This website is using a security service to protect itself from online attacks The action you just performed triggered the security solution There are several actions that could trigger this block including submitting a certain word or phrase You can email the site owner to let them know you were blocked Please include what you were doing when this page came up and the Cloudflare Ray ID found at the bottom of this page VIENNA, April 28, 2025 – Economic growth in the Western Balkans is projected to slow down modestly in 2025 owing to weaker external demand and economic uncertainty arising from evolving global trade policies which could affect business and consumer confidence, according to the Western Balkans Regular Economic Report released today by the World Bank The World Bank forecasts that the combined economic growth of Albania 0.5 percentage points below previous projections Growth is anticipated to accelerate to 3.5% in 2026 "We are seeing some positive economic trends in the Western Balkans that underscore the region’s resilience and should underpin firm economic growth Lower inflation and rising wages support consumption public investments are beginning to pick up," says Xiaoqing Yu World Bank Division Director for the Western Balkans we are witnessing increased domestic uncertainty in several economies of the Western Balkans Slower economic activity in the European Union and heightened global trade uncertainty could also negatively impact the growth outlook in the region." Global trade uncertainty is likely to affect the Western Balkans primarily as a result of slowing economic activity in the euro zone This slowdown could reduce trade in goods and services The report suggests that during periods of uncertainty diversifying growth sources and renewing the structural reform agenda are the most effective strategies for maintaining economic resilience Key measures include eliminating labor market barriers—including those affecting women—enhancing regional economic integration and increasing market competition to boost productivity and support long-term growth faster implementation of EU accession reforms—such as joining the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) and introducing “green lanes” to streamline cross-border trade—could further enhance business confidence The report also emphasizes how rising temperatures and extreme weather events coupled with the transition to a low-carbon economy are reshaping sectoral employment patterns in the region requiring significant workforce adaptation The six Western Balkan economies should prioritize reforming their social protection systems and employment services This would help their labor forces cope with adverse weather events such as floods and be ready for new employment opportunities driven by the green transition Strengthening labor income protection systems to respond to employment shocks and enhancing the flexibility of social protection systems would help prevent individuals from falling into poverty reskilling workers for green jobs would help respond to the evolving demand for skills For more information and previous editions of the Western Balkans Regular Economic Report, click here In Vienna: Filip Kochan, fkochan@worldbank.org Belgrade: Gordana Filipovic, gfilipovic@worldbankgroup.org Pristina: Lundrim Aliu, laliu1@worldbank.org Skopje: Anita Bozinovska, abozinovska@worldbank.org Sarajevo: Jasmina Hadzic, jhadzic@worldbank.org Tirana: Ana Gjokutaj, agjokutaj@worldbank.org STAY CURRENT WITH OUR LATEST DATA & INSIGHTS This site uses cookies to optimize functionality and give you the best possible experience. 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To learn more about cookies, click here Preliminary findings on flood prevention and responses of the REGIO study "Reducing border obstacles between EU Member States and Interreg IPA beneficiary countries" will be presented on 5 June 2025 What has been achieved and what can be done to facilitate flood prevention and response in cross-border areas in South-East Europe The aim of this study is to gather knowledge and improve understanding of border obstacles affecting the borders between EU Member States and Interreg IPA beneficiary countries It also aims to identify best practices for policy makers to better address these obstacles and to provide conclusions and policy recommendations  During the workshop on 5 June 2025 (from 14:00 to 16:00 CET.) participants will discuss tentative study findings and perspectives for scaling up solutions in support of cross-border flood prevention and response The study team and external experts will provide an overview of all identified obstacles as well as potential and already implemented solutions The identified obstacles include lack of financial and human resources for coordinated approaches insufficient harmonisation of emergency response lack of cross-border prevention and planning lack of cross-border early warning and administrative issues hampering cooperation of rescue services These tentative findings are based on desk research Participants are invited to discuss these findings and add their local and regional insights to further refine the evidence on obstacles in particular on the needs and opportunities on how to overcome them.  The discussions should help answering the following questions: Online workshop on reducing border obstacles between EU Member States and IPA countries Transactional politics in the Western Balkans under Trump’s second term ThemeThe EU now faces the challenge of rebuilding its credibility and securing meaningful reforms in the Western Balkans during Trump’s second presidency as lingering tensions and the legacy of the previous ‘stabilocracy’ continue to affect the enlargement process SummaryThe EU’s approach to the Western Balkans (WB6) highlights the importance of sustained diplomatic efforts for enlargement saw the EU support local governments in exchange for security and stability but this weakened reform efforts and increased transactional relationships As tensions over Kosovo and Serbia or the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina persist the EU faces a challenge in maintaining its credibility and ensuring meaningful reforms in the enlargement process The EU has often been characterised by a certain rigidity in its geopolitical activity burdened on many occasions by institutional frameworks that guide its actions on the global stage this rigidity does not preclude the possibility of drawing valuable lessons from its approach to the Western Balkans and Bosnia and Herzegovina (collectively known as the WB6) has long been a focal point of EU diplomatic and political engagement The challenges faced in the area provide critical insights into the EU’s enlargement strategy and the broader implications for its geopolitical ambitions this constituted a wasted opportunity in a vital area such as judicial reform Two symptoms of this new direction were observed: a competitive climate between contenders as seen in the race for membership in SEPA and the traditional political cynicism was softened by forcing aspirants to meet in summits and ministerial meetings where the cordiality of the family photo took precedence over neighbourhood disputes protecting foreign investment in the absence of legal certainty; and third supplying labour to the economies of EU member states which also contributed to local demographic decline one of the most serious problems faced by the WB6 beyond a model that stabilised continental diplomatic relations the enlargement paralysis eroded trust among the political elites of the WB6 regarding the EU’s European perspective and weakened the principle of conditionality as the loss of incentives reduced reform efforts while consolidating the transactional nature of relations between the WB6 and Brussels Both Slovakia and Hungary support EU enlargement towards the WB6 but on terms that conflict with the Copenhagen criteria and thus unsustainable as a core strategy if the EU wants to maintain its model of rights and liberties while advancing towards strategic autonomy Dodik’s leadership generates significant ethnic tension but it has become essential for appeasement as the region struggles to move beyond the ethnocratic model established by the Dayton Accords Political currents in the region are filled with such personalist profiles, even within socialist ranks, as seen in the cases of the Croatian President Zoran Milanović and the Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama. Milanović has been critical of any sanctions that might be imposed on Hungary, has questioned the EU’s stance on Russia and insisted on maintaining independence from the EU Rama has carved out his political space by aligning with strong leadership figures within conservatism such as the President of Italy Giorgia Meloni about the reception of migrants in Albania or the President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić That distinguishes him from his Kosovar neighbour who does not enjoy the support of either the US or the EU and is now facing the challenge of forming a government after the recent elections The concentration of governmental power in these leaderships while enabling political manoeuvring in the volatile and disordered context of the Trump era in an environment of unstable and uncertain balances –such as Bosnia and Herzegovina’s ethnocratic division the contentious negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina or neighbourhood disputes with North Macedonia– Trump’s arrival could escalate regional tensions by destabilising recent diplomatic agreements or reshaping NATO’s role in the region Serbia knows how to capitalise on its position as a geopolitical crossroads for major powers but this is only possible in an environment of political stability However, Kosovo has strengthened ties with Turkey. After violent clashes between KFOR and Serbia in May 2023, Ankara sent a commando battalion to Kosovo through NATO. Turkey has provided military support and, in 2023, supplied Bayraktar TB-2 drones to Pristina At the end of 2024 Turkey’s Chemical and Mechanical Industry Corporation and Pristina signed an agreement to build a munitions factory in Kosovo This forces Belgrade to determine what it can offer Trump opening the possibility of less close relations with China or more economic engagement with the US alongside eye-catching concessions to Trump that could be leveraged for media attention such as an agreement to normalise relations between Serbia and Kosovo in 2020 This same approach extends to the relations promoted by the Serb-Bosnian leader Milorad Dodik with China and Russia while also seeking the removal of US sanctions imposed on him and his inner circle due to his political actions and secessionist threats Both Serbia and the government of the Republic of Srpska celebrated Trump’s victory and both leaders aligned with the policies favoured by the White House the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan interested in maintaining and expanding his influence in the Albanian has been following this trend for over a decade Trump’s rise to power opens up a horizon of unpredictable agendas such as the border exchange between Serbia and Kosovo which faced widespread opposition from various sectors of the Balkan and Western political classes the EU faces the potential full membership of Montenegro following Croatia’s accession to the Union more than 10 years ago there remains uncertainty about whether Serbia through Hungary will adopt a constructive stance on this given Russia’s interests in the local Slavic ConclusionsThis apparent regional stability primarily supported by autocratic foundations after the EU and Serbia signed a lithium mining project agreement which was opposed by strong social movements experiencing annual protests against the government since at least 2020 holds the highest levels of rejection towards the EU in the WB6 Following the death of 15 people in a train station collapse in Novi Sad on 1 November in a context of growing political and social tension the Serbian Prime Minister Miloš Vučević resigned and an intense period of protests is expected with the opposition focused on boycotting institutions The EU seems to consider these governments as inevitable in the current political ecosystem which comes at a significant credibility cost for its communication strategy in the region The guarantee of stability under an illiberal framework will become a medium-term risk for the EU if Brussels does not assertively push for the rule of law and ensure local commitment to the Copenhagen criteria An enlargement based just on geopolitical necessity undermines EU values Governments that concentrate vast amounts of power without sufficient legitimacy from the majority of society –not necessarily electoral– can provoke serious social crises The new US government will be a key test for Brussels and EU member states’ ability to maintain security in the region while also fostering genuine democratic reform and adherence to the rule of law Balancing support for stability with the promotion of democratic principles will be crucial in restoring the EU’s credibility social conflict and the instrumentalisation of potential regional tension by the elite will be the most likely scenario over the next four years [1] For a general view, see N. Hogic (2024), ‘Pre-enlargement reform failures in the Western Balkans: social and economic preconditions of the rule of law’ Ending a 40-year Kurdish insurgency: a historical turning point for Turkey and Syria By Cengiz Çandar // Posted on 01 Apr 2025 Conversation “A year later: The 7th October attacks and the war on Gaza With Johann Wadephul at the helm of the Foreign Ministry the Western Balkans can expect clear support for European integration Germany is moving towards a more pragmatic diplomacy is a law graduate from the University of Kiel and a major in the Bundeswehr reserve he has built a long political career in the state of Schleswig-Holstein and has been a member of the Bundestag since 2009 Johann Wadephul was appointed deputy chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group for defence As vice-chairman of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly he has been committed to closer European cooperation in the field of security and to unconditional support for Ukraine Regarding transatlantic relations and the changed US policy under President Donald Trump Wadephul has said: "We must keep our hand outstretched but we must ensure that we can defend ourselves if the negotiations do not go well." pragmatic and results-oriented style," Hans-Joachim Falenski a former foreign policy adviser in the CDU/CSU group and one of his closest associates until 2021 An example of this approach was seen in 2022 when Wadephul openly criticized Chancellor Olaf Scholz for his first official visit to the Balkans Scholz publicly demanded in Belgrade that Serbia recognize Kosovo's independence a statement that Wadephul called "amateurish" such demands should be addressed with diplomatic care so as not to block the dialogue "This is desirable and everyone knows this but recognition should come at the end of a process while now this statement made in public in such an amateurish way burdens the entire process which has become difficult for Serbia," Wadephul said at the time in the Bundestag He also criticized the fact that the German Chancellor went first to Pristina and then to Belgrade A knowledgeable and attentive follower of the region Albania's Honorary Consul in Hamburg and a former candidate for the Bundestag from the CDU in Schleswig-Holstein has worked closely with Wadephul in the party structures of this state He tells DW: "Wadephul has been the best foreign policy expert in the CDU/CSU for years and a supporter of strengthening Europe's role in global politics." Gjoka who has been on the state's list as a candidate for the Bundestag since 2017 believes that Wadephul "will have a great influence on the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue and will be an extraordinary supporter on Albania's path to EU membership." Wadephul has led the Working Group on the Western Balkans in the Bundestag a cross-sectoral platform that brings together specialized deputies to follow developments in the region This group also included Gunther Krichbaum who has now been appointed State Secretary for European Affairs in the Foreign Ministry a post previously held by Anna Lührmann it is expected that the Western Balkans will remain a priority for German diplomacy – but always linked to the fulfillment of standards and reforms Both Wadephul and Krichbaum are figures who have been outspoken about domestic politics in Albania without hesitating to speak out about the internal political conflicts of their sister party Krichbaum condemned the PD's violent protests in Tirana and criticized its leader Sali Berisha stressing that "a healthy democracy needs a strong and peaceful opposition that is consistent with European values." He also suggested that the Democratic Party elect a new leader to restore its credibility and pro-European orientation Wadephul and Krichbaum are the main architects of the additional conditions that the Bundestag set in 2020 for the opening of Albania's EU membership negotiations Wadephul told DW at the time: "We set some preconditions that cost me a lot of work and energy then I will have a hard time convincing my parliamentary group colleagues to positively accompany the process." This approach to the conditions is expected to be followed in the future the fight against corruption and the strengthening of institutions will remain key criteria for the European integration process," says Falenski Mijatovic: Do not pave the way for authoritarian regimes A peculiarity accompanies Wadephul's appointment as Foreign Minister: for the first time in almost 60 years the German Foreign Ministry is back in the hands of the CDU this post has usually been left to coalition partners both the Chancellery and the Foreign Ministry are headed by the same party – the CDU a Balkans expert in the Greens and a party colleague of former Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock He warns that the weight and independence of German foreign policy could be weakened as incoming Chancellor Friedrich Merz is expected to take a more active role in international affairs and concentrate more powers in his office democracy and a clear European perspective for the Western Balkan countries "Germany should openly stand on the side of democratic forces in the region and not pave the way for authoritarian regimes," he told Deutsche Welle./ DW Nëse doni të jeni i pari për t'u informuar mbi lajme ekskluzive BELGRADE — Alarm bells are ringing in Belgrade While Europe’s attention has been focused on Ukraine tensions in the Western Balkans have been simmering and leaders in the region — as well as in Britain — worry Russian President Vladimir Putin will use the moment to further exploit fault lines in the former Yugoslavia The Western Balkans are described as “the other hotspot” by figures in the upper echelons of the U.K government — and with the heat now being turned up Britain is pushing for all six states in the region to join the EU to ward off Russian influence with war in Europe and seeing the long hand of Russian interference also in the region you would be a fool if you took your eye off the Western Balkans where there are still legacy issues that are yet to be overcome,” British Foreign Secretary David Lammy told POLITICO during a visit to the region last week “Putin’s interests here are to keep the region destabilized It’s in his interests to keep the countries that make up the Western Balkans on edge to have a destabilized population and to wage a cyber and hybrid war.” All six western Balkan states are attempting to become EU member states, a protracted process in which geopolitics can be as important as fulfilling alignment tasks both domestically and with their neighbors has been pushed into crisis as Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik evades arrest for his separatist policies Serbia accuses Kosovo of repressing its Serb minority while Kosovo blames Serbia for violence within its territory Foreign policy experts and ministers alike fear the Kremlin will try to capitalize on the deep-seated ethnic and religious tensions to stoke further unrest across the Balkans entrenching Russia’s own interests and creating yet more troubles in the EU’s backyard “Right now they must move forward or they will continue to be Russia’s playground,” said one U.K granted anonymity to discuss matters they were not authorized to comment on publicly There is now “quite a small window” in which the Balkan states need to “stop sitting on the fence” before Brussels is instead consumed by Ukraine’s accession Lammy believes that Serbia — despite the democratic backsliding and its continued refusal to recognize Kosovo — genuinely wants to accede to the EU “But there are different perspectives about how to get there and how quickly and how seriously,” Lammy said during an interview in the Serbian capital Belgrade It’s a position that harks to oligarchy and those things are contested in this part of the world.” The huge hurdles Serbia must overcome to join the bloc are on stark display on the streets of Belgrade. The increasingly authoritarian government led by President Aleksandar Vučić, who recently welcomed Dodik with open arms, is being severely tested by a wave of protests on a scale never before seen in Serbia.  Hundreds of thousands have marched against government corruption in demonstrations organized by students over a canopy collapse at a renovated railway station in the city of Novi Sad that killed 16 people in November They’ve even extended their protests to counter a proposed luxury real estate development by U.S. President Donald Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner The hotel complex is planned on the site of the bombed-out former Yugoslav defense ministry a memorial to the NATO airstrikes that brought the war with Kosovo to a close in 1999 The students link that plan to other real estate deals they say are corrupt Many in the country also feel distaste at the Trump family’s profiting from a site wrecked by a bombing campaign led by Washington Lammy told POLITICO that “we stand alongside the people,” before raising the protests and the sonic weapon use claims during a Wednesday meeting with Vučić at his presidential palace The foreign secretary was there to sign a series of accords with the twin aims of tackling illegal migration and holding Serbia closer to the West But it was clear in a statement to assembled broadcasters that Vučić the 6-foot-6-inch populist who has spent more than a decade at the top of Serbian politics “It doesn’t even occur to me to make any comments on protests and demonstrations in Great Britain since I respect the sovereignty of Great Britain,” he told Serbia’s tightly controlled media Vučić also denied that force or acoustic weapons had been used against protesters and issued a staunch defense of Dodik after Lammy raised his “unconstitutional” actions during their statements to the press (The Serbian government did not respond to requests for an interview.) EU flags are not waved at the protests. Students perceive Brussels as having turned a blind eye to the endemic corruption they are condemning, as the EU tries both to bring Vučić into the fold and to gain access to Serbia’s lithium deposits for electric-vehicle battery-makers.  Unlike elsewhere in the Balkans, Serbian approval for joining the EU doesn’t appear overwhelming The process could be even harder if the country has to recognize Kosovo as a condition for accession Graffiti throughout Belgrade claims “Kosovo is Serbia.” A denial of the 1995 genocide in Srebrenica of more than 8,000 Muslim men and boys is visible from the central Republic Square are daubings of “fuck NATO fuck EU.”   Lammy’s visit to the region began 150 miles south in Kosovo, where in the capital Pristina his welcome could not have been warmer. Britain, the U.S. and NATO are held in the highest regard there for coming to Kosovo’s aid in the war with Serbia. A generation of children named Tonibler Clinton or Madeleine after the Western leaders who helped the nation win independence are now in their mid-20s In an interview with POLITICO in her office an energetic millennial who has held high office since 2021 makes it very clear all is not well in relations with Serbia which she describes as their “crazy hegemonic neighbor.” Then there was an explosion that damaged energy and water systems at a crucial canal last December, which Kosovo called a “terrorist attack.” Serbia denied involvement and alleged the incident was being used as a pretext to crack down on Serbs in Kosovo claiming Kosovo is treating the Serb community unfairly NATO-led troops from 29 countries assigned to the Kosovo Force are crucial to maintaining the fragile peace POLITICO was at their Camp Film City base as British troops told Lammy they believe Russia is supporting Serbian activities in Kosovo an assessment a senior official in Pristina confirmed The soldiers also monitor political rallies and elections as well as key infrastructure following the canal explosion Osmani alleges that Serbia interfered in Kosovo’s recent general elections; that the “Serbian-Russian Humanitarian Centre” on the border with Kosovo is really a “Russian spy center”; and that Moscow has tripled the amount spent on disinformation in the Western Balkans since invading Ukraine She insists that America under Trump is a reliable ally but warns that if Putin emerges emboldened from U.S.-led peacekeeping talks with Ukraine the Balkans could be “fertile ground” for a “spillover” of that conflict “If these autocrats seeking destabilization are able to do whatever they wish … things can escalate very and we should not allow Putin to have his way Vučić has been dancing to Putin’s tune for way too long It’s about time he decides where he wants to take his country.” Lammy was traveling the region with Karen Pierce the recently appointed special envoy to the Western Balkans Pierce was Britain’s ambassador to Washington where she was widely praised for her work with both the Biden and Trump administrations and her appointment is seen as confirming “just how seriously the U.K takes the Balkans,” said one European diplomat the president pressed him over signing an economic and security deal that would include bilateral arms purchasing and more joint operations between their troops She also told POLITICO she had “formally expressed” her country’s willingness to join the peacekeeping force that the U.K and France are trying to organize for Ukraine — but she did make it conditional on the U.K The president hit out at the “active appeasement” by unnamed parties in the EU, whom she criticized for continuing to hand out money to Serbia despite the tensions. Kosovo formally applied to join the bloc in 2022, but is still not recognised by five member states and has been told that it needs to do more to normalize relations She said Lammy should tell Vučić to “stop attacking his neighbors very plain and simple,” though in the interview with POLITICO he declined to attribute any blame for the Banjska siege British officials admit there is evidence of Serbian involvement.) and Britain have sanctioned him in recent years but there are those who want them to go further a refugee of the Yugoslav wars who is now a member of the U.K.’s House of Lords but they’re not devastating,” said the former government foreign policy adviser She also has advocated to ministers for the U.K to send troops to the EU’s peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina Lammy doesn’t rule out hitting Dodik with fresh sanctions declining to comment on such measures except to say “they’re always kept under review.” One disaster scenario Helic envisages is that Dodik positioning himself as on the “right of the right” and falling victim to a “big leftwing conspiracy,” could succeed in appealing to Trump to recognize the independence of his region in Bosnia-Herzegovina a research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society think tank warned that the EU cannot “afford to lose” Serbia given the geopolitical circumstances arguing it could trigger a ripple of problems across the region had someone paid more attention to what was going on here in the ‘80s I think things could have played out very differently I think the West woke up to the realities of what was going on in Yugoslavia “And I’m wondering whether something very similar could happen right now not in terms of the outcome being the same — like you’re getting a war no — but waking up to a reality where Russia and Chinese influences are so deeply entrenched into this country that it’s too little Helic agrees that the West is paying too little attention and attributes that to Russia’s gradual creep into the region “It’s like a disease because it’s developing slowly and invisibly It’s not a cut; it’s like a slow-burning infection and contagion,” she said.  There is the influence of state media outlets Russia Today and Sputnik as well as the Kremlin-linked Russian Orthodox Church Disinformation campaigns are being waged on social media as well Helic thinks the danger could become obvious to outsiders very suddenly if Putin is allowed to get his way “It can go from bad to worse overnight because this has been a process of unravelling the state institutions since 2006 everything that we achieved after the wars in ’95,” Helic said “Russia doesn’t want a stable Balkans because it’s a constant and it suits Russia just fine.”Correction: This story has been updated to reflect Dodik’s current title Swot up on the local votes that could have massive ramifications in Westminster — and deal a boost to right-wing populist Nigel Farage here’s how it looked to political insiders president’s most trusted lieutenants is doing his bidding in London — and British officials see someone they can do business with He’s an unlikely pin-up for electoral reform campaigners — but a 2029 surge that’s not matched by House of Commons seats could see Farage turn up the heat on a “rigged” system highly relevant issue briefs and reports that break new ground with a focus on advancing debates by integrating foundational research and analysis with concrete policy solutions the Atlantic Council’s experts have you covered—delivering their sharpest rapid insight and forward-looking analysis direct to your inbox New Atlanticist is where top experts and policymakers at the Atlantic Council and beyond offer exclusive insight on the most pressing global challenges—and the United States’ role in addressing them alongside its allies and partners A weekly column by Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe Inflection Points focuses on the global challenges facing the United States and how to best address them UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics UkraineAlert sources analysis and commentary from a wide-array of thought-leaders and activists from Ukraine and the global community MENASource offers the latest news from across the Middle East and independent analysis from fellows and staff Econographics provides an in-depth look at trends in the global economy utilizing state-of-the-art data visualization tools the United States has rapidly shifted its approach toward Russia and the war in Ukraine This has many pockets of Europe scrambling to understand the local implications of this change and to adjust their postures accordingly The Western Balkans—a part of the continent outside the European Union (EU) where the United States has a significant security and development footprint—is already feeling the effects and is bracing for more The Trump administration is not expected to focus intently on the Western Balkans anytime soon. Yet it is reasonable to expect that a divergence between the United States and the EU on broader questions of security and trade will be reflected in the region This could make the Western Balkans into an area of competition rather than complementarity for Washington and Brussels Western policy fragmentation could reshape regional dynamics that until recently had been anchored around EU and NATO accession—twin goals that the United States and the EU have pushed for together. Regional leaders who are angry with Brussels, whatever their reasons, may use the “Trump card” to agitate the EU which could fuel instability and potentially even arms races and conflict This is particularly the case in non-NATO countries and a reliance on NATO and the United States as guarantors of peace settlements Can Europe fill the gaps created by US disengagement and play a credible deterrent role in the Balkans at a time when it may also have to significantly step up its support for Ukraine as part of its broader rapprochement with Russia the United States went over Europe’s head and tried to resolve the Kosovo-Serbia dispute which Brussels—much to the dismay of Washington—has failed to do for fourteen years These are questions European policymakers need to start asking themselves US-EU discord is already deepening regional fragmentation, mostly in an anti-EU direction. Early signs of this were visible in last week’s United Nations General Assembly vote on Ukraine which pit the EU against Russia and the United States On the other side of the spectrum is the region’s most pro-US country, Kosovo, which finds itself in a strategic pickle, as its statehood and security rely on transatlantic unity. What’s more, the country’s decision making has been paralyzed in the aftermath of an inconclusive election in February which could drag out the formation of a new government for weeks which were built largely through US technical expertise and are now vulnerable On democracy, the EU already has the instruments in place to fund institutional reforms or support civil society—such as the continent’s NED equivalent, the European Endowment for Democracy it needs to use those instruments to fill the financial gaps left by the United States the real litmus test of Europe’s power will be its ability to resolve the lingering bilateral disputes in the Western Balkans and to finally push the region forward toward EU accession these goals would be best served by an approach that tries to work together with Washington these talks could be used to serve joint Western interests in the Balkans Agon Maliqi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center He is a political and foreign policy analyst from Pristina Note: Some Atlantic Council work funded by the US government has been halted as a result of the Trump administration’s Stop Work Orders issued under the executive order “Reevaluating and Realigning US Foreign Aid.” The Western Balkans stands at the nexus of many of Europe’s critical challenges of the countries of the region may soon join the European Union and shape the bloc’s ability to become a more effective geopolitical player will continue to pose problems and present a security vulnerability for NATO that could be exploited by Russia or China The region is also a transit route for westward migration and an important node in energy and trade routes The BalkansForward column will explore the key strategic dynamics in the region and how they intersect with broader European and transatlantic goals Image: The Palace of the Republic is illuminated in the colors of the American flag and with photo of Donald Trump on the occasion of Donald Trump's victory in the presidential elections in the USA Sign up to receive expert analysis from our community on the most important global issues © 2025 Atlantic CouncilAll rights reserved If refreshing the page doesn't resolve the issue you could try clearing the sites browser cache In the framework of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans and to support investments in the region by EU/EEA/Western Balkans1 companies the European Commission is launching a Call for Expression of Interest from EU/EEA/Western Balkans (WB) based businesses who seek to invest in any of the WB economies or at regional level in line with EU strategic areas of interest and policy priorities.  The objective of this Call for Expressions of Interest is to enter into dialogue with EU/EEA and Western Balkans private companies on concrete investment opportunities and identify how to overcome related constraints in the Western Balkans region.  This dialogue is aimed at building a pipeline of transformative private investments in the region that could potentially be supported by the European Commission with its available policy technical and financial instruments. Based on assessment criteria subsequent contact with partner Financial Institutions may be facilitated for potential financial cooperation.  Participation in this Call does not constitute any form of partnership or other legal relationship between the Participant and the European Commission It does not imply any guarantee of financial support either from the European Commission or any partner Financial Institutions The publication of this Call for Expressions of Interest also does not commit the EU to finance the project investment proposal All project proposals presented to the European Commission will be assessed based on the criteria outlined in this Call and will be treated equally ensuring a fair and transparent assessment process All information submitted as part of the project proposal will be treated confidentially and used solely for the purposes of evaluating the proposals in accordance with the criteria specified in this Call.  The priority areas of the Call are based on the strategic priorities of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans as well as of the Western Balkans Investment Framework (WBIF). They are focused on key economic sectors requiring Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) including: ([1]) This Call for Expressions of Interest is open to companies established in the European Union (EU) the European Economic Area (EEA),  and/or the Western Balkans To ensure a structured and transparent assessment the following criteria will be used for evaluating the eligibility of project proposals: ([2])    * This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/99 and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Kosovo declaration of independence ([3])    EDES - European Commission impact and financial criteria will be used to assess the project investment proposal:  Interested companies are invited to submit their project proposals through the designated EU expression of interest form through the EU Survey link below Each proposal should include the following documents: and documents related to this Call exchanged between Participants and DG ENEST must be written in English Supporting documents and printed literature provided by the Participants  in any other language must be accompanied by a legally valid translation into English.  The first phase of this Call for Expression of Interest is open for submissions until 21/05/2025 00:00 – Brussels time Depending on the number and scope of submissions received the portal may be reopened for subsequent phases of submission.  Participants may submit requests for clarification regarding this Call for Expressions of Interest in writing to: ENEST-PRIVATE-SECTORec [dot] europa [dot] eu (ENEST-PRIVATE-SECTOR[at]ec[dot]europa[dot]eu) up to 10 days prior to the date of closure of the call Clarifications will be published on this page The Commission reserves the right to update the Call for Expression of Interest and its documents on the basis of the received requests of clarification.  Eligible Participants will receive feedback on their proposal within 60 working days following the Call's closing date The European Commission will provide information about the outcome of the assessment process and may subsequently facilitate contact with partner Financial Institutions.  Participants will be notified of the outcome of the assessment by e-mail The notification will be sent to the e-mail address provided in the EU survey We recall that all documents in the possession of the Commission may be subject to a request for access to documents4. However it is established practice to always consult the author of the document regarding the possibility of an eventual disclosure DG ENEST may refuse to provide access to the submitted information the disclosure of which would undermine the protection of commercial interests of the company We encourage Participants to clearly mark and explain which information they consider confidential Please note that general statements claiming confidentiality for the entire proposal or substantial parts of it will not be considered The EU reserves the right to make its own assessment of the confidential nature of any information contained in the proposal Personal data will be processed in accordance with the applicable data protection rules and the Privacy Statement ([4]) Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council regarding public access to European Parliament Participants must not be affected by any conflict of interest and must have no equivalent relation in that respect with other Participants or parties involved in the project Participants and their personnel must comply with human rights as well as environmental legislation and core labour standards Participants shall comply with all applicable laws and regulations and codes relating to anti-bribery and anti-corruption [1] * This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/99 and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Kosovo declaration of independence EXPRESS INTEREST HERE The Western Balkan region is experiencing sustained economic growth; however it is also facing challenges in regional integration affecting logistics costs transport infrastructure being more frequently disrupted by climate-related shocks and growing congestion and pollution in urban centers transport accounts for 15 percent of the Western Balkan region's greenhouse gas emissions and is the fastest-growing emitting sector Transport systems in the Western Balkan countries are at a critical decision point for determining development trajectories and climate impacts As detailed in the report Transport Inputs to the Western Balkans Green Growth Narrative: Strategic Actions for a Greener and More Efficient Transport Sector three strategic policy actions are essential to reducing emissions facilitating regional trade and integration and improving health outcomes for communities today the European Union announced a Call for Expressions of Interest to mobilise private investments in the Western Balkans aiming to support the region's economic growth and integration into the EU Single Market EEA and the Western Balkans are invited to submit proposals for investment projects The European Commission will review proposals and aim to support the most suitable projects with its available policy or financial instruments. The objective is to boost private investment in infrastructure development with a view to creating jobs and bridging the economic convergence gap with the EU in line with the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans Commissioner for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood Marta Kossaid: "We are not just talking about investment we are talking about transformation. We are looking for innovative game-changing projects that will propel the Western Balkans forward and strengthen its connections with the EU I invite private companies to seize the opportunity and join us on this journey The priority areas of the Call – based on the strategic priorities of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans and of the Western Balkans Investment Framework – are as follows: secretariat@globalinitiative.net Avenue de France 23 – Geneva, CH-1202 – Switzerland Links between the Western Balkans and South America Click here to register and Serbia have transitioned from regional actors to key players in the global cocaine supply chain These groups have forged strategic relationships with coca producers This report maps out the growing footprint of criminal groups from the Western Balkans in the South American cocaine trade providing an in-depth analysis of their evolution The study explores the rise of these groups amid a boom in cocaine production and sustained European demand It details how they have leveraged their experience in regional conflicts and ties with European criminal organizations such as the Italian mafia and Dutch-Moroccan networks to establish control over transcontinental trafficking routes One of the report’s key findings is the adaptability of Western Balkan networks and businessmen who maintain relationships with local partners and facilitate logistics and weak judicial systems in South American countries these groups have employed a variety of creative and concealed smuggling techniques Their influence has also extended beyond Europe “Cocaine Connections” draws on over 100 interviews across the Western Balkans and South America supplemented by secondary sources and law enforcement data It offers an evidence-based overview of how these networks function how they maintain a “no-clash” policy with rival groups and how they exploit institutional gaps to thrive The report also examines implications for international law enforcement cooperation and makes recommendations to strengthen responses to this transnational threat Subscribe to the GI-TOC Observatory of Organized Crime in Europe mailing list to stay updated on our upcoming publications and initiatives. secretariat@globalinitiative.net Avenue de France 23 – Geneva, CH-1202 – Switzerland Design e Creative Coding by Café Amid evolving geopolitical dynamics and deepening political divisions in the Western Balkans NATO and the EU must redouble their commitment to the region to preserve fragile stability in this part of Europe as both Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) are facing their most significant political crises in decades and as the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue remains stalled there is a strong desire for peace and a European future among Balkan societies These were the main takeaways that members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly brought back from their visit to Serbia and BiH from 7 to 10 April 2025 The delegation from the Assembly’s Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security (STCTTS) and Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations (PCTR) engaged in a series of highlevel discussions with national authorities underlining the Western Balkans’ strategic importance to EuroAtlantic security.   The delegation, composed of 22 lawmakers from NATO member and partner countries and  led by STCTTS Vice-Chair Mustafa Kaya (Türkiye) and PCTR Vice-Chair Rachid Temal (France) legislators engaged in candid exchanges on the country’s multi-pillar foreign policy and the delicate security situation in the region the members of the delegation expressed concern over mounting internal divisions and reaffirmed their united stance that actions to undermine the Dayton Peace Agreement are unacceptable.  Serbia navigates a complex geopolitical landscape engaging in a pragmatic partnership with NATO pursuing EU integration all while maintaining military neutrality and close relations with Russia and China Officials reiterated their commitment to Ukraine’s territorial integrity and noted efforts to diversify energy and defence partnerships amid Russia’s declining regional influence Russian soft power and disinformation campaigns remain potent The ongoing presence of Russian narratives amplifying anti-Western sentiment was cited as a key challenge by interlocutors.  Serbia has a vested interest in stable Western Balkans in order to sustain the socioeconomic achievements made over recent years “The Western Balkans region should not be viewed through the lens of division but as a space for cooperation and for a common future,” said Ana Brnabić Speaker of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia.  Despite challenging public perceptions of NATO shaped by the legacy of the 1999 intervention and domestic political rhetoric practical cooperation between Serbia and the Alliance has grown The delegation welcomed news of Serbia’s planned participation in joint exercises with NATO in 2025 and 2026 as a positive indicator noting that such initiatives reflect converging security interests and a shared desire to address common threats noted that “Despite [its] military neutrality Serbia remains committed to building strong The delegation also visited the Vinča Institute of Nuclear Sciences one of Serbia’s leading research institutions and a long-standing partner in NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Programme which was showcased as the country’s contributions to regional innovation Parliamentarians were briefed on research projects in areas such as hydrogen energy which underscore the potential of scientific collaboration to strengthen regional resilience and stability.  While Serbian officials emphasised their concerns about the state of the BelgradePristina dialogue citing perceived violations of the 2013 Brussels Agreement and systemic discrimination against ethnic Serbs in Kosovo there was a broad consensus on the need to avoid further escalation Officials reiterated their support for the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and dialogue facilitated by the EU while emphasising that sustainable peace requires a balanced and inclusive approach.  Civil society interlocutors provided critical insights into Serbia’s democratic development While they acknowledged ongoing reforms and engagement with EU mechanisms they expressed concern over the concentration of power and declining public trust in institutions.   In discussions held at the Finnish Residency in Belgrade and co-hosted by the German Embassy– both embassies currently hold the status of NATO Contact Point Embassy in Serbia – delegation members met with NATO country ambassadors and gained insights into national and regional dynamics at play.   Serbia’s energy diversification was also highlighted as an area of strategic relevance Lawmakers were informed of efforts to reduce dependence on Russian gas through regional interconnectors and renewable energy investments.   the delegation was presented with a concerning assessment of BiH’s political and constitutional crisis widely regarded as the most serious since the end of the Bosnian war in 1995 tensions between state institutions and different political leaders risk deepening societal fractures and escalating into a broader security crisis.  All interlocutors reaffirmed support for BiH’s sovereignty and efforts to establish parallel institutions by the current leadership of the Republika Srpska (RS) entity undermine the Dayton Peace Agreement and pose significant risks to peace and stability Such moves threaten not only the constitutional order of BiH but also the broader credibility of the post-conflict peace architecture.  including EUFOR Commander Major General Florin-Marian Barbu and Ambassador Vladimir Vučinić from the NATO Headquarters in Sarajevo These meetings highlighted the critical role of international missions in maintaining peace and deterring destabilising actors The continued presence of EUFOR under Operation Althea was described as a key safeguard against security deterioration.   Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Commission for Cooperation with NATO affirmed that “NATO’s continued presence and engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina sends a powerful message but also to those who seek to destabilise the region.” The establishment of unified BiH armed forces supported by the Euro-Atlantic community and led by a multiethnic command remains the hallmark achievement of the country’s reform efforts RS opposition to BiH membership in NATO poses obstacles for more effective NATO-BiH cooperation anchored in vibrant civil society organisations and local initiatives was identified as an essential safeguard against polarisation and disinformation concerns were raised regarding the sustainability of this resilience particularly in the face of inflammatory political rhetoric Hosted by the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Sarajevo members exchanged with NATO ambassadors in country along with the EU Special Representative and Head of the Delegation of the EU Principal Deputy High Representative from the Office of the High Representative.  International partners stressed that external support alone cannot substitute for domestic political will It was noted that not everyone in RS supports the obstructionism of the entity’s current leadership Strengthening BiH’s institutional functionality and fostering a culture of compromise among political leaders were repeatedly mentioned as prerequisites for long-term peace and progress The country’s complex governance structure continues to hinder effective decision-making and reform.  in strategic sectors such as energy is a concern as outdated coal-fired infrastructure and delays in the green energy transition create vulnerabilities that geopolitical competitors may exploit The importance of accelerating BiH’s alignment with European standards on energy and environmental policy was widely acknowledged.  further compounded by political instability Legislators noted that regulatory fragmentation and low transparency hamper economic development They emphasised that economic reform and improved governance are critical for reversing widespread emigration of youth As BiH marks 30 years since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement the visit served as a timely reminder of the need to protect peace and stability in the Western Balkans while also ensuring that history is not repeated.   The achievements of the Dayton Peace Agreement and remaining challenges in the Western Balkans will be a central theme of the Assembly’s Spring Session Photos of the visit to Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina courtesy of © National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, © Pedja Vuckovic, ©Parlamentarna skupština Bosne i Hercegovine and North Korea – collectively referred to as CRINK – represents an unprecedented and multifaceted threat to the Euro-Atlantic community Battlefield tactics are rapidly evolving with increased deployment of uncrewed systems Recently published reporting is indicative of the importance that uncrewed systems take on the battlefield in Ukraine and the war is often said to have revolutionised warfare Russia’s illegal and brutal full-scale invasion of Ukraine has shattered the European security order and ushered in an era of intense geopolitical competition After more than three years of relentless warfare Ukraine continues to defend its sovereignty with courage… NATO has and continues to guarantee freedom peace and prosperity in the Euro-Atlantic region and will continue to do so in the future the Alliance faces a rapidly changing environment characterised by strategic competition Synthetic biology is one of the most disruptive emerging technologies This third-generation biotechnology is a multi- and interdisciplinary field that applies engineering principles to biology It enables the modification of existing organisms and the creation of new… Artificial Intelligence (AI) is set to rapidly change how people live and work but also the ways in which wars will be fought Experts believe that the integration of AI into military systems has the potential to revolutionise warfare The potential use cases of AI in the military are far-… As the Alliance is celebrating its 75th anniversary it finds itself in a world characterised by geopolitical and strategic competition quantum technologies and robotics and autonomous systems… In the evolving landscape of the twenty-first century the Global South has emerged as a pivotal player wielding significant influence in shaping the dynamics of our interconnected world The mixed global reaction to Russia’s illegal and brutal full-scale invasion of… The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022 shook the foundations of European security NATO met its 75th anniversary facing the most precarious global security situation in decades NATO once again faces a threat from the east: Russia’s unprovoked aggression against Ukraine had a transformative impact on the Euro-Atlantic community.… If Putin’s Russia manages to achieve some of its objectives in Ukraine by the use of brutal force it could de facto upend the post-WWII world order based on the UN Charter and a network of international conventions and institutions The roles of Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) for military forces are steadily growing While their integration into existing military force structures remains an issue they will be crucial for the development of future military capabilities.… Critical infrastructure in the maritime domain facilitates the continuous delivery of basic services such as energy and communication The importance of these networks has dramatically increased in recent years The accession of new members since the end of the Cold War reinforced NATO as the world’s most successful military alliance and the pillar of transatlantic security The future membership of current NATO aspirants – Bosnia and Herzegovina While rightly focused on the immediate task of helping Ukraine to prevail in Russia’s unjust and brutal war the Allies must not lose sight of the systemic long-term challenge an authoritarian and revisionist China poses to Allies’ interests Novel Materials are essential for the progress of science and technology and their continued research and development is vital to meeting current and future challenges facing NATO nations Additive Manufacturing (3D printing) facilitates more rapid integration of new… Faced with the greatest security crisis on the European continent since the end of WW2 The new NATO Strategic Concept adopted in Madrid places a clear emphasis on defence and deterrence NATO’s new Strategic Concept has highlighted the importance of the Indo-Pacific for Allied security and endorsed the growing collaboration with like-minded partners in the region This partnership is becoming increasingly important today as the world’s geopolitical… the ability to innovate has been key to NATO’s deterrence and defence maintaining its technological edge and upholding a competitive pace in Research and Development (R&D) will be instrumental for NATO to… The future is fraught with uncertainties and envisioning the future of warfare is a difficult task particularly as warfare is shaped by geopolitical Too many analyses focus on the issues of today… Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has completely overshadowed the sixth assessment report (AR 6) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published shortly after the beginning of the war the IPCC’s message is clear: climate change is at… Allied and partner engagement in Afghanistan came to a sudden end culminating in one of the largest airlift evacuation efforts in history While the 20-year engagement by Allies and their partners in Afghanistan successfully prevented new terrorist… The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus epidemic which was first identified in China in late 2019 has expanded to touch nearly every corner of the globe The World Health Organization (WHO) assessed COVID-19 as a pandemic on 11 March 2020 The speed and the scale of the virus’ global spread have been… “A global pandemic is not a question of if Variations of this statement have over the years been repeated by countless health experts yet when in late 2019 a novel coronavirus  emerged in the Chinese city of Wuhan One of the highlights of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s March 2018 State of the Nation address was the presentation of two new nuclear delivery systems could evade US anti-ballistic missile defences This special report provides a brief overview of the challenges that the Alliance is facing on the defence innovation front and how member nations and NATO as an organisation have begun to tackle the issue Your rapporteur also outlines some of the challenges Allies… As the COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing recession are transforming the global security landscape the Gulf region finds itself in a particularly vulnerable situation The region’s volatile security environment was already of significant concern to the Allies and the… The relationship between NATO and the European Union (EU) – arguably the two most powerful multilateral bodies in modern history – is a recurring theme in international political debates Urbanisation is one of the most prevalent global trends of the 21st century Already today an estimated 55% of the world’s population live in urban areas According to the 2016 United Nations World Cities report two-thirds of the global population will live in cities… Obtaining insights in Africa’s security dynamics related to the evolving security landscape in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region was the main focus of a NATO PA visit to Addis Ababa from 23 to 25 September 2019  The current state of cooperation between… The report provides a brief overview of the security environment in the Western Balkans It argues that NATO and the European Union need to remain engaged to encourage the countries of the region to continue their reform process Science and Technology Committee (STC) noted its worry “that NATO’s technological edge is eroding” the STC is redoubling its efforts to identify the challenges in meeting Alliance goals and to lend political support to rectify any shortcomings This report argues that Russia’s meddling in elections and referenda is a threat to the Alliance and its members This report discusses the challenges posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) - commonly known as North Korea- to regional and international security It begins with a review of North Korea’s ballistic and nuclear weapons… This report reviews the main security challenges in NATO’s southern neighbourhood and their impact on NATO Allies After providing a brief update on recent developments in Syria and Iraq the report analyses the key drivers promoting instability in North Africa The strength of encryption today has had a positive effect for groups which need protection from governments or law enforcement for example whistle blowers or journalists operating in repressive countries However such technologies can also hide terrorist activities… co-chairperson of the Ukraine-NATO Interparliamentary Council (UNIC) welcomed the delegates to Odesa and noted that the President of the Parliament had just presented a national security bill to the Rada A number of allied countries helped with that… 32 members of parliament from 15 NATO member countries visited Abu Dhabi to discuss the broad geopolitical situation in the Gulf the foreign and defence policy of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and to participate in a… the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Science and Technology Committee (STC) visited San Diego and Silicon Valley STC Chairperson Maria Martens (Netherlands) led the delegation consisting of 19 members of parliament from 15 Allied countries.… the Science and Technology Committee (STC) has focused extensively on technological risks and opportunities and on how NATO must adapt to an era of rapid technological change 13 members of parliament from eight Allied states and two… During the four-day visit to London and York NATO Parliamentarians received briefings on instability in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region as well as UK civil protection and emergency relief… The Western Balkans’ drive toward the EU has been slow but geopolitical realities are forcing a reassessment of the bloc’s strictly merit-based accession policy With conflicts raging over Ukraine and around Israel and an increasing spotlight turned on China the Balkans have slipped out of the limelight of international attention The countries of the Western Balkans – three of them NATO members themselves – are believed to be safely surrounded by European Union and NATO member states Talk of them being a dangerously unsettled “inner courtyard” or “soft underbelly” of the EU has receded or been eclipsed by other challenges encouraging to see the economic growth figures of the six Western Balkans countries – Albania Serbia and North Macedonia – averaging a steady 3.4 percent in 2024 outdoing the rest of the wider Central and Eastern Europe region with the exception of Turkey (3.4 percent) and Russia (3.8 percent) Progress was palpable at a recent summit in Berlin with interested EU countries and the six Western Balkan states This comes 10 years after the initiation of these annual summits These events are meant to help ensure candidates’ progress in developing a joint regional market facilitate tertiary education within the region realize dozens of transport projects and reduce regional roaming fees there was a remarkable breakthrough: the unprecedented experimental and seemingly successful total overhaul of Albania’s judicial system judges and attorneys had to undergo a vetting process and those who were suspected of possible entanglement with corruption were evicted That left a temporary void of almost 60 percent Albania: Applied for membership in 2009; candidate status awarded in 2014; the EC says Albania’s candidacy is progressing smoothly Bosnia and Herzegovina: Applied for membership in 2016; candidate status awarded in 2022; in March 2024 the EC decided to open accession negotiations Montenegro: Applied for membership in 2008; candidate status awarded in 2010; after eight years of accession negotiations all the 33 screened chapters have been opened North Macedonia: Applied for membership in 2004; candidate status awarded in 2005; in 2022 the EC started the screening process Serbia: Applied for membership in 2009; candidate status awarded in 2012; association agreement entered into force in 2013; 22 out of 35 chapters have been opened and three are provisionally closed Kosovo: In 2005 the EC adopted a communication on A European Future for Kosovo; in 2012 the EC issued a feasibility study for an association agreement with Kosovo and the agreement entered into force in 2016 while being a good EU reformer that resolved political issues with its southern neighbor Greece by agreeing to constitutionally change its name is now continually held back from accession mostly by the political demands of its eastern EU neighbor Serbia and Kosovo – Belgrade and Pristina according to the EU countries that do not recognize the independence of Kosovo (Spain Greece and Cyprus) – have achieved modest progress on the pivotal issue of reconciliation and normalization Disappointed by Brussels, Belgrade can hardly be blamed for still pursuing a multi-vector foreign policy inherited from Yugoslavia’s role in the global Non-Aligned Movement This policy includes carefully balanced ties with the EU and Germany has helped Belgrade’s relationship with Washington thrive against all odds despite the country’s warm ties with Moscow and Beijing are heavily reliant on their special bonds with the U.S. which have been somewhat strained due to the very principled but often seemingly stubborn and abrasive position of their Prime Minister Albin Kurti vis-a-vis the remaining Serbian minority holding out in Kosovo  Brussels welcoming a country like Montenegro is a low-hanging fruit to signal that stagnation can be overcome has respectably weathered a domestic change of guard (the end of the era of long-term President and Prime Minister Milo Dukanovic) and seems to be genuinely advancing in the process of aligning with the EU both politically and technically It is on the way to possibly becoming the first of the Western Balkans group to be seriously considered for accession Montenegro’s 617,000 citizens (only slightly more than Malta) could easily be absorbed into the bloc as its fast-growing economy can rely on tourism Brussels welcoming a country like Montenegro is a low-hanging fruit to signal that stagnation can be overcome and that the EU is not just words Negotiations with Albania opened politically at the first Intergovernmental Conference (ICG) in July 2022 the EU’s set of goals which includes the foundations of the rule of law and democracy was finally opened for negotiations a short time ago According to Tirana’s former chief negotiator for EU accession it is thanks to the current Hungarian EU Council presidency that the latest overdue ICG was held to determine the next negotiating chapters to be opened A further ICG for Montenegro is planned for this month EU members might stress the need for a preliminary EU reform (to accommodate extra members) which would again hold up the accession of any state Continuing accession of candidates may well move in parallel with internal EU reform which started on the integration path almost 30 years ago was granted candidate status in June 2022 due to political motivations The politics of integrating Ukraine into the bloc could trigger a lengthy debate in the EU on how to adapt the rules to accommodate further candidates while still barring the progress of relatively small Balkans states like Montenegro the EU started to co-fund the entire functioning of Ukraine’s state and army while fast-tracking an immediate preferential EU accession process for Kyiv This exemption from its own hitherto proclaimed principles of merit is justified by the overriding geopolitical importance of Russia’s attack on Ukraine Yet the consequences of this move on the EU’s overall enlargement strategy remain uncertain The question is how the burdening of the “old” accession processes for the Western Balkans (plus Turkey) through the disproportionate addition of Ukraine can be digested what must be determined is the percentage of Ukraine’s territory and population under the current and evolving frontlines that can be integrated into the EU If the accession destinies of the Balkans and Ukraine were to become effectively intertwined they would inevitably be determined by the outcome of Russia’s war several scenarios for the accession of the Western Balkan countries and Ukraine are conceivable in the medium term Probably the only way toward an assured smooth and peaceful evolution of the region while the bigger issues of Serbia Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina remain yet to be fully addressed is European acceptance that it is time to grant more Western Balkan states full membership the EU keeps the Western Balkans accession process neatly separated from others and before long manages to accept Montenegro and perhaps even Albania and North Macedonia as the 28th This process would send multiple positive signals: that the EU is finally acting strategically and is capable of proceeding with enlargement that it keeps its promises and honors the candidates’ efforts and that it accepts Slavic as well as Albanian nationalities attention would turn more fully toward larger states such as Serbia or Ukraine Extracting the rich raw material deposits found throughout the Balkans (such as the untapped lithium deposits in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina or the variety of minerals in the Trepca area in northern Kosovo) could become a boon for the region as employment and wealth are an excellent basis for overcoming inherited rivalries questions remain: Will current EU member states and their domestic industries be willing and able to help develop and use these riches Can the EU help Serbia and Kosovo to include this important and promising issue in their dialogue A scenario lacking breakthroughs but also devoid of setbacks while keeping the region rhetorically “warm” as it rambles along losing inhabitants due to meager birth rates and high youth migration to mostly EU countries the populations vote increasingly for nationalistic agendas that The EU helps out with a growth plan for the Western Balkans and the famously slow and bureaucratic Instrument for Pre-Accession has been overshadowed by the sprawling multi-billion-euro aid flows to Ukraine if respectable economic growth rates persist nothing dramatic can be expected to happen the demographic downward trend and the risk of re-emerging political tensions will grow again There is also a smaller chance of negative developments collateral effects of the war in Ukraine or the advent of another type of leader in the region the two tall men at the helm of the region’s biggest Slavic and Albanian states President Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia and Prime Minister Edi Rama of Albania the ghosts of the past could easily make a return especially in the most fragile Balkan state A rapid integration of every single Balkan territory into the EU space that fully surrounds the region is a logical Think only that the EU and its about 450 million inhabitants is and will be dealing with the Western Balkans region of 18 million a genuine urgent effort and a serious allocation of political and economic means and resources The EU’s hardly sustainable spending for Ukraine is demonstrating that a significant European effort is perfectly possible bringing the Western Balkan states into the bloc would cost very little in comparison to remedying any conflict situation while offering a multitude of benefits to the entire European continent The EU assessment mantra for candidates has always been “based on merit.” The relevant council conclusions from the Copenhagen criteria onward have made it clear what the steps for accession are this would be the credible path for Ukraine and Moldova as well.  The EU could “buy” peace and assured prosperity It is possible if member states genuinely decide to go for it Washington and Berlin will move into office almost simultaneously Their decisions will shape developments throughout Europe including in the half-forgotten southeast corner of the European continent that is the Balkans For industry-specific scenarios and bespoke geopolitical intelligence, contact us and we will provide you with more information about our advisory services Receive insights from our experts every week in your inbox Information about what personal data we collect about you and how we process it (including information about how we personalize our website for you and deliver content tailored to you) can be found in our privacy policy Show all reports China is expanding its global influence in the Western Balkans through the Digital Silk Road (DSR) a key element of the Belt and Road Initiative it introduced in 2015 The DSR aims to enhance digital infrastructure benefiting Chinese tech companies such as Huawei While the DSR offers technological and economic benefits to participating countries and foreign-influence risks including concerns about surveillance and data privacy the United States launched the Clean Network Initiative in 2020 to secure digital infrastructure against providersthat are not trusted and the EU announced the Digital Agenda for the Western Balkans in 2018 to improve digital connectivity and innovation these efforts have had limited impact and the region remains significantly influenced by the DSR.​ How can the Western Balkans balance the benefits of China’s technological investments with the risks to security and sovereignty What role should the EU and the United States play in supporting secure digital development in the region Are countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia jeopardizing their long-term aspiration to join the EU by aligning with China in technology What strategies can these countries adopt to ensure a resilient and trusted digital future This panel brings together experts to discuss how Western Balkan countries can navigate this critical juncture while safeguarding their future For more information, please contact Zsuzsanna Végh ([email protected]) The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpartisan policy organization committed to the idea that the United States and Europe are stronger together Don’t forget to subscribe to our ideas on transatlantic issues via: View our Privacy Policy The report provides insight into reforms and investments that can make cities in the Western Balkans more resilient to natural disasters It covers six economies of the Western Balkans: Albania Download Full Report Climate change is  a serious issue in the Western Balkans the region has been experiencing more heatwaves both droughts and heavy rainfall have become more frequent reversing a trend of decline seen from the 1970s to the 1990s Small and medium-sized cities in the Western Balkans are more exposed to climate shocks and stressors than their counterparts in other parts of Europe and Central Asia Many of these cities are also expanding into disaster-prone areas increasing their exposure to climate risks These trends are exacerbated by existing and worsening vulnerabilities in urban areas in the region placing municipal governments and local communities under increasing pressure the challenge of achieving sustained economic growth while addressing environmental and climate change issues is a multifaceted one one that spans various sectors and levels of government This will need to be supplemented by the increasingly crucial role played by private sector and local communities To ready cities in the Western Balkans in the face of a changing climate the report “Reshaping Cities” lays out four pathways: green Green actions for sustainable urban development involve revising zoning to limit sprawl Shrinking cities can prioritize environmental protection and social equity instead of unattainable growth leading to reduced energy consumption and pollution while enhancing quality of life Resilient cities are essential for Western Balkans to adapt to challenges focusing on managing infrastructure and implementing nature-based solutions to mitigate climate risks and emergency management are key for enhancing local capacities Inclusive pathways are crucial for addressing inequality fostering community engagement and social cohesion while investing in public services and promoting gender inclusion Cities must also be competitive drivers of collaboration between government and the private sector and exploring funding options like green bonds or carbon pricing tools to promote sustainable urban development This essay is part of the report “Transatlantic horizons: A collaborative US-EU policy agenda for 2025 and beyond,” which outlines an agenda for common action for the next US administration and European Commission The Western Balkans is a region neither the United States nor the European Union (EU) can afford to ignore or mishandle and the geopolitical implications of misinformed and misaligned policy are costly The United States and the EU must work together and play to their own respective strengths to prioritize democratic and economic growth and alignment with the West The United States and the EU have recognized the importance of the Western Balkans and have worked on engaging the region, to varying degrees of success. There has been modest progress on the region’s Euro-Atlantic integration, and there remains moderate to strong support inside the region for a European future There has also been renewed momentum from the EU to make progress on enlargement to the region as Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has reinvigorated the bloc’s understanding of the geopolitics of enlargement These opportunities and challenges together will require leadership from the United States and the EU to realize the region’s potential Geopolitics is the main driver of the external focus on the Western Balkans. The region for years has been Europe’s “soft underbelly,” where Russia holds significant influence as both an instigator and negotiator especially in Serbia and Republika Srpska (the Serb-majority entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) but also in North Macedonia Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has raised the stakes about Moscow’s willingness to inflame conflict in the region Securing the region within the Euro-Atlantic framework will do much to stem Russia’s influence and diminish the chances of violence on the continent There are positive motivators for transatlantic engagement, too. The region could be a success story for the West’s de-risking agenda Lower labor costs and the region’s strategic geographic location and physical proximity offer a twofold opportunity to help realize Europe’s—and the United States’—efforts to reshore its supply chains and investments and diminish China’s own influence Both the United States and the EU need a clear vision for the region the region can overcome its challenges and emerge as a stable By prioritizing democratic values and good governance the United States and the EU can significantly and positively impact the region’s trajectory a successful transatlantic policy in the Western Balkans requires a long-term commitment and a clear vision for the region’s future The Western Balkans will remain a focus on both sides of the Atlantic Either a Democratic or Republican administration is expected to be more engaged once in office than during this past election year and will bring a focus on security issues the European Commission will focus on the region The uncertainties are prioritization and calibration How will policymakers prioritize the need to address economic or democratic reforms Will the United States continue its practice of giving the lead to the EU which all countries in the region at least nominally aspire to join The prioritization of democratic values will be the key to engaging the region successfully in the future A more decisive and uncompromising insistence on the development of democratic institutions and values—such as free and fair elections and the fight against corruption and organized crime—must be a priority Reforms in these areas are prerequisites for any sustainable economic progress and investment and stronger democratic consolidation will do far more to reduce the impact of malign influences from Russia and China that thrive precisely in the absence of these values Failing to prioritize democracy in the region will risk cementing the petrifying status quo a much stronger and more active US role in the Western Balkans will be required the United States has given primacy to the EU but that strategy has not yielded convincing and sustainable results on key issues like the struggles of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue (and the lack of implementation of the Brussels and Ohrid agreements that underpin it) and the festering ethnic tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina This is a consequential demonstration of the EU’s inability to take a leading role and bring key players to the table with the determination to reach an agreement the process of normalization between Kosovo and Serbia has stalled—or worse but its institutional structure has limited its effectiveness The bloc is a heterogeneous and loose union of twenty-seven members many with vastly different priorities for the region it is not decisive in some key policy areas where the current veto system has left the Western Balkans as a political punching bag for domestic politics among EU member states A few such cases include Bulgaria and Greece blocking North Macedonia’s progress Slovenia delaying Croatia’s 2013 accession over border disputes and traditional enlargement skepticism in France and the Netherlands stemming from Given that this decision-making framework is embedded in the highest legal act of the EU it is not realistic to expect any change in the foreseeable future—even though change is much needed The United States is not as constrained in implementing its policy toward the Western Balkans Provided the next administration does not change its priorities for the Western Balkans it would be of crucial importance to take a more decisive stance in pursuing its interests and the reduction of Russian and Chinese influence but only if the next administration acts energetically and resolutely in their implementation There is much that the United States and the EU can do—together and separately—to enact positive change in the Western Balkans Insist on the primacy of democracy and the rule of law The underpinning of democracy should be a prerequisite of any approach to the region must prioritize support for democratic reforms and the rule of law in the Western Balkans Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) and Roger Wicker (R-MS) policymakers should aggressively pursue a strategy of investment and infrastructure development in the region by: Refocus on regional economic competitiveness Increasing the Western Balkans’ competitiveness will make Europe more competitive a joint effort is needed to improve the business environment Develop a new approach to the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue The Serbia-Kosovo dialogue has been a longstanding and complex issue It needs new life with incoming US and EU administrations should play a more active role in facilitating a comprehensive and final normalization agreement Develop policy for cybersecurity and infrastructure protection. The Western Balkans is increasingly vulnerable to cyber threats as have been documented recently in Albania Protecting critical infrastructure and building cybersecurity capacity are essential for economic growth and regional stability The Western Balkans remains a geopolitical battleground with Russia and China seeking to increase their influence in the region The United States and the EU should develop strategies to counter these efforts Maja Piscevic is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and representative of the center in the Western Balkans Ilva Tare is a resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and host of the #BalkansDebrief podcast Recent initiatives could be a beginning in the revitalization of cooperation between the United States and the European Union in Africa From the other side of the world to each other’s backyards and into cyberspace Instead of pushing back against European defense efforts as it has done in the past Washington must fully embrace the steps the European Union is now taking The Europe Center promotes leadership and forward-looking transatlantic relationship Image: An attendee walks at the venue on the day of the EU-Western Balkans summit in Tirana and mailings and dive into the most pressing foreign policy issues with insights from our experts I consent to receiving the selected ECFR newsletters and to the analysis of open & click rates. I can revoke my consent later by clicking on the link at the end of every newsletter or by writing to [email protected]. More information on how we process personal data can be found here The Africa programme analyses the geopolitics of the Africa-Europe relationship the programme delves into relations between the African Union and the European Union to find creative foreign policy tools and strategies It also focuses on two regions that are particularly relevant for Europe: the Horn of Africa and the Sahel The Asia programme seeks to help Europe recalibrate its relationship with China and its Asian partners The programme analyses China’s domestic situation It also places a renewed emphasis on fostering Europe’s relationships with the Indo-Pacific The European Power programme is focused on helping Europeans develop sustainable policy solutions to the issues affecting the European Union’s capacity to act with unity on the global scene This includes analysing the path forward for enlargement The Middle East and North Africa programme seeks to support a coherent European agenda in pursuit of regional interests The programme works with European and regional governments and civil society to advance channels of dialogue as well as providing direct policy prescriptions to secure conflict de-escalation The US programme helps Europeans create policy responses to developments in US domestic politics and foreign policy The programme seeks to strengthen transatlantic relations by exploring the obstacles to a more balanced partnership and developing ideas to overcome them The Wider Europe programme aims to help the European Union defend its interests and values in the Western Balkans as well as the South Caucasus and central Asia The programme also supports EU decision-makers work on a unified and coherent policy to address the challenges resulting from Russia’s full scale-invasion of Ukraine The modern history of the Western Balkans has shown the danger of attempting to align borders with the predominant ethnicities in any given area Serbia’s government was and is known to have designs on northern Kosovo The territory swaps idea is fraught with peril It is not consistent with a policy of regional integration into the European Union and thus gradually less significant frontiers between countries So Bolton’s comment was not well-advised But it did point to something that deserves urgent European attention as the US presidential election on 5 November nears: the potentially destabilising influence of Trumpian power in America on the fragile peace in the Western Balkans But those four years demonstrated that the idea of border revisions is still alive and well in the Western Balkans — and that the US can easily divide the EU and its member states on the matter Would a second Trump term make such a difference? Especially given widespread criticism of the Biden administration’s concessions to Aleksandar Vucic Serbia’s politically all-powerful president are the calamities that the Biden administration has been able to prevent For it has helped to contain a series of political and security crises in regional hotspots – particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina and northern Kosovo – that could have led to political or even armed escalation Beneath these crises lurk revisionist appetites that may well be unleashed if a new US administration resiles from this deterrence There was the moment in late 2021 when the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska one of the two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina laid out a formal plan for the collapse of the country’s overarching institutions Under its president Milorad Dodik it even started to implement this Then spring and summer 2023 brought a series of Serbian challenges to Kosovo’s stability. These included an attack on the NATO-led international peacekeeping force (the Kosovo Force, KFOR) that left more than 90 soldiers injured and a border-crossing by special forces to abduct three Kosovo police officers.  a thinly veiled threat of further violence Both the Serbian parliament and the national assembly of Republika Srpska subsequently ratified the declaration Despite the escalatory potential of these moments of crisis over the past four years including an increasingly far-reaching sanctions regime But the Biden administration’s failure to pursue a bolder policy towards Serbia – standing up more to its flirtations with all-Serb expansionism – also means that its successes are vulnerable A US administration with a different agenda more instinctively favourable to Belgrade and Banja Luka (the main political centre of Republika Srpska) could reverse them within a matter of months A second Trump term looks set to be just that administration the region still has much to lose if revisionist disruptors are given a green light and how could they trigger escalation under a more permissive US president This so-called Greater Serbia project is rooted in the nationalist ideology of the young post-Ottoman Serbian state in the 19th century Its leaders envisioned the unification of all ethnic Serbs into a single country by bringing together all regions with significant Serb populations The idea persisted throughout the region’s tumultuous 20th century and resurfaced in a new devastating form in its final decade as Yugoslavia crumbled and nationalist movements found new momentum The US played a pivotal (if sometimes belated) role in ultimately containing these ambitions particularly by intervening militarily and brokering peace agreements It preserved Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single state albeit with significant autonomy granted to Republika Srpska the US-led NATO intervention in 1999 helped to halt further Serbian aggression and paved the way for Kosovo’s independence The term bears similarities to Moscow’s concept of a Russian world (Russkiy mir) which seeks to unify and protect ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking populations abroad Both concepts serve as nationalist frameworks for exerting influence over neighbouring states positioning Serbia and Russia as defenders of their respective ethnic groups Three landmark moments from the past four years tell of the growing confidence of the “Serbian world” agenda: Dodik is no newcomer. He has been a leading figure in Republika Srpska since 2006 and has threatened to break up Bosnia so often that his threats have become unremarkable his strategy has been gradually to salami-slice Bosnia’s central government in order to weaken shared institutions and abolish all those mechanisms of judicial or administrative oversight he could not control his agenda has become more ambitious; albeit partly limited by local checks and balances and European measures In Kosovo, Serbia’s government has focused on consolidating control over four Serb-majority municipalities in the north. There it has been able to wield influence through its political proxy, the Serb List (Srpska Lista) party, whose former vice-president Milan Radoicic has been sanctioned by the US Treasury for involvement in organised crime networks Serbia’s strategy for the north is to prevent Kosovo’s state from exercising sovereignty and to maintain parallel institutions controlled from Belgrade Its policy has shifted from the land-swap idea to the pursuit of full autonomy in the form of the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities (another Republika Srpska The situation there stands in contrast to the six Serb-majority municipalities south of the Ibar River where Serbs have integrated into Kosovo’s institutions and participate in local governance Recent efforts by the Kosovan government to assert its authority in the north have resulted in a backlash from both Serb List and the Serbian government. In November 2022, Vucic encouraged Serbs in northern Kosovo to withdraw from all political Kosovo’s government stepped in to fill the vacuum by holding municipal elections and appointing four ethnically Albanian mayors local Serbian-backed hooligans resorted to armed violence The clash between local security forces and the paramilitaries ended in three militant deaths and over thirty arrests it advocated the disintegration of Bosnia and Herzegovina veiled in a language of “peaceful” exercise of rights to self-determination it was less specific but more blunt: asserting that this independent country is an inseparable part of Serbia and calling for all available legal economic and “other” means to protect Serbs in Kosovo — as well as their monasteries Although it did not explicitly advocate the use of force “other means” conspicuously hinted at that possibility In private meetings and his public statements, Serbia’s President Vucic likes to claim he is committed to peace and stability in the region. And observers [1] (with the notable exceptions of Berlin and Ljubljana) have dismissed the declaration as a symbolic move rather than a serious bid to claim much of the region for the “Serbian world” as it is understood in much of south-eastern Europe Yet this is the first time that Serbia’s government has put its signature on a project that so overtly calls for disintegration of Bosnia’s institutions and that Serbia’s parliament has ratified such a project whatever harsher words may be spoken behind closed doors the outgoing US administration has often stopped the worst from happening It raised the price for Serbia and Republika Srpska of doing greater damage This public release sparked international diplomatic pressure leading to a Serbian military pullback within days Although Vucic has had to balance his nationalist appetites against the costs particularly those imposed by the Biden administration he has never voiced any substantive disagreements with the expansionist agenda espoused by Dodik and others Unspoken but implicit in the Serbian president’s statements is that a change of power in Washington which lifts the restraints would alter his calculus and open the way to more of the drastic action he would ultimately prefer and logistical infrastructure for further escalation remains in place The Biden administration’s achievements can be reversed within the matter of months if the international circumstances change without admitting that this is due in part to pro-Russian messaging in state-controlled media as well as Russia Today and Sputnik (Both propaganda channels continue to operate freely in Serbia.) Such is the background: under-appreciated Biden administration successes in preventing worst-case scenarios but significant failures to address the structural risks leaving important avenues for regional progress (including towards EU accession) strewn with obstacles would be the background for a second Trump presidency’s policies on the region would a Trump win on 5 November mean for the Western Balkans The restraints the Biden administration placed on Vucic And the Republican candidate looks set to lift many of them if he wins European policymakers need to consider five specific – though closely related – risks in particular It is therefore likely that he would gain influence in the event of a second term Put together those two developments – a more influential Orban under a new Trump presidency and Orban’s longstanding indulgence of Serbian expansionism – and it becomes clear that the EU’s Western Balkans policies would face a particular challenge from an emboldened Budapest if the Republican candidate wins on 5 November along with the majority of member-state governments would need a stronger plan for working around Hungary on those issues Precisely how this matter might play out during a second term is of course a matter of speculation Belgrade might de-facto freeze the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue and demand that Pristina withdraw its administrative and security presence from the northern Kosovan municipalities initially returning these to international administration It might then reopen discussions on sovereignty over those municipalities testing the possibility of their becoming part of Serbia And in doing so, Serbian leaders could draw not only encouragement from a new Trump administration but explicit political support, too. Grenell’s backing for Serb narratives and cases (like his opposition to the UN resolution on Srebrenica) suggests that they could even reach for diplomatic tools to support the land swap like reducing the US military presence and pressing Kosovo and its EU partners to accept the move Particularly with Hungary as a close partner within the union they could pressure Brussels formally to advance Serbia’s accession process even without progress towards a settled agreement on Kosovo’s sovereignty Between the lines of such statements: he expects a Trump administration not to stand in the way of Serbia asserting political and military control over north Kosovo or implementing other central stipulations of the all-Serb assembly in Bosnia judicial and police institutions in those four municipalities in north Kosovo rested on a prediction that such interference would not trigger a major US or EU reaction While in his private meetings and public statements Vucic has been able to convince many Western officials that he is committed to peace, stability, and the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the contents of the all-Serb declaration and the steps proposed on Bosnia are impossible to implement through peaceful, legal means. Doing so through a constitutional process would require a two-thirds parliamentary majority which is impossible to obtain given the opposition of the rest of the country so opted explicitly to support unilateral steps in the declaration This would involve an attack on the constitutional order of Bosnia and Herzegovina triggering a response by the rump central government institutions in charge of defending that order Not surprisingly, the pro-Bosnian and Bosniak parties have made their response clear. Bakir Izetbegovic, the leader of the largest Bosniak party, has warned of escalation if the declaration were ever implemented: “What matters is the legitimacy of what would remain of the state-level armed forces This army would be defending the constitution these figures would increase very quickly.”  Similar effects could be expected across the other institutions from which Republika Srpska would withdraw These include security institutions such as the border police the central government’s investigation and protection agency (the Bosnian FBI) but also agencies overseeing veterinary and food safety Bosnia would be left with broken institutions Many observers [2] have dismissed the dangers entailed in the all-Serb declaration claiming that it is simply a symbolic move But this is the first time that Serbia’s government has put its signature on a project that so bluntly calls for disintegration of Bosnia’s institutions A vision for crippling Bosnia and Herzegovina and its ability to function as a sovereign state The possibility of widespread violence ensuing barely needs to be stated A Trump win on 5 November would probably move that vision much closer to becoming reality; and perhaps all the way The risks of a second Trump term for the Western Balkans show just how sensitive events in the region can be to political shifts in Washington That is itself an illustration of how – particularly given the stalling of the region’s EU accession prospects over the past decade – US rather than European leadership has often placed the most significant limits on nationalism revisionism there Should the US play a less restraining role under the next administration it would fall to Europeans to do what they should have been doing for a long time: taking the lead in ensuring stability And yet the EU does have leverage. And whether it can step in if the US steps out (and for that matter, whether they can take more responsibility irrespective of the election outcome) is a basic test of the union’s credibility as a foreign-policy actor. It has extensive economic instruments, ways to incentivise the accession process and the institutional and diplomatic force of the Common Foreign and Security Policy at its disposal If it cannot marshal these resources to ensure a basic degree of stability in its own immediate neighbourhood among states that on paper at least are all candidates or (in the case of Kosovo) aspirants to EU membership what hope does it have of handling the wider global crises of our times the union’s incoming high representative for foreign and security policy the EU has a strong new chief diplomat who Assuming she is confirmed in that position in the coming weeks she should make it an early priority to brief the European Council on the full scale of the threat posed by the summer’s all-Serb declaration She can use her position to raise awareness among governments and European voters of just how dangerous this agenda could be to peace and stability in the Western Balkans and confirm and reinforce the EU’s own red lines on this and would be more so without clear backing from Brussels So it is the EU that has leverage over Belgrade when it comes to the 'white gold’ Kallas should then work with the European Council to build a package of new deterrence measures agree those with the most influential EU governments and communicate these clearly to Belgrade and Banja Luka the prospect of a Trump inauguration on 20 January 2025 should add particular urgency to that process This immediate package should have three main pillars First, EU governments be ready to withhold funds earmarked for Serbia and Republika Srpska under the union’s New Growth Plan for the Western Balkans in the event that either proceeds with the implementation of the all-Serb declaration Adopted by the Commission in November 2023 this plan aims to accelerate the convergence of the region’s economies with those of the EU as part of the accession process It is supported by a new financial instrument worth €6bn over 2024-2027 Threatening to cut access to these funds would raise the costs of moves to undermine further the central Bosnian state or challenge Kosovo’s territorial integrity Freezing access to these funds would further sharpen the incentives for restraint in Belgrade and Banja Luka major EU economies in partnership with Brussels should develop a non-US sanctions mechanism specifically tailored to any additional attempts by Dodik and his allies to challenge Bosnia and Herzegovina’s statehood This should comprise targeted sanctions on individuals central to secessionist or otherwise destabilising activities and restricting access to financial institutions within the union Preparing these measures in advance would enable EU governments rapidly to activate them (and if necessary ratchet them up) in response to concrete aggressions by Republika Srpska like bids to withdraw from state institutions or reclaim powers vested in the central government under the Dayton Agreement Likewise they should develop an equivalent sanctions plan for the event of Serbian escalation in Kosovo and particularly the four Serb-majority municipalities in the country’s north As EU-wide consensus on such sanctions would be unlikely – Hungary under its current leadership would not participate – so instead these mechanisms should emerge from a coalition of member states whose political and economic weight or commercial relevance (or both) would contribute to a strong disincentive effect At a minimum this would need to include Germany but others such as the Nordic group would likely follow EU governmental and institutional leaders could complement these financial measures with other penalties that they could use with greater flexibility: political measures such as declaring a corrupt or obstructive official persona non grata in one or more European capitals would have a significant signalling effect Denying entry to political players who seek to destabilise the regional order would also be quick and easy to implement EU governments and institutions should hope not to have to use these measures they would ideally serve as an effective message of the price Belgrade and Banja Luka would pay for exploiting any new ambiguity about the United States’ commitment to order and even-handedness in the region to escalate tensions But the threats have to be credible and acted on confidently and consistently if needed “Dobro je sve dok se ne puca,” goes a common Bosnian phrase: “All is well as long as we are not shooting at each other.” Locals often use it jokingly to put the country’s post-conflict political and economic difficulties in context as a reminder that however tortuous its peacetime progress A different administration with different instincts may not be as effective It should not be beyond the capabilities of the EU’s institutions and its major governments to fill the gap this would leave If there is one region where the union can still exercise leverage and make a difference Adnan Ćerimagić is a senior analyst for the Western Balkans at the European Stability Initiative (ESI) think-tank where he is researching EU policy towards the region Ćerimagić worked for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo and Brussels He also spent time at the secretariat of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee and worked for the European Training and Research Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Graz Ćerimagić studied law at the University of Graz and EU international relations and diplomacy at the College of Europe in Bruges Majda Ruge is a senior policy fellow with the Wider Europe programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations Previously she spent three years as a fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute/SAIS at the Johns Hopkins University She has twice testified as an expert witness at hearings of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Western Balkans Ruge worked for the Delegation of the European Commission to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina she was a post-doctoral fellow and lecturer at the Otto-Suhr-Institute of the Free University of Berlin Ruge holds degrees from the European University Institute (Ph.D.,2011 and M.A. Central European University in Budapest (M.A in International Relations and European Studies The authors would like to thank Jeremy Cliffe and Nastassia Zenovich for their support on this paper [1] Authors’ conversations with European analysts and policymakers [2] Authors’ conversations with European analysts and policymakers Be the first to know about our latest publications I consent to receiving the selected ECFR newsletters and to the analysis of open & click rates. I can revoke my consent later by clicking on the link at the end of every newsletter or by writing to [email protected]. More information on how we process personal data can be found here Essential cookies enable basic functions and are necessary for the proper function of the website Content from video platforms and social media platforms is blocked by default displaying this content no longer requires manual consent The six Western Balkans economies have made progress in aligning with EU legislation on environment and climate improved monitoring and reporting procedures and greater focus on emission reduction targets there are signs of higher use of renewable energy sources and new investments in wastewater infrastructure However, progress has been slow, and some issues remain to be still addressed, according to the JRC analysis. The findings are published in the report Status of Environment and Climate in the Western Balkans with the objective to help monitor progress and support the EU accession process of the region.  the impact on health (air quality) and the contribution to the antimicrobial resistance (water quality) It also investigates the impact of climate change on precipitation the study finds that air quality remains a significant problem for both the region and neighbouring EU countries despite a downwards trend of air pollutant yearly concentrations Greenhouse gas emissions remain stable and no significant change in the overall greenhouse gas emissions 2015-2022 is observed – in 2022 greenhouse gas emissions were 18% lower compared with 1990 the report examines soil degradation and key stressors to water management insufficient wastewater treatment and the impact of human activities Air quality has improved in terms of meeting annual limits for particulate matter PM10 (smaller than 10 µm in diameter) and PM2.5 (smaller than 2.5 µm).  the PM10 annual average concentrations were below the limit of 40 µg/m3 (set by national authorities) in nearly 70% of the total Western Balkans monitoring stations but well above the World Health Organization (WHO) recommended value of 15 µg/m3.  daily concentrations of these major pollutants remain too high and are often above the limit values set by national authorities.  the health consequences of poor air quality are more severe in the Western Balkans region with higher death rates linked to exposure to PM2.5 when compared to the EU The mortality rate linked to PM2.5 is up to four times higher in the Western Balkans with a significantly slower declining trend Coal-fired power plants continue to be the primary culprit contributing the most both to greenhouse gas emissions – showing a stagnating trend – and air pollutants (CO2 the rise in biological CO2 emissions – including those from the combustion of primarily solid biomass fuels and liquid biofuels – indicates a progressive transition towards renewable energy sources excluding Kosovo for which no data are available grew by 85% comparing to 1990 and 43% compared to 2015.  The use of solid biomass in households represents a trade-off between climate and air quality policies: the increased share of this fuel contributes to reduce fossil CO2 emissions while its emissions of particulate matter and black carbon have negative impacts on air quality and human health Precipitation trends show intensified droughts during the summer months in southern and coastal areas as well as increased rainfall during winter periods which increases the risks of both droughts and flooding These changes are disrupting water quality and natural water flow patterns and are accompanied by a 40-60% increase in the duration of heat waves between 2003 and 2023 particularly along the Adriatic coast and regions of Kosovo and average burnt area is lower than in the EU.  Soil erosion stands out as the most severe form of degradation with average losses reaching 4.1 tons per hectare annually (still below the region’s threshold of 10 tons per hectare annually) affecting approximately 40% of the region's total land area Industry is the largest contributor to potentially contaminated sites primarily linked to metal production and processing These pressures further compromise soil's ability to support agriculture maintain ecosystems and sustain human activities addressing these challenges is hindered by a significant knowledge gap as Western Balkans countries rely on outdated soil data limiting the ability to implement effective monitoring and mitigation strategies compared to EU countries Water management faces multiple challenges: key problems include untreated municipal and industrial wastewater discharge agricultural pollution runoff and the combined effects of climate change and altered water systems But efforts to improve water management are underway through measures to align with EU standards and ongoing investments The report's findings call for increased cooperation among Western Balkan economies to address transboundary pollution – both within and outside the region – and environmental challenges.  It also highlights the need to expand and improve environmental monitoring systems including better data collection and management This is crucial for a better understanding of critical issues related to air quality Status of Environment and Climate in the Western Balkans Guidelines for the Implementation of the Green Agenda for the Western Balkans  Growth Plan for the Western Balkans Reform and growth facility for the Western Balkans Entrepreneurs like Dženana are benefiting from easier property registration in Bosnia and Herzegovina and transferred ownership of approximately 5,000 square meters of new land near our existing facility,” says Dženana “We need to expand our capacity because our customers demand more of our products.” By integrating land and other geospatial information for example through building and real estate registries and implementing user-friendly accessibility measures entrepreneurs in Bosnia and Herzegovina like Dženana now can access a streamlined process for property acquisition and registration Thanks to investments in land registry modernization and IT infrastructure updates supported by the World Bank These upgrades expand opportunities in mortgage and credit markets while also strengthening the business landscape enabling entrepreneurs to focus on innovation and day-to-day business operations it's essential to manage the documentation efficiently so you can proceed with your investment This makes it possible to start operating sooner and begin generating a profit," concludes Dženana This will enable us to invest in higher-quality equipment Digitization Saves Entrepreneurs’ Time and Effort One effective way to streamline paperwork is through digitization which transforms paper-based processes into digital systems to simplify administration and improve accessibility - a transformation already underway in Serbia was eager to quickly register her inherited property Owning the land allows her to apply for agricultural subsidies that can enhance her farm “Digitization has made everything easier for us There are no more endless walks through corridors with piles of papers and forms,” explains Marija For family-run businesses in Serbia like Marija's easier access to digitized property ownership is freeing up time and opening possibilities to run and expand their business The Real Estate Management Project in Serbia has established a modern IT infrastructure that manages land records for over 85% of the country the adoption of web technology has significantly reduced processing times at Serbia’s land agency: the average registration time has dropped from 48 days to under four and we had hesitated to expand due to the complex paperwork and the time it demanded we are considering growth in the near future.” Kosovo has also made significant investments in enhancing its property data which has been crucial for the country's economic development over the past 15 years supported by the World Bank and other partners Kosovo's land and property sector has undergone major changes The IDA-funded Real Estate Cadaster and Registration project has updated land records for 15% of Kosovo—in areas where the majority of the population lives and economic output occurs—and cut transaction registration times by 65% These efforts are making a difference for Kosovar women entrepreneurs the former Head of Cadaster Services in Shtime joint property registrations among spouses were virtually unheard of Through targeted and data-driven awareness campaigns nearly one-fifth of all registered property transactions in Shtime were in women's names by the project's conclusion unlocking the potential of women entrepreneurs—crucial for boosting growth and innovation the World Bank is collaborating with authorities in Kosovo and partnering with civil society organizations to enhance awareness about the importance of secure land tenure The World Bank's partnership with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia in modernizing land registration over the past 20 years has improved property ownership which is vital for strengthening these countries’ business environments By continuing efforts to digitize services these countries are improving real estate market efficiency and empowering small and medium-sized businesses to create jobs and expand Please enable JS and disable any ad blocker Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies This event will center on the themes of Kroc Institute visiting research fellow ‘Balkanization’ and the Euro-Atlantic Processes of the (Western) Balkans: Back to the Future exploring how the discourse of 'balkanization' has shaped EU and NATO policies toward the region this event will challenge outdated narratives and advocate for sustained engagement with the Balkans moving beyond episodic attention during crises the discussion aims to redefine the Balkans' central role in trans-Atlantic identity Moderated by Clemens Sedmak director of the Nanovic Institute for European Studies and professor of social ethics Presented by Liridona Veliu Ashiku Respondent: Gëzim Visoka associate dean for research and associate professor of peace and conflict studies Respondent: Carli Steelman Posted In: Kroc Institute Events Kate ChesterCommunications Program Director574-631-8577cchester@nd.edu Ari WoodworthEvents Coordinator(574) 631-3237awoodwor@nd.edu Jena O'BrienSenior Communications and Digital Media Specialist574-631-3991jobrie29@nd.edu Lisa GallagherWriter and Content Specialist574-631-9370lgallag3@nd.edu Accessibility Information You are using an outdated browser. Please upgrade your browser to improve your experience the Western Balkans were the scene of intense armed conflicts triggered by the breakup of Yugoslavia marked by ethnic cleansing and mass displacements led to significant population losses and lasting demographic shifts in the region These events resulted not only in depopulation but also in long-term social and economic transformations the consequences of which are still felt today Analysing the demographic impact of this period is particularly challenging because the available data is incomplete and inconsistent the dismantling of institutions responsible for population registration and large-scale migration have made it difficult to accurately assess the scale of demographic changes that took place in the final years of the 20th century estimates of BiH’s population rely on assessments prepared by demographers North Macedonia has faced similar challenges A planned 2011 census was cancelled due to intense ethnic tensions and was only successfully conducted a decade later The issue with demographic statistics compiled back in the 1990s is particularly evident in Kosovo this Yugoslav province was inhabited by 1.58 million people two years after Slobodan Milošević revoked its autonomy leaving the Yugoslav authorities to estimate the population at 1.95 million such as the application of outdated fertility rates led to significant discrepancies in subsequent counts When the first post-war census was conducted in 2011 the recorded population was significantly smaller than previously assumed (this time The shrinking population in the 21st century the Western Balkans are struggling with a continuous decline in the number of inhabitants and an ageing population the population of the most populous post-Yugoslav country has been decreasing by an average of approximately 40,000 individuals annually BiH’s population has decreased by either 11% or 17% the country may have lost up to 40% of its population over the past decade Albania faces a similarly unfavourable demographic trend with a steadily declining population since the fall of Enver Hoxha’s communist regime the country had just over 3 million inhabitants this number had already fallen by nearly 250,000 a 21% decline since the beginning of the millennium The demographic challenges faced by the Western Balkan states are further exacerbated by persistently low fertility rates which for years had one of the highest birth rates in the region The marked decline in fertility is the key factor distinguishing the region’s population trends of the 1960s and 1970s from those of today (although some Yugoslav republics already had low fertility rates during that period) the overall demographic profile of the Western Balkans was typical of poorer countries characterised by high emigration offset by strong birth rates the trend of declining birth rates has continued in Serbia the most dramatic shift has occurred in Kosovo and Albania these two countries still maintained birth rates sufficient for generational replacement their fertility rates have nearly converged with those of the rest of the region The combination of low fertility rates and the emigration of young people has resulted in a rapidly ageing population in all WB6 states the median age is close to or even higher than the EU average of 44.5 years The proportion of individuals aged 65 and over is also rising rapidly across the Western Balkans Serbia and BiH have the highest share of elderly residents with this group comprising 20% of the population in both countries The rest of the region is also ageing quickly with only 10% of its population aged 65 and over The growing proportion of elderly citizens presents significant economic and political challenges The declining share of the working-age population limits economic growth while the increasing number of pensioners places additional strain on already overburdened pension systems across the WB6 countries Share of individuals aged 65 and over in total population Source: ‘Population estimates and projections’ Emigration is not a new phenomenon for the Western Balkans The region has long faced large-scale population outflows the so-called Gastarbeiter (guest workers) migrated in large numbers to West Germany in search of employment Another wave of emigration occurred in the 1990s due to the turbulent breakup of Yugoslavia and the collapse of Albania’s communist regime persistent high unemployment and the significant wage gap between the region and the EU provided further incentives to emigrate the Western Balkans experienced a steady outflow of skilled workers (including plumbers who found higher wages and better working conditions abroad However, economic factors are not the only incentive to emigrate. A 2022 OECD report highlights several additional reasons for relocation, including the low quality of education, healthcare, and the judicial system, as well as the incompetence of the political elite, an unfavourable business environment, and endemic corruption.[8] Main destinations for emigrants from the WB6 countries meaning that even more individuals from the WB6 states are eligible to enter the German labour market Workers from the Western Balkans account for a quarter of Germany’s total foreign medical staff (over 42,000 individuals in 2020) Due to mass emigration and an ageing population the WB6 countries are increasingly turning to foreign workers The economic improvements over the past decade have made them relatively attractive destinations for individuals from poorer countries seeking better living and working conditions Serbia currently faces a shortage of around 50,000 workers, with projections suggesting that this number could double.[17] Other countries in the region are also struggling with significant labour deficits and Montenegro of up to 25,000 during the peak tourist season The most affected sectors include construction tourism (especially in Albania and Montenegro) Serbia has simplified its work permit issuance procedures in recent years the country’s National Employment Service issued a total of 52,000 work permits with the largest share going to Russian citizens (39%) They were followed by Chinese workers (20%) reflecting Belgrade’s growing economic cooperation with China foreign workers primarily come from South and Southeast Asia The governments’ reaction to the demographic crisis The demographic crisis and pronatalist policies are increasingly evident in public debate across the WB6 countries this rarely leads to the development of specific Government measures primarily focus on one-off financial incentives for parents fail to address the systemic population challenges The reasons why people in the Western Balkans choose to emigrate or decide not to have children are increasingly linked to structural and cultural changes local political elites are generally uninterested in raising democratic standards or improving the judicial system and public services the emigration of disillusioned citizens seeking genuine change and comprehensive reform often benefits the region’s leaders Demographic issues are also becoming a more prominent topic among politicians The country has introduced substantial one-off birth grants currently amounting to approximately €4,200 for the first child in the family and €5,000 for the second Benefits for the third and fourth child are even higher but are paid in instalments Aleksandar Vučić’s party campaigned under the slogan “Za našu decu” (For our children) This issue has also been reflected in Serbia’s close ties with Hungary President Vučić regularly participates in summits on the subject hosted by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and frequently highlights the issue of low birth rates Belgrade has adopted several policies modelled on those implemented by Budapest such as home purchase subsidies for parents who have a child these subsidies cover between 20% and 50% of the value of a home purchase or construction only 583 Serbs have received these grants in the past two years Remittances sent by representatives of the WB6 diaspora to their countries of origin and BiH – have also published similar documents The core elements of these strategies include establishing contacts (especially business-related) with members of the diaspora and encouraging them to invest in their countries of origin The demographic future of the region appears bleak Persistently low fertility rates and mass emigration significantly reduce the likelihood of reversing these negative trends while government efforts to boost birth rates remain fragmented and largely ineffective the future development of WB6 economies is also at risk Their competitive advantage to date has relied on the availability of cheap and highly skilled labour the Western Balkan countries are now trying to offset these deficits through immigration Long-term forecasts predict a significant decline in the population of all countries in the region the population of the Western Balkans will decrease by 3 million by 2050 which recorded 6.7 million inhabitants in the most recent census may have just 5.5 million by 2050 – a reduction of around 1.2 million is also expected to lose 18% of its population Projection of change in WB6 population between 2024 and 2050 [1]   The largest ethnic group in BiH the Bosniaks – who comprise just over 50% of the population – advocate for greater centralisation of the state demand changes to the method of electing members of the BiH Presidium The political representation of the country’s three constituent nations operates under a strict system of ethnic quotas Any proposals based on census results that alter the perceived balance of power could destabilise the country’s already fragile political stability [2]   This refers specifically to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia The state emerged from the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and existed from 1992 to 2003 [3]   ‘U.S. Committee for Refugees World Refugee Survey 1998 - Yugoslavia’ United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants [4]   Since then the authorities in Sarajevo have not managed to carry out an official population census; as a result the exact number of the state’s inhabitants remains unclear [5]   ‘Demografi: U BiH živi 2,9 milijuna stanovnika, a prema nekim procjenama, manje i od 2 milijuna’ [6]   J. Vukićević, ‘Izazovi za Crnu Goru od priliva ruskih migranata’ [7]   ‘Current health expenditure (% of GDP) - Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, North Macedonia, Montenegro’ [8]   ‘Labour Migration in the Western Balkans’ [9]   ‘International Migrant Stock 2024’ [10] ‘Westbalkanregelung’ [11] A comprehensive analysis of migration processes involving the WB6 states is hampered by the fact that local authorities do not maintain annual registers of their citizens’ places of residence which is the most popular destination for the region’s residents and compiles detailed migration statistics [12] ‘Country capacity to retain talent, 1-7 (best)’ [13] A. Vračić, ‘Put za povratak: Odlazak obrazovanih ljudi i prosperitet na zapadnom Balkanu’ [15] ‘Unemployment statistics’ [16] ‘Cost of Youth Emigration in the Western Balkans’ [17] Мобилност радне снаге [18] Retaining the Growth Momentum [19] Code for Albania a project organised by the Albanian diaspora living in Silicon Valley It aims to promote the development of programming skills among Albanian youth [20] Strategjia Kombëtare e Diasporës Shqiptare 2021 - 2025 Biuletyn Informacji Publicznej This issue is preventing our website from loading properly. Please review the following troubleshooting tips or contact us at [email protected] By submitting your email, you agree to the Privacy Policy and Terms of Use and to receive email correspondence from us Create an FP account to save articles to read later ALREADY AN FP SUBSCRIBER? LOGIN Downloadable PDFs are a benefit of an FP subscription This article is an Insider exclusive Contact us at [email protected] to learn about upgrade options unlocking the ability to gift this article Most discussions in Washington about the Trump administration’s approach to global affairs relate to Ukraine and most recently Greenland; there is little talk of the Western Balkans foreign policy in the region could upset the fragile status quo prevailing there The Western Balkans’ current state of affairs and delicate geopolitical equilibrium have prevented Bosnia and Herzegovina from sliding back into civil war while keeping the Serbia-Kosovo conflict frozen for the past 26 years President Donald Trump’s return to the White House They are optimistic that his administration will align Washington more closely with Belgrade and the Bosnian Serb statelet of Republika Srpska Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic and Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik want the United States to counter other western governments and institutions that strongly support Kosovo’s independence and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s centralized structure as established by the 1995 Dayton Agreement the U.S.-brokered peace deal that rigidly divided the war-torn country into two main entities—the Bosnian-Serb Republika Srpska and the Bosniak-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina which both exist under a central government that has a rotating presidency among the three main communities: Bosniaks Under the banner of defending Serb interests and advancing the cause of Serb unification Dodik has spent years undermining the Dayton Agreement by obstructing Bosnia’s national institutions through various actions deemed dangerous and destabilizing by the United States and other western governments In practical terms, this would mean easing U.S. constraints on pro-Russian Serbs who desire Serb unification and oppose sanctions on Moscow. Such constraints and pressures include sanctions on Dodik and ultranationalists, including Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vulin who previously headed Serbia’s Security Intelligence Agency and was known for his ties to Moscow and his harassment of anti-Putin voices in Serbia’s Russian émigré community Additionally, the previous U.S. administration recently imposed sanctions on NIS It is not difficult to imagine Trump easing pressure on Serbia over its relationship with Russia while keeping quiet about Serbia’s human rights issues Serbs who believe in “Greater Serbia” stake claims to land in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere outside modern-day Serbia’s borders then-Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic’s pursuit of a Greater Serbia was a major factor in the wars that tore the region apart Shortly after Trump’s electoral victory last November, Vucic had a “very cordial” phone call with him and credited him with knowing “many things about Serbia,” and noted that Trump’s approval ratings in Serbia are higher than in any other European country Because of Russia and China’s positions in the U.N. Security Council, it is essentially a given that the U.N. will not formally recognize Kosovo’s independence. Trump has previously threatened to withdraw U.S. military forces from the Kosovo Force (KFOR) that would not necessarily prove an existential crisis for Kosovo KFOR should be capable of continuing its operations in the event of a U.S mostly because Pristina has prepared for this possible scenario by strengthening its relationship with Turkey in recent years a pro-Russian enclave within Bosnia keeps NATO and the European Union nervous about instability in the Western Balkans—a tactic that the Kremlin can always use to distract from Ukraine—and creates an issue that prevents Bosnia from joining NATO At the same time, Western sanctions on Dodik have pushed Republika Srpska closer to China. In 2016, Republika Srpska and China entered into a cooperation agreement that formalized ties and China has invested in construction projects and power plants throughout the Bosnian Serb enclave over the years giving him free rein to obstruct the Dayton Agreement and some bet that Trump will become the fourth figure in it If the Bosnian Serb strongman succeeds in getting Washington to lift sanctions he will “surely be emboldened to go on with his agenda,” said Vladimir Trapara a senior research fellow at the Belgrade-based Institute of International Politics and Economics Although Dodik may talk about separatism to rally his constituents in Republika Srpska he might not ever make such a bold move given various practical considerations including risks of a new war in the Balkans Trapara drew a distinction between Dodik’s populism-driven agenda and his “real political goals.” The Bosnian Serb leader tends to play the separatist card to whip up support from Serb nationalists when doing so makes for good politics only to focus more on administrative issues when emotions are less charged Such business interests may well factor into the Trump administration’s approach to this region possibly complicating the picture with interests in Albania running counter to an increasingly pro-Belgrade policy Trump is known for making foreign-policy decisions based on the highest bidder and through personal connections In terms of Bosnia’s territorial integrity authorities in Banja Luka seem to believe that the Trump administration might deprioritize the Dayton Agreement’s enforcement mechanisms Trump’s general lack of interest in so-called transatlantic values combined with his good relations with Orban and Vucic might lead power brokers in Republika Srpska to have high hopes about Trump 2.0 “While Belgrade may not openly pursue territorial ambitions Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy could offer opportunities to push nationalist goals subtly,” said Petar Milutinovic a research associate from the Belgrade-based Institute of European Studies disengagement to intensify calls for Republika Srpska’s independence.” But things could turn out differently—and assumptions about Trump’s transactional foreign-policy approach being inherently positive for Serbia are overly simplistic. Albania and Kosovo spend money on U.S lobbying efforts to advance their own interests which include persuading Washington to advocate for Kosovo’s independence There could also be a role for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan given Ankara’s close relations with Sarajevo which are [currently] pretty dysfunctional,” explained Jahja Muhasilovic a geopolitical analyst and an associate professor at the International University of Sarajevo If Trump succeeds—as promised—in freezing the Russia-Ukraine war with portions of Ukrainian land remaining under Russian control the reverberations would be felt across Europe Such a diplomatic agreement on Ukraine could make the West appear weak especially if it is accompanied by the lifting of some sanctions against Russia Pro-Russian Serb nationalists could interpret such a scenario as “a victory for Moscow’s strategy reinforcing their anti-Western rhetoric and calls for regional reordering such as aspirations for secession in Republika Srpska or undermining Kosovo’s sovereignty,” Milutinovic said a Bosnian columnist and editor for Nezavisne Novine explained how Belgrade is most comfortable when there is an equilibrium of influence in the region with both NATO members and Russia making concessions to Serbia and it usually means some sort of instability in the Balkans,” he said Trump’s unpredictability suggests that the optimism of Dodik and other Serbs could be misplaced ongoing Russian influence in southeastern Europe will limit Belgrade and Banja Luka’s ability to move closer to Washington Serb nationalists should therefore think carefully about what they wish for This post is part of FP’s ongoing coverage of the Trump administration. Follow along here Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO and founder of Gulf State Analytics Commenting on this and other recent articles is just one benefit of a Foreign Policy subscription Join the conversation on this and other recent Foreign Policy articles when you subscribe now Please follow our comment guidelines The default username below has been generated using the first name and last initial on your FP subscriber account Usernames may be updated at any time and must not contain inappropriate or offensive language FP’s flagship evening newsletter guiding you through the most important world stories of the day Specialty rates for students and faculty. Lock in your rates for longer. Unlock powerful intelligence for your team. The European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as part of her first trip to the Western Balkans Kallas said in Sarajevo that the European Union stands with Bosnia and Herzegovina adding that the actions of the authorities in the Republika Srpska entity are undermining constitutional order of the country “The EU will not tolerate any threats to the territorial integrity and constitutional order of this country” “Our mission clearly demonstrates the EU’s readiness to ensure peace and stability as part of our commitment to supporting BiH we increased the number of troops in the country last month A safe and secure environment in the country must not be jeopardize I emphasized that political leaders must work to bridge divisions The Chairwoman of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina stated that the country’s EU path faces numerous obstacles She noted that problems can be resolved if there is mutual understanding emphasizing that BiH could overcome these challenges “through reasonable conduct by the EU” the meeting with Kalas was an opportunity to demonstrate to EU officials just how divergent the views within BiH truly are Cvijanović rejected claims that anything happening there that could undermine the territorial integrity of BiH “There is no need for anyone to warn us – nothing is happening in Republika Srpska that would threaten the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina” At the joint press conference with Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama the EU High Representative stated that Albania could potentially become a member of the EU by 2030 She described Albania as a truly strong partner of the EU and emphasized that the country is fully aligned with the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy “Your decision to fully implement EU sanctions against Russia along with your humanitarian and political support for Ukraine demonstrates your strong commitment to EU values You are also a valuable and constructive partner in regional cooperation especially in helping ensure a secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Kallas said She underscored that the EU remains fully committed to Albania and that this partnership brings mutual benefits Kallas added that Albania has an ambitious plan to complete EU accession negotiations within the next two years When asked whether 2030 is a realistic target for Albania to join the EU stressing that it is achievable if all parties fulfill their obligations Prime Minister Rama stated that Albania is fully aligned with the European Union in all areas during his meeting with Commissioner Kallas they discussed the accession process and a “very ambitious timeline” agreed upon with the European Commission to complete negotiations by 2027 “There are no outstanding issues or problems between Albania and the EU which is 100 percent in line with the EU,” Rama said Kallas began her regional visit with meetings with Montenegrin officials At a joint press conference with Prime Minister Milojko Spajić she praised Montenegro’s commitment to reforms reiterating that there are no shortcuts to membership—only through reform can progress be achieved “I welcome Montenegro’s support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the UN Charter I also commend your generosity in welcoming Ukrainian refugees you have taken in more refugees per capita than any other country in the world,” Kallas said Prime Minister Spajić affirmed Montenegro’s determination to maintain the current pace of reforms “Last year was the most successful yet in terms of Montenegro’s European integration and sets the stage for continued progress this year Montenegro has no doubts—the European Union is our strategic path We are the only country in the United Nations to have voted in full alignment with EU decisions We are grateful for the support you’ve provided in strengthening our defense which enables us to participate in joint NATO and EU activities This demonstrates our commitment to foreign policy regardless of who serves as prime minister or who is in government,” Spajić emphasized She stated that the EU is working on an analysis of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue in order to encourage the normalization process between two sides “What we are doing this month is sitting down with the special envoy to really go through what the mistakes have been along the way and to ‘ignite a new fire’ in this normalization process,” Kallas said European Western Balkans is a web portal that focuses on the WB countries and reports on development of the EU’s enlargement policy The portal is launched in 2014 by the Centre for Contemporary Politics where he and his Serbian counterpart Aleksandar Vučić discussed military cooperation Ankara’s post–Cold War engagement with the Balkans Turkey’s relations with Serbs tended toward the adversarial while Albanians received Ankara’s cautious support Following Erdoğan’s rise to power in the 2000s Turkey leaned into its partnership with Albanians amidst a great deal of historical and religious rhetoric Turkey also tried to engage Serbia during this time but Erdoğan’s neo-Ottoman references alienated the Serbs and derailed Ankara’s Balkan policies Erdoğan’s more personalized approach has enabled Ankara to act more successfully as a broker and balancer among various Balkan players Erdoğan’s dual visits this past month demonstrate not only that Turkey has become more active in Balkan security affairs but also that it has been successful in balancing its relations with both Serbs and Albanians — the region’s two most influential ethnic groups in Ankara’s eyes This policy has been executed through a series of Turkish overtures toward Serbs — principly Serbia but also the Republika Srpska — and Albanians in both Albania and Kosovo Erdoğan’s transactional dealings have enabled him to engage leaders of both groups without fully alienating the other with 325 troops in Camp Sultan Murat in Prizren which was locked in a running dispute with Greece with a defensive perimeter and zone of influence in the Balkans This leaves Turkey with an abiding strategic interest in having a stake in regional security affairs thereby ending Turkish mediation efforts and showing how Turkey’s Ottoman-infused nationalist rhetoric could alienate Christian nations in the Balkans moving away from the invocation of the Ottoman legacy to being a power broker that maintained parallel links with the key local ethnic groups Turkey faces an enduring challenge: how to balance ties with both the Serbs and Albanians the challenge of maintaining a balance between these two ethnic groups has only intensified as Ankara becomes more assertive as a diplomatic actor and arms exporter in the region including the likes of Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama and even Milorad Dodik a Serbian entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina Increased Turkish activism in the region also reflects the breakdown of Ankara’s ties with the West. The Balkans have now emerged as an area where Erdoğan can display defiance toward the West or engage the West on a more cooperative basis, depending on circumstances. In 2018 when several European governments with large Turkish diasporas for prohibiting him from holding electoral rallies on their soil he responded by organizing a large rally in Sarajevo Güler met Kosovo’s President Vjosa Osmani and discussed the same issue At the same time, Ankara has worked to build relations with Kosovo’s new Prime Minister Albin Kurti since he came to power in 2021. Former Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi was a close friend of Ankara’s, but he is now being tried for war crimes Erdoğan’s most recent visit was a chance to continue improving ties with Belgrade and with the new Albanian regime The overlap of interest between Turkey and its Albanian and Serbian partners as well as the fact of the transactional and pragmatic nature of the leaders involved will help ensure that this pattern continues Turkey will maintain its old policy of sometimes clashing and sometimes cooperating with the West and using the Balkans as low-hanging fruit to develop a working agenda and leverage with the West will continue the local nations accustomed to playing external powers against each other will use this opportunity to engage powers like Turkey and use it for their ends While the Serbs and Albanians are irrelevant factors in European and global geopolitics they are the two on which the regional equilibrium depends Ankara appears to be mindful of this reality although with the unresolved Kosovo dispute and local countries lack capacity for prolonged warfare But more localized violence is always possible Any instability in the Balkans would be bad news for Turkey which is already faced with conflicts in other neighboring regions efforts by using its political leverage to help break the deadlock in talks between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians Turkey will see its weapons sales to the region used by local power-brokers to advance their own agendas Dr Vuk Vuksanović is a senior researcher at the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) and an associate of LSE IDEAS, a foreign policy think tank at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). This piece is in part based on the report he authored for the BCSP Image: Hamed Malekpour via Wikimedia Commons Signing up for this newsletter means you agree to our data policy The Western Balkans 6 Country Climate and Development Report (CCDR) examines how the region can boost climate adaptation and reduce greenhouse gas emissions while continuing to deliver on broader development goals This comprehensive report covers six economies of the Western Balkans: Albania Download Full Report  Executive Summary | Press Release   The Western Balkans CCDR provides several policy recommendations facilitating the region’s transition towards climate neutrality by 2050 These recommendations are categorized according to the 3 T’s: Transversal, Transboundary Transversal Policies enable the government to coordinate efforts across different sectors This approach helps to prevent policy duplication and ensures that agencies do not operate in isolation To support the development of these policies the governments in the Western Balkans could: Climate hazards do not adhere to geopolitical boundaries and many critical natural resources are shared across borders This highlights the importance of transboundary policies in addressing localized climate challenges The Western Balkans can contribute to this effort by implementing the following Transboundary Policies to support climate action: communities or locations would ensure that adaptation and mitigation efforts are delivered in the most effective way Key Targeted Policies recommended by the CCDR include: The Western Balkans CCDR finds that investing in adapting to the effects of and mitigating climate change is both urgent and important What does this mean for the European Union The EU Meets the Balkans Forum is therefore very timely in the current volatile context We have effectively entered a phase in which geopolitical competition and outright aggression in our immediate neighbourhood are undermining our efforts to consolidate democracy and threaten to transform Europe into a battleground of competing interests For the first time in the history of the EU we are negotiating with a country that is at war it is not just about the candidate countries fulfilling the conditions to become members we also face external disruptive forces that want to see us fail The conviction that we Europeans need to do a lot more to protect our security and our prosperity is commonplace. Public polling across the continent shows a large majority of Europeans expect us to take responsibility for our own security The new geopolitical landscape is moving our neighbourhood to gravitate even closer to the European Union as an anchor of stability and democratic values the unification of Europe is the way to consolidate stability and ensure sustainable peace and security And Enlargement is our most strategic policy tool Because the EU's offer is a positive one: It brings not just economic strength it brings not just democratic institutions it means belonging to a community of shared values This applies not just to the Western Balkans and in the East Iceland intends to hold a referendum on restarting accession talks Public sentiment towards the EU is at its highest in Norway in 25 years Switzerland attended an EU finance ministers' meeting President von der Leyen recently said: “We are living in extraordinary times” And extraordinary times require extraordinary answers. I agree with her we should dare to think beyond what we know today Just look at the new German coalition agreement which defines enlargement as a geopolitical necessity And it opens the door to new ideas such as including candidates as observers in the European Parliament and the Council while phasing them in into EU programmes and policies because a Europe in motion is creating a window of opportunity to take bold steps towards completing the unification of Europe Enlargement is a clear priority of the European Commission I know there is a frustration in many of our candidate countries the EU was too often consumed by itself: a debt crisis the consequences of the pandemic and an unprecedented energy crisis But this period of enlargement fatigue is over The current generation of European leaders understands that uniting our continent is essential to guarantee peace There is now a window of opportunity we have to seize together This is why we are working on speeding up negotiations as much as possible  And we are already seeing progress that would have been unthinkable just a few years ago Just earlier this week we have opened another negotiating cluster with Albania and likely not the last one this year.  Seizing this window of opportunity requires leadership that embraces transformational reforms It requires the ability to make difficult compromises that breaks away from the ghosts of the past and is looking to the future I know that often what we are asking is politically not easy It touches established power structures; it challenges vested interests sometimes it touches on questions of identity and it demands a clear geopolitical orientation It requires the engagement of the whole of society - from civil society organisations Citizens need to feel they have a stake in this project It has often been a shortcoming of the accession process that the big benefits of EU membership often seemed too far away We have been asking leaders to spend political capital on major reforms without being able to show benefits that change the lives of voters already in the short term.   This is something we are addressing with the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans It helps with financial incentives in return for important reforms And it will allow you to bring some of the benefits of the EU – on an equal footing with Member States – to your citizens and businesses even before you become members of the EU Some countries in the Western Balkans have already joined the Single Euro Payments Area which will make money transfers faster and cheaper a young entrepreneur in Tirana can receive payments from customers across Europe as easily as a business in Vienna or Dublin especially if we get regional cooperation right the promise of the full implementation of the Green Lanes They will help cut border waiting times 50% to 70% For any exporter from the Western Balkans to the EU Especially now that European companies want to reduce geopolitical risk by investing closer to home we should make it as easy as possible for them to choose the Balkans.  But there is still so much potential to untap This region will flourish once integrated in the European Union and freed from conflicts and borders – physical and mental – just like it happened in so many other parts of the Union We are accelerating the integration of the country into many more parts of the Single Market Because security guarantees to the country cannot just be military Enlargement is the political arm of security guarantees They will also have to build on economic strength and secure energy supplies Whatever new ideas we explore in Ukraine to deepen economic and investment links will also be considered for all other candidate countries my advice to all candidate countries is: keep working on your enlargement reforms and on regional cooperation Take advantage of the Growth Plan and other EU instruments to make it a success – and to show that you are ready for more I consider all 10 candidate countries equally and I'm ready to invest in all of them to bring them closer In some countries violation of human rights basic freedoms and democratic principles make accession difficult  But I will not turn my back to any of you and will continue pushing to get all candidate countries move forward on the EU track I want to get as many of you as possible over the finish line during my mandate the European Commission has launched many new initiatives And every time we made sure that we are already factoring in our candidates We did that with the EU Competitiveness Compass and again with the EU Preparedness Strategy and the Internal Security Strategy Because it is in our shared interest that our future members are on board from the first day of implementation we need to think broader about the environment in our neighbourhood We need to look with fresh eyes at the Black Sea region the new EU Black Sea Strategy before the summer It will aim to address the evolving situation in the region focusing on security and key region-wide challenges and opportunities (maritime issues This will be a key connecting policy framework for the countries in the region Romania and Bulgaria sit right in the middle of these considerations together with Türkiye who plays a key role in the Black Sea region If we want to seize those chances together and shield each other from the fallout of geopolitical changes My message to the candidates is: When you deliver on implementing the necessary reforms I will be your best advocate in Brussels and in the Member States so that the EU delivers as well I have no doubt that we can seize this historic moment and complete the unification of our continent the Commission approved the Reform Agendas of Albania North Macedonia and Serbia following the EU Member States' positive opinion the five Western Balkans governments commit to socio-economic and fundamental reforms .. Thank you very much for hosting this meeting here and inviting me I was glad to be here to mark the tenth anniversary of the Berlin Process Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Olivér Várhelyi,is in Serbia and Montenegro this week 16 May to advance discussions on EU related reforms and the Reform Agendas to access funding under the newly adopted €6 billion Growth Plan for the Western Balkans The Commission welcomes the political agreement reached today between the European Parliament and the Council on the €6 billion Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans underpinning the Reform and Growth Plan proposed by the Commission in November 2023 The Growth Plan for the Western Balkans was adopted by the Commission on 8 November 2023.  The Growth Plan incentivises enlargement partners’ preparations for EU membership by bringing forward some of its benefits ahead of full integration into the EU.  This in turn should significantly accelerate the speed of the enlargement process and the growth of their economies Economic convergence is an essential element in getting the Western Balkan partners closer to the EU The lack of convergence is a major issue for the Western Balkan region; it is currently at around 35% of EU average level.  The Growth Plan has the potential to double the size of the Western Balkan economies within the next decade To support this process a new €6 billion financial instrument the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans was adopted for the period 2024-2027 The Plan is based on four pillars The key to how the EU funds are divided among beneficiaries is determined in the Annex to the Reform and Growth Facility regulation The Reform and Growth Facility will reinforce the current financial assistance under IPA III The Reform and Growth Facility regulation entered into force on 25 May 2024 Read more The Commission shall sign loan and facility agreements with each beneficiary having an approved Reform Agenda.  Beneficiaries can request the release of a pre-financing of up to 7% of their total allocation foreseen under the Facility.  The disbursement of pre-financing will be subject to the entry into force of the two agreements and subject to the respect of the preconditions.  In parallel, a pipeline of investments to be channelled through the Western Balkans Investment Framework is in preparation where she will meet the Prime Minister of Albania She will also deliver a speech at the opening ceremony of the academic year of the College of Europe campus in Tirana where she will meet with the Prime Minister of North Macedonia President von der Leyen will travel to Jablanica to visit the areas affected by the floods that recently hit the country where she will meet with the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the Chairwoman of the Council of Ministers she will meet with the President of Serbia President von der Leyen will be in Pristina where she will meet with the President of Kosovo She will conclude her trip to the region in Podgorica where she will have meetings with the President of Montenegro The President will hold press conferences during all her visits, and they will be broadcast on EbS This year´s visit follows that of last year, and the several occasions in which the President has outlined the importance of the region for the European Union. She did so recently, at the Berlin Process Summit and the Bled Strategic Forum (For more information: Eric Mamer – Tel.: +32 229-94073; Arianna Podesta – Tel.: +32 2 298 70 24) Western Balkan economies are in the initial phase of a green transition Progress in smart specialisation – introduced in 2016 and involving shared features with green transition such as sustainability societal challenges and digitalisation – can help unlock the potential of a green transformation The findings are published in the report Green transition and Smart Specialisation in the Western Balkans It investigates regional research and innovation capacities for the green transition through the lens of smart specialisation and highlights policy actions to leverage these capacities within both national frameworks and collaborative initiatives The report analyses the main challenges and opportunities emphasising the need for enhanced inter-ministerial coordination upskilling and re-skilling of the workforce and public awareness to support a successful green transformation According to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) the Western Balkan economies currently lag behind 11 EU countries in Central Eastern Europe in terms of the green quality of a sustainable market economy As for carbon intensity of GDP (CO2 emissions per unit of GDP) most Western Balkan economies show ratios several times higher than the EU average which accounts for 70% of electricity production significantly hinders the transition to a low-carbon economy The carbon intensity of electricity production in the Western Balkans surpassed more than three times that of the EU-27 average in 2020.  emissions are predominantly generated in the electricity and heating sector a relatively higher proportion compared to most EU member states where the transport sector is the primary contributor to emissions Key environmental challenges include threats to biodiversity trends towards more intensive farming in agriculture poorly enforced waste and recycling legislation and concerns related to mining and potential transboundary risks The Western Balkans are particularly vulnerable to climate change due to a relatively high percentage of the population employed in weather and climate-related sectors The EU integration process is currently the main political driver of change in the region The Green Agenda for the Western Balkans aims to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 decouple economic growth from resource use The agenda focuses on five key pillars:  The EU support its implementation through the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA III) and the Economic and Investment Plan (EIP) with €9 billion in grants and €20 billion in guarantees Smart specialisation strategies have a pivotal role in promoting environmentally focused activities and in facilitating the green transition in the Western Balkan region development of skills and robust funding are key steps to push forward action on climate To support the green transition in the Western Balkans aligning policies with EU environmental objectives is crucial especially to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 along with implementing national energy and climate plans Introducing carbon-pricing mechanisms like the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) can accelerate decarbonisation in key sectors which directly support vulnerable regions and communities is recommended to address socio-economic impacts.  Other essential initiatives include agendas to measure the economic impact of decarbonisation and embedding climate considerations across transport Investments in waste recycling and urban waste management infrastructure will further support this transition Education and capacity building are key for the Western Balkans' green future By focusing on sectors like sustainable agriculture and information and communication technology (ICT) S3 helps evolve education outlines to meet green economy demands.  Expanding curricula to include environmental sciences and climate policy will create a workforce skilled in sustainable practices Partnerships with universities and research institutions foster knowledge sharing and skill transfer while regional training centres offer small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) insights on emissions reduction A robust financing approach is essential for advancing the green transition Collaboration with international financial institutions to create dedicated funds and offer low-interest loans for SMEs adopting green practices is crucial Comprehensive funding mechanisms across sectors will encourage environmental goals.  S3 provides a pathway for investment that aligns with both economic and environmental objectives supporting the Western Balkans in meeting EU climate goals and attracting investment S3’s Entrepreneurial Discovery Process (EDP) fosters cross-sectoral collaboration guiding the development of alternative industries like green manufacturing and eco-tourism which create jobs and reduce environmental impact the Western Balkans can harness the potential of Smart Specialisation to align with EU climate goals cultivating an economy that prioritises environmental stewardship and sustainable development spans approximately 208,000 km² and is home to around 18 million people The region’s primary economic activities are in climate-related sectors like agriculture These six economies are committed to the Paris Agreement and EU2020 and EU2030 targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions they prioritise mitigation measures and regional collaboration.  is gaining traction to enhance competitiveness and economic transformation significant progress has been made in developing smart specialisation strategies focusing on innovation and sustainability.  * This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence Green transition and Smart Specialisation in the Western Balkans International cooperation, sustainable and trusted connections Innovation in the EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Region Knowledge Hub: Smart Specialisation in the EU Enlargement and Neigbourhood Region How effective are sanctions in the Western Balkans Click here to register Click here to access the Database The study highlights how sanctions have influenced individuals Financial sanctions from the US and UK have constrained prominent figures like Milorad Dodik in Bosnia and Herzegovina whose access to financial services has been severely restricted similar sanctions in Serbia and Kosovo have yielded mixed results with businesses tied to sanctioned individuals continuing to secure state contracts worth millions sanctions stigmatize individuals and force them into political isolation they are framed as resistance to Western interference enabling sanctioned figures to gain prominence rather than being sidelined individuals under sanctions have been appointed to senior government roles raising concerns about the effectiveness of external punitive measures in politically complex environments The report also reveals the uneven geographical application of sanctions with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia receiving the highest number of designations and political destabilization dominate the list of offenses and economic realities in the Western Balkans often limit sanctions’ intended outcomes the report suggests that sanctions must be integrated into broader policy frameworks that combine legal reforms Enhancing transparency and ensuring consistent enforcement could improve sanctions’ impact making them a more effective tool for fighting corruption and promoting stability in the region North America Strategic Platform on Organized Crime An official website of the United States government A .gov website belongs to an official government organization in the United States ) or https:// means you’ve safely connected to the .gov website Share sensitive information only on official Emergency Information for American Citizens Applications for this program are now closed GIST Innovates the Balkans is a ten-week pre-accelerator training program modeled on Lean Startup methodology We will coach teams on application of Lean Startup entrepreneurship methodology guiding them on how to do effective customer discovery for problem/solution fit of participants’ ideas teams will have completed at least 40 interviews with target customers in the U.S. gaining valuable insight on how to shape their product for maximum impact in the U.S The program will provide innovators with the training and resources they need to build their entrepreneurial skills and bring their ideas to market The program will also provide opportunities for teams to connect with mentors in the U.S and provide opportunities to interact with U.S.-based investors and companies select teams may have an opportunity to pitch their ideas to investors at Arizona State University’s bi-annual Venture Devils Demo Day at ASU in Greater Phoenix The program is open to all science and technology startup companies led by entrepreneurs and innovators from Kosovo You can learn more about this specific program and the larger work of the GIST Initiative at our website. -Application window: 13 January 2025 – 11 April 2025 -10-week training program: The training will begin with an in-person workshop 2 – 5 June Albania followed by 9 weeks of virtual learning -November 2025 Venture Devils Demo Day at ASU in Greater Phoenix This program is perfect for Balkans startups that are looking to take their innovations to the next level by getting mentoring All Balkan science and technology startups whose founder is 18 – 40 years of age are eligible to apply Please read the full eligibility requirements before applying The broader aim of GIST Innovates Balkans is to reinforce productive values in the entrepreneurial ecosystem of the Balkans and inclusion of traditionally underrepresented groups The program is open to all science and technology companies led by entrepreneurs and innovators from Kosovo You may create an account on the Appointment Service Website and follow instructions for applying Whether you are applying for the first time or renewing your visa, you will use the same application process. 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