Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on August 29 ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 30 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment Russian forces are currently pursuing two immediate tactical efforts as part of their ongoing offensive operation to seize Pokrovsk — a tactical effort along the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka line east of Pokrovsk to seize Myrnohrad and advance up to Pokrovsk's outskirts and another tactical effort along the Selydove-Ukrainsk-Hirnyk line southeast of Pokrovsk aimed at widening Russia's salient in the Pokrovsk direction and eliminating vulnerabilities to Ukrainian counterattacks The Russian military command likely views both of these tactical efforts as desired prerequisites for launching an intensified offensive effort against Pokrovsk itself Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on August 29 that the most intense battles in the Pokrovsk direction are ongoing on the eastern outskirts of Hrodivka (east of Pokrovsk) within Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) and immediately east of Selydove near Mykhailivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[1] ISW has observed Russian gains in these areas in recent days but Russian milbloggers have claimed that Russian forces have made more significant tactical gains in the Pokrovsk direction than what observed visually confirmed evidence currently supports.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to the southeastern outskirts of Myrnohrad (immediately east of Pokrovsk) and have begun small arms battles with Ukrainian forces in the town although a Ukrainian military observer described the Russian forces operating in the town as sabotage and reconnaissance groups.[3] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have advanced in much of eastern Selydove and have reached the center of the town.[4] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces are fighting on the northeastern outskirts of Ukrainsk (southeast of Pokrovsk) seized Memryk (immediately northeast of Ukrainsk) and entered Halitsynivka (immediately east of Ukrainsk).[5] Russian forces appear to be attempting to maintain their rate of advance along the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka line to quickly seize Myrnohrad and reach the outskirts of Pokrovsk although it remains unclear if Russian forces can maintain their relatively rapid rate of advance through the comparatively larger town of Myrnohrad and its surroundings Russian forces may attempt to fight directly through Ukrainian defensive positions along the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka line in order to maintain their rate of advance and try to seize Myrnohrad more quickly Russian efforts to seize Myrnohrad do not preclude Russian forces from advancing up to the eastern outskirts of Pokrovsk and the Russian military will likely pursue these tactical goals in tandem Reported Russian advances into Selydove and in the direction of Ukrainsk and Hirnyk likely aim to eliminate a relatively large Ukrainian salient on the southern edge of the wider Russian salient in the Pokrovsk direction that could threaten Russia's offensive effort in the area Ukrainian positions east of the Selydove-Ukrainsk-Hirnyk line offer Ukrainian forces opportunities to threaten the Russian rear in the Pokrovsk direction and the Russian military command is likely concerned about Ukrainian counterattacks and fires disrupting Russian offensive efforts as Russian forces deploy logistics and force concentrations westward into the forward part of the salient to support the intensified effort on Pokrovsk itself Russian positions along the E-50 (Donetsk City-Pokrovsk) highway southwest of Avdiivka are roughly 13 kilometers from Avdiivka whereas the current line of Russian advance along the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka line is 30 kilometers from Avdiivka Significant Ukrainian counterattacks from the base of the salient towards Avdiivka could threaten to encircle the Russian force grouping deployed forward in the salient and the Russian military command likely aims to preempt this possibility by eliminating the Ukrainian salient on the southern flank of the Pokrovsk direction Russian forces likely hope that advances in the direction of Ukrainsk and Hirnyk will mutually support ongoing offensive operations west of Donetsk City and that offensive pressure from both directions will overwhelm Ukrainian forces or prompt Ukraine to withdraw from the limited positions in the rural open areas east of Ukrainsk and Hirnyk The area north of Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City) is mainly comprised of open fields with limited cover or concealment from relatively few windbreaks and Russian advances through this terrain would likely require significant successful mechanized assaults which Russian forces have routinely struggled to conduct.[9] Russian forces have proven more adept at advancing from settlement to settlement with small infantry groups in the Pokrovsk direction although it remains to be seen if Russian infantry groups can maintain their rate of advance as they approach Ukrainsk and Hirnyk.[10] The Russian military command likely aims to achieve both of these tactical efforts before launching the more resource-intensive effort to seize Pokrovsk itself although Russian forces may begin urban combat in Pokrovsk regardless if progress stalls on these preparatory efforts It remains unclear if the Russian military command intends for Russian forces to fight their way entirely through Pokrovsk in frontal urban combat as they have through the smaller towns east and southeast of Pokrovsk or aims to envelop or encircle the city as Russian forces previously attempted and failed to do against Bakhmut and Avdiivka.[11] The Russian military command's calculus about what preparatory actions are required for launching offensive operations on the city of Pokrovsk and how Russian forces will attempt to seize the city will likely depend on where Ukrainian forces decide to engage in significant defensive efforts ISW will not speculate or forecast about future Ukrainian defensive efforts Russian authorities are creating new volunteer territorial defense units in response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast highlighting Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwillingness to counter the incursion more seriously with a mobilization due to the risks of societal discontent or with large-scale redeployments due to possible disruptions to Russia's ongoing offensive operations in eastern Ukraine Smirnov stated that volunteers will sign six-month contracts and receive any "necessary" weapons to perform their duties Kursk Oblast officials published a recruitment ad for the detachment on August 24.[13] Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vitaly Sarantsev reported that Russian authorities are also forming "BARS-Bryansk" and "BARS-Belgorod" detachments and that the three detachments will support the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces.[14] Sarantsev estimated that the three detachments will be comprised of 4,921 volunteers in total The formation of these new BARS (Russian Army Combat Reserve) volunteer detachments is consistent with the Kremlin's apparent strategy to avoid re-deploying experienced or combat effective units engaged in fighting in the Pokrovsk or Toretsk directions to Kursk Oblast due to concerns about slowing the tempo of Russian offensive operations in these higher priority directions ISW previously noted that the Kremlin appears to be largely relying on conscripts and irregular forces redeployed from lower-priority directions in Ukraine to defend against the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.[15] Putin indicated a possible desire to continue relying on Russian volunteer servicemembers (dobrovoltsy) to address the Ukrainian incursion during his August 12 meeting with Russian military and civilian officials by alluding to increased willingness to sign military service contracts among prospective dobrovoltsy.[16] Putin has consistently relied on volunteer and irregular formations to alleviate Russia's manpower constraints during the war and has avoided declaring general mobilization or another round of partial mobilization both of which would be incredibly unpopular among Russian society.[17] Putin almost certainly remains extremely averse to declaring general mobilization and will likely continue to rely on irregular formations to address the ongoing Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast until Russian offensive operations culminate in eastern Ukraine — at which point Putin may consider re-deploying more combat effective Russian forces from these directions to push Ukrainian units back across the border   Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced north of Sudzha as Russian forces recaptured some areas of Kursk Oblast on August 29 Geolocated footage published on August 29 shows that Ukrainian forces have reached Nizhnyaya Parovaya (north of Sudzha) and advanced into the northwestern part of the settlement.[18] Additional geolocated footage published on August 29 shows that Russian forces have likely recaptured Ulanok (southeast of Sudzha) and eastern Korenevo.[19] Ukrainian forces continued attacking near Korenevo Malaya Loknya and Russkoye Porechnoye (both north of Sudzha) and within Borki (southeast of Sudzha).[20] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces are continuing to storm Korenevo to try to create a route to Rylsk (northwest of Korenevo).[21] Elements of the Russian "Kaskad" Operational Combat Tactical Formation (formerly of the Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] reportedly since subordinated to Rosgvardia) are reportedly fighting near Korenevo though the Russian military command reportedly previously dissolved the formation.[22] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 29 that a Ukrainian F-16 fighter jet recently crashed while defending against a large-scale Russian drone and missile strike.[23] An unnamed US official told Western media on August 29 that the jet crashed on August 26 and the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appointed a special commission to determine the cause of the crash.[24] The loss of equipment and aircraft during combat operations is not particularly novel and it is expected that Ukraine will lose some Western-provided military equipment during combat any loss among Ukraine's already limited allotment of Western-provided F-16s and trained pilots will have an outsized impact on Ukraine's ability to operate F-16s in the near term as part of its combined air defense umbrella or in an air-to-ground support role Russian authorities arrested and charged former Russian Deputy Defense Minister Army General Pavel Popov with large-scale fraud on August 29 The Russian Investigative Committee charged Popov with embezzling money meant for the maintenance of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Patriot Park a Russian military exhibition in Moscow.[25] Russian authorities did not disclose how much money Popov is suspected of embezzling personally but noted his case is connected to the large-scale fraud cases of the Patriot Park Head Vyacheslav Akhmedov and MoD Directorate for Innovative Development Deputy Head Major General Vladimir Shesterov whom Russian authorities arrested on August 5 for embezzling over 40 million rubles (roughly $471,000).[26] Russian state news outlet TASS reported that Akhmedov testified against Popov.[27] A Russian source that has previously correctly preemptively reported several command changes within the Russian MoD assessed on August 5 that Popov could be the next high-ranking MoD official to be arrested.[28] Russian sources have previously theorized that the arrests of high-ranking MoD officials who served under former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu may be part of an effort to "clean house" of Shoigu's affiliates within the MoD which the sources claimed indicates that Shoigu's influence within the Kremlin may be declining.[29] Russian President Vladimir Putin will conduct an official visit to Mongolia despite Mongolia's status as a signatory to the Rome Statue and Mongolia’s legal obligation to enforce an arrest warrant for Putin from the International Criminal Court (ICC) The Kremlin press service announced on August 29 that Putin will travel to Mongolia on September 3 further highlighting the strong bilateral relations between the two countries.[33] Russia has previously stated that it does not recognize the ICC's jurisdiction and Russian officials have not yet commented on the possibility of Putin’s arrest in Mongolia The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on August 29 that Ukrainian forces struck the Atlas Oil Refinery in Rostov Oblast and the Zenit Oil Depot in Kirov Oblast on the night of August 27 to 28.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that members of Ukraine's Special Operations Forces Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Ukrainian forces struck the Atlas Oil Refinery causing a fire at the refinery's vertical reservoirs The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Zenit Oil Depot and a field artillery warehouse of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces in Voronezh Oblast and are clarifying the effect of these strikes Russian and Ukrainian sources stated on August 28 that Ukrainian forces struck targets in Rostov   We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City) Fighting continued north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City in Vovchansk on August 29 Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are operating near Lukyantsi (north of Kharkiv City) and that elements of the Russian 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA] Southern Military District [SMD]) continued conducting a relief in place for elements of the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade near Tykhe (northeast of Kharkiv City and east of Vovchansk).[40]   Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Kupyansk and reportedly seized Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk) amid continued fighting along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on August 29 Geolocated footage published on August 29 indicates that Russian forces advanced in central Synkivka.[41] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Synkivka and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Stelmakhivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[42]A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Tabaivka.[43]ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims Fighting continued near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Stelmakhivka and Kruhlyakivka and towards Lozova; west of Svatove near Myasozharivka; southwest of Svatove near Tverdokhlibove and towards Cherneshchyna and Druzhelyubivka; northwest of Kreminna near Novosadove and Makiivka; west of Kreminna near Torske; and south of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area on August 28 and 29.[44] A Ukrainian officer operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are attacking daily in small squad-sized assault groups of two to four people and have recently been using equipment after not using equipment for an unspecified amount of time.[45]   Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas) Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka and Spirne on August 28 and 29 but there were no changes to the frontline.[46] Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar; north of Chasiv Yar near Hryhorivka; east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Bila Hora on August 28 and 29.[47] Elements of the Russian Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Hryhorivka.[48]   Russian forces recently advanced east of Toretsk and reportedly advanced further within eastern Toretsk on August 29 Geolocated footage published on August 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Chapaieva Street in northwestern Druzhba (east of Toretsk).[49] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 500 meters in eastern Toretsk on August 29 although ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[50] Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk east of Toretsk near Pivnichne and Druzhba south of Toretsk near Niu York and Nelipivka and southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka on August 28 and 29.[51]   Russian forces recently advanced east and southeast of Pokrovsk and continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 29 Geolocated footage published on August 29 indicates that Russian forces advanced to a windbreak northwest of Svyrydonivka (east of Pokrovsk) northwards in fields east of Hordivka (east of Pokrovsk) 1/3 in northwestern Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) and westward up to the Rosiia Mine slag heap north of Mykhailivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further within northwestern Novohrodivka although ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[53] Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Vozdvyzhenka and Hrodivka and southeast of Pokrovsk near Novohrodivka   Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and Krasnohorivka on August 29 but did not make any confirmed gains.[55] Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) and 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA] Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka.[56] Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City and continued offensive operations in the area on August 29 Geolocated footage published on August 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in fields south of Pobieda.[57] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northward past the T-05-09 highway west of Pavlivka and advanced along a front up to 2.5 kilometers wide and a kilometer deep northeast of Vuhledar.[58] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims Russian forces continued offensive operations near Kostyantynivka   Russian and Ukrainian forces did not report fighting in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on August 29 Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes) A Russian milblogger claimed on August 29 that positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 29.[60] Another Russian milblogger claimed on August 29 that elements of the Russian 70th and 71st motorized rifle regiments (both of the (42nd Motorized Rifle Division Southern Military District [SMD]) advanced north and east of Robotyne although ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[61] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked in Robotyne and northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka on August 28 and 29.[62] Sevastopol occupation head Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed on August 29 that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian aerial and naval drone strike on Sevastopol and destroyed four aerial drones over the Black Sea and three naval drones in the area.[63] ISW has not observed additional evidence confirming this claim and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline) Russian forces conducted a large series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 28 to 29 Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk reported on August 29 that Russian forces launched three Kh-59/69 cruise missiles and two missiles of an unspecified type from airspace over Kursk and Belgorod oblasts and 74 Shahed-136/131 drones from Primorsk-Akhtarsk and Yeysk Krasnodar Krai and Kursk Oblast.[64] Oleshchuk reported that Ukranian forces downed two Kh-59/69 missiles and 60 Shahed drones over Kharkiv and Donetsk oblasts and that the other 14 drones did not strike their intended targets Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization) The Russian government continues to expand pathways for accused criminals to sign military service contracts Kremlin newswire TASS reported on August 29 that a group of State Duma deputies submitted a bill proposing to allow accused criminals to sign military service contracts during mobilization and wartime.[65] Russian State Duma State Building and Legislation Committee Head Pavel Krasheninnikov and Defense Committee Head Andrei Kartapolov and Russian Federation Council Constitutional Legislation and State Building Committee Head Andrei Klishas authored the bill and noted that the bill does not apply to criminals accused of violence against minors The author's explanatory note states that the bill also allows for people with a criminal record or who have expunged criminal records to sign military service contracts It is unclear how the proposed process is legally different from the current mechanisms through which Russia has had convict recruits sign military contracts although the new law may no longer require the immediate pardons that the Kremlin appeared to be offering convicts in exchange for signing contracts.[66] Russian authorities have previously relied on penal and convict recruits to supplant Russia's manpower needs in Ukraine.[67] Kremlin officials continue to project confidence about the state of Russia's domestic drone production capabilities Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov claimed on August 29 that Russia is developing its high-tech industry and that Russian drone production industry is moving towards using a higher percentage of import-substituted component parts and machine building equipment.[68] Russia has previously relied on the People's Republic of China (PRC) to evade sanctions and offset limitations in its domestic technology and production capacities and the PRC is set to limit the export of an unspecified number of radio and drone production components to Russia beginning on September 1.[69] Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine) Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US ISW is suspending publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts until further notice Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today Russian Information Operations and Narratives Russian officials recently intensified existing narratives attempting to deter the West from providing further military assistance to Ukraine and prevent the West from lifting restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons against military targets in Russia Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova and First Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN Dmitri Polyansky recently doubled down on narratives accusing Ukraine and the West of escalating the war in Ukraine and permitting alleged Ukrainian war crimes in Kursk Oblast.[70] The Kremlin has routinely intensified these information operations during critical moments in Western policy discussions regarding support for Ukraine and is likely doing so now as part of its ongoing reflexive control campaign to coerce Western decision-makers into making policy decisions favorable to Russia.[71] Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus) Ukraine's State Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko reported on August 29 that Ukrainian forces have not recorded any significant movement or increase of Belarusian forces near the Ukrainian border and the implications that such an incursion would have for Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s regime domestically.[74] Independent Belarusian monitoring group the Hajun Project reported on August 28 that Belarusian forces used a fixed wing aircraft to shoot down a Russian Shahed-136/131 drone that violated Belarusian airspace amid a large-scale Russian strike on Ukraine on the night of August 28 to 29.[75] Belarusian forces reportedly shot down the drone over Yelsk Raion Gomel Oblast (which shares a border with northern Ukraine) Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update   [1] https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFofUkraine/posts/pfbid02dAFUbguyJ6ti1Xx4GKu9JNNtteqK33sf7Gj4h8fBH2aqzLGy9YPnhyALJgZQsJial ; https://t.me/osirskiy/830 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/08/29/golovnokomanduvach-zsu-pobuvav-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-i-rozpoviv-pro-zhorstki-boyi/ [2] https://t.me/operativnoZSU/155760; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6583 ; https://t.me/ngu_war_for_peace/20294; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6582 ; https://t.me/officer_alex33/3599; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6580 ; https://www.facebook.com/151OMBr/videos/856130316682507/; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6587 ; https://t.me/okspn/32537; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6589 ; [3] https://t.me/dva_majors/50947 ; https://t.me/stringer_donetsk/13580 ; https://t.me/Donbas_Operativnyi/87930 [4] https://t.me/stringer_donetsk/13578; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27847 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/135301 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58614 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58629 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/19177 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/135368 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/135278; [5] https://t.me/stringer_donetsk/13581 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27856 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/135353 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58636 [6] https://t.me/rybar/63125; https://t.me/rybar/62816; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/135195 ; https://t.me/zimovskyAL/31879; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58508; https://t.me/rybar/62969 [8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024 [9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar080824; https://isw.pub/UkrWar08072024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar073024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072524; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2024 [10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024 [11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv [13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-24-2024 [14] https://t.me/otukharkiv/975 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/08/29/okupanty-formuyut-novu-brygadu-dlya-pidtrymky-svoyih-syl-na-harkivshhyni/ [16] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74856 ; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6891385 [17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121423 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012223 [18] https://t.me/napravleniespravedlivosti/283; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6584 [19] https://x.com/blinzka/status/1829143931310977133; https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1829125774374310218; https://t.me/black_swan_ukraine/184; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6588; https://x.com/EjShahid/status/1828803134417957344 [20] https://t.me/rybar/63146; https://t.me/dva_majors/50947; https://t.me/wargonzo/21806 ; 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https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Bp4dr92qk2zHW1YEuNAwPyZ7KPNvhinR8r46MauKYDt88NdpLgrxGT8Amw3BYBBCl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Znz1cYM6oYhxkV7eYuL9qyGxu6AKnj9pAkpCkvELzQZayx2xVxG8BmF7FCfrtSLdl [45] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/08/29/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-vorozhu-taktyku-vypalenoyi-zemli-na-lymanskomu-napryamku/ [46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zk9JE35rpj96MTjvBrtAspTzFf5Joc3gcvY7tXtucB2zuFMm2TspVxbJdUXfgJKsl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Bp4dr92qk2zHW1YEuNAwPyZ7KPNvhinR8r46MauKYDt88NdpLgrxGT8Amw3BYBBCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Znz1cYM6oYhxkV7eYuL9qyGxu6AKnj9pAkpCkvELzQZayx2xVxG8BmF7FCfrtSLdl [47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Zk9JE35rpj96MTjvBrtAspTzFf5Joc3gcvY7tXtucB2zuFMm2TspVxbJdUXfgJKsl ; 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and settlements as they push forward Ukrainsk lies around 30 kilometers (18 miles) west of the regional capital Donetsk Moscow's forces are seeking to gain control of the entire Donetsk region and have demanded Kyiv withdraw its troops from there They’ve also said that Ukraine’s withdrawal from the Luhansk saying its troops had "liberated the settlements" of Hostre and Hryhorivka in the Donetsk region Hostre is a small village located around 30 kilometers (18 miles) west of the city of Donetsk while Hryhorivka lies close to the hilltop town of Chasiv Yar Russia's Prosecutor General's Office has designated The Moscow Times as an "undesirable" organization criminalizing our work and putting our staff at risk of prosecution This follows our earlier unjust labeling as a "foreign agent." These actions are direct attempts to silence independent journalism in Russia The authorities claim our work "discredits the decisions of the Russian leadership." We see things differently: we strive to provide accurate We, the journalists of The Moscow Times, refuse to be silenced. But to continue our work, we need your help please support us monthly starting from just $2 and every contribution makes a significant impact independent journalism in the face of repression Ukrainian emergency service workers and police evacuate civilians from the village of Ukrainsk close to the front line in the direction of Pokrovsk Russian forces have captured the Ukrainian town of Ukrainsk in the eastern Donetsk region as they advanced westwards in a bid to take the whole of the Donbas Russian state-run RIA news agency and pro-Russian war bloggers report Russian troops raised their flag on a mine ventilation shaft on the outskirts of the town, which had a population of more than 10,000 people before the war, RIA said, citing an unidentified source in the Russian military. an Ukrainian-born pro-Russian military blogger adding that Russian forces had taken the city “almost intact” allowing them to use it as a base for further offensive operations There was no immediate comment from the Russian or Ukrainian defence ministries Reuters was unable to immediately verify battlefield claims from either side due to reporting restrictions in the war zone Russian forces had encircled Ukrainsk earlier this month as they advanced westwards towards Pokrovsk, part of what Russian President Vladimir Putin says is a primary goal to take all of the Donbas region a town to the south with a pre-war population of about 10,000 a town to the north with a pre-war population of more than 20,000 Since Russia sent its army into Ukraine in February 2022 the war has largely been a story of grinding artillery and drone strikes along a heavily fortified 1000km front involving hundreds of thousands of soldiers Russia in August advanced at its fastest monthly pace in two years, according to open source maps, although Ukraine also took a chunk of Russia’s Kursk region in a surprise August 6 incursion control 98.5 per cent of the Luhansk region and 60% of the Donetsk region Together, the two regions make up the Donbas, which is the cradle of the war. After a pro-Russian president was toppled in Ukraine’s 2014 Maidan Revolution Russia annexed Crimea and pro-Russian protests broke out in parts of the Donbas where Russia began supporting separatist forces Russia said on Tuesday it had repelled five new attempts by Ukrainian forces to smash through its border into the Kursk region bringing the total number of reported attacks on the border to 26 in just the past six days The number of Ukrainians and Russians killed or wounded in the war has reached roughly one million Microsoft has closed Skype to focus on its Teams service Russian forces have captured the Ukrainian town of Ukrainsk in the eastern Donetsk region as they advanced westwards in a bid to take the whole of the Donbas Russian troops raised their flag on a mine ventilation shaft on the outskirts of the town which had a population of more than 10,000 people before the war citing an unidentified source in the Russian military adding that Russian forces had taken the city "almost intact" allowing them to use it as a base for further offensive operations Media reports say the number of Ukrainians and Russians killed or wounded in the war is one million Russian forces had encircled Ukrainsk earlier this month as they advanced westwards towards Pokrovsk part of what Russian President Vladimir Putin says is a primary goal to take all of the Donbas region a town to the north with a pre-war population of more than 20,000 Russia in August advanced at its fastest monthly pace in two years although Ukraine also took a chunk of Russia's Kursk region in a surprise August 6 incursion control 98.5 per cent of the Luhansk region and 60 per cent of the Donetsk region After a pro-Russian president was toppled in Ukraine's 2014 Maidan Revolution Please check your email and enter your one time pin below:   Open in Gmail Sorry there was an error loading the audio The head of Russia’s nuclear testing site said on Tuesday his secretive facility was ready to resume nuclear tests “at any moment” if Moscow gave the order in rare comments likely to fuel concerns that the risk of such a step is rising Top Russian security official Sergei Shoigu held talks with his Iranian counterpart in Tehran on Tuesday, Russian and Iranian media said, days after meeting North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang.advertisementDon't want to see this? Remove ads Russian forces captured the Ukrainian town of Ukrainsk in the eastern Donetsk region on Tuesday as they advanced westwards in a bid to take the whole of the Donbas reported the Russian state-run RIA news agency and pro-Russian war bloggers which had a population of more than 10,000 before the war adding that Russian forces had taken the city “almost intact” allowing them to use it as a base for further offensive operations Russian forces had encircled Ukrainsk earlier this month as they advanced westwards towards Pokrovsk, part of what President Vladimir Putin says is a primary goal to take all of the Donbas region which has an area about half the size of the US state of Ohio.advertisementDon't want to see this? Remove ads a town to the south with a pre-war population of more than 10,000 the war has largely been a story of grinding artillery and drone strikes along a heavily fortified 1,000km front involving hundreds of thousands of soldiers though Ukraine also took a chunk of Russia’s Kursk region in a surprise incursion on 6 August control 98.5% of the Luhansk region and 60% of the Donetsk region where Moscow began supporting separatist forces Russia said on Tuesday it had repelled five new attempts by Ukrainian forces to smash through its border into the Kursk region The number of Ukrainians and Russians killed or wounded in the war has reached roughly one million Moscow has not conducted a nuclear weapons test since 1990, the year before the fall of the Soviet Union, but some Western and Russian analysts say Putin could order one to try to send a message of deterrence to the West if it lets Ukraine use its long-range missiles to strike Russia A nuclear test by Russia could encourage others such as China or the US to follow suit starting a new nuclear arms race between the big powers which stopped nuclear testing in the years after the Soviet collapse located on the remote Novaya Zemlya archipelago in the Arctic Ocean was where the Soviet Union conducted more than 200 nuclear tests including the detonation of the world’s most powerful nuclear bomb in 1961 It is closely watched by Western spy satellites for activity amid signs of construction work last summer shown in open-source satellite images “The test site is ready for resumption of full-scale testing activities. It is ready in its entirety. Laboratory and testing facilities are ready. The personnel are ready. If the order comes, we can start testing at any moment,” said Sinitsyn.advertisementDon't want to see this? Remove ads Top Russian security official Sergei Shoigu held talks with his Iranian counterpart in Tehran on Tuesday, Russian and Iranian media said, days after meeting North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang Russia has deepened ties with Iran and North Korea, both of which are hostile to the US, since the start of its war in Ukraine The US views the growing relationships with concern and says both countries are supplying Russia with ballistic missiles for use in the conflict Shoigu’s trips are taking place at a crucial moment in the war as Kyiv presses the US and its allies to let it use Western-supplied long-range weapons to strike targets such as airfields deep inside Russian territory affiliated with Iran’s Supreme National Security Council said Shoigu met his Iranian opposite number There was no immediate information on the outcome of the meeting Russia has repeatedly said it is close to signing a major agreement with Iran to seal a strategic partnership between the two countries.advertisementDon't want to see this? Remove ads Shoigu was Russian defence minister until May when he was appointed secretary of the Security Council which brings together Putin’s military and intelligence chiefs and other senior officials President Joe Biden’s administration is probing a surge in imports of enriched uranium from China since late 2023 amid concerns the shipments are helping Moscow sidestep a US ban on imports of the power plant fuel from Russia US House legislators passed the ban on Russian-enriched uranium in December 2023 as part of a US effort to disrupt Putin’s ability to fund Russia’s war on Ukraine shipments of enriched uranium from China to the US shot to 242,990kg according to data from the US International Trade Commission The imports are significant because from 2020 to 2022 China did not send any enriched uranium to the US In May this year, the month that Biden signed the ban China again sent the US a large amount of uranium — this time totalling 123,894kg The US Department of Energy “along with other relevant agencies is closely tracking imports from China to ensure the proper implementation of the recently enacted Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act” US officials were watching the imports from China and other countries to “ensure they are not importing Russian uranium as part of a scheme to export material produced domestically that they would otherwise have used in their own reactors” Russia is the world’s largest exporter of enriched uranium Imports to the US from Russia through July this year stood at 313,050kg The ban allows some Russian imports to continue until 2028 if there are supply concerns Any circumvention of the ban could undermine the US effort to eventually eliminate dependence on Russian fuel for its nuclear power industry, the biggest in the world. It could also weaken the Biden administration’s attempts to jumpstart a domestic uranium supply chain as the ban unlocked $2.72-billion in public funds to do so Facebook owner Meta said on Monday it was banning RT Rossiya Segodnya and other Russian state media networks from its platforms claiming the outlets had used deceptive tactics to carry out covert influence operations online marks a sharp escalation in measures by the world’s biggest social media company against Russian state media after years of more limited steps such as blocking the outlets from running ads and reducing the reach of their posts we expanded our ongoing enforcement against Russian state media outlets RT and other related entities are now banned from our apps globally for foreign interference activity,” said the social media company RT had more than 7.2 million followers on Facebook and more than one million followers on Instagram Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters on Tuesday: “Meta is discrediting itself with these actions Such selective actions against Russian media are unacceptable This complicates prospects for normalising our relations with Meta.” Moscow branded Meta an “extremist” organisation in 2022 and blocked Instagram and Facebook, objecting to changes in Meta’s hate speech policy designed to allow users to vent their anger over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine Moscow’s pre-existing bans on Instagram and Facebook may limit its ability to respond to Meta’s state media block which Russia has stopped short of banning so far Telegram Messenger, whose Russian founder Pavel Durov was placed under formal investigation in France last month Ukraine launched the biggest foreign attack on Russia since World War 2 bursting through the border into the region of Kursk with thousands of troops supported by swarms of drones and heavy weaponry which sent tens of thousands of troops into Ukraine in 2022 began a major counteroffensive against the Ukrainian forces in Kursk on 10 September pushing Kyiv’s forces back towards the Snagost River But Ukrainian forces have been trying for about a week to pierce the Russian border towards Veseloe and Medvezhe in an attempt to threaten the Russian counteroffensive about 15km to the west of the main theatre of battle in Kursk “With the support of army aviation and artillery fire five attempts by the armed forces of Ukraine to pierce the border of the Russian Federation in the direction of Veseloe and Medvezhe were repelled,” said Russia’s defence ministry The ministry said that Russian forces were attacking in Lyubimovka Malaya Loknya and a host of other settlements in Kursk Russian military bloggers said that Ukraine had carved out some territory towards Veseloe and Medvezhe and that Russian forces were taking back territory and storming Lyubimovka Russia fired missiles at energy infrastructure in the northeast Ukrainian city of Sumy on Tuesday hours after an overnight drone strike on the region reducing power in some areas and forcing authorities to use backup power systems said Russia had used at least four missiles in the latest attack on energy facilities Ukraine’s energy ministry said Russia’s attacks had caused a fire at a power substation and cut power to more than 281,000 consumers Acting Sumy mayor Artem Kobzar said there were no casualties in the city but regional officials said the overnight drone attack had damaged the region’s Konotop The Ukrainian Air Force said Russia had launched 51 drones in Tuesday’s attack Russia also dropped three guided bombs on the town of Hlukhiv Ukraine’s northern military command said on Telegram Two people were wounded and 20 private houses public transport and a grain silo suffered damage Moscow said its air defence systems had overnight destroyed 16 Ukrainian drones over Russia’s Kursk and Bryansk regions ' + scriptOptions._localizedStrings.webview_notification_text + ' " + scriptOptions._localizedStrings.redirect_overlay_title + " " + scriptOptions._localizedStrings.redirect_overlay_text + " The State Emergency Service reported this on Facebook 29 apartment buildings and a retail facility were damaged The enemy shelling destroyed private houses and injured four civilians While citing and using any materials on the Internet links to the website ukrinform.net not lower than the first paragraph are mandatory citing the translated materials of foreign media outlets is possible only if there is a link to the website ukrinform.net and the website of a foreign media outlet Materials marked as "Advertisement" or with a disclaimer reading "The material has been posted in accordance with Part 3 of Article 9 of the Law of Ukraine "On Advertising" No 1996 and the Law of Ukraine "On the Media" No 2023 and on the basis of an agreement/invoice Online media entity; Media identifier - R40-01421 Please enable JS and disable any ad blocker waits for her son Vladyslav at her apartment in Kyiv Ukraine (AP) — Iryna Reva stares at her phone replaying the last video her 25-year-old son Vladyslav sent her from the front line before the volunteer soldier disappeared 19 months ago in a battle with Russian forces in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region Reva is one of the thousands of Ukrainians desperately seeking news of loved ones who have disappeared in the two years since Russia’s full-scale invasion began more than 30,000 people have been reported missing in the last 24 months there is no evidence that he has perished.” she begged him not to take part in a battle the next morning say your arm hurts,” she told him over the phone The missing include soldiers like Vladyslav lost on the battlefield but also civilians and children who have vanished in a variety of circumstances the agonizing uncertainty and relentless search for answers has already gone on for two years with no end in sight sits in her daughter’s home while waiting for the return of her husband Mykola in Bucha went missing during the Russian occupation of Irpin who celebrated their 70-year wedding anniversary with Mykola just a few years ago only the tear-off calendar on the wall remains and March 19 is the last day a leaf was torn off… that’s when he vanished,” said Valentyna’s daughter Liudmila Yeremenko reflecting on his disappearance This is not the only tragedy in Valentyna’s family During the Russian occupation in March 2022 a sniper killed her granddaughter Tetiana Yeremenko Inna Usenko left her hometown of Mariupol on a business trip the day before the war began in 2022 on March 1 as Russia laid siege to the eastern city and thousands of civilians were trapped a Russian airstrike hit the house where he had lived “I understand perfectly well that if I were there and maybe something would have been different Usenko filed a missing person’s report with the occupation authorities the Russian Federation and the Russian Red Cross she came to Ukraine to file a police report and provide DNA to Ukrainian authorities neither side was able to provide her with any information adding that the uncertainty not only drains her but also affects close friends The International Committee of the Red Cross says since February 2022 its team has been contacted more than 100,000 times by families searching for their loved ones wait for the return of Serhii at their apartment in Kyiv wait for her husband at her apartment in Ivankiv sits in her rented apartment while waiting for the return of her husband Andrii in Kyiv “That doesn’t mean a hundred thousand missing people But this gives you an idea of just the amount of suffering that this creates on both sides,” Achille Després the official search often begins with submitting a DNA sample head of forensics at the National Police’s main investigation department said more than 18,000 DNA samples of relatives of servicemen and civilians have been collected and processed DNA is a vital part of establishing the status of the missing person Even if fellow soldiers said they witnessed a soldier killed in battle the head of a press office at the Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs this person will have the status of missing,” he said He said they have had cases in which soldiers were found wounded in captivity despite testimony from their comrades that they were killed in battle numerous volunteer projects have arisen to aid in the search for missing people often serving as a last resort for relatives who receive no official information from authorities who runs the Search for the Missing project under the Kateryna Osadcha Foundation said they have around 1,000 open cases and have already closed hundreds She said that while they receive new applications daily the influx has dwindled compared to the initial months of the war when the project was launched the geography of missing civilians has not changed Cases originate from both liberated regions like Kyiv Many open cases relate to people missing in Mariupol because there is always a chance that some information will be found,” Reshetova said await the return of her husband in their rented apartment in Kyiv Tetiana Khvostenko’s husband Oleh was last seen in the summer of 2022 in the occupied city of Dniprorudne in the Zaporizhzhia region when the Russian military detained him as he went to pick up his car who remained in the occupied territory and therefore can’t be named for security concerns tried to get information about why he was detained They visited the military commandant’s office many times learning he’d been handed over to the Russian Federal Security Service Tetiana and her son Klim have been living in limbo devoid of any new information about Oleh’s fate The family contacted the relevant institutions on both sides international organizations including the Red Cross and even directly inquired into places of captivity “We’ve actually reached out to a lot of places and the responses are pretty much the same,” said Oleh’s son Klim “And that’s what makes it all the more difficult because there’s no result await the return of her husband Mykola at their apartment in Kyiv a Ukrainian serviceman with the 30th Mechanized Brigade went missing during fighting at the frontline in Ozarianivka “My husband was taken captive by Wagner forces but I don’t know anything about his fate or whereabouts,” Larysa said sits surrounded by her pets as she waits for her son Hryhorii inside her apartment in Kyiv a military medic with the 120th Battalion went missing at the frontline in Mayorsk he sent a message to his mother saying simply: “Love you very much I will go without connection for some time.” (AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka) await the return of husband and father Oleksandr in Mala Ofirna “Children don’t wish for presents on their birthdays; they wish for their father to come back,” Olena said waits for her missing husband Yuriy at her apartment in Kyiv disappeared during fighting against Russian forces on Aug sits at home waiting for the return of her husband Oleksandr in Svitilna chose to remain behind when his wife and son evacuated I immediately look to see if it’s him,” Liubov said waits for her missing husband Serhii in an apartment in Kyiv a Ukrainian serviceman with the 46th Separate Air Assault Brigade disappeared during fighting at the frontline near Bakhmut I am still in December (2022),” said Daryna “All I know is that they went on the assault sits in her apartment while she waits for the return of her brother Andrii in Kyiv a Ukrainian serviceman from the Territorial Defense disappeared during the fighting against Russian forces in Mariupol on March 21 no one made it out… they all disappeared without a trace,” Nina says await the return of Rostyslav at their apartment in Kyiv a serviceman with the 30th Mechanized Brigade went missing during fighting at the frontline in Mykolaivka Druha awaiting the return of her husband Vasyl at their rented apartment in Kyiv a Ukrainian serviceman with the 77th Air Assault Brigade went missing during an evacuation operation of an injured comrade at the frontline in Paraskoviivka Associated Press writers Vasilisa Stepanenko Alex Babenko and Volodymyr Yurchuk contributed to this report Russian troops edged closer to encircling Kyiv’s stronghold of Vuhledar in the eastern Donetsk region on Monday, according to the Ukrainian crowd-sourced tracking site DeepState The advance is a part of Moscow’s wide-reaching offensive in eastern Ukraine that rapidly accelerated last month despite Ukraine’s surprise incursion into western Russia’s Kursk region.   “The situation is difficult,” said Ukrainian military analyst Ivan Stupak adding that the city could fall in “a matter of days” given “the pace of the advance.” “[Vuhledar is known as] a fortress city a fortified area on an upland that has been built up over many years we are coming to the point where the city is practically surrounded,” Stupak told The Moscow Times.  Russian troops have made multiple attempts to capture the strategic coal-mining town during its two-and-a-half-year invasion, an effort that has cost Moscow thousands of troops, hundreds of tanks and armored vehicles, according to the Financial Times’ sources.   But maps released by DeepState on Monday suggest that Russian troops might finally be nearing their goal moving to block off the only remaining entryway north of the town and surrounding the 72 Mechanized Brigade that is defending it Troop “exhaustion” among Ukraine’s forces and delayed Western military aid deliveries to Kyiv have been cited as key factors that enabled Russia’s advance on Vuhledar.    Analyst Stupak believes that the near-capture of the town was also made possible after the Ukrainian command decided to redeploy some of the equipment and personnel stationed in the “fortress city” to aid the defense of the key logistics hub of Pokrovsk some 50 kilometers north of Vuhledar.   Updated map showing Russian advances on the flanks of Vuhledar, around Ukrainsk, and in New York and Toretsk. The situation in Vuhledar continues to deteriorate. https://t.co/VhSJQxhgtwhttps://t.co/e9DaSslWGo https://t.co/jfp4LhSPdr pic.twitter.com/h9zJYd3hkV Russian troops have been rapidly advancing on Pokrovsk since August and are now positioned less than 10 kilometers away from the city proper Israeli military expert David Sharp labeled the possible capture of Pokrovsk as a “key point” in Russia’s “battle for the Donetsk region” in an interview with The Moscow Times last month.    so advancing toward it means gaining territory But it could also be an important defense center if it is properly organized," Sharp said in August.  Though Vuhledar does not hold the same value for propping up the Ukrainian army’s logistics system as Pokrovsk its loss to Moscow would still count as a major setback for Ukrainian forces.   “This is [the entryway to] the southern Donbas which we are holding up to prevent the Russian army from advancing further," said analyst Stupak Stupak’s view was echoed by defense analyst Federico Borsari, who told The Kyiv Independent earlier this month that the capture of Vuhledar would be “a morale blow for Ukraine” and “a very serious development that can potentially threaten the security of the entire southwestern portion of Donetsk region.”  With no additional Western aid in sight and little hope that Russia might redirect some of its troops toward the besieged Kursk region experts say Ukraine’s chances to turn things around in Donbas remain slim.  Stupak believes that one thing that could still help Ukraine gain the upper hand is its increasingly audacious strikes on military depots in western Russia claiming that Kyiv is now eyeing a total of seven depots as potential targets.  “There’s a large quantity of missiles and various bombs in there and the shortage of ammunition should somehow stop the Russian army,” explained Stupak.  “If we [Ukrainians] can’t stop Russian soldiers head-on This issue is preventing our website from loading properly. 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LOGIN Downloadable PDFs are a benefit of an FP subscription This article is an Insider exclusive Contact us at [email protected] to learn about upgrade options unlocking the ability to gift this article were on their way to soccer practice in early February when they heard automatic weapons firing near their home in Ukraine’s front-line village of Krasnohorivka “We had to run home like we always have [to] when they shoot,” Sergey said but I never know if someone will shoot me dead.” Sergey and his siblings are among the 378,000 children in need of protection and assistance on Ukraine’s front line Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (Parents asked to withhold the last names of their children to protect their security.) After nearly eight years of simmering conflict children remain among the most vulnerable groups unable to leave the war zone maiming and death from unexploded ordnances and the occasional return of higher-intensity fighting to a conflict long thought frozen and one shell crashed through the wall of a kindergarten High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) last year alone Three boys and one girl were killed because of land mines and unexploded remnants of war while eight more were injured during explosions and shelling making this zone particularly dangerous for its youngest population who are frequently exposed to mines while traveling to and from school And there are psychological wounds as well told Foreign Policy that a boy he met in a settlement near the contact line in November 2021 “asked his grandmother if it was his fault that the shooting had started again He thought he may have done something wrong in school and that was why the shelling started,” Leon-Garcia said Due to countless incidents in recent weeks and months teachers in schools have to improvise to protect their children’s safety In the front-line village of Novomykhailivka volunteers recently decided to paint drawings on the walls to teach children how to avoid mines while playing outdoors therapists had to teach children basic breathing exercises to protect them from panic attacks “We have installed special sound isolation in the school so that pupils won’t hear shelling and shooting while in class,” said Elena Lyubchenko “Children already see and hear everything in their houses at the contact line We try to protect the school so that they can have at least one safe place in their lives.” secretary-general of the Norwegian Refugee Council said on his recent visit to Ukraine that “what you see is that all hope for the future is gone for youth and children.” Egeland added that he had visited a school in Krasnohorivka where out of five schools that were operational before the war as most of the teachers have now left their positions said that recent security incidents and shellings remind her of the beginning of the war I heard shellings so often that it felt exactly like when the war started,” she said I only know one thing for sure: that I must leave All my schoolmates only talk about leaving.”  Children like Katya are now affected by fighting and security incidents The long-term psychological effects of such trauma for children remain worrisome “Teachers report signs of psychosocial distress among children triggered by loud noises and recent estimates suggest that more than 1 in 4 children require psychosocial support,” Alyona Budagovska a nongovernmental organization (NGO) present on the front line But for some children in front-line villages we have seen children coming to school only to hide in our basement,” said Irina Fedorchenko director of a primary school in Pervomaiske we have to ask the children if they want to go home despite the bullets or if they prefer to stay at school.” limited data is available on the needs of children but it is likely that young people in separatist-controlled regions are facing similar infrastructure and public transport are virtually nonexistent and mothers claim it can take them up to 10 hours to bring their children to the nearest doctor or hospital when they are sick or injured said that since no pediatricians are present in her town changing buses and waiting for a ride to get her child to the nearest doctor especially when the child is sick and has a fever while it is 10 below outside,” she said this situation is unbearable.” (She declined to give her last name.) She added that her children often become ill as a result of drinking contaminated well water; she can’t afford bottled water “While the whole world is watching this region now—including leaders in Moscow and Kyiv—the people living on the front line say they want peace and are exhausted.” “The top military and political leaders who are sitting their offices in well-heated safe capitals should come to places like Opytne and Donetsk to sit and freeze with the vulnerable people,” he added “Maybe they will understand that this escalation is senseless.” Sara Cincurova is a freelance journalist based in Bratislava covering human rights and humanitarian issues Commenting on this and other recent articles is just one benefit of a Foreign Policy subscription Join the conversation on this and other recent Foreign Policy articles when you subscribe now Please follow our comment guidelines The default username below has been generated using the first name and last initial on your FP subscriber account Usernames may be updated at any time and must not contain inappropriate or offensive language FP’s flagship evening newsletter guiding you through the most important world stories of the day Specialty rates for students and faculty. Lock in your rates for longer. Unlock powerful intelligence for your team. You don't have permissions to access this page located about 70 kilometers northwest of Donetsk remains one of the most fiercely contested sectors of the front where Russia has concentrated its main offensive efforts since March  (Updated:  May 6, 2025 11:41 am)Ukraine's drones target Moscow second night in a row, Russian official claims, ahead of Victory Day parade. Debris from one of the drones reportedly fell on the Kashirskoye Highway The reported attack comes just days before Russia's Victory Day parade and three-day "truce." Vice President Mike Pence said Putin "only understands power." About 800 million euros ($905 million) will be allocated for the acquisition and installation of anti-tank mines to deter potential aggression  (Updated:  May 6, 2025 9:36 am)War analysisFrance is sending Ukraine more AASM Hammer bombs — here's what they can do Polish President Andrzej Duda said the United States has tools that can effectively influence the Kremlin arguing that only President Donald Trump has real leverage over Russian President Vladimir Putin The number includes 1,430 casualties that Russian forces suffered over the past day "To the Success of Our Hopeless Cause: The Many Lives of the Soviet Dissident Movement" by Benjamin Nathans which covers dissent in the Soviet Union and Russia today Reporters Without Borders (RSF) on May 5 announced they had facilitated Russian journalist Ekaterina Barabash's escape from Russia to France after she fled house arrest on April 21 A Russian drone attack on Odesa Oblast on May 5 killed one and caused damage to local infrastructure "We appreciate that Germany plays a pivotal role in supporting Ukraine throughout the years of war Ukraine is also grateful for your personal commitment," President Volodymyr Zelensky said MPs will be able to ask questions and learn more about the details of the agreement in meetings with Economy Minister Yulia Svyrydenko May 6-7 MP Serhii Sobolev told the news outlet Suspilne The ratification vote is scheduled for May 8 Attacks against the border villages of Bilopillia and Vorozhba damaged civilian infrastructure and triggered emergency evacuations the regional military administration reported "I look forward to working with President Erdogan on getting the ridiculous war between Russia and Ukraine ended — now!" U.S by The Kyiv Independent news deskMembers of the unit Dnipro One of the Joint Assault Brigade of the National Police of Ukraine "Luty" operate a Soviet-era howitzer D-30 on November 09 Ukraine (Diego Fedele/Getty Images)Russia will be able to produce 30% more artillery shells than all EU member states combined next year Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha said at a press conference in Kyiv on Nov "According to Ukrainian intelligence, using the information we have, if there is no proper response or prevention, Russia will be able to produce 30% more artillery shells than all countries of the European Union combined," he said in comments reported by Ukrinform Sybiha called for international action to constrain Russia's industrial capacity which helps Russia circumvent sanctions and continue to trade energy resources It is very important that the further strengthening of the EU's sanctions policy of our allies focus on this aspect," he said Ukraine has long tried to ramp up its own domestic ammunition production to become more independent from Western partners In the summer of 2023, Ukroboronprom said that it had already mastered the production of 82 mm mortar mines Earlier media reports cited Ukrainian officials hoping to begin producing "desperately needed" NATO-standard 155 mm artillery rounds in the 'second half' of 2024 at the earliest Despite domestic efforts, the Ukrainian army still mainly depends on supplying 155 mm shells from partners, as European countries join forces to buy the rounds outside Europe The U.S. also opened a new factory last May to produce 155 mm munitions for Ukraine and significantly increased production in some existing factories. We are the news team of the Kyiv Independent. We are here to make sure our readers get quick, essential updates about the events in Ukraine. Feel free to contact us via email with feedback and news alerts. Ukrainian ministers are fearful Vladimir Putin will go ahead with his ‘Zero Day assault plan’ as he stocks up on ammunition and manpower I would like to be emailed about offers, events and updates from The Independent. Read our Privacy notice Russia is massing around 1,800 tanks, 700 aircraft and 500,000 men for a new assault on Ukraine Ukraine has stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin is stocking up on weapons and ammunition in preparation for a massive new offensive in the coming weeks There are now fresh fears that the despot will launch an attack that will coincide with the first anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine In what is being called a Zero Day assault plan Russia has reportedly massed hundreds of thousands of soldiers and hundreds of warplanes for the invasion on already heavily war-torn Ukraine And the Eastern European country fears the assault will be “much bigger” than last year’s wave which stormed across the country and towards its capital Ukraine sources are claiming Russia is massing precisely 1,800 tanks and 300 helicopters to carry out the attack They added Putin has 2,700 artillery guns and 810 rocket launchers for a deadly “new wave of attacks,” reports Foreign Policy. A Ukrainian official said: “It’s much bigger than what took place in the first wave.” He also predicted that Moscow is “not paying attention to any casualties or losses.” and so due to the carelessness of the Kremlin, “In the next 10 days, we expect a new, huge invasion.” And according to Ukrainian intelligence, the new spring offensive could involve 300,000 to 500,000 soldiers. Russia is, reportedly, already believed to have approximately 300,000 troops operating on the ground in Ukraine. And it’s believed another 200,000 men from the recent mobilisations will be called up to fight in the offensive. There are also grave concerns among Ukrainian officials in Kyiv that Putin could also stage a new round of mobilization to further bolster his forces for the assault. Speaking out about the attack, Andriy Chernyak, an official in Ukraine’s military intelligence, told the Kyiv Post: “We’ve observed that the Russian occupation forces are redeploying additional assault groups, units, weapons, and military equipment. “According to the military intelligence of Ukraine, Putin gave the order to seize all of the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions by March.” This follows Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s visit to the UK this week, where he renewed his push to persuade Prime Minister Rishi Sunak to deliver more weapons to Ukraine. Zelensky also travelled to Brussels for talks with EU leaders this week, as he urged his Western allies and its 27 member states to speed up the delivery of promised tanks and weapons - including badly needed heavy armour. Meanwhile, last night, Zelensky accused Germany of ‘foot-dragging’ over the provision of advanced weapons to help repel Putin’s invasion. In a show of frustration, the Ukrainian president said he was “constantly having to convince” Chancellor Olaf Scholz to help him and his country kick Russia out. He told German news website Der Spiegel: “I have to exert pressure to help Ukraine and constantly convince him that this help is not for us but for Europeans. Our relationship to Germany goes in waves, it is up and down.” Despite this, Mr Scholz yesterday said the EU would send a “signal of unity and solidarity, and can show that we will continue our support for Ukraine in defending its independence and integrity.” Join thought-provoking conversations, follow other Independent readers and see their replies Putin is pushing for an offensive against Ukraine, that may come on the anniversary of the war and mailings and dive into the most pressing foreign policy issues with insights from our experts I consent to receiving the selected ECFR newsletters and to the analysis of open & click rates. I can revoke my consent later by clicking on the link at the end of every newsletter or by writing to [email protected]. More information on how we process personal data can be found here The Africa programme analyses the geopolitics of the Africa-Europe relationship the programme delves into relations between the African Union and the European Union to find creative foreign policy tools and strategies It also focuses on two regions that are particularly relevant for Europe: the Horn of Africa and the Sahel The Asia programme seeks to help Europe recalibrate its relationship with China and its Asian partners The programme analyses China’s domestic situation It also places a renewed emphasis on fostering Europe’s relationships with the Indo-Pacific The European Power programme is focused on helping Europeans develop sustainable policy solutions to the issues affecting the European Union’s capacity to act with unity on the global scene This includes analysing the path forward for enlargement The Middle East and North Africa programme seeks to support a coherent European agenda in pursuit of regional interests The programme works with European and regional governments and civil society to advance channels of dialogue as well as providing direct policy prescriptions to secure conflict de-escalation The US programme helps Europeans create policy responses to developments in US domestic politics and foreign policy The programme seeks to strengthen transatlantic relations by exploring the obstacles to a more balanced partnership and developing ideas to overcome them The Wider Europe programme aims to help the European Union defend its interests and values in the Western Balkans as well as the South Caucasus and central Asia The programme also supports EU decision-makers work on a unified and coherent policy to address the challenges resulting from Russia’s full scale-invasion of Ukraine As the new United Nations General Assembly opens the world should rapidly turn its attention to the Sea of Azov but this sizeable north-eastern offshoot of the Black Sea – encircled by Russia and Ukraine – could soon be the new frontline in the ongoing war in eastern Ukraine The Sea of Azov plays host to the key Donbas ports of Mariupol and Berdiansk Mariupol itself is indeed known across the world: Russian-backed forces seized it in bitter fighting in 2014 Mariupol has since become a symbol of Ukrainian resistance But Russia is now increasingly militarising the Sea of Azov in a series of moves that could have implications not only for maritime trade and supplies into Ukraine but also for the ongoing land war in eastern Ukraine The UN may soon need to take steps to stabilise the region Russia began asserting itself in Azov in 2015 when it began the construction of a long-anticipated bridge across the Kerch Strait The bridge stretches from Russia to sovereign Ukrainian territory (eastern Crimea) But Russia also designed the bridge in such a way as to reduce the flow of north-south shipping into and out of Mariupol and Berdiansk The Kerch bridge is just 33 metres in height making it impossible for larger ships to pass fully loaded The strait itself is narrow; even before this vessels would often have to wait before proceeding through Things began moving rapidly over the summer and early autumn Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov began stopping and delaying shipping including both Ukrainian vessels and those with flags of third party states imposing huge waiting costs on all vessels on their way to or from Ukrainian ports On 17 September Ukraine decided to abrogate the general ‘Friendship Treaty’ that it signed with Russia in 1997 But this also leaves it potentially more exposed: the Friendship Treaty contained a promise for both sides to respect each other’s borders and territorial integrity – even if Russia has since broken this promise The 2003 agreement provides a right to conduct random inspections but that was never supposed to lead to a general inspection regime vessels sailing to or from Russian ports or Rostov-on-Don do not find themselves stopped Time delays impose considerable financial costs Turkish vessels are suffering particularly but Romanian and Bulgarian and many other EU-flagged ships are also experiencing long and costly delays Russia’s aim is to put off international business in the longer term There is a political backdrop to this too: Petro Poroshenko is standing for re-election in March 2019 on a national security platform, and is taking a tougher line on Azov Losing Mariupol to Russia again would be a severe blow to Ukrainian morale at a time when populist opposition candidates are backing a message of ‘peace’ and ‘compromise’ in the 2019 elections including the later parliamentary elections in October What happens here matters for what happens inside Ukraine Mariupol is the key to maintaining the imports and exports that serve the heavy industry on both sides of the fighting line in Donbas Remaining economic connections across the frontline would weaken severely Mariupol may lose viability as a result of these Russian actions from the impact of the new bridge to Russia’s ramped-up naval activity The Russian maritime threat will force Ukrainian forces to be more cautious about committing soldiers to the current frontline Most of Ukraine’s exports leave by sea so a Russian escalation of this approach would be greatly damaging to Ukraine’s economy The most dramatic scenario would be an outflanking operation that surrounded the Ukrainian army in east Ukraine by landing behind it to the west but some parts resemble the defensive positions of the Western Front in the first world war The Russian maritime threat will force Ukrainian forces to diversify and be more cautious about committing soldiers and resources to the current frontline Russia is using the Azov operation to pressure Ukraine to loosen its blockade of Crimea but also to promote disillusion and fatigue with a war that is now more than four years old Actions on the ground appear to have rendered the 2003 agreement effectively obsolete but diplomatic protest from the West so far has been minimal despite the serious nature and strategic intent behind Russia’s Azov operation and the increasing number of ships with Western flags affected by it The rapid deployment of a UN Maritime Peacekeeping Operation mission would defuse the situation and maintain the freedom of maritime movement in the region the mission’s tasks should include monitoring It should also provide escorts for Ukrainian and other vessels as well as receive the power to intercept and inspect vessels and to organise incident resolution meetings A neutral third country with maritime capabilities Such a mission would require invitations from Ukraine and Russia Russia may wield its Security Council veto but it actually has a long-term interest in reducing tensions given the expensive infrastructure it is building in the region Turkey would also be key to any passage of ships through the Bosporus Discussions about a peacekeeping mission on land for Donbas are currently stuck; a maritime operation would help restart the conversation and bring the UN back into the picture.  Be the first to know about our latest publications I consent to receiving the selected ECFR newsletters and to the analysis of open & click rates. 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More information on how we process personal data can be found here Essential cookies enable basic functions and are necessary for the proper function of the website Content from video platforms and social media platforms is blocked by default displaying this content no longer requires manual consent personal data of residents of the temporarily occupied territories are collected allegedly for residents to receive ‘humanitarian assistance’ or social benefits FSB officers will fill out ballots using the information obtained without the consent and physical presence of the Ukrainians themselves Mentioned special operation pursues the following goals: - to eliminate members of the Ukrainian ethnic group; - to conduct propaganda activities to impose on the population of russia and the world the myth that “the population of the regions liberated from the Nazis began to fight against nationalist battalion” This is another crime of the putin regime against Ukraine and proof of the genocide against the Ukrainian nation Working language: English (with consecutive interpretation) Organizers: National Academy of Arts of Ukraine Swedish Museums Association with member partners Development Centre “Democracy through Culture”  ______________________________________________________________________ August 19th #2 Download program International Ukrainian-Swedish scientific and practical conference Development Centre “Democracy through Culture”  Objective: To learn about the current situation for museums in Ukraine today in order to understand their needs and build a platform for future cooperation At least 12 (maybe 15) Ukrainian museums will give presentations of their activities This will be concluded in a dialogue about possible paths of cooperation and action (Secretary General of the Swedish Museums' Asossiation),Viktor Sydorenko and Yuriy Vakulenko (National Academy of Arts of Ukraine) and Oleksandr Butsenko (Democracy through Culture director of the Yosafat Kobrynskyi National Museum of Hutsulshchyna and Pokuttia Folk Art (Kolomyia general director of the Vyshhorod History and Culture Reserve (Kyiv region) general director of the National Museum of Folk Architecture and Life in Pyrohovo (Kyiv) director of the National Museum of Ukrainian Folk Decorative Art (Kyiv Pechersk Lavra Reserve) Department of Conservation Gothenburg university former National property Board and Swedish National Heritage Board Working language: English (with possible consecutive interpretation) in order to understand their needs and build a platform for future cooperation.June 3 2022 at 8.30 – 12.00 (CET) and 9.30 – 13.00 (EES) Viktor Sydorenko (National Academy of Arts of Ukraine) deputy minister of culture and information policy of Ukraine Yuriy Vakulenko (National Academy of Arts of Ukraine ІIhor Poshuvailo, museologist, director of the National Memorial to the Heavenly Hundred Heroes and Revolution of Dignity Museum leading scientific researcher of the Modern Art Research Institute NGO “Bohuslav” – Museum of Bohuslav Terrain History Patrik Steorn (Chair of the Jury Committee for Museum of the Year Museum Director of Gothenburg Museum of Art) Susanna Pettersson (Museum Director of National Museum Member of the UNESCO Emergency group för museums in Ukraine) Vi tar tillvara och driver den svenska museisektorns gemensamma intressen facebook-f twitter Cookie inställningar Producerad av The Generation