A blog of the Kennan Institute and the US Delegation listening to discussions in Finlandia Hall during the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) National Archives and Records Administration As American and Russian negotiators meet in Saudi Arabia to discuss ending the war in Ukraine the fate of more than Ukraine hangs in the balance How the war in Ukraine ends will in large part shape the future of European security And that geopolitical debate is best framed these days in the shorthand of two European city names.  Earlier this month, Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, commemorated the 80th anniversary of the Yalta Conference during the closing days of WWII, saying “For all its strengths and weaknesses the Yalta-Potsdam order has provided the international system’s normative-legal framework for eight decades.” Lavrov neglected to mention in his remarks the other definitive security framework—one that is celebrating its 50th anniversary this year: the Helsinki Final Act which both secured the borders of post-war Europe and committed its signatories to observing a common human rights agenda If you want to understand Moscow’s negotiating position for peace talks on Ukraine or its broader security goals there is no better place to start than comparing these two seminal events there is the obvious symbolism of grounding Russia’s negotiating position in the name of the Ukrainian city which Russia seized in 2014 and later illegitimately annexed But the true meaning of Yalta for President Vladimir Putin goes much deeper Yalta evokes a time when Moscow’s ruler was one of the Big 3 at the end of WWII—soon to become one of the Big 2 Moscow was at its apogee of strength and influence on the global stage relative to other powers The negotiations at Yalta set the Cold War frontlines for decades through carving out zones of occupation and influence—consigning Eastern Europe to decades of control and oppression from Moscow The Soviet interventions in Hungary in 1956 and Poland in the 1980s all had their origins in the wartime negotiations at Yalta Putin himself declared to the UN General Assembly in 2015 “…The key decisions on the principles guiding the cooperation among states as well as on the establishment of the United Nations at the meeting of the anti-Hitler coalition leaders.” It is no wonder that Putin with his fetishistic reverence for Soviet power and its success in World War II would want to return to a world order shaped by Moscow’s military might and ability to intimidate other nations into permitting Russian domination over its neighbors—a world order both evoked and symbolized by Yalta Compare the Yalta negotiations to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 the Helsinki Final Act was a negotiated treaty fully ratified by its signatories The Soviets valued Helsinki at the time because it finally provided international recognition of the post-war boundaries the Soviets had expanded at other nations’ expense Helsinki also codified a commitment to certain human rights that were promised but never delivered in the Soviet Constitution that unfulfilled commitment to human rights would erode the Soviet government’s legitimacy in the eyes of its own citizens Helsinki came to define and secure international borders and relations in Europe for almost five decades—until Russian aggression shattered that order.  Today’s Russian Federation has the status of a successor state to the USSR including the Soviet Union’s permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council the Russian Federation also took on the Soviet Union’s treaty obligations including its commitments to observe international borders and the individual and national rights established in the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act It affirmed those obligations with respect to Ukraine specifically in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum (under which Ukraine surrendered its inherited Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia) and the 1997 Russian-Ukrainian Friendship Treaty Russia violated those commitments with its annexation of Crimea in 2014 Beginning with its takeover of Crimea in 2014 and again with its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 it is clear that Moscow no longer finds it convenient to adhere to either the border or human rights guarantees enshrined in Helsinki It prefers instead a Yalta-based world order where rights and sovereignty exist only for those with the might to defend them—and perhaps remove them from others Russia is in search of a new Yalta—an agreement that would not only confirm its control over the Ukrainian territory it currently occupies but also ratify that control on a permanent basis The Putin government wants international recognition of its aggression and an understanding that Moscow is entitled to its sphere of influence—one that is not necessarily limited to Ukraine Giving Putin the grand bargain of a second Yalta topped off with the visual of another “Big Two” in-person wartime negotiation with the American president would send a chilling signal to our allies and the neighbors of authoritarian states alike led by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov just concluded the opening round of talks in Saudi Arabia about how to end the war in Ukraine the American negotiators would do well to consider the shorthand references to Yalta and Helsinki to understand what Putin is after—and what agreeing to his terms would mean Then they should consider whether they want to live in a Yalta- or Helsinki-based world order The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute and mailings and dive into the most pressing foreign policy issues with insights from our experts I consent to receiving the selected ECFR newsletters and to the analysis of open & click rates. I can revoke my consent later by clicking on the link at the end of every newsletter or by writing to [email protected]. More information on how we process personal data can be found here The Africa programme analyses the geopolitics of the Africa-Europe relationship the programme delves into relations between the African Union and the European Union to find creative foreign policy tools and strategies It also focuses on two regions that are particularly relevant for Europe: the Horn of Africa and the Sahel The Asia programme seeks to help Europe recalibrate its relationship with China and its Asian partners The programme analyses China’s domestic situation It also places a renewed emphasis on fostering Europe’s relationships with the Indo-Pacific The European Power programme is focused on helping Europeans develop sustainable policy solutions to the issues affecting the European Union’s capacity to act with unity on the global scene This includes analysing the path forward for enlargement The Middle East and North Africa programme seeks to support a coherent European agenda in pursuit of regional interests The programme works with European and regional governments and civil society to advance channels of dialogue as well as providing direct policy prescriptions to secure conflict de-escalation The US programme helps Europeans create policy responses to developments in US domestic politics and foreign policy The programme seeks to strengthen transatlantic relations by exploring the obstacles to a more balanced partnership and developing ideas to overcome them The Wider Europe programme aims to help the European Union defend its interests and values in the Western Balkans as well as the South Caucasus and central Asia The programme also supports EU decision-makers work on a unified and coherent policy to address the challenges resulting from Russia’s full scale-invasion of Ukraine These events are symptomatic of a broader geopolitical realignment in which eastern Europe risks being cast adrift from the West Trump’s recent overtures to Vladimir Putin resemble a sinister recreation of the 1945 Yalta conference which preceded the cold war division of Europe this risks undoing the democratic progress which began in the early 1990s and returning to illiberal regimes; marionette institutions; raging unchecked oligarchy; and silenced civil societies led by figures like Vance and businessman-cum-presidential-advisor Elon Musk has found common cause with its European counterparts Europe’s right-wing leaders offer the Maga theorists ideological camaraderie in their culture wars against social liberalism and a bulwark against continued EU efforts to promote democratic governance Their ultimate goal is not just to weaken Brussels Recent ECFR polling suggests that in Bulgaria large sections of the population expect Donald Trump’s return to the White House to be beneficial nearly half of Bulgarians—along with sizable shares of Hungarians and Romanians—believe a second Trump presidency is good for America While enthusiasm wanes regarding Trump’s impact on their own countries (this total falls to 28% among Bulgarians) an ideological affinity remains—and in eastern Europe have long relegated them to the periphery of decision-making do not expect Trump to elevate their social or economic status But they do expect him to dispense with the hypocrisy and treat them less like second-class citizens He and his ideological allies—including but not limited to Vance Hungary’s Viktor Orban and Slovakia’s Robert Fico—share a common goal: dismantling the post-1990s consensus that liberal democracy represents the pinnacle of governance These leaders reject the transatlantic model of checks and balances the rule of law and institutional accountability as essential to prosperity they embrace an illiberal vision in which strongmen rule unencumbered by judicial oversight or free media Trump’s rhetoric already resonates in eastern Europe. His proposal to criminalise student protests seems particularly ominous in a region where mass demonstrations, such as in Serbia or Georgia have played a role in increasing democratic resistance Governmental attempt to suppress civic activism revives memories of pre-1990s authoritarianism; now the population protests while leaders such as Aleksander Vucic and Milorad Dodik stand by their connection with Trump Now, rather than targeting kleptocrats, there are whispers that it is anti-corruption activists who could end up on American punitive lists. In Romania, far-right presidential candidate Calin Georgescu has been banned from running in the country’s upcoming election due to illegitimate Russian interference Georgescu has openly welcomed the prospect of US sanctions on Romania’s current government in order to reshape his country’s political landscape But it is Washington’s evolving stance on Ukraine that lays bare the true nature of this Faustian bargain between Trump and Europe’s nationalist right. At ceasefire negotiation talks in Riyadh, for which Ukraine was conspicuously absent, Russian officials reportedly proposed that America withdraw from NATO’s easternmost member states effectively rolling back the alliance to its pre-1997 borders declined—but added the chilling caveat: “for now.” A new “global Yalta” It could be assumed that an American administration ideologically aligned with Europe’s nationalist right would serve them as their useful ally against Brussels But the eastern European far-right has placed its bets on a partner who is fundamentally unreliable The region’s nations hope to free themselves from what the far-right view as the constraints of liberal democracy they may find themselves isolated from the EU and unprotected by Washington Those who oppose nationalist backsliding must work to strengthen democratic security within their own borders with independent media playing a crucial role the National Endowment for Democracy and the International Republican Institute provided vital support Brussels should channel funding directly to NGOs and regional governments bypassing nationalist-led administrations where democratic norms are under siege The EU needs to strengthen the European Public Prosecutor’s Office by giving it more prerogatives and resources; it should expand the scope of the European Magnitsky Act to also cover corruption the EU should use the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act to leverage its regulatory power and to shield its public sphere from foreign manipulation—whether from China The stakes are high. Should Trump’s vision for a divided Europe and a “global Yalta” materialise—and eastern Europe find itself abandoned by the EU—the continent’s eastern flank could spin into a cycle of instability, tug-of-war politics and regional conflict And at least one European war has started from this point Garvan Walshe is co-founder of electoral integrity NGO Unhack Democracy and founder of democratic tech startup Article 7 Be the first to know about our latest publications I consent to receiving the selected ECFR newsletters and to the analysis of open & click rates. I can revoke my consent later by clicking on the link at the end of every newsletter or by writing to [email protected]. More information on how we process personal data can be found here Essential cookies enable basic functions and are necessary for the proper function of the website Content from video platforms and social media platforms is blocked by default displaying this content no longer requires manual consent Discover stories from this section and more in the list of contents Paul Dans argues that the system needed smashing and rebuilding The historian says attempts to restrain tyrants are often futile: for them it’s all or nothing The historian on commemorating the shock and horror of concentration camps, 80 years on The former Liberal leader on the threats that come not from Washington but from within It starts with Germany realising that it’s stronger than it feels, argue Thomas Enders and Hans-Peter Bartels Artem Priakhin/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images If you know anything about the Yalta Conference, it’s probably that picture. You know the one: three war-weary leaders, sitting side-by-side, Roosevelt with his toothy smile, Churchill all eyebrows — and Stalin, grinning under his moustache, visibly pleased at the outcome. It’s an amazingly powerful image and not merely because it’s come to epitomise the start of a Cold War that carved up Europe for decades to opportunities for the Motherland in the here and now the global stage in 2025 looks remarkably similar to 1945 But think again to that picture: and who Stalin is slouched with would help dictate his country’s imperial ambitions for decades to come is the real lesson of Yalta eight decades on — not that Russia was naturally destined to dominate Eurasia but that it can only succeed with help from the West when Muscovy was beset by succession crises and foreign incursions by the Swedish Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth Contrary to the popular version of history most Russians know the first tsar of Russia’s most storied house was crowned in 1613 only after collaborating with foreigners notably the 1836 opera A Life for the Tsar who fled the invading Poles instead of submit his uncle supported Polish efforts to put a foreigner on the Russian throne while Michael himself even lived for a time in the Polish-occupied Kremlin It’s a thread woven through the long centuries of Russia’s history as it struggled to overcome the geographic prison that is Eurasia Despite giving Russia ample space to expand its geographic position leaves it vulnerable to land invasions from both the east and the west it traditionally had scant opportunities to develop its naval strength — vital for any modern superpower Getting creative about securing sea access and acquiring plenty of colonial possessions to act as buffers was crucial if Russia wanted to be anything beyond a backwater outpost along the Moskva River By Michal Kranz this could only happen through collaboration with outsiders something clear enough far beyond the Time of Troubles Russia had no qualms about flexing its military muscles Yet when it came to vanquishing its old rival Poland-Lithuania it relied on deal-making to carve up the Polish state alongside Austria and Prussia it drew up a new balance of power in Eastern Europe finalised at the Congress of Vienna and which mostly endured until 1914 Snatching windows on the Black Sea and the Baltic would have meant very little if Russia hadn’t equally secured passage through the Bosphorus (from the Ottomans) and the Kattegat (from Denmark) into the seven seas beyond that this heritage has stopped Russian rulers from parading their would be independence based on narrative-building and historical erasure and just as A Life for the Tsar lionised Tsar Michael for the St Petersburg nobility so too have these themes endured into the 20th century That’s clear enough from Russian narratives about the Great Patriotic War which describe how 20 million Soviets gave their lives to defeat the German invaders That sacrifice is indisputable: but Russia’s victory in Berlin would have been meaningless had it not been accepted by the Western superpowers For if Nazi rule in Europe was undone at Stalingrad and Kursk what came later was decided between 4-11 February 1945 where Roosevelt and Churchill gave Stalin their blessing to establish a new European order Stalin convinced his allies to let him extend his reach right across Eastern Europe annexing the Baltic States and adding a sizable chunk of Eastern Europe to his sphere of influence but an updated balance of power to replace the Cold War order was never established leaving Russia rudderless in wild geopolitical waters Putin has long felt America’s unipolar moment was simply a delusion an aberration of history that stubbornly denied the geopolitical realities of Russian power Putin can equally point to the revival of multipolarity with great powers from Beijing to Delhi establishing geopolitical centres Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was never just about that country alone it was Putin’s attempt to force America and the West to confront what it sees as its natural rights to settle the destabilising ambiguity between where Russia’s sphere of influence ends and where America’s starts and to finally restore balance on Moscow’s terms — the wishes of the locals from Kharkiv to Aleppo be damned Russia cannot set up this new international system alone — despite what he might claim Putin relies just as much on the West as his precursors in the Kremlin One good example is that perennial quest for warm-water ports with the fall of the Assad regime in Syria forcing Moscow to pursue good relations with its revolutionary successor and thanks to Ankara’s influence in Damascus Russia is again forced to bargain with Turks to keep its empire afloat Russia must reckon with the presence of Nato states like Norway and Canada as they race to establish facts-on-the-water while the ice caps melt brute force alone is not a realistic option Putin will also be conscious of what happens when Russia tries to act unilaterally communist fervour compelled the Bolsheviks to spread their revolution westwards Eschewing the diplomatic waltzing of the tsars they rejected dialogue with Europe’s bourgeois states Following some initial successes — against newly independent Poland and Estonia — they were stopped by the Poles at the gates of Warsaw Lenin was forced to sign the Treaty of Riga delineating the Soviet Union’s boundary with Poland The young USSR thus had little to show for this brute display of force and had failed to regain much of the territory Nicholas II had lost through the First World War Stalin’s approach two decades later took vital lessons from this historic mistake combining the military might of the Red Army with clever diplomatic manoeuvring at Yalta Through tough negotiating and sleights of hand Stalin convinced Roosevelt and Churchill to accept a dramatic expansion of Soviet territory alongside a bevy of buffer states from Bulgaria to Hungary Stalin promised to hold free elections in places like Poland and Czechoslovakia a vow he never had any intention of keeping The results of this manoeuvring spoke for themselves: Russia extended its power further than it ever had under the tsars and governments as far west as Berlin answered directly to Moscow These days, there are signs that Putin is ready to talk once more. Even before he attacked his neighbour, he had effectively demanded that Nato expel all new members since 1997 That was clearly unrealistic — but nonetheless hinted at an awareness that negotiations with the West were necessary That’s doubly true now there’s someone new in the White House Donald Trump may be the partner Putin needs to formalise the bounds of Russia’s new empire establish a new balance of power in Europe and ultimately lay down the ground rules of international relations for the rest of the century By Michal Kranz it’s becoming ever clearer that any such summit will exclude Ukraine and that Trump won’t merely represent the United States but rather personify Nato and the whole Western world Putin certainly sees him that way: with the precedent of Yalta at his back he’ll view the talks as a generational opportunity to clarify the global playing field from the Pacific to the Danube That still leaves the question: what exactly might Putin try and secure from his negotiations with Trump Trump himself may see Europe as a sideshow it will always be ground zero for the country’s ambitions Ukraine may have replaced Poland as the primary object of Russian geopolitical manoeuvring conversations about its future will form only the backdrop for wider questions about Russia’s sphere of influence Moldova and Georgia are two obvious candidates here and he had no choice but to rubber-stamp Yalta at the Potsdam Conference five months later the green light Moscow received from America was a more powerful tool for its expansionist ambitions than any tank or bomb Soviet leaders saw no hint of irony when they played the orchestral finale of A Life for the Tsar at their victory parade in June 1945 a musical retreat to a Russia that never truly existed it will be curious to see if Putin goes for the opera once more Δdocument.getElementById( "ak_js_1" ).setAttribute( "value" Δdocument.getElementById( "ak_js_2" ).setAttribute( "value" Please click here to view our media pack for more information on advertising and partnership opportunities with UnHerd This potential bilateral agreement threatens to reshape global alliances and exclude key stakeholders from vital security discussions for Canada and Europe The 1945 Yalta Conference is one of the most defining moments in modern geopolitics and Joseph Stalin convened to divide post-war Europe into spheres of influence effectively setting the stage for the Cold War President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin appear to be negotiating over Ukraine’s future without including Kyiv or its European allies This potential bilateral agreement threatens to reshape global alliances, undermine NATO, and exclude key stakeholders from vital security discussions for Canada and Europe. With Trump signaling a realignment away from Europe and toward transactional diplomacy and Germany’s new leadership advocating for European security independence from the United States Canada and its European partners must confront the possibility of a new Yalta one where they are merely spectators rather than participants What happens when world leaders make decisions about nations without their involvement the echoes of history remind us of past diplomatic miscalculations This article unpacks the risks of a Trump-Putin deal examines Canada’s role in the shifting geopolitical landscape and explores what’s at stake for Europe and global security The Legacy of Yalta and the Danger of Bilateral Diplomacy The Yalta Conference was a pragmatic exercise in power politics where three superpowers decided the fate of post-war Europe While it helped end World War II and create a new world order it also led to decades of Cold War tensions with Eastern Europe falling under Soviet influence One of the main criticisms of Yalta is that it prioritised significant power interests over the sovereignty of smaller nations a situation (mistake) that could be repeated if Trump and Putin strike a similar deal over Ukraine it is that such exclusionary diplomacy can lead to long-term instability and discontent among affected nations Recent reports suggest that Trump’s administration is open to negotiating a ceasefire with Russia that may not align with Ukraine’s national interests The fear among European and Canadian leaders is that a deal could involve concessions such as recognising Russian control over occupied Ukrainian territories reducing NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe Meanwhile, in Germany, Friedrich Merz has signaled a dramatic shift in transatlantic relations, stating that Europe must take rapid steps toward security independence which includes questioning NATO’s long-term viability and suggesting a European defence strategy independent of U.S could significantly reshape the balance of power in the region it would not only undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty but also set a dangerous precedent where authoritarian regimes can achieve strategic gains through aggression This would have ripple effects beyond Eastern Europe emboldening other global powers with expansionist ambitions Canada and Europe’s Response: A Struggle for Relevance Faced with the possibility of being sidelined, Canada and its European allies have attempted to assert themselves in the ongoing diplomatic discussions. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has been vocal about the need for Ukraine to be included in any peace negotiations stating that “nothing about Ukraine should be decided without Ukraine” Canada has also positioned itself as a steadfast supporter of Ukraine, providing over $3.5 billion in military aid, including advanced weaponry, drones, and armoured vehicles Canada’s influence remains limited compared to the United States European leaders have similarly struggled to maintain a united front. While Britain and France appear willing to take a more active role, Germany is now advocating for a more independent European security framework The lack of a coherent European security strategy could further enable Trump to unilaterally dictate terms with Russia leaving Canada and Europe with few options but to react to decisions made in Washington and Moscow Geopolitical Implications: Possible Scenarios Scenario 1: A Trump-Putin Deal Excludes Ukraine and Europe and Russia reach a bilateral agreement that acknowledges Russian territorial gains Ukraine may be forced to accept unfavourable terms without strong Western backing leading to a weakened government and territorial concessions This outcome would undermine NATO’s credibility creating fractures within the alliance as member states debate the feasibility of continued collective defence efforts the EU would struggle to present a unified response with some nations advocating stronger sanctions against Russia while others push for renewed negotiations Countries like Poland and the Baltic states would likely call for an expanded European defence initiative Germany and France attempt to navigate a complex diplomatic landscape to prevent further instability Scenario 2: Canada and Europe Secure a Role in Negotiations successfully lobby for their inclusion in diplomatic negotiations Their presence ensures that Ukraine’s sovereignty remains a core issue in discussions The EU pushes for a comprehensive security framework including guarantees for Ukraine’s defence and calls for increased military support independent of U.S This scenario strengthens NATO’s position by proving European nations’ ability to lead in crises Canada leverages its role as a G7 member to broker support among non-European allies reinforcing its strategic influence in global peacekeeping efforts Russia faces increased pressure from a united Western bloc potentially altering the course of negotiations in favour of Ukraine’s territorial integrity Scenario 3: A Fractured West and the Rise of a (more) Multipolar Order reduces its military commitments to Europe European nations attempt to establish an independent defence force but internal political divisions weaken their collective response increases its influence over Eastern Europe while China capitalises on the power shift to expand its geopolitical reach in the Indo-Pacific Diplomatic repercussions include strained transatlantic relations with Canada and the UK pushing for stronger NATO engagement while Germany and France pivot towards a European-led security strategy and Asia observe the decline of Western unity leading to new strategic alliances that redefine the global order in favour of emerging regional powers The current diplomatic landscape bears striking similarities to the Yalta Conference where decisions about Europe’s future were made primarily by great powers with little regard for the agency of smaller nations Just as Eastern Europe found itself under Soviet control following Yalta Ukraine risks becoming a pawn in great power negotiations today The lesson from history is clear: exclusionary diplomacy breeds long-term instability and resentment If Western democracies fail to act decisively the international order could shift toward one in which authoritarian states dictate the terms of global security The fate of Ukraine today mirrors that of post-war Eastern Europe caught between conflicting spheres of influence The erosion of NATO’s authority would mirror the Cold War’s early days when divisions among allies left smaller nations vulnerable to external domination Canada and Europe must take a proactive role in shaping security policy rather than passively reacting to the geopolitical manoeuvres of the U.S reinforcing economic sanctions against aggressors and committing to a long-term strategy for European security will be critical Failure to do so could result in a fractured alliance system where Western power is further diminished and global security becomes dictated by transactional agreements among great powers rather than by the rule of law and the consequences of repeating Yalta’s mistakes could be catastrophic for global stability This moment calls for principled diplomacy and an unwavering commitment to defending democratic values in the face of authoritarian encroachment Only by learning from history can Canada and Europe avoid the mistakes of the past and forge a future where security and sovereignty are safeguarded for generations to come MD does not stand behind any specific agenda and arguments to the light and see what remains valid and sound please click the box below to let us know you're not a robot Get the most important global markets news at your fingertips with a Bloomberg.com subscription Foreign Affairs has been the leading forum for serious discussion of American foreign policy and global affairs The magazine has featured contributions from many leading international affairs experts and Director of the Center for Strategic Studies at Tuft University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Monica Duffy Toft Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine was never simply a regional conflict His illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 was the proof of concept for a broader Russian test of the so-called rules-based international order probing how far the West would go to defend that order The ensuing war forced Europe to consider its dependence on the United States and required U.S leaders to reassess their appetite for foreign commitments It ushered China into a new role as Russia’s backer and made countries thousands of miles away grapple with essential questions about their futures: How should they balance partnerships with large What material and moral stances taken now will seem prudent decades down the line and China’s global influence rapidly expanded geopolitics swiftly began to revert to a more ancient Larger countries are again using their advantages in military force and diplomacy to secure spheres of influence—that is geographic areas over which a state exerts economic and political control without necessarily exercising formal sovereignty Even though another world war is not yet on the horizon, today’s geopolitical landscape particularly resembles the close of World War II and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin sought to divide Europe into spheres of influence Today’s major powers are seeking to negotiate a new global order primarily with each other much as Allied leaders did when they redrew the world map at the Yalta negotiations in 1945 Such negotiations need not take place at a formal conference and Chinese President Xi Jinping were to reach an informal consensus that power matters more than ideological differences they would be echoing Yalta by determining the sovereignty and future of nearby neighbors Unlike at Yalta, where two democracies bargained with one autocracy, regime type no longer appears to hinder a sense of shared interests. It is hard power only—and a return to the ancient principle that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” In such a world, multilateral institutions such as NATO and the EU would be sidelined and the autonomy of smaller nations threatened It is no accident that over the past two decades, the nations now driving the return of power politics—China and the United States—have all been led by figures who embrace a “make our country great again” narrative Such leaders dwell on a resentful comparison between what they perceive to be their country’s current restricted position—a constrained status imposed by both foreign and domestic adversaries—and an imaginary past that was freer and more glorious The sense of humiliation such a comparison generates fuels the belief that their country’s redemption can come only by exercising hard power Commanding and extending spheres of influence appears to restore a fading sense of grandeur Ukraine can never be adequate to fulfill Putin’s vision of Russia’s rightful place in the world The United States begins to look toward annexing Canada one in which the EU and NATO adapt rather than wither they could continue to serve as counterbalances to U.S. and Chinese efforts to use hard power to achieve narrow state interests But those potential counterbalancing forces will have to fight for such an alternative—and take advantage of the obstacles that a more globalized world poses to great powers’ wish to carve it into pieces The term “sphere of influence” first cropped up at the 1884–85 Berlin Conference during which European colonial empires formalized rules to carve up Africa But the concept had shaped international strategy long before that France attempted to expand its influence by conquering nearby territories and installing loyal puppet regimes only to be countered by coalitions led by the United Kingdom and Austria The British and Russian Empires engaged in protracted struggles for dominance over Central Asia asserted that European powers would not be allowed to interfere in the Western Hemisphere effectively establishing Latin America as a U.S It is worth noting that the Monroe Doctrine was inspired by Russian Emperor Alexander I’s efforts to counter British and American influence in the Pacific Northwest by expanding its settlements and asserting its control over trade Russia agreed to limit its southward expansion and acknowledge American dominance over the Western Hemisphere Alexander I recognized that encouraging further European colonization of the Americas risked sparking more instability and war Great powers’ drive to establish spheres of influence persisted through the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries shaping new alliances and ultimately triggering World War I In his wartime effort to delegitimize the Austro-Hungarian President Woodrow Wilson pointed out that colonialism amounted to an oppressive boot on the neck of nations’ self-determination France and the United Kingdom—suffered collateral damage and struggled to maintain their colonies in the face of a rising tide of nationalist sentiment Given the close connection between “spheres of influence” and colonialism both concepts came to be seen as backward and a likely catalyst for conflict Yalta marked a decisive return of politics based on spheres of influence but only because the participating democracies tolerated it as a necessary but hopefully short-lived evil the best available means to prevent another catastrophic world war The United Kingdom and the United States had each become war-weary no democratic politician could reasonably oppose demobilization the only other way to prevent Stalin from ordering the Red Army westward was to engage his demands In the nineteenth century, power politics had hinged on military and economic might. In the second half of the twentieth century, the ability to shape global narratives through soft power became almost as vital: the United States exerted influence through its dominance in popular culture and investments in overseas initiatives such as the Peace Corps and democratization efforts actively promoted communist ideology by mounting propaganda and ideological-outreach campaigns that attempted to shape public opinion in far-flung countries Moscow even pioneered a new kind of attack on democratic states under the broader banner of “active measures”: a long-game strategy aimed at polarizing democratic publics by propagating disinformation But after 1991, as ideological battles gave way to market liberalization, democratization, and globalization, spheres of influence appeared to lose relevance. Without the stark ideological divide of the Cold War many political scientists assumed that world politics would shift toward economic interdependence demonstrating through action the benefits of working in teams to solve hard problems The global spread of democratic norms and the swift integration of former Soviet and Eastern bloc states into international institutions reinforced the belief that power could—and should—be diffused through collective frameworks; the Cold War’s geopolitical fault lines seemed to vanish a pivotal agreement intended to define NATO’s relationship with Russia after the Cold War And the act explicitly committed its signatories to avoid establishing spheres of influence directing NATO and Russia to aim to create “in Europe a common space of security and stability without dividing lines or spheres of influence limiting the sovereignty of any state.” China has also militarized the South China Sea and has pursued expansive and legally disputed territorial claims have increasingly used financial sanctions as tools to constrain adversaries has continued to innovate brilliantly from a position of material weakness It has effectively deployed hybrid warfare to weaken the West including with cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns to affect the 2016 Brexit referendum and the U.S It is clear from Putin’s many recent speeches that he had never really abandoned an understanding of geopolitics that rested on spheres of influence and always struggled to understand why NATO should continue to exist If the alliance’s purpose had been to defend the West against the Soviets NATO’s expansion effectively made the entirety of Europe—and particularly the former Warsaw Pact states—an American sphere of influence Beginning with its assault on Georgia in 2008 Russia has relied on hybrid warfare and the use of proxy armed forces—efforts that escalated with the illegal 2014 annexation of Crimea and culminated in the full-scale invasion of Ukraine The Ukraine war—and the settlement terms that now appear to be emerging—mark an even more pronounced return to nineteenth century–style geopolitics in which great powers dictate terms to weaker states has demanded that Ukraine accept territorial losses and remain outside Western military alliances an outcome that would render the country a satellite of Russia the final outcome will normalize the use of military force to advance national interests—and Although major powers have attempted to use force to get their way throughout the past few decades their attempts have consistently backfired and failed to prove that force is an effective tool for advancing national interests Russia’s military efforts on behalf of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad failed and its incursion into Ukraine was faltering foreign policy since the end of World War II has now gifted it victory An older style of power politics is fast becoming entrenched in other ways Establishing spheres of influence involves a dominant power abridging the sovereignty of geographically proximate states—as Trump is seeking to do with Canada and Mexico and as China is attempting with Taiwan A political order based on spheres of influence also relies on other great powers’ tacit agreement not to interfere in each other’s spheres Measured by its economic and military might, Russia is no longer a great power But the way today’s Russia is often conflated with the Soviet Union gives it perceived power beyond its actual means—it remains a potent nuclear power and Russia all agree that they have a vital interest in avoiding a nuclear war acknowledging each other’s spheres of influence can serve as a mechanism to deter escalation Negotiations to end the war in Ukraine could resemble a new Yalta with China playing a role akin to the one the United Kingdom played in 1945 Britain—weakened by World War II but still considered a great power thanks to its legacy of empire—balanced U.S and Soviet interests while securing its own geopolitical concerns has become a much trickier project than it was at Yalta It was easier to delineate—and to respect—geographically coherent spheres of influence in a less globalized world dependent on steel and oil; today the critical resources that large powers need are spread out across the globe Taiwan is a particular flash point because the chips it produces are critical to countries’ growth and national security; the United States cannot afford to let China dominate access to those chips Neither does the United States want to permit Russia sole access to Ukraine’s rare-earth minerals A country’s maritime strength has become much more important: it is more possible than ever to imagine Japan and Taiwan within a U.S This is why China is seeking to become a maritime power and working tirelessly to disrupt U.S Even if Trump and Putin move toward a more cooperative relationship with Xi that could leave European states to fend for themselves Countries such as Germany and France may be forced to develop independent security strategies would likely push for greater defense commitments that their fellow European states may be unable or unwilling to provide That outcome would also undermine the strategic importance of U.S forcing them to seek alternative defense arrangements—or even nuclearization The European Union could be moved to evolve into a sovereign federal state more closely resembling the United States and the United Kingdom each remain capable middle powers and France and the United Kingdom have their own nuclear deterrent but together—and perhaps only together—a united Europe would have significantly less to fear from China and the United States both militarily and economically the United States and Russia align against China then Japan and South Korea in particular may find themselves trying to balance between Washington and Beijing yielding more independent foreign policies and efforts to diversify their security and economic agreements Japan might accelerate its military buildup and seek closer ties to regional partners such as Australia and India while South Korea could attempt to hedge its position by deepening its relationship with China If Russia aligns more closely with China—and Europe remains firmly aligned with the United States—that would reinforce a Cold War–style two-bloc system If Russia (wary of giving the impression that it is subordinate to China) and European states pursue a more independent path that could contribute to a more multipolar world in which they act as swing powers leveraging their influence between China and the United States global geopolitics would resemble a hybrid of nineteenth-century great-power maneuvering with twenty-first-century strategic blocs Australia would face difficult choices regarding its economic and security alignments It could strengthen its defense cooperation with the United States deepen its engagement with India and Japan and increase military spending to bolster its deterrence But if China were to secure its desired sphere of influence in Asia Australia might seek to emerge as a regional stabilizer asserting greater autonomy instead of remaining a junior partner in a U.S.-led bloc Spheres of influence are rarely static; they are constantly contested The reemergence of spheres of influence signals that the nature of the global order is being tested This shift could lead to a transition back to the power politics of earlier eras But there is an alternative: after experiencing a few cycles of destabilizing crises the international system might reassert itself reverting to a rules-based order centered on multilateral cooperation and U.S.-led or collective security arrangements that discourage expansionist ambitions the United States is no longer serving as a reliable stabilizer was considered the primary check on regionally expansionist regimes it now appears to be encouraging those same regimes Whether this transition ultimately returns to a predictable balance of power or inaugurates a prolonged period of instability and war will depend on how effectively spheres of influence are contested—and how far countries such as China and the United States are willing to go to secure them Subscribe to Foreign Affairs to get unlimited access Already a subscriber? Sign In Zainab Usman Timothy Naftali A. Wess Mitchell Ngaire Woods Stacie E. Goddard Michael Beckley Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay Tong Zhao Zongyuan Zoe Liu Anne Neuberger Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage * Note that when you provide your email address, the Foreign Affairs Privacy Policy and Terms of Use will apply to your newsletter subscription Published by The Council on Foreign Relations Privacy Policy Terms of Use From the publishers of  Foreign Affairs This website uses cookies to improve your experience You can opt-out of certain cookies using the cookie management page * Note that when you provide your email address, the Foreign Affairs Privacy Policy and Terms of Use will apply to your newsletter subscription As soon as Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin hung up their phones commentators began invoking the spectre of Yalta—a conference often seen as a division of the world into two blocs and the beginning of the Cold War between two irreconcilable spheres Let us recall that the agreements signed at Yalta included the United Nations Conference which led to the establishment of the United Nations (UN) in April–June 1945 with China and France among the invited participants; the redrawing of certain European borders particularly those of Poland and Germany; and assistance to countries liberated from German occupation in establishing democratic governments The third objective was ultimately not achieved as the USSR imposed an “iron curtain over Europe”[1] and established communist rule over the territories it occupied it is only by examining the agreements to be signed between these two presidents that a meaningful comparison can be drawn and the European Union are not currently expected to play a key role in resolving this conflict—whereas they still featured in the negotiators’ discussions on global governance This absence—hopefully temporary—remains entirely consistent with the fundamental causes of this war, as clearly stated by the Russian president in his speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference and reiterated in the two documents sent to the United States and NATO on 17 December 2021[2] This war is fundamentally a Russo-American conflict in which Ukraine finds itself embroiled due to its geopolitical position The rhetoric surrounding Russian identity and the condemnation of Nazism primarily serve as instruments of indoctrination to secure public support for Russia’s core objectives: keeping NATO away from its borders (i.e. influence (halting the deployment of ABM systems) and securing Russia’s place in a multipolar global governance system Many commentators have also referenced the “Spirit of Munich” in discussing the war in Ukraine a reference to the 2007 Munich Security Conference might have been more insightful encouraging a reassessment of President Putin’s speech to better understand his strategy and avoid the surprise of February 2022 Thus, the link between Yalta and the current situation in this Russo-American power struggle remains tenuous. The only significant parallel is the question of global governance—addressed at Yalta with the establishment of the UN but soon evolving into a bipolar Cold War system, and later into what some observers describe as unipolar U.S. dominance: “The system of a single state’s law—above all the United States—has extended beyond its national borders in every domain […] and is imposed on other states Who could possibly find this acceptable?” the Entente Cordiale between France and Britain in 1904 appears more pertinent Setting aside the historical coincidence that Franco-British rapprochement began in 1854 during the Crimean War against the Russian Empire, the Entente Cordiale primarily aimed to end centuries of warfare between the two empires and regulate their international policies. It was also, implicitly, a means of containing the rising German Empire, which sought global hegemony to break the alliance through diplomatic manoeuvres from 1904 to 1914 the Franco-British alliance enabled a joint resistance against German aggression in 1914 and the Entente Cordiale was an alliance of two empires against a third empire in the midst of asserting its hegemony—an analogy that aligns with the emerging Russo-American rapprochement a rising hegemonic power eager to exploit these resources to solidify its own dominance The recent U.S.-Russia contacts do not signify a new Yalta as Donald Trump has clearly identified China as his primary rival This emerging alignment is not about dividing the world but rather regulating it for the coming century—or centuries Two competitors are poised for dominance: the United States and China And both need Russia to achieve their objectives will the new Entente Cordiale be Sino-Russian or Russo-American The first option has gained significant ground but Trump and his team are known for their ambition in overcoming challenges To “Make America Great Again,” a reset in U.S China’s reaction will be crucial: will it respond immediately or adopt a wait-and-see approach Will it further tighten its grip on Russia presidential term is fleeting in the eyes of an empire with millennia of history and a communist state approaching its centennial Let’s indulge in a historical analogy for rhetorical effect There are two possible models: Europe can either be cornered within its Eurasian peninsula by a new Mongol Empire and its successors or assert its strategic sovereignty as in the era of the “unequal treaties” imposed on China by Kublai Khan’s successors Put more diplomatically: Will Europe accept subjugation or will it dare to pursue strategic autonomy The road to European strategic sovereignty is long and fraught with obstacles But the first step is to understand why a strategic dialogue is emerging between Russia and the U.S and where it is leading—because only then can Europe define its own position and objectives Speech at Fulton University (United States) Analyses / Political and Geostrategic Observatory of the United States Interviews / Gender and Geopolitics Observatory all the IRIS news gathered in a single email (analyses The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS) an association recognized as being of public utility is one of the leading French think tanks specializing in geopolitical and strategic issues It is unique in combining a research center with an educational institution that offers degree programs through its school This model contributes to its national and international appeal The IRIS is structured around four main areas of activity: research Today marks 80 years since a historic meeting took place that brought together the leaders of three of the Allied powers during the Second World War – Winston Churchill Franklin D Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin – with the hope of a brighter future for everyone.  held at the Livadia Palace in modern-day Ukraine was a turning point in global diplomacy and would shape the world we know today.  In a joint statement following the meeting "The German people will only make the cost of their defeat heavier to themselves by attempting to continue a hopeless resistance."  US President Franklin D Roosevelt and Premier of the Soviet Union Joseph Stalin – often referred to as the 'Big Three' – joined forces to discuss the future of Europe and the world following the defeat of Hitler and his brutal so the meeting would never be straightforward.  Churchill was concerned with the balance of power in Europe particularly in Central and Eastern Europe and the preservation of British influence in the region.  Churchill provided an update to MPs in the House of Commons regarding what was discussed at Yalta such as plans for a new international organisation aimed at ensuring peace and security after the Second World War – the United Nations.  or from the gathering of the means of aggression.  "I am sure that a fairer choice is open to mankind than they have known in recorded ages.  "The lights burn brighter and shine more broadly than before.  Roosevelt travelled to Yalta to secure the creation of the United Nations.  Churchill's doctor wrote: "The president looked old and thin and drawn.  "He sat looking straight ahead with mouth open as if he were not taking things in."  Roosevelt spoke of the success of the Yalta Conference to the US Congress that we would not agree – that some slight crack might appear in the solid wall of allied unity a crack that would give him and his fellow gangsters one last hope of escaping their just doom.  "That is the objective for which his propaganda machine has been working for many months "Never before have the major allies been more closely united – not only in their war aims but also in their peace aims."  Stalin's aim was to expand Soviet control in Eastern Europe ensuring that the country would be a dominant force to be reckoned with.  In response to Roosevelt's speech about unity against Hitler Stalin said: "It is not so difficult to keep unity in time of war since there is a joint aim to defeat the common enemy "The difficult task will come after the war when diverse interests will tend to divide the Allies.  "It is our duty to see that our relations in peacetime are as strong as they have been in war."  the leaders made several key decisions that would shape the future.  the country would be divided into four zones of occupation It was also vital to rid the world of Nazism and the joint statement made that very clear saying: "It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world."  were equally horrified by Hitler's actions It said: "It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany but only when Nazism and militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for Germans and a place for them in the comity of nations."  The leaders committed to founding the United Nations (UN) maintain international security by the removal of threats to peace.  The UN was to have a Security Council with permanent members the UN is made up of 193 member states.  Stalin promised that the Soviet Union would join the war against Japan within three months of Germany's defeat.  including the return of territories lost in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.  One of the most controversial issues was the fate of Poland and Eastern Europe.  Stalin pushed for Soviet-backed communist governments in the region while Churchill and Roosevelt sought to ensure free elections and democratic governments.  the leaders agreed that Poland would have a government that included both communist and non-communist elements.  This arrangement would ultimately turn out to be unsatisfactory for the West as Stalin's control over the region went from strength to strength.  Although the leaders agreed on free elections Stalin's actions revealed he would not keep that promise.  The Soviet Union solidified its control over Eastern Europe establishing lasting communist regimes.  Critics argue that Churchill and Roosevelt gave in too much to Stalin allowing an unnecessary expansion of Soviet influence.  This division of Europe marked the start of the Cold War which shaped international relations for decades.  While some of the agreements made at Yalta were short-lived despite Churchill and Roosevelt's positive speeches following the conference not the fix to the world's future problems.  To mark the 40th anniversary of the Yalta Conference then-President Ronald Reagan released a statement saying: "The reason Yalta remains important is that the freedom of Europe is unfinished business.  "Those who claim the issue is boundaries or territory are hoping that the real issues – democracy and independence – will somehow go away When the three leaders were drawing up their plans to reorganise Europe few at the time could probably have imagined what would become of Yalta itself 80 years on.  While Yalta is on the southern tip of Crimea it has not been hit by any of the land battles taking place inside either Ukraine or Russia.  But the city is around 50 miles from Sevastopol including some big strikes by British Storm Shadow missiles.  Yalta itself was apparently hit by a precision missile last May Please select at least one newsletter to subscribe to: Please enable JS and disable any ad blocker China eyes Ukraine peacekeeping role as a stepping stone toward a new world order He spent seven years in China as a correspondent and later as China bureau chief He was the 2014 recipient of the Vaughn-Ueda International Journalist prize How the war in Ukraine ends could determine who's in charge of a new international order Greece’s geopolitical fate was sealed on a piece of paper that the prime minister of the United Kingdom gave to the other statesmen meeting with him in Yalta one has the feeling that the world is set to be divided again Not exactly as it happened in Yalta in 1945 devastated country it was at the end of the Second World War but also because the world is much more anarchic and it is not clear who is the winner and who is the loser nor who will sit at the final table where the new spheres of influence will be carved out with US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin at the table Trump can easily exchange a country for something we can’t even imagine while Putin plays the game masterfully without ever showing his cards Greece has had two major concerns: The first was to move on stable tracks that protect it from misadventures and deviations we had placed our hopes in our relations with the US Washington would intervene to prevent a war in the Aegean or on Cyprus Mainly because it would not want the cohesion of the Western Alliance to be disrupted As a veteran and experienced diplomat often says “We pretended that we would stand by the US in a generalized war and they pretended that they provided us with security guarantees.” But now we have moved on from the era of safe assumptions and diplomatic hypocrisy to the absolutely dry world of transaction That old cliche of every Greek politician when addressing an American interlocutor that “Greece is the cradle of democracy” concerns very few people and seems ridiculous when you see how Trump behaves toward Canada a country with which the US maintains the closest relations We are now in a world where the main question is “What do you bring to the table?” “Do you have an army?” “Yes.” “Are you willing to risk sending it on a dangerous mission on behalf of your allies?” “Do you have natural resources?” “Let’s make a deal,” “Do you have a serious military industry?” “Do you have innovation to offer in the production of weapons systems?” we have weakened some of our cards ourselves Domestic populism and the long-standing corruption and inadequacy of our political system have eroded the necessary security culture but in practice we are a mess in critical areas we have proven to be good at playing our geopolitical cards from the times of the renowned Greek diplomat and politician Alexandros Mavrokordatos to the present day With a little ingenuity and perseverance we will find the safe geopolitical path because the most important thing in this anarchic and dangerous scenario is to be able – in difficult times – to rely on your own strength which is in danger of not having a seat at the big table that concerns its own future and which saw its geopolitical certainties and expectations collapse in a few hours Enter your information below to receive our weekly newsletters with the latest insights opinion pieces and current events straight to your inbox The failure to defend Ukraine would usher in Yalta 2.0 the partition of Europe between an imperial Russia and a reluctant US A potential Harris White House may decide to continue Biden’s strategy hamstringing Ukraine’s ability to strike Russia and eventually exhausting Kyiv into an unfair settlement which threatens a direct armed conflict with NATO any mention by Washington of diplomatic agreements or resets with Russia revives one of the most disappointing and traumatic experiences they faced in modern history—the Yalta agreements reached in February 1945 that paved the way for communist domination of that region and a gateway into Europe and Josef Stalin met in the Crimean resort city of Yalta that year to continue designing a postwar security framework it was clear that Europe’s stability depended largely on handling the delicate matter of Poland’s postwar place on the continent—what came to be known colloquially as solving the Polish question The prospect of dividing and destroying Poland in order to gain a place in Europe compelled Stalin to enter an alliance with Nazi Germany in 1939 with the intention of keeping territorial spoils indefinitely Poland was the country Great Britain went to war over in September 1939 per bilateral treaty obligations ethnic diaspora in the United States that actively lobbied local and federal officials for humanitarian and military aid on its behalf throughout the war Once the Soviet Union joined the Anglo-Saxon alliance after being attacked by Nazi Germany in 1941 and when it became clear to the US and Great Britain that they needed one dictator to defeat the other Poland went from the position of an integral ally to being viewed as a difficult partner unwilling to yield on political issues and questions of territorial sovereignty framed as necessary for defeating Hitler Beginning in 1943, each Red Army victory on the Eastern front emboldened Stalin’s growing appetite of having a say in Europe. Diplomatically, he returned to a concept his diplomats previously presented to the British: a division of Europe into spheres of influence. In Quebec that year US and British military officials concluded that a second military front would be launched in northern France stipulating an Anglo-American zone of operation up to western Germany This signaled that Central and Eastern Europe would likely fall under Red Army military administration severely limiting future Western influence in the region At the first meeting of allied leaders in Tehran in November 1943 Stalin gambled that his partners would not contest a political fait accompli associated with the advance of Soviet power—the Red Army was continuing its drive west while US and British forces wouldn’t launch their invasion of Europe until mid-1944 He took advantage of this position by indicating his intentions toward Central and Eastern Europe which centered around an agreement that Polish territory annexed in 1939 under terms of the Nazi-Soviet Pact to fall indefinitely to the USSR after the war With the caveat of foregoing a detailed public statement of the meeting results Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to shift postwar Poland west at the expense of losing territory in the east the British and Americans began pressing Poland to accept costly territorial changes—called “dictatorial demands” by the Poles—as the basis for smoothing over diplomatic relations with Stalin and maintaining an image of allied cohesion that was already fraying the US and British pivoted from a position of fighting for Poland’s independence to albeit within the confines of a territorially diminished state Roosevelt vaguely guaranteed that Poland would emerge “unhurt” from the war with American backing in a valiant attempt to liberate Poland’s capital by forces loyal to the legal Polish government ruling from London was on the verge of collapse; hostilities ceased on October 3 It was here the Polish side learned of the Teheran agreements calling them a “political sellout,” to which Churchill responded in a fury: “Unless you accept the frontier The Russians will sweep through your country and your people will be liquidated We’ll become sick and tired of you if you continue to argue.” with a series of monumental events putting it to rest The key was changing US policy toward the Soviet Union Roosevelt was especially sensitive to the possible political fallout of questionable foreign policy decisions based on commitments from a dictator in an election year he instructed Harriman to explain to Stalin that the president could not take an active interest in Poland until after the elections while the Soviet leader “could help by giving the Poles a break and carefully avoiding any step that would embroil the issue in the heat of the presidential campaign.” Harriman told Molotov in June 1944 that Roosevelt “remembered Stalin’s reassurance at Teheran that Poland’s independence would be respected” but with the election five months away he “thought it best to keep quiet on the Polish question.” In the words of Harriman: “It was a time to keep barking dogs quiet.” The fate of Poland—and by extension all the nations in Central and Eastern Europe—was ultimately decided “about it without it” at the Yalta Conference in 1945 Heavy-handed measures quickly ushered in the imposition of pro-Soviet communist regimes in Warsaw While Roosevelt achieved several key victories—assurances that Stalin would declare war on Japan in the Pacific and plans to forge the UN—Stalin too scored a major political and military triumph by gaining the much-coveted foothold inside Europe This translated to the rise of the communist movement on the global stage and the ascent of the USSR to the status of rival superpower with its capitalist nemesis The agreements reached at Yalta are an example of when political realism met a last-ditch effort to secure the bare minimum of freedom for those already cast into the orbit of an imperial dictator it came to mean an abandonment and betrayal of allies and values Due to questionable decisions made at the conference the course of history in Central and Eastern Europe was fundamentally altered for decades The region went from its traditional role of the West’s semi-periphery in Europe to an extension of the Soviet East Undoing Yalta took decades which went from containment to détente to a Europe whole The collapse of the Soviet empire and self-liberation in Yalta-affected countries like Poland laid the road to truly free elections that placed the former satellite states in Central and Eastern Europe on a Western democratic trajectory the removal of all Red Army troops stationed throughout the region and accession to NATO—perceived as self-atonement for Yalta—provided an invaluable security umbrella ultimately moving the region out of the gray zone of partitioned Europe to a secure and stable West Putin has linked Central and Eastern Europe with Ukraine presaging the next target of future aggression Making quick deals or vague agreements with an imperially minded aggressive Russia is equivalent to kicking a hand grenade down the road like the 1994 Budapest Memorandum or the Minsk agreements They were instead used to buy time for reconstituting Moscow’s war potential before going on the offensive When it comes to handling Ukraine’s political and territorial future in talks with Moscow America’s next president must keep two things in mind: think twice about faithfully accepting commitments from an authoritarian dictator and negotiate with your partners at the table—in other words Our newsletters highlight and offer a deeper view of the best that is being thought and said in law If you want to wage a proxy war on the other side of the planet only interests—and the United States needs to focus more on what’s most vital Law & Liberty is an online magazine published by Liberty Fund and committed to a society of free and responsible persons living under the rule of law and forum debates that elevate discourse on law all with an eye to understanding and cultivating a free society Part of the Liberty Fund network The opinions expressed on Law & Liberty are solely those of the contributors to the site and do not reflect the opinions of Liberty Fund Essential digital access to quality FT journalism on any device Complete digital access to quality FT journalism with expert analysis from industry leaders Complete digital access to quality analysis and expert insights complemented with our award-winning Weekend Print edition Terms & Conditions apply Discover all the plans currently available in your country See why over a million readers pay to read the Financial Times This year marks the Eightieth anniversary of the historic Yalta Conference where the leaders of the wartime Grand Alliance: Franklin D and Joseph Stalin negotiated the post-war international order.  signaling a resurgence of great-power politics and the rejection of post-World War II norms On the occasion of the anniversary, Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha wrote on X postwar order and spheres of influence were forged in Yalta the aggressor’s illegitimate demands must be rejected He must be forced into a just peace instead.” the world perceives the conference’s legacy in fundamentally different ways it represents a necessary but flawed compromise that laid the foundation for international cooperation Yalta serves as a tool to legitimize its neo-imperialist ambitions The Yalta Conference (February 4–11, 1945) and the Potsdam Conference (July 17–August 2, 1945) established the geopolitical framework of the post-war international order.  they initiated the processes of demilitarization and denazification Germany was divided and restructured to prevent future aggression The stability of the Yalta-Potsdam order gradually eroded with the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 dismantled the bipolar world order stripping Moscow of its dominance in Eastern Europe Former Soviet republics and satellite states pursued Euro-Atlantic integration further weakening Russia’s post-Yalta sphere of influence Between 1999 and 2004, NATO and the European Union expanded significantly integrating former Warsaw Pact members and ex-Soviet republics: Estonia and the Czech Republic into Western security and economic structures The accession of these states to NATO and the EU decisively weakened Russia’s sphere of influence challenging its post-Soviet geopolitical aspirations In 2008, Russian forces invaded Georgia under the pretext of protecting pro-Russian separatists in the Tskhinvali region This military intervention represented a direct challenge to the post-Cold War principle of state sovereignty.  flagrantly violating the fundamental principle of territorial integrity and signaling the collapse of the post-World War II global consensus The illegal seizure of Crimea and the subsequent full-scale war against Ukraine definitively dismantled the great-power consensus designed to prevent wars in Europe These events also exposed the limitations of international institutions highlighting the inability of the United Nations and Western powers to deter aggression or enforce a lasting The Russian state and its political elites have increasingly invoked the legacy of the Yalta Conference to justify their contemporary geopolitical ambitions. For instance, in June 2020, on the occasion of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Soviet Union’s “Great Victory,” Vladimir Putin wrote “The historical revisionism we are currently witnessing in the West — particularly regarding World War II and its consequences — is dangerous because it cynically distorts the principles of peaceful development established in 1945 by the Yalta and San Francisco conferences The primary historical achievement of Yalta and the other agreements of that era was the creation of a mechanism that allowed the great powers to resolve their differences within the framework of diplomacy.” Less than two years after invoking the “framework of diplomacy,” Putin launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine he had already annexed Crimea and ignited a war in eastern Ukraine events that marked the definitive collapse of the Yalta-Potsdam system Russian propaganda claims that it was the West that violated the “spirit of Yalta” by expanding NATO and “undermining” Russia’s security the Yalta Conference legitimized Moscow’s control over the former Soviet republics while their democratization and Western engagement constituted an illegitimate intrusion.  For instance, in an article on the conference’s legacy Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov argues that the West “betrayed” the principles of Yalta He specifically claims that newly appointed U.S Secretary of State Marco Rubio perceives the modern world order as a tool weaponized against American interests.  “That is, no longer is the Yalta-Potsdam order—with the UN at its center—deemed unacceptable, but even the so-called “rules-based order” is now rejected Once seen as an embodiment of the post-Cold War West’s Washington-led arrogance and self-interest and geopolitical conditions have changed irreversibly.” Russia’s state-controlled media, TASS has also manipulated Yalta’s legacy to justify its contemporary ambitions In an article marking the conference’s anniversary the Kremlin’s main propaganda outlet wrote “The Big Three ensured peace on Earth for the next fifty years without any major wars in Europe or America.”  Russian propagandists assert that the “expiration date” of the Yalta-Potsdam system has passed necessitating new geopolitical alignments and a fresh redistribution of spheres of influence Moscow eagerly associates itself with the idea of a supposed “New Yalta,” portraying itself as a key player in shaping a revised world order today’s Russia occupies a far weaker geopolitical position than the Soviet Union did then It lacks the global reach and influence required to serve as a central pole in a bipolar system remains useful to the Kremlin because it fosters an illusion of retained great-power status reinforced by references to historic summits and grand diplomatic moments serves another strategic purpose: under the guise of advocating for “peace,” Russia seeks to freeze the current war and later expand its territorial claims just as the Soviet Union hosted negotiations in 1945 as Hitler faced inevitable defeat has the right to dictate new geopolitical settlements In 2023, Crimean officials declared that Crimea would once again become “the center of world politics,” while local media speculated about the possibility of a modern-day Yalta Conference. Articles with headlines such as “Yalta Conference 2.0: Can Crimea Once Again Stop the Bloodshed?” began appearing Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Russia is prepared for such a summit — but only under the condition that two of the three dominant powers at the table are anti-Western In this envisioned “Yalta-2,” China would replace Great Britain aligning with Russia against the United States The 1945 Yalta Conference laid the foundation for modern international law Russia openly disregarded the very principles of international law that it once helped to establish Moscow has consistently sought to rewrite history deflecting responsibility for its aggression onto the West and blaming the United States and NATO for supposedly “provoking” Russia The Kremlin appears to be anticipating a geopolitical deal reminiscent of Yalta one that would serve its interests through a hard-nosed pact between major powers securing such a pact would not only legitimize its territorial conquests but also reinforce the idea that global order is dictated by raw power rather than principles of sovereignty and self-determination Russia seeks to engineer a world where military strength and political leverage Dr. Lesia Bidochko is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and currently also a Non-Resident Fellow at the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt-Oder Stay in the know with The National Interest newsletter © Copyright 2025 Center for the National Interest We use cookies to enhance your browsing experience We use cookies to help you navigate efficiently and perform certain functions You will find detailed information about all cookies under each consent category below The cookies that are categorised as "Necessary" are stored on your browser as they are essential for enabling the basic functionalities of the site We also use third-party cookies that help us analyse how you use this website and provide the content and advertisements that are 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to analyse the effectiveness of the ad campaigns The world is undergoing a major redistribution of power Europe was divided into Soviet and Western spheres of influence events such as Donald Trump’s potential return to the White House the uncertain course of the Russia-Ukraine war and the sudden “revolution” in Syria that brought an Islamist group to power indicate a quiet redefinition of global concepts History has a strange way of repeating itself—but this time the figures at the table are not Roosevelt ensuring that Israel remains in the picture What we are witnessing is a new “Yalta” or a process of global restructuring The world is experiencing the birth pains of a new global order The Cold War paradigm that emerged from the 1945 Yalta Conference has long been a defining force in global politics and the military-industrial complex the global system has been searching for a new direction a new approach is emerging—one that aims to end the militaristic order economic forces pushing for a transition from a war-driven economy to one focused on domestic growth and production are gaining influence investment-driven models are being encouraged world politics is entering a phase akin to a new Yalta or global restructuring The Key Principles of the New Global Order The End of the War Economy & Reduction of Defense Budgets military conflicts and defense spending have remained at the heart of economic structures conflicts will be resolved through diplomacy and economic agreements rather than military means with resources redirected toward investment and production • Territorial integrity will be a fundamental principle of the new global system • Internal conflicts and separatist movements will no longer be supported • Global powers will recognize democratically elected governments as long as they meet minimum human rights standards the focus will be on internal stability within nations The Strategy to Weaken Iran from Within Will Continue • Iran will remain one of the most sensitive issues in the new global order military interventions will be replaced by economic and political strategies to weaken the regime The Main Rival: China – But the Battle Will Be Economic • China is seen as the biggest competitor in global geopolitics • This competition will be fought through science and business rather than military conflicts and new production systems will be the West’s greatest weapons against China The Implementation of the New Yalta: Afghanistan The principles of this new global framework have already begun to take shape in various geopolitical crises decision to withdraw from Afghanistan and to engage not only with moderate Islam but also with radical Islamist factions—so long as they adhere to certain humanitarian standards—was an early sign Russia’s Exit & the U.S.’s New Strategy The fall of Assad and the rise of HTS (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham) in Syria was no coincidence—it was the first major test of the new global order (arranged by US • Turkey became the first country to recognize the new Syrian government and appoint an ambassador • Russia chose to withdraw its support for Assad rather than confront the new reality and Israel backed the new government to curb Iran’s influence • The Kurdish issue in Syria was resolved not through autonomy Turkey’s long-standing advocacy for Syria’s territorial integrity was validated • Russia has reached a stalemate in Ukraine seems willing to let Russia find an “advantageous” way out ensuring a geopolitical balance in the region • This approach allows the West to refocus on a more critical target: China’s economic expansion • The Trump administration has made it clear that NATO can no longer serve as a “free security insurance” for Europe • European nations are now being forced to take charge of their own defense Turkey is leveraging its position within NATO to balance its relations with both Russia and the West Turkey has emerged as one of the biggest winners in this global restructuring process: • It has shaped the new Syrian order in its favor • It has strengthened its position within NATO • It has built a pragmatic balance with Russia • It has enhanced its bargaining power with the U.S Strengthening diplomatic and military cooperation with Syria’s new government Using its success in Syria as leverage in NATO and EU negotiations Establishing a new balance with Russia to solidify Turkey’s leadership role in the region Carefully managing relations with China to gain an advantage in global trade competition A shift from a war economy to an investment and production-based model A transition from military conflicts to diplomacy and economic agreements Strategic competition with China through science and technology rather than military confrontation The strengthening of Turkey as a rising regional power The Big Question: Turkey’s Role in the New System Turkey was absent from the discussions at Yalta Turkey is now a key player in global power struggles Will Turkey merely be a participant in this new system or will it be one of the forces shaping its rules Some believe the current global transformation is nothing more than an attempt to dismantle the war economy by a real estate mogul (Trump) Others argue that Trump is simply a tool of American capitalists who want to reindustrialize the U.S Some claim that the real war is between the oil and arms lobbies versus the industrial and technology sectors—a battle over who controls the corporate structure of the new world order And let’s not forget: Trump survived an assassination attempt during his campaign Abdullah Öcalan’s call for laying down arms and disbanding the PKK fit in Is all of this merely the growing pains of a shifting system or is it a calculated effort by global powers to redefine balance vous acceptez nos conditions et notre politique de confidentialité you agree to our terms privacy policy agreement بالتسجيل، فإنك توافق على شروطنا واتفاقية سياسة الخصوصية الخاصة بنا Getty Images.Save this storySaveSave this storySaveI don’t know which moment in American history Donald Trump imagines when he says “Make America great again.” He has never given a clear answer in any speech or interview But I know exactly which moment Vladimir Putin imagines in his own vision for Russian greatness Three months remained before the surrender of Nazi Germany but it was clear that the Allies were winning To determine what the world would look like after the defeat of the Third Reich and Soviet leader went to the city of Yalta Stalin achieved everything he wanted: He convinced his then allies that he should have his own “sphere of influence,” which included all of Eastern Europe—Poland The leaders also devised the United Nations Security Council on which they secured permanent member seats for their countries This structure existed for the next 45 years de facto collapsing along with the Soviet Union Putin once called the extinction of the Eastern bloc “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.” Throughout his presidency Putin has repeatedly said that the world needs a “new Yalta.” If the old world order no longer works He began talking about this in 2007 during his famous Munich speech in which he challenged the US-dominated unipolar world order for the first time and has repeated the proposal many times since and in his addresses to the Russian parliament almost every year including a US president who would agree to divide the world with him there has been a stereotype in the Kremlin: It is easier to negotiate with Republicans than with Democrats This stems from the détente between the USSR and the US during the Nixon and Ford administrations; Jimmy Carter Kremlin officials still believe that Republicans are constructive partners while Democrats are hypocrites posing as saints Bush even “looked the man in his eye” and “was able to get a sense of his soul.” But after 2004 when the US supported the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and other “color revolutions” in the former USSR Putin began to fear that Bush wanted to overthrow him too the Kremlin sincerely believed that Bush wanted to become the military dictator of the world Bush’s ratings plummeted and he did not cling to power did not attempt to change the Constitution did not seek a third term—the things Putin himself would be ready to do for power He always believed that when American politicians talked about values Putin watched the (fictional) series House of Cards All his expectations and fears were confirmed: Indeed He just needed to wait for the right person to come to power Putin believed that the mass protests against his third term were organized and funded by the State Department under Hillary Clinton He saw the Democratic candidate as a personal enemy the word Yalta became one of the most popular among Kremlin officials They were confident that Trump was the right person to agree to such a spectacle This did not mean that Russian authorities considered Trump “their puppet”—the Kremlin never had any means to influence him Putin simply believed that Trump was morally close and understandable to him: a fellow cynic who also thought that money solved everything the scandal over Russian interference in American elections ruined all these plans aside from a few brief meetings during international summits Putin and Trump held only one full-fledged negotiation—in Helsinki in 2018 But now the Kremlin believes that if Trump wins in November It hopes he will no longer pay attention to the liberal media or the criticism of the Democrats the Kremlin is convinced that Trump is ready (at least rhetorically) to dismantle the old world order and claim credit for creating a new one The fantasies of Kremlin strategists have developed like this: A new Yalta Conference with Putin and Trump might not necessarily take place in Crimea roughly equidistant from Russia and the US who wish to remain anonymous for security reasons suggest that such a summit could look good on Fiji The Pacific archipelago is conveniently equidistant from Russia and the US Putin’s entourage understands that despite his ambitions and today’s Russia is no match for the Soviet Union the dreams of the current Kremlin inhabitants suggest that another participant in the new “Big Three” should be China They believe that the real Cold War is beginning between China and the US so the upcoming “Yalta: Fiji” should formulate the rules of this confrontation And Putin is ready to be content with the role of the third partner he wants to secure his place on the global board of directors that is the UN Security Council and expects to be allotted his sphere of influence: the countries of the former Soviet Union While fantasizing about the future of the US under Trump It sees it as the ultimate revenge for the Cold War defeat and the collapse of the USSR Putin’s current advisers are confident that the US will eventually disintegrate breaking into several pieces like the Soviet Union ultimately did This would require the right conditions and a leader who could plunge the country into chaos but the nickname used for Trump in the Kremlin is the American Gorbachev Mikhail Gorbachev is not a democrat or a reformer Gorbachev is a demagogue and a narcissist who desperately wanted to please the audience but had no plan of action; a president whose policies were so chaotic that the empire began to fall apart with different parts declaring their independence but Putin’s inner circle would like to believe that Trump could become just such a president since American cinema is an important source of information and inspiration for Putin’s analysts they have already received the necessary confirmation from Hollywood: Civil War is evidence to them that the situation in America is worsening by the day The disaster film is treated as almost a prophecy They are therefore convinced that they are on the right track Vladimir Putin believes that his dream is not so unattainable How Miriam Adelson Went From Big MAGA Winner to Casino Loser in Trump’s First 100 Days Trump’s Lies Are Finally Catching Up to Him The UK Has Found Another Reason to Be Mad at Meghan Markle “It’s About Him”: How Trump Is Perverting the Presidential Photo Stream The Ballad of Bill Belichick and Jordon Hudson The Truth Underlying Pete Hegseth’s Job Security Why Are Americans So Obsessed With Protein How Sebastian Stan Became Hollywood’s Most Daring Shape-Shifter Every Quentin Tarantino Movie Meet Elon Musk’s 14 Children and Their Mothers (Whom We Know of) From the Archive: Sinatra and the Mob In February 1945 Winston Churchill, Franklin D Roosevelt and Josef Stalin met in the town of Yalta in the Crimea to talk about the future of Europe after World War 2.  Ever since there have been accusations that Churchill and Roosevelt 'lost' Yalta by not extracting enough concessions from Stalin in relation to the future of Poland and other Eastern European countries, which went on to spend the next 45 years behind what Churchill famously described as the 'Iron Curtain'.  Diana Preston, Author of Eight Days at Yalta, joined Suzanne Hill on Nightlife in the This Week in History segment to talk about how the conference played out and whether history could have been different.  British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, US President Franklin Roosevelt, and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin at Yalta in February 1945.(Wikimedia: US Department of Defense) Published: 17h agoMon 5 May 2025 at 12:00pm Download the ABC listen app to hear more of your favourite podcasts Our editors will review what you’ve submitted and determine whether to revise the article although the Soviet Union was permitted 10–15 percent of the industrial equipment in the western zones of Germany in exchange for agricultural and other natural products from its zone Please select what you would like included for printing: Copy the text below and then paste that into your favorite email application Enter your phone number above to have directions sent via text This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply Service map data © OpenStreetMap contributors Ukraine’s endurance is a strategic victory in itself and author of the newly released book ‘The Land of Great Sacrifice: How Russia Defies Western Logic.’ Van Bladel dissects the latest developments in the Ukraine war in an interview with RFE/RL’s Georgian Service the enduring flaws and strengths of Russia’s military mentality and the unpredictable role of US President Donald Trump in shaping the next phase of the conflict — or in potentially — and perhaps unintentionally — handing the Kremlin a new “Yalta.” the Kursk offensive has more or less run its course What effect that will have on the overall course of the war This also leads us to the fundamental question: what was the strategic intent of this incursion It was a very difficult endeavor to sustain especially given Ukraine’s limited resources The chief goal – to divert large numbers of Russian forces from Donbas to Kursk – clearly didn’t work out in the end to an extent due to the arrival of the aforementioned North Koreans This takes us back to the realization that kinetic warfare is still very much here Technology can replace many aspects of war but here we saw that the superior numbers in manpower and firepower had their say The conventional warfare element is still essential to this war Russia is utterly confused by the incoherence that they have made Russians unable to achieve any strategic breakthrough over such a long period The entire world is watching how a regime that has done what Russia did in Ukraine is rapidly reintroduced and given back its former status on the international scene I fear Washington is greatly underestimating the skill and grit of the Kremlin diplomatic corps I fear it’s not Donald Trump that is making a deal with the Kremlin—the Kremlin is playing Trump Russia is using its well-honed negotiation tactics to manipulate him extracting maximum advantage while disregarding any so-called agreements the moment they no longer serve its interests And to circle back to your initial question this new Yalta- they will only get it if President Trump allows it to happen It’s quite telling that if you look at the Russian reactions to the Riyad and Jeddah talks they are utterly confused by the incoherence One side effect of it all is that we’ve seen Europe mobilizing taking defense and security more seriously But I doubt whether that effect was intentional President Trump’s claim that Ukrainian forces are encircled in Kursk: Trump’s claim is based on a Russian setup he impulsively picked up without verification It reflects his habitual reliance on spontaneous unverified assertions rather than a well-considered strategy The Ukrainian denials underscore the disconnect between Trump’s rhetoric and battlefield realities Let’s turn to the Russian military mentality – a subject you explored in depth in your latest book – and its role these three years what old truths have been reaffirmed and what new things have we learned We have once again seen that a lot of the elements in Russian military culture and mentality haven’t changed at all A big chunk of its organizational culture has stayed the same There is an aspect to the Russians that we may be underestimating in the West: the willingness to fight on and so on and see the same kind of behavior that we see now in Donbas the Russian armed forces underwent a period of modernizing and reforming Why Silknet's eSIM could be your top choice in Georgia  Since its introduction Schmidt Distinguished Professor at the Henry A Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies To Run the World: The Kremlin’s Cold War Bid for Global Power is a finalist for the 2025 Lionel Gelber Prize presented by the Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin hosted the U.S Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston Churchill at Yalta to discuss their joint plans for the postwar order Their agreement ratified Soviet control of Eastern Europe especially by the Eastern Europeans who endured more than 40 years of misery under the Kremlin’s control President Donald Trump’s bid to end the war in Ukraine by Trump has dangled the promise of Russia’s triumphant return to Europe and the world Putin – eager for such recognition of his greatness – will have to seriously consider the offer a prospect that cannot help but alarm America’s allies and especially the embattled Ukrainians who fear a sellout Roosevelt badly needed Stalin’s co-operation The war in Europe was already drawing to a close But Roosevelt required Stalin’s help in Asia and he was even willing to trade away Japanese-held Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Island chain in exchange for Stalin’s participation in the war against Japan What the Soviet leader wanted above all else was not just territorial gains in Europe and Asia as important as they were for someone with Stalin’s imperialistic mindset What he wanted was America’s recognition of the legitimacy of these gains – and it was here that Yalta mattered most It marked the Soviets’ rise not just to the status of a superpower (this Stalin owed to his victory in the Second World War) accepted by the United States as an indispensable partner in the creation of the postwar order believing that greater gains with lesser legitimacy weren’t as good lesser gains with greater legitimacy The Yalta agreement played into his initial refusal to support the Greek Communists in their civil war his pullback from Iran (in exchange for a promise of an oil concession that never materialized) and his willingness to sacrifice the cause of Chinese Communism for a profitable relationship with Chiang Kai-shek’s government (though Stalin later reversed himself to back Mao Zedong) He expected the world to be divided into spheres of influence and wanted the Americans to recognize his Soviet postwar planners took it for granted that Eastern Europe would fall under the Soviet sway which would extend far into Western Europe they thought – perhaps as far as Sweden in the north and the Libyan coast of Africa in the south he put a premium on left-wing coalition governments the United States would mind its own business in the Western Hemisphere “There is a universally-known rule,” he explained not long before Yalta: “If you cannot advance but once you have accumulated your strength go on the offensive … We are not guided by emotions but by reason Stalin had not expected the Americans to stay in Europe The United States also extended massive aid to Western Europe – known as the Marshall Plan – to prop up postwar European economies and make misery-induced Communism less appealing to the Europeans Fearing the attractiveness of American values and the power of the U.S Stalin moved rapidly to consolidate his grip on Eastern Europe through brutal communization He attempted to expel Americans from Berlin Great power co-operation in the spirit of Yalta went out of the window it’s hard to blame FDR for signing on to Yalta Eastern Europe was already under Stalin’s military control A war with the USSR was unthinkable (though Winston Churchill was ahead of the curve by ordering war plans to this end in his eagerness for great power co-operation with Russia (which he wrongly thinks will help him confront China) What he wants is American acceptance as an equal who assumed the presidency upon Roosevelt’s death Then – working hand-in-hand – they will try to impose these same values on recalcitrant Europeans steering Europe not toward the far left (as Stalin tried unsuccessfully in his time) authoritarian Russia run by an aging dictator back in from the cold Report an editorial error Report a technical issue Editorial code of conduct Authors and topics you follow will be added to your personal news feed in Following Welcome to The Globe and Mail’s comment community. 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For more information on our commenting policies and how our community-based moderation works, please read our Community Guidelines and our Terms and Conditions Roosevelt met with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom The “Big Three” met at Yalta to discuss the reorganization of the European geopolitical landscape after the inevitable fall of Nazi Germany Soviet involvement in the Pacific Theatre of the war against the Empire of Japan After the conclusion of the Yalta Conference President Roosevelt met with several Middle Eastern heads of state along his voyage back to the United States including King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia on February 14 while the destroyer passed through the Suez Canal the President and the King discussed political challenges faced by Middle Eastern nations such as the settlement of European Jewish refugees fleeing persecution in Palestine European colonialism in the Middle East and the struggle for sovereignty and efforts to increase agriculture through improved irrigation in the region.1 Newspaper and State Department accounts of the meeting indicate that the two heads of state opened a productive dialogue and shared warm friendly feelings during a very successful audience The leaders also exchanged gifts as a sign of good faith and mutual respect before their summit Suad presented the American president with a jewel-encrusted saber and beautiful examples of traditional Arab clothing President Roosevelt’s remarkable gift to King Saud did not go unnoticed by the press was instrumental in arranging the meeting and acted as a translator for the President Eddy recorded the friendly nature of the discussion and the presentation of the President's gift to the King: During the more informal visit on deck before lunch (11:30 to 1:00 p.m. February 14) a very friendly relationship was quickly established The King spoke of being the “twin” brother of the President “but you are fortunate to still have the use of your legs to take you wherever you choose to go.” The King replied My legs grow feebler every year; with your more reliable wheel-chair you are assured that you will arrive.” The President then said Would you accept one as a personal gift from me?” The King said I shall use it daily and always recall affectionately the giver The personal backgrounds and common interests of the two leaders brought them close together But it was their shared experiences with disability and the offering of the wheelchair that cemented their fast friendship The King and the President got along famously together Among many passes of pleasant conversation I shall choose the King’s stamen to the President that the two of them really were twins: (1) that were both of the same age (which was not quite correct); (2) they were both heads of states with grave responsibilities to defend protect and feed their people; (3) they were both at heart farmer the President having made quite a hit with the King by emphasizing his rural responsibilities as the squire of Hyde Park and his interest in agriculture; (4) they both bore in their bodies grave physical infirmities – the President obliged to move in a chair and the King walking with difficulty and unable to climb stairs because of wounds in his legs… Whenever the King took friends through his palace at Riyadh he showed them his private apartment where his wheelchair rested with the White House tag still on it “This chair is my most precious possession It is the gift of my great and good friend on whom Allah has had mercy.” The King who later used a wheelchair did not use thus gift chair which was built for the very slight and frail F.D.R Shortly after his summit with President Roosevelt King Saud also met with Prime Minister Winston Churchill to discuss similar issues about the future of the Middle East King Saud and Churchill didn’t share the same amiable meeting that Saud had experienced with President Roosevelt The British attempted to outshine the Americans with a larger ship and a grander display which Saud apparently found “dull” and off-putting.4 He preferred the more engaging and intimate atmosphere provided by his American hosts and President Roosevelt was extremely touched by FDR’s present of his own wheelchair President Roosevelt also valued his encounter with King Saud and found their conversation to be productive FDR reported that he “learned more about [the Near East] by talking with Ibn Saud for five minutes than I could have learned in an exchange of two or three dozen letters.”5 one newspaper printed: “A new disclosure today was that the President gave King Ibn Saud a wheel chair the King had coveted It was probably the first such gift in history between two chiefs of state.”6 By exhibiting this cherished souvenir his "most precious possession," prominently in his private apartment in Riyadh and sharing the story to his closest friends King Saud literally put his personal affection and gratitude towards Roosevelt on display The State Department also notes that the wheelchair that President Roosevelt gave to King Saud was too small Roosevelt to arrange for a shipment of a new one to the King Documentation in the archives of the Franklin D Roosevelt Presidential Library further confirms Eddy’s and newspaper reports According to page 46 of the log of the USS Quincy trip to Crimea “the President presented the King a gold Fourth-Term Inaugural Medallion (with special leather case) and also one of his wheel-chairs which had attracted the King’s fancy.” Upon the President's return to the US from his whirlwind diplomatic tour FDR addressed Congress for the final time on March 1 the President reported on the success of the Yalta Conference his encounters with Middle Eastern leaders and his goals for lasting world peace through the United Nations Unlike his previous appearances before Congress this time there was no ramp with handrails leading to the rostrum for Roosevelt to walk to the podium; instead President Roosevelt entered the chamber of the House of Representatives in his wheelchair and remained seated for the duration of his speech I hope that you will pardon me for the unusual posture of sitting down during the presentation of what I want to say but I know that you will realize that it makes it a lot easier for me in not having to carry about ten pounds of steel 'round on the bottom of my legs; and also because of the fact that I have just completed a fourteen-thousand-mile trip.8 questioned the President's actions in the days following the Yalta conference went against the media's previous cooperation with a White House restriction on covering the President's paralysis and disability: there has been an understanding that no stories or pictures would be circulated playing on Mr has he approved the release of such stories as that from the Mediterranean when he gave Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia a wheel chair like his own Why has he so far dropped the veil as to apologize in what may have been his most widely circulated public address before Congress the other day for remaining seated and explaining that its was easier he had to carry ten pounds of painful steel braces on the lower part of his legs?9 Stinnett reported rumors that FDR now acknowledged his disability only because he had no further plans to run for reelection: is that the President is through with running for office and even with any further personal participation in politics other than perhaps giving his nod to some one who may seek to succeed him.10 Speculation that President Roosevelt no longer concealed his disability because he was free from electoral repercussions incorrectly implies that Americans were unwilling to vote a disabled person into public office But the American public had been aware of the President’s limited mobility Hundreds of disabled Americans wrote letters to the President funds were raised for the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis (later the March of Dimes) in FDR’s name more than $22,000 was donated to a campaign led by 42 newspapers to construct a swimming pool in the West Wing for the newly inaugurated Roosevelt because “Swimming in a warm water pool has been highly beneficial to Mr in his struggles with physical handicaps.”11 Stinnett couldn’t have addressed it more plainly: “It wasn’t any secret No one who could read or hear was unaware that the President had been paralyzed in the lower part of his legs by infantile paralysis.”12 During the 1932 campaign the press scrutinized FDR’s disability to evaluate his fitness for office with the facts of his disability laid before them American voters still elected FDR for two terms as governor of New York and a record-setting four terms in the White House putting to rest the notion that FDR was compelled or forced to “hide” his disability for political gain Those who perpetuate the myth that FDR hid his disability from the public often cite as their evidence the very few known images of the President in his wheelchair perpetuating it as a symbol of limitation and weakness And in the case of American-Saudi relations FDR’s use of the wheelchair proved to be politically advantageous and helped forge diplomatic ties between two nations 1 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume VIII - Office of the Historian 2 Minister to Saudi Arabia William A. Eddy to Secretary of State Edward Stettinius Jr., March 3, 1945; State Department, Office of the Historian Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume VIII - Office of the Historian 3 Eddy, F.D.R. Meet Ibn Saud, page 27 FDR MEETS IBN SAUD : WILLIAM A. EDDY : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive 4 Eddy, "F.D.R. Meets Ibn Saud," page 13 FDR MEETS IBN SAUD : WILLIAM A. EDDY : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive 5 President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Final Address to a Joint Session; United States House of Representatives; President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Final Address to a Joint Session | US House of Representatives: History, Art & Archives 7 Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume VIII - Office of the Historian 8 President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Final Address to a Joint Session; United States House of Representatives; President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Final Address to a Joint Session | US House of Representatives: History, Art & Archives 9 Jack Stinnett, “Stinnett Hears FDR Is Out in ’48; Wil Not Be Candidate,” The Daily Alaska Empire, March 27, 1945, pages 1 and 6, The Daily Alaska empire. 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"Winter War"(between November 1939 and March 1940) the alternative facing Europe is "either the Yalta moment or the Helsinki moment in international relations." coinciding with the meeting of US President-elect Donald Trump Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and French President Emmanuel Macron at the Elysée who had come to attend the ceremony to reopen Notre-Dame Cathedral said that "we must be very clear with the Russians [...] If they try to push us towards new European security arrangements we already have them from 1975 and the Helsinki Accords strengthened in 1992 by the Paris Agreements which established the OSCE: the principles are there You have 74.97% of this article left to read Lecture du Monde en cours sur un autre appareil Vous pouvez lire Le Monde sur un seul appareil à la fois Ce message s’affichera sur l’autre appareil Parce qu’une autre personne (ou vous) est en train de lire Le Monde avec ce compte sur un autre appareil Vous ne pouvez lire Le Monde que sur un seul appareil à la fois (ordinateur En cliquant sur « Continuer à lire ici » et en vous assurant que vous êtes la seule personne à consulter Le Monde avec ce compte Que se passera-t-il si vous continuez à lire ici Ce dernier restera connecté avec ce compte Vous pouvez vous connecter avec votre compte sur autant d’appareils que vous le souhaitez mais en les utilisant à des moments différents Nous vous conseillons de modifier votre mot de passe Votre abonnement n’autorise pas la lecture de cet article merci de contacter notre service commercial The head of Ukrainian diplomacy stated this on X the aggressor's illegitimate demands must be rejected He must be forced into just peace instead," the minister stressed the Russian and Crimea occupation authorities intend to hold a teleconference in February involving studios in Simferopol and the UK and the USA on the occasion of the anniversary of the Yalta Conference they intend to circulate narratives of alleged “Nazism” in Ukraine and the obsolete nature of the existing world order head of the Center for Russian Studies Volodymyr Ohryzko said Russia seeks to exploit the topic of the Yalta Conference to promote the idea of ​​dividing the world into spheres of influence of the major powers trying to deprive Ukraine of agency as an independent state in the Western civilizational space gathered at the Yalta Conference to resolve the issue of the end of World War 2 and the post-war order While citing and using any materials on the Internet links to the website ukrinform.net not lower than the first paragraph are mandatory citing the translated materials of foreign media outlets is possible only if there is a link to the website ukrinform.net and the website of a foreign media outlet Materials marked as "Advertisement" or with a disclaimer reading "The material has been posted in accordance with Part 3 of Article 9 of the Law of Ukraine "On Advertising" No 1996 and the Law of Ukraine "On the Media" No 2023 and on the basis of an agreement/invoice Online media entity; Media identifier - R40-01421 Putin has long dreamed about the kind of power that Stalin once wielded And now the new American president may have handed him an olive branch that he can use to whip the Soviet Union back into being…with a quid pro quo to Trump After their lengthy phone call, Trump made no secret on Wednesday of the “great benefit” he believes Russia and the United States will someday derive from working together they needed to settle that pesky war in Ukraine That is the question beguiling other world leaders who are watching the Trump-Putin bromance with interest and no small trepidation saying in his Truth Social post that he would visit Russia without specifying where or when Much would depend on how quickly a meeting between Trump and Putin—pointedly without Zelensky—can be arranged in Saudi Arabia, hosted by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman A Moscow visit would be easier to sell for Trump if he could bring Putin and Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky together in the meantime and bathe in the glory of his peacemaking and there is a very real possibility that it will Putin will have the two leaders he needs in the same place at the same time to bring about a coup that would make him a major player once again and no longer a pariah on the world stage It would provide him with a gold-tipped opportunity to bring the world’s three power brokers together And the last time it happened it worked out really well for the Kremlin Despite the celebratory mood following Yalta Putin is staking his future on Yalta 2.0 with Fiji as a possible location halfway between Russia and the U.S. As Bloomberg pointed out on Wednesday Trump has made his interest clear in Greenland potentially the world’s next big flashpoint And while Putin may not get carte blanche to reclaim Eastern Europe he would at least guarantee being back on the superpower big table the very idea of Yalta 2.0—or Fiji 1.0—seemed like a figment of Putin’s febrile imagination Trump is supremely confident in his negotiating abilities and genuinely believes he is smarter than the presidents that have come before him He might not be able to resist the opportunity to match his wits against the world’s other two great strongmen Got a tip? Send it to The Daily Beast here. Donald Trump has made a lot of decisions that fly in the face of traditional US foreign policy and he’s floated the idea of seizing new territory in Greenland And the big one: President Trump seems to have a great deal of time and respect for Russian President Vladimir Putin So what’s the deal with Putin and Trump - is what we’re witnessing now just the beginning of their grand plans for a new world order And what hints can we get on how things might unfold from a conference that happened 80 years ago between US president Franklin Roosevelt British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in a little town called Yalta will Putin’s dream of an emboldened Soviet sphere come true And if you're a Newcastle fan come see If You're Listening live with Matt Bevan on Sunday 4th April at 4pm at the Conservatorium of music concert hall - Tickets are free! Find out more: https://www.newcastlewritersfestival.org.au/events/if-youre-listening-live/ Follow If You're Listening on the ABC Listen app. Published: 23 Apr 2025Wed 23 Apr 2025 at 3:00pm Published: 16 Apr 2025Wed 16 Apr 2025 at 3:00pm Published: 14 Apr 2025Mon 14 Apr 2025 at 11:00pm That’s according to Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha who spoke at the plenary session of the OSCE Ministerial Council in Malta on Thursday Europe has not seen such a scale of atrocities Moscow tries to justify all of this with the so-called “legitimate security concerns” But my nation’s right to exist is not Russia’s legitimate security concern My nation's choice of its own future is not Russia’s legitimate security concern Russia itself is the biggest security concern for the world For hundreds of years," Sybiha noted in his speech He also stressed that "when Russians say they want peace "They talk about negotiations only to divert attention from what they are really doing Russia continues to expand the war," the Ukrainian minister said He recalled Russia's terrorizing of the civilian population with constant missile and drone attacks Russia's attempts to cause a nuclear disaster through systematic strikes on energy infrastructure and occupation of the Zaporizhzhia NPP the use of weapons supplied from Iran and the DPRK and the deployment of North Korean troops as well as Russia's launch of a medium-range ballistic missile at Ukraine "These actions demand strong responses We must raise the cost of the war for the aggressor We must force Moscow to accept a just peace We must demonstrate strength and unity in the face of blackmail not simply declare them," the Ukrainian Foreign Minister emphasized He added that the Budapest Memorandum " has shown the price of agreements at the cost of Ukraine" he emphasized that "there will be no compromises on our territorial integrity When the Russians say “peace” they mean murdered Ukrainian civilians mass graves and cities razed to the ground Ukrainian children sent to Russian families and given Russian names Our peace plan is for Russia to get out of Ukraine and leave us alone Entirely in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act," he said Russia "wants a second Yalta or at least a third Minsk." "They want a world of zones of influence where the use of force dictates new rules and new borders These are the two approaches to the future that are being decided right now in Ukraine We need to act now to ensure that the future comes because Russia turns them into zones of influence we need geopolitical certainty on Ukraine as part of the Euro-Atlantic community," the minister emphasized a two-day OSCE Ministerial Council kicked off in Malta on Thursday The meeting is also attended by Sergei Lavrov Presidential Scholar in Residence Dr. Joseph Loconte’s recently published essay “A Frail President in a Hostile World” compares the fragile health and electoral pitfalls faced by Joe Biden with FDR’s own circumstances at he sought a historic fourth term in 1944.  America was already in the late stages of World War II and Loconte contends the 32nd president’s failing health made an impact on negotiations with Stalin at Yalta in 1945 and America’s adversaries may seek to take similar advantage of the 46th president.  Joe Biden is not the first ailing American president to seek another term of office despite being manifestly unfit for the job But the last time it happened — with the re-election of Franklin Roosevelt for an unprecedented fourth term — the result was disastrous for the cause of democracy and human rights in the world The democratic revolutions of 1989 might have occurred much earlier had a stronger American leader been present at Yalta Throughout much of the eight-day conference the president physically projected weakness and capitulation The end result of his performance was the forcible absorption of central and eastern Europe into the Soviet Union touted for decades by Roosevelt’s sycophantic admirers is that the Soviet army already occupied these European states by the time of the Yalta conference; there was nothing the president could do to alter Moscow’s intention to create “friendly states” along the border of the Soviet Union it wasn’t because of his physical or mental capacity,” insists author and New York Times editor Joseph Lelyveld. “Had he been at the peak of vigor the results would have been much the same.” Yet the transcripts of the Yalta conference and the memoirs of key participants expose this narrative as fairy dust Roosevelt’s mental decline accentuated his naïve progressive instincts and played into the hands of Stalin the ruthless realist hellbent on dominating Europe in thwarting the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union occupied most of eastern Europe and was not about to leave But the decisive issue at Yalta — the hinge upon which Soviet designs depended — was Poland The American president possessed the power to intervene on behalf of its democratic future FDR used Poland as a bargaining chip for his Wilsonian dream of a rejuvenated League of Nations Churchill went to Yalta with a supreme objective: to preserve Poland’s political independence It was the invasion of Poland by Nazi Germany that ignited the Second World War and created an existential crisis for Great Britain “Everyone here knows the result it was to us and that it nearly cost us our life as a nation,” Churchill said “Never could I be content with any solution that would not leave Poland as a free and independent state.” FDR seemed indifferent to the sacrifice and valor of the 150,000 Polish ex-patriates who fought with the Allied forces at Monte Cassino His interventions on behalf of Poland were sophomoric Against the calculating and duplicitous Stalin The Polish democratic resistance, with its leadership in London, was dead set against the communist puppets installed in Warsaw during the fog of war. The American and British negotiating teams wanted the Soviets to agree to a new Provisional Government in Poland — reorganized “on a broader democratic basis” — to offset the Warsaw communists “The United States will never lend its support in any way to any provisional government in Poland which would be inimical to your interests,” he assured Stalin It was an absurd and astonishing thing to promise: The Soviet Union had made it clear that any democratic government on its border was “inimical” to its interests the Soviet army invaded Poland from the east as the Nazis invaded from the west He confirmed it again when he proceeded to brutally dismember Polish society ordering the deportation and execution of tens of thousands of ordinary citizens If elections were to be held without a more broadly democratic government in place Roosevelt and Churchill insisted upon the presence of election observers and Russia should be observers to see that they are carried out impartially summarized FDR’s frame of mind thus: “He was deluding himself.” Hugh Lunghi a translator and member of the British delegation at Yalta “Those of us who worked and lived in Moscow knew that there was not a chance in hell that Stalin would allow free elections in those countries when he didn’t allow them in the Soviet Union.” the American president was commander in chief of the most powerful military in the world and was within months of possessing an atomic weapon and Allied forces had staged the largest and most successful amphibious invasion in the history of warfare The United States boasted unrivaled industrial might and was the engine of the global economy Yet with all of these resources in hand, Roosevelt would not even insist upon election observers in a European state that had been brutalized by both the Nazis and the Russians Did Roosevelt’s fragile condition contribute to his posture of appeasement interacted with Roosevelt and recorded in his diary: “The president appears to be a very sick man He has all the symptoms of hardening of the arteries of the brain in an advanced stage … I give him only a few months to live.” (Roosevelt died two months later) looked ghastly.” His condition deteriorated throughout the conference Those present believed Roosevelt probably heard only half of what was said during the meetings Churchill complained that Roosevelt took “a distant view” of the Polish question throughout the sessions of that conference that the President had a distant view on many other problems as well,” recalled A.H “appeared to be putting the words into his mouth for him to say.” Indeed it seems likely that Roosevelt suffered a pulsus alternans (when every second heartbeat is weaker than the preceding one) during one of the debates over Poland a frail American president embodied political impotence at a moment of geo-political crisis By not demanding a free and fair democratic election in Poland Roosevelt telegraphed a clear message to Stalin: The United States would not object if Poland’s sovereignty and independence were destroyed Roosevelt later declared to Congress that the Yalta conference had been a smashing success especially with regards to Poland. There were difficulties And more important even than the agreement of words I may say we achieved a unity of thought and a way of getting along together.” It was a deception based upon a delusion underwritten by political ambition and personal vanity What difference might a democratic Poland have made caught in the communist grip of the Soviet bloc when the Polish democratic resistance movement compelled the regime to allow free and fair elections The downfall of communism in Poland led directly to the collapse of communism in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and a lust for domination that has few historical rivals The sick and feeble Roosevelt was no match for “the man of steel.” America’s enemies are taking stock of the fragile president who melted into incoherence during his first debate with Donald Trump — and they are praying that he stays in the race and wins in November Joseph Loconte is a Presidential Scholar at New College of Florida and the C.S Lewis Scholar for Public Life at Grove City College He is the author of the forthcoming book, The War for Middle-earth: J.R.R The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the New College Trustees New College of Florida promotes a climate of free expression and tolerant civil discourse according to the principles set forth in the State University System Free Expression Statement and the Board of Governors Civil Discourse Final Report The Local Europe ABVästmannagatan 43113 25 StockholmSweden At a press conference held immediately after a digital meeting between European leaders and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau Kristersson declared that Europe and the world were "currently at a crossroads" "How the war against Ukraine ends will affect and shape the security of the whole of Europe for generations to come," he said No situation in Europe has been this dangerous for a very He expressed particular worry about the way the US and Russia had begun negotiations "A situation where the world is starting to talk more and more about 'spheres of interest' would be extremely dangerous for smaller countries who have for many decades been able to have faith in a world order which respects national sovereignty," he said The Yalta Conference in 1945 saw the leaders of the US splitting the continent for more than 40 years European leaders had called for all countries to boost their national defences "at a dramatic pace" "There is going to have to be a dramatic rearmament both to meet the needs of Ukraine and to meet Europe's needs after whatever peace agreement Ukraine ends up with," he said European leaders had also agreed on a strategy of "peace through strength" with Ukraine supplied with as much equipment as possible in the coming months to put it in a strong negotiating position "That is the only way to secure peace in our part of the world."  Kristersson also said that European leaders had agreed that Ukraine must be able to define the conditions of any future peace deal "There should be nothing decided about Ukraine without Ukraine and nothing about European responsibility in general without European involvement," he said Asked to respond to US President Donald Trump's claim in a post on social media on Wednesday that Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky was a "dictator" and that Ukraine had started the war with Russia President Zelensky is democratically elected," he said But he warned against reacting to everything said on social media or in newspaper "I think we should have ice in our stomachs [keep a cool head] and not react to everything that gets said in the international media or on social media," he said adding that European leaders should "speak less and do more" Even in the event that the US withdraws all support for Ukraine European countries should continue to support the country "There's no doubt that European countries would be able to go in and do more and also completely or partly replace American support," he said of the absolute majority of countries was that defending Ukraine is absolutely existential."  but it would be much better with a cohesive transatlantic partnership."  Please log in here to leave a comment Yet in the first month of Donald Trump’s second presidency His actions so far demonstrate both a significant break with US foreign policy overall But the break is in some cases backwards looking returning the US to a place either pre-1991 or even before 1945 the US was an isolationist country largely disengaged from Europe Separated by oceans and thousands of kilometres the US developed for much of its history with a desire to break free and isolate itself from the rest of the world Isolationism became part of American culture It did not see its security interests in Europe It created the UN and other international organizations as part of an effort to remake the world in its image and to erect what came to be known as the rules-based order of international law that was to exchange war for diplomacy to resolve disputes peacefully support for democratic values and opposition to communism and containment of the Soviet Union led the US to forge alliances such as NATO to guarantee European security Yet this security guarantee came with a caveat that emerged out of the Yalta talks with Joseph Stalin in 1946 The US along with England and the USSR agreed to relative spheres of influence This divided Europe along the so-called iron curtain that declared Eastern and Central Europe as part of the Soviet sphere of influence and Ukraine which were part of the USSR then From 1945 to the present the US was a guarantor of European security through NATO was central to US foreign policy Under US president Richard Nixon his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger refined this world view to include closer relations with China to contain Russian influence The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the breakup of the USSR in 1991 changed some of this strategy Yet the US remained committed to European security with an expanded NATO While initially embracing a post-Soviet Russia as a possible friend this quickly dissipated as Putin became more aggressive and grew in power not even the 2014 invasion of Ukraine by Russia completely convinced the US that Russia was a security threat and perhaps not until the 2022 invasion did it start to realize that President Biden’s reluctant support for Ukraine and his abrupt pullout from Afghanistan questioned US international commitments His first term questioned US foreign policy internationalism and talked of isolationism He disparaged alliances such as NATO and seemed dismissive of Russia’s threat to US or US security interests His new presidency has picked up where his first term left off He again questions NATO and seems to view them as foes and not allies His administration has effectively split the European alliance and there is a real question whether the US will continue to guarantee European security much longer his pressure on it to capitulate to Putin’s demands and talk of doing business with Russia all represent both a break with some parts of US foreign policy since WWII but also a return to both a pre-WWII isolationism and Yalta-style spheres of influence politics So far Trump’s second round as president is a break questioning of recent US foreign policy David Schultz is professor of political science at Hamline University visiting lecturer at Mykolas Romeris University (MRU) and member of the MRU LAB Justice Research Laboratory Today's print edition Home Delivery he and President Vladimir Putin of Russia are about to have something akin to their own Yalta moment great powers determining borders within Europe He didn’t explicitly refer to the 1945 meeting Roosevelt carved the continent into the American-aligned West and the Soviet-dominated East creating spheres of influence that became the battlegrounds of the Cold War.googletag.cmd.push(function() { googletag.display('div-gpt-ad-1499653692894-0'); }); But talking to reporters on Air Force One while returning from Florida on Sunday night Trump made clear that his scheduled phone conversation with Putin on Tuesday would be focused on what lands and assets Russia would retain in any ceasefire with Ukraine In a time of both misinformation and too much information quality journalism is more crucial than ever.By subscribing Your subscription plan doesn't allow commenting. To learn more see our FAQ Sponsored contents planned and edited by JT Media Enterprise Division 4 – 11 February: Yalta ‘Big Three’ Conference opened on 4 February and was the second meeting between the leaders of the major Allied powers during the Second World War: United Kingdom; United States of America; and Soviet Union And the last time Prime Minister Churchill President Roosevelt and Premier Stalin would be together the end of the European war was in sight and the primary objective of Yalta was to plan for the final destruction of German military power and agreeing the immediate post-war world But against Japan – despite the Allies overwhelming superiority – bitter fighting continued the Allies (Britain/Canada and United States) had recovered from the shock of the German Ardennes offensive (‘Battle of the Bulge’) but were still on the west banks of the Rhine – some 300 or more miles from Berlin Soviet Armies had cleared virtually all of Poland and East Prussia and smashed into Germany on a 300-mile front The Soviet tide swept over the River Oder into Silesia and reached within 35 miles of Berlin itself Stalin taunted Marshals Ivan Koniev and Georgy Zhukov over whether Koniev’s First Ukrainian Front [Front = Soviet Army Group] or Zhukov’s First Belorussian Front would be the first to plant a Red Army flag on Berlin’s Brandenburg Gate Japan’s position was dire: American submarines were imposing a crippling blockade on the vital oil and raw materials their war industries craved And Boeing B29 Superfortress raids from the airfields in the Marianas were mounting But still the Japanese fought on – literally suicidally – with Kamikaze attacks Allied military planners envisaged an invasion of the Japanese main island in 1946 with the fighting potentially dragging on into 1947 with casualty counts on both sides in the millions The principal political outcome from the Yalta Conference was the reinforcement of the concept of European ‘spheres of influence’ first considered at their conference in Tehran in November 1943 Unconditional surrender was demanded of Germany to be followed by division into zones occupied by four powers: Britain despite being hundreds of miles inside the Soviet Zone a Cold War flash-point for the next 44 years transferring some territory in the east to Russia but gaining areas in the west from Germany together with Bessarabia [now Moldova and parts of Ukraine] were incorporated into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR The Soviets were to have ‘influence’ in eastern Europe through their respective national governments permitting some non-Communists to be elected (but this part of the Agreement was ignored and by 1947 all those areas had exclusively Communist governments sympathetic to Moscow) Also the USSR was allowed massive reparations for the damage caused by the German invasion This division of Europe into two politically-opposed ideologies was a very major factor in the long Cold War which was to follow the end of the European war Stalin promised the Soviet Union would declare war on Japan three months after the end of the German war The reference in the published communiqué to ‘unconditional surrender’ dashed the fantasies of Hitler Göring and other Nazi leaders of negotiating a separate peace with the Western Allies and then German forces fighting alongside them against the Soviets the above commentary on the highly complex and contentious political elements of the Yalta Agreement has been shortened and simplified The full text can be studied in the US Library of Congress together with detailed minutes of every meeting – see Bibliography below.] Churchill was accompanied by the military Chiefs of Staff This author has been unable to determine the exact size of the British delegation but a later analysis in The National Archives calculated it was not far short of 600 through very senior officers – for example Air Chief Marshal Sir Alfred Earle attended as part of the staff of the War Cabinet Office – to hundreds of more junior officers and other ranks on tasks such as coding Many of the coders were WREN and WAAF officers Whereas a large contingent of lesser ranks went by sea on the SS Franconia which also served as a floating hotel at Sebastopol: only the most senior slept ashore in various villas which had been specially restored for the  occasion following the devastation caused by the German occupation and subsequent Soviet liberation of the Crimea [at that time all Ukraine was an integral part of the USSR] not all the journeys went without incident: on 1st February came down off Lampedusa.(a small island between Malta and Sicily) owing to a navigational error including four members of the War Office staff four of the Foreign Office and one of Scotland Yard (See Bibliography for complete list of casualties.) Accident card for Avro York MW 116 (RAF Museum) Personal recollections of those attending in any capacity give fascinating insights into  details of both work and social aspects: a luxury cruise liner serving dinners with wine; bright light of Malta where the war was by now far away in northern Italy The BBC’s ‘World War 2 Peoples’ Stories’ series has two worthy of study (listed in Bibliography below) Churchill used mainly two aircraft for his personal transport during the Second World War: a Liberator named ‘Commando’ and an Avro York named ‘Ascalon’ The Liberator was a Consolidated LB 30 (the mark type allocated to RAF Liberator bombers which were different in many details from the B24 bomber provided to the USAAF) It was later further modified by a fuselage extension and replacement of the standard twin-fin tail by a single fin of the type installed on the Privateer the Consolidated PB4Y-2 variant of the B 24 Commando with Privateer-style single fin (IWM CH 14142) The York was a passenger and freight derivative of the Lancaster using the same wing and tail (with a third fin as in the ill-fated Manchester) but with a large box-shaped fuselage; Churchill’s favourite York Churchill is being met by General Eisenhower (Australian War Museum 4085306) An example is his flight from Athens to RAF Aboukir (Alexandria Egypt) after the conclusion of the Yalta  conference he used an RAF Transport Command Douglas C 54 with an escort of USAAF Lockheed P 38 Lightnings and an RAF Air Sea Rescue Warwick complete with parachute-dropped lifeboat designed by the famous yachtsman RAF Aboukir magazine showing Churchill in the door of a C54 I was awoken by what I later knew as Spitfires on their finals to RAF Biggin Hill As a schoolboy I was captivated by the annual September Battle of Britain Days at Biggin Hill with a vast range of visiting aircraft including all three V-Bombers in gleaming anti-flash white Fast forward very many years past retirement I joined the RAF Museum London as a volunteer as a Vulcan and Cold War tour guide london@rafmuseum.org midlands@rafmuseum.org Sign up to receive the Newsletter to be kept up to date with current news and future events Panama proposals show incoming leader's focus on force over norms President-elect Donald Trump appears more interested in negotiating one-on-one with leaders like Russian President Vladimir Putin than coordinating with American allies TOKYO -- With days to go before his inauguration President-elect Donald Trump is already causing alarm with proposals to seize control of Greenland and the Panama Canal as well as his refusal to rule out the use of military or economic force to do so The response from international officials can roughly be divided into two How The Economist reported on the final year of the second world war “No motor-cars, refrigerators, pianos, vacuum cleaners, tennis or golf balls have been produced since 1942, and only very few radios, bicycles, watches and fountain pens.” “His talk was full of the German myth, the rebuilding of bigger and better German towns, the failure of the bourgeois world and the new dawn of National Socialist principles…He appears to have passed beyond even a remote interference in the strategy of the war and to be now little beyond the focus for the despairing nationalism of the German people.” “The landing on Luzon, the largest of the Philippine Islands, has begun. Great American forces have already established four bridgeheads, and although tough fighting lies ahead, there can be no doubt that the last phase in the recapture of the Philippines has begun and that the end is in sight.” “In face of this situation—a potential Greece of the Far East, on a vaster and even more damaging scale—what policy ought the allies to pursue? China’s allies suffer from this grave disadvantage, that foreign intervention is always unpopular, and interference, if pressed too far, may end in nothing but violent dislike for those who have done the interfering…It is therefore with the utmost patience and tact that the Allies must press on both sides in China the need for unity.” “France has been allowed to drift into a position from which it must be speedily rescued. The population of Paris and of many other towns is shivering from lack of coal; during the first week of this month daily deliveries to Paris averaged little more than 10,000 metric tons, a mere fraction of normal requirements and barely enough to meet the urgent need of hospitals, schools and essential public services.” “A complete veil of secrecy has fallen over Russian-occupied Europe. Odd hints and pieces of information point to some political tension here and there, and to some extent armed clashes between Russians and local forces. But secrecy has made it almost impossible to gauge the scope and importance of these disturbances. Whatever its policy in the occupied territories, the Russian Government is not handicapped by the exacting demands of democratic opinion and parliamentary control.” “It cannot be doubted, therefore, that during the last two years Upper Silesia has developed numerous new industries. Apart from new chemical plants, large factories for all kinds of war material have sprung up all over the area, usually being situated away from inhabited places and well camouflaged by forests and hills.” The biographer of Stalin argues that the great failure of the Yalta conference was its neglect of Asia “The destruction of German militarism and of the German General Staff appears for the first time beside the annihilation of Nazism. The punishment of war criminals is reaffirmed. For the first time it is officially suggested that the Germans can eventually win ‘a decent life…and a place in the comity of nations.’ The ambiguities concern the economic and territorial settlement.” “First of all, the Russian armies are decidedly superior in numbers. Once the break-through was achieved, the speed of the advance was accelerated by the dense network of roads. The rivers, lakes and swamps, common to eastern Germany and western Poland, were therefore no obstacle. Under these conditions, a mere stabilisation of the fighting on a new front along the Oder line cannot be more than a temporary halt, if it can be achieved at all.” Sources: United States government; Mapping The International System, 1886-2017: The CShapes 2.0 Dataset Sources: United States government; Mapping The International System, 1886-2017: The CShapes 2.0 Dataset Sources: United States government; Mapping The International System, The professor of history laments the struggle to remember the catastrophic firebombing of Tokyo “By hard labour and unparalleled sacrifices Russia has thus succeeded in winning the war, not only militarily on the battlefields, but also economically, in the factories and mines. In spite of the tremendous devastation in the western lands, it can now find the basis for post-war reconstruction in its newly-built factories in the east.” “The military tasks of the alliance are nearly fulfilled, at least in Europe, but the tasks of peacemaking for the most part still lie ahead. They are certain to put Allied diplomacy to a test much more severe than any of the strains of war. Victory over the common enemy inevitably tends to loosen the ties of solidarity that bind allies in the face of mortal danger. On the eve of victory, and even more on the morrow, differences of outlook and interest reassert themselves.” What to read about history's bloodiest conflict Hitler's death proves the destructive nature of dictatorship, argues the historian The historian considers the shock and horror of the liberation of Dachau, 80 years on “These are days of many emotions. Uppermost, quite naturally, is that of thankfulness that the long ordeal, for half the world at least, is over, and that the sins of blindness and indolence and complacency that encouraged the aggressor—sins from whose taint none is free—are purged at last. It is right that there should be a brief pause of rejoicing.”