIM data modeling They also thank Sam Thorpe for assistance on the tax provisions They thank Vani Agarwal and Yihan Shi for excellent fact-checking and Rasa Siniakovas and Chris Miller for incredible editorial assistance and the team in the Office of the Chief Actuary at the Social Security Administration They also thank Karen Smith and the team at the Urban Institute They gratefully acknowledge research support from colleagues at the Bipartisan Policy Center For decades, studying in the United States stood as a beacon of aspiration, a rite of passage for ambitious students across the globe seeking not just academic excellence but a springboard into global opportunity Prominent examples include Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella and Zoom founder Eric Yuan who first arrived in the United States as international students from India and China A Chinese international student at Syracuse University recently had his visa unexpectedly revoked His advisor noted that he maintains an impeccable record and does not even own a car—making the revocation all the more perplexing reflecting the impact of pandemic disruptions and bilateral tensions these statements are more than routine guidance; they signal that the United States may no longer be a safe or even a viable destination for Chinese students The consequences extend far beyond diplomacy. The Institute of International Education estimates that U.S. colleges enrolled about 1.1 million overseas students in 2023‑2024, injecting roughly $43.8 billion into the economy and supporting 378,175 jobs Nearly 25% of those students were from China whose families spent about $14.3 billion on tuition and living costs in the United States in 2023 alone In engineering and computer science—fields especially popular among Chinese graduate students—colleges are struggling to fill seats while also contending with shrinking research budgets The combined effect is a growing crisis in departmental sustainability The National Science Board’s 2024 Science and Engineering Indicators report highlighted the critical role of international students in the U.S In key fields like computer science—whose subfields include artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing—nearly 60% of doctoral degrees were awarded to international students with Chinese students comprising the largest group Undermining this pipeline risks eroding the very foundation of America’s innovation ecosystem While national security concerns must be taken seriously, they should be addressed with precision and transparency. The now-defunct China Initiative—meant to uncover and prosecute economic espionage among Chinese students and researchers—ultimately cleared most of those investigated and was disbanded after widespread criticism of racial profiling Protecting national interests requires tailored evidence-based measures that avoid broadly stigmatizing international students Today’s policy environment is doing just the opposite international students fear that even brief travel outside the United States could prevent their return international students tell each other not to return to their home country during the upcoming summer break for fear of not being able to reenter and major life events back home because of the risk of being denied reentry This climate carries a cost that is less visible but deeply consequential: the erosion of U.S. soft power. For much of the 20th and early 21st centuries, the allure of American education served as one of the country’s most effective instruments of diplomacy That soft power—earned not through coercion but through the appeal of openness and opportunity—is now fraying In its place grows a perception of a closed enrolling in top domestic institutions for both undergraduate and graduate studies can studying in the United States survive geopolitics Only if policymakers recognize the long-term damage of short-term fear National security is essential—but indiscriminate suspicion is self-defeating The United States must decide whether it wants to remain a magnet for the world’s brightest minds—or whether it will let that magnetism erode by mistrust The stakes are clear: what’s at risk is not just enrollment numbers or university budgets—it’s the future of American innovation and the country’s standing in the world emerging technologies such as generative artificial intelligence (AI) have dominated headlines while industrial strategies centered on technologies such as semiconductors have become central to U.S a growing stream of scholarship has shown that certain groups—including women and many workers of color—remain underrepresented in technology-oriented fields despite the importance of diverse workforces for firm This new analysis finds that far from being unnecessary overreach proactive policies aimed at reducing disparities by race and gender are still needed to support the well-being of the digital economy This report contributes to the literature on inclusion in digital technologies by exploring which workers have access to “highly digital” jobs—namely those that make the most intensive use of digital technologies It focuses on a subgroup of highly digital occupations: computer which play unique roles in the digital economy Computer and engineering jobs are central to the creation and dissemination of the products and processes that enable the digital economy these occupations aren’t just highly digital themselves—they also build the technologies that make other occupations highly digital help shape the direction of hiring and advancement for firms and industries management occupations play a unique role in determining the demographics of highly digital occupations: who has access to the opportunities these jobs provide highly digital CEM occupations play a central role in enabling the future direction of the digital economy CEM jobs remain highly unequal across gender with little progress over time in remedying these inequalities As the report and below interactive demonstrate the supply of highly digital CEM jobs varies significantly by place and Indigenous workers remain underrepresented in every metropolitan area in the nation Demographic inclusion is limited and varies widely federal policymakers have begun working to reverse demographic and geographic economic divides through a set of historic investments contained in major federal laws emerging political and legal efforts are seeking to eliminate policies aimed at supporting the progress of historically underrepresented racial groups and the election of Donald Trump is likely to accelerate the rollback of such policies on the federal level This means that just as new initiatives have moved to address demographic and geographic divides the emerging federal policy landscape threatens to block efforts to help workers find opportunities in CEM or other highly digital workplaces These crosscurrents could prevent workers from accessing the best-paying this report provides six key data-oriented findings about highly digital CEM jobs and identifies three important barriers to improving demographic and geographic inclusion in highly digital CEM work it proposes a series of robust state and local policy recommendations to build out the pathways to such opportunity only through sustained investment over time and an enthusiastic embrace of new approaches by all stakeholders—including those in the private sector as well as state and federal actors—will the nation be able to build a stronger and ultimately more competitive digital economy there is less consensus on the scale of the shortage Recent estimates range from 1.5 to 5.5 million units with variation driven by a combination of methodological differences in calculating the shortage and different characterizations about what constitutes equilibrium in the housing market we examine the assumptions underlying existing shortage estimates and offer an updated estimate based on our preferred methodology housing market was short 4.9 million housing units in 2023 relative to mid-2000s Understanding what constitutes a household and how households are accounted for is essential in the context of measuring housing shortages Figure 1 depicts the total number of households in the U.S since 1960 together with the total population Trends in the number of observed households can be driven by population growth a shortage refers to a market situation where the quantity supplied is less than the quantity demanded at the current market price Neoclassical economic models predict this outcome; for example in the case of a minimum wage in the labor market the demand for labor at the minimum wage is predicted to be less than the quantity of labor supplied a shortage is more complex than a simple mismatch between supply and demand at prevailing prices a “shortage” often refers to the inability of supply to meet demand at affordable prices can distort the number of observed households as individuals or families may combine into shared housing arrangements not because of a lack of units but because they cannot afford to live separately the prevailing market price of housing influences both the availability of housing units and the observed number of households creating a disparity between the number of actual households and the number of desired households Estimates of the housing shortage generally refer to any gap between the existing stock of housing and the number of housing units needed to accommodate the desired number of households either currently habitable or new construction through the Housing Vacancy Survey and the Survey of Construction measuring the number of housing units needed to satisfy demand or the “target housing stock,” is more complex and often involves different estimation methods researchers project future housing needs based on historical trends in construction or household formation researchers directly estimate housing demand based on factors such as population growth or housing affordability illustrates the range of recent housing shortage estimates that emerge from different approaches to determining the target stock Understanding the housing vacancy rate is an important precursor to analyzing different approaches to calculating the supply shortage Just as the labor market has a natural rate of unemployment to allow for efficient job matching a healthy housing market requires a certain vacancy rate to align buyer and seller preferences supply shortage estimates must account for some vacancies making the assumed vacancy rate a critical component in determining the gap between housing stock and demand Vacancies can be categorized into three main types: units available for sale/rent Seasonal vacancies typically reflect the unique needs and patterns of specific regions or market segments Units held off the market may be undergoing renovations or kept vacant for speculative or personal reasons Figure 3 illustrates trends in the vacancy rate over the last sixty years the overall vacancy rate has been declining since the financial crisis and has remained just below 10% for the past three and a half years For these and other technical reasons related to data availability from the ACS we will utilize 2006 as our base year for estimating the housing shortage the back-of-the-envelope estimated housing shortage was about 1 million housing units in 2023 this estimate likely represents the lower bound of the housing shortage as the number of households itself can be constrained by the housing market high housing costs may lead some individuals to delay forming their own households National Association of Realtors (2021) provides an alternative way to estimate the housing shortage by comparing historical construction rates to current trends about 1.5 million new housing units were built each year this rate fell by 18% to about 1.23 million per year NAR estimates a housing shortage of 5.5 million housing units by the end of 2020 the report considers the loss of older homes and the need to meet growth in household formation which could push the total shortage closer to 6.8 million units This method focuses on under-building but doesn’t fully account for changes in housing demand like fewer people forming households due to high prices this takes a narrow view of who might otherwise prefer to form their own household or families in shared households are relevant to pent-up demand but are not the central focus of the Zillow estimate Alternatively, Up For Growth (2023) estimates pent-up demand by comparing the share of people who self-report being the head of a household (“headship rates”) by age in 2000 to those in 2021 The difference between the headship rate of each age cohort across years is aggregated to calculate the housing shortage which Up For Growth estimates to have been 3.9 million units in 2023 this estimate does not account for factors that may have contributed to the change in headship rates during this time-period—be it shifting preferences for living arrangements or housing market conditions affecting household formation across different age groups Finally, Freddie Mac (2021) uses a statistical method known as a Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to analyze how much of the observed decline in household formation is due to high housing costs The Oaxaca- Blinder decomposition is a statistical technique that decomposes the difference in mean outcomes across two groups into shares attributable to difference in magnitude of each group’s characteristics and the difference in the effect of those characteristics Freddie Mac estimates how the decline in household formation between 2001 and 2020 relates to differences in housing costs during these two periods—as opposed to differences in age distribution across the population or changes in income—and characterizes this decline as households that are missing due to pent-up demand This method stands out as the only one that directly accounts for the relationship between the price of household and household formation They combine this estimate with the back-of-the-envelope shortage calculation that assumes a 13% vacancy rate to conclude that the U.S housing market was short 3.8 million units in 2020 and use the latest survey data to provide an updated estimate of the housing shortage in 2023 This approach is more robust than simply projecting trends in construction and household formation because it captures specific factors that drive household formation we can associate part of the decline in household formation to housing costs to provide a more nuanced projection of the number of households that would have formed under more favorable conditions This approach provides a clearer connection between the shortage and underlying driving factors Our Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition compares average household size in 2006 and 2023 using the 2006 and 2023 American Community Survey We attribute changes in the average household size to housing costs and the multigenerational nature of the household The decomposition technique allows us to estimate how the change in average household size (group mean) between 2006 and 2023 can be attributed to the change in housing costs between the two time-periods We use this parameter to estimate what the average household size would have been in 2023 if housing costs remained at 2006 levels We adjust this estimate for a natural equilibrium vacancy rate of 12% reflecting the vacancy rate that was present in the market in our base year we combine this estimate with the back-of-the-envelope estimate of the housing shortage in 2023Q4 to arrive at a 2023 housing shortage estimate of 4.9 million units we show that this estimate varies between 3.4 million and 6.4 million units depending upon the choice of model and vacancy rate The U.S. housing supply has struggled to meet demand in the last several decades, driving up costs and deepening affordability challenges. Both state and local governments, as well as the federal government, are actively pursuing policies to help boost housing supply as a key strategy to address housing affordability (Council of Economic Advisers 2024) effective policy solutions require an accurate understanding of the scope of the housing shortage the magnitude of the shortage is not straight-forward to measure Estimates suggest that the shortage has ranged between 1.5 million and 5.5 million during recent years Using the latest data available by the 2023 American Community Survey and the Housing Vacancy Survey and following the method employed by Freddie Mac housing market was short 4.9 million units at the end of 2023 Our methodology for calculating the “pent-up” housing demand closely follows the analysis of the U.S. housing market done by Freddie Mac (2018) This technical appendix provides details of how we calculate the missing households our analysis is based on household size as measured by the American Community Survey We choose this data source because it includes detailed demographic characteristics about households and information about housing costs for both homeowners and renters one could utilize the Current Population Survey which also identifies homeowners and renters the CPS provides more limited information about housing costs and the sample size of the CPS is an order of magnitude smaller than the ACS (roughly 100,000 compared with roughly 2 million) We estimate a threefold Oaxaca-Blinder to decompose the change in household size between 2006 and 2023 This is a statistical method that allows us to attribute the change in household size between these years to various factors such as housing costs and multigenerational nature of the household The inclusion of these factors is guided by our intuition of the variables that impact household formation The decomposition exercise yields a parameter that can be interpreted as the difference in average household size between 2006 and 2023 that can be attributed to the change in housing costs between the two years We use this parameter to calculate the counterfactual household size in 2023 and we use the 2023 population data to arrive at the target number of households as follows: Where HHSize2006  is the average household size in 2006 calculated from ACS data  is the parameter yielded by the decomposition exercise as the change in household size between the two time periods attributable to housing costs  is the population of potential heads in the U.S population and  is our assumed equilibrium vacancy rate of 12% We include all adults (age 18 and above) and those aged 16-18 who are not in school in our calculation of potential heads of households We test the robustness of our estimate to the inclusion of different demographic and household characteristics as well as different vacancy parameters Table A1 summarizes the estimated number of missing households and housing shortage under different specifications of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition as well as two different vacancy parameters (12% and 13%) Our preferred specification is model 5 with an equilibrium vacancy parameter of 12% Different estimates of missing households are within a narrow range of 2.0 to 3.5 million households across all models resulting in the housing shortage estimates to range from 3.4 to 5.1 million households the housing shortage estimates range from 4.7 to 6.4 million households Housing Shortage Estimate (Millions of Units) it matters not only how much money they earn but also the manner in which their pay is earned one worker may have reliable and consistent earnings and hours from a single employer While workers may desire some amount of flexibility in their work schedule and earnings we document how volatile earnings and work hours are month-over-month for workers We explore the financial consequences of volatility and several potential causes of volatility—whether the volatility is the worker’s own choice or driven by factors beyond the worker’s control such as employers setting unpredictable work schedules We document that instability is a defining characteristic of low-income workers’ earnings and hours This is true regardless of whether the low-income worker is the only earner in the household the current amount of earnings and hours volatility for low-income workers is not simply a reflection of preferences for more irregular work but rather a reflection of the nature of the labor market they work in compared to high-income workers with volatile income low-income workers with volatile income are 3.5 times more likely to report their volatile income leads to trouble paying their bills 1.4 times more likely to report their employer requires they work an irregular schedule and nearly twice as likely to want to work more hours Figure 1 shows the share of households in 2023 who report that their income is volatile month-to-month almost a third of all households in the U.S report that their income varies occasionally (22 percent) or often (9 percent) More than half of households earning less than $25,000 a year in 2023 reported experiencing income that varies month-to-month occasionally or often Only about a quarter of households earning over $100,000 a year report that their month-to-month income is volatile we find little difference in income volatility by household structure among the lowest-earning households: 55 percent of single households and 57 percent of two-adult households report volatile month-to-month income (not shown) Figure 2 shows perceptions of financial stability by household income and whether the household reported that their income was volatile (either occasionally or often) Households that self-report volatile month-to-month income report being less financially comfortable (75 percent) than those who report more stability in income (63 percent) More than a third of all households who self-report that their income is volatile say they have difficulty paying bills because of this volatility about two-thirds of low-income households with volatile income report this causes them difficulty when paying bills this study proved that month-to-month income volatility is substantial At the time of the Financial Diaries project, its authors recognized the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) was the best nationally representative survey to study volatility, but they worried about recall and seam biases. Since the mid-2010s, researchers redesigned the SIPP to address these concerns Using the most recent SIPP panel, we analyze changes in month-to-month earnings for 2021 and 2022. The redesigned SIPP allows us to analyze instability after the pandemic recession, and its oversample of low-income households enables us to track lower earners better than prior volatility studies, such as a 2019 JP Morgan Chase analysis Our primary sample includes those who earned at least $300 during at least one month of 2021 and worked at least 40 hours during at least one month of 2021 We add the individual’s income across all months in 2021 and categorize people into five evenly sized quintiles among workers The maximum annual earnings from the first to the fifth quintile are roughly as follows: $29,000; $47,000; $72,000; $118,000; and $2.4 million We measure volatility through multiple lenses: large shocks to earnings and overall earnings and work hour instability (regardless of whether the change is positive or negative) we look at monthly changes relative to the two-year average in 2021–22 The advantage of comparing changes to this two-year average is that it gives a better sense of an individual’s permanent income and work hours The tradeoff is that it can introduce volatility Figure 3 shows the frequency of spikes and dips overall and by personal income quintile; the vertical axis indicates the number of months during 2022 that the individual experienced a dip (dark purple) or spike (light purple) those who had earnings in 2021 experienced 2.7 months of spikes and 3.2 months of dips in their earnings in 2022 The lowest income quintile had the highest frequency of spikes and the second highest frequency of dips; on average workers in this quintile experienced 3.8 months of dips and 5.6 months of spikes The highest income quintile experienced the highest rate of dips at about 4.3 months per year but reported lower rates of spikes (1.4 spikes) The middle three income quintiles had lower rates of dips than either the first or fifth quintile given everyone in the sample earned at least $300 and worked at least 10 hours in one month in 2021 people experienced 2.3 months of no earnings across 2021 and 2022 on average The lowest income quintile experienced 5.5 months with no earnings on average compared to the highest quintile who experienced just 1.2 months with no earnings Figure 4 shows the magnitude of the changes in earnings during spikes (light purple bars) and dips (dark purple bars) in 2022 by quintile—so the average percent change in earnings from the long-term mean—among people who experience at least one spike or dip a month when a person earns an amount equivalent to their long-term average earnings would be 100 percent of their long-term average earnings and thus a 0 percent magnitude change We find that the magnitude of earnings spikes is largest for the highest income quintile and the magnitude of earnings dips is largest for the lowest income quintile Although we find that the highest income quintiles experience dips more frequently than lower income groups The average dip for an individual in the lowest income quintile who reported at least one dip was an 80 percent reduction from average monthly earnings There is a 13 percentage point difference between the first and second quintile dip magnitudes This finding is consistent with the self-perceptions of volatility described above: lower-income households not only reported experiencing greater volatility but they were also over three times more likely to report difficulties paying bills because of their volatile incomes than households with high and volatile income the highest income quintile experienced the largest spike magnitudes months where their incomes spike were typically over double their long-term average income (106 percent change) The lowest income quintile reports slightly lower spike magnitudes The middle quintiles report the lowest magnitude spikes (68 percent change We next look at a measure of instability in earnings using the coefficient of variation (CV). The CV is a statistic that shows the changes in a person’s monthly income relative to their average long-term income. The CV is a ratio of the standard deviation in earnings to the mean of earnings; a higher CV value means more instability someone who earned $2,000 per month and someone who earned $10,000 per month would both have a CV of 0 percent because neither experienced any earnings deviation from their average The average earnings CV for the whole sample is 47 percent an individual can earn between around $1,440 and $1,600 every month between January 2021 and August 2021 and then earn between around $1,500 and $1,680 for the first 11 months of 2022 when they earn about $900 (see appendix b for illustration) their standard deviation would be around $600 Figure 5 shows the CV for earnings overall and by personal income quintile we also find higher earnings instability for the highest income quintile relative to the middle: 41 percent on average for the highest income quintile compared to an average of 34 percent for the middle 60 percent of households Those in the lowest income quintile experience by far the greatest earnings instability (84 percent) could earn between around $500 and $600 for the first two months of 2021 earn between $400 and $550 between July 2021 and June 2022 and then earn nothing for the remaining months in 2022 with an earnings standard deviation of $243 and an earnings CV of 84 percent (see appendix b individuals in households that experienced at least one change in the number of earners in 2021 also experienced the greatest earnings instability in 2022 on average (77 percent compared to about 30 percent for both single and consistently multi-earner households) the lowest income quintile experienced a 104 percent earnings CV if they lived in a household with a variable number of earners in 2021 these households reported that their earnings are around 100 percent different from their long-term earnings for most months the lowest income quintile workers had the most earnings instability so differences in household structure do not explain the differences in earnings instability we find by personal income quintiles Figure 7 looks at earnings instability among primary and secondary earners conditional on being a household with two consistent earners or a variable number of earners For primary earners in consistent multi-earner households the lowest and highest quintiles report the most earnings instability (54 and 38 percent Secondary earners in consistent multi-earner households have relatively similar earnings instability for the top four income quintiles but the earnings CV for secondary earners in the lowest quintile (52 percent) is substantially higher Households with a variable number of earners are defined by having periods of no earnings for one or both earners so it is not surprising to see that instability is higher across the board among this group low-income primary and secondary earners in households with variable number of earners are almost equally highly unstable: their typical monthly earnings are more than 100 percent different than their long-run average secondary earners have higher earnings instability compared to primary earners which may indicate that these secondary earners intermittently supplement the comparatively more stable primary earner’s earnings We show instability in work hours using the coefficient of variation (CV) the CV indicates the dispersion of a person’s monthly work hours relative to their long-term average work hours the ratio of the standard deviation in work hours to the mean of work hours Monthly work hours are the number of average weekly work hours multiplied by the number of weeks that month If someone works a 40-hour week every week of every month over the sample period average work hour instability is 37 percent Let’s say an individual works on average 30 weekly hours between January 2021 and May 2022 They work 30 hours weekly on average for the rest of 2022 We then multiply their average weekly earnings by the number of weeks in each month they work on average 113 monthly hours with a standard deviation of 41 monthly hours resulting in a work hour CV of 37 (see appendix b Figure 8 shows that while the average work hour instability was a little less than 40 percent it was 70 percent among the lowest-income households What kind of schedule could produce a work hour CV of about 70 percent An individual could work between 32 and 40 weekly hours for all of 2021 when they work 10 hours per week on average they don’t work for the first three months and December and they work between 32 and 40 weekly hours on average for the middle eight months with a standard deviation of 79 hours and a work hour CV of 70 percent (see appendix b Hours instability is so disproportionately high among the lowest-income households that average hours instability for the next 80 percent of households is below the average for the full population Figure 9 reenforces that work hour instability is a defining characteristic of the lowest-income households There was little difference in work hours instability for the top 80 percent of households by income if the number of earners was consistent But for those in the lowest income quintile work hour instability was 10 percentage points (always single-earner) and 13 percentage points (always multi-earner) higher than the total Even among households with a variable number of earners include a least one person with no earnings for a time the CV for the lowest income workers (90 percent) was almost 39 percentage points higher than the CV (51 percent) for variable earning households in the next highest mean work hour instability Looking at primary and secondary earners (figure 10) we see that secondary earners in the highest income quintile who live in households with a variable number of earners had a higher work hour CV (64 percent) than the primary earner (41 percent) for lower quintiles in households with variable earners primary and secondary earners have remarkably similar CVs to each other the most instability in hours is seen among those with the lowest incomes particularly those in households where the number of earners varies Figure 11 shows the share of employees who work for an employer and who reported having irregular schedules split by household income and the same self-reported volatility measure from above More than half of low-income households who reported that their income is volatile also reported an irregular schedule compared to a quarter of those with stable income who also reported having irregular schedules have less than two weeks’ notice for their work schedule and about 70 percent experienced at least one last-minute shift change in the past month Workers with variable schedules report higher rates of material hardship and have more difficulty securing childcare than workers with the same wages but stable schedules The SHED survey also asked respondents whether their irregular schedules were at their request or their employer’s almost 40 percent of low-income households reported having irregular schedules two-thirds of which were driven by the employer but the values are much lower: 23 percent reported an irregular schedule 48 percent of which are at the employer’s request Forty percent of high-income households with volatile income reported an irregular schedule 60 percent of whom said this schedule was because of their employer’s request Among households that reported stable income there were still 20 percent who report irregular work schedules This is even more severe for low-income households—27 percent of low-income households with stable income report that they have irregular schedules most of whom reported that the irregular schedule is at the employer’s request Just as irregular schedules largely result from employer decisions gaps in work hours are not necessarily a function of not wanting to work Figure 12 shows the share of respondents who were interested in working more hours by income and self-reported income volatility About a third of households overall reported wanting to work more in the past month and almost half of households reporting income volatility did somewhat more (64 percent) households reporting volatility wanted to work more hours than those with self-reported stable income (56 percent) Adding work requirements to Medicaid, expanding the population subject to SNAP time limits, and limiting the ability of states to apply for waivers from SNAP work requirements for distressed labor markets are on the agenda for 2025 It is critical to understand both the financial position and the earnings and hours dynamics of low-income workers because recently proposed changes to work requirements in certain U.S safety net programs assume that workers are in control of meeting designated work hour thresholds we find that earnings and hours volatility for low-income workers are not due to their preferences but rather reflect the nature of the low-wage labor market adults with income below 100 percent of the poverty line can receive Medicaid if they successfully prove that they work or volunteer for 80 hours a month and at times and in places with low labor demand “Survey of Household Economics and Decisionmaking.” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System “2022 Survey of Income and Program Participation.” U.S “2023 Survey of Income and Program Participation.” U.S The authors are grateful to Wendy Edelberg for her insightful comments and Bradley Hardy for helpful conversations on this and earlier work Noadia Steinmetz-Silber and Eileen Powell provided excellent research assistance A list of donors can be found in our annual reports published online here These developments raise cause for concern. Homeowners’ insurance is a pre-condition for most home loans, so most American homeowners are obligated to hold this coverage for the duration of their mortgage homeowners have no choice but to pay these higher prices rising premiums and limited availability of insurance can have significant ripple effects across housing markets reducing demand (and housing values) for homes in high-risk areas Given the far-reaching impacts of property insurance market instability there is a sense of urgency around mounting a policy response and public pressure to intervene with policies that can keep insurance affordable and available for all homeowners keeping property insurance costs artificially low in risky areas would leave property markets and financial markets increasingly over-exposed to climate risk we investigate why homeowners’ insurance premiums are rising significantly outpacing the general rate of inflation over this time period These cost increases are being passed through to households in the form of higher premiums Climate change is also an important factor putting upward pressure on insurance premiums through a number of channels These risk load management strategies increase insurers’ costs and thus the insurance premiums they charge which simulates plausible catastrophic event scenarios are changing how insurance companies assess and price natural disaster risks The adoption of more sophisticated risk modeling will drive prices up if insurers learn that they have been underestimating climate risk exposure Finally, new risk modeling tools can support more granular pricing of climate risk which brings the premium that a customer pays more in line with the best available assessment of their individual risk This more customized pricing will imply higher pricing for those high-risk homeowners who were previously pooled together with low-risk homes under coarser pricing structures Homeowners insurance is regulated at the state level. While regulatory regimes vary across states, all are guided by objectives of rate adequacy (i.e. insurers should charge prices that are high enough to keep them solvent) and fairness (i.e. prices should not result in exorbitant profits) and rate transparency are additional imperatives guiding regulations in many states In pursuit of these objectives, state regulators have adopted various methods of regulating insurance rates regulators review insurance prices before they are offered in the market Other states rely on market forces to keep insurance rates in line with costs Regulations that are designed to limit insurance price increases can have unintended impacts on insurance market outcomes limiting insurers’ ability to charge prices that are commensurate with costs can reduce insurers’ willingness to provide insurance in high-cost areas it becomes challenging for regulators to negotiate competing policy objectives of insurer solvency As private insurers retreat from high-risk areas it may be tempting for state and federal insurance entities to take on more of the climate risks going forward But an increased reliance on publicly funded climate risk insurance does not address the fundamental challenges that are destabilizing private property insurance markets Public insurers would face many of the same challenges as the private market in terms of managing rising costs and increasing climate risk exposure plus the added complexity of political pressure to keep premiums artificially low Subsidizing insurance in high-risk areas would burden households in less risky areas and dampen the price signal that potential homebuyers should receive about the true costs of living in harm’s way state regulators can take proactive steps to encourage private insurers to write policies in high-risk areas This includes initiatives that make more sophisticated catastrophe modeling tools and re-insurance more accessible to all insurers Promising new technologies such as virtual home inspection tools and fire safety certification programs could help insurers offer premium discounts for more resilient properties by lowering the cost of monitoring and verification for insurers the inconvenient truth is that property insurance premiums will need to increase in high hazard areas to reflect climate risk exposure Property insurance markets have a crucial role in providing financial assistance to households and their communities when disaster strikes insurance prices must increase to adequately reflect the real and rising costs of climate change Richter is a part-time employee of the Pricing Carbon Initiative Fowlie is Chair of the Independent Emissions Market Advisory Committee of California The authors did not receive financial support from any firm or person for this article from any firm or person with a financial or political interest in this article or board member of any organization with a financial or political interest in this article and conclusions in this report are solely those of its author(s) and are not influenced by any donation.